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some remarks on critics and criticism

Richard Steele: Critic as nuisance.

"I am just come hither [to my Apartment] at Ten at Night, and have ever since Six been in the most
celebrated, tho' most nauseous, Company in Town: The two Leaders of the Society were a Critick and a
Wit. These two Gentlemen are great Opponents upon all Occasions, not discerning that they are the
nearest each other in Temper and Talents of any two Classes of Men in the World; for to profess
Judgment, and to profess Wit, both arise from the same Failure, which is Want of Judgment. The
Poverty of the Critick this Way proceeds from the Abuse of his Faculty; that of the Wit from the Neglect
of it. It's a particular Observation I have always made, That of all Mortals, a Critick is the silliest; for by
inuring himself to examine all Things, whether they are of Consequence or not, he never looks upon any
Thing but with a Design of passing Sentence upon it; by which means, he is never a Companion, but
always a Censor. This makes him earnest upon Trifles; and dispute on the most indifferent Occasions
with Vehemence. If he offers to speak or write, that talent which should approve the Work of the other
Faculties, prevents their operation. He comes upon Action in Armour; but without Weapons: He stands
in Safety; but can gain no Glory.*…+ A thorough Critick is a Sort of Puritan in the polite World. *…+ so the
Critick is never safe in his Speech or Writing, without he has among the celebrated Writers an Authority
for the Truth of his Sentence."

Richard Steele [orig. 1709] (1988) 'A critick and a wit'. In Angus Ross [ed.] Richard Steele and Joseph Addison: Selections from The Tatler and The Spectator, London:
Penguin. 88-9.

Matthew Arnold: Curiosity and criticism.

"It is noticeable that the word curiosity, which in other languages is used in a good sense, to mean, as a
high and fine quality of man's nature, just this disinterested love of a free play of the mind on all
subjects, for its own sake, - it is noticeable, I say, that this word has in our language no sense of the kind,
no sense but a rather bad and disparaging one. But criticism, real criticism, is essentially this exercise of
this very quality. It obeys an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that is known and thought in
the world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and to value knowledge and
thought as they approach this best, without the intrusion of any other considerations whatever."

Matthew Arnold [orig. 1884] (1993) 'The Function of Criticism'. In Stefan Collini [ed.] Arnold: Culture and Anarchy and other writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 35-6.

Stanley Rosen: Criticism and modernity.

"The expression critical thinking is charged with a heavy burden of historical baggage. It was not so long
ago that modernists were referring to theirs as an age of criticism, thus striking, perhaps unconsciously,
a note of decayed Kantianism. The role of the critic, as is evident from the etymology of the term, is to
discriminate between better and worse. The etymology is Greek, but there is a modern pedigree as well,
going back to Milton, who says in the Areopagitica that 'reason is but choosing.' For the ancient as well
as for the early modern, choice is rational if one chooses well. The tangled history of modernity has
unfortunately tended to result in a suppression of the judgement of better and worse from the act of
judgement, which culminates in our ostensibly postmodern age in the mere expression of difference.
Even further, it is now not the reader but the text that acts as critic, which is accordingly transformed
into ontological excitation. Criticism is no longer rational choice but what might be called uncritical
crisis."

Stanley Rosen (1992) 'Postmodernism and the Possibility of Critical Reasoning'. In Richard A. Talaska [ed.] Critical Reasoning in Contemporary Culture, Albany: SUNY
Press. 231.

Michel Foucault: On the nature of critique.

"A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on
what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted
practices are based.

We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social as the only instance of the real and stop
regarding that essential element in human life and human relations - I mean thought - as so much wind.
Thought does exist, both beyond and before systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is
often hidden but always drives everyday behaviours. There is always a little thought occurring even in
the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits.

Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as
obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To
do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy.

Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly indispensable for any
transformation. For a transformation that would remain within the same mode of thought, a
transformation that would only be a certain way of better adjusting the same thought to the reality of
things would only be a superficial transformation.

On the other hand, as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been
thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible.

So there is not a time for criticism and a time for transformation; there are not those who have to do
criticism and those who have to transform, those who are confined within an inaccessible radicality and
those who are obliged to make the necessary concessions to reality. As a matter of fact, I believe that
the work of deep transformation can be done in the open and always turbulent atmosphere of a
continuous criticism."

Michel Foucault (2000) 'So Is It Important To Think?' In James D. Faubion [ed.] Robert Hurley et al [trans.] Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume Three,
London: Penguin. 456-7.

Jurgen Habermas: On Foucault's conception of critique.

"Foucault cannot adequately deal with the persistent problems that come up in connection with an
interpretation approach to the object domain, a self-referential denial of universal validity claims, and a
normative justification of critique."

Jurgen Habermas (1987) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, Frederick Lawrence [trans.] Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 286.

Seyla Benhabib: On social criticism.


"Certainly, a normative theory, and in particular a critical social theory, cannot take the aspirations of
any social actors at face value and fit its critical criteria to meet the demands of a particular social
movement. Commitment to social transformation and yet a certain critical distance, even from the
demands of those with whom one identifies, are essential to the vocation of the theorist as social critic."

Seyla Benhabib (1992) 'Models of Public Space.' In Craig Calhoun [ed.] Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge MA: MIT. 92-3.

Lillian S. Robinson: Ideological criticism.

"An ideological critic has three fundamental tasks: to identify a worthwhile subject, to determine what
to say about it, and to communicate her views. Reduced to such generalities, the points hardly seem
worth making at all, for the responsibility of the critic concerned with social issues does not appear very
different from that of any other critic. Much depends on how those categories are interpreted, and
whether one accepts one's choice of topic, one's literary argument, and one's mode of expression as
political acts, with political roots and political consequences. Unless it is based on such awareness and
shaped accordingly, ideological criticism can be as sterile as academic criticism, or, even worse, can
become an unintentional parody of it."

Lillian S. Robinson (1978) 'The Critical Task'. In Sex, Class & Culture, New York and London: Methuen. 47.

Giorgio Agamben: On Lautréamont's dictum.

"'Judgements on poetry are worth more than poetry.' We do not yet think seriously enough about the
meaning of aesthetic judgement: how could we take Lautréamont's sentence seriously? *…+ the work of
art is no longer, for modern man, the concrete appearance of the divine, which causes either ecstasy or
sacred terror in the soul, but a privileged occasion to exercise his critical taste, that judgement on art
which, if it is not actually worth more than art itself for us, certainly addresses a need that is at least as
essential."

Giorgio Agamben (1999) 'Les jugements sur la poésie ont plus de valeur que la poésie'. In Georgia Albert [trans.] The Man Without Content, Stanford CA: Stanford
University Press. 40-1.

Donald Kuspit: Creativity and criticality.

"[Creativity] is not a guarantee of criticality, and criticality is ultimately more important in life than
creativity. Criticality is a major ego function, and the only source of adult autonomy and independence,
whereas any dependent child, with a limited ego, can be creative. T.S. Eliot thought that genuine
creativity was an act of criticality, but that was a modernist idea that is no longer necessarily—indeed,
hardly—the case in postmodernity. One of the modernist claims—articulated particularly by Duchamp
and Beuys—is that everyone can be creative. That is, creativity is not the prerogative of the artist, but a
potential of every human being, even if people who are actually creative are regarded as superior to
those who are not. But what postmodernist art makes clear is that the creative everyman does not
necessarily use his creativity critically. The issue is not simply to be creative, but to use one’s creativity in
the service of critical consciousness. One cannot assume that it automatically will be. Indeed, I want to
argue that it is harder to develop critical consciousness—I think, incidentally, that it is what
psychoanalysis does, with respect to psychic but also social reality—than to be creative. Indeed,
creativity is all over the place these days, if to no critical purpose."
Donald Kuspit (1996) 'Author’s Comments on The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist'.

Stanley Aronowitz: Critic as star.

"[T]he critic, rather than the artist, has become the subject of the cultural sphere in the past two
decades. The development of both the new theory in [America] and the structuralist and
poststructuralist schools in Europe coincides with a series of tendencies in the modern world that have
produced changes in the relation of high culture, mass culture, and popular culture. Among the most
important of these is the changing status of high culture in the light of the hegemonic character of the
culture industry in Western countries.

[...] Much of that which we might call high art depends on its audience and its context - museums,
reviews in little but highly regarded magazines, chamber music halls, and of course, the university - in
short, the haunts of critics and "artist"-critics whose work merges. The critic's appraisal of the work of
art can certainly propel it to stardom or assign it to obscurity. But there is little in the work of art that
reveals its aesthetic value that can be distinguished from its exchange value. The business of judgement,
whose legitimacy depends upon its bureaucratic parameters and its market location, has become the
cornerstone of high culture itself. In the bargain, the critic has become a mass cultural figure. Indirectly,
the critic is a central investment counsellor who predicts the exchange value. But here prediction may
be a misnomer, since the critical act produces exchange value or allows the work of art to remain merely
a use value. The result of this is that the critical work both produces value and becomes a work of art.
The conjuncture means that the critic-author has become a star.

The emergence of the critic as the central figure in artistic production is linked in diverse ways to several
cultural developments. Coincident with one another in the early twentieth-century, and all linked in one
way or another with the emergence of mass audience culture, were the loss of character complexity in
the arts, the elimination of subjectivity (the character's or the author's), the emergence of an intense
literalism, and, perhaps predictably, the loss of an audience for high art. Among the disintegrations that
these developments have brought with them, it is perhaps understandable that the persons offering
explanations of them, or those appearing to do so, should assume as much or greater importance than
the creators themselves."

Stanley Aronowitz (1994) Dead Artists, Live Theories and other cultural problems. London and New York: Routledge. 49-51.

Theodor Adorno: On criticism.

"To anyone in the habit of thinking with his ears, the words 'cultural critic' (Kulturkritik) must have an
offensive ring, not merely because, like 'automobile', they are pieced together from Latin and Greek.
The words recall a flagrant contradiction. The cultural critic is not happy with civilisation, to which alone
he owes his discontent. He speaks as if he represented either unadulterated nature or a higher historical
stage. Yet he is necessarily of the same essence as that to which he fancies himself superior. The
insufficiency of the subject - criticised by Hegel in his apology for the status quo - which in its
contingency and narrowness passes judgement on the might of the existent, becomes intolerable when
the subject itself is mediated down to its innermost make-up by the notion to which it opposes itself as
independent and sovereign. But what makes the content of cultural criticism inappropriate is not so
much lack of respect for that which is criticised as the dazzled and arrogant recognition which criticism
surreptitiously confers on culture. The cultural critic can hardly avoid the imputation that he has the
culture that culture lacks. His vanity aids that of culture: even in the accusing gesture, the critic clings to
the notion of culture, isolated, unquestioned, dogmatic. He shifts the attack. Where there is despair and
measureless misery, he sees only spiritual phenomena, the state of man's consciousness, the decline of
norms. By insisting on this, criticism is tempted to forget the unutterable, instead of striving, however
impotently, so that man may be spared.

The position of the cultural critic, by virtue of its difference from the prevailing disorder, enables him to
go beyond it theoretically, although often enough he merely falls behind."

Theodor Adorno (2000) 'Cultural Criticism and Society'. In Brian O'Connor [ed.] The Adorno Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. 196.

"The assumption that thought profits from the decay of the emotions, or even that it remains
unaffected, is itself an expression of the process of stupefaction. The social division of labour recoils on
man, however much it may expedite the task exacted from him. The faculties, having developed through
interaction, atrophy once they are severed from each other. *…+ Is not memory inseparable from love,
which seeks to preserve what yet must pass away? Is not each stirring of fantasy engendered by desire
which, in displacing the elements of what exists, transcends it without betrayal? Is not indeed the
simplest perception not shaped by fear of the thing perceived, or desire for it? It is true that the
objective meaning of knowledge has, with the objectification of the world, become progressively
detached from the underlying impulses; it is equally true that knowledge breaks down where its effort
of objectification remains under the sway of desire. But if the impulses are not at once preserved and
surpassed in the thought which has escaped their sway, then there will be no knowledge at all, and the
thought that murders the wish that fathered it will be overtaken by the revenge of stupidity *…+ Fantasy
alone *…+ can establish that relation between objects which is the irrevocable source of all judgement:
should fantasy be driven out, judgement too, the real act of knowledge, is exorcised. *…+ Once the last
trace of emotion has been eradicated, nothing remains of thought but absolute tautology."

Theodor Adorno (1978) Minima Moralia, E.F.N. Jephcott [trans.] London: Verso. 122-3.

John Michael: Criticism and the ghost of Adorno.

"What many in cultural studies feel they must reject is a certain model of intellectual work, a certain
mode of critical commentary, for which Adorno has become the preferred example.

This model of intellectual work (the special insight and knowledge that the critical theorist claims, the
power and elitism inherent in his or her interpretations of cultural phenomena, the projection of
preferences particular to intellectuals as universal values) is not easily rejected as many critics in cultural
studies, especially the most avowedly populist, have imagined it would be. Today's cultural intellectuals
prefer to masquerade as fans, but if you were to look at them closely, you might find them more
proximate to Adorno than either they or he would find comfortable to admit, as if the ghost of Adorno
had materialized beside them, a balding, portly, middle-aged, middle-class, Middle European mandarin
with pierced nipples and an electric bass. The Frankfurt School's ghostly presence, the figure of the
critical intellectual with all its problems, is not easy to escape.

The Frankfurt School's most haunting legacy may be its assumption of the critic's autonomous position,
a position from which the mystifications of contemporary culture could be disenchanted and its dupes
and victims set free."

John Michael (2000) Anxious Intellects: Academic Professionals, Public Intellectuals, and Enlightenment Values, Durham: Duke University Press, 112.
Pierre Bourdieu: On reflexivity.

"Parable or paradigm, discourse reflecting upon itself in the very act of discourse, the lecture on the
lecture would at least have the virtue of reminding us of one of the most fundamental properties of
sociology as I conceive it: every proposition that this science sets forth can and ought to apply to the
subject who produces it. It is when he or she fails to introduce this objectivizing, and therefore critical,
distance that the sociologist lends support to those who see in him a kind of terrorist inquisitor,
available for all operations of symbolic policing."

Pierre Bourdieu (1990) 'Lecture on the Lecture'. In Matthew Adamson [trans.] In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Cambridge: Polity. 177-8.

Antonio Gramsci: Multiple criticisms.

"*…+ so there is no need to be worried about the multiplicity of criticisms: indeed the multiplicity of
criticisms is proof that one is on the right road. When on the other hand, the tenor of the criticisms is
uniform, it is something that needs thinking about: 1) because it may point to a real weakness; 2)
because one may have been mistaken about *…+ the readership being addressed, and therefore be
working in a void, 'for eternity'."

Antonio Gramsci (1985) 'Types of Periodical:[Critical information]'. In David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith [eds.] Selections from Cultural Writings, London:
Lawrence and Wishart. 403.

Zygmunt Bauman: Criticism without foundations.

"Critical reflection is one human activity that - very much like life itself - does not have foundations but
does not need them either, and so feels no need to justify itself, let alone apologise, when asked
questions from utility or instrumentality - questions like 'On what authority?', 'What for?' or 'For the
sake of what?'

Critical reflection is guided by the need to scrutinize the de jure validity of human institutions and
significations, but as much as it is devoid of foundations other than its own impetus it also lacks a point
of destination. It is not foreclosed (it refuses to be foreclosed) by either a preceding brief or a telos given
before the take-off point. It builds and dismantles its own foundations and targets as it goes."

Zygmunt Bauman (1999) In Search of Politics, Cambridge: Polity. 83-4.

Charles Harvey: The possibility and actuality of criticism.

"What must human being be like in order to engage in social criticism? One way to answer this question
is to say that human being must be just like it is, because in almost all cases of being human the human
being engages, to some greater or lesser extent, in social criticism: it complains, it protests, it strikes, it
critiques. So, say what human being is like, and that answers the initial question.

This response is, of course, too simple. But it does make a point philosophers should not forget, namely,
that social criticism is a relatively commonplace actuality; hence it is surely a possibility. Part of the task
of the social philosopher, then, is to describe what it is about human being that makes this actual state
of affairs a possible one."
Charles Harvey (1990) "Husserl's Complex Concept of the Self and the Possibility of Social Criticism." In Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott and P. Holley Roberts [eds.]
Crises in Continental Philosophy, New York: SUNY Press. 47-56.

Barbara Johnson: On critical difference.

"In a sense, it could be said that to make a critical difference is the object of all criticism as such. The
very word 'criticism' comes from the Greek verb 'krinein', 'to separate or choose', that is to differentiate.
The critic not only seeks to establish standards for evaluating the differences between texts, but also
tries to perceive something uniquely different within each text he reads and in so doing to establish his
own individual difference from other critics."

Barbara Johnson (1981) "The Critical Difference: Balzac's 'Sarrasine' and Barthes's 'S/Z'". In Robert Young [ed.] Untying The Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, London &
New York: RKP. 165-6.

Hans-Georg Gadamer: Authority and criticism.

"Dogmatic freedom, we may say, is the desire for control which brings with it a false sense of certitude.
Genuine freedom, on the other hand, is the capacity to criticize, and this capacity to criticize includes
and is a precondition both of our own recognition of the superior authority of others and of others'
recognition of our own authority. There is, in truth, no real opposition between authority and critical
freedom but, rather, a deep inner interconnection. Critical freedom is the freedom to criticize, and the
most difficult form of criticism is clearly self-criticism. The distinguishing character of human beings, the
ability to recognise our own limits, is based on this. It is the foundation of all genuine authority. The
most immediate expression of self-criticism is our ability to ask questions. Every posing of a question is
an admission of ignorance and, in so far as it is directed towards someone else, a recognition that they
may possess superior knowledge.

[...] Anyone who is tempted to play on the institutional force of their authority rather than on genuine
argument is always in danger of speaking in an authoritarian as opposed to an authoritative manner. It
seems to me the best way of preserving the proper use of one's authority lies in the critical freedom to
make mistakes on occasion and to be able to recognize this fact."

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1996) "Authority and Critical Freedom". In The Enigma of Health, Cambridge: Polity Press. 123-4.

Gerry Smyth: Decolonisation and criticism.

"The reasons for the links between colonialism and criticism lie in their shared roots in modern
European thought. The concept of criticism began to perform important functions in the production and
reproduction of certain characteristic modern modes of thought in Europe from the late seventeenth
century. But it was during the eighteenth century that the principle of critique became an area of central
concern for European cultural and philosophical thought, attracting interventions from many leading
thinkers and writers. Thomas Docherty points to the origins of modern criticism in the Enlightenment
and its objective to emancipate humankind 'from myth and superstition through the progressive
operations of a critical reason'. Criticism was one of the principal mechanisms through which the
rational, autonomous subject of Enlightenment reproduced himself as 'an agent of history rather than
its victim'. Evolving from its classical roots in law, medicine and philology, critique emerged as the
ultimate articulation of reason in an Age of Reason, the mode of discourse by which the great questions
regarding humankind's existence could be posed and, hopefully, answered.
[C]riticism betrayed its Enlightenment roots in its radically ambivalent character. For at the same time as
it was emerging as an important element of rationalist discourse, criticism's own status was coming into
question, and thus was laid the basis for the constant crisis which has attended the discourse ever since.
This crisis manifested itself as a stand-off between [...] 'two different modes of critical analysis'. The first
exemplified by Kant, is a form of 'institutional' critique which attempts to discover 'the invariant
conditions that govern the existence of any phenomenon. It subjects the actual to relentless questioning
in order to discover sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise'. The second, exemplified by
Hegel, is a form of 'transformative' critique [...] modern criticism is from its inception working to
different agendas as an agent of either Kantian or Hegelian narratives."

Gerry Smyth (1998) Decolonisation and Criticism: The Construction of Irish Literature, London: Pluto Press. 40-1.

"Spectre-like, 'the function of criticism' has returned to haunt modern intellectual debate. Systematically
repressed in the Western cultural consciousness, there are in fact pressing cultural and political reasons
for this return. Criticism, critique, commentary: these and related terms need to be salvaged from the
hierarchical structures in which they have been traditionally positioned and seen instead as elements of
the discourse in which both colonial and decolonising strategies gain their force and their coherence.
Ever since Plato decided to expel the imaginative writer from his ideal state, criticism's self-professed
secondary and revelatory role has masked a much more active and engaged agenda. The philosopher's
concern in The Republic was with the health and survival of the state; to those ends, 'bad' art was to be
censored, 'good' art to be tolerated, and a critical discourse invented to enable those in power to tell
one from the other. Thus, at the dawn of Western philosophy we find criticism performing unashamed
ideological tasks as well as being appointed the moral guardian and social conscience of a certain kind of
imagined community.

Criticism's inherent political dimension has been maintained and enhanced during the modern era."

Gerry Smyth (1998) Decolonisation and Criticism: The Construction of Irish Literature, London: Pluto Press. 50-1.

Octavio Paz: Modernity, time and criticism.

"The modern era began as a criticism of all mythologies, not excluding the Christian one. The latter fact
is not surprising: Christianity shattered the circular time of Greco-Roman antiquity and postulated a
rectilinear, finite time, with a beginning and an end: the Fall and the Last judgement. Modern time is the
offspring of Christian time. The offspring and the negation: it is an irreversible time that follows a
straight line, but it lacks a beginning and will have no end; it has not been created, and it will not be
destroyed. Its protagonist is not the fallen soul but the evolution of the human species, and its real
name is history. Modernity is grounded in a twofold paradox. On the one hand, meaning resides neither
in the past nor in eternity but in the future, so that history is also called progress. On the other hand,
time does not have a foundation in any divine revelation or immutable principle; we conceive of it as a
process that continually negates itself and thus transforms itself. Time is grounded in the criticism of
itself, its constant division and separation; its form of manifestation is not the repetition of an eternal
truth or of an archetype: its substance is change. Or rather, our time lacks substance; what's more, its
action is the criticism of any and every substantialism. Thus Revolution takes the place of Redemption. A
new time is a new mythology: the great creations of modernity, from Cervantes to Joyce and from
Velázquez to Marcel Duchamp, are different versions of the myth of criticism.

Technology today makes criticism an even vaster enterprise, since it has undertaken to criticize criticism
itself and its idea of time."

Octavio Paz (1987) "The New Analogy: Poetry and Technology". In Helen Lane [ed.] Convergences: Essays on Art and Literature, London: Bloomsbury. 121-2.
Helen E. Longino: Scientific objectivity and criticism.

"[T]he logical publicity of scientific understanding and subject matter makes them and hence the
authority to criticize their articulation accessible to all. It should be said that these constitute necesary
but not sufficient conditions for the possibility of criticism [...] it is the possibility of intersubjective
criticism, at any rate, that permits objectivity in spite of the context dependence of evidential reasoning.
[...]

There are a number of ways to criticize a hypothesis. For the sake of convenience we can divide these
into evidential and conceptual criticism to reflect the distinction between criticism proceeding on the
basis of experimental and observational concerns and that proceeding on the basis of theoretical and
metatheoretical concerns.[...]

I have argued both that criticism from alternative points of view is required for objectivity and the
subjection of hypotheses and evidential reasoning to critical scrutiny is what limits the intrusion of
individual subjective preference into scientific knowledge. [...] The maintenance of dialogue is itself a
social process and can be more or less fully realized. Objectivity therefore, turns out to be a matter of
degree. A method of inquiry is objectivist to the degree that it permits transformative criticism. Its
objectivity consists not just in the inclusion of intersubjective criticism but in the degree to which both
its procedures and its results are responsive to the kinds of criticism described. I've argued that method
must, therefore, be understood as a collection of social, rather than individual, processes, so the issue is
the extent to which a scientific community maintains critical dialogue. Scientific communities will be
objective to the degree that they satisfy four criteria necessary for achieving the transformative
dimension of critical discourse: (1) there must be recognized avenues for the criticism of evidence, of
methods, and of assumptions and reasoning; (2) there must exist shared standards that critics can
invoke; (3) the community as a whole must be responsive to such criticism; (4) intellectual authority
must be shard equally among qualified practitioners."

Helen E. Longino (1990) "Values and Objectivity". In Martin Curd and J.A.Cover [eds.] (1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, New York and London:
W.W.Norton & Co. 177-81.

"The respect in which science is objective, on this view, is one that it shares with other modes of inquiry,
disciplines such as literary or art criticism and philosophy."

Helen E. Longino (1990) "Values and Objectivity". In Martin Curd and J.A.Cover [eds.] (1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, New York and London:
W.W.Norton & Co. 180.

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