Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
story of the historical use of armor in Low-lnten- casualties, problems associated with evacuating
sity Conflict with his examination of the U.S. ex- casualties do not rise to the surface. In "Medical
perience in Vietnam. With this issue, he con- Evacuation," CW3 William L. Tozier explains
cludes the two-patter with a look at Soviet opera- what problems he encountered in operating a
tions during the eight-year-oldwar in Afghanis- battalion aid station when playing realistic casual-
tan. Did the Soviets capitalize on our successes ty evacuation. Many of his vehicles were in the
in Vietnam, and did they learn from our mis- hands of others, and first aid was a problem.
takes? What do we know now about Armor in This is an eye-opener.
LIC, the most likely battle scenario? Captain Ed Smith says that well-rehearsed bat-
Another likely scenario for future battle, and one tle drills are the hallmark of a good unit. In
for which we do little training, is combat in and "Team Battle Drills: Translating Doctrine Into
near citiis. In "Armor Takes Cologne," Major Action," he shows us how to refine and hone
John M. House takes us along with the 3d Ar- responses to contact, indirect fire, and air attack.
mored Division on its mission to take the major He also discusses the fine points of conducting
city of Cologne early in 1945. This was a mission a hasty attack, hasty defense, and hasty breach.
for which armored divisions were not designed, Precious time is saved when a unit goes into its
and one that flew in the face of the doctrine of drill immediately, rather than waiting to think
the day. about what to do next.
In an associated story, Captain Andrew F.
DeMario asks "When Will We Ever Learn?'.
One final word about something that is a little
Europe is covered with forests and villages and
out of the realm of our usual subject matter, but
towns of various size. Fighting in these environs
is as equally important as anything else we do to
will be the rule, not the exception. Because we
keep our country strong. In November, we select
do not train for heavy combat in these condi-
our country's leadership at every level of govern-
tions, the author wonders if we are losing sight of
ment. We in uniform usually find ourselves
the realities of armored offensive warfare.
among the ignored, but it doesn't have to be
Deception is a combat multiplier. A good decep-
that way. Our Constitution makes us subordinate
tion plan and operation can move enemy forces
to our civilian leadership, but we are equal to
out of the way or in the wrong direction, force
any citizen when it is time to say who gets the
the enemy to throw his reserves into the pot in
jobs. Make your voice heard. Register and vote.
the wrong place and time, force the enemy to
PJC
waste ammunition and other assets, and reap
other benefits for the commander who pays atten-
tion to deception. In "Voices in the Sand: Decep- Mark Your Calendars: The 1989
tion Operations at the NTC," Captain George L. Armor Conference will take place at
Reed outlines how to confuse and deceive the Fort Knox, 8-12 May 1989.
enemy with a little sleight of hand.
~ ~~~~
Editor-in-Chief
MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY FEATURES
given to ARMOR and to the author, except Second-class official mall postage paid at For( Knox. KY. and addHlonal mslllng flees.
where copyright is indicated. Postmaster: Send address changes to EdHor. ARMOR. A T W ATSB-MAG. Fort Knox. W
40121.
MG Thomas H. Tait
Commanding General
So You Want To Command a Battalion...
U S . Army Armor Center
When promotion or command battalion command. This is not ter-
selection board results are an- ribly important because we did a lot
nounced, the Armor Center of dumb things in Vietnam, and The number of companies com-
Proponency Office, in concert with many of the lessons learned simply manded is probably not a dis-
Armor Branch, immediately do not apply to today's high speed, criminator; however, if you are a su-
analyzes them. These results are use- high technology, heavy combat. perior company commander, you
ful to the branch and to the center may very well be selected to com-
when we advise officers about their 0There were a number of repeti- mand the headquarters element of
possibilities for promotion, com- tive company commanders, and the your battaliodsquadron or brigade.
mand selection, and, in the case of length of time spent in command The real discriminator is serving as
lieutenants, retention. was interesting. The average time in a battalion S3 or XO. It is readily
first command was 18 months. The evident in Armor that if you haven't
The 1988 Battalion Command number selected for second com- done so, your chances for battalion
Selection Board results went mand was 13 (37 percent); and the command selection are poor at best.
through this rigorous process. The average time in second command
records of the 35 selectees were was 18 months. Four were selected The next question is how do 1 get
screened, and the results, to those for third command (11 percent). to serve in a battalion as a major?
of us who have been involved with The average time in third command First, ensure that Armor Branch
boards for some time, were not was 24 months. knows your desires. Then, if as-
surprising. In fact, they cor- signed to USAREUR or a large in-
roborated what we knew from past 0All had served or were serving stallation like Fort Hood, it is up to
experience. For instance, ap- as a battaliodsquadron S3 or XO. you to make every effort to get to a
proximately one year ago we looked The average time in eithcr position battalion. As a personal experience,
at the records of 104 serving bat- was 15 months. when commanding the 1st Indepen-
talion commanders and battalion dent Cavalry Brigade of the 8th Im-
command designees and found that 0 A smaller number served as perial Division in Mannheim (1979-
102 served as battalion S-3s or XOs brigadehegiment S3s or XOs (14 1981) I had difficulty getting Armor
and the other two served as brigade percent and 17 percent, respective- majors into the tank battalions and
s-3s. ly). the cavalry squadron. There were
plenty of them in Heidelberg, but
This is the 1988 Battalion Com- 0All were CSrGSC graduates (a they were too comfortable or too im-
mand Selectee Profile: requirement for promotion to LTC portant. My advice is to seek the
0 The predominant year group - nothing surprising here). troop assignments if you want to be
was 1971, (57 percent), followed by a warrior leader. We have all kinds
1972 (23 percent). Selections were 0 Interestingly, 87 percent of of opportunities to track in alter-
also made from year groups '68, '70, those selected had a master's de- nate specialties. We need warriors
and '73. It is evident that we are gree or better. However, the board in a command track - our soldiers
selecting younger officers for com- did not consider this a discriminator. deserve that.
mand. Therefore, it is reasonable to
speculate that the predominant year 001 the 35 selected, eight had After all, warfiglltriiig is riot an
groups for next year's selectees (it either Joint Professional Military amateur sport!!
will be a larger list) will be 1972 and Education (JPME) or had served in
1973. a joint assignment. Treat 'Em Rough!
0 There were four Vietnam There are certain truths: one must
veterans selected - 11 percent. command well in order to be
There are very few combat-ex- promoted to major and subsequent (CPT Fierko, Ofice of the Chief of
perienced officers in the queue for selection for battalion command. Annor, provided statistics.)
Although armor was born on the and smashing. In a previous article, tains as warfare under special condi-
high intensity battlefield, both super- 1 examined the role of armor in tions, they have no specific doctrine
powers have employed mechanized Vietnam using these functions to for fighting guerrillas in moun-
forces in low intensity conflict. At analyze the doctrine for armor in tainous terrain. Apparently, they
lirst, the U.S. Army expected no LIC. Now, I propose to do the same believe that tactics suitable for com-
role for armor in Vietnam, but the for the Soviet employment of armor batting regular forces will work
employment of mechanized forces in Afghanistan and then suggest the equally as well against guerrillas.
grew steadily throughout the con- implications for armor doctrine in The key elcments in their offensive
flict (see July-August 1988 LIC. doctrine for mountain warpare are
ARMOR). In contrast, the Soviets their unshakeable faith in combined
overrated the role of armor in Af- The first Soviet postwar (WWII) arms and the importance of
ghanistan. experience in low intensity conflict mechanized forces.
began on 24 December 1979 when
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Af- the Rcd Army invaded Afghanistan. Soviet doctrine forsees an impor-
ghanistan, in a number of articles In a well-planned operation, an air- tant role for all the arms of service
which discussed mountain warfare, borne division seized the capital at in mountain warfare. Recognizing
several military authors writing in Kabul, while two motorized rille the difficulty of massing artillery
Voenrtvi Vestrtik confidently asserted divisions attacked from across the fires and "the limited accuracy of ar-
that tanks could operate "jointly Soviet border. The invasion force tillery in the direct-fire role, tanks
with motorized rifle and artillery grew into the 40th Combined Arms supplement the artillery and
units, and even sometimes inde- Army, with seven motorized rille provide support by fire for
pendently."' By 1982, after three divisions and an airborne division, maneuver forces."' The Soviets con-
years of fighting, articles discussing supported by five air assault sider the BMP particularly suited
armor operations in mountainous brigades. The Soviet divisions came for combat in mountainous areas be-
terrain were much more cautious.? into Afghanistan with no specific cause its armor can protect the in-
In the same year, the popular press doctrine for counterinsurgency. fantry squad while its armament can
in the West claimed that the Soviets They came armed only with their su- hit the enemy? With the exception
had chan ed their tactics in Af- perior technology and a convention- of special operations forces, the en-
ghanistan. F al doctrine to employ it. tire Soviet army is mechanized. The
very force structure of the Red
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, Combat operations in Afghanistan Army suggests that primarily
the success of armor depended essentially mean mountain warfare. mechanized forces will fight moun-
upon the function it fulfilled within The range of the Hindu Kush tain warfare. The doctrine does
the combined arms team. J.F.C. covers half the country, with peaks state that motorized rifle troops will
Fuller defined these functions as rising to 17,000 feet. Although the dismount to attack, but they will at-
finding, holding, hitting, protecting, Soviets consider combat in moun- tack with support from both tanks
and BMPs. Airmobile infantry is infantry combat vehicles swept troops were taking the field and as-
also important and can secure high rapidly northward, ploughing suming more of the combat burden.
ground otherwise inaccessible to the through whatevcr was lcft of thc set- The Sovicts also hegan what one oh-
motorized troops. All combined tlements."' The offensive drove server called, "a trial-and-error
arms encircle and destroy the many of the Afghans into exile, but searcv for tactical solutions."
enemy in a coordinated attack. failed to crush the resistance.
By 1982, the Soviets continued
In a typical attack, helicopters con- A year later, the Soviets were un- large-scale offensives, but with some
duct reconnaissance ahead of the able to do any better. Some new tactical adjustments, principally
main body. On the ground, combat Western observers claimed the with a marked increase in the use of
reconnaissance patrols scout ahead "Soviets' tactical reliance on armor airmobile and special operations for-
to identify less accessible routes for curtailed their effectiveness in deal- ces. In May and June, the Soviets
possible use by the outflanking ing with the guerrillas."* At least and their Afghan allies massed
detachment. The main body one analyst pointed simply to the 15,000 troops against 3,500
proceeds up the most accessible Soviet inability to execute their own Mujuliediri in the Panjshir Valley, 40
route. The next take the command- doctrine. The motorized rifle miles north of Kabul. The Soviets at-
ing heights along the route of ad- divisions that took part in the in- tacked into a 300-meter to two-
vance or to the rear of the enemy at vasion had at least 50 percent reser- kilometer-width gorge. Air assaults
all costs. The outflanking detach- vists on 90-day call-up. Training was descended on the ridges, while an
ment, which can be either certainly an important factor. A armored column attacked up the val-
motorized rifle units or airmobile year after the invasion, however, an ley. The air assaults ran into stiff
troops, does this. The outflanking eyewitness account of a battle that resistance and had to withdraw.
detachment would ideally contain took place at Paghman, 15 miles Without command of the dominat-
artillery and engineers. Once the northwest of Kabul, offers some in- ing heights, the Soviets took heavy
dominant heights are secure, a coor- sights. In the three-day battle, the losses. After a good deal of fighting,
dinated attack - preferably from tanks and BMPs made headway the Soviets declared victory and
two directions - completes the en- over the hilly terrain. However, only returned to their permanent gar-
circlement and destruction of the a few reluclzant Afghan infantry risons. The Miijaltediri returned
enemy.6 units (forces of the Soviet-backed also, which prompted another
regime) supported the armor. The Soviet offensive into the Panjshir
The functions of the various arms Afghan infantry failed to close with later the same year.
determine their employment. the enemy. The Mujahcdirt roamed
Helicopters and ground reconnais- the battlefield in small groups, On better ground, the Soviet
sance units find; tanks and armed with RPG-7s and antitank mechanized forces found it much
mechanized infantry protect, hit, grenades. Despite their advance, by easier to encircle and thus obtain
and destroy; airmobile infantry also the third day, the Soviets were better results. The city of Herat sits
fm and destroy; finally, artillery, forced to withdraw their armor? at the western foot of the Hindu
rotary, and futed-wing aircraft hit. Obviously, when the infantry failed Kush near the desert. It had long
Soviet officers probably had little to fulfill its function, the combined been a hotbed of resistance. Follow-
idea how to adjust this tactical sys- arms team was broken. ing the Panjshir operation, the
tem in order to work in the low-in- Soviets surrounded Herat with
tensity environment of Afghanistan. The reluctance of the Afghan units more than 300 armored vehicles
to attack their countrymen was un- and conducted a house-to-house
Shortly after the invasion, the derstandable. Within a year of the search. Most of the Mirjulrediri had
Soviets began large-scale offensives invasion, the Afghan army disin- fled, so the Soviets met little resis-
to pursue the Miijuliediri, the resis- tegrated, from a force of 90,oOO tance." All the same, the Soviets
tance forces, to their strongholds. In men in 1979 to 30,000 in 1981. The reestablished their control of the
February 1980, 5,000 Soviet troops Soviets looked for solutions by in- city.
attacked into the Kunar Valley. For creasing their troop strength and ad-
two days, the Soviets hammered the justing their tactical system. Less The most effective tactical adjust-
area with artillery and air strikes. willing to depend on their allies, the ment made by the Soviets was the in-
Troops then airlanded onto the Soviets annually increased their creased use of special forces
nearby ridges. Following the air as- troop strength by 10,ooO in 1981, (Spetsrtai and airborne units) in
sault, "columns of tanks and BMP 1982, and 1984. Soon these Soviet small-scale search-and-destroy mis-
Soviet experience in
Afghanistan parallelledthe
U.S. Vietnam campaigns
against similar indigenous
guerrillas.
I
designed fire sack, the nearest thing they do not see a target and they the commander must
to a covered and concealed position cannot find enough dead space to template at what point
can only be found by moving out of obtain cover and concealment. One along the unit's axis of
the enemy's fire sack or by seizing quick radio transmission, by any advance he an-
the enemy positions. In the far am- crewman: "CONTACT FRONT (or ticipates a near am-
bush, backing out of this fire sack of- LEFT, RIGHT, REAR)," weapons bush (defiles, built-up
fers the shortest path to a "position" firing, and the lead platoon moving areas, and woodlines)
not covered by direct fire. Moving to the rear at high speed in a cloud and where he exDects
500 meters to the rear temporarily of smoke will let everyone know
pulls our chestnuts out of the fire that the team has made contact,
and enables the command to survive that it's a far ambush, and the
the initial contact with maximum for- general direction. The lead platoon
ces intact. However, if the enemy and the ovenvatching platoon are
positions are closer than the nearest now moving back out of immediate moves as necessary to prevent the
"position" outside the fire sack, the danger, and the commander can lead platoon from masking his fires
tcam faces a near ambush. In this in- enjoy a brief respite while he ob- and to see his target area.
stance, the lead platoon assaults the tains more information and decides
enemy position with all weapons upon his options (hasty attack, hasty Hasty Attack
firing in the direction of contact. Of defense, bypass, or continue to
the two types of ambushes, the near develop the situation). The FIST re- After the initial actions on contact,
ambush is the most dangerous. For- quests fires, the executive officer thc commander analyzes his options
tunately, it is the least likely of the reports to task force, and the and determines, based on his under-
two, due to its high risk for the platoon leaders look for favorable standing o l the mission and his war-
enemy (exposed flanks and rear) indirect routes to assault the flanks gaming, that a hasty attack is the ap-
and the limited availability of of the enemy position. propriate option. By definition, the
natural reverse slope positions in sequence of events for any attack in-
most terrain. As a result, the team's Only a platoon leader or the team volves the troop-leading steps and
initial actions on contact are always Commander initiates the actions-on- the concomitant decision-making
for a far ambush. In both cases, the contact drill. He announces "AC- process. However, since companies
team fires rapidly, regardless of TlON FRONT (or LEIT, RIGHT, hcquently conduct hasty attacks, a
whether it has a target in its sights REAR)." He then leads the platoon drill-like series of steps will increase
or not. During the operations order into an immediate assault of the the unit's chances of success.
sequence, the Commander must enemy position.
template at what point along the The commander delays the assault
unit's axis of advance he anticipates All tanks guide on him in a wedge to ensure the positioning and
a near ambush (defiles, built-up and place all fires at either iden- availability of dismounted infantry,
areas, and woodlines) and where he tified targets or likely enemy loca- indirect fires, and the support-by-
expects a far ambush. tions. The crews do not activate on- fire etement. The hasty attack battle
board smoke systems and do not drill uses the lead tank platoon as
Anyone may initiate the actions on stop until the platoon leader issues the support-by-fire element and the
conlact drill. All crews immediately further instructions. other tank platoon, followed by the
rcturn fire in their assigned orienta- mounted infantry platoon, as the as-
tion, or at identified targets. Simul- In both versions of this battle drill, sault element.
taneously, the drivers put the the overwatching platoon leader
vehicles into reverse (unless they gives an immediate support by fire First, the commander queries the
can see a covered and concealed command to his platoon. Target FIST to determine if he can sup-
position within 100 meters), activate priorities, in order, are: observed press the position the commander
the on-board smoke system, and enemy positions, lead platoon's wants to assault, isolate mutually
back up 500 meters. The designated tracers, and likely enemy positions. supporting positions (real or
crewman (it doesn't have to be the templated), and screen the move-
vehicle commander) gives a brief The overwatching platoon leader ment of the assaulting platoons.
alert over the radio, per unit SOP. places the highest possible volume Next, the commander places the
vehicles will probably displace. reconnoiter the obstacle. The two platoon may not have identified. As
During the time the enemy vehicles crews seek the following informa- a result, the far-side security force
are moving they are most vulnerable tion: may have to move as far as two
to the supporting tank's fire, This kilometers in open terrain. Under
"bird dog and shotgun" routine 0 Feasibility of forcing the obstacle no circumstances does the far-side
enables the infantry to flush the 0Location of bypass, if any security force breach a footpath and
enemy and the tanks to kill them. 0 Likely breach site (one with just flop down on the other side of
Although the infantry will be doing most dead space) the obstacle. The near-side security
most of the work, the tank cannon 0 Location for support-by-fire force can already cover that far.
will kill the bulk of the enemy armor. position The remaining squad-sized force
conducts a hasty breach using ex-
The commander now designates The remaining vehicles of the lead plosives or grappling hooks to physi-
control measures for consolidating platoon also identify near-side cally move surface-laid mines. If the
the enemy position. The designated security positions (support-by-fire mines are buried, the breaching
target reference points identify positions). The FIST requests in- force must use mine detectors and
mutually-supporting enemy posi- direct fires that will obscure enemy probes to locate and destroy (or
tions on the flanks, likely counterat- observation of the team's hasty remove) the mines. The breaching
tack routes, and the most likely breach and fires that will suppress force then marks the breach site
route for continued team move- known and likely enemy positions using smoke, engineer tape along
ment. The executive officer an- that can place direct fires onto the the boundaries of the lane, or
nounces the location for the com- team. The closer he can place the aircraft recognition panels elevated
pany combat trains and decides smoke to the enemy, the better. The on long pickets near the entrance of
whether he will require the platoons FIST avoids placing smoke on the the lane. The assault platoon moves
to evacuate casualties to the com- team and on the obstacle. The in- through the lane, proofing it, and
pany combat trains or if he will "tail- fantry platoon leader moves for- continues the mission.
gate" the trains to the line platoons. ward, selects a place to dismount
The first sergeant receives the per- his far-side security force. This ele- Movement Drills
sonnel and equipment status from ment, led by the platoon leader,
each platoon sergeant in order to clears a footpath, using wire cutters Although there are a large number
direct cross-levelling of people and and grappling hooks. This force of possible formations, consider
equipment and request urgently moves to those positions that can limiting the team to five basic forma-
needed items. place direct fires on the obstacle. tions: column of platoon wedges,
The far-side security force team diamond, staggered column,
Hasty Breach maneuvers with all of the platoon's column, and the line formation. The
Dragons. keys to security during movement
The lead platoon detects an are good target acquisition skills,
obstacle and immediately begins The far-side security force places overwatch elements, platoon leaders
contact drill actions. This drill as- suppressive small arms fires and an- alert to changing requirements for
sumes that the enemy will cover his titank fires on those enemy forces dispersion, and making contact with
obstacles with fire. The initial that can disrupt the breaching and the smallest enemy force possible.
report describes enemy activity and assault force's operations. The far- Consequently, do not shortchange
the obstacle type. side security force communicates unit alertness for the sake of a tidy
with the near-side security force in appearance. Infantry fighting
The first vehicle turns left, the order to adjust the near-side vehicles lack the necessary
second vehicle turns right and both security fires onto positions the tank firepower and protection to survive
. 1
ARMOR - September-October 7988 15
I
the initial actions on contact and to mounts with essential
rapidly kill all types of enemy equipment (weapon,
armor. Therefore, tanks should binoculars, and protec-
lead, unless the commander's need tive mask).
for security requires the use of dis-
mounted infantry. The commander
gives specific respon-
The platoon wedge should rarely sibilities to the platoon
exceed 200 meters in width. The for scanning; for ex-
platoon is not the element we want ample, "Lead platoon
to spread out. The commander to the front, second
should consider the diamond or platoon to the left,
column of platoon wedges when his third platoon to the
estimate dictates greater dispersion. right, and keep the team
Except during a movement to con- aligned with Bravo"Under no circumstances does the
tact, most company/team formations Team. The commander permit the Stinger crew to
combat
should not exceed 800 meters in trains will maintain air fight from the assigned wheel
width. Distances greater than 800 guard and alignment vehicle...Since there is not enough
meters make it difficult to achieve with Co C to our rear." room in a tank, the commander selects
mass, and strain the command and an infantry vehicle, the maintenance
control lunctions. This becomes Hasty Defense track, or the recovery vehicle, for in-
more obvious once the entire bat- side protection for the two-man Stinger
talion or brigade is viewed, rather Often, we use the hasty team. 'I
E '1
by Captain Mark T. Hefty Normally, the company master After a particularly disappointing
gunner is in the calibrating tank, Level I gunnery, my battalion com-
The M60A3 main battle tank has a and the battalion master gunner is mander looked for a solution. He
complex fire control system. The in the range tower. They are check- asked the few (about 10) tank com-
current method of calibrating the ing the elevation output reading manders who had qualified what
M60A3 is to conduct an accurate from the elevation actuating arm they had done to be successful.
boresight, then fire a round at a 900- and comparing the reading to the Some of them said that they had ad-
meter target panel. If the round hits solution in the ammunition tablcs, justed their jump knobs after
the target, the tank then fires a con- which gives a mathematically calcu- calibration to bring the strike of
firmation rQund at a 1,500-meter tar- lated output reading and a small their rounds closer to center of
get panel. If that round hits, then tolerance. If the tank's output read- mass of the target.
the tank is calibrated. If the first ing is outside the given tolerance,
round hits and the second round the tank does not fire, and the tur- The battalion commander also
misses, a third round is fired at a ret mechanics check the entire fire heard that another battalion in the
1,250-meter panel. If that round control system for malfunctions. division had allowed its personnel
hits, the tank is calibrated. to adjust their jump knobs, and they
Inside the GCU are four very spe- had shot very well. Using this infor-
If the tank misses the first round cial jump knobs. Two of them con- mation, the commander came up
at the 9O-meter panel, it is not trol azimuth and elevation for with a plan to qualify more tanks at
calibrated, and the crew must check HEAT ammunition and two control gunnery by making adjustments to
several items, such as boresight and azimuth and elevation for SABOT. jump knobs in a "controlled" man-
knob settings on the gunner's con- The knobs allow manual input of ner. He authorized adjustments
trol unit (GCU). The GCU feeds correction data to the computer. based on a two-round shot group at
data into the computer, including the 1,250-meter panel. The adjust-
gun tube wear, air temperature, and Currently, the only authorized ments brought the strike of the
elevation. knob adjustment is a -.8 mil eleva- round within a three foot radius of
The crew follows the same proce- tion for HEAT ammunition. That center mass. The tank fired a third
dures if it hits the 900-meter panel. number is derived from historical round at the 1,250-meter panel to
but misses both the 1,500-meter and data indicating that HEAT consis- verify the adjustment. If the round
1.250-meter panels. tently shot high.
- struck within the target circle, the
tank fired a fourth round at the best M6OA3 tank battalion qualifica- ly off center of mass, the round
1,500-meter panel. If the round hit tion rate in USAREUR. could miss the target.
the panel, the tank was calibrated
for that type ammunition. If the One area of concern was the num- There is a direct relationship be-
third round did not hit within the ber of rounds allocated for calibra- tween our use of adjusting jump
target circle on the 1,250-meter tion. The normal allotment was knobs and our battalion's success.
panel, the commander determined three HEAT and three SABOT. Keep in mind that not every tank
if a further adjustment was feasible, The modified version required four, needed to make any adjustments,
based on how the first adjustment or sometimes five, rounds per tank, and after two battalions-worth of
moved the strike of the round. The per ammunition type. We found jump knob adjusting, the effects on
battalion commander listened to that most tanks only needed two round impact were very consistent.
recommendations from the respec- rounds of SABOT because of the
tive platoon sergeant, master gun- round's accuracy. The HEAT was
ner, and company commander. more difficult to balance, though.
We diverted some of the Tank
The results of this gunnery were as- Table VI rounds to make up the dif- Captain Mark T. Hefty
tounding. The battalion qualified ference. was commissioned from
about 44 tanks out of 58 on their the USMA in 1983. He
first run on Tank Table VIII. That Benefits were that the crews had also attended the AOBC
was about four or five times better more confidence in being able to hit and AOAC. Assigned to
than previously. targets, and it also started the gun- the 1-37 Armor, 1st AD, in
ner closer to center mass of the tar- the FRG, he served as
I was the towerlrange officer in get. That is to say, the strike of the mortar platoon leader,
charge (OIC) for the entire bat- round is closer to the gunner's lay. tank platoon leader, tank
talion's calibration, and became company XO, and 53 Air.
very familiar with the sequence. I Using the "old" way of calibrating, He is currently assigned
was also the range OIC at a sub- even if the round struck only the as assistant S3 of the 2d
sequent gunnery, when the battalion edge of the panels, we made no ad- Bde, 5th ID, at Fort Polk,
qualified 54 out of 58 tanks on their justments. Then, during a hasty LA.
first run on Tank Table VI11. the reticle lay, if the gunner layed slight-
to accept as real. The success of the controlling headquarters. The main is concerned about flanking actions,
deception is directly proportional to emphasis of deception in the of- ambushes, and surprise attacks. If
the number of reliable intelligence fense is to deceive the enemy with the deception (including FASCAM
sources that can be contaminated false avenues of attack and false fires) can convince him to send ele-
with the various forms of false data times when the attack will occur. ments off to the various flanks, the
within the context of the deception This allows the regiment or division real combat ratio is significantly im-
plan. Put simply What is seen and to retain surprise and momentum. proved.
heard, again and again, becomes Many media provide the desired Misfires: Misplaced or poorly-
believable. (Incidentally, this is the picture: timed FASCAM and ICM fires can
favorite tactic of dictators; constant greatly assist the real maneuver ele-
repetition creates belief.) Show the .Sound: Tapes of a MRR's ment. As the other elements of the
enemy what he expects to see; it will vehicles in a combat line will deception are completed and mis-
make him think he is in control of provide both the straightforward fired enemy artillery occurs, the
the situation. Few overconfident audio presence of a "regiment" in enemy maneuver elements on the
commanders take detailed precau- the pre-dawn hours, as well as an ex- ground will believe their head-
tions. cellent background for battle traffic quarters is shooting at the real at-
on the radio. This can be ac- tack.
The preparation of the deception complished with $400 worth of used
must be made at the tactical plan- car stereo equipment and a few Putting It All Together
ning level, in the maneuver unit's hours to fit the system to the
operations order, thereby making BRDM-11. These techniques can combine to
the false operation an integral part provide an excellent battlefield ef-
of the real maneuver plan. This .Visual: Test fires, MILES fect, as occurred in a recent MRR
brings the deception plan into checks, heat signatures, covering night attack against an MllM2-
phase with all of the other combat smoke, and dust signatures will equipped task force in the central
multipliers at a maneuver com- replicate a regimental-size march to corridor of the NTC maneuver area.
mander's disposal, thereby ensuring the attack. As the enemy begins to The OPFOR conducted the attack
that the illusory operation enhances see the "attack," he will react with from east to west with a line of
the mission without hindering the security upgrades, indirect fires, and departure at Hill 720 (See Map 1.)
commander's intent. It is unlikely repositioning. After all, seeing is
that this would be accomplished if believing.
the deception was planned in the Phase One: Radio traffic concern-
war room of a military intelligence artillery: This can provide false ing rehearsals in the north end of
battalion. illumination and false preparatory the sector, as well as the clearing of
fires. Areas the "regiment" appears defiles along the march route, clut-
In common with U.S. doctrine, the to be interested in will shortly be of tered the air all afternoon. As a
OPFOR uses METT-T analysis as interest to the enemy. result,
the core of deception planning. At
the NTC, the OPFOR has .Radio: Enemy intercepts of a .The enemy expended about
developed different styles of decep- "busy command and control net are 4,800 rounds of enemy artillery in
tion for offensive and defensive often the pivotal intelligence source. vain attempts to destroy the "forces"
operations. In offensive operations, If the enemy hears "us" talking in the north.
mainly division and regimental at- about doing what his people are
tacks or meeting engagements, as- seeing and hearing, he will believe it. .The enemy was convinced that
sets internal to the motorized rifle two MRBs would attack in the
division and combined arms army Flanking: During meeting north, with LD no later than 2100
are used, but parceled out to the engagements especially, the enemy hours.
h
enemy task force to expect the main At company, battalion, and and are relatively cheap and easy to
attack within 30 minutes. regimental levels, deception has a make.
key role in the success of the defen-
The task force cancelled sleep sive mission. The primary goal of e Artillery: Smoke and guiding il-
plans, bringing the task force to 100- deceiving the attacking enemy is to lumination, or special signal flares,
percent security. seize the initiative, thereby draining will give a physical signature to a
his attack's lifeblood. Also gained deception plan involving reposition-
Phase Three: At 2300, the "regi- by a successful defense deception is ing or counterattacking elements.
ment" conducted a second attack, protection from air and artillery bar-
with sound, smoke, illumination, rages, as well as mounted and dis- 0 Radio: Lengthy discussions of
chemlites, dust, heat signatures, mounted infiltrations. Such combat vehicle locations, rehearsals for
fake battle damage, and heavy bat- multipliers, if the attacker uses counterattacks, and loose talk such
tle traffic on the radio. The results them effectively, can unseat a as, "Are routes Green and Red
were that: defender, however well prepared. clear for my Charlie-Alpha?'' paint
0 Ineffective enemy FASCAM The tasks involved with defense a picture of an overconfident
tires. deception planning are to deceive defcnder with poor OPSEC.
the enemy about where the defen-
0The enemy task force came to sive positions, avenues, and routes Combinations of these techniques
100-percent security again. for counterattacks and repositioning can keep the enemy guessing for ex-
are, and where the reserve forces tended periods of time, as well as
0The enemy brigade told task are. This can be done as low as having the following effects:
force that two MRBs were con- motorized company level, but must
firmed to attack in the north. be coordinated with higher com- 0 Misfired artillery preparation.
]SGmber-Ozber 1988 33 I
through the better
armor terrain. 81D and
W I D attacked through
the Vorgebirge mining
area. Collins left the
corps’ southern flank
open;’ which allowed a
concentration of effort
in the north.
The VI1 Corps’ attack at 0300 on 1 Conclusions 0Tanks have utility in urban ter-
March w0rked.3~The lack of depth rain. They are protected firepower
in the German defenses ensured MG Collins’ employment of 3AD and provide large-caliber direct fire.
success.36 At 0420 on 4 March, to seize Cologne was not the
patrols from 3AD reached the doctrinally preferred mission for an 0 Infantry must accompany tanks
Rhine at Worringen?’ On 4 March, armored division. However, Army into urban terrain. Infantry can go
Collins ordered 3AD to attack doctrine acknowledged the poten- places tanks cannot.
Endnotes
ARTEPs in the 1st Armored the platoon is authorized 11 radios battalion positions, so the
Division (1AD) took on a new and 11 sccure speech devices (VIN- physician’s assistant accomplishes
realism when full battlefield play SON). Normal configuration teams the platoon leader and medical of-
with MILES gear transferred from up two medics with each APC, one ficer duties. The medical platoon
the NTC to Hoehenfels, Germany. as driver, and one as track com- sergeant (E7), the aid station NCO
This became the first opportunity mander (TC). (EG), and the evacuation NCO (E6)
for many medical personneI in ar- lead the medical platoon. The BAS
mored battalions to train in a com- Each line company receives one and Evac sections are normally co-
plete medical evacuation situation. such team. The lour remaining located with the administrative and
Each casualty the battle generated APCs and medics remain at the logistical operations center (ALOC)
had to be evacuated to the battalion BAS with the evacuation (Evac) sec- in the combat trains.
aid station (BAS) and “recon- lion. Each APC has its own radio
stituted before returning to the bat- and VINSON. The BAS consists of Battalion-level evacuation of a
tle. the two M577s, two 2-112 tons, and casualty begins at the time and
a 114-ton in lieu of the HMMWV. place ol injury and proceeds to the
By doctrine, the medical platoon The M577s can be used for either BAS. Normal casualty flow starts
of an armored battalion consists of patient treatment or commmand with a radio call on the company
one surgeon, one physician’s assis- and control centers, and the 2-112- net to the assigned company medi-
tant, one Medical Service Corps tons can be used lor hauling either cal team, although medics may see a
(MSC) officer, one platoon ser- cargo or patients. The remaining damaged tank and move to
geant, and 27 medics. The latest medics support the BAS, its equip- evaluate. At this point, the medics
TOE authorizes one HMMMV, two ment, and missions. triage the casualties, then treat and
M577s, two 2-112-ton trucks, and return as many to duty as possible.
eight M113 armored personnel car- There are currently no surgeons Other soldiers may also give initial
riers (APC). For communication, and very few MSC officers in the treatment.
officer was rarely in charge to been reassigned to tal overlays with reference points
provide further direction in the other sections. On the eliminates the dependence on
evacuation chain. Medics were able average, three of the secure radio communications.
to provide medical treatment, but medical APCs in a// bat-
evacuation from the PCP depended talions had the red cross 0 Medical platoons must retain
on the BAS'S knowledge of the covered. The battalion control of all their assigned APCs.
situation and coordination of the commander or the com- The best vehicle for transporting a
evacuation. pany first sergeants litter casualty is the medical APC; if
used them as command medics do not have these vehicles,
Lack of vehicles complicated and control vehicles, they cannot effectively meet evacua-
evacuation to the BAS. Although which left most Evac sec- tion demands. Assignment of other
most battalions had almost their full tions with only one APC tasks compromises the mission of
authorization of APCs, many of and a 2-7/2ton." the medical APC, detracts from the
them had been reassigned to other scant medical resources available -
sections. On the average, three of and violates the Geneva Conven-
the medical APCs in all battalions tions.
had the red cross covered. The bat-
talion commander or the company ness to use it. They cannot save Exercises in which casualties must
first sergeants used them as com- their wounded companions by yell- be evacuated provide realistic com-
mand and control vehicles, which ing, "Medic!" They are the ones who bat training that involves all ele-
left most Evac sections with only must establish the airway, control ments of an armored battalion.
one APC and a 2-112 ton. The the bleeding, and start the IVs. It Commanders are able to see how
remaining 2-112 ton was usually may be an hour or more before the the large number of casualties
uploadcd with the BAS'S equipmcnt casualty can receive medical care, generated by battles would cripple
and therefore was unavailable for and evacuation to the BAS may their mission.
casualty transport. take the better part of a day, or
more. Traumatic injuries must To provide must take an impor-
In most battles, the PCP receive treatment in the first few tant role in future training.
processed 50-llH) casualties, and minutes, if the casualty is to survive.
reliance on non-medical vehicles be- Courses such as buddy aid and the
came heavy. Transportation of Combat Casualty Lifesaver Course
casualties from the battle to the can provide the needed training,
BAS averaged from 4-6 hours, with and small packets of dressings and
some taking two hours and some 1V materials could easily fit into the CW3 William L. Tozier is a
taking as long as 12 hours or more. "stuff spaces" in a tank. graduate of the physician's
associate program at Duke
The experience of this type exer- 0 Awareness of the use of non- University, where he
cise provided realistic training for medical vehicles for evacuation earned a Bachelor of
armor battalion medical sections. It must be stressed all the way down Health Science degree,
demonstrated that armor battalions to the individual soldier. Battalion- cum faude. He served in
in battle will generate large num- level SOP must integrate the resour- the 2d Sqn, 116th ACR, of
bers of casualties requiring evacua- ces of the support and maintenance the Idaho ARNG prior to
tion over fairly long distances to get platoons to include loading casual- coming on active duty in
definitive medical care. Recommen- ties on returning vehicles. 1982. He was assigned to
dations for planning, given the exist- 1st Bn, 35th Armor at Erlan-
ing strengths of equipment and per- 0 Every leader must know the gen, FRG, when he par-
sonnel, should include the following: stages and routes for casualty move- ticipated in IRONSTAR 86,
ment. PCPs should be planned so the exercise that forms the
0 Crewmembers must have more that the system does not require basis for this story.
medical training and the decisive- radio coordination. The use of tacti-
One of a commander’s most valu- 0Promote and instill in the new Oath of Enlistment, and their roles
able resources is the men he leads. soldier the highest degree of in- as soldiers.
The level of training of soldiers dividual responsibility and self-dis-
entering his unit is a matter of inter- cipline. .Be devoted to the Army in its
est, and can be a matter of concern. defense of the United States and
The 1st Armored Training Brigade 0 Establish the pride and dignity the principles embodied in the Con-
at Fort b o x , Kentucky trains all of being a soldier in the United stitution.
l U K , 29E, and 19D soldiers who States Army.
enter the Armor Force. If com- 0 Know and abide by the Uniform
manders, platoon leaders, and 0 Promote and accelerate the tran- Code of Military Justice and other
senior NCOs in the field do not sition from civilian to soldier. statutes and applicable rules and
know what training their new sol- regulations.
diers have received, they waste .Develop in the new soldier an
resources training subjects already understanding of the Army system The above objectives and stand-
taught, and don’t expand on the sol- and the role of the individual in ac- ards are literally part of the regula-
dier’s training base. complishing the Army’s mission. tion.
My intent is to discuss the training 0Develop in the new soldier The 19-series IET soldiers are
the entry-level armor and cavalry knowledge and understanding of trained with the One Station Unit
soldier receives. I will touch upon Army customs, hcritage, and tradi- Training (OSUT) method. They
philosophy, constraints, resources, tions. report to the 46th Ad,jutant General
and areas in which the new soldier Battalion (Reception), are in-
will need additional training. .Provide the new soldier the processed and then go to their
knowledge, skills, and task proficien- OSUT company. The M1 and
I base this article on my observa- cy so that the soldier can immediate- M6OA3 OSUT companies train
tions as an OSUT company com- ly contribute the unit’s mission these soldiers (19K10, 19ElO) for 14
mander in a M1 training company, and survive on tile battlefield. weeks. The Cavalry Squadron
so it is oriented toward 1YKlO (19D10) trains its soldiers 13 weeks,
trainees. But, most of what I discuss 0 Provide the Army with soldiers or 14, if the soldier receives one
is also applicable to 19E10 and who are physically fit. week additional training on the M3.
l9DlO trainees. Once training is completed, the
Soldiers completing IET will newly-trained soldier goes to his ini-
TRADOC Reg 350-6 contains demonstrate the attainment of the tial assignment in a line bat-
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine above listed objectives when they - taliodsquadron.
Command (TRADOC) guidance,
policies, and responsibilities for 1st Armored Training Brigade has
managing and conducting IET (ini- 0 Demonstrate the strength, four training battalions, two training
tial entry training). This consists of stamina, and agility to perform the squadrons, and a H&S company.
basic combat training (BT), one sta- common skills and MUS tasks Each battalion consists of three or
tion unit training (OSUT), ad- trained in IET. four line companies and a head-
vanced individual training (AIT), quarters company. Two battalions
and any other formal armor training 0 Demonstrate the desire and ac- train 19Ks, two battalions train 19Es
received before the award of a cept the need to apply themselves and two squadrons train 19Ds. H&S
military occupational specialty to accomplish assigned tasks. supports the entire brigade. Each
(MOS). battalion/squadron has three or four
The objectives of the IET pro- 0Understand and adhere to their OSUT companies and a head-
gram, as stated in 350-6, are to - enlistment obligation, including the quarters company.
I
~~
well-rested. Second, when topping assets returned to him three- during an ARTEP; or see a fuel
off at the forward support refuel quarters full. Tank commanders, vehicle driver attach himself to a
point, send drivers who returned platoon leaders, and platoon ser- tank platoon during a displacement.
earliest that previous night. geants should relay accurate infor- These situations happen, and it is
malion to the first sergeant. Rerout- the support platoon leader's job to
The support platoon is equipped ing unneeded assets from battalion correct them.
with one ANflRC-46 in the sup- control could be critical in combat. Class 1 and V operations will fol-
port platoon leader's jeep and an low similar patterns. The key to the
AN/PRC-77. Radio comnunications Units should be able to use the support platoon leader's survival is
in the platoon are severely limited. LRP system in resupply operations. planning and prioritization of assets.
Support platoon personnel can only The first sergeant and the supply With an extremely high rate of fuel
function on instructions provided to sergeant make this work. The first and ammunition consumption in the
them before their departure on a sergeant should have units arrayed, M1 and MlAl battalion, the sup-
mission. Brief your personnel in or know exact positions, to expedite port platoon will be the key to the
detail and ensure that they are profi- resupply operations and return the unit's survival.
cient in map reading. LOGPAC to the field trains. A
HEMTT platoon can refuel an M1
The support platoon leader should company, service station method, in Captain Juan J. Heman-
take an active interest in how units eight minutes. dez graduated from USMA
conduct resupply operations. The in 1982 and attended Air-
company first sergeant is the Inspect resupply operations when- borne, Ranger and NBC
primary logistics operator; there ever possible. Not only is the sup- schools and the German Air-
should be a good working relation- port platoon leader the resupply ex- borne Course. He has
ship between him, the S4, and the pert, but he is also responsible for served as platoon leader,
support platoon leader. 4U to 50 men. His presence is good battalion support platoon
for morale and enables him to ob- leader and company XO
Units should avoid overexaggerat- serve the men at work. He will be with 2-64 Armor in FRG. He
ing fuel status. There have been able to see units abandon fuel is an AOAC graduate and is
many instances when a unit was al- vehicles in an assembly area, depart- currently assigned to 2-37
legedly "red" on fuel. The support ing without leaving instructions to Armor, 1st ID (forward) in
platoon leader then redirected as- the driver; watch a tank platoon FRG.
sets to that unit, only to have those refueling on top of a battle position
"The first employment of including Russian-built PT-76s, to shooting match began in which
tanks by the Viet Cong did a night assault. A platoon of four one M48 was struck in the glacis
not take place until 3 March U.S. M48s was part of the plate and some of its crew killed or
1969. Until then tank defence perimeter defence and had wounded.
had been by orthodox am- detected enemy engines.
bush based on hollow-charge 'The enemy withdrew, leaving
weapons and mines. But at "Later yet track noises were three vehicles, including two PT-
Ben Het in the Central High- heard. Then the Americans came 76s destroyed. This was the first
lands, overlooking entrances under fire. Nothing could be seen time in 16 years that U.S.-
to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the through night-vision scopes until a manned armour had engaged
North Vietnamese committed PT-76 detonated some anti-person- enemy tanks in battle ..."
a number of armored vehicles, ne1 mines, setting itself on fire. A
One Army means one standard, developed battle positions sup- woodline behind the Reserve
because in war there can be only ported by continuous dismounted Center became a close-in training
one standard. But how, in 12 patrolling. Unfortunately, the ar- area. We constructed our lighting
weekends and two weeks of active mored cavalry troop’s role in this positions, had the engineers instruct
duty a year, can a Reserve unit scenario was that of armored pill us in building obstacles, which we
reach the same standard that Active boxes. One of my major tasks was left in place and improved, and
duty units train continuously to to emphasize my scouts’ ability to developed our lire planning. The
achieve? patrol beyond the foot patrols, and result was an instantly available
the need to keep a least a portion of training site perfectly suited to our
With the background of several the troop free to act as the brigade defense mission. Our 4.2 inch mor-
years of conducting ARTEPs on Na- reserve. I developed the METL to tars outdid everyone in building a
tional Guard and Reserve support this battle plan, emphasiz- textbook example of a fortified posi-
ArmorKavalry units in New ing two tasks: defense to support tion. In front of these positions, they
England, and as the commander of the brigade’s plan, and reconnais- prepared a scaled range for use
a Reserve armored cavalry troop, I sance to maintain the troop’s ability with the pneumatic firing device.
spent many hours thinking about to support any contingency the
and discussing how to train the brigade might face. With this The Scaled Tank Engagement
Reserve armored force. What I METL, and a thorough analysis of Range (STER), an indoor scaled
decided is that in the time-con- the troop’s strengths and weak- tank range (see ARMOR July-
strained training environment of a nesses, 1 next turned to resources. August 1987), was another example
Reserve or National Guard unit, it of using a facility to the utmost. Use
is critical that the trainer change the In addition to time constraints, of the laser targeting system allowed
scale, not the standard. What is Reserve units face restraints in train- excellent training in tank crew drill
scale? To describe my concept, 1 ing areas, ranges, and ammunition. and TOW tracking. But lkdt was
must rely upon my own command Many units have home stations with only a start. Placing two scout crews
experience with D Troop, 5th Caval- no training areas or ranges. Going and two tank crews on line, we al-
ry, 187th Separate Infantry Brigade to the field involves not only the nor- lowed the platoon leader to develop
at Ft. Devens, MA. mal maintenance, equipment draw, a scenario using spot reports by the
etc., but transportation to the scouts to guide target acquisition
We all know that the Mission Es- nearest post or State training and platoon fire commands. The
sential Task List (METL) should facility. A unit is lucky to have from mortars added the finale to this ex-
drive training. The first, and per- Saturday noon to Sunday noon to ercise by setting up a scaled range
haps most critical, step in changing train. Under these conditions, field adjacent to the STER, allowing the
the scale is recognizing that a survival must be trained during the scouts to call for fire by looking out
Reserve unit cannot train to stand- unit’s two weeks of annual training. the sliding garage doors on the side
ard on every ARTEP task. Clearly, We must obtain the maximum of the building.
the prioritized METL tasks must benefit from the constrained
represent a realistic assessment of wcekcnd training periods. Sand Map reading is a critical reconnais-
what are the critical tasks required tables are a necessity. sance skill. Map reading in moving
when a unit exercises its vehicles demands terrain apprecia-
CAPSTONE mission. My troop was fortunate. Ft. tion. Teaching these skills requires
Devens has ranges and training seeking out new areas and forcing
The 187th‘~ commander, BG areas, and they could fit us into the the soldiers to read maps, preferab-
Stones, clearly stated that his train- heavy weekend schedules. Changing ly in a moving vehicle. We ac-
ing priority was defense. The the scale here involved using every complished this by taking our
defense, as practiced in this bit of ground and every facility we wheeled vehicles to state parks
brigade, is an active exercise in well- could. To train in the defense, the during our annual trek, which
3. Mi-8 HIP-C. Type, utility, assault, 6. AH-64 (USA). Crew, 2; type, attack
electronic warfare, etc.; dimensions, main helicopter; combat weight, 7,892 kg; max.
rotor diam. 21.29 m; length, 25.24 m; height, speed, 378 km/hr; max. range, 578 km: main
5.65 m; combat weight, 12,000 kg; max. rotor diameter, 14.63 m; length, 15.05 m;
speed, 260 km/hr, max. range, 480 km; arma- height, 3.69 m; armament, Hughes 30-mm
ment, 57-mm rockets, AT missiles, gun pods, chain gun, 16 Hellfire AT missiles; 76 2.75411.
etc., depending upon mission. rockets, or combination.
-
The Bustle Rac
Military Qualifications 1992 and involve 364
Standards (MQS) Manuals units, or seven percent
of the total number of ph A d a
One of the findings of the recent Army tactical com-
(Nov 87-Apr 88) Armor Officer Sur- panies. The goal is for
vey was that about one of every all tactical companies -
three lieutenants does riot have an combat, combat sup-
Armor MQS Manual. Of those port, and combat ser-
lieutenants who do, about 44 per- vice support - to come
cent said the manuals were under company
moderately to extremely helpful in COHORT. in the initial four-year expansion
their professional development. phase. These companies will form
There will be two types of unit and spend their first 24 months in
Units ordering copies of STP 17- manning systems in operation once Forces Command and Western
121L-MQS, Armor Officer MUS 11, the expansion begins. Companies in Command divisons. They will
must submit DA Form 4569 Korea will come under the tradition- deploy to Korea for the h a 1 12
(USAAGPC Requisition Sheet) to al COHORT concept. Members of months of their life cycle.
U.S. Army Publication Center, 2800 those units will be recruited and
Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore MD trained together. They will then stay Phase I1 and future phases of the
21220. Individual officers must see together for a definite life cycle, plan to expand COHORT to the
their unit publication control of- usually three years. remaining tactical Army are under
ficer/clerk or unit training officer to review. They will be coordinated
initiate this action. Most other units will use the sus- with the major commands as they
tained COHORT system. Once a are formalized.
Other MQS publications currently COHORT unit is formed, it will pe-
available and of interest include: riodically receive replacement pack- 1988 Armor Trainer Update Set
STP 21-II-MQS, MQS Manual of ages. They could be platoons,
Common Tasks, and STP 25-11- squads, or any number of soldiers, The 1988 Armor Trainer Update
MQS, Commander’s and Super- depending on the unit’s require- (ATU) is scheduled at the
visor’s Guide. Work on the Armor ments. USAARMS, Ft. Knox, KY, from 24-
Captain’s Manual (MQS 111) is un- 18 November. The five-day session
derway, and the manual should be Sustained COHORT units will in- will update Armor/Cavalry officers
available through the pinpoint dis- clude 288 other companies assigned and NCOs who are instructors in
tribution system in the second to Forces Command, Western Com- schools and NCO academies; U.S.
quarter of FY 89. mand, and U.S. Army Europe. Com- Army Reserve Forces (USARF) ad-
panies slated for Europe will form visors and unit officers; Readiness
and spend their first 12 months in Group Armor Assistors; Active
1989 Armor Conference Forces Command. They will then Component (AC) staffs; and AC
Dates Announced dcploy to Europe and replacement and USARF unit commanders on
packages will sustain them. current developments in doctrine,
MG Thomas H. Tait, Chief of tactics, training, and training
Armor, announced that the 1989 Companies remaining in the materials.
Armor Conference would be held at United States will form COHORT Forward agenda recommendations
Ft. Knox, KY on May 8-12. units and remain in place. The and requests to address the assemb-
Army will use traditional COHORT ly or conduct a seminar to Mr. Troy
Expansionof COHORT in Korea because, as a short-tour, E. Schaffner, ATSB-DOES-SA,
unaccompanied area, it is suited for Autovon 464-1932/3028.
The Army recently received a p that kind of system. It also allows
proval to continue and expand the the Army to modernize in Korea by 1988 Military History
COHORT (Cohesion, Operational sending fully-trained units to man Writing Contest Announced
Readiness and Training) concept. the new equipment. BG William A. Stofft, U.S. Army
The first phase of the phased expan- Seventy-six companies will support Chief of Military History, has an-
siosn is scheduled to run through I
Korea under traditional COHORT nounced that the 1988 Military His-
~ ~ ~
PIN: 063513-000
U.S.Government Printing Office 1988 748-050188-5