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As this program builds up steam it will overwhelm the ability of Vietnam, Malaysia or
the Philippines to respond. China will continue to push and harasses in the
expectation that Southeast Asian states will back down to avoid confrontation.
States that do stand up to China can expect a spill over to other aspects of their
bilateral relations.
Q3. Can Vietnam dare to attack China’s vessels if they continue to harass Vietnam’s
boats? How can Vietnam protect itself if China continues to be very aggressive?
ANSWER: Using force only invites force in return. Vietnam will have to develop
tactics to interpose its ships between Chinese fishery vessels and Vietnamese
exploration vessels. Vietnam will need to think about increasing its capacity for
surveillance so it can anticipate what Chinese vessels are up to and respond
accordingly. But Vietnam must refrain from firing the first shot. This will only
provoke China and divert attention from China’s assertiveness in upholding what it
considers its sovereignty.
Vietnam is closer to where the incidents are occurring than China. In other words
Vietnam is operating on “interior lines of communication” whereas China is
operating on “extended lines of communication.” Vietnam can marshal greater force
– ships and airplanes – to protect its vessels. Vietnam can also place anti‐ship
missiles on its islands to deter Chinese vessels from operating in certain areas.
Q4. Do you think China can launch a quick attack to seize islands occupied by the
Philippines, or Vietnam? How will the US act if things happen?
ANSWER: It is inconceivable that China would forcibly seize an island presently
occupied by either Vietnam or the Philippines.
This would be a blatant act of aggression and would result in uniting the nations of
Southeast Asia and their supporters – the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, India ‐
against them.
China’s aggressive actions would only cause the issue to be internationalized in every
conceivable multilateral security forum in the Asia‐Pacific. This would be a huge set
back for China which promotes “a harmonious world.”
The United States has no treaty obligations with Vietnam and would not become
directly involved in defending Vietnam. The U.. would expect Vietnam to do that. But
the U.S. would use diplomatic means to respond to China.
Although the U.S. and the Philippines are treaty allies, the U.S. has argued it take no
side on territorial disputes and is ambiguous about how it would respond. The US‐
Philippines Mutual Security Treaty was signed before the Philippines occupied
islands in what it calls the Kalayaan Island Group and therefore the US says it ha no
obligation. But the new administration in Manila is more willing to take responsibility
for “territorial defence” and work with the U.S. U.S. policy is more likely to support
capacity building in the Armed Forces of the Philippines than taking a direct role. US
treaty obligations, however, would be severely tested if China attacked military
aircraft or military ships belonging to the Philippines.
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be careful not to overreact and provoke the Chinese. However Vietnam would help
its case if it filmed incidents of this nature, broadcast them on national TV, and made
copies available to the press and diplomatic corps. Vietnam needs to prepare a good
information strategy.
But this incident calls for greater efforts on Vietnam’s part to monitor its EEZ and to
provide escorts for exploration vessels. This means stepped up air patrols. Vietnam
might have to draw up a long‐term plan to acquire the ships and aircraft to monitor
it EEZ.
Q3. What could be China’s purpose by undertaking this action?
ANSWER: There are many institutional actors in China involved in South China Sea
policy. There are five organizations responsible for maritime security and safety
along China’s coast (Coast Guard, Maritime Safety Administration, Fisheries Law
Enforcement Command, Customs Service and most importantly the Marine
Surveillance Service under the Chinese Oceanic Administration). The People’s
Liberation Army Navy and local provincial officials are other actors.
There is a growing consensus among analysts that the South China Sea is being used
by several of these actors to advance their own interests. China’s leadership appears
divided on how to uphold sovereignty in the South China Sea and this indecision
allows more nationalistically inclined officials and agencies to take the lead.
There are multiple purposes behind Chinese actions. One is to constantly take action
to demonstrate that China has effective jurisdiction over the South China Sea. China
defends its position as if international law is on its side. China also hopes by taking
such an assertive stand it can divide ASEAN members. Some might feel it is best not
to confront China. Others may feel it is best to make concessions. And some
measures may feel that it is “Vietnam’s problem.” Finally China hopes to intimidate
countries into backing down. For example, China has exploited differences between
the Philippines and its ally the United States. The U.S. says it will come to the
Philippines aid if its military vessels are attacked but will not take a stand on
occupied islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines wants a commitment if one
of its islands is attacked.
Q4. Your further comments would be welcomed.
ANSWER: Many analysts, including myself, saw grounds for cautious optimism late
last year that some progress could be made on implementing confidence building
measures in the DOC. China’s actions have served to put the South China Sea back
on the international agenda at the forthcoming Shangri‐la Dialogue and at ASEAN
and ARF meetings in mid‐year. Vietnam can look to Indonesia’s leadership over the
next six months but China is playing a waiting game until Cambodia – then Brunei
and Myanmar – assume the ASEAN Chair.