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exploration vessels and naval/air authorities with a view to providing escorts and/or
air cover when Chinese surveillance vessels threaten its civilian exploration vessels.
Q4. Can Vietnam expect help from ASEAN to solve the situation?
ANSWER: ASEAN and China last year revived the moribund Joint Working Group to
Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The
DOC was signed by China and ASEAN in 2002 but never implemented. ASEAN is
pressing China for a more authoritative code of conduct. By all accounts negotiations
have stalled. Vietnam should join with the Philippines and other littoral states to
press China to make progress on this issue. All ASEAN can do is try to work out
acceptable behaviour and suggest confidence building measures. The conflict over
territorial and sovereignty claims can only be settled by the states directly involved
or, with their agreement, international arbitration.
Q5. Can Vietnam get help from US?
ANSWER: The United States does not take sides in the matter of conflicting territorial
claims and is unlikely to become directly involved in what is a bilateral matter
between China and Vietnam. The United States is already on record as offering to
facilitate a settlement of conflicting disputes. This has been rejected by China as
outside interference. The US Ambassador to the Philippines has called for the parties
to exercise restraint and settle their matter peacefully.
The U.S. will defend the right of safety and freedom of navigation in international
waters. But China’s actions have not threatened these rights. The U.S. will also
oppose any one country from establishing hegemony over the South China Sea.
Vietnam cannot really expect help from the United States. It is not a treaty ally, like
the Philippines, and it is not a strategic partner, like Singapore. Although Vietnam
has signalled it is willing to step up defence cooperation with the United States the
U.S. will be wary of being entrapped in a bilateral dispute. Vietnam is paying the
price for deferring to China for so long and holding back on developing defence ties
with the United States. If these ties had developed over the last decade or so
Vietnam would be in a better position to work with the U.S. on this matter.
Q6. If the situation really deteriorates (ie war), what or where should the
Vietnamese government look at?
ANSWER: If the situation in the South China Sea deteriorates to the extent that
armed hostilities erupt Vietnam can only look to itself in the first instance to defend
its interests. Any armed conflict would immediately attract the attention of ASEAN
and the international community. Both parties would come under immense pressure
to end hostilities. If china uses forcer its prestige would suffer, its political influence
would decline, and key regional states would move closer to the U.S. and its allies.
Q7. What do Vietnamese people think of their government in dealing with China in
South China Sea and common border?
ANSWER: The South China Sea is a highly emotive issue in Vietnam. Since late 2007
anti‐Chinese nationalist sentiments have flared over China’s creation of the Sansha
District (with administrative responsibility over the Paracels, Spratlys and
Macclesfield Bank) and bauxite mining. The commercial interests of the coastal
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fishing community have been seriously affected. Some sections of the educated elite
advocate a stronger government response to China. Anti‐sentiment has emerged in
sections of the media and by bloggers, but this has generally been censored and/or
repressed. Public sentiment definitely puts pressure on the government to take a
harder line in resisting China.
Q8. What do Vietnamese people think of their government’s handling of relations
with China in general?
Vietnam and China normalised relations in 1991. Since then the two governments
and communist parties have developed a dense network of relations. The land
border has been demarcated and turned from a zone of confrontation into a zone of
cooperation. Cross‐border trade flourishes to the benefit of the Vietnamese
consumer. The Gulf of Tonkin has been delimited and there is cooperation over
fisheries. The two governments continue to hold expert discussions over the waters
forming the Gulf of Tonkin and the principles on the settlement of maritime
disputes. The Vietnamese people realise that from time immemorial China is their
neighbour and they must be practical in adjusting to the reality that you cannot
choose your neighbours.
But there are a number of issues that cause concern: the huge U.S. $13 billion trade
deficit to China, the migration of illegal Chinese workers into Vietnam, Chinese
investment and investment practices (bauxite and environmental issues), Chinese
harassment of Vietnamese fishermen, and China’s military modernization and
transformation. It is difficult to generalize about what the Vietnamese people think
of their government’s handling of relations with China because there are no public
opinion polls, the media is censored and anti‐China public demonstrations are
banned. It is clear that a large section of the educated public, and the coastal fishing
community, would like to see their government be more assertive in standing up to
China. Some of Vietnam’s educated elite would like to see a build‐up of the navy so
Vietnam can enforce its sovereignty claims. The government has responded, in part,
by permitting more information about China relations appear in the media. But
Vietnam’s relations with China must be handled in a deft diplomatic manner and not
be influenced by the passions of the moment.