*

OPERATION

."MARKET':

* k ~ ., ­

* XVIII CORPS ~

\ ,.1,... ~~~
; - \ "\1\ ~

8 fEB 1941>
 4)
l t RNB
AI'O 109, U. S. Arm;y ,
1
5 October 1944.
SIlbJoct. G-4 ActiTitie. - Operation IWiltET

ro I Chio! of staft, XVUl Corps Airborne.

1. asien.
a. General .
To the limit ot our oapabUit1es to insure t hat good , 8JIIIlunitionJ
am other ouppl les we:e delivered to the 82d 1 ~at A.1rbom e Divisions .
b. Specific.
( 1 ) Sinoe thi. Corps ..a. not part ot the troop. ""88Sed in t he
ope.l'a.tion" t heor etioally, we had no Jlpecitic responsibj,l. itiee .
(2) Because of t he Task Force Conmander ard. bilS bead uart. ers
cOJting t rom the British Anr.y and, theref ore, beins • __bat W>famlliar with
resupply procedure., thi. heodqaarters accepted t he tollowiog specHlc r ....
• pcn.ibUitie• •

(a) To ..ccept the .fixed and on cell au re-supply no­

qa.ir«nente trol!l the dlvisionej to tranamit these requirsaente to Coamuni­
cations Zons; t o maintain active l iaioon between the dl.,.is ca, C wU.catlona
ne, arxi t he Air Forces; to lollow through on these aupplloa wrt.ll such
tim. aa the supplies were delivered t o the Air Forces on the departure
airfields.

(b) To as!l.i~ in the movement at the s$3borne echolons

on both divlsiollB from the United KingdolR to the to arc! cOlllbat area
(G-3 ;;ection) .

(3 ) At tho time of the oporatioQ, the consolidation of all

Troop Carrying forces aD:l all A1rborna ForcelJ umer one comma.rn hAd just
boen directed : The higher headquarters involved were now at t.hair jobs.
BecQUCle ot thi s , &1'Xl. beclluse t hes e were our own divi s i ons, thi s headquarter s,
althollgb not aocoptlog the r esponaibilit i es, act uelly per formed the f ollo....
ins odditional tunctions.
(a) "II• • et up liaison at t he departure airtield. and
assisted t he Air Foroe in plann i ng and f!DC.ecuting t heir air r .... 'uppl,y functions .
nus invol ved co uting l ane requirsaents; eatablls t llgbt leheclules;
8stabllGhins, liaison between the divisions and the A1r FO.r089 and. within t he
Air Forces (i. e. - Between Troops Carrier Conmand arr::l t.he 490th ermast er
Dspct Company, a.pply); notit;ying division. of expected tiJRe ot arrival ot
e-suppl,. missions over the Drop Zone.

(b) 'lhrouglo the agoney of liaison otficers, did allw.

in our power to insure a smooth now of suppl ie s from ground sources after
contact had been made with the ground torces.

Rognuled UNCLASSIFIED

.&11<:__ &J<f.;~
I Dabt
r.,y - •
,I
~ 2. N8l'rative.

a. Prior to t he oper at1on.

D
(1 ) The epeeial gtaft ot t hi. headquart er. made a detailed
stud,y of the thad and call requir8l101lt. ot bot h d iv1oiol1ll and o""",11ad
an itOlllized ll gt ot r equa emed.. t o be turui shad dsily and ot requir....
ments to be held at departure a.1..rtlelds, on call. A copy ot this list
was turnished to all interested agenci es and is att ached .

( 2 ) Property on hand at depart ure ol.rf leld. wao carefully

invert.orlsed and t he shortages revsaled by thls inventory were brought
to the attention ot th e ~ropriate agencies.
(3) Detsiled plan. were made and later euperY1.ed, to eee
to it that. the property on hand , at departure airf1eld s , WIlBI prompt ly
cared to r~ .
• (4)
Appl'Oldmtoly fow-filt h. of t hlo r "':'.uppl y lte/llS were
~~unitlon. Hence, the bulk of the wor k, i nvolvod in accomplishing t he
above, was done by the Ordnance Seot ion, thi s head qujp't era. It ,JaG a
tremeooous t ask, lnvolving met i culous attent i on to :small, but important,
details . The task was ccompllsbed in an Gutsta ndingly s uceesstul
manner by a section f r eoh trc:m t he United states aai completal.:y unfamiliar
wit h airborne activiti es. 'lbe work of this section, during t he operatiCl~,
is des erving ot the highest praise.

b. During the oper at i on.

(1) Fixed r.-supply.

(a) A table showing tonnage. actually deilver ed to

divis i on s , under ·thi s s ch edule, i s attached. In f'pl ann1cg dally div­
isi onal tonnage requir ements, the following est imates are as ac curat e
as can be mat.! o, wit hout knowing the e.x.lict deiviliional. organi::z.at l OZl and.
the speci fic mission of the unit .

Class I 30 Tons
Cla•• nI 10 Ton s
Clas s V 200 Tone
All othere 10 TOIlO

Total 250 Tons

(b) On D plus 1, a fh ad re-.uppl mission ..... f lo""

by the Bemper Cccma.n:1 of the 8th Air For ce, B-24s were used . From. 75
t o 90 percent ,of the supplies delivered ctually reached t he troops on
the ground. These are, probably, the best r esults -.blch ave 6Ver been
obtained in tho [iold of parachute re-supply. UD1oubt edly. even bettor
•• re sults are pos8ible, i f t he Bomber Conmam I s given additional t l'ainirJg
in t hi s t ,ype of wor k. The principal reason f or suoh out standing sW)ces e
on this, the tirst I-e-8upply mission eVer flown. b the BOIDbGl" Com:nand,
ani wi thout previous tra1n1ng_ ~t rr.\, ~~' . ~ ,"\
,,1 •
" fl Q j '~
I '
L\

a...
....=-.,
 •

~ .,;: '

, 1iI'~ .i!~ •
i . t he rae\. that the iM\5 a ,;~~;r' -~,jFrflf
. 1)' air5hl.p the"
the C-47.
'the banber carrlera t ~ec£..22 ' .~;J . s possible t o drop t he whole
load i n Ll very r estri cted are a. On t he oth~' . I a C-47 e&l"rlos from 9 t o ,
12 bundle., ot which i t b "".s ibl e to drop 9 bundle . in a tairl,!' restr icted
area. Using equipment present ly provided, it i s not p083ible t o 8,Y'Oid scatte.r­
ing t he l ost three bundle• •

(c) Ths 9tb Troop Carrier Comman1 n ew t he remsin1!l8 re-s ' Ppl,Y
missi ons.

!.. In setting up t"e-supply missions, t he Troop Carri er C0m­

mand. Worms t he 4 jOt.b Quart,erma.ster Depot Company 3uppl y , the f ields trom
lfhich t he ~lanea 'Ifill t ake of f . Thes e 11eld a are not, in all cases , t ho
same f ields which oontain t he auppl1es. This means t hat a£tor recei ving -­
notifio at ion ot t he take-ofr fiel ds , it. Is ne cessa r y f or t ne 490th art er­
mast er Depot Company Suppl y to move t he supplies f t'OlQ on r ield t o .another.

'Ihia i s a c wnbar ~om e system, invol ving an mcp enditur e of noodles B t ime and etton.

It could be corrected in the planning stage by coordinating b etween the Troop

Carrier CCUIGUlIld, t he Dopot COOIpany and the divisions engaged in t he operation.

6,- There was cc.ns1cierabl e 1&51. minut o re-arrane;1ng of schedules,

..hich caus ed lIore confus i on_ This was due t o the Division COD'JMnders making
l a st minute de cisi ons as t o 1rbether t hey would use the avail able planes
f or re- supplie9 or fo r bringing 1n addi t ional t r oops . It 1. believed t hat
such contusion i 5 inevitable in an operat ion whe r o t he re q~ent3 f or planes
ar e geeater thnn t he actual suppl , ot plnnes am ere a rapid.l y moving t act i cal
situat on nece 881t ate ~ a hurr ied pl anning . Al l agenci es 1..rwolved. Quat le arn
to upeet t his contusion ao:1 be pr epared to deal with i t at. t he tJ..me . It is
part.icularl yat thia period t hat t he ever present need tor liai s on be '""'ACS ,an
urg~ nt necosaity, due t o t he tact that so flWl1 88etlcies wo.r ld..~ s emi- indep ond­
entl y ot each other, mus t be .t"apidly ani thoroughly coo rdloatecl, when the~
changf!'le occur.

62 ) On-coll .....supply.

( s) A tabl e abowing tonnage. actually d ellvered to the divisiollB

under this schedul e is attached .

( b) '!he system us ed was analogous to t he t 1.Jted r ..."l1pply system,

with the exception that r equirement s est abll Bhed prior to t he operation were
eetioat es. 'lbe actual l"$~int::1ent 9 were presented. to thi6 het.d parterG at the
t 1me the need occurred. Practleall ;y aU administrat ive de y in tu.rnishing
thes e suppll-es \',as el1m.inated. by the establishment of it llaison eection wit h
tho 490th ~Ol'IlID.ster Depot Ca:tpany Supply and physicolly l ocated at t hat
headquarte s on ODe ot t he d.eparture airfi elds. en request s f or on-call
supplies were received by the divisi on base echelons, they were J.DII1ed1catel y
telephoned t o this secti on am direct arrangement s for set t ing u.p the pl anes
and l oading t he oupplie s were made on t he spot . Arr aments we1"e also made
t o have a 11a1son section t the COl!III.unioation5 Zone est.abllshed at t he
same point. 'Ibus , when r equests tor supplie s, not available on departure air­
f i elds, were received, mediate am. direct a~t~-w c~ ~ ~ i.~q ~ procure
the supplies treel the Commw1icat l ons Zone DeP9.t.'I.
, '
',.>. .. •. l !
'-I~ ~ . ~ i\: t... ;
'2-- .~....,; l' ",.. :' ...." ­
 • ..
J I ,
,
(0) It n. r ound t hat supplies • • uld be 4el.ivered to divisiona
. ith the followi ng t .lJllo l .lJll1tation.. .

(1) All request . rs.si ved prdlor to m.1dnigllt c<U1 b. proc.....

oed and . upplie. delivered the f ollowing d8J' in a thorougblT etfie1. nt manner.
1b1s tim. l.lndt allows opportun1t,y tor complete planning, complete coordination,
and th~ most eff icient use or necessary a1 lanes.
(2) Request s r~eived pr ior to '1000 hour. can be handled
tor delivery the l;Jamo day_ Su ch a system involves t he r eadjust1ne otn1ght
schGdul es and l ast minute procurement of supplies, la3t minute coordinat ion
between t he agenc1 0s izwolved, wi th t he cons equent risk of .failure, anei, in ../ / 1
general, an inetticient 318tern. However, it i ll practicable am ,.,as us ed wltff
satistactory ~ucee 3S .

Requests received atter 1000 hours should not be con­

(3)
s 1d~d tor delivery that day, unless a crit icsl emergency exists, The fil­
ling ot t hese r e uest a invariably result s i n a disruptl('1n of n 1ght schedule s ,
allo" . insut!icient t ime r or t he proper briefing of pilote, 4nd insuffioient
t ime tor proper packaging and l oading.

(d ) '!bore is an understandabl e tend enoy on tho p&rt of the

divl ns t o insist on air re- s upply att-er gro und contact has been estab-
Ushed and beyond the l.IJII1t. set up bT t he original pl an . 'lb1s is t o be ..pect­
ed in an airborne operat.ion, since the init ial contact with t he gt'ouat forc es
is almost oure t o be mad e at a time lIilen the groun:l suppl y sFv6Il\ is st.rettched
to the l.IJII1t of its capabilities and at a t . when transportation for hauling
s upplies 1s D.t a premium.. It i s , t heref or e, the line ot l &&st reaiet anc e tor
t he divisi on ccmmander t o d i spatc h a inesS4&e to his base section calling t or
air re-supply. nus means that his reques t will b e consid ered separately aa1
his needs will not be ba.lancod agairuJt other unit.s in the area. The base sec­
tion, having no sure way or knowing t he 8Illergency of the need, quire properl y
f eel that a..U such requests should. be eonsider ad as operat i onal eMergencies .
'1'hia \'1Orks out ver y well for the d1vi:si ons, but f r om t he overall pic t ure, it
1s an unsound Method of operation. The use of airplanes f or supply purpo ~ es
1s an expensive system, both in planes, canopies, an:l oontaineru, which ahould
be resorted t o only during the t ime ldten troop~ are i sol at ed tl'OJll ground.
s ource s ani turing th ose times when the g Wld supoly s yst.em b,UII compl etely
broken down. 'nlere were actually cases, during thi s oampaign, 'lihen suppli e s
were tlown trom Fr ance t o fngland , unloaded in Ebgl..a.Di, l oeded. again, and fio. .
back to France for t he us e 'of t he Airborne Divisions. ere appears to be no
solut ion of this waste ar:rl inefti ciency, urJ.ess the di vision comnttUlder can
l ac.rUlce bis imedi ate needs in favor ot t he overall ne eds ot the entire
expeditionary f orces , or unless there 1s a higher commander on the ground who
will filt er t he r equests f rom the divisi ons and de clde whether t.he 9uPRlies
should be furnished trom ai r or ground 8ources.

•
 .- , -
,
• ..

(3) Gro Wlcl Supp1, .

A separate report on thi. phase "ill be submitted

1!hen suffic ient lnro"""tlon beeome. avaUabJ,• •

ill
Annex IIUl!lber 1 - !laU, Requiremen•• tor Fixed Re-Suppl y.

Annex lIuqber 2 - Liot of SUpplies Held ON - Call.

Annex Ilumber J - Ton""lle. del1ve""d, Fixed Re-3upp1l.

Annex number 4 - Tonnage. Del.l""red, on-Call Re-Suppl,•

•
rot
 •
~------------~~ . ~-------------,

TH!, RE~CRT COI'EJIS Ol;LY THE FIF.>'T TEN DAYS

THE :'lNAi., CC 'LE'l'i" REPORT h'It.L BE FORUARDED

THROUGH Cm.~.w1l CdA1:IIELS AT A LATEr. DhTE .

171 S70

I
 •

•
COPY i.O , _ __

Hl!;,J:r.;UART.lffi XVIII CORPS (AIRBORI!E)

OfficE: of t he Corps Co:ruander

370 (CG) liFO 109 - u, S, !'''my

0"1 Le cembc r 1944

S ~lBJ 'J;T : Operation It...ARY.i.T, Al roorne Phase, D 'to D Plus Ten) I ncl.J.s ive.

TO Co.:uua.'1ding General, rirst ,:.liled iii::."borne .-;rHW, APO 740, U. s. Army .

1. For Op erat ion lo..h..l;,iCT , tne ti.2Q and 1 01s!;. A.lrborne Dl.vl.sions of this
Co r ps \\e re c.e t-ac hed a nd placed.uncer 8 r .l.tis h .:lperat.ional c ont rolp The re­
sponsibilities of the t..VIII Corps ( .lI.iI-borne)s .'f ith ::'' 'e spect to t hese two di­
vl.sior.a , were t he::.'eiore cO.lfinect to cert-ain ad.idm.sc rat i ve functions covered
1.'1 Inclosure 3, and to gener al obs ervat l.on of t he )lailIl.. . n g a'1d conduct of
oper at i ons •

2 . To secure first R'hana ;~o \·t le c.ge of t he opc:r atl.on , the Cor ps CO!ll.uander
and sor..e of the Sta lf pa rtici,at ea i l l the u Day op erat.on, ooserving t h e drops
or' SOUle of t he Seri.ll6 of bot h US divis.lons frem a B-17 i'l", .lI"-l;. \v ith and a few
hundr€:d fe e t above t he 7roop Carri er f or wations at t l:e saI:le spee d. They re­
JJ~ .1Ded in t he NI Ju[cl}tN " r ea u!lt.il appro;-L.:&.te1y H pl cs thirty .:-d.nutes to ob­
s e!'ve our l nit. ial as s e,lIbl,i' ana enelItv r eaction:; on t he gr ound. During t he r e­
mainder of t he operat .lon , and begillrling on D r-lu3 t ·.iD, ~ei'io dic vis i ts \'o ere
Ha de to both div isions in 't he co,;.ba t area .

3 . I nclos ures I and 2 a r e the re:-,c rts r espect.ively 01 the Co.!IIJanding

Generals , &2d a nd l Ol st Airborne Di"is.l.o~ , f or t t e per iod D to D ,Ius ten)
lllcl us ive. The l et t .€ !' has beer. cl.oscn ... 5 the t e r!lu.flal date 01· the essent j.ally
airborne p hase of Operat i on £..JJiliT. Tnere&l't er, t ha continued part. icipat i on
of the se divisions in the :UJ...t!X}.i!N salient .. as a purely g r o und opere..t i on. In
ac cor dance "ith ' ,::. r Dep;:..r t ..lent instruct.ions , a r e;;ort on the \".ho1e operation,
in.c lu.cil!1u t he 6.ir bcr ne ) r.ase, \ i l l oe 1'0 r ,lardea lc.ter .

4 . The exp.;!rience of tperation kilRKST has pr oduc ad no oasic 6.1te ration

of accept ed pr inciples r e sp ectinJ t he emp10,l ,ne nt of airborne fo r ces . It has J
in. f a ct, f ;.llt her st r ength ened ~' co!wiction that c..ur prll1 c~p1es are sounfj and,

~
' f a corded d ue c or..s~de rat i o n in the plRmung c nd execut ion of airborne oper­
a . ens , wili of fer t he !.na x:l.Juum pr ospec.1. 01 ~uC(' ~'i"s" All 0 1. these pr inciples
are enunciated in "ar Def1Brtlhent 'Iral:1.1J1g Cj r ~t:"'... r :I'~e . 113 ,. 9 Oct ober 1943 .
T.,eir inco r por ation :.n the processes of t hought of co,,,,,ll£lnders and staf fs cha r­
ged '<lith planni.ng and exec utL1g &ClJ' phase 01 airbcrne o!,erc:.ticns ~n l gr eatly
cOI .t r~bute to the prop_€:' and e ff ect ive 6111plo,)-Ioent of al.rborne i'orc e5 o

5. Pa ra,§, rafl h 9b of t he :=lur Depa rtll.ent Train~ng Circular daBls with" the
r esponsibilit y fo r p::!..annin..; airb-:-'r nc operati ons . The o• .anner of application
of this p rinciple in Operation !WU1.}I'...§ js dese rving of c areful st.ud,y . S ~ nce
SIC ILY there has been a steadJ trend t owar d vesting a s:L1g1e i !,d ~vi dual l"'Iith

.. 1 ­

O ED

 SZCRET Ltl',
}i~SgllIilSS.
UI~~ i-~
! 4.
' Il""·[
. r. .' n~ ,
<'l~
Hq X'iIII Corps (Airborne) , f ile
·n 0 (00) , subject : lIOpe r ation.
i:.j;-~, J"irborne Phas e, D t o D ?lus 'len, I nclusive, 1I dated 4 Dec 44 , cont ' d.

direc t cOIIlFuS.nd a ut horit z," over p ar t icipat i ng a~ r oorne fo r ces , and ",.;. th oper ­
ation~~ control ove r as ~oc i Qted air forces in an airborne oper ation, In upar­
at ion . K..:.T t hi s trend took tCinSio.lc .lorll'. f or the r irst ti.lte ~ Lial..t€::nan~
/ G~nera l Lo H. ahiliE'IQ}\!, cOf!lj.~nding Fi r st hl li!;:!d Airborne .~rlI!Y , h.:..d all pa!'-­
tic i pat .l.I1g a irborne fc rce s under his CO....l..a'ld . The extent to ;Ihlch he exer­
cised op er at i onal cont r ol ov er associat ed air f o rc es b beyonC: tl:e 5c o.r'e 01
t :".is r e;>ort, I beli eve i t pertinent , oIJweve r ; to Llvit e att ention to the
f al'-reachint implications inv olved i n the manner of a !JPlic ation of the pr.in­
c.i.plt:.: h~re discusse6. . Obvic:lsl~' t hl:l r~sponsi b i.lity io~'" plannin5 i s ,i.nilcr .m t
in that of cOlr.!!l.i:l.lld, and the liwlt.ations placed upon co"n..and aut hor ity will
iJlpose i dentical limit at i ons o n the l'esponsio ility for ~"llannir.g, To what ex­
t ent unified cc!.!.nand is jualified over all air an d airborne for ces partic i­
~ing in a singl;: oper "tion 1s a qll€stion to ce ansHer ed ).n th~ lig ht of the
V condit i oCls ootai rung ':n ea ch pc..rticJ.lar sltu.:ltion . No sL,gle solutlon 'owo u.ld
satisfy all cases. I belili:lv.:l , :lO\.ever , t ILE: .•lCItt(lr is one of i'unda;t1bnta l Ln­
por t anct3, and deserves car<Jf ul COr:tinuillg $t uo.r I t CWl ex.s:ccise a ,najor and
0

per haps a dt::c ..Lsiv Q L.'ll1uence on opa r~t ioI!.s.

6 . I I!. aCJ.cition t c the foreboll1g , th<d following ci3t ails a r e conmen+.ed

upon in vic·... of the observatio :1s \~h l. ch the Co. ol!1ClJ1ding Gene r als of the b2d
and l Ols t 1!.lr iJorne Divisions have im:luded in th3ir attached r eports .

DAYI1CHT ViRSUS :iIGP.T OPlRnTIGi,'S .

Prov iding ...eans are available t o .(.ini..m!i. ze G.an;-., e r of h05til e air

i nterception , anci to avoid or ade'-iuate~ t o nt:; ut r alize hostJ.J.e £ l'ound f i re up
t o Dnd i ncluding the DZ and LZ areas , ar~ providing the plru1 f or coor dlnation
v 6f the a irbo r ne effo rt i(lth that of .1. ri ~r.d.ly b r ound forces p ermit s) a daylight
sirbc rne oper at i on P l'e s ents deC i ded udyaot.a{,.$S-o\ter t lliLa.am.e Qp-~t io n con­
ducte d at ~daYlight our pres ent cnor nous olr sUr1er iorit y f inds i ts
Ires €l ectIve enq:d oj·r.r.ent in pr€vUlting hostilQ ui r int e r c ~p t ion and in i s o­
l atHl€, the a uborne battlefield before, <lur ing and aftdr the t r oop deliv er y .
n night op~ration IIIaS offer great~ r t.actical rmrp rise and c re ate g r eat e r con­
fusion ana disorg.mization UI,>Ong en-3!fv 10rces. On the other han d, it r equir es
a far hi~ he r t ral.ning l .;;ve l for oot h Troop Carrier and airborne forces : ra­
sults in f a r gr eater disparsion ) pres ents a alUch' loor 8 cli.ffic 1i1.t p roblem of
ground as sel.ely, and sacrh i ces !:£1st, i f not all, of t he advd..!1.taee 01' air
GUp Nr-uaCY .

(1) In SICILY and in ;WP.!I.AiillY thl.. major f a c tol' deter !!l1nl.ng a

nifht operation was the ~lan f o r c ~ or alnat ion of airborne ~ nd 6ea b o rn~ ef­
forta . I n ITALY, ....ith our figh t er s at t.h~ extr eJle h,.... it 01 t~1ei r r ange ; the
contr olling fact or in deciding upon a nig ht o?er ation ,las a,ir pOYlar. In HOL­
L.tU:~D , f or t he firs t t·l.ffi9, bot h our air sup r~Il'acy and the plan fo r coor dina+,l on
of airborne and gr o l.a1d elforts y.ero such t. n~ t a day l..!.~ ht o~~ eration .vas f eas ­
ib16 .

( 2) lione of our_ w.gQ.:·s.cal e i:oirbcrne oper ations to date war­

r ant a c or.c lus ion that aAt..m slve hos tile g r ound. lir e can b~ e ~the r lbllor ed
ored..:quat ely n6ut r all.z ed f rom t ho:; air. In SICll.Y, suc h f ire was n<::f:,li &.l bl a .

- 2 ­
 •
UNtlASSIFlffi

Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), rile 370 (CC) , subject : rtOperation'

Airbo r ne Phase, D to
D Plus T",n, Inclusive,t1 dated 4 :cee 44, cont'd o

It is signiiicant , however, that in one night operation a loss of over fift een
per cent of participating Troop Carrier aircraft was inflicted by ground fir e
from our ow n forc es . The,re is no r eason to suppose that hostile fire, had it
been available to first-class troops , wo ~d not have been a t least as e ff ec­
tive . In IT ALY, no gr ound fire whatever was encounter ed, except on the one­
battalion oper at ion at AVELLI1;O. In NOILlANIJY , g ro und fire cnco unteriJ d was
generally l ight , and far l es s than anticipated , In HOl..LAND) froUl the data so
far available, it would be dang<::r ous t o conclL:.de that str ong and extensive
AA 8round d e fE; ns ~s can ba ignor ed, or neutrali:;;ed by air action alone. We
do not yet know th ~ dens ity o f ,;n~ Jf\'f fl ak in.~t allations over which the Troop
Carri e r for mations f l ew, no r do W~ have suffic i ..::nt data on \'Ihich to evaluate
the eff ect of our nl3ut ral ization fr om tht3 air o f t hose enemy defenses which
did open f ireo The amount of fri encil~' cOJro at a ircraft available J the cont inu­
ity of this support, the str..:ng t.h and location of hostile flak defenses and
ene~ ground forces J the norale of these lorces , the durat ion of flig ht of
troop carriers over such de f enses , ana w eat h ~ r will all gr eatly influence o ur
ability to p rovl.de a dequate neutralization from the a iro Under favorab le con­
ditions ther~ is good reason to axp~ct that this can be achieved, but the MAR­
KET Operation has by no means solv ed the probl em presented by a daylight ai r ­
borne ope ration ove r dense and ext ensive en~~ flak d~f~ ns es .

b. RATE (],' BUTLIrUP .

This will be a function ot' th e availabl e air l ift, distance from

base airfi elds , 'neat her , and enGmy interfer enc ;;. JLS in any milit ary oper ati on,
the greatost poss ibl e r apidity o f c oncentration is d es ire d . Particularly is
this true in an airborne operation, \~here enemy I'Gactions will be as violent
and as rapid as he can make t hem. The objective, in o ur airborne operations ,
should b~ to provi de t he stro 'est 'os sibl e i~tial troo deliver s upported
by the most rapi d possible build- up in J:it;:n ana s lie s .

c. TROOP CARRIER Rt.?fuSilI;T ~T Iml ON THE GROUND.

This has been r e peat e dly discusse d, but never executod. It is

believed that a unanLllity of vie't'/ no., proJvails , and that t his will be provide d
in the future, coor dinat e d with a cOffi lland ship in t he air c apable of influ­
encing the troop delive ry, pr~narily r 0ga r ding last minut e deviations from
planned flight routes and the use of alternate DZ ' s and LZ' s.

d. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDnU STRIPS .

No gener alization is justified. In somo si:tuatlons it might be

pe r fectly f easible ; in others, not .

e. AIR RESUPPLY .
An evaluation of the ilrq:lortanc ...: o f air resupply s hould be made
at the outset of planning an airborne oper ation . Depending upon the estimated
period dur ing which t he airborne force must sustain itself unsupport~d by
j
- 3 ­
 .Jt:!r~lA~§~f'~r~ rne), 3~ me (CG) , subject: "Operation
1.AftKZT, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Te n, Inclusive ,tI dat ed:4 Dec 44, cont ' d o

frl dndly ground forces , the irrportance of air resupp ly may vary fran. a v e ry
s econda ry element to an essdnt.i al pa-rt of the op er ations p lan, full~ ~8.l to
that of the in l~j.a l t :ro op del:h"'!..P:!Y> In thE! latt e r cas e , its .iJnportan ce must
be accorded the full consid6ra U..on it raerits in all p hases o f planning . It
is entirely conc t;ivable that an est iJ"lIO.tt:J} duly arrive d at , of the i mpr "acti­
cability of air r es upply uJ..ght al one aictat e the a bandonment of an otharwise
feasible ~ irborne operation.

f . Q!lOUND OPffiAlI OIlS OF Tltll O."LST AIRBORN}" DIVISION.

~
The conclus ion of the Division Coll1l1\.ander, that an airborne divi­
. on is ci:lpablG of a strong e ffort in only on~ dir ection , 'Nh~ l e sound 'nhcn
applie d to Oper at ion UARKET} is subj ect to the usual ~c1H ic ation whi ch t he
conditions of any pc1rtici..J.b.r sltlliJ.tion may j ustify .

The COlllldanding Gen er al, b2d Airborn a Division, gives /;l.S his opinion
th..::t with Certa in provisos, thd s <.;:v-.;n d ays ~lapsing bt.t wc.:::n thtJ receipt of his
initiel mission <.:. n d the 1....., K<.;<-nff l'rom ddpc: rturi:! a irdromos w•• s suffici""nt .
Through the int , ns o coniJ incl d c fiorts oi tho COmlll<.nd end Staff of a vetordn di­
vision , this wa s s uf fi c bnt for this o~ a r <.:t i on, conduct ,Jd e:gainst tl r et ru<J ting
e n~ U ffiOflg "flhos d troops disorg.:.:.niz<.: tion .:nd loss of control h<.1d th.m r <::l;L ch:;d
un I.ldv,.nc f.; d stHge . In tho... cv-.:.:nt of <I n ,. irborn0 mission ng<ltilst ,ill unsh cl kon
\,; n-mly or strong ground dt. fcllses: u l(k.t""rL.:l incr ,.;.~.s e in t his tim~ Hill be im­
p er ative to p e r mit much ./lore ddt ...ilcd pla nn ~ ng , o.! nd p r ob ..:bly rche l:irs C!ls .

h. AIR SUPPORT PARTIES .

Action h" s .::lreaqy b~ O:;!n i nit L...toJd ~nd r oco,u,uenddtions forwc;lrded to

th e Vjar Department fo r the incorporetion of Air Suppo rt Parties, under a dif­
ferent name, as organic elenents in the al.rborne divisio n .:.nd corps .

1. PAltACHUT:; H oLD .Rl 1LLERY.

The hi6hly succes s ful drop of the 376th Parachute Field Artillery
Battalion, Lieut ena nt Colonel ·il. Y. GRIFt'TIn Co,illllandJ.ng, in this daslight oper­
/ ation fully Justifie d the time and effort spent in t he dev.€llopment of tilis t ype
of unit . Its US ~ at nib ht is still of und ~t 6 rmin~d value .

j. SALVAG.6:.

The probl em of salvag..l.I1g the hug e 8loounts of hi g hly expc:nsive Air

Corps equipme nt us ed in an airborne operation has been unddr study for some
time . It pre s ents ~reo.t diii'ic ulties, but its i aq>ort ancc is fully rucogniz ed .

k. GLID~R PILOTS .

I diss .:;nt irOH} the vit;w of' th e COlIllnanding Gen e.ral , 82d Airborne
Division , that this pl:1r sonnel b.., plac e d unddr the iJ!'J nediat c co,ilI,l8nd of tha

- 4 -

l
 •
1\~&lA~ini U...~
_ _ Ltr, Hq xM'~orps (Airbo rne) , fil.;: 370 (CG), s ubJ.:ict : l1Op.Jr ation
k.Al1KEl' , Ai rborn.;) ;Phas ~ , D to D Plus TI::!t1, Inclus ivG, 1I dat ed 4 Dt.Jc 44, c antld.

airborne div i s i onal cO";"l.ondcr s for full-till\:... gr o.mci traim.ng. ThcSu lJ.\.;!n <ire
al.rman , an l.nt egrCil and essential part of an Ai r Force um.t , and ClO indis­
p(.nsabl c ",l<3f..ent of th..; gl i d.:: r-tug t eam . Briti sh pr actice to th ... c ontrary
not~ithstallding, I b~licv ... thq a r e now \whert: the y b~long - in thv 'l r oop Car ­
riur squudr ons . Such €,ro W'ld training as is ct... sir abL. can bt: N ... dily g iven by
and within th~i r Jsso ci ~t~d airborn e divisibns .

1. YlEAPOIiS .

Ch ant;~s in maiv idual ~nd C N\..... sc rv..: d we apons within Cl irborn-: di­
vl.sions , to /Th:<Jt th...: s p ...cial r equi r e'1.io::nts 01' tJa r tl.c ular o,P-Jr ation&, have b -.:un
6. r ...:cogni z c d n .... c .:: ssity in this Tht::Dt ... r throughout this wa r J and g..:nvr ous as­
sis t dnc . :: in this Ng ..: r d ha.s b",i:ln provid...,d both in NORTH AFRI CA <.I nd the UNITED
KmGOOk. I bdi"'v.... s uch ch<.ngl.!s will cont i iJu.... to occur , and thCi t thes e n e\":lds
should be 1I1.clt t o thu l.l.Jlti.t of o ur r -'lsources whon requests cr Q ffiQ de .

7 . I concur ....ith thd Cou~nunding Cit:neral, 82d Airborne. Division, in his

vi..:w thi-I t Op E: r<::.t~on MARKi!oT W..:l.S nurg inal , c:.nd th..1t th0 outcorru hung in th~ b",l­
onc e for thu first !IJW d;...ys , but success is the ult.Ll18.te criterion by whic h
to judge a military dec ision, und the o~e ration of Lhe two divisions of this
Corps achieve d cons~icuous success. However, there is d point here o f such
vit al. iillX'rtance to f ut ure airborne operations in this theater .lIl this war,
that I >'Iis h to emphasize it in the st r ongest possible .!Ianner . At the tl.ffie the
decision to undertake il.ARlCi.T was made we d ealt wit h an enemY engaged in a hasty
and sOI~w hat disorganiz ed 'l¥ithd r a'iYdl und lOlr powerful Allied press ure. This
r " t rograde r.lOve.uent had be en in pr oGress lor s ix waeks and over hundreds of llliles
of g ro.md . Du.ring its c vurse on eruy COmmand had be en bddly shatter ed, and his
cont r ol seve r ely cr~pp~~ d . All thescl conditions cr ~at ed favorabl e fpctors f or
the ef:1pl oyment of ai r bo rn", ro rc ~s whor e risks co.l d~ nsur &tz with them and with
the possibl e:, ga~ns could well Dt. justlfi0d . Now W~ fac e a elif fer ent foe . His
p r ecip it 4ted retr.;at has end.,;d , his cOJh.'lClnd has b ~e n r esto r ad and invigorated ,
his control r ~es tablishcd, gnd h ~ t ights wit h th~ aid of st r ong g r o und defenses ,
clos ",r to his SO W'C 0S of supply . What we wer e abL:: t o accomplish with two o. i~
bornt. divisions in ,I.....RI(E.'T i s no indication of wh ~ t W ~ tray c::Xp&c t t o accoJoplish
in c ..;rtui n situo:tions nO~j, lind tho; JIIeas ure of SU.CC-.lSS of t Ins opcrCition llluS t
b ~ ~p prc cirlt ~ d under th ~ pit~lcs s light of cold-blooded ~nalys is, l est these
.r.agnific..;:nt divisions b", assignE::d a t ask wholly o",yon d th eir s tr \3ngth..

b . To thd lOjr<.llty, fic.tt:llity, st~ u.di·l::I st co urag~ end f~ghting spirit of the
l Olst ,ind 62d . . . irborn... D~v~s~ons, t o th ~ b a ttl ~ l~ddership of thuir COJl'lh.....nders,
M~jo r Gc;nar d.l Y. D. Taylo r ,lDd M.:ljor Gcn"r al J. Jd . Gavin, r espLctiv,.;ly, .... nd to
th", g nlJ.unt suppo rt of t h.. ir Briti s h coull'udes -in- r illS full credit i s dU-il . My
own l d.nir <~ti on c:.nd th t of this Corps for t h..:ir l.: Ch~ c v':; lllOnts i s unb o LUld~d .

/ 9. Th ... pc r fo r ll....:nc;;: of the IX Tr oop Curri _r COJn.J.:'J1d was sup,)r~or . m d ",n

~ c5s~nt ~1 contribution to th~ ov~r- all success.

10 . I c..mnot too st r ongly W'g", tht.. study J the m.: st.... ry , ...nd t~ a •.lplic dtion,
by <~ll upon who,l} d.avo]:v\,..$ ~ ny d<:llSr vc 01 r cs pon !3ib ~lity fo r the ClIlpl.0YJn..:nt or'
.J irborn", !orct;s , of th~ ~rincitJ les c nw lci ...l t ~d in 'liar Dop,' rt".,mt Trdining

- 5­

•
 , ,

~;; ;~CLASSl,[n
Hq XVIII Co r ps (Airborn~, 1r.P370 ( GQ) , subj~ct: nOp.,)r .. . 1" ~'OZ1
Ai lrborn.. PhL! s ";', D t o D Plus 'Io::: o , I ncills ive , fl <i..tcd 4 Do..c 44, c vnt. ' d.

Cir cul~ r No . 113 , ~ Octo b ~ r 1943 . i , \ \

1 .f \ .~
M. B. RIDm IAY~
~~ jor Gvnoral J u. s.
Couuu,1lldl1lg . Army , \

3 In cl s : ,
1 - h~ po rt of 82d A13 Di v
2 - Repo rt of l l ls t AB Div
3 - Admin i s trutiv0 Functions , XVIII Corps (A8)

- 6 ­
 OF THE

nd
8Z AIRBORNE DIVISION

SICilY ITALY (TI)

ITALY (I) NORMANDY

 •
, Auth: ~
(Ai1;;o/
U~!.~tAS~~nElluARTffiS I nit : . 1" ,/1, (.~
.w'
Date ; a'Da c 19 <it;
1i ""
82D AIR80RNg DIVISION
Of f ice of t he Divis i on CoJIli.LB.nder
,

APO 469, u. S. Ararr

3 December 1944
,s UBJEI: T: Le ssons of Op er ation !.ii.RKh"'T.

TO Co.nma nding Gene;:-al ; XVI II Co rps (Airbor ne )., APO 109 , U. s. ~my .

1 . This l et,t er is subJIutted in ccr:!p.lil'lnC'e with v erbal orders, Coaunand­

ing General , XVI LI C0l1=6 ' (i< i !'bo- r.o)" Th e"C'e .~ s also sl!ba"J,ttad here~ith a
copy 0 1' this Division's oper ational r epo n f o r the pe.!.."iod 1 7 Septemb e r - 1 6
o.ctober 1944.
2 . GeneJ:'a.l : In ' general thi s operat -i.on ser ved t o empha si ze the val ue
01' lessons learned in pas t airborne opC''t'a'':ions , Most of t hese l essons are
well covered in Tra ining Circ u.l.ar 1.1.3 1 i;iar IiP.pcr t ment , 19J.J, The content
.natter 01 tl':is circula r i s bel iev ed t o be basically so und and it is not re­
co.n:"enoe d that any chang es be made in i t .. Al l of our pas t couob at e..<pe r iences
and our analy s is of o ur a i rborne op e~ ations and t r a 1nLOg we re drawn upon to
p rovide the ba ckgr ound f o r the plann~ng and execution o f operation ~~RKE Tft
Although our t hr ee previous CQ,ub &t op erations were c onducted under cover of
darlO'les s , trairling p r eviousl y conducted enabled us to arrive at a sound pl an
fo r r eorganiz at i or. on the g round ana ProlUPt .lnitiation of Ol.ll' g r oWld act i on .

3 . SeQuence of Planning: ()n 10 Sept ellmer 1944 , at 1800 hOUT::> , a con­

f erenc e was held at Headquarters , r'ir s t A...lied Airborne rnw ~ The mi s s i on
of the 82d Air borne Di v~ slOn to sieze and hold the bridges over the MAAS and
',:AAL Rive r s and the h4 h gr ound aouLinllting t hese oridges \'ias g iven to the
Division Coumande r at this t iJua . The 10110'o1ing t ,'ie1ve hours Vlere devoted tl'l
i ntens ive study of the ter rain \lit h a view t o a'r rivir"!& at an out l ine g r ound
ta ctical plan and t he se.l ec t ~on of t'rope r landing zones . At 0800 ho '.. lrs , 11
Septe.lober , Capt. HARRY i3ESTl!'J3R.l!.URTZE, Dutch COuLda ndo Officer and nat i ve of
N IJMEC~ , HOLLAND, became av.a i lable to a s s ist t he s t aff .. At 0900 ho ur s , 11
September , a conferenc e was held at the op erational he adquarter s, IX. Troop
Carrier COI..nand, a t fiih l.ch tUll'! the dro p and landing zones were s el ect,ad) full
cons ideration be ing g iven to the accouplisl\.loo ot of the gr o und mis sions from
t he landing areas s el ect ed; the hostile fl a k likely to be encountered; capa ­
bilities of the 'T r oop Ca r rier COJl.If.L.and .in del i ver ing us t o the desi r e d loca­
t ions, and the loc ation of the dr op zones in r alation to the proposed line of
1'li[ht over the operat i onal ar ea of the 1roop Car r i er a ii·c raft. A div ision
outline p l.an was pre pa r ed ilf~"ediat e ly fol.lfJw.!.ng t hi s and presented to t he
unit cOJHll1snders of the division the f ollowi ng day, 12 September 1944 . Troops
began movi ng to the t ak,?- off airaroJil8s on 1 5 Sept embe r and we r e closed and
sea l eQ at the a iraromes a t dayl ight, 1 6 Sept e mbe r . The per iod bet we en 12
Sept embe r and 1 5 Se;>t euher was devoted to pl annlIlt and i ssuance of orders
and p repar ation of ~n dividual u~it 10ads4 This time would have been mor e
than adeqlU.l.t e f o r t his par.)ose , howeve r 1 in thi s op er ation a n umbe r of ch<:lnge s
in the basic pl an , each vitally aff ect ing the c ompos ~tion of the divis i onal
lift Imd the location of units at i·akr:off air~ .nes, made definite plann.L"lg
e xt r~mely difficult. The seven....ctay pt;:rio3 al10'ried bet wee n t he t .i..oe Gt u.u:t
r ec e ives its mission W'lt il i t st agd S 8 '1 airtJor r:.e oper at ion i s aru;-le pr::v j ded
all supplies . are in the hands o f the +-, reflps and t r ansport,ation is AY9;j ~.~ !.:le "
to "X?ve troops to the tai~e-CJf!' ah.:'rL">'OIt."'s ' l1n~ .?'=:2·!i d~~tLdt ", hen t ht;ju..T4~~ ~!} .
is g~vbn to thg~ivJ.~j..2r.:S..?!:~:l1~!.. h~_ .:LI ~~~~6Jd.!2.n t.be .g Y.,a i i<!Ql e . :~.f ·;:'i ::.~.
tal(e-nff aird' ~ ~~~4 __~~'!. !~,,!!.;!.e=:.._t..2~'_~:~ ....?f'.:..R~-£.dF~-2P.E9. ~t ~, H.y t~ ~,,)le ~_':.:~!J:~!.
drop Zones wit h...E _!:J!.?;(.:..'!....:!?~_.h;):!:'i_ <l.i.!: :'=-:'.,!,:,';!~ =:"Bt .Ei:. +.trJ nJ:!-" 'l ~n J ' l'Ii d c ':l. -Pl:-:'­
s uppos as t.hl:~ aycu):.ili lj,~'L}l£.&9 ('d . 111JlP Brtd ph ~ covel'age o
.' , . ,
4 . ~ct' ..qJ._'!:~'?'.i.9,!!,,il.}_+'Q!l; Thls , it is believed, is ad~quate~. cQvered
in t he .accot:Jfla~in.5 operat i onal report.

5. Lessens I G a~~~:
-
(1) Qe,tes·~..~y~! Tht:: pT'cl ct l ce of assignin6 an airbor ne division
front ar. e far in exce s s of that nornlB.l."!.y g ivdn 0 gr ound diviSion l.o.ust be weighed
vc ry cardfUll.,y and full coosi d':: raticn g iven to the pr oba ble enemy groW'ld re­
action . 1;0 this oper at i on the st agg dring t as k of se~.zin g cros sj ngs over .three
lllB.jor waterways and dcu.U16tlng t. e r; 'ain , a s \0'011 as occ ilpying and w lding aP":
proxiulately 25.• 000 y ards of f ronc.agc: re quired t ho coup l ete ~nd rapid coUl..Jlit­
lne ~t 01' all' ttie troops <:lot thd dis p:>sal of t hd Di vision Col'OIll.e.n dc r . As the bat­
tle d03velo,jed. in int ens ity , we;;'ght O.r· Go r man at tacks debo uching from the R;!J:CHS­
~'; ALD tnlJ;de it i apo~s~bl e to comm t a " 1'0r'c e "'0 1 any size aga ~n s t the NIJM$Ell
Bridge Until D-plus- 3. ~'ven then :it W"iS an ext r emely marginal pez:fo r l1l8nce .
The pr oblem of mopping up the area ..it.hi n t he p W' illleter of defense alo:le was
sufficient to eng age a great bulk of the div .ts~ on. I I the civilians were op~n­
IX hostile the probl em wo uld "have been i wmea surably mo r e difflcult~ Holding
ke,Y terrain in an air bor ne oper at i on by seizing locations of high tae;tical
value and covering the gaps between them '"I ith pat r ols and fire i s pract.\.«(lple
onl.\.' so long as t!1.e enelI\Y does not throw sufficient weight against the gaps to
force an entry into your lIlain battle po sd.t .!.on. In t his operation, when the
ene~ undertook major attacks and pen etrated the divisionis dp. fa~sive area to
abo ut 1,000 yards , all weight thdt could be mustered o"las thr.own against them
at thes e points in vigoroas , desperat e countel"-attackB support.ed by evary means
available within the division . This resulted in wide gaps, oVl::lr 1, 000 j'ards
in SOI~ cas ds , of the front being unoccupiea and undefended. A vigorous, alert
enemy , with the proper ul~ans at his disposal, could hav e capitalized on these
opportunities ~ o s eriously jeopardize th~ integrity o f our dei' tmse s~t-up.
Operation"MARKET was a marginal per for~nce as a ground operation from s~art
to fi nis h 'and should not. necessaril.,y bt:l take n as a y ardst. ~ck f or the capa­
b.i.llti.as of an airborne division in an aver age situation .

(2) Neather ; Weather again proved to be a IIt)st iJrportant .faqtor

to conside r in staEi ng an airborne operation, es peci ally when the accomplish­
ment of' the i!.r ound mission is aepende nt upon an airbor n e lift that is to build
up for a p eriod of several days aft e r the initial landing . The failure of the
32 5th Glide r Infantry to land in operation ....ARKEl' until D-plus- 6 may have well
caused thu de f e at of the enti re force if the Ovrman counter - at..tacldng forces
had been stronger . The late or non- arrival of the air r esupply lifts became
a v~ry serious l!l8tt er by D-plus - 3 . I f the successful execution of t he b"r oWld
,nission depends upon t r oops a nd supplies thut are t o . arrive subs equent to D-
day, ic. must be 8ppreciated of bad waather J.Jl8y .result in the
. . ..l
"

 • •
failure to accomplish the mission and ?ossibly the defeat of the airborne

fo rce . 4 Therefol"e, t he present met nods of r esupply , b oth t r oops and suppl ies,

iaUst be {cod ified to p err.ti.t re supply by infiltrati on W1der any weathe r co.o­

ditions by borrbers o r s imilar type aircraft \.it h especially traine d crews held

ready lor cQ.anitment t o assi st an airborne force on the g roW'ld if it becomes

necessary in the event of bad weathe r.

~. (1) Air Suppo rt : An airborne opl::! ration needs a maximum amount

of air SUppClrt, bl-fore, during and a.fter the landings .. The success of this

oper ation as a daylight operation was due l ar gely t o t he excell~nt pre- l and­

ing a ir support and to the suppor t given du r .l..Og the l a nding .. F"riendly fight­

ers acco.npanicd Troop Car:t'ier a ircraft all the way i nt o the landing areas a.nd

were frequentl,}.' seen at tacking g round fiak positions . Spotty fiaK was r e­

ceived from the time the Troop Carri er aircr aft crosse.d t he hostile coast un­

til the l andings were made . I t is beliaved that it would have been Juuch heavi­

e r, with. a co nsequent heo.vier Tr oop Ca rrier los s , if thorough fi ghter cov erage

had not been available . Support a fter l anding in this op er ation was g i ven by

the RAF . Air support illis sions, the r efo r e) had to be request ed through Hea d­

quar ters , Airborne Cor ps . The clos e a i r support ava~able in operation NEP­

TIJNli:, in NOR..1ANDY , co uld not ba obta w e: d o Direct radio conmWlication fo r the

purpose of calling in f ig ht er s O[J hosti le targets was not a vailable .

(2f Air Suppo rt Par~ ie~~ Air support parties should be p~rman­
ently assigned to d div~sio n so thot they w~l l become full y acquainted with
the diyision p ersonnel ond airborne problcrr~ . To assign an air support party
just be for e an operation is not a satisfactory solut i on to the air support ,
problem. These assi&ned a ir suppo rt parties should be availabl~ to parti­
. cipate in all g r o Wld, as well as a irborne ope r ut i on s during training of an
air borne divis i on . Just p rior to an operation the y should be given an op­
portW1ity to become a c quainted with th<J a ir supt'O rt squadrons that hl;l.VE:! bo:;::en
assigned the ~ssio n o f s upporti~~ th =ir Qivision. Air suppo rt part i es .need
l!IUch JIlore exper~e nc e than they hav€. had to date in handli.ng thElir particular
. type o f equipment in airborne exe r cises.

c . Anti- Air c r a ft Fire: 301311\}' a,ck-ack did not prove too serious an

oQstaclc , - p r incipalJ..y due t o o ur own oir suppo rt. Ack- ack crews at t he drop

zones \vere destroy e d by the par ac hutists .L.lIllidi ately upon their landing . It

is be lieved, however , t hat the ef f~cts of enemy ac k- ack could. be .tlJo r e t hor- I

oughly neut.ralizo;:;d by f urther eXpl oitation and development of new pl" ~vo::nt ative

1116<!sures. It is believed, for I.lxaJl*pl~ , that sJl"IOke could well have been used

In tht:: v i cinity of NIJ t!.ElJ~ and in t he vicinity of the i(J~ICffiWALD on ~pl us-l

to g uarantee a mor e favorable a irbo rne delivc rj ""nd pos sibly raduce ev/::!n f ur­

ther the a ctual l osses suffered •

.£. Drop & landing Zon es :

(1) The careful selection o f drop and lCinding :zones p.robably

has !tOre b{;;aring on the successful outcome. of tne groun d p ha se of an air borne

op e r~tion than anY oth~ r factor cons ider ed in operationa l plann ing . Their

proxiI.iity t o the obj ective , to cove r a nd conc eallnent, to wate r ~nd si.mila r

hazards; and to terrain of high tactical value fo r dominatill& the enemy im­

.rredL,.tely upon landi.n6 all mus t be care fully considorod. I believe that the

p ar achute drop zones and trye gli d.;r landlng zones, and r ~ supp ly drop a r e as

- J ­
 should be identical whenevdr possibLe, or very close to each other • . £Nen with
a mimimum of ene~ r 0sistance, it is ir~ra cticable to fight a mile outside
of the p c: riineter of ·a de f""nsc in orde r to socuro · t emporarily a . r~suppJ.y area
or glider land1ng zone •
.' ,
. . (2) Ground: Glid<o r Co,lw,unications; Soma met ho d must be arrived
at .... itho~t :d(..loy .for- 1-· nf-- Qrm.:T:i;:l&
C"~t~. he"",gcl
~ ~~;~_a~_~' r="p~1'f·l~' o:"ts of thob o:x.~ct 'a Na in which
they should land. In t his ,op,er at :i..on D/1 zone s T and N wor e ir~ ed of· all Gcr­
il"lan troops an ho'..!r D. ft"r. our · l1liti.o.l lc.nd.tngs occurrvd on D-.day. P'".owcv~ r, by
duy light, D-plus- ·l > Ge r IDcL."1. c..:...t'Ji'£)~': s al.!'-·p>:'Opellad gW1S c nd af:,g r e ssive infw.t ry
ur.its had OV ~ I'r ,,_'1 both l.:r: d.ing: pon (Js b c~ J. '.l3c of o~ ~ ..;ns iv c committille nts in
oth'_r diructlf):') $: p"i nc ipt!lly c loJani ng up t h..: ;..r ea <..nd s e izlll6 the three brid­
(;:;)s. By 1000 hours , D-p l '.lS-.l, t3voJ"!:'Y G,·'T c.il... bl e "l....n wa s org anized into two f.lo:Jin
cOW1tc;r- ott c.~ cki.n g l'o rc e s wh ~ch, <!tt <.>ckj.ng shortly b\;; fo r o no on, drovtl th'~ G'ir­
.r".ns b;..ck to th (;: l'ront.:..... r t:long th~ Rri:IC ~ ISUA~.J) " .Ji;'V":m so , th..:. c ",st~rn por.ti.ons
of the L.nding zones word un d.c r s r.1<l ll d ' lllS fire, soruet i.nes of great intens ity ,
c..nd .undi.r ~.rti.u·(::rJ' J.:nd mort:(r fires of nil c"llburs . It w.. s t oo l at e ut this
tLDE. to g.. t ~.nl'or"k .tion to th..; glid.... r pUots to V nd on LZ O. Instructions
wart:;l th~r\:::i"or t.! s t'::nt to· th~ glld,,-r p.ilots ·to l ::;\nd on tho western sid~ of th~
LZ!p,- n.L. r · th;.. noods on th.., GR03BrEK h<J~ gh t s , Th.::so t. re ~ s woJr" (;'?-tiNJ..y free '
of s.tt.all arms tir.·e. a..'l.:1 ;·.:'i:1 ·sorre e-aGes ) .frl'le 01' enenw observat ion and only W1deJ'
occasional artil.leo ry fi re~ It. is be.h eved t ha.t. thl.s information NlJ.ched only
very . fen of .th~ g~ i de r pilots and JD.'l1:'y t,15 dd::'S and gl ider troops lost could
otheI"V'!i.se have been. £clved if i t had bee n p ~s s i b2. e to g ive them .s broe ground­
to- air signal, · ev.er, aft er the ir C1;rrival ove r the L2 1 s. This is a lilO st iL1pOr­
tant problem and tra L~ing w~th a vi ~w to its solution ~ ill be conducted as
~Ool"!: .as. the· /nG9;hs are o.vailabJ-e.
' ..
..
'. ~• . Par(;l.chute Fi~Jd Art,i .l1-e:;:.y': The employment of tJ:1e pa rachute Field
. . Arti;t.lery of this di. v i s~on ..as Ci p ar a chute fo r cd .no rc: t han justi1'i{id the . Troop
.Carritlr ,lift e.xpcnde.d in it s ("o lruait,J)1o;r.t . . The J 76t h · Parac hute Field .Artillery
. engaged ' its tCirgets shortly a ft ~r l~ding and on D-plus:l, prior ' to tht:) UI'­
rival of th¢ glid<;, rborn~ arti l Lary , contribut~d, I b cl i evt3 de-cisj.vt:;ly·j ,'·tc .the
success of th ~ g r oW1d f~ ghting.
., .. '
Glid03rborn", he avy anti- tank wea}X>.ns, such as 57 ~~ :shoul9. ?c­
f.
co,npa~ /::I - parachut e i tlfantry rog.L[,¢nt \,h ~ncver yossible • . In thl.s operd.t·ion
two . 51 1 s were p:.res ~nt ·,dth e&ch parachut..: N gi loent shortl y aft~I' l.and-1-n8 . ­
. ' ~X ' r
g.Pbthflnd>:> rs: .Ni):\:"ig;..,.tion by P~t hf'.l nders Wldor . d aylig-h~ . con.d.tt,ipns,
although . not as critical ly Te Ciuired o.S ..I.t ni gr.t., still is ess ential · tQ· t .hw ?uc­
.c'- ~s oi . im ,:irborne op(;r ...:tior. . G~n..:rcJ.ly, 'it; is b cli.:.:ved th;;:.t daylight . Path­
finders· should ' be dro~ped e oou't ten nunutes prior to the <.,rrival of the .first
ser.4l . .A longer t~ lne aug ht jeo.pordil,. El the success of the entil·e oper<!tion.
The u rea in which they drop ,Rust be vt.;:ry · carefully selected. ·

h. D<s.ylight. op er <.. t ions a re ,nu.ch ea sier to ·c a rry through to a succese­

i ul cOL,clusion th o.n nif!, ht Opert..i.. ions, provided the en6lD3 &r ound situa tion is
f~vor ~ ble , lor d duyli&ht o p er~tion. Despite the success of operl::ltion MARK~~,
-it is be lieved however th t u dayl~g ht " irborne operation would meet \dth
di Sdst rous results i f <l hi..:.hly organiZed ground def ense , s upported by <lrJIDr,
Glistcd · l..fl the J."",,,.,di <.!t G loc a lity o f th ~ lLnding .

PClTlichutes, p.-rachute conta iners c.tnd gliders

mU8;t This hfl s not b ~ en th~ case to d nte .
A occurs in an ~ irborne operntion due

•
to ,the uncontrollc a ,"- n o. willful dt!struction WId I"is dpp ro) ri ation of gl ide!"s
~na p~ r a~hut e s.by troo~ s o! ~ll br anch~s ~nd natiioa l1t i es . G e~crally spea ~­
~~ , It 15 balleved th ~t ~ lroo rne,troops t iv~ gr ~ Jt cr crrrc to ~~ Corps cq~p­
than oth<;;:r troops " possibly Dccuuse of t heir f amiliill"ity with it <:.lna
uJ...m t
t. lcir <! pp rcci ~ tion of its value . It is ioost iroporte nt th i.t a Tho.... t clr policy
be e st~b l ish~ d ~nd pub ~ isht!d to all troops dS soon e S pr ~ cticablc on th ~ s d f~
g u::rding of equit>ment in u irborna op cr ~ tionS.

J.. Rapl Lc0u.tU1ts : Opportunity ulUst be t;,iven for airborne units to ab­
s urb and train r epldcements before being committed to an operl:ition. It is be­
lieved tho.t e i t; ht weeks are a minimwG for this purpose . All wlit cOJ,lJLanders
and .,.any soldiers of t his division, in a cOlilb at q uestionna ire recently conducted,
expressed the desir e th~ t rooI'e opportunity bd given to them to train with thClir
new r epl uc e.nents . The :1ig h individual initiative and s kill "-nd the superior
s,/tall unit nnd bc1ttclion tea1Illwrk r eq:.lirea to c arry nn airborne unit through
to Eo succe ssful ..ussion requires t ho ro ~ h, int~se , r clalistic ... irborne training,
us we ll oS t round trc. ining . The l!1i!chint!- liKe dXt.cutioncof t he ullssions of each
b attalion of t his division in t ilis opdrution, it i s believe d, rusult dd from
t horc.ugh tr uining and HJSist cnce upon prou;pt, pos itive c::.ction i"Jlldd ktely upon
h.nding . This cun on ll-- bd l e ....rned through p rop ..r tra ining .

k. Glid( r Pilots: Glider p i l ots must be well trained ground soldie rs

or th ~y ""ill not live l on g . At bast ttcy will be <! lia bility to <lny <=.irborne
CQ ,lilrul nder until th;;:y can be t:V<lctli.. t~d frolilo the conb et zone . It is rccom.ik. . n de d
thc:.t thoy b e put :md.:::r i.:..mcdL.!td COl.it.lk.. nd of th :..I irborna divisionol COI.:ill1d ndt..rs
Q

f o r full- t w ground tra ining , with nccess <..l ry p ~ riods , . llocc1t ed to th("Jir glider
pilot truining .

1. "::(:apons :

(1) Durin6 the p <: st Yo,;dr und <I hull o f d rborooJ opt:U' b.tions unit
cortmf:l nders of this division hiwo , through comb at n~ ccss ity , found it de sira bl e
fro ... tiul"; to time to &ug.fient or ~th<:,; r-tlis o modify the we apons th_t were uu.tho­
rized in orde r to meet s p ecific t a ctic ul Qonditions . -,hUe this condition
Hlay~" ut first g l ance , app ei;>.r WlS Oo.lIlQ and, at best, umdse, it has nevertheless
proven neces s bry cnd, I believe, un effective co ntribution t o our cOJClbat suc.. .
cess ". It i s believed to be sound, therefore, t o est~ blish as cl guic;ling prin- .'
cip1e the S3Ct th~t ~ irborne units may r equi r e : ~n d should hove 3va il uble, dif­
f e r ent I'/ edpon s an d equiprre nt for different missions . In t hd dyKe countr y of
IiOlJ..AND BAR' s \·. e r ~ . t a premilLlI . In this division e.:. ch p l.r a chute rifle sqUod
is now equipped with one BAR ov.... r lind above its nor.n.:ll c0>--i:>l eillc:mt of W6d.pons.
Additione: l d.. . R's '(we N obt. din cd '"-Hhll ~ in HOLlAt.U.

(2) At ont t~ m£ e Very p~8c hutist wa s a r mQd ~ ith u Gal . 45 pistol .

Tni s Wi:.S l at er r s..:;laced by th(: c3rbine . A 'n;Hpon of t his t ypt. 'N US nc c cssury
b..lc !l.uSC <..I ll rii'l..ls \~or e dropp ed in s qUu d cont u inors clnd it was css cnth.l thut:
tht. pbr tl chuLi s ts ha v... a w~ apon 00 th eir pe rson to be c.r.pl oy ed until they could
obt a in rin es . ', n th th'O. :..:.dv ent of thu M- I r ifl e c onta ini:l r th~ folding stock
c <...rb~n" has COmE: into disuse exc ept wh,-,r~ it is Eo pri.•.. :...r y hand w~cl.pon tor
cl'.'Yl- stJ rvo;.d .... I;l... pon creYrs . It is impr<!ctic....lb1d fu r ... p~ r~ c hutist to drop with
bot h ~ f olding stock c "l r bl n .:l , fo r nis .i.lJunedi ,t e prot ....ction, ,:.nd tht3 M- l or
BAR in ? contc i ncr. It h~s the r~i or~ prov~n ~ dvis ~ bl e LO r~c~nt oper dtions for
tha i ndividu:.l p .... r ..: chut i st to drop with I:l pistol for his i mmodi i-.tc protection,

- 5­
 U" ~CLA\illi>l~r. .tU

n . ,
, . ' " . :'C"
'­ {

, . -;-: . .. "; ".

.. ..

as viell us· "his noriilQ,l ha.nd ~eapon; eithe r rifle, BAR or c a rbine. Since a uth­
o rity does not now' exist for obt'cuning these p isto l s J only a fe~ fortunate
L)divid.J.a1:s have '\:>e en s o . .. rilled . It ~s aw belief th2.t a nwJ'ber of 11v'35 could
. h ave " be~ sav ed iri ' t hl.s operct'lon if th.; individual tk1d been ~ rmed -,;ith a p is­
t ol upo.n 14l1ding, and it is Certain th ...t droj:ls soong t.ostile civilLws will
result in sd.l'n& "loss 01 lifs ' froIl!- Lnti~di b te .ltt.:a ck upon l .":nding wess our ·
pa.rachutists· h re . .I rmc:d ·... ith pistols. It is
ther e ford rcco,n,fi;,; nded t h..!t st ~ ps
jbcl t ..:.ken .to provid..: ove ry p.: rachu1;.ist ,', ith .1 CcQ . 45 pistol.

m. Fksu.EE..!z: R(; suppl.1 continues .to be one of our mt.jor unsolved

'problems.. Alt.li.ough c. solution ex;ists =.I t 'the pres ent , it is not believe d to
b e s ,.~~f a ctory J.s l:!v~ilc.l;jd ·in.thtt !!CCO.npH l1ylng ope:r atioDe l report . · .P ras uming
·th ~t pa r a chute ri:supply is ·a ccurc!t.Jly and coapdctly deliv er ad in territory
occupied. by friuild.ly nctiv~s , i t still would r~quire' approximately one-tJtird
of the infantry forces or" the ' division to recover and deliver to the firing
line :J da.ily resupply . Parachute ' resupply is an emergency meuns of resupply
at bes.t 1;.hat c an only augment & soiind plan fo r · res Uilply by other rue.ms·. .At
prE;~ent., troops of tills divis~on ~~r~ qn, ~hej,r person suf ficient sme.ll urms
UaIlI.!lLlntt".ip n ...nd r gtions for seve r IJ1 · aays.. figh~ing . wl.th pr ope r t r aining und .
good supply discipline, an .luborno;: 1:or ce CWl. exist ior sevs.r <Jl d...ys on the
supplies i t brings . . ith it , provided ~n6~ resist...ncd is not too intense .
The resupply proble.n, the reior e, is not :" 5 ho ?C less : 5 it may first uppe.,.r ,
but it is b (:.liy y~ d th t this p robl",m should bl:l g iv en mor,; study ...:nd d.zveloyed
in tra ining" . C:XIJrcises. It is b",licv..:d th ot r~supply by glid<:;I"'/'W0uld be i1 fur '
more ~fficicnt jn.:;t ;.od thHn by p...r <.t chute. .. '. / .

('---J~..
~ _ "
~ J; .
/-" f>ff"24<~
/' j.M-~"..Ih, .
" / /J. I JAbIUlS.M . GAVIN ,
// / k:t. jor G... meral, U. S . Arll\y,
/ .' • CO'llal.<"!I1d.J.ng.
I ...
L .• '
1 I ncl - COpy of O~d r ~ti ona l Report .

".

,. J r!'i.~.. .;,'•.01:..~".,~.. ~n\!\.i. " c ,,":.l !i. t·

.1 ., ' : .~ .. Jj\i~ .. .. ..' •
> .... .
I

HISTORIC t ..L Dl~~2L.

P}-\.Hr:I.' I
~,.

P.i.H'l' J. J.

lJl-~.E'~' III

Pl,R'r rr Ii

j'J.ili:S H . GAVIP ,
d a,jor Gen8ral,:J . ~) . i~ .,
Commanding
• .
••
J,;;mn its ret'lrn frorl ~,-orT1.L:-~ (ly on 1 9 ,Tul ,'f 19hh this llivisio n
''1e s locE-lted in tho :·fl1t,L.i.i , ;) ' "' - _,0 icc s 't'3r - "l'kct }Io.:: ooro A~:ren . 'i'here
it rt~m e i n ed tina trained un t i l its 1)F.!:ctlc"Lpotion ill oJ€ l 'Gtion ;;j]\ ­
ICE'r on 1'/ ~")e .Jt\~m lJe r l qhl:. . 'l',·cro ty - :;.',-,Ul' bours r11':!..o:r t o talre - o f f ,
all a:i. l'bDrnC f.lenentr:: 0:;'-' tbe. J) : vt3.i.on '.:ete clo::led (Jt seVf!.n alrl' ie lds
i n t he (~r8nth~f:ll -CO'V\,CSj :Drc: -1::11lf~ tU' H:i,'e n . ,'!'.l.e1'i.l1C;s "Iere cOl!ducted ,
l OAdl nc l)lans tol'] til l s tGU , .::: L"L l"tmll (: hec~cs u n do , tln(l. the lJi v i Hio n
to!)]': of!' for the _ ethc:L'load3 e.HJ.J.: LiG 1 ('.~ n L~ (It 1 70'1,0 .Je::; ·)tsTIl.be l' 19h 1~ .
'1.'i1l:) l1is:;l"lIl l1.r tlJ' l;j.viGior:. iLl this o?eret.t~ n ',")(1S DS fo Llows :

"I,and by par!l~· JJlJ.t o and r l ir]er cO!l!·lencin,"! D Dt.,,{ SU11th o f

J,"i j msglJrl; scL.:: t! und holG. tho hi " !1\'IllY bl'id .... :.~ ::. ecr::JfiB t!Je
t .n ss Hiver ut r;'~Dve and ehl3 . iSfll. IUver at '··ijme~E.m ; s:;ize ,
ox,:::cniz.e , ond hvl(~ r,h'J hlgn ,'";rour.d betwuP'.ll ~ti,imop,sn and
Groesbce x ; deny the roods iH thn D!vision urea to the
enemY i at"!.rl d ..> lrinnte the ar9fl bOll11,ded l',' ortil ~y liuG rtL.'1 ­
ninr:; from beet: ·.. .'rst t iu'oue;.1. j~otcrt t lh.H1Ce ;)(lut m'lest to
':;, Inds(:h.=strc.at , ":;u uth b:.~ j~i"6r ' tlS3 ()'lU th(l •.oo~ -:R ietilorst
high\i,"~' , ~:ost b· r Glo ve -!'· i.iuegen hir::hwoy und :?OJ~st Eetchs ­
weld , Gl:.d 't;~t by l ine r unning 'iTortil and i')O 'l t h thl'o u.~h
L i ndsohestraet . ·'

The f irst l ift con sisted of:

H9 " liq Co S2d • .II, [; 1;-

.-.?r ',,-­
.
<:ht
,
Glide r

---;20­
•Iq :<. JIq .otl'Y Di v ... :;:oty 3 2

82d 1./~ Sig Co 6

.u
".:1" ...."It·
... r y ~ ... 0111 Jl J. j '...
•.. 1 ... ~ l:.n
'E: 22
307 ,./b i.no tin 27

504 .t'rcht ruf 137

505 l?:: cht Int 126

50B 2rcht Int 1:;0

3:~5 Glld'!)r J:nf

;76 . .Il'cht J~J ~ eLl I8

':.'o tDl 50
Jl.ll units d!'ol)Y'le rt E1 S :pll:'l:ulUd 6:7CB'1t t\'!O ~~riD13 of the
505 1.1ar3ch:;,-I;,e I n fElntry . ;.. lllX',ifl tn rnarohall i.rp cour.e,:. the 2d
Eot t aU.on soriol to dro9 b r:.r"ore tJ~e 3d;' bttc.liol1. ee':"iDl , 3jld c,s
e C O ;lsC(:ue~c(' the ;'~d. L.3tta l ion seria l "OS dl·o··nac:. tvlO trJO~.lSom!
Y<;lrds .:o_,t,}:,ousi", ~)i' its sche(iulen (11'':)l) zone .
The ent.Ll'(' fliS!lt \;8S !) r e.:;(>de(~ by e uut:lfi':li~er tomr. , whic h
l ondoc 0.:.1 'J'i'.J ,•• J" te:c. T:l.Lnutn S Dr lor to the 01'1' i V~ 1 0:' t,lc i" i r:Jt
e l ements 01' tho lIla in boe~r . ,' 1 ttl ·i.be o;~ce':)t.5.on :~n th", 5C5 ')C1'O ·­
chute ~nfl.~ n tr~r .\.ndIc8 ,;'~ (\ nb::n;-G , n I L unit::; londefl on I~h('! (irop zo nes ,
or I n 1.11e iHJ.i.',(;t1.idtC vici n lty the:ceof , o n SChCd 11') . }I'I,, ': en r out o
r;DS s pott:r !.ll':,d 110:t . li' l!:;.~ c ::)Z1lr:[', f::::01'I J}'L. nC" rirJ:1 :tn~ tiI.3D_~r het~ v'y
b u t In(,Qc lu·o tr; . !l!h'3 first )8I'3l!l1utists to l&nd de::; tr oye d a l l flaK
uJ'cws £.I ud took OVE':l' thEd.::· ',',1,.0)0:18 . ,· _.el::JY disiJOa:_tion s 8lonr, t he
l'.EiClS - i.-.al i,;!Jnol in t ll( v1.cin.ity 01' all briclr.; ~ 13 a n d 1.n t he v'ooded
co un try t.:.t.':Jr..Lid ths ;aJ'\cg~,ll h€';ir~>t s ~ma. :La the neicl!Gwu l d we r e , os
a n t~cipCltcJ , \,ell o:c r-vniz;id and 01' Db'Jut 0 3tr(~nf'th of eIGht b£: t ­
t o l ions . .Jl'r;.l,st~ i ng fLee 0Jllti0.H2d t.,) CO ','J j,'l'Jrl i',ho e,h;e s of t he
drop zones thl'oughout [.1J. 01' \..1.' llm rliI'.~;G until OVO:r;'CO;1£. . o:.r :J.:;!r.1y
r ea c tio n Wb S prol~!>t unu 0 ..'}';l~'Jr "'0 t. ~) 1'0110"/ n oJ,'inl t 13 po t te rn . ];.11
l o ca l t roo,s \';c r e CO,lll,:i tt.~~,1 i'::!l1vc1ilJt.cl." ill 1100.1 1:1.'38 1 ft:sh i o n .
rTear h,Y "homsyll:uc" t,ViJC t~··1."'1'.':o\ 1 :",' thro·, .•l i 'j ::of; "'l ~ c!\l .:r es they
CO'lhl b e r,whon to tl:, o' ; I·u ~"ton:,l. Ol'l.\..i . -·';.1.::; ·) h~r.r,! mea l build up
~. n creo s e d un til fl coord.Ln i"t.c d 31,,\,:)C '( \:l:,. ; 'Vl<..1u., :r ,t~ ';{Jl!~n 6th
..lara Di vi s~.on on Df h . .(~"
,.\" I ..
.I'~
.
'OJ "I . '1
~
111 ~ • ,
- 1 - ~ ~ t> _
· ...
..

Loc'\ l. enemy units 1;161'6 in .i. t i ~ l l:y ove rc~mc :::nd des troy ed or , exceIi t
fJ" t.hose in t hE: city of Ki}Dp.l:.>er.. prop er , ti1.ey diape r' sed in t he
ti r- at several houts ,:.. fter 1 ::l11di ng .

.• d~lY by dj.Y summ.;:.ry o f the: ..l ctivl t1c;.s of ef;.-::h unit o f the

Dt vison f e llo·. :a :
o DoY. 17
U
· · ~ fp,"1
q~:r.¥:::!EER
(l' 11 Uflfn
hll!IL.ftIII I H L'
01 vi sien p r... ro.ch~ te ele!!lcn "...e in fO 'Jr' hundr ed and e1 6hty - two

0-47' Blond f:1 Beri 'l i cf fi:[t'l (l l d~re l0ft ....i rpor· ts in t h e c..rea.

of Gr'..l.l1tham , S:8 1md , bet w ~'3l::.:950 ..nj 1040 . ..1 1 ee,ri 3.1s excop t

those of ;04 P : -. ra.::\.l.\ite i 'llf:":Jtl j . l...J..'Jed ::crth , L.s t, 'lnd So uth

o f Gr·oesb0e!\. , !iolL'~ld J ~::ci't; Ce.i! 1 2C:O ..1j:lrj 14CO . T~e- 524 P fl. r ~ c hu te
I n f<ll1try 1 3n dfl1 ' !es t -:..f c!s ~L' s - '-!:...a l ,~ n ...l .;.TId _I O::t'rJ. of the j.1a3.8
Riv er . :~ll d rop P! ~ t v' ~ ',ie~'6 ey'c (::. ll o!.~ t . .?c:.t 3C'!-J~~c;1 ..!.nd e quipment
108S 8S enroute Sin::l dUY'L-: t.:e dr .) ... . .:ere l l ~..ht , ,~ ..ld :' ss embly wa s
the best in the histc z'Y of' th(~ D.lvisil.::. ..J .

t!eadq'Jarter@ [':M lie~ d~~r 1irs....Qo::~p ~ ny,J!~9. ,-J] Oi vi s i en

P3.r ac'.1uto elemth~ ~: a dr- ~pped 1 ;Lo j 51 1 dcn:- f.le "oLl~te L.n ded 1350 on

zone South ef GroeE.Uel'",:K , rr,o v(!;d ric:' t h thro'~!3',1 \'/ooda , ':""l d establish­

e d Dlvision Co!tJ! ."Jn d Pea t :I t predeai611 di.ed l o c " ti on 1000 y ~H"ds

~les t o f G-r co socol{ "" t 1700 .

; 0 5 P :;.r a chuta I n f o.n t!"y

Droppod <l ft er t.he P .;. t hfir.de l~s .a t 1300 , ~ elz cd G:;."'oeebeek , occupied

its 13.r': of defe:1sive rcsp 0l1 ~ibl1ity froin ~ •..I.iI,p Sou t o'e,Hzt t o r.iook ,

cl c:l red lts areq o f eaemy , Md con t a cted ::04 P~r...:cil'ltc I nf.m try

a t the Ma'ls - ',i!!.•.'t l C.:.n .J.l br lde;e neal' HeUiIi '1n . .. 11 lnitL.l mi ssions

...Ie re a ccompli shod by 2OCO •

..;,Q4 P <.Lrachu t€J I!"1f~~_try_

:>rol)ped beginni n G 131} ',¥'e st of the .,1tu. s-'lLtS l C",i1ul on t h ree dr'op

zon e s , t'iIO North ~-t":..j one S0uth of" th \;.l .\'i~-.i S ~, iv c r .. One ba"t. t .::.tli ol1.

drcped Nor'th e n st of Gver:!.sse l t d.na at 1600 , .:J f tor 'o v orco ,n ~n6

strong o!lsmy resis t 8,nce , c e-.ptul:ed i:-, t :..c t the ••1.J,.... s - ··/ea l ::;an.!ll brip.ge

.:I t Heum:;\I1 . The .sites c f ~.he C ~~n&. l or ide;o s r;e) 'lr' 31.:.nkcnoer ;:, a nd
Hc. t ert, oath of ~l h ich ha d be:e-:1 d.&str'oye d by t ... . e (;;":';E;,ilY up-::n t':-Ie
a pprotl. ch of t"/\ c b9.t t ..... lon , '. . er··3 c Jpt:'lTe. d before dc.rk . One b e tta lion
dro ))ped "los t o f Gver£:.5s ~:. l t , ~ l -::· ~:{E..d :.:.. 1 1 So u thw -?,rd mc v€;. n:;..nt alone;
the Gr a v e - Nijn19 y,€!l h~ ~,l-:\"I 2~' I ::u1 cle r ed the r,1"1emy frem t he lies t&rn
portion of t ne Division " r& ;;:. . One b .. tt,.. ll cn dropped one r ifle
c omtJa.ny South of' t ·:l.G :'1 : 3.s :. t r:'r'·, ve .;..nd t ',l S be. lll':ce o f the b a tts lion
North o f the river .'~l:d .'cs t ,)f Cvr:::r;,..se;ol t • .3c-:h 'f or c es mov6d
against the bl"1.dgo ''I t -::;'r ~v €; L L... :-. . dj,3tely . ~m"!J ~: lse ~ W s ccn:pl€ ; t e
snd the bridge c PVlrcd (. t J,43O , 'l'h~ t ·J '.11l of C·rave ';Jas o ccupied·...
9. t 23C0 afte r , v l ng boen ?bn~dcnud by 400 cnemy . ".11 init h . . . l
missions o f 504 '.oIe!"'0 E..ccoru'p li s:--~ed oy 1930 .

508 Pa r achut e lr.ff.:.n .t ry

Dropped ":o r thc:; st of G-r o 0 sb€ e k .:;. t 1328 . a~ scd on .1 report from
th e Du tch th:l. t the town (.. . nc. or- i dees were l i6htly held , irnmcdia.t.z ly
movod into Nljo egen to t '~l.. o Vie ':/.;.t c l !"-t ivor b r idge s . z,t 2000 the
a t t " ck me t he'lVY enomy t'os i st:J.nce abou t 400 .y 'lr'ds frc-m t he hi shway
b r i dge ...::'l d \'ie. S stopped . The l"' ee,i ;n c nt o ccupied th.3 ... . CSl tm:.Je dl 3. t e::ly
E:l 8t of thl) vi ::.\a s -~-I .... a l C ::m~l l ;;...n d. cstt!.;:"li ehed r O!!Ld alocks to pr o'l ent
en e my movowont S.ou th of :l. l.i~le runni ng E ;~ st H.rld .Je st through
H1ter t . One c cmp ~ l1J mo v e d t o olth... r th e Kl ld Gr l .;J.ndinfl zone l~ orth ­
(:'" at of r.rc Gs'r)ee k hnd met considera ble ~mcm y ros18t !~ ce. One
bat t :l lion , l es s b. cOi!lp ~. ny , oc cupied t hG importu nt hi Ch 3rcun d.. in
tho vicl \.l l.ty of Berg en 0:::. 1 'rl it.hc ut too ho -::~ vy cl.n oPPos,i ti o n . One
com p r.my "' dWln c ~ d on the H ij~ se;on :3-r-idgcs fr.Jm th e &out,noc;. st J.tld a t
2400 h " d r~ ·_ cl1Qd 'l tU 64 . 4 )lo,- t hc'., st of Ubb c r _on . .,ll t n ttt~l
missions of :-08 \"1€.r~ ·.:cccmp11sn( d. by 2030 .
 • •

7"7
~"..! ' / .::;_~~.:.;.~__
:. - 1 ':;""'- " ""-'0". ' _2.:::_.:...!~_~.~
- t " ~l"o'
CC "i'i p -' ni(;s ~ , G, ;.:.;.;1 D, " 1.1 jJs~.""'0h'J.tf; , d·- oIy::eo. ?:,Ct~th of '}roEls ­
be2k .;: t 132C , CC:!liJ.: ni:.s .3 j.n:: 0 f'u'cLi s.w'::: CJIJ".. r on rOilte
lP.;l1.... ch to clE::!lct.ta cf Dl.-J . . . £'i\")D HE;'-1un.!'t!-]~~H '.·..;:11. i.:;--o':"0cted
D~.visio :Zl CO .lh] .r!~ }:;"st 'Ii :cr, it \': .. s (;s:t ·A bL.s~:cd ;:.\t 171: . Cc'm ­
P "lllY C movei ()l;t:.O ~(,."t , ... ct ~C4 :'&n: C:1U'':'C I : lfc.ntl~Y ' (;st of
il1
M£.\8.s - i·! ~~. ;11
C_tn.l .

3 '). t_te~~:!..l. Go~ 'il"! ,",.r:: ~r~r:-

.. J.L1c. t L ... l:~ ..

!:i ::':': t ::~ . !ffi ~ ns .• 110 te1 £: s fo;. ',(''.i s : Tw ,) , 50S P.:...r,;.l chu t e

,~, -r~~·,-,t r
..L 'J ~ _ -J'" '
."" 't'~"O .... 'I o. _?~'·,..·r.:f" h"tn........
... ,,_ , r:::,~,. ,_~",,,, T:-f"',',j"J'"
_ .. . _ , 1"/10 , "- 04 P.-.r ·~_ cl"'..ltc,

-' • ..­
In1'c:.n t :'y upon m:..::l::lt~ co._ t :. ct ; 'Two , Di'/~€:iol' r::.stJ r·V0 i n
vicinity of D~lvisicn 8c...,i!'!3..r,d 2ost .

s.r~~8. c~lU t e Ili1'~·.ft U

Ccn t :"nued to h;Jld t\").c,; ',l is:) 5 ::i v or brid.gc ';I. t G~'.:ve ~' rd th8 A .... ,'38 ­
!'fG:.sl C;.:..r:.c·. l bY·id;}.::. r:.: t I-Icuill :n . VL50rouG p ~ tro.1.li!l ('; \'I' C. 5 cCl.~~ttnued
on tno '~{0 St ,<..;:d tier th~-;c s t cf thG r (,S~il':';':l"'s.:l '";, ro.')_ ,~ l cnL: t:'"!.c
Gr~.ve -Ni J mc-g~n :libhW ::-~Y . .t 1-;::00 c'n(; 1-,l,.. t oor. !I!C-ied Ucrth ~~long
tho 'f!Cgt l)~lr.K of tho ~~ ·;.;) s -;!uJ l C:.!: ':'. l ... l:d .' s::ist(;~2 L::. t.nt. c ~p ­
tu r e of the bridG~ on t .1: "Jl'<" v0 "' Nij::!~::(;.n hi[/tw-:.y n6;'"r :--l·cniEg.­
hu ti o .

C: O: P ""_ r.s.chu t€ Inf' :1 trY

:Z:i n t ,, 1:r:.o"l. i t s i:roa ----or dc f011 8i v(: r C3:iCi~ s i 0::.11 t~' ; n:::pcl1cd. enE.my
8. tt':': c ks c t Hor3t , Cr ~.f.""·,;::::':0n • .. !1ti :- ic t~ l.c::· et; c . . . ;·(;'.;I:<;;'1 _.n cne;my
p:: t r o l tryin~ to viOrk it s ;·,'·'! Y i~CX' t ~1 to t~".!.v :· ~_ .• s -i:; ~· a l ur: i d~8 ~ t
Hcui:': .. n , ~, :;., c··. p~ ,u r a.:1 _ t rfJ i n .;tt (:i! ~l tl~!.E to E.8G..J.r~0 iett-o G0::'ilh1"lY .
, t •l?"O l ...., r~ ,.. \ .. '·~.,.,T · <+t · -It -d
t ,..... "d n1 J,.., l jc~r.-'r l -....ndir •'5
-'. -..,. '"" .;-'''''~- - ''' <-,-, - ' " '. ~... , .... -. ,
, .." r<.;....
' " 1","'_'
.~- -J~' '"....

z·:me South .;.1.1';0. S:ut".:1c::.:s,t of Grci;~(;')E..ck •

.5.CS P ~TS. chu te I rf.!::::!l t ry

\'ii t ilir·t;.,..l bL.t.t e.licn i n Ni J ;!:C-3cn : ~nd ,:..tt'-. clt.0d to clGar th!) p;lider
h:~1dil 'B zoY".c Nortt1c ~. st ..:~1d. E·::,. s t cf Grooso<:.: ck . ':'bs- ~:tt-:cl{ cr:)5S ­
E:d. "':.L.c s'J·,.cdulcd. l i ne of dtJp '_r tu r c ::..t 13l0 , c ; !ilrle t G~. Y GU1'prisod
t:'H: t:TIOii: ,." , .·!1i th e Lnchns :.1"'0.. .. ·fr .8 8~.;pt by 14('0 . f:l x tocn .';.':1ti ­
~.i r ~ r oft p:,Uf' S l nd 149 pr·isor.or s of -"fi fo !' wo~c: c ~,~tur·cd . 111.LliVl. iu.:d
1. ts dc.f."e·,l s1ve ~ect6!"' thr:;Ueh01lt the 16th . ._t 151200 c... pl:: toon ,
v"l.~ ·:.i l.h.;:: "ssist ,; nce of ::04 F'.. ~ ~ ch'J.t0 Infa r.tr·y i:t~ich ,~.=.d.v~llced up
the :-: ~Bs -' ; ",,[, l .J ·.r:·.:: l fran:. t.he ··.' (';st . c .Jptu!""Gd the l'~:~c.s -W_~)..l G·.tn,.;,l
br·.i.d:.;c ·~ t HouL1Ghutl0 . Rr:[lill(':"1t h ,.:. "L<i ti1 ,) hiGh .. 1'o'..I1:d. vlc.ir.lty
Berg on 1)rJ.l thr~uE.h',;;ut t ho'.; 18t":1. !';.. i nG t Cl"1 L nty ,? otrols .. nd eper;:;. ­
dic ;:-:non:y : l't.i.l .€ ry .. c t i o;'! . 0 :10 cO ;:l!1 _ny mcv(;::! i r. t c ~Ujm.:. !~ t:r:. At
('900 , [' dVRllced to t he s _,m ~ sp<)"t to ,.I \-.ich !oboe r:8inlBn t h8.d ~'£:&.chcd
e n t'1a 17t~:1 , f ou[:.:h t -r', i~d?:t [; 8:.1""C ~1f5 ur;qr(, ~, force through t.he
enti ;-e d" j' , ~:.. nd ~, t 1500 ';10. :; \.;it':tdr',-_\"n l..n t o t he G(; c tor ne,.l!"' ders
en DE-1 .

GU Cler E H~ ori ~ rl
;;0t .,!')':'::r.. 1000 ~nd 110':" .,. l.t .... t of 450 ': 11dc ~:'5 c ' r r'yins '.n ':..l1 ti ­
t l?nk '0: tt:JI'Y of" t~L0 sou;. ;" ..Jl·: t ·· .L:cr: ft , tt , U.on , 319 Glider
F1-:,ld .. rtl1 le rjf ~1·~ tt "" ~.i C';l , :20 :~I.i.dJ', r Fl.·;.. :;':' . ·,:,·;.ll \..r~· .29. tti-i. l i on ,
456 p (j. r ~' c'n.I.). te r'lfJld ."~ ti 1 ~ .. r';' J tt l.i0n , _ld 3(.7 .. lroorr. o i'iodlc<:: . l

- 3 -
 CO :!1P ~ ny
SECF.ET

departed from fialds in tha en! ted KinGdom ~.ind flew

••
t~.. 11 s~m c LOLito ~ s the lift o f t.i':e ,H c vi 'J U9 d~ y .
Lnd~d In zon e s . cloarod uy t~? SOS " " r;c~u te } l:f.i:.'l.tl !i\" ..
? :? r :...c hu to In f ·:.nt.ry lr. tl:1e v:;. ~ l!11 ty 01
gl i der -; o vcrS ~1o t t :-tc le~; ding ZC!1r;: '1::.0. 1.5.:10
J::,oewt
GU.dcrs

t . 150' l'k ' ~

't~ ~\

,lEU
Gc ....m:::' I: b o rde: , but f SUbSt3 Y,ti t 1 tlUi'!:b (..!" o f . WJ.!!'! "I · e thlSir

W3'j bac!" to t r:.c D\ v ~slon orea. 'I ~e o verc,ll· 311d(.':' r ("c O V 6-1 'Y
\'las v c ry s9ti s :&' ctol'Y ~ 1. rt c r l ~ dinc a n d .. ss6!::b11n: ' , 319 GIl ­
d o ... . F i :ld Ar ti. ll e:7 g& tt~ . l i on ', '8.s put \ :1 C:lr 3'ct s·.l!Ji:ort of
508 P : r 3.c hu t o I n f .lntry , -4:=6 r.i;..r E, chut.& ~;' lr:: l d l:........ til :.cr-y 3 o::t talion
i;} dl ro ct s'.lp port of 50S fJT 1. chut3 ! ~ f :.. n t l Y , .: nd 320 Gl:'dc..r
Fi e ld A~til l el" Y Bt:. :.t.:.lion in E:,cn ~:, !.. l support cf tho C:lvisicn .
Resupply
FollcwTlls tc~e g l. ider l',ft by 20 :r.inutcs , ,;. fli t.ht of 135 5 - 24
bombers dropped r C 6uppl~' on drop zone South of Gro esbeck . Drop
p q ttorn ...,as ~o o d . F·c covc.ry '11~,. 3 csti m( ted to be ~ t 8070 _

Gu&rds ,.rr.:torod Di v i s ica ::. c.; : ,~ y,. (,, 1 G!'[..vc _ no tt ~ ::04 P,:;.r u. chute

I nf<' ntry at
08 20 .

.5:0 4 P "J.r a S!h,lt c lli,f[t~~,~y

::("ec i mont" le ;~s on c corn ~).!,ny left to s\.';:; rd t ~,,:) i..lrid £;c: f. t GrE- ve ,

on e cO"lly :: ny l o ft t o [.u '.:. rd. 0 :" 0':1 o f' the l,i : ..• e- i:J', ....l C 1. , 1 :';'!"" i j e;;:;s

"t E e u:nt..n .:4:ld Hc nl nshutit. , 3.r,.d 0 :1 0 CO.II:.J .-ny left t o p ::. tro l ~ nd

gue rd th e: h:'u:;hw::,y !'rem OrE;. vo "to t !1o S.... n l!" G:lu ti (.., b-=-- ~, d 2'c J ';f ~ S

mo v(.;d 'S ae t o t t :'-.c HFJ a s - ',:u1 1 C r; n ,~ l, r c1.: cvc j 20 B-:. t.t .i li 0TI :::08

P::s r r- cl:1t: tc.: In ff.'. ntry , (l i:ld occupi e d ":. pc J onl.. cr 3c sca ~'i c c1s , 3d

3l1 tt ).li on ',r 'le; mcov e d to vicl..:1ity ,.1 ,.. ldcn f S 1)ivisi o n r 05 Cl"' VO.

:OS...£.s:rt;~ chut~ Ir:fcll1 tD'

ROEi mt::',l t , I t:.. s :3 2.1 ~ ;"j tt< " , iC :,1 , m,.:: i ntol lnc 1. i t a (;(l ctc:~ o f i.·c apon ­

sibilit~ 1 on t he 30u t h o f t 'J' Divisl c n , r e ~l th::OU . ) lou t l,.hc. 19th .

2d &8 t t:.:,lion_';OS P ~', r :l qhuj;~ e; ~!f~;n~~

t •. tt:. chcd to Gu .;.. rds----X-1"ffiCred D'' \'v'\'si c n ",I t l?llOO ':,nd i!l o v c d Nor th
to .:- 5S:'.U} t t h.: Nijmcgsr. cri d :,",cs . ':I1,e b 7,tt .: . J.!.on m .cha:i the
c d f!)c o f NiJ !:!(JCer. "',! ith ) U-I: L~c i d ~!lt t..l1 d , i n nlol.o il1 t1, thr ou 3h the
outski r ts of th l€ t own , t cc r..: i \' 0G. onl y _rti 1 't.ery fi c o . .i hCTI the
b . . t t..: 1i on r C ,tchtJd t i;. c c~ ['~ t eX' 0 f t .1 e t O ~1l1 , O ~l e co.np •.ny s t:. pported
~y sev en Vin ks tu :~r.c d ;!o rto.'iI0st I, d moved. 0;8· ir..st t ':lo r Gilr-o ....d
bridGc . ':'he b ~ l ·...nc(: or tl"lQ 1..1.: tt ' li m'i , the re;:r; ~ iud e r of the
vnks o f t i1.c 20. a .... tt . .: lion Gr 0t~. ' dicr ::r u ,~' rds , ..n 1 cr.': cornp.:: ny of
Br itis'1. rmo r'cd t n f :: r.try d v: r.c e d t:.e·i n :::.t t he hi ~h\oj' a y b ridgo .
The ~ s5nu l t '..· ... a stc!,pcd ~ t t. ~lC l': ;) l~ L. Pl e in , _' bcut 400 y p. r d s

south of the b tl d ;;;c: . . ',:i o l£.:::!t E;n rL (5 ~.!i;,n t 1. stins thr ou(.hou t

tho evening :.m d nl :':~t o f" th0 2.9U. f &il c c.. t o b re" li: t. he stron(5

<incrny d.efensive a r c , 9r:.c. ,. t :1 i 6, ~~ '):t uotlvity c on s ~ ,st c d o f

p ~ tr o U, ir. 3 into th o e tr c nc, ;Jc i!'! t TIC" ;;;cr t,:.. ri.ne: it fr om the

c e motery scutt. of the friC';1d3..y positi on s _

.:98 P J.r ach'.lte I n f t'fltry

Hc·ld 1 :tr.dinr-: zone £ 8 at 0 f Grocsb..:;ck un ti 1 lGOC _ Clos red enemy
from and occupied h1gh e-,ro;'..m d .... l o n e-, N1.' mc,scn- Clovo:. hi8hway
b-;twccn Ubb cr :.. en I.I.n1 ·"yler . Est<:-. bliahcd ro ~d bloc ks ~ t il fy l r;::r ,
B_nk , .ina 1m Ths l . B01i0 v ~ <l by 504 P ~ r .;. chu t 0 Inf~ntry in J onk-e r
BODcn """nd occupied sccto r botween 1L-rnp <:I n d Vo y. hill . 3.einfo rced ·
Beck r o: d ble c k with ple toon o f Comp " ny 0 , ?;07 Jj a Enc;inG-cr
3 e tt 'J. U.;)!l ; r (..pell od cOlm t or e. ttacks ~1 6 . .,i r. st T~ -.;fG ls BOr'g through ­
out entire d"-~ Y .

- 4 -

 .
,

• ••
---A Att ~ched Units
-lst8-Ql.ci.st~ C".wrds , iU'morea J and 5th. ~~~~~~,'~Infantry
att€ l ched to Divis :l.on and moved to Dekkersv!ald in Division Reser ve .
Resui:)pl~'

"5':"Top yed at 15C O, an:oro~ln~atelr 30 C- h7's frOB exccssivtdly hig h alt i ­

tude J recover~{ u0giigible .

504 Par achu t e Infa):trv

~ \¥ith 2d 11,lsb. (;u;:';:L'QssttE!che(l, c l c81'8f) area bet,wee n Jonl.;:er Bosch
9nd We al River . 1(~ Battfl1.:i.:l:i rel:'eve1 o s Division Resel've . Regiz:te nt
at 1 50 0 effectecl cross l!Lg of i 'cal :;.iiyer l',est of Ases j at 180 0 CB"J­
tured No rth end o :.~ ra j.l:::oed b:~.'iG.{I' ~ aVe!' tr.'3 \'eel rave!' J seized end
cleared bri cf: '€ !head lo rt.n 01' ~ : Eial i..l:s'lrlz:p. pa,ss9gQ of G:.i8rds Armo r ed
Di vision . trapped U~) :!estern OUtS1,::2.1-tS of ~>li.i!::.e&"e n and e t ee South of
railroad bridge .
505 Pers-chute Infs_ntry
RegiIi~en" ) l es s 2d Battalion...., r eoel l ed shar'O o;'1em~r 8tteck at Horst
and Heikent durin,~ rn~ :!'n i n f· . :b"ro:u 1 300 to 2 000 repe lled et ,[ook ener(l.y
attack of en infantry regi:.-'!e:1t stror.;sl:T sUlJportej C:-," ar t il l ery a f ter
attack had penetrated Di visio!'. pe :rir.:.eter to de 1')tb. of 1 000 yar d s on 13
10(,{" ya rd fro nt . Di vis::"cn ]Je!' imeter r e 3tored at 2UC'O. Re g .iJiJ.Gilt re i n '
f o:tced iJ i th attacrJilent of 185 @: l ider pi lots .

2d Batta l ion 505 ?arech'--lte I n f antry

Attackea enem~r stl'ong pOj.r..tG at. bouthern €j1ds of liijn:.eg en bridges
duri ng mornInr: . At l.~}O C :::to ;''Y.led St-l'::>nP. point 30:.lt!1 of 11ighvlOY br i dg e)
c l eered area of enc!'7 , <:::-:<1 rea c hed D!' i ur,e by 1 " 00 . Fi!'st tenk of
Gr t n edier Guords cros:::ed 18)0 .

50Q Paroch'lte I!!:"I;l11tr :· r

.h tt-scjced al; 10Gii ot-:-yl-?!' b"r or-a comv9n~f of oncmy infs::1.try movi ng
~'iort .t.l. ane t wo cO"TJ:)e n i <?s of ene::.:....,Y inf" a nt:;.·y rno:i:1..Q" Sou th , all suppo r ted
by arti l lery end armc:' . g ') l.. ,....'3C~ to \ "itl1L:.:' t.-J.' t.o h i ;::h rround to ylest .
Enemy hrr:ed iete l y o c cu'">!.ca. I:: 'rlla:!. e!:d :~u,...c · !e l ~~ . J .. tt,QcL:ed at Beel(
a t l 20J by 2 betto 15:Jr:.s 0:- e~en:y ~ercc:l l lt:! sts s1l"'norte"~ by ~:;rmored
vehic l es , and forced t:> \ ith d l'S ~ ! 1 0\.0 V, ,1' c19 to high p'r:nu:d to &outh­
·,'ieDt . By co unterattae!: clrOl!e ene!;~l fr o:] &i1d rcoee tt')ied ree k 8t 2140 .
Attecket: 8 P."8.in e t Bef;!k: 23:::'0 b " e:l. '3f,l-.V no'.! r einl'o1'eet- end eO'UlJe l led to
withdra\'l , l'3o'~in~p (. detec.h;.-:J.Elnt sur rounde d b~r the ener:iY in tne tovm .
C€ ntur ecl do,:nrr.•ent fl'o:n ")r i SO~1~Y of val' "hich r e v~ elf'(1 that l€ :'..€ n... y
ett6clcS at flook , Be ek , ar.d I.'yle r V.'9 re part of a cOQr l1 ineted Divi!Jio n
et t acl{ intended to sl) l it Di 'vision cree c: nd seve!' the Gr8ve -:-:i imege n
h,' ,..;,.,l."<.4"
1.-,· ,.... v
•
. V

~ At~echec.. Units
Sl161'wood Rf!::pe rs Ye Oti"..Cl n r y a nd one SQ 11adrcn of the P.orals , i t s r ec on ­
n aj.ssa::lC6 unit , attElcileci t o Divisio n at 170 0 end moved into Dekke:::: ­
s \'n~ l d •

504 Parech1lte Infantry

Cont iauecf'-do :'''ense- o-fl)~i<lg~]168f1, over' '€ l eI end on n i ssion of moop ing
u p South of l-i-inege n to nau5 - ;';0 81 Cana l .

- 5 -
. . .

• ••
~

222-P.rachute Infant ry ( l ess?d Battalion)

Co!!tinued to hold ue!' ensi ve se c~: J;: on South of Division a r e a f r om

Km:.r.p to Mook .

2d Batta l ion 505 Pe r acnHte In:taTl t ry

He l ieved of missio!'l 6f' · :'~lQ;B In-'d ~ fens o c-f Iii,imegen Brid~. es ond
a s s u.T..ed 6.efense of l ine i" l' om B€ s "tern e :d.ts of h·i.ir~cg-€!1. to Ubberge n .

6 08 Parochute Infant r y
ounte:::,sttacked 11aek at. f i rs'~ l i ght:. fro!T1 Forth0ast. , Eas t a nd South ­
east . Initial etT.6c\{ f eiled , r,nd enell;·... , pr e ssing h i s tempora ry
advantage , .oerwtr(J1;.ed to wi tI1~. r. 200 yards of' Be::::'g en Del , but was
held there . .H .tteck re n e~'; ed ot 1 300 , ond at 1800 Beck c l ea r e:i of
enemy and a l l defenses r ees t eblished .

Resu T) pl.'1
At 1 500 su!)pl ies dropped f ro!! a f 'i1::.'c}:irr.ate l y 40C C- 47 ' s on dr op zon e
Hest of the 1I6 !€ fl -'} ar:l GeT'.al . Dr ol? patte::on 1//85 six :niles in l e n g t h
by t\~·o mi l es in width . Rec()v'3rv estbu ted et 6{})"f, v:es tlcc.o!!F)lished
wi t h assis t ance of Dutch civi : is!1s .

504 Parechute Infa ntrv ( l p.ss 2d Battalion)

Re l ie ved of missio:1to .'il:meE-,on brldf,eheorl ~ncl displaced t o De kke r ­

s vta l d as Di v ision Rese r vE' ,

2d Batta lion 50i.. Pa1'8C!~"i1'~, e Infan t r:.'

Relieved 2d Bettalic">n-50~; J:'a-y3"ch 1lt-€ Infantry in sector t et\'fee n

Nijmege n and lJ'ober g en a"1e. , l.11JOn Di vinion order , \:i th Roya l s , c l ea r e d

by 1700 area betvJeen ri:i.,i•.:e;;;e r: - Cleve 1ii(:[g'01 anti '.: ~aal Ri·.rer J.,!e st to

l ine Ubbergen - Pals .

505 Parachute Infant r y (less 2d Batt611o n)

Reestab l ished rond b l ') ck et },look . \.rith Royals , reconno ite r ed to

Ri ethorst and foun d rosd c l esI' of enerr.y .

2d Bett81ion 505 P<JT6chuteI:1fsn.trv

Re l ieved in Ni,1nsgen - U'b'uer .:;en sector bIt 2d B,r;ttalion 504 Para c hute
In:f'entry I r e vcl'te n to r eginentel conr,ro l , and !,61ieved Goldstream
GUbras 6 t HeULl€In Br idge ,

508 Per ;"lchute Infz:lt r y

He l d ,tyler Berg through8ut day end nj.,c;ht against persisten t en8my

count ernttflcks . ,"~f ith Olle COTIP)Bny Ro~rels attached , effected B r e con ­

naiS~J8nCe in f orce to i\! el'cherGn e n.d high f:ro ·.mtl \;e.>t of I;r l e korn .

ri:e t st r ong resistencE'! and . . :itlldleVJ t o hig:1 g r oW""'.d vlcinity Be rg e n

Da l.

,
to attE!che.n to th i s Dt v ision e n d mo ve d
reliev~d
South to Ver,el to restore l i ne of cOlm:lUI"!.ictAt i o n of' Secon d British
Ar my .

- 6 .
.. . . ..

• ••
On this dcte tre t;-: ~_ rd r.l id ei' li:'t. of t ~lf: Di "lision t ootc cff from
six air ....ields in the G:.'(i!~t~l.Hi -Go';;-:'~ '3 .srl '07' (.: -l.anbE r E:,na beering 325
Glider Inf e~try; 30t..h Alb 11.n~i[.i.!.' c~.'aft 5~:tt 'Jlion , less Bl;.tterie s
A ar.d Bj COll:n.. n ~r L 307 A/S ::J!l[,in:;}er Bo >,;;talio~; une. eleMents of
Divisi.o11 S-P3c.ic l '1'1'00:05, 8:1'1 lbnd~)(l on m:d in tr...:'.l vtcd.nity of LZ
1!0 ;1 . vt nu:ubcn: oi' rlid8:!.'f' o. i u not luno. on ti~i:! n1'o:"ler landing zone ;
t\ 1'O l-n". - ,'".1......
..,."... .l: P"''1 ,.,
r.l-,'
~ < d , "",, )'_ (1, f'O--1v
~ -hre
"'- ' .• ' - I".
J . . . .o
_ . "'Dr"
._. , .". ~ele·eec.' b""'-'ee"
, ' ,.. ':'v'.. _tn's
.
Cr)£.. ~t nnd the LZ . '"on F.' li60r J 6~'e stli.L t:.n:::cC'u',m':.ed fo:r . I l.'l,:eci. ­
i ntel y unon lo r.,eEnt' , L1C 325 GIid,);,.' Inf~ntr ~' ~ '& n clos'J<l in the
w:)~c.s \'f,~ ·) t of Groesbeck pr'e1)srcto::-:r to t t Id.:1g II') E :.;cct.:l!' O!1 tr_€
fl'O~";.t •

D
_ -.)T"S
_~_!- 7 k
loo D ,'J,iJ3 }O

The Div j.sio!l conti.nl:ed on its misa jon uSf;ip.!led by 30 Corps of' hold ­
ing tile flreo bet\jdf'U t~p. i.·-e:. l ki ~le !' 6"ld the ifac s River , l.-r tth :ts
front gCT'Grolly timt of' II " l UG 6 . ':1.'113 Jr:5 GliC.cr In f ;.lntry cleaned
out tha ll.rr;er po rtior: ot' t ·ne riekbf'l'g I oo do:; N.d tJ~\'(.;nlJeu the right
fl anl< of tl,,'3 Div"!.s.:.on .

a. PeT Ci chut.a Lift 1"<;11.cer

Plunes crJtiLli t1;cd 'i,:ST­
Oro) )ed on or \!j tll ia 1 ·.:':D ~:<:;ll;(i S 0:[' D7. /-30 3<) , 2
Fnllecl to (~ro;'l en or "\;i',;.h:'r! le ' ,lI ?t,:.' u;: 01' D~', 52 10 , 8
Un IJcco un:;ec. for o o
b. Glider Li~ts
Gliders i-:oJl'll~i tted 902
LLluded on or '. 'i t hj::l 10 C10 :·81'(1.s of L~', '163 3/, .6
Fe ilea to lD'1d on or wi t~hin l OGli 7nn(J.s of' LZ 102 11.3
U!:::lc " o lm ted fo r 37 4 ,1

C. 0111' loase s
KIT_.ed . 69 3. 4
Hounded 1933 11... . 0
J.:i ssing 61,0

d. l:n(l~~ ~o:::;e~ s
KiLl-ea 2l~9Q
Prisons:.:o9 of ~lD r 29'/7
13 . of O")crl,tions
Re~30.!.lts
l~lriiUsa~ons I:.Iccol:l"JIlshed
 •

,
\

,
-
~
-
I
,
st. ,

.. (
••

•
i

• - ,
i
(

J­ i
,,

-
[)flAWIV {frCP/?(J[)V(,EO -
gy .--~-~~iiiiiii~·~
­ 3060EN6.
'­ ' -: -
/1. TOPO . . . .; ~~
~
.. Co /. ­ -
. I
~~
Cf:)/f'r-'S)
,.- • - - - -
- ­
 .L. S E CR E T

. 'lUAUTERS 101ST II:mOO~E

Offi ce o f the Division CO!ll!lander

,....... r APO 472 , U. S . f..rm,v

fr .~~
Ut' It" ."
~ I ~! r ~. 5 October 1944
"1 ' .; ~~ h~ ·
Participation of t e 'l~¥t 7":frbome lJivision i.'1 Ope ratio~ UARl'illT for
the peri od D - D 10

TO ComE.nding Gene ral , First Allied t,irb0I":18 Army

(Thru COffi.'ll&."1 ding General , XVIII Corps CAB)

1. The attached report on Operat i on H/, ;t.KET prepared by Brigadier General

G. J. Higg ins is forwa rded a pproved ': lith the following comments .

2 . EFFECT OF THE DJ..Y.LIGHT DROP o:~ OPE!?J..TICN }.{A ~.KET . Opera tion !:J.!fKET
differed from all othe r Airb or-ne oper.::. tions Hnd ': ~xercises in the cOlilpactness and
accuracy of the 0 day l andin gs . Ap.:'\ rt fr'OfU the na viga tional skill and steadiness
urjder fire sho'lIIn by Troop Carrier pilots, the f a ctor contributing r::.ost to this
a ccuracy Vias the· deci s i on to stage th e ope ration in daylight . Daylight aUOIved
the operation to be put on succes s fully with a rninimtun of !"' reparation. There was
no special oo inti:'"lg for Opera tion :U, HKET on th'i:! part of Ai rborne Troops whereas
a full-dres s rehea rsa l would have been indispen sable had the operation been in
darkness. Daylight sir.:.pl i fied the marsh<olling and pilCit~ge problems of Troop
Carrier Conu::e:.nd n s well as the assembly of nirbome troops on the ground . The
l'apidity of this asse.r:'.bly permitt ed the accor:.plishment of the initial grou"1d
missions on sch~dule . B<:cause of the ~ ccruiog advantages it is f~lt thet consi­
d erable boldne ss is j ustified L"1 choosing daylight r~ th~r than darkness for an
Airborne operati on i f , as in }.fJdUG:T J the on<.lll\V is on th0 run hnd a ir supremacy
complete .

J . lU.TE OF BUIW- UP OF THE 101ST ;'. D1l30hN "';; DIVISI(N. It rclquirud seven
days to bring in a ll the Airborn e elUl!'.,mts of th~ 101st Airborne Division . Dur­
ing this time the Division wa s obliged to prot ,~ ct the l anding field "lith consi­
d .::rable forces whil e ca rry :l.ng out its g round missions. This requirument f or
l an ding fie ld prote ction red uc ed the str..;n gth availa bl e f or the esstmtial tasks
of th~ Division . This inevit!!.ble div.:orsion of strength is a f a ctor which Must
b e born e in nind in a ssign illg missi on s to en :.irborne Division .

4 . TROOP CIIHRIER REPR~S Z'JT{, T!W CliI '!HE naOUnD. Gen e r a l Higgins in Jk"l.ra­
gr a P'l 4 .f conl.1ents on th e nee d of en Air r~orc d control unit on tho glid.., r field .
This would have been most useful in !.II RKET and should ~lot b e overlooked in fu­
ture r.irbor:w operations . ;. Troop Carri~ r offic<J r on the ground could hav e
r a dioed back locn.l we.:1.th.;: r conditions .:::.nd cxarcised a ir tr', ffic centrol. /,lso ,
he could ha ve relayoo. th e latclst infonn.:.tion rog:udbg the t a ctical situation on
th e ground , thus preventing air format i ons from flying ov or a tk"l.ttle III progress.

5. Ca\ STHUCTICN OF L .~lDIN G ST!U PS . Oporat i on '_~!. PJ< -gT included pl.:"'\ ns for the
construction of l <.".n ding strips to bring in a ir tr<I.' 1sporte d units &nd sup!,li e s .
Thi s 'IP- S n eve r possible be c~ use of 3nemy ['.ction a dja cu:1t t o the na rrow corridor
al ong th e Eindhovcm- !, rnhem highway tlnd the absence of a dequate troops t o cl ear
an d control the n .:>cess:. ry I tlnding field a r ea. As thl::l sittB tion is alw~ys going
t o be oxtremely uncl3 rta in wh en evo::r i.irbor.w troop s 1:;.nd b <::hind hostil~ lines ,
t he con struction and pr ot vction of :l l a nd.::.r.g field joes n ot ap pear fe a sible with­
out an entire I: irborn e division with th..: s ol n m.issi on of s,;: curing th oJ fie ld .

6 . r, IH R~uPPLY . Operation n· m;: rt;T provid-3d v:. l uabl~ lessons in air re­
s upply . At pre s cnt , the:: de. ta a r <3 not compl e t e s o t hat con clusions i".r~ t untative .
Howcvo.:r , it wa s amply prov.x!. that glid:.; r Nsuppl y is much mo ;,u c ffici~t than s u
s upply by pa re chute . The k tt .,; r wa s only :.bout 50% e f f oJctive nnd would have buen
LI1a deqtk'\toJ in its~lf to ma inta in this Division f o r any considi::l"ublc pe riod. Ex:­
pl;:: ri onc~ in Ope r :;. tion U·. R:O{ET emph a siz~s tha t air NSUpPly r emains an ellli!rg..>
. ncy
math od \'lith a long way to go before it can bo rclitl d upon to support Airborne
troops in :Hlr.lbt:r for an indefini t a period.

? ~ GHOll-iD OPER' T10.'1 3 OF THE 1015T J. I HBOW:C Dr VI"=l I CN . Tht1 initial g rc)lUld
miss io!1 of th ..: Di~ sion requir ed its dispersion in t h rue a r ea s a long a corridor
'!bout f i ft acn · ru. :~:e s in l e ngt h . Thi s dispos ition made t hcl J. irborn t.l troo ps weak
at ev~ ry critical pOint q,nd IInde n<3cuss a ry the most en er getic shifting of troops
to mee t t he n uma r ous thrcDts as th-::!y d l1 vt!lo p~d alo~ti hi S l?~ " c<>rrid.or' ! f~~
anything 113ss t ita n a supe rior pa.r'"d ch';lt ~ drop b c:~ I 'I :~;lV'il4 ~~ ~~'~ S~PIl 11ight 1"ell
hav') f Ctil<#:i , wholly or in part • . !.s -tU ()\i~~"'~~~e'~Jaa~9,., on
 ..

;._ '~~J

sevora l occasio~s b ef o r e ,th~ Airborne" troop:'! r e stor ed the s itlW.tion. The oxperi­
ence ga:ined by th~ Division ga ve r enewt!d for ce to the conviction th<-~ t an !.irborne
division is c8p:1.b l o of. e.xa rt-ing- a strong uff.ort in but a s:1ngle diructian a t a
givC!1. time.

~))~
l LX' lELL D. T/.YLOl!, I t HL.
].tajor General , USf,, ' .
Commanding •

.'

..
,.

'. ,

, ,
 HEADQUARTERS lOlST AIRDOl11/E DIVISION
Office of the Asst. Div. Comdr.
•

A?O 1.72: U. S. :'_~.r

J.2 October 1<;;44

SUBJECT: ~port on Operation ~ET.

~,,",' " ~ '!I!t\ril
TO Commandlng General, lOlst A:Lrborne Di\\~.~... . ~ \~ . ~~ 'f.
1. GENEH.AL: In accordance witil ver~l ins-:r l!C t. i"n ~ CC::1:11D..'1IJing General
lOlst Airborne Division, the follc,d n $ :repcrt all the pC'.:,, ':.lci}Js l:.j.on of the lOlst
Airborne Division in OperRtion iNillKE'.i' j.s h~.? by e ubtDit.t~d.. This report covers
the operations of the lOlst Jlirbcr!le Di v-i.sion f rem D to D I 10 ;n:lusive (Sep­
tember 17 to 27, 1944). 'me l'epo:.~t 1"5 cii.v h~ed into t.hree P'lrt s ' I-irst, the
Q.OVem.ent of personnel and equi~li'l::.nt !'rem t.he lJK to the cor.lbat. zone in a parachute.
echelon, a glider echelon, "and a seabo.rr.e e ,,~hp· ;. on} sacond, the t.actical operations
of the Division, and units ther-:.- cf, f~cr.l t!'",c ini.ti~l lending by parachute until
o t 10 inclusive, at which tit<8 tl':.t' t.act';.cul S:LtLl..'1tion became 1110:;'9 or less st<;t­
bilized; and third, gene:-dl COl!'.Jnents on vnrious operational and administrative '
'matters peculiar , to an airborne operatio:). .

2. M:JVlliENT TO CO.illAT ZONE:

a. Parachute Echelon: TM ~rachute echelon of the lOlst Airborne

Divis;ion consisted of 436 C-47 transport planes carrJing s':){lle 6,a09 par,achutists
of the Division. Four hundred twenty-four pla!1es clroP$=e d on D-Day, and 12 p-lanes
car-rying Battery "Bu, 377tn Parachute Field Artill~ry Battalion, with 140 person­
nel and 6 guns, dropped on 0 f 3. Of the 436 pJancs whic.:h took off, 434 dr( ,pped
parachutists in a highly satisfactory canner (center of impact WbS SOQe 1,500
yards short of the selected DZ in one case and about 3 mile s- northwest of the
selected DZ in anoth ar case. In both c ases howe W'~ :r I the .drop pattern was ex.cel­
lent and all parachutists of the serials were dropped together) . Only two planes
failf?d to drop parachutists ,!n tne selected DZ's, and these two planes were shot
down on the fli ght in and prior to reaching the DZ' s, All parachutists jwnped
from these planes, and 8 'frOOl one plane and 2 from <nother eventualJ.y joined their
units in tht! combat zone . Jur,1p casualites were less toan 2% of tho total n).llIlber
jumped. The average time of as::3elilbly was about one hour for each pattalion, All
initial objectives werereached prior to darkneSS . Recovery o! equip:,lent averaged
over 95~: Four Pathfinder planes preceded the serials by 15 minutes. Three of
the planes dropped wi tnout incident on the selected DZ 's. OnIJ plo;ne was shot down
several miles short of the DZ in enemy territo~ and no information is available
on this ' plane. (For details of parachutt! tlcnelon, see Annex No, 1).
b. Gli de r Echelons A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from depar­
turo bases in the UK ov(;:r a period of 7 days. Sl;!ven hundred and s~ty-seven of
these gliders landcd 'witnout incident on the dcsiJnat~d Ll. Approxiruattll.Y 5,000
men took off from the UK and somt! 4,800 6VC:ltUally joined their l,Ulits in the
I:ombat z.on e . Some 30 51iders are unaccounted for on this date, practically all
of which are ass~~a d to have dropped in enemy terr~tory. The glider lift on 0 I 2
was d1sp~rsud because of heavy fog encounter ed over the Channel and along the
coast. Of BOt.l.= 384 glidl3rs that took off on this datl:l, only 209 landed safeJ...y on
the desir;nat cd LZ. Many others returnGd to the UK or landoJd on the cont inent in
enenv or friend ly territory. No furthm- glider sdrialB were flcwm after 0 f 6,
but BOac 500 personnel and ossenti<il equifJJll~ t were flown in by C-47 transport
to thu Brussels Airport and joined their units in toe combat zone , by D flO. (For
Oetails of glider 'e chelon see Annex No.2).

c. Seaborne Echelon: The seaborn\;! ache lon of th~ DiviSion consisted

of 1077 pcrsc;mnt:l and 444 vehicles of all typeS . Thu eche lon loaded on D 1 and
salll;;,d from SOUTHAUPTOll on D -f 2. It arrived a.t OLUUiA BEi\CH on D -I 3, -where it was
r
divided into two serials. The first s erial left tre beach on tho morning 01' D f 3
and. arriv'o!d at BOURG-lEOPOLD on t ne 'ev(;nlng of D t 4, It closed in the Div1s:ion
servi'C e area at ZON oh' t"he evening of D -f 5, The se'cond Serial luft OW,HA BEACH
r
on tht.: evening of D i 3" aITivad at BOURG - ' lEOPOLD on D 5, and closed in the
Division .service area on thi:l evening of D -f 6. (For d.atails of seaOorne echelon,
see Annex No.3). '

- 1. ­
 ,

3. TACTICAL OPERATIOIIS

2;. The Div.ision fIlis called for the seizure of the four hl6hway

and railway bridges over the Aa RlVEH. and ItIU.EMS VAART CANAL at VECHELj t.he seiz­

ure of the highway bridge over the ~Ol.ruEL rlIVm at ST. OEDENRODEj the seizure of

the highway bridge over the \iIlJfBLi.!I.N'A CANAL at ZON; and the seizure of EINDHOVEN

and the IJain highway bridges over th~ streNuS in that city. The Division objec­

tiVdS were spread over a road di8tance of some fifteen miles.

2.. Th~ 50ls t Parachut c Infantry , landing on two DZ IS m::ar V~CHEL,

seized all four bridges without incid ent . The 502d Parachute Infantry landed near

20N, and with one battalion St;.iZ03d the main hi5hway bridge near 5T. OEOENliODE.

The 506th also landed near ZON and seized the Canal crossing, but only after the

enemy had blov.n the bridge. The 506th seized EIUDHOVEN shortly aft..;r noon the

next day.

c. In an effort to secure an alternate crossil16 over the HILHELiJINA

CANAL, and ilia to block 0ner.w traffic between EINDHCY'w'EN and HERTOGEIffiOSCH, one

comp<m.Y of the 502d was dispatcned to seize the hibhwa.! bridge near BEST. ThiS

company seized and held the brldgt! for a few haUl'S, but was driven off just befor e

dark. The enemy rushed strong reinforcements to this point, and huo.vy casualties

were suffered by both sides in the stiff fighting t~t took place on D f 1 and

D f 2 in the attempt to secure t his crossing. The bridge was finally blown by the

cn e~ before it could be captured , but th e ene~ forc e defending it was complete~

Wiped out .

d. On the ~ v enin5 of D f 2 th~ en~roy made a raid on the brid6e at ZON

with tanks and
self- propelled guns . Soll'~ da[jlag~ \'las ci:Lus~d, but the bridge was
held intact. Tho next morning: a n enell\Y tank - infantry attack was made, but was
he ld off. The 506th, riding British tanks, mado CUI attEmlpt to cut the attacking

forc e off from th:; south, but the em:!i\}' neld key points and eventually withdrew

his forces in good ardor.

Q. On the morning of D f 5 the onemy severed the main highway between

VECHEL and UDEN, and made a strong attempt to ~eiz~ the town of VECHEL and destroy
the bridges . All av ailable e161l ents of the Division were rushed to the vicinity,
a nd as they arrived tnroughout the day wer e formed into a task force under General
McAULIFFE and disposed to neet the enemy threats. Confused fi ghting continued
during too ent ire day and lat e into the night, with infa.'1try ana t",n1{s attacking
from s cveru.l dire ctions simultan~ously. Enemy penC:ltrutions. 'Werd made to within
500 yards of th"" bridges, but were eventu;.'.lly bcat <:m back. Th... atti:l.ck w.::.s ren~\~ed
the . n",xt morning, but the defense held firmly. The 2d Battalion 506th then
attacked tOn'ards UDEN, and made contact with C1 patrol of the Guards Armored DiviSion
advDncing on VECHEL from UDEN . The enemy was forced to withdraw toward E.RP, and
the road r eopened . By dawn the next morning t ll... enemy had withdra wn frolll the
VECHEL ar ~a to the southeast.

f. On the afternoon of D / 7 the cn~ attacked from the northwest,

cut the ·main highw ay between VECl-I.EL and ST . OEDENRODE, and took up a dufensive
POSition astrid e t he road. The 506, with tanks attached, attacked on the r.torni ng
o( D f 8 cnd by dark had driven the enemy f.roru all but a portion of this iJosition.
The next .:iornin5 the attack was continued , in conjunction with British Armor ad­
vancing in force from ST. OEDENHODE, .md the road cleared.

g . From time of landing to D /10, the encm,y probed t he Division

sectors continuously, C!Od many sma ll skirc.ushes ocCllTred each day. Defensive
positions, the main hig hway, Dl1d tl10 bridge s ov e r the C,U1als and riv ,"rs were sub­
jected to intermittent artillery and mortar fir e . Ttl ~ Cl.ty of EINDHOVEN was
hoavily bombed on th~ evmdn5 of D f 2 . .. CF'9r ·P~t4;i\l~~t[:.ctic.:tl opclrations, see
Anoo x No .4). .~- . :_" ~ k..~ >~ .~'.~ :.~ 81' ~ ~ ,
~ .,J;>N .',+,,,"8, 1I~..•1l.

a. Casuulties : from D to D f 10 inclusive, the cusualtivs of t he lOlst

Airborn e Div ls-e n wer e ~ s fol low s: Kill~d - 373; wounded - 1436 j missing - 547; or
a grand total of 2,356 non -c ff~ctiv e s, of a tota l of 13,112 who t:lnt e r~ d tht: combat
area. (For detailcld r eport of casualti£:s, see Annax No . 5 ) .

• - 2 ­

•
 •
b . Prisoners: A total of 3,511 prisoners were captured by the 101st
Airborne Division from D to D 110, inclusiv e .

.£. Ev acuation: Tnd 326th Airborn <.! l!e di~~~~ liTr:Iv ~ !.n-t'h~B-·
cOlroa t aree in two echolons. The first eche lon, co s tl.n5 of 52 Ine dl...~_ ~q~
t:::l including <11l atta.ch~d surgic3.1 team, arrived in ' CG4Jl. Gliders 0t;l the atte ­
:r,.. noon of 0 - O~. The second ccnelon consisting of 219 personnel in 54 CG4A

~ Gliders, arrived on t~ aftarnoon of 0 f 1. Immediately upon the landing of t he

first. echelon, a t emporary llospit a l w.. . s set up on tne southern edge of the glider
landing fi~ld. First casualties were tre ~ted at 1500 and at 1700 the first major
surgical operation was perfor,ned . At 1800 a hospital at ZON was taken over and
personnel end equipment moved . The treatiJlent of casualties was carried on under
very good conditions. By 2400 D - D~, l U7 c us~lties had been admitt~d and trea­
ted at this hospital. Upon the arriv a l of the s e cond echeion, litt e r bearer and
ambulance sections were s ent to their respective regiments and evacuation from
regimental and battalion aid stations was quito r a pid. By th~ morning of 0 I 2,
contact was established with th ~ 50lst at v~~HEL and an attached platoon of the
50th Ficld Hospit cd was sent to e stablish a station at VE~L. The 493rd Medical
Collecting CompJ.l\Y esta bli s ht.:! d conta ct with the DiviSion Medical Company at 1500
on D I 2, and initial eVacuation begun to the 24th Evacua tion Hospital at BOURG­
LEOPOLD. Due to t a ctic.?l requir ements and the larg o amount of traffic mov ing
north, littl e evacuation W<.lS accomplish~d until 0615 0 ;. 3, at which time normal
evacuation beg an. On 0 I 3, .30 ambulances ,1lld 4 - 2~ ton trucks evacuated a ll
available cases to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at BOURG-LEOPOLD. From D I 3 to
~ ;. 10, immediet~ evacuation of casualti os took pla ce.

g. Air Support: In gen cr a l, requ~sts for air support missions were

"'handled satisfactorily by .Cle ans of the Air Support Party which lande d by Glider on
o - O~. Bad wea the r, transmission difficulti~ s, and higher priority missions
resulted in many r equests b~ ing r e j~cted or unable to be flown. (See Annex No . 6
for detailed report).

!. Glider Re ception: Anticipating considerable confus~on in unit

assembly wh€n a largl) number of glidors l:mded on ont:; field, i:I. Div is loon glider
~ception party cons~ting of 5 officers and 20 enlisted men from various units of
F' ~?e DivislDn came iu with the first t;lidcr c c ~elon on · 0 - D<\y. This party func­
tioned extremely well and in g rc ~t part was responsible for th~ rapid and ord ~ rly
assembling of units. Despite careful bri~fin5, it was found ~opractl.cabl e to
expe ct g~ders to land near predetermined points or in small ar ea s or fidlds. The
most practicable solution appears to b e to st i'l.tion CUid~s at ma~ points ov~r the
entire landing area and have these ~uid e s go to the nearest ~liders when they land,
orient., them, and give them the assembly point selected for the lUlit. This I>wthod
work:ed v e ry well und in c..ll but & few ca ses, units ass ~blcd rapidly and VIi thout
Confusion.

f. Air Force Control Unit: It is bclliev~d d esirable to have a senior

officer from the Troop Carrier COlanand arrive with the first ecnelon of gliders in
a situation of this kind. He should b e provided with a r a dio s~t capable of direct
communication with a control st ation at the departuro airfields. In this way, he
could transmit on-the -spot inform ation as to weathe r conditions, the tactic a l si­
tuation, and too glider fidlds th at are clear for the r e ception of that glid ~ r
lift. It is believed that many . plant: s were unne c<:!ssarily snot down by passing
over enemy held strong points, and which could have b CGn avoid ed hnd late infor­
"'mation be e n given the pilots as to tho tactical s ituetion.

g. Use of Glider Pi lots: The need for a rcg uJ..c,rly constitut.;d tacti­
""'c al ~d administrative organiza tion of g lid er pil ots w:.s quite appa rent on this
o.P6'r~\tion . Theoretic 3lly the pilots joine d thdr tactic ;)l orgsm.zation after
landing and open:tod und(:r the senior office r of t h:::.t organiz a tion. Actually, it
was jmpossibl~ for any one officer to control thu large numboJr of glidt:::'.r pilots
who arrived in the combat area. Tnere we N many .inst<:!'nces of indivl.dual pilots
leavin 6 their assigned are ~ s and disappea ring . Glider pilots were uscld for local
prot~ction oi. v a r10us insta llations ne ar th~ LZ, the Division cP, and the Division
...J'$e'rVicc ~ ~ a,:·. and in gene r a l, perforI;].ed (Jxc e llent work individu :::.lly. S ~veral
",. v oluntarily joined cct'.lbat troops and purticipat.,d in ground fighting in the
vicini ty. It ~ 1s belicved thAt an organizu.tion in wnich the chain of COlilIlL:llld is
strongly forged is ess~tial if glid er pilots ~ to bu used most effici~t~ in
an a irborne operation. I .... ~~~ . ,

- 3- '",~::J
fa
~ e. 1l1l~~1 :r~ . I'i
,~,/", ' \j ..
, .;IiI ~iI J[(t" 61
 l \ ,
..-..,. " .• 9,.
f.
1.li ~
.' .~ V
\Jl.~
T .
h. Resupply: See Annex No. 7 .

5. A final report will be submitted when t.he Divis i on completes lots par­
ticipation in the Holland campaign.

ft4 yr,4-1d'~~'" ;':!/L

G.(fJ . H'ttGms, .
,
Brigadier General, USA,

A S S~. D1V. Comdr .

)'

- 4­

 ~, '''\<~1

~'tAcTICAL Ol'ERATIONS OF

D- DAY
The parachute echelon of the Division began its drop at 1300 on D-Dqy,
September 17, 1944. The 501st Parachute Infantry, wit h two platoons )26t h
Airborne Enginee r Bat talion attached , dropped on two DZ ' sj qne 2 miles west of
VECHEL and the other some 3 miles northwes t of VECHEL. Tne hegiment, less the
1st Battalion, landed on DZ nAil west of VF.CHEL, proceeded to that tOV«l and by
1500 had seized all init ial ob j ectives which were the two Highway Br idges and
the two Railroad Bridges over the H;r,LlEMS VAART CANAL and the Aa hl.ver. No
r esistance was encoWltered on this DZ. The 1st Battalion landed on DZ IIA_ I " ,
in the vicinity of KASTEEL; assembled and reached VECHiL by 1700. The 1st
Battalion received some resistance from scattered ene~ troops in the Vicinity
of the DZ. Some resistance f r om scattered enefflY groups was encountered in the
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the t own was made by the enemy .
At dark the regiment was well dug in and set to defend the town against any
enemy attack. All bridges were seized in- tact. The Engineer Detachment imme­
diately began the cons truction of a second bridge acrQss the WI I.J.Kt..iS VAART
CANAL in or der to permit two-wqy traffic if the situation so required.

Th~ 502d Parachute Inf~try witn thr ee platoons 326th ~rborne Engineer
Battalion at tached, landed on Dol "Bn without enem;y opposition and all bat talions
were assembled by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded to ST. OED»fHODE and after
a skirmish, seized . the town and its objective , the bridge OVer the DOMMEL hIVER,
in- tact. This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had the situation
well in hand . CompaI'.\Y uHII of the 3rd Battali on proceeded to the H l.ghw~ Br idge
at BEST; secured it initially aga~lst little enemy r eSistance, but was forced to
witndraw just be f ore dark by reason of n strong en~ counte r attack. The "remai n­
der of the 3d B1!ttalion was then dispatched to join nHn Compa.I\Y, with or ders to
secure the bridg~ the next morning. The remainder of tile itegimdllt went into
Division Reserve in the vicinity of WOLFS~VINKL.

The 504 th Parachute Infantry l.:Jlded on DZ IIC" without tmemy opposition.

Companies of the 1st Battalion departed immediately without fo r mal a.ssembly in
an effort to secure the three bridges over th~ \;ILHi:::I...MINA CANAL in the vicin i ty
of ZON before tht..'Y could be b l own by the enemy . Scatt';}red enemy re:sistancc was
encountered before reaching the main bridge and forward el~ments wer e within
100 yards of this bridge when it was bl own by the retreating ene~. (It was
found that the othe r two bridges had been blown several days before). The
Regiment began the crossing of the Canal by various Elxpedients, and by 2400 the
enti~e reg~~nt was on the south sid~ of the Canal and had a bridgehead exten­
ding some 2,000 yards .

The Command Echelon of Division Headquarter s jump~d with the 502d Para­
chute Regirat!l1t and establi shed an initial Command Post at ZON. SOtIl!;:; 70 glider s
car r,ying additional Command p~rsonnel, the Heconnaissance Platoon , Signal and
Medical personnel, and some transportation for tho combat units, landed on the
LZ about one hour after th.:l parachute landings . Overall time of landing of all
parachutis t s and gliders was ono and one-half hours. Communicat ion was estab­
lished with al l elements except the 501 by dark on this date.

The " 501st Parachut e Infantry continued the defense of VECHEL through. ut
the day. Communication was establlsh~d with Division at 0600 . Sev dral light
enemy at t.acks were repulsed, but no major effort to retrieve the town was mado.
The 1st Battalion of the 532d Par;'""chute Inf.:mtry continued to hold ST. OEDENttODE
and likewise r~pelled sever a1. light enemy attacks. The 3rd B"~ttalion of the
502d attacked at first light in an effort to retrieve the Highwqy Bridg~ at BEST,
but suff €:-r ed heavy casual ties at the hands of the enemy force which had been
strongly reinforced during the night . The 2d Battalion waS then or dered to
assist the 3rd Battalion in securing the bridges . "Tho Battalion penetrated to
the outskirts of BEST, but wt;.s forced to withd r aw by ht.: C:lvy artillery, mortar,
and small arms fire , and took up a defensive position on the l eft of the 3rd
Battalion . At dark the entire regl.ment less tho 1st Battalion waS in a defensi ve
position east of the highwll,Y fac~J.g tht.! enemy dcfGns6s around "th<:; Highway Br idge
at BEST.
 ,~~

~~.rr

.~'i. ~\,:'"
tr-'\\ ";. : " ,
~
The 5Q6t h Parachute Infantry,
on EI1IDHOVEN at first light.
with the 3rd Battalion leading, advanced
The 3rd Battalion was held up at ~;oEl5EL, one mile
north of the city, by determined en~my resistance. The 2d Battalion made a wide
envelopment to the e ast of the city, outflanked the en~ defenses, and seized
the town at 1300 . qontact ~as made with ~ British Reconnaissance Patrol at
1215 north of the city, and with the main Britisn Forces at 1900 just south of
the city. At dark the Regililent W\lS in cop.trol of the cntird city and was in
positi'on defending the important bridges in t;lla city which were the main
objectives .
,
At about 1530, soma 428 gliders c<...r r.Y1ng. the 3rd Battalion of tho 327th,

the :Ehgincer Batthlion, the retaai.ndcr of the Medical und Signal Companies,

elements of the 377th Parachut e Field Artillery Ba ttalion, and additional supp~

and admi~str~tiv e vehicle s, arrived in the comb ~t a~ea . T~ 3rd Battal~on of

the 32?th waS assigned the missioQ of providing loc~l prote ction for the ·LZ and

the Division' service area.

.' !o• •

Briti~h Forces reached th~ south side of th~ Canal at ZON at appro~t~lY

2100 ~d immediate ly b egan the constr.u ction of a bridge across the Canal.

Df2
.-Jl1e
bridge acros.s thu Canal .was coplp1eted during th<:l night and at 0615

l6adinge1omt:nts of th e Household Cavalry and Guards Annored Division beg$"l .

crossing . These s ame le ~ding elOOlents p...1ssed through ST. OEDENRODE Wld VECHEL

by 0645. One Squadron of the 15/19 Hussars wa s a ttached to the 506th at. EINDHOIEN,

and one Squadl"Oq to the 502d at ZON.

"C" Company of t h~ 50 1st w.. s ordered to send ont: platoon to DIN-TER. Repor ts

from this company indicated the tmemy Wi:l.S in some force in and. around t his.. . town.

'Iha 3d Battu.lion ot: the 501st w.:l$ ordere d to mov~ from VECHEL to EERDE and toke

up a strong defensivc' position at that point. The remainder of the 501st con­

tinued in a close in defcnsE:: of VECHEL and dur:if\s t~u day th l.! 2d Batt3lion

repulsed en enemy attack from th e northwe st est.irnat cd at ova.r 250 Infantrymen.

During tt"!-e late evening, Compeny "E" was driven beck from its outp!,st posi.tion

.
ab:>ut 200 yards
{ - by a "well. executed night attti.ck by .enetll\Y parachutists .

. First .B.a tta lion of the 502d continued in the defense of ST . OEDENRODE.

The 2d ~at.talion ;itt~ckcd at 0.6 00 i .n another a~tC1D.pt to se~,z~ ~he highway bridge

at BEST. This attack was repulsed by t 'ne enemy . At 1415 the Reg:i:m~t, ~t:ss

the 1st Bq:tt~l1on, reinforced by one"" squadron or" the 15/19 HQ.Ss¥s·, launched a

co-ordin.:!.te d· d.ttack .....ga inst the enemy position. This att a ck was very successful

and the objectiv e seized at 1800. Fifteen S8mm guns wt:r e destroyed, 1,056 ·

prisone~s tAke~, und OV~F 300 enemy dead loft on the fi e ld after this ba~tl~ .

. .­
The 506th Par achute Infunt~ ' est ab1ishe d strong points· east and west
of ElNDH'OJEN omd continued ext i.:nsive patrols with the squadron of the 15/19
Hussar~ a ttached.

A .third glider lift beg an to a rrive at about 1400 carrying the 1st and
3rd Batt~lions of the 327th, the Slst Anti- Tank Battalion, th e '3??th p'ar~~ilute
Field - ,i11cfY B.1.ttalion (less Battt;:ry tlB"), and the 90?th and 321st Glider
Field Artill e ry Battalions . Due to fog encountered e nroute, only a portion of
these units arriv e d ·~ . , EJ. emcnts of the 32?th wero . giwn the mission of . protecting
the glider. landing fi,e ld 3lld a ssisting thl..: att a ck of tile 502d ii' necessary . At
about 1700 enemy tanks word report ed approaching ZON from tnu southeast ~d a
f,;w minutes lat er s ey er a l t .w s approached \~ithin a. fow hundred y?rds of the ZQN
bri dge dnd shelle d the . br id.ge~ the Division CP, and .thE. tOHn . Little damage was
don~ nnd th e tanks .withdrew When AT gU{1S arriv ed frem tne glider landing field ..
Two tanks wer e 'knocked out by . A;.T fir e . .

IlI3
Division Command Post moved to ST . OEDENRODE a t 1200.
.,;·r
During th b morninS. tt.. 1st Battalion :~f ~h If.l;:'l · athaCked ani! ~£; r
DINTm . Four hundrod and twenty prisoners wer e t aklO? ~¥ this ac~i"On.. The,' .2d
V. .
• •- 2 -
 SECRET
.,..-':':'--­
'~',
4­
~.\~\. r;·:ll >'.
. ," . •...
' ~J
'
• I "
Battalion continued a closJ-in defense of VE(}tEL. 'lh.c ~Jt'd .'Battalion conduc
extensive p.a trolling to the nortn and west frem a strong point at. WtDE .

The 1st Battalion of the 502d continul::d the defense of 3T. OE.D3iffiOCE .
Dpring the afternoon the 2d and 3rd Battalions we r e order ed to proc e ed t o ST.
OEDENl~ODE and the Regi.tnant ch.irged with the defense of the ST . OEDENRODl!:. area.
By 2100 t ho mtiN Regiment was close d in the area and had taken up strong
defensivd positions .

IUring th e night too 1st Battalion of the 506th was ordE.rcd to proceed to
ZON in order t o assist in the defons. of t n. ZON bridge against the ""pcctod
enemy attack . 'lhl:l Battalion went :into position at 0600 and in conjunction with
elements of tho 1st Ba t talio n of t he 327th a~d one comPanY of the 326th Engine~rs,
r epe ll ed t hl.l a ttack on tn ~ bridge launcned by tile l 07th Panzer Brigade at about
0630. Tha 2d Battalion of t~e 506th, ridLlg tanks 01 the squadron of the 15/19
Huss ars, attackod the enemy rear and a sharp c ngagom~nt took place at NUNEN.
The 3rd Battalion of t he 506th remained in EINDHOVEN as Regimental Hoserv~. At
0900 tho ' 44th Armored Hogimcnt was a~tached to the Division and proc eeded toward
HELMOND in a furth er attempt to destroy tho onGJn.Y attacking the ZON bridge.
Intormittcnt tank and in! antry fi ghting took place tiN remainder of the day .

The 2d and Jrd Battalions of th ~ J27th r e lieved too 5CQd of the defense
of tJ1e s e ctor east of ZON and the landing ZOn.:! and Division s~rvice area. The
32lst Glider Field Artille ry Battalion was attached to t he 327th and fired
missions in support of that W1it dUri ng the dqy . At 1500 Battery ''E" 'of the J77th
arriv Qd by parachute and joined 'its BattaEon. Tne 377th thEm moved t o ST.
OEDENRODE in support of t i-e 502d Parachute Irifantry. Battery nA" of the Blst
Anti-Tank Bat,tal1on was attached t o the 327th anO Battery "C" to the 5Q2d.
Battery liB" r emai ned in defense of thl! ZON bridge .

The 1st Battalion of the 50lst crossed t oe \'lILI..&B VAART CANAL in the
e arly morning at HEES\/IJK and conducted extens ive patrolling during thE:i day. At
1845 an a tt ack was made on SCHIJNDEL 'and t he northwest section of the town was
s eized ~t approximately 2215 . The 2d Battalion r emainud at VECHEL . The 3rd
Battalion moved at 1745 to the west and cut the ST . OED.i!NttODE - SCHIJNDEL Haad
in tho vi c ~nity of the railroad station.

' The 502d Parachutod Infantry, Vfith the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Bat­
talion .attached, continued to expand its defensive p~sitions in t ~ ST. OEDENRODE
ar ea. j'B" Company of the 1st Battalion received a strong enemy attack fran the
northwest in the early afte rnoon, but huld its position.

The 1st Battalion of t .le 5Qi.th continu~d i ts def e ns ~ of the ZON bridge .
Tho 2d Battalion wo rking with the 15/19 H..... ssars and the 44th Tank Regiment, at­
tacked the enemy nE=ar N3DER\/hTIEN: The anomy wit odr ow in the fac e o f thi s attack
and at l a:o contact was l ost. The 2d Batt alion went into a defenSive pOSition in
the vicinity of TONGELRE far th~ night. The Jrd Battalion was ordured to ST .
QEOE.NftODE as Oivision iteserve. Thc Regiment was given a warning or der that it
wo..Q.d probably move to UDEN on the follanfng day.

At 0300 the 3rd Battali(ID of t ne 50{,th Parachut o Infantry closed in the

ST . OEDENHODE area~ moving up from EINDHCNEN. At 0500 orders wer\! re ceived
that this battalion, as we ll as all other e l erucnts of the regiment, would IilOV~
to UDEN .vithout d clay. Movement was to be by lllOtor and marChing . The 3rd
Battalion bdgan its wove to UDEN, by marchill~ , .at 0900. Thd 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their inovelIlflnts, pi0cem~al, a s transportation became avail&b1e.
during the day.

The advanc o detachm\:llt of th e 506tn, consisting of appr.tximatel,y 150

officer s _sod men fran it~gimental Headquar t or s and oth e r units of the r egiment,
passed :tht:ough VE9HEL at 1000 . Immedia tel,y aftcr passing through the enemy cut
the main highw83 be tween VECHEL and UDEN, and this detachment bocaroe isolated
in UDEN,
- 3 ­
 \ •

.The lO?th Panzer after withdrawing from its attack on the tON
bridge on D f 4, mov ed under cover of darkness to EdP, and in the lata morning
of D I 5 launched an ali-out attack to s eize the town of VECHEL and destroy the
bridges th~rc . Enemy forc e s in this attack were estimato:::d as thrce ' bat£al~ons
of 5 5 troops, support ~d by 30 to 40 tanks and artillery.

By 1200, the 2d Battalion 501st astrid ~ th~ VlCHEL - ERP Road, was being
hard pr&s sed. Additional troops ~ ~ rc started to~ard VECHEL and Gcn~ral ~Au1iffc
was plac ed in command of troops in the area and cn-'lrgCld with d e r~ns c of the town
and bridge s. At .about 1400 cno:::lI\Y tanks cut tho h i &l-tway northe ast of VECHEL and
dcstroytl d transport parkt;!d O~ th,:; high\ . ~r . Batt<3 l"",f U!;lll, Slst AT Battalion ,
arrived at the s ame t~ , want i~to ac ~ion en tno n~gn~ ~ end iromDdintcly destr ­
oye d a Mark V tank l oadinb t he a'L tJi:c k . 'i'ilo 2d BattuH.on 506 took position on
the l e ft ox' UiC 2d Bat talion 501; fl j t n tno 1st Batt aDon 401st Glider Infantr,f on
its l e ft. \;ith t h,;: <.:.ssist.:mc€ of British artill ery gat. nIJr .:d from th t;l highway,
thE. attack from EHP \ :&5 r ~puls o d by du:..'k. At a~ut 1400 em.my infMtry , with tank
support, uttack-.!d astridt::! tn . ,; Canal fr om t.h{. northwest t.oward th o..: highway bridg e
southwt: ! st 01 VECHEL. Company liEI'I , 506, which \~ a s in VECHE.L on its way to UDEN,
was turned around, deploy",d naur thi: bridgE. an d r epulsed the atta ck, "lith the
a.ssistanc e of ele.ru mts of the 44th T~k n.cgi t:ltmt.

Ourint; t he ~ ft o rnoon thl: t;.O. emy l aWlchud ;.ill ...ttL.ck c"-8uinst th~ town frO!ll
the north, and we,; r e fin al ly haltl,;d just. shorl; o f t hc r uilrood bridge by GICf"uc;:nts
of the 2d Batt<tlion, 501, and on.:! platoon of " rill Corap:my, 50 6, which h:::.d taken up
1;1 dofans iv e posihon t he r ~ a sno rt ti-ac bofor e .

Th~ e nc rr~ r unowe d th ~r at t a cks from tn~ so4th and southeast dur~g tnc
law a fternoon, but by no\'; ndcitioni..1 for ces h J.d arriv ed <llld e nemy att1:l.ck \~!:J.s
stopped. By d Ct r k th.;: 506 ( l es s 1st B'itt t.lion an d th~ dct a cllr.l.el'lt cut off at UDEN),
the 327th Glid er Infan try, tl'J:.: Division w. connal.ssance Platoon, tht..! 321st Glider
Field Artillery B.:J.tta lion, Battery HBu, Slst AT Batt.Llion, t o(. 2d Battalion 501st
Para chute Infantry, cn:i the First Squadro.'1, 44th Roya l T:mk ncgimunt had arriv e d
and forme d tho task fore w under G::.n.;ral tiolcAULlfF'E chargud witil holdl11g the V~CHEL
area.

In the mcantiJnu th", 1s t Batte-. lion of thu 501 att ,J.c k~ d at d 3wn and had oc­
cupiE:: d luI of SCHIJNDEL by 0915. Some 400 prisone rs Vlt.lr e token in t ins opar ation.
About 1200 orders Wli!r ... rilcllived for tho 1st Bf,t tahon to proceo.;d to '"EIBOSCH,
seize the town, .md provide nort~rn flank p rot ~ ction for VECHEL. Tne £lOVclment
was compl et ed by 17liO, ilrld t he bi::l.ttalion t ook up a stror16 d ~ fe n s ivu position in
and e.round tho town. Tho 3rd B<:I.tt ....1ion, whil.!h hi::l.d adv Ulccld tow.:.rd SCiiIJNDl.L in
tho '~ rnin e:: WId join~ d force ;, with th.; 1st B.:lt t.a lion in s eizing SCHIJNDhl., was
ord er ~d to E»tDE, wh or c It took up l! dcf o..: nsl.v ", poutlon &uarding V~CHEL froo th~
fl e st.

Thu 502d P ar o. chu.t ~ Inf antry cxt ~ nd (;; d its do f c nsive positions during the day .
KJ.. l3llants of t hc 1st Battalion made contact 'Wi th t nt! 3rd Bcttalion 501 so ut h of
SCHI JNDhJ., ruld join\:l d forct.ls in c1oCJll.11g out s av ..;r 11 e;;nw:l,Y StroI16 points a long tne
SCHIJNDEL - ST . O~DEtL{ODE higirNo,.

Tho 327th Gliddr Infi..ntry w... s ordcr tl d e:lt 0930 to proc eed to VECHEL, <..Od
moveme nt began ut 1030, th oJ 3rd Bc.tt.J.lion by truck .:.nd th... 1st 8.'1d 2d Batt.::l1.ions
by marching . Th ... 1st and 3rd Batta lions l~.:;r o corrraittod on both sidclS of t llo.; bridge
immoai at oly upon ?rrivnl; th", 2d Batt-alion continUvd into VECtfuL .:md bcic<:Ul\.: t ~sk
force r ~ s c rv e . Tho tc:wn of VBCHEL \'I.. IS nCG<.vily s hwll\;d during th . ,) lc.ttl ...:.ft..rnoon
i:Lnd early eVDning .

Soon uf t.e r davlI1 th.., odne w,," launched sm.:lll s ccl.c 3ttacks <".g.."inst th.:: de f en­
sive positJ.ons southeast of VE.CHEL. Th.,si.. wc:!r o l1uld off ldtnout difficulty .
DiJTi~ th ~ night pluns V/ ~r c drawn up wl:u,.ch c:..ll.::.d for :l 8ri tish ArJnored BTl.gdda,
recolled fromU .. NIJidEGEN aN .~ )o~ ~.d ~""C o
th~ 2d Bilt t.!.hon of th ", 506, wh~cn .Its COl
,on;V"S:h!t1!
~e
, ~J , join f orc e s l'¥ith

clt..!~r f{(t ~,.

._ . I tOHud UDEN, end
th " .ro :;l.d in ordor t.hat til '] flOlI oi "t fiM b1..: . r Os UIIl\;:d. following th.1.t,
thv Armor.::d Brigadc W.:iS to swing shh rply sout h r..rd cut off tha cn{.ll1,}' CSC ap<.l route

,
throu gh ERP.
- 4 ­
 ,

Duo to oo""unicam'. ~f U~i~ •..t~'Ilo.~~ Of tna plan calling for <h e

advance in forc e and en ~c-JfV . if\€~ol , :, tTlar 3t ~ h Armored Brigade "Ia~ not
c&..rrie d out. . Th,J 2d Sa , ~~ OJ. t. J $G.c("mad", c6r\ta t wi tn a pat ro l of t. h~ M ­
nore d Brigace northe dst of VECHEL a'o:lut "1700 . Sy thht tiillf.l t hd tont:lL\y had bo;:g un
hi s withdrawal, and soon t ! lr3reaft~r cont&ct Was lost .

Durine; tr..1 I!lorn:..ng tb. 0 1st a.,."1G 3rd Battalions of t i le 50 1st r~ad jus tcd
thi:.ir Q,1 f <..nsiv,,; positioos w~ st and north of ~aDE , and at dark wsr..:l depl oy ed
with th~ 3rd oatt-alion ge n~ rally alone; t.'1~ railroad from t.he Canal to EElWE, and
the 1st By.ttalion from EEitDE. dUe: so uth to til ", main h!f;hway . Tht! 2d Battall.on
contin u ed the clos(J .in dt:!f \,;ns~ of Vc.CHE;L, .... i t.h tn..: !n6 6iv~n ofi'l.'nsl.v;; missions
to th.. northeast and south . The 327th Vi as assi~; o d a dof onsivo sector north of
VECHEL.

Tho 502 d Parachu:t. :; Infantry conti nu;:,d its d...:f cns<) of .:iT . O~D:.:J:'M OIE , with
th G 377th Parachut ,; Fio::ld. ·itrtili.Jry hattalion i,1 d~rf.lct support .

During t he day a 4th Glid.:;:r s 6rJ.al arnv .; c br ingioi; r c..mainit1.,5 ul::m.:nts of

the 3 27th Gli dGr Inf antr:r am th;:, 907t.h Glid.:Jr 1"ie 1d Artill" ry Battalion. Th€lse
troops W..,t N moved i.-.vn... di at.;ly to tho VhiCrlf..L ar... a, and to... 907th }o'iuld Artill€ r y
Battalion was plac .::d in dire ct sup:)ort cf til".: ) Olst rarachut ,; Infantry. Tn\,; 321st
Glid er }-'id.d ArtL.!o:,ry Ba-t 1..alion ..~ as at.tac h~d to t nu 506th ?arachut t: Infantry ,
and fl.r ud sev·. xal •.liss10n5 durin.;. t :1e day .

At da\m re connaiS5an c ~ as fer as Er'..P ::"n:licattld t ru c n~my had mad,3 good his
withdrawal to th:. south..;ast, and til ... a!'c.a Was cl l:ar of c.nuq' troops . T.-lt:;) 506th
Parachut o Infantry, with t.it.: 321st Gli<ic r F~,,"ld ArtiJ.l..:ry battall.on and i:!att.::ry IIDu,
Blst AB AT Battal~on attacned , was ordvr~a to Uu~ to tukc ov~r tne dcf~ns~ of
that ar ... a .

Th.,; Division Com-;land Post was r.lovt.:d from $T. Ol;;D.lil':rt0Di:. to VECt!EL at 1000.

Tho 32?th Glider Infa"'ltry was assi6n cd t h.J task of d <.l r~nding VECHEL, \'11 th
the 90?th Glider Fiuld Artill~r.i' Batt<:ilion in 5~n~r a l support. Tho.] 2d Battalion
501 was r~l t!i. s tl d from its d..:fensiv.., assi&n£,lcnt in VL:CHEL und joim::d ' its regiment
in tht:: EErlDE arca, as .H.~5ir,lUl.tal htJst:rv E: . B3ttury IrAII, BIst AT BattaUon , conti­
l1l:led attllchtJd to th\:l 501st, witn th<:1 907th Glid ;;:r .Fii!ld Artillery in direct support~
•
Thl! 502d continued th a defense of tr..; ST. Oi:..DE.,~lODE ar ~ a . Bi::I.tteri.:.:s IIn ll ,
IIE", and 1It'1I, th lJ Anti- aircraft Batterie S of th e 8l st AT Battalion, arriv~d in the
: S6aborn.... eche lon and W'-l ra assi6ncd to prott::ct. the Division S.. rvicc A;:'..Ja nortlrll\; st
of zm:.

, At 1000 the enemy launch e d a s 3rios oi probifi6 attacks acainst the 50lst

d..., f <:! nsiN p..~ sition, i"lOvin~ from SCHIJtWEL to\'1e.rd h:OEVl!.1UIIG. Two l.:om.panios of the

. 502d wer;;;. disp atch ed to KOEVd~ING to int.Jrcf:pt this forc e , rt.port o::d to b.... bo tanks
and about forty' infdOtrylol.Jl1. Tn.., untlr.ty forc ~ move d r .Jpl.dly, h~ev (.r, end wert:
alClost in r(O::"Y l r:.I riG ',I1h ,~ n OO'ilp£.n1t..s liD" an'd Ilti" of th -! 502d arriv .. d . The two C01:1­
p:L.'1.i os · h...J.d KUi!.V .r.Jd NG , but oo u ld not pr..:v ....nt tn. ... dlCm,y froiD cuttinc; th" h l.rlhW<J,Y
norchw ';l? t of KOI:,Vi:.rlIlm just b r.. forc! dark . Under COVlor of darknds;; th3 cn uny built
up his forc u s with tanks, s olf- pr o;Jcllc. d artilh :ry, and fuirly 1:.tr6 ...: inf,:.ntry un,it.~
usi% th p co rridor hu uad f ound ' ~twe<...n tn\:. 501st und tno 502d .

D t 8

Dur.in5 til ..., nignt til ... 506th with Batt .;ric s "bl! dlst AT Buttalior., ~d to..;

321st Glid<:. r liuld Artill.... ry Battalion at tacodd, .1 c:,S ord . . Nd to r 0turn to V1!.,;HLL

fror,1 th", UDBN a re e'. . j·:"' clm,mt b<...gan · at 0)00 , and ut dnylignt t j l~S"; units w... r <:l Jus t

c as t of VECH3L ; At 0915 th... 50 6 , with on" s quadron 44th koy ~ l 'ruth Jt",c;itlL€nt

D. tt<..chod, -'l twckcd th..: en ~ c:.t KOc.VlitINu . 'l'n.,: at tu-cJ.. pro6 Nsscd. f ...vor ubly for
SOIL- 2 , 000 Y.:.Jrds, wh".:n botn 3tta ckin;5 batto::.ions (fon.1 at.ion, ht <!nd 3rd lLtt-lion
abr...Lst, u-s trid .J til .., rll.· n ro .:.. d) wt:ro p innud dowo by wul.l- dir..:ct,,;d urtl.lkry and ,.
SII;.!.ll L.l'ta3 f i r ..: , .:1I1d fir.. fro.a ta.'1ks dug in aloTl6 t Ool rO I~d. Th.. . 2 d B...tt a l:i.on was
th~n ord c r<...d to cx') cutu ~I wid,;; ...nv .... lopro... . nt o f th.., c mll:\y I s soutn..:rn fl4l.k, ..md began
its Qov cu..nt a t 1400 . In tll <.. .:k. c.ntim... ,Jl.:..m. ants of tn<J 50 th Br~hsh Div~sion , wi t h

- 5 ­
 strong arnored force s , be.a!1~Ll1 advance fr ofl tHe soutn . The 50lst and Cor.1panies
nou and II H" of t he 50 2d by providine bases of fire for the at.tackint;
f ()rces . By darkness the enenw had been cleared frou all b LTt a very s[.18.11 area
south of th~ road .

The ,02d continued its der"ense of the ST . Ol!.DElJttODE area, th e ).(:7t..h its
defense of the VECHEL area, and th e 501st. its deiense of tne MltDE area. All
three r egin ents had several 3u a11 scale ene.nJ.Y" attacks launched ~ainst. the ir pos i­
tions durll1l;; t he day .

DI 9
Tne 506th resume d the atcack soon after dayli6ht , and by 0900 had driven
the eneqy north of the highway and I.ade cont.C1.ct with ttl; 501st on the right .
BritiSh forces continued the attack to the north , pinching out t.le 5U6th and
Companies ItOIt and It .PI of the )02d . At 1300 t he 506 , wit :l a",tacru!.ents was order ed
..to .r eturn to t he UDLN are a. . TIl'':: uov e:nent was cOr.l;>leteC: by 1700 .

The 502d continued it s defe!1se of the 5T . O'iD'::l Ji~ODE area, Corupanies "D u an:!
"HI! returmng to Regiment 6.1 contro::' at. 1 :500 .

The 501st and the 327th continued their defensive miSSions, both re~iments
repe11i l16 5..':.la1 1 scale ene;.o"y attacks d!.ll"i.r16 the day.

D 110

No change in unit dispositions . Several enet\lY infiltration atte.npts on

front of 501st and 327th repell ed .

, ..

- 6 ­
 • ,

Divi aion H OLdquar t€r~ 1 2 2

HQ Co & tIP Platoon 0 4 1

50 I s t Fcrechut e I nfantry 103 338 65

~502d Parac hute: Infantr y

103 450 75

506th Pa.rachute I nfantry

7h 304 43

327th Glider I nfantry

:~9 137 J59

401st Gli der I nfant~y

12 64 26

321st Gli o.er Fi e l d Art:J.l<:'-:~.. B!l. '2 17

2,
907 th Gli der Field Art iEcr y Bn. 10 17 98

377th ?arc:.c hut6 Fi erld A:"ti1': eJ.~y .t3 n . 1 29 4

Blst JJ3 AAtiaircraft Battcl. i on 7 21 10

32Sth &B Engineer Battalion 1) 41 12

lOlst Ai rborne ~i~a l Conpe.ny a 1 8

426th Ai rborno Quartermas t er Co . 0 1 o

80lst !IE Ord :.roint Co . 1 o 2

326th AB r.1cdical Company 0 2 2

Hq & Hq Btry , Div . f.rty 1 7 5

l Oht .foB Reconnaissance P!etoon 1 1 12

TOTAL 373 1436 547

G?~D TOTAL - 2356

Al~; LA !JO . 5

ReQu~ s t s 101 RIB D~visi on

•
Thru 26 Sept 1944

No . TiI:le of Requ es t Ar da t"Jld Nature of Ttxg .:lt Re s ultF

1. 20 SC i~ t 055 5 Ar med Recan Ere.!:. Nunen, Nede r­ Not reported

wet ten and Helr:!ond. Tanks
r eported ~nd E'. t tack expected
on Zon .

2. 20 Seryt 1700 Tnc Recon road PiE fr o~ Sakstal Not r epor t ed

t v Best and r oad E fr oln Qirschut.
t o Best.. T" nks r eport ed mov ing
t -:·\"!I:!.J."d Bos ·t,.

3. 20 Sept 230.5--..."l0~b a r en 4J4222 s/'.v to 48~17 E Not r e;:lOrt ed

a;-r t o 4 96?15 Ill'll t o . 8;'::22. (Nunen
-.. . .
~ ~~rc~~:~rnat). 20J t cnks end

4. 22 Sept llCQ roeo from Beckel wes t to r eceived

l~£:ssc.ge
400 t !.llks end ve hicles . 1310 "TLr get
cccepted. Esti­
mnt ed timb of
r rr iv~l t o follow . "
No .lat.er aessage.
5. 22 Sopt 1315 TG.c R... cn r r el', 5240 t o 584,0 to Dclr:yed on nccount
52:;4 to 58)4. (Erp , Boc kel I.nd of weather . No
S/W of Volkp.l) . Conc ~ntr: tlon of rbsults r oported .
t ~nks rnd vehicl es .

6. 22 S.pt 1522 ArT:lcd Recon rO!ld Uden to Vecbel. Not r eportt;d .

)0 tl 'nks and infr nt ry on r Of'd .

7. 23 Sept 0810 fi rmed Recon f'.r..:(' Ht.uvcl, Erp , Position of our

Bockl:!l and Krc.i-nt:1.ctr. Conccn­ troaps r equest ed .
trrtion t fnkS r nd vuhiclcs . \7c informed 1000
yd s~f oty limit.
MiS Sion c; ncclled
by G3 " t 1655.

8. 24 Sept 0905 ArT.'led Recan cr er 5632 to 5641 Armed Recan of ('I en

t o 5932 t o 5941. T ~:lks :- nd icpassibl e . ~e ked
veh icles . for pin-point
.---..r
t r rgcts . ktLr
reessroge s r.id t'lission
r efus ed- fri ends in

9 . 24 Sept 1740 Ar med Recan 1000 yd rndius Not r eported

E 42 5369. T•.nks, vehicles
cnel :- rtillery moving s/E .
10. '<4 Sept 1745 ~ Armed Recan rIcr, Schij ndel post poned on
"""~ A"
r ccount of Vicr t her .
(JI.\25l.
ll . ~5 Sopt 0645 l'.rmcd Recan CIt)r St. l~ ich i t:ls No,. r eportt-d
Cest uI to Schijnde l t o Dl nther
t o Berlicum,T"nks, vehicil:ts ,
r rtillt.rJ ,~d inf~n try.
UNClASStf\ED

No . Timo of RequC,;st f,r er rond Nl' turo of Tr r p£..t Results

1;:. 26 Sc';t 0744 . BOI:lo woc ds N of Ce.n, l. in grid l\ske(! f or r ed
sqULrCS 4340, 4439 c n~ 4539 , S~O kd on t ~ rg~ t s .
r 1. 50 villq;E:s of Beug , Dinthcr c ould not conply.
.nd Hceswijk . T:nks , v0h icl ~s , Bcug r- ttr' cked ~t
crtill ery r n,l. i nfc..ntry. 1045. Civili~n s
r oport B Huns
kill¢d . Our uit ­
nes s r1escribc:d
v~hicl ~s ces tr OYL~ .
B l.'"\nc c; of tr-rg€t s
not r eport ed .

Note- - The hour in t he ti~t of r eqUE:Et i s t hl:: t ime t hl! mosst'ct:. W£ 5 : ckn Ol~lec.god by
the Not Con trol St :- t ior.. ThU t imu of or :.gin i n m ~ ny Cf' S~ ~ Hl 5 much 0[ r1i er , but
('tue t o tr~ nsnitting c1 ifficulties t he ilCS could not be r cr.cbac1 or t he meSSt'ge w: 5
not clenrly r:cceiver.' , lir ~~port oisdons h .t .::r t hon 26 Sept 0744 wer e h ~' nc:l:le(~
thru Briti s h cht'nnuls . Our NeS clasen .30 Sept 4400 .

- -
< -

,
•

•
~l'~ k~
,
. .
1. Following is a report of all resup,. . lias ®liverad by parachute and
glid~r to tne l Olst Airborne Divit-ion. in o~o.!l' al.ion !.:arke t:

•• D f 1

( 1) T\'lanty- two (22 ) gliders , CG-4-A, to DZ II ..

11

&,iOUN1' A!iIJ!L;T PJ!RCt.;ll'l-.GE

11'".;1i DJ:;LIV "'''lJ) Rf.COV ,jllj;D liECOVj!?D

Rations , type uK" 7, 668 7,665 10(1,0

Bat ter;, BA- 37

>40 540
l oa;,
Batt ery, BA- 38
'120 720
100%
Batt ery, BA- 39
43 48
10C1,h
Battery, BA-4.0 48 48
100%
Battery, BA- 41. 20 20
100'"
Battl..r;,., BA-48
60 60
100:;,
Bat.t~q , Bh- BO
168 168
1LO%
Wiro , \1- 110 on IR- 4 (32, ,.lil Gs)
65 65
100:;,
\.irc, vI - D O on 00.- 4 (24 r.rillJs)
12 '12 100',.

Carbine J cal. . 30
24, C()Q 24, 000
l~
Cal•• 30, AP, 6/clip 64, 512 04, 512
loa;;
Cal . . 3~ , AP-Tr (4- 1) belted dO ,uOO ~O J 0O.J 1Q0,6
Cal. . 45, S!.G and Pistol 14;000 14,000
lOa..
bonw i:.iortar , HE 1, 152 1,152
1()()j,
8ulm KLortar, (It) 528 528
"lOiJ;o

'-cli1C~L

Dextrose , btL "100 1dU

lCO::a
Sodium, Citrato, box 120 120
10VJ,
Sul!arulamidc, box 240 24CJ
lOa;.,
~ . c. t£r J dist . box . au 400
1.00',.
Pl asma, pkg . 360 jW 100))
Band~ga, ~auz o , box
2 , 040 2, 040
lC<Y;6
Co~ton, abso r b~t , Pk6 .
300 360
lea;.,
rlLstcr, adh esivcl, spi.
;'1;0 240
100';1.
Splint, basswood , s ot.
..sO 480
lUO'';
Splint , Arnt' L:lg ~ FUng , .;;a.
60 60
lOCI;!>
Splint", ,.ir e laddvr, ~& .
. 80 400
100', .
Pe ntothal, sodiUI:I, box
24u 240
100:.
Alcohol, btl.
120 120
100';1.
jGQrphim:, box .
240 240
l00~
Sl.41fadit1Zl.n(;, pkb '
600 600
lOO~
Bend Qbu , plaster of p ~ r~s , ctn .
72U 720
100:;,
Dressing , first - aid, 1ar6o , oa .
480 4130
100;'
lJr es sing , first - aid , sme.ll , ce. .
1,440 1,440 100').
Blankvt, \\001 , 0D, t a. .
Idu 180 100'p
Li tt ~r, fold ll1g , £l. lw.ullUh~ , !:Ia..
6C 60 100;'"

P,;;ac....' T.GL: 01' ft.!.COV~Y Ol GUO"" ru;SUh 'LY ,.<lit 0 f 1 100»

ANNJi.X 110. 7

 (2) un. B-~4 planes to DZ "~ ." and Dt.

(by parachut.e

UN~!:4SSIFlf.. ~ AiiT PCT

lieD
.iliT
!tCD
PCT
RCD
k tions, typ e "Ku 14,400 }, 480
2 , 3bv 1,500 63 . 5
Gasolint.l , gal s . 1 , 260 125
200 100 50 .

DJ.. Ir ," 17. D... ".•" 56 . 0

Battery , Dh-37 300 o 0 75 o o

Batt ,ry , & - 38 5CO o ,) 125 o u
Battery, B.,- 39 50 o 0
Batt.. ry, Brl- 40 50 o 0
Battt:.ry, 5.1\-41 15 o 0
Batt~ ry, BJoI.- 48 29 29 100 . 5 o ()
Bc.tt e:ry, SA- eo 50 o 0 20 D .0
Batt ery J B.A.-30 · 500 o 0 100 o o
Battery, 8:'- 70 5 o o
t..iN, i~ -llJ on 00- 4 (.r..lil....s) 45 II 24 .4
·~liroJ ~j-13 0 on Dr- 4 (miles) 30 8~ 28 . 3
;;1ru, 1'- 130 on Ok-a (mil~s) 5 5 100.
Rad io, SCR-olO 3 1 3.J .3
Radio, SCR- JQO-h J o 0 1 o o
liadio , SCR- 536 16 o 0 4 o o
kdio , 5Ctt-b94 3 o 0 1 1 100 .
Mine Dat¥ctor, 3CR- 625 4 o 0 1 1 lDO .
T~laphon e , E~~-B 15 o v 1 1 100.
S\';itchboard, 8D-71 1 1 lOu .
Sw1 ~c hb oar d, BD-72 1 1 100 .
?4:.st Secti on , '0- 49 10 o 0
~~ st Section, ~E - 50 Ie o 0
It.inton,,,,c " Equip ., i.S- 53 1 o 0
&tt"ry, BA-2 2Q o 0
Bett\,..ry, 8.....- 23 lO o 0
Battery, BA- 27 10 o 0
Coil, C- 161 2 o 0
Tc l ogra) h, TG- 5 1 o v
Tag , 1£-'/2 1,250 o 0
C onv~rt~rJ M - 209 2 o 0
Uas sagc Book, ~- ~lO 200 o 0
IUl.le J RL- 27- '\ 1 o 0
kevl Equipn~ nt, C3- 11 2 o 0
Crunk , CG-4- A. 4 o 0
Tepe , TL-83 50 o 0
Tape , T1-94 <5 o 0
Climbor s J LC- 6 1 o 0
Tool Eqw.pocnt, 1£- 33 40 o 0
Flash h 6ht, TL-122-A 50 o 0
Lu:1p, LU-35 100 o 0
Glov os , LC-IO 10 o 0
To:.st Set, I-56 1 o 0
T<>st Equipme nt, 1 o 0

Dl. ,I . it

crtI.!,,,!1C}';
Ca11ber . 30 AP 8 c.~p l du , OOO G 0 24,000 21 , 000 87.5
C~ b1ne, Cal .30 427, 000 41,664 9. 7 ~3 , 500 53 ,760 57. 5
Cal . . 30, AP , 5 clip 3D , mO 0 0

,
Cal . . )O,rlall- AP , ct n. 2v,000 12, 000 bu .
Cal . . 30, tracer, ctn/clp 15, 000'15,000 100 1,500 , 500 100.
'.
•
or ~nce (Cant In )
i #
. ,pT.~ C RE T

DZ
-

IInf!
" ,- ­

H IT POT f~IT I Jl 1fti l!l p7j1' 't, r. ",.. ~<;,

REi.
430,000 93,000
IiCD

:21.6
DEL IJ~". ~;~, RCI)..- :_-'- "",,;;....1
Cr I. .30 , tr:-.cer J I,P belte(] 120 , 000 80,000 66 .7
Cc,I. .45, :;rn c.ne. Pir.t ol 133,000 66 ,600 50 . 33,000 10, bOO ;;2 .7
C"l. . 50 , iP-I-T (2 - 2- 1)
37w.l Gun , f-V
31 ,000 26,7l0
360 6/,
86 .1
17 .7
1 ,320 1,320 100 . ,
37mn , HE 180 o o
37mm C.. . IUli s t e:r 60 o o
57illl!l , ER . SABOT '.2AO 240 100 .
57n:n , HE 600 352 56 .6
60mn Mor t,:!..r , HE 5 ,850 1,O?E 13 .4 1,350 900 66 .7
60mn MartI r , Ill. 234 6 3.4 54 54 100 .
SI:;U1 MOl't l".r, Lt. 2, 700 ;;:: ,2)3 83 ·4 606 300 49,5
8lmm Morte r , Hv . 540 540 100 , III 60 54 .
8l.rr..r.l Smoke 162 162 100 . 33 33 100 .
75r.u!1 How. HE , M54 1,680 500 29 . 7
75rnm Horr . HE, 11.48 1, 200 505 4< .
75mm How . Smoke 144 o o
105rnm How. HE, U 54 BI 0 358 44.1
105mm How. HE, U48 540 o O.
l 05mm How . Smoke 100 o O.
lOSrnm How. .~T 160 o O.
Rocket, HE, .W 1,900 1,419 74 .7 240 100 41.7
Gre nede , h~nd , fr ~g . 7,200 2,275 31.5 1,200 900 75 .
Gr en~ce , hr~d,of f 3,600 o o 600 0 o
G r o~~ de , rifle , ~T 2,470 250 10.1 260 .219 BO .B
Grenr.de , rifle , fr o-g . J., Ooo 150 15. 100 90 90 .
G r enr ~e , rifle , s moke 500 140 ~8 . 50 5G 100 ,
Sj gnhl., f'.C, J,N, (3 color s ) 300 o O. 100 0 O.
Or rt. r ifle , grl::ll'..nde , M6 2': 000 o O. 200 150 75 .
Crrt, rifle, grenrde , M3 200 150 75.
Crrt. ~.ux . gr enl".de , M7 200 0 O.
PERCENT: GE OF ",,\MUNITION RECOVERED
DZ t, '1 32.7
ti DZ IIJ~ II 64 .4 '..
,,; IDI C;,L
Dextrose, btl. 120 Je 25. 16 6 33 .3
Sod, Citrate, box 40 30 25 . 6 4 06 . 6
Sulfanilar.rl.de, box 160 ~O 25 . 24 8 33 .3
\later, di st ., box 40 10 25 . {, 6 100 .
Plas.na, pkg . 240 60 36 12 33. 3
Bandage , gauze, box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100.
Cotton , absorbent , pkg . 240 60 25 . 3_ 12 3J .3
Plaster, adnesive, spl . 160 40 2, . 24 8 33.3
Splint, bas swood , set (;J 10 16.6 9 9 100.
Splint , ATOJI Lee; ~ rl1n6 40 10 25 . 6 2 J3 .3
Splint , ~i re, ladder , ea . 150 30 20 . 15 15 l OV .
Pentotnal, s odiWi., box 40 10 25. 6 6 100 .
Alcohol , e thy l, qt . 2 o 0
).lco:-Iol, denatl.lI' t!d, pt. 12 1 ~ .3 6 4 66 .6
Marpnine , box 125 30 24. 25 d 32.
Sulfadiazine , l>kg . 225 50 22 . 2 )4 20 50. 8
Bandage , pl aster paris
Dr essi ng , f i.'r:;;t - a....d , larg e
40
)CO
960
10
70
25 .
2) . 3
25 .
45 •
6
16
lOu.
35. 5
Dressl.ng , fu st - aid, smal l 240 156 4!S 30 . 7
Blanket , wool, 0 . 0 . 120 30 £5 . 24 6 25 .
Litter , f olding , alumi nUl!l 40 10 25. 6 2 33. 3
Sp~nt, \ure, gQ.uze , roll 50 10 20 . 7 o 0
PEhC&:~ 'r.n G~ OF ' .i..DICJ..L E ,JI?i.!ENT rt3COVi.HZD
D:t, II r.1I ~3 . 1 DL. ";;.11 52 .2
Cd ,~nc ...L !tAttF.rIJ'\.E
Gr enade, hand, 8I'Iloke , He , ¢I::S
Grenade, hand , inc end l.ary , J\N- 14
Grenade , hand , smokE , liP, 10:- 15 •
-3­
 DZ ~~
ITEbi . lW"T JJ.l'r l'GT
!!!J. . ReD RCD
.
Grenade, hand, sl:loke, col ored , 11-18 , oran&e 1'2 12 l C).
Grenade , nand , SriOK-O, . color ed·, d-ld , grt.O!1 6 6 100.
Gr enade , hand , smoke , col ored, L"-lcs , r ed 6. 6 l OC.
PJ;l!CENT.CE OF CH.i. I CAL ,.MF",ili &.UIPiiEilT rto.COitltcil - 90.
ElIGINE§<
Compo sition , C-2 . 250 100.
Caps, blasting, special, non-electr1c o O.
Fuse , blasting , tim~ J (lOD 'roll) o O.
Fuse , lighte rs . , o v.
Prima- -cord (100 ' roll) O. o.
Bags, sand 500 (J o.
PERCElIT.C~ 0,' E/IGINEhJi E'.l<J iPlIDl'f rtEUllV'iIiED 16 .6
PERCE/IT""" OF )(I:;C tlibllY 0)' rtl>5UPPLY FQt D t 1
Glid er r'::5uPP!Y - 100',0 .!

Prcht. resupply - J9 . 6~
b. D t 3
. (1) Thirty- five (3S) C- 4? planes t o DZ " 'I II (By Parachute)
.!Uh lt'ritti~ rut

/-T A...'T PCT

~ kCD .<CD

Rations, type "K!! 9,120 -216 2:4

Bags , vl.nyl 205 ;0 10.5
PcllOEllT.CE QUIJlTEllL1JlSTEl< I TEi.6 RECOiEREO 6.5%
,.1EqIC.u.L
Blankets, wool, O.D. £,700 600 22.2
Litter s , folding ~72 120 44.1
Bundles, cli ec . .kdic al supfllies l2 5 41.6
35 . ~

Radio J SC H-694 4 2 50 .
;>;:;WENTAGE OF SIGNAL I TEI.5 R.;cOVDlED - 50"
or' J<E:)Ut'l'LY
PEHClillTnG,,; OF ,,;;COV!1iY )1)" D t 3
Parachut e resuyply - 30 .8%
c. D t 4

(1) Thirty (0) C-47 planes to D'L. " .. ". (By par.cl1ute)

~Uhrl T'MJ.:.;ST'U!

Rati ons, type ",\." 13, 960 4,320

P&C~:TAGE 0,' RE.COVlliY 0, .1I>SJi'I'LY l'Ott D t 4

Parachute resutlPl,y - 30 . 9 ~
d. Dt 6
(1) FoOl' (4) g liders CG-4-j, to D'L.
\
- 4 ­

,
 • ,
" llT
DEl
oi!I'
i~CD
FeT
!tGD
,
~Il. r e , \ i- lll.'-mi . 20 20 100.

Radio, SCH- 536 4 4 100 .

Radio , SCl<-6l0 2 2 100 .

Radio, SCn- 694 4 4 100.

Batt eries , EA-30 1, 000 1, 000 100.

Bat.tel'iea , B;,-39 150 34

22 .6

Ba1jte rH~s J 0..- 40 25 24 96.

Batte r ies , 13..- 70

Ees sase Books , ii- n O
100 n 72 .

300 50 16. 6

Tape , 'Cl,-83 l OV l UD 100.

Tape , T"'-'-~4 lOu l CO l llu .

Flas hl ight , TL-IU - ... l vO l UD 100 .

p::.RCE:r:...':;B or' SlGltoJ. "S _.\J IP1UJT ~vV1l-tED <:s3 . 9;.,

Oitr}j~/l hCi'~

Gun- s l.lb- ulacn ine , mAl 15 15 100.

l:or t ar J 6Omm, 1.2 2 2 100 .

Launcher J grenad e, f7 & d l OU.

Launcher, b~enQde J is 5 5 lOU.

Cloth, wiping , Ibs . 200 200 100.

Patches, cotton, ~ 10 lU 100.

Radiator , l/k ton truck 4 4 100.

Kit , t l.rc r epair , cold patch 6 6 100 .

~fle , U. S. Cal • •30, hI 20 20 100 .

JtCEN'l'.IGE ot' OiIDi'l"NCB

p;:;' E~~UIP~NT ru,.;OV...:o:GD 100%
Pt.aC.1iT,,(l,; Of' R;,;sU? , LY Ri'.CuVUtY Fa, D I 6 - 91. %

e. D I 8

(1) Thirty- foW' (34) G- 47 plar.es to DZ "••" • (By parac hute)

,

1, 000
"~G;T"G~ 0' ru>3UPrLY ,,,,,Cunl<Y FO~ D I 8

f . Pe rcen t~e of rec over s of res uppl y for entll'C operation .

Gll.der rle sup~ly - 95 . ~p
Prent . rl.esu.Jvl:r - 41.410
2 . .~ r esupply recov a red by units and not d c liv~r ~ d to D~vision dumps are
not mcluded in totals as figure s 'ti€ re not r tir'orted .

3. Tne r eport is a cl~ ar ~dic ati on ~ h at g lid e r r~ supp ly i s consid c rab ~

l'JOre affectiv~ as p rac t ically 100lb of th.; com,en t~ aI' bll.d~s was r l;:c ov E;r ed .

4 . TIlE. last r~supply by air on 0 I S ~iv es tnc best gaUf:i;i: on effectlVen<lS S

of par ac hute r esuPi>ly. Ac cordi l16 to r~port s from the r aar b ase , t.nirty - i our 1.34)
planes 'fll.t h six r <J.ck l Obds ar. d t hrde door loads uacn \'/or a delivdra d . hll rUCK
l oads \~ e r e droflpvd in a very small ar,..;a and wer e recovLred w~tni.n a f~V/ hour s . ao
door l oads 'IIe r.;. s een comi% dmm . T,lis is ll;;.tllU!' e.n indlcation tnat tne door l oa ds
l.ere aischur bcd. far f r oli! t ho: tc..rget area or tnd d oor loads wer~ act.ua.lly not l oade d.

5. H..3 suppl,y by Parach ut.:: C OlLa 0(, eff ... c t ....vd a only ro.cy. loads were used W1d
all pl anas discilcll"gl.d th..:i r lo ad s ovur elle id catJ.f:"c ::l.tion 1UU"I-:.ers on t h.:;: 6 r ound.
~- t is b...lioved t hat door l oads should not. normdll,y bd uSed doS i t caUSGS too g r eat
b dl.sporsion of s upplie s and might ~ n~bl~ t n ~ ~ne~ ~o ootain ~ v€ ry n1gh pc r c~ntage
of the t otal su ~11 ~ s d roppod .
- 5 ­
 ,

In cl No . 3 t o Rei-'ort : "Oper at ion 1:ARKEr ,

Inclus iv ~" . dat ed J DGc ~~ ber 1944 .

F't.Jj\,TCTI ONS XVIII COTIi?S

For e pt.rution r.iA~U:.T , t hE; 82d and l Olst Air borne Divis i ons ,<,rere
de tached from this Corps and pl aced undt:=r British opc:ra tioOl:!l control.
ThG re,spon sibi li ti...s of' thE. XVIII Corls (Ai rborne ) , u ith rt..spt:ct to t hesE>
two d i vi5i ons . was th ere ror e liti:i t\..d to the foll m li ng ;

(1) r lan:;; ;.;er "" f onnul a teod , and the Corps Vias pl'E-parod to
~n t v r tht. ccmbat aren a 3 a~ op~rat ion a l cor ~ s to contro l
such gro1,.\nd t roo j,ls 63 . it migh t ho.; dew.vd l1cCE: ssary to
to til(:; CoTllS .
u~s i g n

(2) Corp8 mon i tored a ll me:ssagf..s bc t wE,t;n th 6 forward ech(; ­

I ons of th b 82d und lO l st Airbornu Divisions and thbir
basE: bch~lo ns . and a chuck was mn intainbd to insur u
th a t propc:r Be tion YI.:.t s t ak... n in t.ach ins tanc <J requi r ­
ing it.

b. Int t. llif' !.... nc~ .

(1) Col~S d i stri bu t ed and diss~inat~d to th~ 82d and 101st

Ai r borne; Di v i sion;; a ll i n t~ lli gl. nc(. , oth ~r t han that
paSS i ng tl1rough t hb Briti sh Airborno Corps .

(2) Corps pr.... pare.d a nd de.livcrE..d to both di vi s ions , in

bulk : a terra in s tudy . A riv,,;,r and bridgt. s tudy was
prc~ar6d and de liv~ rcd to th u 82d' Airborn~ Division .
,
(3) !~PS I to\iO IJli:m and Jt:.;fc.nso.; ov ....r t'r int r ....qu i rl:::l!lt;::;nts
\'I\...re s<.. t uiJ by Corl,S . and th" Corps had t h(... sole rt;. ­
spons ibility or l1roc.... ssi ng f rom ~/l:l rt.bousES . br ea king
down , and d(..1i v.:..ry to th.... d i vbions . Th .... fo llowi ng
amoun ts \"I(.r.... 11 _ndlc:.d : '

\'/c i e h t ( !. b~S
"")L.!N~O;.;.o-;o",f';;!'~"h"c",."t"'s
li'.tUps 20 . ~ lO 205 ,100
Town r l ans (20 differen t
tm<1l s) 1.990 19.897
Dcfc.nsu Ovt. rp rlnta ; I 109 1,890
(4) 1\.n udd it i onul tun (10) tons of maps 'rlbr!.. . on hund n i th
arrancEJ!l.....r:ts IJlI:l.dt,; for r esuppl y by air i f thtiy had
b!.... ~D cal Iud f or .

(5) Corps s!.... t up a....ri l:l 1 ? hotography rvqu ir...mun t s , i nclud ­

ing !.~saic s i n buH' , for both t he. 82d and lOl st Air ­
born!.... Di vi s ion!:; i t b .... sumt. \'II:lS go. thurvd from dt. ve:loping
and ~roc(J::lsing plLal t s illld d ... li v(..ry \TIl S mad... to the
d i yi sions .

c. Op6ro.tionul.

( 1) CorV3 accbptLd thL r(; si..onsi bili ty for organlz l ng and

ar!'ang i nt'; th(. d(.tuil::. f or til ... movwnc.nt of the St:oa - lif t3
01' tht.. 82d and lOlst Airborn..:. Di vi s ions from t hu UK
to t h<;. zont... of a c t i ol) . Th(; s ... n lif ts :.11'1'i v ....d in th ....
combut ilr(;l:1$ u::; l)lannt.d und 'tIi t hou 'c in ciden t . ThE;

INCL 3
.....
'- 1 - "
 s t:. o lif t of tluJ 10 1s t Airbor nt. Div .i.s ion movc.d frOO!
m:J-I_~ BL\CH in two Sv ri uls wh i ch cl os£id i n t h l.. ZON a r t.:J.
on 22 and 23 Svp t l..Ii.bl..r rl..lJp(. ctivt.l y . 'nl(; s(.." lif t of
~~e 82d Air born~ Di vi¥ i on closl..d in th ~ d ivi s ion' & arVd
on 23 S",pt-.!1:be:r .

(2) Li a i s on ~las ruc.i n t a i nt.d by u stuff off i c ... r ~ i tb t b<..

LX TeC . i n ordLr t o i nsur u r ~p id t run sm i s~i on of in­
f ~rmcJ.tioli rc.l8.ti vl.. to tilt.. OpEoI'L.tion .

An orr i cl..r ob;:;c.rvLr 1'11.."" wi t h und ob ~V rv bd t hrl.(, li f t s

t o r ... por t on thl.. cl CCU r .lC) oj' thl.. dr op s i nvolv o;:.d u nd
t.nt.Jlly f Ihk HC tion .

d . :Ju poly . Th& fo l lo'.''iin <; epL cific supJ;. l y r Cispons i b U it il.. :3
,,(.r 0 uc cl..pt(.d by Corp,:; I

( 1) .ti!" r ... - supply , 'ro t-..d it und t r un3r.1i t t ht.. r ...qu irwn... nt s
fo!' t bt.. US c i .... i ni on's t o Cominun ic.J. t l ons Zon t. und to fol l o ...
t hrough on ih": ... e: r.. quc3ta until 3uch time. ~\S thl. suppl h .s
ut.r.... di::lvo t chid t o t ho,. un i tD by I X TCe ; to mai nta in
Qc tiv<.:; liotr.on b.. t \· .......n th", d ivision s . Comnun i c';!' tion .:l
Zollt. and tht. ,\1 1' ror c(. .J to i n ...url.. tht.. fu lf il lml. nt of
till a ir r o;:. - oupp ly r C4,uc.s ts o f th ... d i v i s ions . (For
dt..tci I s of (..i r r E:. - OUD.,l y op... r uti ons S(..l. ,\l".nux No . 1 ) .

( 2 ) Cvur lund supplj- . To lrovidt. l1... i Don oi'f i c;'r s \,ho cou l d
t ivl. t ~chnic~ l advicl. to th ... Bri t i bh on ov~rl and supply
of U~ 5upp li ~ s to th~ U divi dio n3 .

(0) Dr ieudit.r Gt;..n(.rul 'Ihc..odorl.. E. Bul. ch l c r . CCl'ps

Artil ll.. l' j' Comrm:mdcr • ./:.1.J d(.. t c..il c.d us lia.i s on of ­
fict:. r to .l~X;: Col'P3 (Br i tisb ) i i.J.l j or Curt i s Y. Kimba ll ,
. Ass i st:.m t G- 4 . us li Licon oJ.'i' icvr to St;cond (ilr iti ::lh)
.\I7!lY ; <lnd t:..ljor ik.nji.l1lli n Wc. tzl... r . ~ ~ sdiB t un t Ord ­
nuncb Of f ic,;,r . us l i :.1 i s on of f i cvr t o Connmmic..! ­
tion a Zon<.. Hl..cdqua.l' t (; l' U,

( b) Tllc~l. offic ...r s ..loai,stt:d ltU.\ t Qrl ul l y in sl.::tti r..g up

ttll.. oVl..rl:lr.d :,uppl y sys t \,om fo r thu d ivi sion.::! ,
supt. rvi dnc; its n!(.chlolll i c3 ':':'nU k... (.pi ng A'VIII Corps
( Airbor nb) und First .\llh.d Ai rborn,", .o\rlllY i nform...d
....s to suppl y st.. t us . Thl.. 1.:.: t k r tno dff i c6r !.1
fun c t i on....d in tha t c 1"·.;.J clty until ~ol t E. r t h l.. d i vi ­
uions \,... 1'.... wi tLdr":".n from t hl. linl.. . .iDd i n t hv la t \..;r
S t .gt.5 nl.Jo ill::l.Ji.!;tl..d ir. ttl", sclvug(. of unconslliCc.d
5Upp li ~s l l..ft ov(.r \.hl.n the.. d i vi s i ol'..3 ~,uru lii t hdrQ'W!l ,

1 i 1'.!.I..X ;,.
.•dmir.iotr!tiv~ Func tions j.VI I I Corp.!;

1L.!....91~ :
No . 1 - Da ily Acqu i r .:.mvn t s f or l :i.xcd HV- Supply
Cb,. V (02d (, 101 s t All D1v.) C'"S It"'"'"
(82d ~ 1010 t AB J i vs )
Cl uBS I & III (82 & 101 Di v .. ) ~ l g'nn l i:<ju ipm~ll t (32 & 101 Di vs)
r,jl.dic.J. l I tun~ (82 & 101 :li vJ) El':g i n(;l..r It....m& ( 82 &. 10 1 Dlv S)
No . 2 - Li st o f SlPpl i...s Ho;:. l d Cn- C...ll

Q;i SUpp li ",~ _ t Dt.P' .rtur"" Air ~'iddo h:fo.dic:J l Items on Ct.l l

Ord !:u.t\..;r i ci on C....l l (82 & 101 Div;,;) D't8' i n\..; .... r Ituna or!. Loull

:Ui~1Plfiti~~trJ.'
.. ' ." t
i xc d Re - SUppl y (82 101 Di vs)
,\ .
'
. vt.r l.d . On- C._ll R.... - Bupply

INCL J

 , " ftl-lI('n
,. " ", IIM(,' 6.~~ '.," nr,~
No .1 . t.o I ncl r:o . 3 ·.to Report :. MGp-er a t ion I:'lnrl'U ~ic~..9r.p.e ~ ~!l~e; ",
)al'1J}9X .. ~
D t o ·0 r 1u's ' T;m I nclus i v e ", dated 3 De cer.tber ' 1941~ . ~ . ' .

AClrrrinistr·d.t t ve . fun ct io n ~_=-YJ!III Corl) s ( ~i r bo z:!2EU

....
1.:' Hission . .

a. neneral.

To the 1 i-r,it of ou r caoabilities t o insure :that . f ooo , smrruni­

'. tion , and' othe r sUI)")lies were delivered t o tne 82d 0.00 IO:}, s t Airborne

Divi.sions . .

1:1 , '. Spec.:i..'fic . .'

(1 ) Since t~is Cor os \~ as' not ca rt of the · tr ooos efl2af>e'd in ,­

t he oneration , . theor~tica.1. l<:: , We h:ld no sl){. ciri.c r ,€ sDCl1s·ibillt i es •

. (2) Se"ullse t hp. Ta<;k Force Corrran~,= r and his hea(louar t er s came

f r o::o. the Pr iti.sh itrmV , all':I 'r'!ere , t t).:3 re "ore: , somellh... t unfdmiliar wit h r e­

sU')olv I')roC~~Ul' e5 , t Ills he 'J!:'cuSll·ters .:I ~·ce'"t.er t he follow in" spec ific' re­

~nonsibi.nt· ies •

" ,
(a ) To ac ; ent t oe fixed am on cw.l a ir r~ -su o')ly r eouir e­

ments fr om the (liv l..o;jon..<;; t o tra,"lscit these re.q·.li r em.ents to Com."'unica tions

Zone : to ml:d'ita'1n active l iaison bet\~ecn the flvisions , COmr'unicat-ibh3 Zo ne ,

at)cl he' .Ur FO"l"'ces ; to follow tltroue'h on thes e s urmlies until s ilch tiIfte a s

'
.. t he sunol
.
i ~~ , v;e r e c!eUv~ r ed to t he H r Forces on t he rel"lar t LU'e air f i e lc's .
'.

( b) To a<;sist in the 'Ilovc"'.ent of t he seaoo r l1c echelons of

both ~iv:Lsio"s f r em t~e Unit ee Ki!1"'no!l1 t.o the forw3. r n "'&>mbat ar ea (rf- 3

, Bect ion) .

'. '. . ( 3) . At t he timP. of t'1e ooeNt ion , the consoli~ation of nI l

. Troon · C ar"l" V" in~ · Fo r ces ::mc' a l l .... irbol"' ''le For ces unc!e r one cOlTf'!.arr hael 1115 t

The hillher heac"oua r ters lnv &.verl 'P. ~ re n8'o" <:I t. t I-j(:ir i obs .

be.en .c i reeterl .
Be c~sr ' of· t his , Cinc bec.:t.use thes'e Y'C 'R our
own dIvisions , this heacauCt r te rs ,

a)tho!J~h :lot l1cce, tln~ t he resoonsib-ilitioo) actually performed t he f ollo....­

in" &Ciditicnal functions .

(a ) We SGt U'J liairon at t he dt=o :;.:rture air fields arc .lS­

sishd the Air Fo r ce ill I) l anning art c; x"cu ti('lf1 th l3 ir air re- s'l'1p l y f U'1Ctions .

This .invcl vco com..... .ltine pl ane r enui r e'I1(· ntsj estc. blishin£' fl i pht scherlu l es ·

c st.l blishine liaison b etv"~ en t hI-: division::: a 1'1( the Air Forc.::s <inc .... 1 tlti.o

the!\ir Forc e s ( i . e . - Retwe-.n TroolJ Cu r ri er Cor.rr mo dnd t~ 1~9oth Qu :lr t e r­

m.. stc:r T' E;I)ot Com"t!O", Suml v): ' notifyinp d ivisior.s of FXP ctc d tirnE". of

:u::rival of r e- sul)'11v I'l:ls s ion.s OV (; r t ro Oron 7..on(; .

"

( b ) Thro'l"h the :1P6rtcyo f li:lison offic G"rs, \\(; dicl all

.i'l.our "ow.. r to insure -.l wooth f l ov, of suo .,lics f r om proUn0 SOJrC6S art~ r

cort",.. t h;J r br C: i Irude wit'1 the: ~ r olnc forc bs .

2. Narr'lti...'e . ·

n.• Prio r to th:: o~.:: r:lt.ion .

(1 ) Th f, ~ T)·;;ci 3, l st l,! !' ) f t '1 is hC ·l -:c , w.rt~ rs J:"!.aC E". .J oi t t·\ il:=:d'· ....

stucV of' t l-j (: fund '~ n~ on cdl .l'(.C'llir·:!l., '1 w.o r bct\.'jljivtsions cinr'! cornnil( d

un tt'~r;i7"':'" lif':t of r ' "' u:ir cn ~ nts t o b,: fu-rn..!.sh ' 0:1 d:t ilv .:: ncI of t ~ "u.ir€"lI\·nts

to I:H' h .-I ";( t r('').rrb.p·.. cir r i c lr's , 0'; ('" ,:.11. I.\. COi" ol"l"-i$ list "';:' S furnishr.d

to "Ill int",r p· st. l~tj ·l " (; '1ci,~.s 3,rlr ~ '. tt-:lC~c. . (SEt

, ,
«) P .I)er ty on hmrl !.at cl';'"I"\Cl rtu r u .:tirfit: lrls w;<lS car f'.fully in­

v rntor ii ~ '111(1 t he shor t .i " !.l ~ r (-v· ~Il , cl t lis i nv\;.nto rv were br ouo-ht to the

3.ttention

''''-Y-.'
. ............. l' t 0 r""lCL
':!..l' •] ' - 1

 l'X,t:C m'l,.a, ~ 'loci l .t ~ r SUOGrvis(.d~ to s E. to

c'c: n ::.rt,u r .: lirfidd s , vns nroD.f')tl·, c p ' (. d fo r .

(4) Anl)r o~i'il_,t c;:ly four-fHt1.s of th~ r E:-su? ....l., itens "'He a m­
munition .. liencE , th e rulk of thl.i work, i nvolv('d in <lccomr-lishinp. the .:itOV E ,
V;JS rl on (; b r th o:: Orcln l nC G S.: :; ction, this hsJe"qu.:lr t E:r s . I t ""·IS a tr. E. men~ ous
t sk , involvL'11' tl!. t icu lo us .l tt€ ntion to sm:lll , but import lOt , (ic;.tnils . Th(;
t sk Wl'J S :!.ccomplish ' r' in ~l :l outst ,t..'l cinO'ly successf ul m.:.mt:r by 'l s (;;ct ion
fr l sh from t~ (; Unit ed St.:::t " s .:.nc compht .:: ly unf..lmil b r with :ir born.:: l ctiv­
iti ' .s . Th,," work of this s ection, c!uring th e oOGr.:.tio'l , i s df.servin~ of the
h:1r;o h cst praise ,

b~ During the; cm;;.ration .

( Cl ) /\ t ,'.bh. showlnl? t Oll .IILS :lctuJ.lly d E. livGr € 0 t o div­

isions , unr' :::, r this sch,,(lulc , is et t _ch-:.d . In "JLMjng d li1y divisicn:ll ton ­

n:lge rcqu il' e m~ nts , th e fo1lowL'12 c. stim.lt € s .Jr o .lS :lccur.ltG .1S c ' 0 be m1:!.dc ,

wit hout know ino t he EX :~ ct division-:: l orlZ :nizJtion and th G so ccific mission

of tl-t ::- unit .

Cl·1 ss I 30 tons
Cl::ss III 10 tons
CBSS V ~O t ons
Al l Othe rs 10 tons

Tot Jl 250 tons

(b) On D ~us 1 , !! fixu 'l r t - sul"lol" lJ'Iissic:1. l"'1s fl own by

t" e DO':lb "r CO'1!ic:.nc\ of t he:: 8th t~ ir For ct:: . B-245 VlEr e us w . From 75 to 90

l'lJ rc c;nt of th ~ sun....U .. s -:.::; liv(,·rrr ~c tu :-. llv r 'J. chr.,j th. troo'1s on the pround .

ThES{'; .trc , ''''rob~blv , t hr- b es t r esu lts l'!hicl-]. h'w" ', v ~ r b.:: en obt:'in€ .,C- in the

fic. ld of f)2r3chiJ.t,s r e- su.... "'l\.'. UncO'lbt ·.::dl 'f, (Vc;:l oc tt Gr r eEu lts :.I r e 'X)ssibl e •

.. if th(; POC'Ibc r CO:"'L"''' ltT is .ai\' &) J.-:'-' itio.n l tr intnl? in t h is typE of work .
'Ph! nt:i l1ci"lO l r l;. :~, Ol for sucl-]. out· s t "nci n ~ s u cces s 0'1. t his , t he first re-
su,,",lv missio'1 (·v ~~ r nowl'! bv t,he b€ r Con"1. :n~, mri wit hout or cvious tr lin­
i n" , is t h..: f \'c t th-' t the bCi"'.b "~ r is ..l much bett(; r r c -su,o....lv :l i r -shiD tha n
t hr C-47 . Th ..: oorrbcr c lrri(; s frO!"! "0 to 2:2 bunrllr-:s ~cl it is ')ossibl l: : to
~ro!) t h o whcl e 10 .(1 i n a v ery r .' strict '-_d 'lr e..L . On t" t:; c th€ T h:::. nc' , :l C-4.7
c rriE.s f r om 9 t o 12 bunc'lefl , of i'fhich i t is !;"Io3sibh. to rlror'l 9 t.uncl1 .€ s in
:I f ,ir 1v r cs trict "d .I r e.! . Us io g. f.Qu1-lm..:nt Q'''''Ec ntl:y orov id cd, i t is not
I")()ssibl~ to .v oio s c ttcri'1g t hf: Ll s t thr e~ buncl.:: s .

(c) The IX Troon Carrie r Corrrnand flew the remainine: r e­

1. In settinp u'" r e-s1Jo"!.v mi ssions , the Tro op C'i r­

r ie r Gorr-anr1 iflfo r lT' s the 49Jt.h Qua rte r n<:, ster Del')ot Cort"'l.my Su'X)lv , the fi elr.ls

f r oM which t he nl J.OOS will take off . Thp.se fie l ds ar e not , in all ca ses ,

the sa!re fielcs wl1ich co '1t ain t he sunt')lies . This f"teIl OS th Jt ' aft e r receivine

!1.otific ,lt ion of the takeoff fi e les , it is n(cElssarv for the 49?t h QJ.3rte r­

ma!)t~ r T)eoot Co:n... .a!W SU ')r.llV to move th e ~UI).,liES fr Cfll. one fid e to a ot;'t hEr .

Th is 15 ::l. cumbe rsc)!l's s'lstem , imolvi!'lr' a n ExpEnditure of n a:c'less time an rf

effor t . It coulc be c orr ec t e d io t he ryl~ n ~ in" st ~ re b v co-oreina t ion be ­

t .... r-en t ry e Troo'" C'i.r -rifr Corw.anc , t h ~ eoot COMO:ln" , anc the rfivisions en­

par: .€ d in t he o:'\f::rat i o n .

2 . There was cons irl~t u i:'lG 1 '1 ~: t. !·i.nute r E'.-3r-ranP'inc

o f scocnql ' s , wh i ch. c aus ed S~t" c (I;'Jfusion . T'1i8 wac: c'u(. tc the:: Division

Co.r:".,lnt'f r:rs na!<in- l'l~t f"li.,ut '· recisions :i ~ to ,~I-t(.'t'1· r t"~ v 'o'Oulcl U S(i t he

::lv1~jt: lc ....lam:s ror re - ml"lI')li.f' S or fo r ~ r i l D'i')P i n ddc:'i t .ionu1 tr ooos . It

is hclie v (,c t,· t Ellen conf1.lsion is inevi jhlr in 3n 01'), r at.ion whc:rr the TC' ­

aui'r or:ents for "l'3n...,s are "l"l'lt e;r t l-t 11 t '":c lctull S' I"''1l" of '1l:inES and wh :: re

a r Broirll,r mo vine t·') c tic~l si tu~ t ion n C!'S= tWt S l htirriCrl .., l &.nninP . All

a"'r "ci 'g L'1volvcr' mus t k ," rn to ""x"sC't this c mfl1 si('n anel b.:: nrc pa 1'" (;d to (lea l

wit'" it '.t t.br: t.w..: . It is rm-tiC'u.larl,· n.t thi~ - iost.\hat. t ~ 1S' mj~
n..:.(;o ('or liaiso~ br.coqr s om ur.acnt; necc·csttv , (I " P ~!Ji~.lfll¢~ \h 9.t
s",,( .,cic. s , ;;ortd.'1~ s ,-, t"J.i- i!Yi c "'err~Tl tlv o f' €.:lch ot. ~ ~;'lJtfttllicl lY .
.
r , v
(
D
tho r ouphlv crorcinatcr" , "ilic.!'! ~l:wS(; C~,lfl" i o.cc u 'l it: ,'>;.....­
A.~m 1 t o n~CL . - 2 ­
- ---'" ... ­~
SEC .l E T
 •
Ann"x NC? 1· to In~ ;'0 . :; to
D to D Plu s Ten ;rllclusiuo"
§H.!l~I
R~!,ort: "Ol.Jerati on
SJilbC! b tl. .
r!"'~~'I'; Airbor ne Phase ,

(~) On-o , l1 rc-surym~i~" Ii ~f" tn~ Ii

.. ..,~~o rt 1"~~-" :\ ' ~"" a
(a ) jJ. tllblc sh . lpJ'tOrlMa'''C's l ctually del iv er ed
divisions U"1dr:r t"tis schululf.;. is attacht::c1 . (S ee Table:s 2 & 4)

(b) The SVSt.E!:l us r e \''1 &S d nalo~ous to the fix ed l'E-sunplv

sV'stGlll , with th(; e:xc 0 "1tion that r . (luir cmt! nts cs til blls hcc o r ior to t h e 01')- r­
ation \~ ,; rc .stVnites . ThG actual r i.;.'"'ui r G'lcnts w",re ')1" sc:nt(.d to t 'us head­
qlF' rt Hs;;t h'· t in~ thr, nc" d QCC Urr loc . Pr .3.ctici::llly, il .:ldmin i st r :l tiv G de ­
1liY in fu r nishin!l thG ~E s U'Joli cs W'i S e liminat e d b~.' tn 6 establis hr.:€nt of a
li.3 i son so;ction wit h t.h G 490th Qu l. rt !'r:!l.1 stl r ficoot Compa ny Suooly e.nd
,.,hysic llv loc .;. t r.c 'It tiHt he:.c''''u:' rt.r, rs on one:: o f t~ l- r. em rturG a irfie lds .
Whe n r t qu.-sts fo r o~-c 'l ll 5u,)n1.i6 5 \'kr E r 6 c l;. iv t~ bv t. h e cltv is io n base ech elonsl
t hti:y w ( N im~ !,~cli ~t .;; lv t ~ lGl1hon (;<' to this s .;!ct i on end di.r~c t arranD c:~ nts f or
s e tt 1m un t"J", m 106 s 9..nC: 10.:L0 .ino t"J ..; suO"p')li:c;s wel' t, rn..ld~ on the spot .
Arr 3.nD CMc nts w ·r c .also rn.: r:: to h ... v '~ ..1 l i 2i500 s !:ction from t he CO~l""llnic..:..tions
Zo'1 € ~··s t· . blish ; rl 1t th.: s ~";l.c ooint . Thus , '~h€:n rt"uc sts for alomic.;.s , not
.:Lv.... iL:bk. on c c n1rtUl' r li rfic lc's , .,. 'ro:. r ec e iv e d, irrJUboi .l te::ly ::.: nc dir ect
ection cO lllC\ Ix t .;!It;Gn to procur(: thi..: SLJ.J:lplit.,s from th e Communic ,tions Zone
D€nots .

( c ) It 'Nas fou ne t h",lt sun'"\lie s c Oltld be d eliv ereCi to

divisions wi th the followitlf! t itre limit.1t ions .

1. All r€£"'ue~ts r ecfdved orior to lhdnig~t can be

nroce ssed anfl suo-olies (ieliver ed t he follo\~ing d::I'7 in a t oorouj;!l1ly efficient
manne r . Th i s t, b"e 1 1r"' it !lllows o'1portunit v for CO!'l1?le te plAnniop. , coml')lete
co-or~in ~ tion , anc' t "!e '1Qst e:fficie ""lt use of necessary airola nes .

Reouests r eca iv p.d ol'i or t o 1000 hour s can be

2.
hanc"le~ for t:'elive rv t.he sarre r'a'l . Sue "! 3. svst.e r.' i l1 vo lves t~e r e -a~ iusti np
of f1iP'"rt. schedules ,Uld la·st Illirute nroouT ~r-Gnt o f Su')pliES , l ast lIinute
co- o rrl il"'~ tion hetw€e'l thb 'l"' e'lc i ES i ,vlJlved , with t ~le conse ouent risk of
failu r e ard , i '1 I'l1n(;r&] , a~ inerr icient system. However , it is nrCl.cticable
aoc' "Was uSed wlt~ satisfacto r y succoss .

3. Rcouests T E:-cG iv ~ c' afte r 1000 hou r s shoul" oo t be

c 0 1Sirlerec' for r! eliv!?rv t. hat Otl" . unl€!" ~ a c r itlcal em.:rl"'"Cnc v e "'ist~ . The
f ilUne: of these r eOuc-5 ts lnvariA.blv r ssults in CI. 1 i s r Ul'.' t ion o f flipht
sc h~ !ll €s , '11101'15 insuff icient time for t~ c pr oper bridinp o f pUots , and
i..,suff ic ic.rrt t ~e far orOO,-T packa~inp. 3 nC loadinl! .

(0) The r e is.;in urxh.rstllndubh t · nc e.'1cyon t hc oa rt of

th o divisions to insist on o lI' r t-;-su1) ('I ly aft t:. r qroun:' cc nta ct h:as ber.n es ­
tablish..: d anc! b(;yonc the limits Si:lt u':) bv t h: o r ipinal olan o This is to be
e X"h. ct '"' ~ in ll..YI ai r oorne oo :::ration 1 sinc l" th € init ia l CI)nt ac t with th e oround
f orl'" GS is alJ'lost sure to bn IihlC C .,t 9. t.im~ ...·h en th e 171'Ounr1 sunnl v s';st ('1J is
stl'€tch ~'c1 t o th r Ijr.;it of i ts (' 'loabilit i € s ann at u t irrr.; when tl"<.lnspo rtl3:­
tion for hlUlinp sunnlic.s is 1t 'lo Tl.. mium . It is , trer{ for e , th " linE o f
V ~ls t r ~s ist ~ n cc. fo r t'1 G division cC)mm.1 rrcr to disPJt ch a Jll(;SsilP.e to his
boiS!,; s ...ction calling for Ciir r ~ - su(l" ly . ' This mea ns tint hi s r Eq u est, will 00
consid er red SE'p'lr1t r 1,r ."1nc his nf JCS wi ll "lot hE' b l~nc::d ",aC"aj,.ns t oth e r units
in tho "'1'.:'9 . ThG b"l S\ s c CtiO;l , htving no surf': w~" of knowinp' the <:m.:.rrrency
of Ul\". nt:..:d , q~it E orop" rl., f l;...: 1 th.lt. :l.ll such r '.ou", sts s.,ou1d bCo cons.id € r 6d
: s o"lcr 'ltion'll PIll r C' t·:J"lci (s . This wo rks cut v rv well for th., divisions , bu t
from th ~ ov r r 'l U '")ictur ~: , .it is :In unSOJnd f'l . tooc' of 01) 1'.:.. t ion . T~& U56 of
J il'"" l·: n.s for su..,...l v ,)U!"ry)S \:S is :11 (x'o.;ns lvo f':'rst,"; r.'L , oot h in 'llJ.nes ,
c:Jt1Q'"1i r s, .mrl conbL" E r :~ J I"!'!ich shalld be '··-sorteO to only c!ul'1.nc t h l.: time
wh..: n t1'OOl)8 !l. r. i.so l itec' from pr ounc' s ourCGS in" r1urlnl! t'1 0Sl> t kes when
t,,!a "roune' SUD1))V s'·st.(fll h.'.S ccrn .. l ('- t,~ lv b r ok (-: n dovm. Th...rc III rr. ::ctu .illv
CiS\.'; , rlurlnr this c :rlt),:. tipn , ""!~ En su , nli..s \\ l n- flo \.,n f rof'il Fr_nce to Enp11no ,
U ·U01(' ,~(1 in Enpl .lno , 10{H":'d l o·. l n , ·.nr flaVin b ck t o Fr. ncf3 for thG us;:: at'
t!r Airbo r n p nivisions . T'1 r eo .. O"n:,.;. rs to ~ no SOl~ltio n of t"Jis wdste :lIlC

n
in l' !"'ricll l1cl' , unL:.t< s t.h" . . . tvis ion COir nt'f"r c_n sle'rii."ic l:O his i...trrs r'i ·t \:l
n,'!-. c!s i ·1 f "' vor of t. "!", o v ~ r II nE.. - 5 of t.h, li:! ntir ~ ( XT' t:cfit1onlr y for c.·;s , or
1)'11 , :;3 th E.r ,. is ! hlfYw r comm _ nn· r on th(: r r ounC who will filtrr th" r OU-.: St.3
from th E ciivi."jo'1S "la·.! ~(' cirl vrhd. h l r the:: sUI)..-u.. i?· f~:/ICl~ F.t r~~ ' ~
air or I!roun~ s o urC';3 . tj '~l
;Ii
.a
'.J\. ,~. "I'
....\
I' ~-'t
'& rr"
AN!/EX 1 to INCL 3 - J - . .
 • ­
'T''..i.blc NO r 1 to Inc! No . 3 to ct<.:.tnr t) 5'\ L 1 ct. :
rh Sv, n to D Plus T n J Inclus.lv I) J !:;ecGl!lber

_FixGrI._-­Su':.')"llv :'01'
' 8~rl Dtv isl0'1

Cl-:.ss V

C' rbi.n\-J C '1. . 30, ill. 168 . 000

C' l •• 31, AP, R/clip 427 ,000

* , fI',:ll , a/clio

C 1. .3'1, AP , 5/elia 50, 000

i, , P'. ll ~ 5/c1i1'"

* J qu I f.. AP , rt as

C~ l . ,J'), Tr .c · r (ctn or clio) 20 , 000

C, l ••30 , AP-Tr , B. lt d (4- 1) 43~ , 000

C::.l. L5 J 51':1", Ur i~is t ol l S0, 000

C~l . 50 , AP- I -! , 2- ?- 1 35 , 000

J?mm Gun , S' .

.* , 37m AP-T

37"" HE

37:run C:mnistl". t'

57rur Gun, fir , S'4bol 300

* 57r:-rn. Gu:l , .\P- '" or APe

J
57llV'1 OJn, A?-T o r ,\PC 600

57nw. nun, HE 600

* J 57m.~ .~p_'T' or APe

60mr.!. Mort·, r J HF. 5, 850

6Q,m lJo r t ·~ r J I II 234

6lmm Mor t .tl': , !.t 2, 700

Slrun Mo r t r, Hv 540

8l.mm Hor t ." t', Srookt.: 162

75l!1ll1 HO\~ , HE J w/f, 1:51, 2 , 160

75f!r.l Ho\'l' , HE , w/F,I:48 1 , 6<)0

75M lIoYl , Hf. J ~,"" 340

7 5!,"JlI :-!ow , Smok 210

105""" How , fIl·; ..jF, 1'54 810

l 051'1'ffi How , iiF. \'f / F , )A8 5"0

1 ')5J:11l How , HE, 41 160

l OIj,':.m How , Srok 100

!ioc kC't. , AT , h'F , 2 . 36 11 2, 000

r·r n ,~r!l , h J;,r' , fr !~ 8 ,001)

~r n .:o rl!' , r.: m""On Er

* J r;r'" n :lr r , h'lnr , Ofl';,;n.'1 iv c 4, 000

~r' n \ ~~ , Rifle , AT U9Al 2,730

~r n :l~C: , RUle- , Fr .".? 1, 0<}2

* , Gr.' n lciE , hlX , f r l Cl , wi lc'l'.pt Er

rtr n ' ("1 (" r 1 fle , Snoke 550

Slp nu ,. AC , Atl (3 col o rs) 300

* , Sinn.1 , srounr. , l~n·.c'c. b '.lnchin q

C.lrt , rine pr , n .lc('; , E6 3 , t~50
C~:rt , rifle ('r ""1ntr!.:. , in 2, 000
C l~ t, 'lU:X e;r ~· nl~C , lt7 2, 000
An lpt..; r , prun:"'" Ml 576 ( plus those
subst fo r
rifle f r olg
Il r o:n..ld t;; s)

AcIdit lon~ l :..utlM1 tnitioTl V., il lblc- on c lU .

*- E IV b: sur.3titut ~ . Tot. 1 ":G1rht - 215 Tons . No of Pu'nt'l ~s 1862

- 1 ­

T.\J1J.F. IlO . 1 C'.

J
ill f"lit• ;("~i1fl£
~ ..l~ . t
 ~L~ 3 V

Fr~i) D.HLY SlJ?'::l'LY

C ~. rhin J elL :1), 1'1 l ?O , CX))

CJ,1. 30 , \1' , 3/ eli.:) 427 ,om
* , P".11, $/cli"l
el l. .)n, A', 5/clip 50,mo
* , !hil , 5/c1ir>
,;. , B1.1. 1 $: ,\P, ctns
C ;l, 30 , Tl' ,~ ' r , (ct.n or clio) 15 ,000
r . .ll. , )'1 , JID-Tr , bdt cI (4-1) 43'\~
Cll . . /.; , S!:a ~~ Pistol 133,000
C11 . . 5-); ,\p- 1- T, 2-2-1- 31, 000
J?Mf!l (".un , sv 360
.:~ " J7f1'm \F- '1'
)7"'ll!; HE . 180
J7rnm C nnht r 60
57 mm Gun , Er , S ~ot 240
-I~ , 571"Jr Jun , A.'")- T 0 r "PC
57rnm Gun , "'P- T o r o\fC 6'Xl
S"'mm Gun , HE 600
* , 57~\P'-T 0 r A!"C
60-..1:' Uort 'r , HE 5,e 50
6"1mm Mort:lr ) III 234
8L-:unLfort r , 'Lt 2, 700
81:'"1. ! 'Ol't " , ' nV 540
81mm l!ort .r , :lItlokp 162
7S'""m .HO"I , HE , ':IF , HS4 1 ,680
75r.m Hoyt, i--IF. , w/F , 1!48 1 ,200
?5mr How, Smokt.· 14 4
?5 nm HO'Ii, HE , AT 270
l 05r.!:l How , H'? , wi f , ~f5L (llO
lO"i"1I!} Ho," , HE, ·...,1::, j~g 540
l05mm :~o , H:", \1' 160
10~hm (JOt·" s"\Oke 100
'1ockct. , HE ~ \'l' , ~ . 'Jf. tt 1 , J'X>
r;r-n ~ c r: , H .nrl , f1' ;; 7, 2'"0
Gr n .rL , G. J"lmo(1 , E!r
-\:' , (inn:lC ' , h~n~ , O rf{J1Siv f'; 3 , 6;)0
r.r n .:.rl r· , r i_nf. , AT , E9Al 2, 470

Gr.n,r' r: j rif1.-: , f'r ' ~ 1,000

* , r;r ~ '1·.tl , h~nrl , fl' ~ ~ , w/.:ld ,pt( r

'}rcn' c't. , rifh; , smo:{~ :1)0
51"') 1 , .te , oUT (J colors) 300
~. , Gien _l , prn!) 1(' , ar C''11ch , l _un c hin~
C ,rt , rifle Pl' c, n ': rT'( , ':'6 3,450
Crt , r i.fl· (1 1' n,{ .c , lO 2, 000
C .r t;, lUY r:' n (', , ~f7 ~ , ooo
~,.: ~ pt l: r , ptc-n r~ , Ml 576 (plus those
subst for
rifle f r ~g
grE nJ.cu s)

Arldition.J. ·~fT"!!.un1tio n ' lV " i l b1(. on r.:: .ll.

* l~' 1f bt: SI1l,r-t,j tut.L ~ .

Tot J Wl. ipht - '21') t (\ns ·No . of bunCL-s - 1760

- ;­
b
• r 2 3;; 7

•
'rablt! No . I t o Incl 1'10 .3 to RqJort , Suhj .ct :
• Airborrlu
Ph.:'s c j D to D plus Ten Inc lush' c: ") 3 t'ecE;mber

Cl ~ ::;S I '~~1 T\ II I

Wh. OllLY TO~S fl.\ IL:f

16, 000 27. 5

'J'lsolino 2,000 10.0
Oil , F.n ~i ll.~ 120 .6
40 .?
Lbs . 38 .4
"
Tot:.l Tons 76.7

r IT)! flO. r'.\. tty TONS ~.,ILY

K Rltion F' . • 11, , 4'Xl 25 . 0

f' iv (; i n Oort E1 . 10 .1
R::.ti on

r; 'so lin e G:l. 1,2m 7 .0

01 E!1 P'i lE' I) ;.1 . 80 .5
r ~'Ir LubQ G11. 13 .1
r}l", ~ sc Lbs , 40 .1
Tot : 1 '1'ons 32. S

- 3 - v~
. ~\ " ~
....
.­
I, to '. '
. ",elf ~ , .'

• •
.'
 •
Table No .1 to l ncl ~o . J t o Report : Sub i L ct J nOpEr Jt ion H/IRKErT , :i.ir bol' nc
Ph'\se , D to D Plus Ten Inclusive ll • 3 Decembe r 194J.l. .

One ~ J.y of r ,~ supplv of rm oic .:..l items for 82nd AB Div to be fOrl'l"l.rded t he
fir st d 3.Y .::.nc' 0:tch succ ~.r:r1i.!lg chy ,

Stock Nq .
Itf!M Unit QJ'ln titv

11650
ne7t r ose 5% in ):hysio lot;iClll sor chI sol , "Ei'tl 24

1000 cc
13835
Prnc::in ;:! hyrl ro ch l or ir1 e , ?O c1utti:opcs , bx 1 .5
?5 c c C[lrtritp e cont .'lininp -Z'; sol
Sor' c it r ~t G , 6 .1I!1P, 50cc \:'tp c ont :;.inin~ bx 8 8

11% s t erile sol

14636
Sulf:J.nil'lrrdflE' c r vst 12- 5 '"rtI envelopes US ?
bx 12 3

16089
PbSI"lt.i nO')"!'I'W l hU"'m ci rieC" '250c o
pk€ 144 504

20050
B hnr':{ 0' 6 f' iUZr: r oller , J U x 11..0 -rcs 12
bx 12 14

20340
Pl.nste r .s.~heRivc. snrp. 1" x 5 vels
snI. 12 2

37500
Splint ArtJlV Ie"" , l/i r inr
GOl 12 50

37540
Splint wi r E l_rlder ) t x J I "
eel. 65 36

1330885 Penthotho1 s<Y'iUM 25- ) . 5 f't'l O!~p !'lNR

with ?:5 - 20('c .... rno str. rile dis t '~1itrr

bx 4 15

10480
Alcohol othvl 1 at US?
btl 8 21

9115 5
~~orphine t 3 r tr~lt, 5 tub G
bx 25 2, 5

92060
rr essbp 1st ·.d.d s rrnl1 white
e1 96 12

92\J30
Bane _~e nl.lstr r p·l ris 6 11 :x 5 V{\s 12
ctn 10 36

99090
Bhnke t od
(;·1 240 960

993?O
Lit tt"r fo lr1i.nr c:lu!1
120 2190

20350
Pllstbr 1r'hcsivo S..lrq J!r "X 5 vels
24 10

13340
Pct:-ol:.: tum 1 l.b usr
2 2

10100
.I.ei<' ':'ccc tv] s licvlic 1000 t ""'.bl ~t.s

U~P 5 [! r
btl 1 1.5

1413715
Sc(l JU!lvt ,1 500 c \")s Nl\TTl J 9: r
btl 1 1

93750
Spl int wir '.:. f' .\U7,. 5 1 1
' :x 1 yn
r ol l 10 20

11490
t;Q0ain" sul["t e 500 t:lbs USP t. fi r
btl 1 1

146 ,~ Sul.f,....f~b zinc 1 )1)'") t :.:.bs USP 7 .7 Q1'

btl !, 15

11105
C'Jff€ . it'l r f... s~iul"I bf::ns("Itc injEction

12 '~l1ns USP ?:cc 1

717 '0
TO\'ld h...nr'
6 1

6 ,5

16127

9?.l ,5·

Tt.t"nus t oxoi(i pl"in 30cc USP

Snonec rurf' J 4 .x 4 J 500

.,
vh l
I, 16

'1'<040
I.hnrl.1PO t ri: nr>Ul' l' cc..,nrG~sec' \'ihit,~
"
whol( b 1.oo~
btl 12 2A·

101,)
AC'irl bo l'ic oi"l.tl"'T nt, 1 It­ J ~',r 1 1

] 0>'..4 5
At-.brirx. 1')0 t .; bs 11 ar
bt.l 1 1

10860
t,tr ol"'i n(: su) Lt6 ?O 1/150 PI' HT
t ub, 2

lJ3 BO Chloroforn for 1ncsth.:si'l Ib

t btl
btl
1

1 1

1] <05 COI"",pounrl c 1to.'! rti.c 1000 pills or t '1bs

9lQg() (":r6301 c _n c ol I ot
tin 4 15
,

11790
r·:;th-~ r f or <!1(;!>th <'-$i 1 .l lb
em 10
~

ll('oo
Ltl,.,l cho r icl!.i :3 OZ
tube 1

1,290
H"u'ro(l' :n o·y!"ox:i t:lc c ol 3,; 1 l b
btl 2 3

1 ?)';'52
J l' llv lubr lc ·tiop 4 oz
j or 1

12641
il1p'.onsiun "ulr· tE L Ibs
C·ln 1 4

12e54
:..Ic;rc:.l r'.1 ridtlod r1 ... 25') L'ff!" !)oi.son

t. ~bh. ts
bt l 1 5

12950
':orolli.nl;.. sLl.l r t(, ?O - 1/2 Pf !iI'
tube 2

11,2!15
SoruM chlorid e i sotonic so'. l 'X)()c c
btl 3 16

14644
Sul f· th i .,z01< sofliu:·\ st<.. f il. 6 vi. 115

USP 5 f" 1'

bx 2 ,5

14 R60
Tr O')iUM C \I" .p~ont(·d 1 pt
btl 2 4

1605015
:"ntitoy in c-:s tr '"tro r ,,'lf nolvv 1.. nt w_o

tt,t nus '.I'\tlto)l"in vLl 20 5

1606P, P~ ncillin , sociur- 100 , 000 oy[orc uni.ts

dr " Oo . . . rl l r . \"
~ i1'l
, ~. ., t' ,
T IALE ~n , 1

• .' "
 \

• ...--"
_ _.if, .,
~;'J
•
"'~ ~ll.'\
..\ ' r'
.'
In\t..;;,[\,\rl

.. j
'l'able No . 1 to Incl No . :3 to R port : Sui'icct , rtOoor.ticn 1.L.!tl0"T , .n i rbol'n ;.>
?h'ls_ , !:' to D Plus Te n, InFlusivc." , 3 D-=ce.:.ber 19!J.':" .

St··.. ·( No . Itel"\ Unit· Ql.la.'lt it v !Nt.(~~

- f7.j15 l"IextrosF. 5fI,.~ sol ~')cc­ btl" ~ 0
1301R10 N:'k~th.:!r-1(~, '5 ""!orne t}.'~ 1 . 5ec J~'p bx 1 1
?"O22 E·.:1C"·'~· d -:.stic '11-cotto'1 J " y. 54 "cs 12 ct n 2 5
2()060 B.n~.J'1c p Jllze roD .:r 4'1 x 10 vrs 11 bx 2 I,
'2 . . 1, 2') "!c.rninC! slot· ,-t 5 11 x .; VC~ roll kg 94 ]8
31'91 C-.th r, t r crrrt hr9.1rubbf:r 18 fr 1
33369 Knife: OT'lf;r bi ~r'E r!o . 10 , 6 nkg­ 2
33> 1 Knjt\ or)..; r 1)1 ce 1'0 . 20 , 6 pko 2
36"30 Glov(~ ~u r ~fO: size 7! or 4
36"40 G'.ov'.s ;;:.11' ~ ');) sLz.; i' or 2
37:10 R ...1)1' :"..:. f ~t.' · b.' '-s ~ p/,p 12
3""'790 SutU!' l' C"tP.L<t c!iro-i(' siztO 1 , 1 ~ut'll't: tub e 24 1
37969 Sutolr· ,Uk br .V ,-rf I.or.- c .01111.... siz.:; OrO
25 y~~ sol ?
37840 Sl.ltu:,c (' .t",ut. ))l-.in si~(.; 00 1 !'atur c. ttl be 3Q 1
37995 Sut.ur E sil', ,: r'" 1 co ~!' sc 1 5uturo pk~ 3
31\1,/{) S"ri.n o luEr "'cc <- 1 .5
3 >170507 Tub..:: f'uor'~ n - 1 !k !'r J.E:vin CJ_ 1
38700 TIl1:iOP r ubbe r 1u in q::'rr: ri. 1/16" w:.ll ft 6 .5
71'770 To\~el b-J.h 2 1
74560 Brush h uta 2
74J90 SO"P 1.J.Unn r·' 1 l~ "b r ? 2
"'19J) So .., "j1it." no li 1"" 6 07- b_ r 8 4
77150 R'~::>in 800:10- EO _1 .5
777&J Cun I") fY, r coll 08~rl 250 ctn 1 1
n:60-;,) O.xYf! -/1 t :f11( 750 ~ .•l i'ill....r 132
n127 Soon",l.; !'lur~ic-l 4" y 3 11 ISO b p 3 12
)9415 P -.~ heat r e r ill o. 6 6
7,1,40 {I r in 11 (;'"0, h'i r· 1 1

1182 4235

TA BLE 1'0. 1

,
Tj'lea.; . ] tlOpero.
Ph',sc J n to n Plus Ten Inclusi.ve ,. j :Jec'3..1ber 1f~I+

One cay r esu,,,'ly of ~er'icJ.l itsms fo r lOlst A= fiv t.o be {' o r"J.rc1('~ t.he fiIf. .~
r:...,. uor on .!!.}('''! Sllcceerlinl:t cay.
st~ck no . Unit

11650 n,·"tI"OS~ , 5';" I)h" siolopictll sorl chI ~ol , btl

l'XX)cr:.
11.305 40

14636 3u If'm t l"':n i ~'e} crvst , 1?:- 5 Pm e nv<: l ~pes , box 160 1,0
U'5.J
11,917 'IJte" , oIif'-I;. 25 , 5'c,: ; am" ' ptrr i le I)'!ro"'en :-:ox 40 60
fre;e
16089 PJ..JS.!l:.1 J nOl"';al hL<·'i31, r11"::'e~ J ~5')cc pkp 240 840
oOn50 e~I!""'.:..I"e , "'.:.I11?O . r."lc r J'I ... 1") "r1~ J 12 hox 40 45
20130 Cott.en , ah~"'rbr-:nt , c~r:tn . 10'1: "lkf: 240 15
?0340 PliJ!'1t-H, ar"~lC"s.i.ve , Sll!' !" , l ' x 5 ',,",s Sol 16') 27
)"1186 $'"I]i.·lt , bqr;" "lor , 1,) ; ,)n roy IP'! l el\f~ t.l-!s set 60 30
17500 S.... 1 LIt. , ,t r 'w let> } t'-\ r- c" 40 105
37540 Snl i.:It , '''ire lar'''''''r, 3 1u ;.; 31" c, 150 16)
1331R05 Pent,,! ~'11 :;orium, 25 O. c; q" a:,,~ : NNR : boy 40 20
I~it \.. 'l'i - 20cc am") ste)"l.le r'ist wat e r
10)480 tllco~lol, et';·.. l , 1 at US? btl 12 105
91155 l'ornl1.in.e t.'1!'tr ..lte , 5 tu'1E box 125 12
91204 Sulf'lc'1'!ztne, ..)t,He t ~: USP7 . 7 " r in p~o 225 17
wa~e r prrof Q'~p
n130 ~3..1r'.:t"'6, 01 st "'"r of ""'Gris , 6" y. 5 vrls, 12 atn 40 12'1
9""50 Drc:ssin~ , 1st air" 1 ~oe VI1ite e, 3::0 8~
92060
9QJ91
9?380
nrc~sin"' , lst a i c' S!"'J]l yo; • ie
~lanl(et , '·001 on
Litt.er , fo1cii 11" , alwinum
e.
ea

ea
960
12'1
40
114
48)
730
93750 Snlint , lI'~r A "cUZG 5.! n X 1 yd r ol l 5) no
91020 .Heohol , c' c'\d I.i re d 1 I"t tin ~ --2Q
TOT.lL n4~ 3438

l tf.'m RA~ P 3 r~:c Tor.s F'oLl nc' D p, " Po~

r;r r·n·H'le , :::~o'<~ , H'l;~ , ~: ' 1$ 100 .1 60 Ibs per box of 25

"rcnar'e I H'i"', l14
In('E.:lI'~ , .~: ~ .1 75 Ibs r box of 25
.... rf 'l~(' , H:.\nr, 5.l"lok.: 1'1' !.1. " 1210 1.7 75 1t'1s roy of 25
r:"l"~'l-rc , S:nol(e , Colore'" , i:J..8 """
r.r, n 51 .1 50 lb. ocr box "5
0"
olue 50 .1 50 lbs er b07. of 25
(lr '"v, 5)0 .5 50 los bay of 25
q. r' SO .1 5) Ihs ""
ry(- r hoy of 25
Vi....lc:t. 50 .1 50 lbs bo, of 25
Y6110w 5·1 - .1
- 50 Its ""
nc r box o!' 25
Tar L TO rs ' .'

Pounds F,.t: Boy

60 Its po r bo)(' (If 25

75 Ibs 0, r box of ~5
"'5 1be at r boy of 15

5"\ ll~s n-: r tox o f 25

5') I bs pe r bo '" of 25
51-, Ibs pH be:x of' '25

TM. ~ NO . 1 • 6

•
I

+.
 Qu antity ·'jt . U::s

Pnn .1 Set A',\-50

1 50

O:ut t l"TY BA- 2

al 1,0
II BA.- 2J
5 10

II 9"- 27
20 30

" B \-)0 1000 320

II
P,\- 37 50 25

., ".\- 38 50Q 6'XJ

" n>.- 39 50 500

II P.\-40 50 540

II ~,\-41 15 15

11 RA-4J
25 15:l

II Q'\ - 70
100 500

11
n:l..-8Q 50 500

II FA- 20')...U
5

R;~E' 1 eauin:n, nt rt:'.-ll

4 l llO
• Casr , GS- 34
4 2

T G V~ l)ho re , F'...E-~
2 3~

-ro.:E-S

T ~· l.Q nhom: , 2 22

Form (,r1·4.\ .
100 1

Ground ro ~ , rrp- 16
2 3'

Hr:iicl s'et 1 HS- 30

1 1

Pud J LC- 80
2
2
Lamp, UI - 35-A

liU:S S .l C , E:
Pencil , g- 140

m"elop.: , JJ-40

al
1000
100

•
3~
3;
Hess 'H'€: hook , ~~lO
300 7

swi tchbo..lrd ,. ~71

1 58

II , 9Tl...72
1 103

F l ashli~ht , TL -12~-A 50 .
75

''l'M , !:C- 72 l JO'j 1

"Form SO .'/50
"ForI!' S~ #159
f orm SC #160
50
50

250 2

t
1l..1oio ~ct , 'SCR- 536 2 20

r i crooho'1c , T-45
1 3!

Che st Set , TT)...3

1

PliHs ~ TIr'-13 - A
4
Knif"" TL- 29

T lO t: , TL-P,3 100" 51

20

T.l 0(: , 'fL- ?4 100 20

CHo, TL-l 23 50 2

Ni. r!.! , "i- lfYI

l'tir r , 11.J-IIO ,. on rc<, l, r1- 4
nlire , I'~ .1 10 CX1 r.f:E!1 , nij- 5
1 lb
2J mil cs 1640 •

25 mil.:-s J.rY/5

II 1" -130 on r eol , nR.-4 30 rn il ~ s 2000

.. n , W - l )) on re el , "'It- a 30 mil es ~50

Batte ry , P\-48 35 210

Radio set J SC"R- 3CO 2 100

TOT,L (in Tons) 5. 5 Tons

TABLE NO. 1 - 7 ­
 sub l ec t : IIOrer atio n l!.\RKE!' , !l.irbo rn6
December 1' 44 .

Item t:u"!.nt it.y ~ . Lbe (Pe r n.v)

Itlir e , "'1-110 on nR 4 20 mil t:s 1640

W-1 10 on f'R5 25 miles 4075
"
",' -130 on T'R 4 30 mile s 2001
" , '1[- 130 o n DR 8 30 mil<s 250
"! ~..:J.st Sc: ct ion , tf 5-49
10 20
, 1lS- 50 10 23
"
ll~ (iio Sat , SCq 3DO-A 3 150
SCR- 536 16 160
" SCR-610 3 37 5
" , SCR- 694 3 250
"
~'i no [}(; t e cto r , SCit 625 4 200
Hll int E.Jlmx:e EQJ, i orn; nt, 1'E- 53 1 350
R'lt t ery , 8\- 2 10 40
10 20
" , B.\- 23
500 160
" , B\- 30
10 7
" , n.\- 27
300 125
" , 8,\- 37
500 600
" BI-38 500
, EA- 39 50
" , B\-40 50 550
" fl;l\-41 15 15
" J

BA- 43 20 120
" B.<- 48 20 l20
" , BA- 70 60 750
" , B .~-BO 50 500
"Co il , C- 161 2 10
1 6
T El e" r ~ ph Set, TG-5
15 150
Te l c.phon e. , EFrS- A 58
Swit chboo rd , Bf).....71 1
,. B11-?2, 1 103
"
Tap , MC- ?2 l2 50 1
2 16
ConvGrt er , U- 209
lJ... ssapG book , M- 210 200 4
1 6
\ xlr.: , RL-27- A 50
ReEl e q.1ipm~ nt CE-ll 2
4 12
Crank , GC- 4 - A 10
50 ro 11s
T:lPE, TL-8 3
25 ro lls 5
T11>' , T1-94 7
Cl imbe.r s , Lc-f 1
40 80
Too 1 eouinmp nt J 'l'F.- 33
Fla sh l i ,..h t, TL-l 22-:' 50 75
100 2
L'J Ino , LH-J 5
Glov rs , LC-10 10 Pr . 5

T h~ f ollowi nl' tt b!"\S t o be (l(' liv br f'd on l y onc e du ri rv. t h e fiv e day pe.riod .

Te st s ct , I- 56 1 50
Tc s t GOU ioreen t, IE- I? 1 30

GRANn TOTAL- 6 To",

- 8 ­
TA",U; NO. 1

,
 ~-
G c
_ .~ .
Tlt.le No . 1 t o Incl No . 3 t o Rf"T)ort : Su l :h c t : nOp.::r ll ti on M RKET , Air borne:
<'ho" , n to D Plus T fJtr'~V<II , .... ~'j,f~rr9 ~

Fix' r "1IJ il v ~n:"tv~f"'F.rll?'imr('r' 11.t.M~ "Y-.o. j 2 ,F\ DivJsi.o n

'Xl 'i11 t it y POGn~s

---
Co~oositio~ , C- ? 1000
1000
Ca ps , t.)f:\stl.,,,, sre.cLtl. n"ln r.lEctr"i. c 100
1. 0
"'UE' '-:' , 1I1'stin" , timr.: (1J:J ' roll ) 4
8 .0
Fu:'f(' , I t"'ht rs 100
0 .8
Prir.ncor d (lOO ! roll) 10
110 . 0
P:tPS , S'l-r '2:JOO
660 .0

TO'1'.\L 1779 . 8

~ntit., PounC s

C ~~posjt i o~ J C-?
1()()0 1000
rot'.... s , hI Ltltinf" , s ~ ci..;:l , non-(..1. ctric
1:0 l. 0
to'l lSC , bla.!'1tin"', l il"'c (100 ' ro ll)
4 8.0
FUs( , 1 tpht · rs
1'Xl 0 .8
po- i"luco rrl (101 1 roll)
10 llO. O
tI,J.J>s J s'Old 2'l0'l 660 . 1

TO'i' ••L 1779 . S

T \rlF '.0 . 1
 UI
Tab l e No . ~ t o .Inci No . 3 to RepOrt : Sub1cct : "Ooc ration M.:ocsI' , Airborne
Phase , D to n Plus Ten Inclusivc; ", dated 3 necembe r 19l~4 .

Rect. i;r{'d R(. cu ivl;d

Since [ JJg Pr ior to
1 - f or 1 ,.ur. fOT
tJ) Unit s ,iB & Grro Wei~ht in
Units units Tons

II Krr Rations 409032 24960 433992 68400 365592 783.185

.. T)'IR!ltions 43 2 NonG 432 No n, 432 .2268
5 in 1 rations
10 in 1 rat io ns 1300 NotT 1 3~ Non,;. 1300 4.3
Toil et p·\~r (rolls) 1•080 Non~ lOBO Non e 1080 .4
Tobac co Rat i on 160000 None 160000 Nom! 160000 5.
Cundy Ratton
Toilet ration 160000 None 16:JOOO No,..- 160000 2. 5
r~solinc V-80(Gd1s) 62758 7746 70504 43351 27153 352 .5
~i <se 1 ruel (OS ls) 5616 599 6215 2052 4163 31.075
Oil #30 (n'us) 4392 252 "644 None "6",, 23 .22
Gre. 'lse f/2 (Lb s) 11.35 45 21.40 NOnE; 2440 1. 22
Ge..r lu be (r.:1ls) 156 12 168 NOM 168 . 84

- 1 -

TABlE NO. 2 ,
t
 T"" c. f.'oP owi no O!'<7n lnCe t!9.tn i l' l is o n C:.ll f o r tho 82~ I.n Division :
" .:, ior I t "M.':' :me .~c c c !' 3 0 rl ," :1

Item 9J. 8."1 tity

Car h ine 242
Pouch , \'I ch 215
Clin , cart., C1.l. . )0 , w.. 39000
"l ifl e; , HI 175
?ayone t , i'l , w/ sc jbl::<.!.Irr 225
To ol, Co:':\binilt i oo 250
Sl irtf'; , r u 'l , 1'19:>7 2<5
" rownin!' Aut ctl'11::\tic Rif le 89
Pi stol 50
Hal stEr 50
S\l bmll chtne Gun 151
tfA. chite Gun , Light, w /rro ~J"l.t 120
I~a c in e , j=lo:'! l t H Ub "' , cal. . J:) , l-a918 20
Hac hlne r;un , c al. . 50 , VI/mount 17
1:00 nt, All , l!6J 14
iWr ttt r , 6Ornr.., w/rroWlt ~: si ghtinp eQUipl'" mt 25
Horta r, 81,,1"\, l'J/rnount ': S i l1l),t.dt" € 1ubment 22
LaU'lC ~ f. " J Roc ket , l'9 100
Lqun('her, '1renafe. , ~ :7 35
Laun(' '¥>r , ('rr rnatie , 1:8 35
nun , 0F , 6 pounde r, Irk IV 15
Ho lo': , Puck , 7511U"!J w/on c ar r s i-'1tim' E!I"uiome nt 31
Ha." l 05mm, lfJ 3
Cir cle J Aimi n!" , t2 10
Te lescol")e , ~iQ' ht irvr 9
Te l escope J rlflO ram ie , ffl 4
!lou ''It , t e l e~ con e , BI6 3
Tele .::l eon e , t'l.bow , r!6 2 1
T(l loscopl.· , f.l(i:lpt or, i:9 7
flua cirant, rl1n c.e , H8 3
S u. h t, mortnr , U4 8
Teles cope , r loow, Ub I 3
Mount , td(>s co po , to , w/panoramlc t o:; l e scope HI 4,
Te l bscon lo , I.: lbow, !:6.~ 5
Qua.dra nt , ounn E!'s , US . 3'
Kni" c , t"c::n c h, H3 150
Truc k , i ton 16
Tr8 il vr, t t on 16
Ti"e , 60') x 16 60
To1 bt J 61» x 16 60
Tir e , 7 5~ x 16 9
Tub< , 750 x 16 9
Tir e , c or.bllt. ,., /tu bc , 8C() 7 16 1
r.l f' ~.'!:.:.1!.rr Pr ESE.r!ln.F !!a.t erial
Oil \E f 30 qt 90
Gr ca sr , on , #0 lb 50
CLanc:. r, r ifle 1:o r e qt , 1198
Cl ot h , crocus awe t 450
Cloth , wlnLn'" Ib 36 50
~r f" a s'" I r if1. 1,;0 e. 3 225
Oil , lu b , 01"1. S , It . ot 1150
Patch,:s , cut , cott.on
" 62
'~~r~ R~ ' \'!t'~r
:' n.. m6 I , am , on 171

.lut e· , tou r) 'lO

l ~rI'4';A:t Y ,. 8600
on , f l. coiJ , snr.-cia l , 'f ,..(11).... 1'-:: ."' )1 . 42
Par)!;T,l 'ns t issue qu irt 1~
PriMcr , avn, ru ~t pr r v p.u. 42
Sorla , a sh , tvo, I lb 1<97
Sod!J. , c!£ustic, Iv.; lb 1043
- 2 - '
TAllV' t'O. ~
----­ .-
SFCq,:T
?ahle No , , t o I ncl r~ tion HYVE'I' , Airborne
Phas , ') to 0 Plus T( r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .44

11 !1'i t r.tl 'lI!.t ib'

"PCHlPI: , borG , coarsE ) c 1lulos; L'
lb
1700
Twin €. , 1ut e 25
":' .<;te , cot.t O'l , 'lft i t c lb :L?12
Fl, il" , brain I hvrrau li(' ..1 OJ
r ,t~lrl.d , c3" !:x:m V-t r achlor'We ql 109
"'ho,,", c~ l. , 3D ,a r. iO
'T'h :'"'1"', c 11. . 50 co "0
Oi 1, n Jt afoot pl ..,:?~)

011 , bu''f r , br , ,Q': u hS

Cloth , 'J br1~iv,. Shf d 96
NOT' : . 11 ~tcck (I f ~n:o.rc f't:irt.s for Orrln:lnc t. V.Ltc rie l rl. l ,~ t "d t o ai r oc-rnc
01')< r ',tions is h i(1\'1 r s rv c:d t '\ c'coo t, M rl c an h,: SUT,p] it:'d on c a ll .

Thr r,.,lloYj ; '1'" 'lrr''l il1 ". l..!'o.l ~r i .-I is on (' ill f o r t he 101 A9 Div islc'ln

":.I ~ 1!.. ""!: llliL tce ~ ';o r h f'

I h~ ru1"1titv

Gl r b1.."X 21.3
Pou ch , ,. ,,, <25
Cl i,> , (' "r t r1.dv.!. , c~l. ,:n, ~'l 39:>~:'
1i rtL , !o'l 175
TJ~ von ,' t , -,1 , ¥l/sr! ,11 .J. yyI 'n5
'rMl , c t.t .... bi.n. t.' on 250
S1tn!" , t"un , :!lQ,")7 22;
'~rOy.ln 1!1 "1 Au t or it 1c l.if 90
Pi ~ t ol 50
rio Jst ,"r 5·1
SU I~C '"' in" ",u n 15"
l':"cl}lrh nun , lill'hl , ""/MO mt 12"
)l\ hi 'l. ) h It fiUi1l'~ , c . l. . 3::1 E191S 2'1
" ,::!., l~ ",un, cill o . 5 ') , Imount 1$
,.,,....
y.'
t'ou'lt. , . 1/' 1 J.!63
~:ot'lur , 6'};ot~ . w!mcunt silO"l't inn (' qu i,,;-r~nt
z:o r fJ r , cL...."' , w/mount dn ~ :;iO'hti:r ... .,ui>:r.I nt »)
1 ' lOC'h t' , ~O(" I( t, Iff) 1'f'
I.... lll'\("h· r , r. r C'1 3r/, , 1:7 35
L:,\l~ch !" , Gr .n<1(l,. , ':8 35
')un , 37(1"" , .... /si,,:1t qol i'Y!l!1.t 6
"rUt" , 00;0 . 6 ""Ounp, r J i};: 1\' 15
HC''' J rlC'!.r , 751'l1" , w/on c :J.r r si"hting ,,,uirlloc nt 31
HC"" , l')~'m , !:J 3
C'j'cl , irli., ,,,, 1'1 10
T, 1 :;C''''' , ~ i;ohtin ~ 9
,.. I :' ~ o')' , p;morl!"ic , in 4
Eount , t, 1. rcor.. , !116 3
TI I, ~con.. ltoYI, ~~62 5
'r· 1. ~co"" , :.I(l·,l)t, r I ~:I] 7
0\.\ :l~r'\nt . r 'm,',' , 1'8 3
S iro~t , mo.. t J.r , F4 S
"'t 1 ;CO'1,' , , 1bow, 1 ~6] 3
" 0'.1 T'lt , t 1 "con • 1'1 , r "1::.J'lO>'l'" ic t,] "S c on,-· III 4
r\Llrll' tnt , n'lnll' r'<! , !!f~ 3
' i"if' , t r 'nc " , 1'3 15"
r .... 'lr. t: , r t on 16
1'1" :ti.1 ·r , ~ ton 16
'rir , 6i't x 16
'1'u b. , 600 x 16
"'i r , 750 '{ 16 if OIlJJ\4r ;~~
'I'u '~'E. , 75'1 x 16 9
Ti.rt , C )',.1:\ t ' / tube , 8'Xl '( 16 1

T.\"I.!: 1'0. 2
".
TabId NO . 11: to I ncl No . :3 to !'h'nort : Subj- ct: "Op":; ["t io n l!A~KFT , Airbor!1l;.
Ph:;'SI' , D to T'l Plus Te n, Inclusiv e" , oate<l J Pect:::nber 194 4 .

0\ i , S ..F: ,~JO ot 90
(}r ~;a.,e , OD, ,If) 1b 50
Cleaner , r i 1'1 0 , tor e. qt 119~
Cloth I CrOCIJD sho.£ t 450
Clot;." wbin~ 1b 3650
(:.r',a56 , rifl c
Oil , lub, ~rcs , It
."
Qt
3215
1150
P'ltch, s , C'lt. , cotton 11 62
Em.-(..l , svn , on 0;, 1 171
Jut.~ ,burb,n vd 8600
Oil , r cot 1 , s'" chI r'.:l l h2
Psry r r , 1 n.'\ tissu ,-, C)'; t r (' 9
or Lll'r , sV"\ , rust nr(..v 4 ·.~

So~'~ , !.Ish , tvr.lC "[ lb 1C97

Soc''1 , C':iU~ttc , IV(' 1b 1044
SDOnp' ~ , bore: . co.:l r se, c .. llulo:K: co 17'XJ
Twi Ol. J .1u tl~ 1b 25
':lastc , co to:1 , "Whit e 1b 1312
Fl 'id , brak\" hy~ r "ulic p:.:J l 20
Ur:pi~ , ca"bon tr tr chlor"i.~;:: qt 109
Thom I c'l.l . .J0 ,."
C.1
550
70
Thone' , " . . 1. . 5f)
011 , nr. ·ttsfoot pt
?20
Oil , buff( r, Pr eal 48

Clo h, :lbl'.l:;; i vt.; shl,;l;.t 96

NOTE: .\ stocle cf sou r p-l rts f o r Orrlnancc l.~ t c r h, l r olutiv<o to Ai r bo r ne

Op- r3tions is ocio" t' l"srr vI .cl at a ~ r_f"lot aoc' can b t; l3Ur)nlit.d on c!.:ll .

- 4-
Tlru' 110 . 2
 t
Table No . :2 to I ncl No . :3 to s.:!b:i1";:~~,n~;~~" ~~~;f~n UARKET , Airborne
Phas t:' , n to T) Plus T, n I nclusiv{::" , ~ at(; d 3

It em tIo .

11650 f)l' 'Xtros c 5"" P1YS Sor~ ChI Sol 1 'OOc e btl 185
I JS7 5 Procaine Hvdrochl oriC .: 20 car tr ictr (~ s 2 . 5cc cart r id,c( box 265
containiM 2~ so L
1l,3~ 5 Sodur:l. Cit r ':' <.i , 6 Urn!) , 5')c c 4% st eri l e Sol box 502
14636 Sulf "\nil 1."li~ Cl'yst , 12 5 - ~r:l. ~ nv elon G box gf}9
14917 -'Jut -r "'istj lJ i' d, 25 5:).....cc art'lS , st -: r il..;. , nv r o<::r .;n box 897
fn e
16019 Pl:1SI:.;l , nom" 1 ' U";\<.)H , a r t - d , 251-co pk~ 3679
2')')50 P.~'.~:- G::uz" rollcr , 3 11 x n yes 12 box -· 5730
2)130 Cot.ton , ah so "P€·nt , l - oz , cr'TJ)r ·;5s'-d ok'l 45 1
<1340 ?l'1.tt r- r ".cIh':si v · , :2ur '! , 1" x 5 ve's spl 7619
37Jn6 Snli.nt Dl5"'I~ O("Ic' J 1 ) s~t 29
3750\.1 Snli '1t , ? l"My l ;. c , l.-t im ,: 626
37540 Solint , .·'ir ~ 1 :1c(, r ·;a 313
1330805 PGntot!l'o l Sorliu"\, 15-0 . 5 I'7fn u..'!1 .... wi th 25-Zlcc st~ ri lc tox 5)8
dlst..iD ..;(1 .....:!tu·
10M30 t.lcohol (,thvl , 1 qu::.r t btl 11
911 55 !:or ..,hii ' t :'lr tn.tc 5 tube 1-ox 122
91204 SuIf·let iaz~ R t -Ir. s 7 . 7 por in w . t l! r.,r oof okg pke 122
?~'J3f) n n~L..r.~ Pl ·lst.i.. r r". r is , 6 11 x 5 yPs 1.'2 cto 436
92n60 :"t'\.. ssi '1,... , 1st 'l ttl 3:T1.l11 3398
99~90 n1F.:l1k t..t , wool , ®. ,·a 2927
99380 lit tt-. !' , f 0 1c'i.n'< , llurr.i nu."!l (; '1 n 08
20'.)50 P1 st t' r :.<'i n.;s iv\.: sure 31! X 5 vel s spl 213
13340 ?:·t r ob iulTo l-lb c'n 129
1010·1 Ac irl l c ~ tvls ..: licvlic l r»)O t ,,-.bs btl 5
lu9n ~o~ iM Sul!' ,to ! pr ~)O t'bs btl 8
14622 5\ )] f '~c'i ~..zine 7 . 7 pr 1')00 t ..l.bs btl 85
1110 5 C'lff dn Sotiium ECrnzo lt o In j<';ction 12 .UIlD box 15
717'l'.1 To\·)\·1 , h-::. '1rI 42
16127 T t ~. nus t oxo in '11·lin 3')..c c 36
9'll.25 Sronc:>\: su r~;c : l 4 x 4 500 34
10-145 At -JbriTl\;O- t blds 100 15
1~860 ,\troolne sulf ·t o 20 - 1/15~ pr HT tub ~ 30
11380 C1llorofor r:l for _"H.. sth,~ sL l /h I b btl 5
11505 Com"oun(~ c ~ th l rtic 1t)')0 pills or t .bl "ts otl 5
91000 Cr ' s ol ' 5.lpon .it t cl sol I ot t in -20
11790 F:th ~ r for .l..'Y.:sth,.s i n. 1/4-1b 174
11800 Ethyl chlor ide 3-oz 15
12~9J
Hv(rop cn ") royicl p sol 3% 1 Ib 10
l2J~52
Jrllv lubric tinS!' 4-oz 15
1261.1 H .l"In.. . sium suU "t c 4 u ."S e 'n 15
1~54 HLrcur v bichlorid<:; 250 L lr!7C Doison t .lb) c: ts btl 5
12950 Porphin", sulf . t c 20 - lis p r HT t ub£ 10
14295 Socium c !11arlr[; i !3 otonic s al ut ion l ,)OOcc btl 112
14644 Su l f .t ht · . zonC' sol1ium st _rile 6 v.i · l s 5 om box 10
14860 Tincture Ooiur' C' Mr'\l-lon tcd Pi nt btl 10
lh15015 r. ,5 fJ ~nnr r..n r .ntitoxin Tl c:l yv ·hnt vi J. 100
)7315 T'I <..xtros c 50'" $")1 50cc btl 120
1; 11810 ~l-tk- th :mi(l~ 25 l m"') s bo x 5
200n ~ lnd (lie \;- l lf"t ic ~U c ot t (' n rloz ct.o 2
21060 P'1.nc'"CJA p 1UZ{ ro11 ~. r 4 11 }I 10 yrls 12 box 43
~42n "r IcVlil1!7 ,s~ r t 5 1r y. 6 v de 11
31~O C l th lt.(·: r u rdhr ~l r u hb(: r 18 ft 5
'33369 Knlf '" oOf' r tjn ... bl _ (' ~ s rIo . 10, 6 pkr 10
333R1 Knife ooer .t in" bl lC,' S tJo . 20 , 6 pkp 10

- 5-
, l.\~~i '
T ·1,RLF. NO . 2 . t'
I). I
Tabl e l~ o . 2 t o tn('l No . :3 t.o :lcoort: !jur i, "OoL, r lion !1..Ill(E.T , Air bor :1'"
Ph~!l " 1 t o n Ph Is 'l' pn Il')f"lusiv!; " , ~ !lt('o 3 Decer'lb3h 1944 .

~, ~ t(' 1 It. .- ."S' on (' :11 t i.irf iE l~ (CO'ltinuff' )

Unit., "'u :mlit v

" lov s . sur f' ons: sL~. 7~ pr ;»

JI,"3'> 10
)':840 ~lov 'S , sur" -r) $ size 8 nr
T2l) Tt lzo r, S_lr ty bl _rJ· 5 5 nkp 40
suture ch r of"ic c -t ,-,ut 5i t. ~ 1 tl.:. 0... 123
3"790 spl 760
37"'>9 Sd.u r ... ~il k br :W cl non-c _o i ll rv siz!' 000 ? 5 yr's
37R40 SutllrL C .t"l.lt siZG 1 tu r.. 130
3 7~95 RU tun. nil k d J'TI'I 1 co!t'S (; ok~ I.' 45
) 1":/+60 S ·_:r1.tl!" T~ l u · r 30cc
c, 18
)"70507 Tub ~- ~uorl - n ':l l U f h vin . '-, 17
3l'7?O Tubin !' f ltlh · r 1/ 411 rl i ~ il1s1.,-I(. ft 90
(. ·l 10
71770 't'o~, 1. , b It"
V' 10
74 560 Pn. sh , h nr'
Soap , burl'-' r v 1 I b bar 30
74gg0 40
:30.:11) YT"tit e: flo 'lt ~ ,O' 5 OZ bar
749JJ e. 5
77150 B3D in socnp.f'
Cu r s pJ.p: r c o1l3!}sml (; 2 ~ et n 5
77700 ca 10
77<;6020 Oxvt'c n t .:m,1( , 750 f'):l D on fill e d
S-xm Qc sur" te 3.1 h )' 1 189 bo" 15
92127 eo 57
99 415 p:lr h l.'ot r t. fil
Ur 1ml m olm.: ] ~ !I. ... c ea 5
79440
93750 Splint .... -u:, '-"auze 5t x 1 yd r oll
t in
2~
l i~O
91020 '\l cohol, ct (':l .J,t.ur~ 1 pi nt

Tot31 FnoinH r-l.!{..rns on call

Pouncs

f)(' v i.e r.,f-t rinn' , "1.1 s h nu ll 300 72

21,
f'lr v i.(' '1 , f l d no, nr<.~ ~ ur~ Tr>lUls,; 100
T'\ vic G! r trt nr'l , n r( :-su"c 300 72
t'/oll , P'l b tin , ~ uol ic 'l.tinr. , "'2 T1 wt(1l.> , 2 26
1'I'I ,_ d .
P.1o- r, l i t fi r, ish ?.2" x 29 ' 1
mg\,) , 500 90
C ~-.moo sj t i on , C-2 6000 60.)0
cnt<: r tn.l! ,,"t'\ r gr: 4'XlO 40'XJ
r.a p, b l 'lst in,.. , sn€c i:l l , n- " het rie 750 6
Fu z{' J bwstl nr , t ifn i.: (100 ' r olls ) 3 6
\t''U z, li.r'1t ' r 9 ~OO 2
PTir.:;cor d (1')0 ' r oll) 30 330
Shs.rx- einr" " (10#) 10 100
Sh nn,- Ch:l T": C (35 1' ) 10 350
10 , 000 1000
T ' 1
ttl f' S J snn~ 5 ,roo 1650
60
C1r, li1.:J , t t nr- , s!"); c i ~, l , c. l r ct . 750 -­
TOTIL 22 , 288 ll.144

T ,nLE !'O . 2 - 6 ­
 -
-.
H' 'U~,.ble t-io . ') t o
• Pt"it~n , 0 to n Plus
_
I ncl1j~t 3 to ilo"X)rt : Sub.;,·ct : "Ooc f :Ation
'i't; I"lc1 J. .::d.v l. l!, cllt.ed 3 T'lerembc r 1944 .
I
-I :'nRKET , .'l.irbo rn...

D PU1S 1

p<n Div lOlst niv 1'ot:il

1!.lli..
----
C l ;J. s ~
,
27 1'0.,5 '2.4 .7 Tons 51. ? Tons
Cl us3 ~ ~ "
1,1 , 9 " 7,7 " 18. 6 "
ClA~ ~ ,'" '.17 .1 ~O,1
" 417 . 2 "
" 8.6 17 .1 "
cthll" ',' . 5 " "
'rO'!' J~L 263 ,5 'rans 241 . 1 7005 504 .6 Tons

PLA'·""S l:n 121 252

(0-24 Pomb rs )

Q....!. IUS _~

CI IHls I 1 .1 'l'ons 1.1 Tons

CL1SS HI
63 .1 63 . v
.\

Gbfl s 17 " "

Qth ,'r

TOT 'II, 64 . 1 Tons 64 . 1 Ton9

PLAMf. S ~J 60
(C- 475)

~I:UlS 3
r:1 '15 S T .,., • 5 Tons 9.5 Tons 37 . 0 Tons
Cl'lSS III ]0 . 9 " 1? 9 "
(a ~~8 V 391 .7 " 397 . 7 "
8. 5 7 .h 15 . 9 "
Oth· r " "
TOT ,\J, 444 . 6 Tons 16 .9 T'm s 461 . 5 Tons

PL;\1'JT.'S 111 35 3/,6

( C-~ 7 )

1'OT ',L (3 rl >l.VS )

772.2 Tons 25B .O Tens 1030 . 2 Tons

- ] ­
'I'..PF ~,!O . J
 Torr J '.E.,s "''''ITV EREr ,
.­
• t-:3
G)
leI' ss v
'U-3
~
C l ~Fs 5iF~ a l
3 2 ' -101
Or r1n.:LnC l tc·..; rl 1. c...! 1 . d r Corns ~ .lll
82- "101
Totll
--­
;IJl)
,. .~

82 101 82 COl' ? s- l J l 82 1,)1 '2 111 82 101 To:tr::.l ~\" "il ~

0 (?ar ac hut " '"'roY» )

3.Q
\ " 'D

.
Z

~
1) Plu s 1 :3 . ..j 0
.J.­
0"
o J::­
n Plu s 3 .5 1 1. 5 '.::! c-t­
0
'"0
J Fl a s L. 8 1445 22 . 5 ~ ~ !;I

43 J )
F~
n Fl u:;: 8 43 - - ;!iI
4:f~, '· of ':.3 /

( T<. j( ·l"} ~ ,., .. i th '1"' ;" ;; nv c:l i (lr r )

, _ ...!... . .. ~.....L. . .. • _', - ,,-. '. .. ' 'b';iW-.; ­HI...0
~ ';'
:r. ....
.
,, ~

1) ?l!:s l ]J~ 12 J2 '\

; ('t, 4108 .;~ . ..'

-,p "'''',:

~:~
.... . .·~::~ 1(;)
t~
t:
n Plus 2 1 "
.L ~ ) ~ • .J
~.-, .,.,-='·1
I, .J
~:,"Jt

n Plu s 3 1.5 1
~ ~
J::,
, .~~, ', ' " ~~
I )
, i, ~~:~~'"!~~fl ;c-1

~~
n Fll: ~ 6 .1. 9 10.,(;
1-3
5L . a i~
i~
~
~ .."

( -l ir Lncl t'o .:it rru:) sd s ) ~ ../ .:::J ;:­
D ,
()

D Plus 5 .5 1.+ • 'J ~.5 .3 .J 29 . 6 ~ o

~.
<; 25 .0
'I Plus 6 24 . l) (iI
>-t
..
"
D Plus 8 50 60 r;
-' 7.5 122. 5 ~ ,,.;
D Plu s 9 25 .1 25 . 1 ~~
~ 0
T) Plus 12 12 1 1 .5 .5 15.0 +:-::l
D Plus 13 12 35 .5 1.3 1.0 1. 0 50. 8 .....
,.,..
D ?lu s
n Flus 15
14 47
Lt.9 ...5
.2 .5 .5
. 5 .5
48 . 2
50 . 5' ~£rj
hi
"
~
~.
u
C,
>-t
.,:!
".
t
 of t he l Olst. Airborne O~vl.Sl.on 1n Operation ..:....i.:...... for
ne period D - D! lD

TO ~ :2,
COIrmandi."lg General, First Alll.ed Airbonle Army
(Tnru Coramandin6 General , XVIII Corps (AD) • V' I

1. 'Ih e a ttached relJOrt on Operation uJ-O!dCi,'£ prepared by Brigadie r General

J . Hig:::-ins is fon:arded approved -..1 th the followi;,g cOO'.,.'llt:nt S.

2 . EF~;oe.::;T OF' THE DJ;.YLIGH'? UttO:' Ol~ 0£­' _ ;' . ;q.t . UiMET . 4leration 1~J~I;T
differed fr'':II., a.::"l ot.her Airoor!16 operatioCl_ LI. 'U exercises in the cOJ,lpactness and
accuracy of the D day landing s . Apart fro.n t oe navigational. slull and stea ~.l.~~... S:3
und er fi ::"e sho ~ m by Troop Carr:..er pilot s , the factor contn.. buht16 most to t hi s
accurc..cy \~as the decision to stage the operation in dayligilt. Daylibht. a.iJ..o~ ,ed
t he operation to be put on successfully .lith a r.linimum of prepsration . There '" as
no special pointing for Ope r ation l.iAh.}',ET on the part of AlTborn e Troops wnereus
a full-dress rehearsal wou.ld have been indispensable had t.ne operar.ion been U1
da.n..nes s . Day light simplified tne marsha.l..Lin6 and pilot8.t;8 prot"le~ of ·.rroo~
Carr ier COI..-na nd as well as the asseabl,y of Airb orne troops on 'the t:;rou."l.d. I ns
r a!Jidity oi' this assembly permit.ted the accolniJll.sn.'lent. of to ne llutial gr ound i •
mi sEol.oJns ::)0 acheou:e~ Bec ause of the accrJing advanta6es it is felt t nat cons i ­
der a ble bold nes s i s jllstl.fied in choosing d~li iSh t ratner tnan darknes.~ for an
Airborn e operation if , as in ...;J U\ET ) the enem;y is on t ne r Wl and air sllpre.'lliI.cy
c~ ...,.lete .

J . Rn'rE OF BU I1~ U? Or' TrIE 1015T A!ltOOrtN'E. DIVISIOtJ. It required seven

d8i'lS t.o br ine. in all toe .n::-fJorne el~:Hne~'1ts o f t he l(j~irborne D~visJ.on . l>uri Tl&
th~s time t.ne Division ~-.as obl1ged to p rotect t he landi % fi eld H:l. tll cons~derat,le
f o r ce3 \~hile carryiOG out l.t 3 gr ound missions . Tn15 req~re:nent for landin& f...e l d
prot'O.Ction r educ ed the strent;th avail able f or tne essent.ial tasks of t!1€ Divis loOll .
This inevit able d1Vers ion of si..rersc;tn loS a fac t or wniclt ~\ust be bo rne in mind in
ass~~ing mission s to an Airborne Division .

4 . TH.OOP ChltnIcil. rtU'hISEi'l'rATI0;~ UN" Trlh. Gttuu,m . Gener al llii!trl.n. :':1 para;;r8,;lh
Q

4 f. COtlfllents on the need of a.'1 Air Force cont r ol ur:it. on the ~ lld sr fielo . TI .15
would nave been mo st useful in 1.•• .l"tN:.1' and shOu::.d not. t.1:! ov..::r l ooi;;ea in fut ure
Airborne operations . A Tr oop earr:;.er ofiiciJr 0:1 :na ~ ro und could have radi oed
back local weather conditions an9 exe r c isod A:11' traffic controL Also ) ha could
havo relayed the l atest info.rnat.,ion r ebarc":'l, lone t.actic al sit.uation on t he
ground , t ;IUS p r cver:.ti!).b air f or:::ations fro!. r'lyinB OVf:;r a batt le in pr ogr e ss ,

5. C(]-JS'I'R.:.cTIOI~ OF L~ ~ JIt~ S':'fC.IIS . Opttration ..uUtKt.T i ncludad plans for the

r n~~truct ion of la~ding str~p s to brin ~ in air truasported units and supplies .
Thi s was never possible beca!lSa of eneL~ action adjacern. to the narrow cOl'ridor
along the EindhOven- Arnhem nigh\"/ay a.nd the a bsance of adequate troops to clear
and control the n eces S8I}" landl.llJ; fi l;lld area . As tne sit uatioll is alwa.y s going
to be extremely uncertain whenev'er Airborne troops land b..: hind hos tile lines ,
the cCIlstr u.ction and protecticn of a landing fi eld does not a pJJe:ar f e:.,.sible witho..J.t
an entire Kirb~rne divi &ion with the sole mission of sccurip~ the field .

6 . AIk kESUPPLY . Operation liArlJili"'T provided valuable lessons in air

At presa nt , tha data are not corople t a so tha t conclu.sions are t entd.tivo . nOi/lt-ver,
it Has amply .Jrovod that b~de r resupp ly is much mar l;! ~fficl.ent than supply by
parachut-.J . Ths lat t~r wal3 on ly about 50:0 eff..;Jc tiv ~ and wo uld have been 1nado.!ql.late
i '1 i t :; '.:ll i' t o fII"d nt. ain tn l.S Divisl.on for a ny C01' 8ide.r! 'lO pl;luod . hxperlc!1ce i.n
Op.:.ration bJArl.K£T erJi-hasizl.;!S t hat a ir r ""s uppl.Y r~J,..4 an t!m.~rg~;:cy fIK:tllod ~t-,:. a

.- .
l fmg way to .0 befor e i t can 0"; r tJlh..Q upon t o 3~t>.tJQ_J Airborne: troops ~n nu.;l.IX;r
for a~ L~oaf~n1t~ ~c a d . ~ ,

*' .. ..J -

- 1 - ..Jut c \ \969
I 7. GROmm O? _ \TI ON3 Of T:ib-.h0lS 'L T ')l :3 D1VISIOtL The l.nit.ial I;r ound
mission of t h..;: Divisio.1 r e quir .;J its di s._ .I. in thrtlC ar...z,.s alOrlh u. corrid or

about fl.ft6iln miles in lengtn . This dis J-~ :>ition l~dc thd nirborm; troops ,"lea k
at every critical ~oint ~nd ru.:ld~ ncc.::s::::al7l thoJ most enIJr&ctic stliftirlb of tro ....?s
to meet the nW'Jc rous thre ats as th;.;y d..::vt!loPed along this lonl corticio-:" . Had
anything l ess t han a su~rior parachute drop b .:cn r~eiv",c th;,; r.ri.ssion miglu... <:ll
hav e fail ed , \'I holly or in part . As it. wa s , tne issue hung in ... Ul.ce b .;. lanc:~ on
several occasion,;:; before the .i,irbort :e troops r .. stored th e situation . Tn_ ,..Xp.<L'l.­
cnca gaihl3d by the Div).sion g;w<.: roJn_'., I'c'; Lo re e to the cawictioit t l l<.1:. an .... ::iJ· ~olno;;)
diviSion is capable of .ex/artlng c.. s\. ro!lb <.: ffort l.n but a s ingh~ a ir t;;:t i on h'L c.
given time .

~~~?E-~Hl
\

MajO!' G{:.nural, us,,;

COltuandinG·

-_.
 t

- HEADQUARTERS
Office of : the Asst . Div . Co~~r .

APO 472 , U. S . Army

12 Octobe r 1~ 44

SUBJECT : ' Report on Operation .r.LiUi.KST.

TO COf.lmand ing Gener al , l Olst Al.rborne Divisl.on .

1. GE LHAl. : In accordance -.dth v er~ :i :" instructi o:1S Corn.:nanding Gen eral
l Ols t Airborne Divi s:.on , the ':0110'0in6 re . ~ on t.: 'e part ic ipation of t ht:; lOlst
Airborne Division in Operation j.tAR.t:ET i s .1... :.'<,;,;)y subr:titted . This r eport c overs
t he ope!'ation3 of tho; l OIs!. . u .rborne Di. vis J.on fr Cl':l D to D I- 10 inc lL;.siv e (Sep­
tember 1 7 to 27 , 1944.) . Tre r eyort. is divided int.o t.nree par t s : F:'r s t , t he
r..oveme:"lt of personnel enc equipme!1t f ror" the UK to toe cor.lbat zone in a par achute
echelon, a gl i der echelon, a.'1d a seaborne eenelen ; second , tile tac'tl.c al operations
of the D ivi s~on , und units thereo f , f r otl t hE:: initis.i. lar.ciing by parac.lut e until
D f 10 inc lus i ve , at. v:hich U :re tht:; tactical s i t\l... t.ion becbl-ae u..ore or 1es~ sta ­
bilized ; and third, general cOlI'.11lent s on va.rious a per l!. t l.O a1 ana a dministr s.tive
matters peculiar to ~n airbc~e op erati on .

2 . !.{OVE;IDlT TO SO...:B... l' ZONE :

a. Parac hute 3chelon : Toe parach...rt.e eChe l on of t he lOIs t Ai r borne

DiviSion cons i s t ed of 436 C- 47 tran sport p lanes cc.rrJi% 30 •.1e 6, tiV1 para~nutists
of the Division . Four nund r ed t wenty- rau l' planes drof.lped on D-Day , ana 12 planes
carry i!J"'; Batter-y "B", 377tn Parac hute Fi eld ArtL .. ler:t Bbttoalion , \ll.t.h 140 person­
ne l anc 6 guns , dropped on D f 3. Of the 436 planes wilic!l t ock of f , 434 dropped
parac:lutists in a hiohly sati s factory aanne r (cent er of impact ". .... 5 sO.:le 1, 500
yards s ho r t of tnE:: selected DZ in one ':ase and about 3 r.d.les northn es t. of the
s e lected DZ in a.t1 0ther c as e . L'1 both cases hOVievt;lr , t he drop pattern \Ias excel­
lent and all parach..ltist s of the seria l s were d r opped t0 5~t he r ) . Or.1:' t'liO p lanes
faile d to d r op para chutis t s on tni.o! selected DZ ' s , a l.d these two planes ¥Is r e shot
down on th e fli l ht in a'1d prior to r eacnln g the DZ ' s . All par achutist.s jumpe d
from thCl se p lan~s, and 8 frClll one plan e and 2 fro.lIl 00 otoher ev € m .. ually joined t heir
10- unit s i n the combat zan\::: . Jump cas ua lites were les s tl1Ull 2% c1' th:J t o t a l nUCl.ber
jwnped . The av e r J.gc time of as setllbl.y was a bo ut on ~ Hour f or each b att.::..licn. All
initial obj ect ivos ~jt~r~ rcached prior to aarknLss . ku covr:: ry 01' e qui pw;n t ave r ~~d
ove :- 95~ . Fo l.lI' Pathfl11dcr pla:l'::s p rec ed l;..·~ . :; ::>f:rials by 15 minut e s . Three of
the p lanes dropped voit:lout in cident on tn -.: ..>... ..L ~c t e d DZ · s . One pl a.'1e Vias sho t do"'n
seve ral ltil::s short of tht. DZ in tma.,i.,Y t ;;:r rito l'Y and no in fo rmation i s availab l e
0:1 t i.lis :Jlan;:; . (fo r details 0: parachut..: ,-,cmllon , s oe Annex No . 1 ) .

2. Glida!' Ecnelon : A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from d ~par ­
tur a base s in t ho UI{ ov e r a period of 7 days. St.:ven hun dred and sixty- sev e n of
the s e g lide rs l anded wit :10UT.. incident on th.1 dusi6nat~d Ll . Approx inlatt:; ly 5, 000
men took of f fr an t ho; UK and some 4,800 evontually jo in ~ d th!;.ir unit s in ~hc
corrllat zan:? Sam.; 30 51ider5 are unac count ..: d for on t illS date , practica lly all
of which ar e aS Sur.\cd to have dropped in enen" tern.tory . Th.;: glider lift on D -I 2
was dispd rsed bl! cause of heavy f og encount~n:d OV>Jr th;; Channc:l and along th.;
coast . Of S Ota.; 384 s lid..:r s that took off on t hi s datd , only 4)9 landed safely on
tht! des ign ated LZ . !Jan.y others rt;)tum.::d to the UK or land~d on the continent in
(:nGm;y or fri.::ndly t o::. rritory. No furth ..;r 5:1id.., r St;rial5 we r e flown a ft. t.:r D .J. 6,
b-lt s o.~~u 500 p",r sonncl a'1d ess(;.nt.ld l :€ qu i }J!Il Jlt ".e r e flm..r. in by C-4 7 t.ra."l sport
t o th.. Bruss ",ls Airport and join·. d tht-ir units i n t n..:; co.mbat zen.., by D flO. (for
Qo tc..ils of g U d"r echelon SeC Armex No . 2) .

c . Sl)abom':? Echel on : Tn;; s oJabornt: e cholon of t ht; Dl.vision consisted

of 1077 por;onnel and 444 v c hich:s of all typo:: s . 1'h1S a c nelon load ed on 0 -I 1 and
saliLd from SOU THAi.!PTON on 0 f 2. It a rriv ed at O~HA Bl:J.l.CH on D .J. 3, where it 'o'1b.S
divided into two serials . The first s .3rial left to.; beach on th\: I.o.ornine of D f ;3
and arrived at BOURG-LEOPOLD on tne evcnlng of 0 f 4 . It clo sed in t he D1vi5ion
se rviCE: ar..M at ZON on th~ evening of 0 f 5. Th~ se cond Se r ial l\,!ft OUAHA BEACH
un t h . . . ev..,nin~ of 0 -I 3 , arriv~d at BOURG - LEOPOLD on 0 -I 5, and clos ed in the
Dl.viaion 3 urvic d ar Uil on t hb ev~ning of D f 6 . (For details of seaborn >J ecno;:lon,
s t:.:: Al'ltl.. X No . :3) .

- 1 ­
 3. TACTICAL OPERATIONS :
a , The Divis ion missions called r.~l z ay
and railw.s.:,l'- bri d6es ov e r th e Aa RlVEK and ~II J;1'~ seiz­
ure of t!lE ni g hwa.y b:-i die OVE:r the DO:&.:;E.L ttIVlli at ST . OillE.NdODE; t.he sei zure of
thE;! highway b ri dge over the \ d l.H}!;L~£mA CANAL at ZON ; and t h<:l seizure of EIIIDEOV l!.N
and the {.lain hignway bri dges over t ne streaas i n t !1at city . The Divisl.on obje c­
tiv eS Wbr t;: :3pr~ad OV 0r a: road di.=>tance of some fift een ruiles.

b . Th€.; 501s t Parachut (l Infantry, land i ng on t i;Q Dt- ' s ntl aI' V E~HEL ,

s eize d all four bri d~es wi t ho.1t inc:"a e:lt . T,le 'X)2d Parachu.t~ Infan t r y l ande.d ne ar

Z01~ , and with one battal i on s "i zcd t..;' e r.I.ain i1i C;ro.ay brid;c n.::.ar ST . Oi;,D£N'itOiJE .

The 506 th o. l so landdo n""tl, r ZON and sei zt: d t he Canal cro s3 ' , but only aft.t; [' t he

onClI'.y had blo\~n th~ bridge . The 506th seized :S:WDAOVEH s hortly aft~r no,) n the

next day .

£. L'1 an. ~ffort to secure an "-'- _ :"."l· n-'1.t e cro ssil'lb over t he UILHEI..:,lINA
CANAL, and also to b l ock ,me..:,;. t mffic bc·.....·,CO I1 EliIDHO:,EN and i1.r..HTOGEl!BCS CH, '-Jne
company of t he 502.d Vi as dispatco<; d to seize tho::! lii ;h1t'a..i bridgl.; near B_ ·T . This
comp.:my seized al.lo h<..ld thi3 bri dgl,.; for a f "f:VI hO ur s, but W:.J. S driv E..n oe jus t before
dark . The cn....:I!'.y r ushed stro;"lb r e inforcements to this point, and heavy cas ualties
wer e su f fl:lrcd by both sides in th~ sti ff fi!;;htinb t "c.. t took place on D I 1 ~nd
D .; 2 in the 3tt<:mp t to sccUr.;J this crossing: . The bridge was finally blov:n by the
o n ~my be foru it could be captured , but thb eneuw forc e d~fcndiOti it WclS c omplc t e ~
wiped out .

d. On th (; I;:v cning of D t 2 th: enfJ~ :ns-de u r ,li d on t tlo;:: brid<::e .it ZON
with tanks und scl f- pr op0 l h;d g uns . SOJ."IC dacu<:tg13 ~ lUs ,:;",usuc , blt t nc b ridge was
he ld i ntact . Tho n ex t morning C.n enelI\Y tnnk - in f antry a ttack Vias Illadb , but wa s
he ld off. Th.:: 50 6t.h, ri din.b. Britis h tanks, made An a t t",mpt to CJ.t t IL a ttuckinb
forc e off from th G south, but tIlC eOf;;coJ'" held k€;y pointG Wel <.. v e nt.ua lly "Iithdr ow
his for cos i n good o rd ~ r .

.£. On the mo rnin g of D f 5 the enemy st;v<;red the main hi ~ h\l a.y bdtween
VECHEL ,w d UDEN, and mad e a strong attempt to seizi";: t he t m:n of V E~ifSL ril1d destroy
the b::-idges . All aVJ.i lab l e elan~nts of t he Division rl 8re r usned t o tho;; vicin ity ,
and as t h~y arr ived t hrou.::;hout.. the day Vl er o forme d in1.. o <l. t ask force und<:r Gene ral
Mc AULIFFE and dispo sed to n~f;;t the 6nemy thrc~ ts . Confusud f i fihting continued
dur i n!5: t oo e nti re day and l at e into t he ru..e;ht , with infantry ana t...... nKs at..thcking
f rom s-.:v<.:rc.:.l di r ecti ons sim.ultomt: ously . FncnlY p-=n cH,r '-l.tions. w"" r ;:; made to wit hin
500 Yf.:rds of t ilt:: bri dges , but 'tlCr e ",v entu ,";l~ lly beat dn back. Tll"" att..<.ck YI.:...s rt::n ~we d
t he n:;xt morni ng , but tht:: defE.. ns"" held fin:lly . Tr.e 2d Bi:.tt.:lli on 506th th.:;n
attacke d towurds UDEN , and ma de cont ~.ct ;~ith :.. patrol of the Guards Armo r ed DivisiOl
advancing on VECHEL from UDEN . Tht: enur.JY·' . fo r Ctld to .dthdraw t oward EP..P, and
the road. r eop €lr~ed . Ey dawn t oo next G'.orr. .i..I .... t..,l":: enaL' had withdrawn from t he
VECHEL area to t it..: southeas t .

..£ . On the afte rn oon of D t 7 the enl::lIlY a t tacked frOJ,l the: north'ole s t ,
cut the twin highway b e twc~n VECHEL and ST . 0.iWFJ.fRODE, and took up a d...:f cnsiv e
Posit- i on astride thc r oad . Tne 506 , with tanks ~tta.ched , D.ttack""d on th e Mo rning
o{ D;' B i.:.nd by do.rk ha.d dr iv on t he enerny frolu al l but a. po rtion of this pos ition .
The n ext iJorning t he att ack was continued, in conjunct i on wi th British Armo r ad ­
v ancinf; in force from ST . OEillNrlODE , an d th.... road clear.::d .

g.. From tine of l ancing to D t 10, the (;:ncmy pr obed t he Division

s ect..or s con tinuously, und many Sflll:i l1 skirr:ti.sh..:s occcrr ",d tJach duy . l):;!fens iv ~
positions , t hE: j!la.in highway , ~d t tl.:: brid ges ov e r til...: Carre.ls and rivtJr s w.ar e s ub­
j e ct;; d to inte rlllltt ,m t a rti lle ry 'll1d fli.O rt ,J.r fir e . Til..! clty of EllWHOVEN Was

4.
o
Annex N . 4) .
GEN:iliAL COAlliNTS :
lli:""
hO:1v ily bomboJ d on th(;! ev ~n ~n5 of D W~ "or" d~trrit1m
•
.. •
J I.
,
~ ~ "
t
a. . .. ~ .. ~ _ ... ~ .
' p0r a tions , see

Q. C."'!.sualtics : From D to D f 10 inclusiv ~ , thtJ casu ...lti...:s of the l Olst

Airborne Divis..on we re -as follows : Kill€.!d - 373j wounded - 1436 ; missing - 547; or
a. grand to tul of 2 , 356 non- t..:f ftlc tiv es , of a tota l of 13 , 112 \'Iho ~nti..!r t.l d the cOllbat
urea. . (For d",tai l.:d r eport of ca sualti£s, s.: e Ann eX No . \ 5) .
~

I - 2 ­
 g. Pri soners : A t otal of 3,511 prisoners ;~",r c t
Airborn.3l Div·lsion fr oo D t o D /10 , inclusiv o. nf
£. Eva cuation: Th~ 326til Airborn..; .,:ediAf raii1p~Y arrived ill t ilt,;

CO'lo a t ar\.;z- in t wo ecn...lons . The f irst e Ch~ loll, cons1stlne, of 52 roedl.cell craon ­

:1.;1 incllldi ng em att ac h ~d sur Gical tt.lam.: a.rriv od in 6 CG4A Gliders on ~he ... fte r ­

noon of D - DJ.,Y . The st:cond c c rmlo., cOllsi s ti.l15: of 219 personnd 1.."1 54 CG4 A

Glidl; rs, ar riv lJd on trJ::l c~f t (: rnoon of D f 1. Immt:.idiat e13 upon t ilt;! lundint;; of tIle

fir st. (';ch;:.lon , a t.empor ary hospit ul W~. S set up on t. 1l(l south€. rn (;d6~ of t n.:: ~lidi:! r

l endlI.g fi ~ld . First cC'. su'll ties Viere t rc~t.cd c:.t 1500 and at 1700 the fir st mu jor

surgica l opo:;r ati on W ~~ purfor.r.l1d . kc. IdCO Il hc :;pi t~ l at .wl~ \i aS t nkdn O\' ",r :'nd

persormel :.:nd aquipment rua·Jed . Th~ tr;)!..tw~nt cf C3su'uti·.;s was c... rl"i co. on Ullder

'v ~ry good conditions . By 2400 D - Duy , I v7 c~s..u:lti:.ls l/'~id been c\rj.:..i.tt ... d and trea­
t e d a t t h~s hosp ital. UpoP.. th~ arriv al of t he s'OlcOtld tJcntJlcll , lit r..... r b{;.:>.To r ::.nd
ambul<'.:l!lcG 3Gctions ¥.'€ l'a s clnt to their r ..ssp<..:ctiv c r c~imimt.; :::.nd ev~cl.i."l.ticn from
r egim,..;nt.:!l and b attali on a i d s t~,tions "las quite r .:;;p'ld . By th .. £ilOr !1ins of D t 2 ,
conta.ct was es t ablishod with th e 501st at V: '-.L e.."'1d an att~\chcd pl:~t,()~,:1 of t.he
50th Fi{;ld Hos pit ul w:...s s ~ nt to estnbll.:;, _..1.:':m at. VE..:'!.;F'..L . TI';;' i.ir 1 "::..d.i cal
Collecting Co.JP 1.."""ij' ",st.lolish ..:rj c on t~lc t \~:. _ Di v is~on ....:dical Ccrrps.t1)' <::t. 1500
0;1 D f 2, 2nd in.i..t.i.;;.j. cVCi.cui\ticn bCEWl t o ...: 24th ij"1.';":'."'.ti on ~osr .,;.tal at BOi:l~.i} ­
LEOPOLD. Duo::: to t a cti c".l rc ~ ~ur eii1ents i!rld t ht> 1 b!'6\; amount. of tr:o.1'fi ~ moving
nortn , l ittl u l..v a cJ.a tion wus ac col~pliS !1,,- d until Gol; D f 3, iit wnJ.ch +·.a..:Ud nor mal
eva;::uc.tion b dG c:n , On D f 3, 30 ~1lI1 bul ances ....nd 4 - 22 t on t r uc ~s ev c.c_.:l<.ed a ll
avaiJ.<:d.Jle CaSe s to th.... 24th Ev ac\.ld.tion Hosp ital E.t E0J~il- LEePCLD . Frum D f 3 to
D flO, immedi ate ev acuati on of c asuilti ~s t ook place .

d . Air Suppo rt: In gen e r ... l, ro;;qu<..:sts for ai r s upport mssiolls we r e

handle d satisfactorily by .Il6MS of th~ Air Support Perty which land,;,d by Glider on
D - Day . B....d wea.th~ I", transmis sion difficulti>..: s, and n~~hv .l.· priorhy ru.ssions
r csult.tJd in many r dq l1",s t...S b(:in5 r .:: j.;.ctcd or unc.blt:! to be flo ....n . (See Anm.. x Uo . 6

for d ct ail ud r epo r t) .

e. , Glider Reception : Anticipating cons ido;: r abl c c cnfti.s~on in Ulut

a.ssembly wh ", n C'. la r 5e n umber of gliders Lande d on on(;' fie:1d , ;~ Div ls:~on :;lld.;:r
Nc ep tion party consisti n:; of 5 officers and 2J enl isted men f ro.ll v lr;i.o..!S unit s of
tl1~ Il.Lvis20n Cafl:.e ill \lit n t.he fir s t t;l i dcr e c he lon on D - Dej"'. Tn .,.'; p ·rt,y 1'unc­
tion;:; d e x t r er.c ly we l l :md in g r eat.. p art Vias res pons ibl~ for thl. r · p:.ct .• a ord~ rly
asst;mblinc;; :)1' units . Despi te c .:o.Nful bri<:oiL"1E; , it WlJ.S found i"1pr,..:.ct~ci'ble to
.;lXp "ct t,; h do;:; r s t o I nnd n ear prdde tarraint:d po~nts or in small t.l' e;.s or n;:;lds . The
Inost pr ~'"I.cticab le solution appears to be to st:ltiOll ullides at m.:my pcints oVer t he
cntir~ l andi rig area end h e.v ~ these 6u1d,-s go to t h~ n ~a r ust 6 1id~ rs wh0n they land ;
oriclnt. t h<.m , end give th . th e assembly point s e lecte d for th e unit . 1't--.is lolt! tnod
worke d very wli:lll and in bll but 5. f ~w cases , lU1its ass..mJ.blc.d r api dly and withoU t.
Confusion.

f, .A.ir Force Control Unit : It is believed desirable to have a senior

officer froa t he Troop Carrier Co;:mand p.,r r:.-:. with the first f<:c nc lon of glide rs in
a situa tion of t nis kind . He s hould be pru~ ~ded with 3 r adio set capnblo of direc t
corrmun-icati on ·. 'lit;l a cont.ro l s t ation at th e depa rture air fit:lds. In this way , he
could transmit on-the -spot i nforrn ~,tion as to weather conditions, th o t :lc tic al si­
t uat.ion, rnd tm: glider fi ~lds th ltt are clea.r for t he r e ception of t h~t 6lider
lift . It is beli ev e d t h~t many p lan ~s wera unne c;:;ssa rily soot down by p a ssing
ov er enemy h.. ld strong po ints , nnd which could n.:lVC be on dvoideQ hnd late infor ­
mation b een giv en t ne pilots as to tne t actica l situa tion .

g. !is :€ of Glider Pilots : Th~ need for a r cg ul~ rll constitut.zd tacti­

cal t'n d admill i s t.r ativ..::: o r gani zntion of g lider pilotz ~ I:.S qt.d t~ appa r t>nt on this

o r C'. tion . Tneor e tic:111y tho:! p ilots joined th.:;ir t c. ctJ.c ;. l or gam.za tion aft ~ r
l:mding and opE:.n:tud undGr thc s enior offic.:: r of tru...t. org :mizc.tion . Actua lly, it
was i.mpo ssibl ~ fo r anyone office r to control th ~ l<'ll'"ge numb.::r of glid8r pilot s
who arriV e d in t he combat area . There 'IIer" fi1 ,Ulj' . inst. ~nces of indiv~d uul pilots
lo;l avll15 t hc; ir as sign ed are ..:.s and dis uppll e ring . Glid",r pilots He r o;) us~d for loc':l.l
prot~c tion of V il UOUS inst<i llations ne:lI' th t;: L2, the Division CP , and the Division
Servi ce rtr o;la , und in gen c r ~ l, p~ rforr.l(::d (Jxce llt;:l1t wo rk individu "'~ly , S<:vdral
voluntarily joined conbat troops and purticiputcd in gr ound f ibhting in the
vi cini ty. It is bc li...vcd tna t an organiztJ.tion in whicn thd chain of cOluJnnnd is
strongly for go;ld is .;:;sscntiu l if glid0 r pilots a!"ci to bl.; USed mos t. i;ff ~ c i.:::'lt.ly in
an airbor n~ o ~ ra tion.
 h. ResuPPlY : See An.'1ex [~o . 7.

5. A final r eport will be submitted when th e Di vi sion coop~e te9 ~t 5 par­

ticipation in the Pollanc callpaign .
 • •
TACTICAL QPERATIONS OF THE DIVISION
ANNEX NO. 4

". at
gSil
D-DAY
'nle parachute echelon ot the Division began its drop at
rn
September 17, 1944. The 501st Parachute .Infantry
Air~!:rne Engineer Battalion attache~, dropped on tw . ; on ~ .. ..~
't W,\J
, 0 ... ~
VECHEL and the other some :3 miles nortt;Mest of VEe. e~~ l er s 't:le
1st Battalion, landed on DZ nAil west of VECHEL, proc e to ' that town 811:': c~r :
1500 had seized all initial"objectives which were the two Highway Bridges ~~
t he two Railroad Bridges over the HIU.EMS VAART CANAL and the Aa Xiver. No
r esistance was encounte'r ed on thi:r DZ. The 1st 'Battalion landed on DZ l1A_P J
in the vicinity of KASTEEL, assembled and reached VECH£L by 1700. The 1st .
Battalion received some resistance from scattered ~ne~ tro ops in the vic~' ity
of the DZ. Some resistllIlce from scattered enemy groups was enoountered lii the
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the town was made by the 'enemy .
At dark tht::! regiment was well dug in and set to defend the town against any
enemy attack. All bridges wert seized in-tact. The Engineer Deta chment iEme.
di ately began the ' construction at a second bridge across th~ hI~ VA.ART
CAN.~ Ul order to permit two-w~ traffic i f the situation so r equir~ d .

The 502d Parachute Infantry with three platoons 326th Al.rbo rn e Engineer
Battalion attached, landed on Dl "B" without en~ opposition and a ll b.... ~talions
wer e assembl~d by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded to ST. OEDhNhO~ bnd after
a skirmish, seized the town and its objective J the bridge ov~r the D<l..it>S1. !lIVER,
in-tact. This Battalion then proceed ed to dig in and at dark had t he s~ t uation
well in hand. Canparv tlH" of the 3rd BattC:l.l.ion proceeded to the H~ghwav' Bridge
a t BEST; secured it initially against little enemy reSistanc e , ,b ut was f or ced to
witndraw just before dark by reason oi a strong en~ counte ratt ack. 'rhe r emain­
der of th e 3d Batt<:ilion was then dispatched to join I'HI! Compal1Y , Wit h or ders to
s ecure the bridge the n~xt morning. The remainder of the Re'gim~t went into
Divi Sion Reserv e in the vicinity of WOLFSlWINKL.

The 506th Parachute Infantry landed on DZ nc" without ener.iy oppositi on:
Companie s of the 1st Battalion d epar t~d inunediat ely vlithout formal ;Issemb ly in '
an effort to secure thl:! thre e bridges over the HilHEUHNA CANAL in t he vicinity
of ZON b~fore they could be blown by the enelll3'. ' Scattered en~' r esi st ance was
encountered before r eaching the main bridge and fo rward e l uments weru wi thin
100 yards of this bridge when it was bl~n by the retreating en emy. (It was
found that thu other two bridges had been blown several dgys bef or e) . The
Regiment began the crossing of th e Canal by various ~xpedien ts, and by 2400 t he
entire regiment was on th e south side of th e Canal and had 8 , bri dge he ad exten­
ding some 2, 000 yards.

The Command Echelon of Division Headquarters jumped with the 502d Para­
chute Regiment and established an initi al Command Post at ZON. SOJll(: 7P gliders
car~ing ~dditional Command personnel, the Heconnaissance ,Platoon, Signal and
Me di cal personnel , and some transportation f or the combat units~ landed on the
LZ about one hour after th~ parachute landings. Overall time of landing of <'1.11
parachutists and gliders was one and one -half hours. Communication WaS e stab­
lish ed with all elements except the 501 by dark on this date . ,

The 501st Parachute Infantry continued the defense of VECHEL throughout

the day. Communication was establl.shed with Division at 06eX)'. SeVer al light
e nemy attacks were r epulsed, but no ma jor effort ,t o retrieve tho town was made.
The 1st Battalion of the ;o2d Para chute Infantry continued t o hold ST. OEDENkODE
and likewise r epe lle-d ' sever al light enomy attacks. The 3 rd B,'ltt ali on of the
502d attacked at first light ·in an e ffort to r e trieve' th~ f:iighw~ Bridgu at BEST,
but suff e red heavy casualties' at t he hands of tile Cllt.lll\Y forc ~ ,wlii ch had been
strongly r e inforced during the night. Tne 2d- Battalion was th,m order ed t o
as sist thto! 3rd Batt.alion ill Se'cqring ' the bridg€ls. The Batta lion pen etr at e d to)
the outskirts of BEST; but W<.I'S forced ,to withdraw by heavy., artille ry, mortar, ( \L­

I
and small arms fir e , and' t .bok 'up. cr _defe ~ive ~sition on th,; l eft of the 3rd \. 0,
Batta lion. At dark the entire regiment 'less tho 1st Batta lion was in a def ensi~e

at BEST.

.
position e<1 st of the highway f acing the enerD3" de f '"

- 1 ­
,. ~
,i
~
rE~
\
 ~

Tho 506th Para.c-hut:ci Iirfanti-y,. \~ith th~ 3r.d Battalion laading, .advanced
on EIUDHOVEN it first light:· The ·Jrd:.B a.t tal i .on was held . up at ·\'K>ENSEL, one mile
north of the city; by ' determined enemy r es i st.:tnce. The .2d Battalion made a wide
envelopme,nt t9' th~. e ast cir the city, Qut.flanked· the entllD,}r- defep.s es , ana. se~zed
) the town at ~300 . · Contact w ~s' made w~th a British ·Reconnaissance Patrol at .
1215 north of ' t"he city'; and wi. t h the mainr ~ribi sn Fo-rcei3 .at 1900 . ju~t south of

U
h~ city. At darK t he,'RegiLlent· \'I llS in contr.ol of · thc.. entj.rtl. city and v. as in

position d.e~fc ~di ng the.: l.fupbrtant bridgc~ in t q; c1t.y r4U~~ we r e ~.h e main

obje ctivt:s . . ",; . ., .. . ..

, . I· · ·. '. , . . : . :... .

At aQout 1530; soma 428 gli dt:l rs c:..rrying t he Jz:d .B ~1::till.ion. 0 1' tJ~ 3 27th ,
t he Iihgince r hatt e.liorl, thb "t'\lClaindcr o'f t he . f,Je qi ca1. ~d ~ignill Compani e.s .
e l ements of t he J77th Pai'athllHf Ficid Artil l ery Bat:t;alion , . a nd. addit~cna.l supply
and c.dministr"tiv e ve hicles, a rrived in th\.! comh c:t a rca. Thfi:! Jrd Bat t al J.G:l of
t he J 27th was as signad thE:: missi on of providing local prote ction for ~,h~ L1. and
tne Diyisio.n se rvice a r e a.
, ,
British ' Forc e s r e'ached the south side o,r th E: C.i;U1al at ZON "I-t. <torruximattl.ly
2100 and immc diat c J..y o.'rg~ the cons truction of' a bridg~. acros s the Can~ .."

D,I 2 ,
.. ,-.

The bridge across the Canal wa 3 ' COOlplet ed during th..:: night 'at 0615 . m.d
leading el e ment s of th .;! Household Cavalry and Guards Armore d Division b<::gan
crossing. T!1e s e' S aJTC l eading e l~cnts p....ssed through gT. OEDENitODE and VEGHEL
by 0645. One Squa dr on of the 15/ 19. Hussars .w ~s atta ched ~o the 506th a~ EINDHOVEN.
and one Squ.i:ctron t o the 5020 at . ZON • .. , .
, , " ,

ncn , COfllPany of t oe' 501st w'a s ord er ed' to . send ont:l platoon t o .DL'JlZ.i{ . Report:
fr cw this comp any indicated the .t:ifenw ,.;as hl' SOt'D.<o! forc e i n a nd .around this t ow n.
The 3d Batt..l lion of the 501st 'W ;;!.S order.cd ,;0 !!tOV ~ .from VECHEL to EERDE and take
up a strons. 'de f ensiv e position' a t th at p oin'40 . The ' rema inder : of 'th e 501st con­
tinued in u cf.osc in defense of VECHEL and during ti'k! <iuy .th u 2d Batt:a1ion \
r epulsed an enemy a tta ck fr <:xn the .nor·thwc;st· estimRted a t oVo,;:r 250 Infantrymen .
During the I nt e evening J Company 11£11 waS drive n buck froin its out post position
a oout 200 yaros by a. well executed .night att hck by. cnt.:my par a.chuti-::t.s .

First Ba tta lion of t he 502d continued in the ·def.e nse of 8T . oiOENRODE.

The 2d Bat~al ion a ttr. cked at· 0600 ·in another attempt to s~izi;: .t he highway br idge
at BESTl. This a tt'ack was 'rtlpulsed by · th~ enlllAY. At .14+5 t he R.eg .im~ n1:, l ess
th~ 1st Bat~aIlon, r einf or ced. by one squ~dr.ol). : of .t.hc·•. t~J19, Hus s ars., l a uncht:ld a
co-or di nat e d. , ~~t<:ck : against "Uie !jOeruy ·pos i tiDn • .• Tlus att a ck wa li. v e:r y succ a ~sful
and the obj e c"4Y.c scj.ze~ 'at ' 1000 . '. Fifteen · 8Bmm ~ gtm~ · wer,e ~ destroyed, .1,056 .
pr isone r s t<lk:en J c::n d over' 300 ' ""ne&3 de a dl left·,orv the fi~ ~d afte r , t.his battle .
'. ": \ " " ,,,,, , " ,' n ,·, .. ..
The $06t n Pur achute lnf~try e~tab::LisMd t .st<rong. .P.9int..s~ ~ aSt. and we s t

of EINDHOJEN and continued ext ensive patrols with the 's quadron' th e 1 5/19
of
Huss ars a tte.phe d~ ~ · .. ' . .,. . . .. ' ":­
. -, :. . or' . • " . , '
A .thi~d '~lider' li'f1; · began:.to .~ rr.iv. e ut ...Qbo~t · lJ.6o ·~ar.r¥~ the l,st and
3rd Bnttalio'ns of tli~ }27th J tho Blst Anti-'l'qn~. ~t~on, ttJe .3.77 ~h Parachute
Field Artil.1c.ry Battilli6n (l:.ess Batt~y II'B1IL ~ and the 907tli ' and 321st Glider
Fidd Artill e ry Battalions, Duc: to f og 'enoountereQ ~n:rou~p'J 'only a portion of
these unit s arriv-ed . Element3' ~o:f. the 327th wer.e gi yan ,the.. mission of protecting
the g lider ·i .analrig f i eld 'and ,a'S si'sting' t tlt.'· att,ack . of t.i"ia.. s02(f if necessary . At

'n
abou t 171:>0 ' enemy t anks' were reportr.~cr 'appro...obiI?g .ZON· fn:>Jli.·.the sputheast and C:t
faw minut~s Iat.ct se'v cr a l t 'arik-s 1QP}.lro acJo:led, w.i.thi-A ;a .r,~w. ~h\U1drGd ya r ds C!f .t he ZON
bridge und shelle,d t'~ .b·r·~~~,., th ~ ·~iV±sion: '~P.J' ·thert?,I~.: . 14ttl~ . dam~e was
don~ and th o tan.k s "Wl.thdrl:iw when · ~T' ·g uns , e.rrl.""c,(j, ~ t+Cli, .g;ll.dcF l e.ndlng fl.eld'
.
Two t anks werc · kn.ocked'~u:t: · by·(AT : fire .... ... ., ..~ ~.

Df 3 , .
: . . ... ."

. . ': .' ... ..

')":.) 1'
....,' . I
. : ': ' A .'
..

~.
"' : :- '" ' ' ,-;- : ~. '-:' ' ' ''
. ' .

' . :

.. :·..f: ... · 'I'!; , "

' '"f' ' ,./-. •.
. , ~ . ; • ...
.•

~ ..

J
• . • : rl .· '~ :;,;.: '; i. ;.. •..• : ' ; , ' I'~ ' .'. \. ' •• , ~ . , . . . . . .... . ... .,

,P.:i.:Il.ision Command Post moved to ST. OEDENRODE a t 1206: '.,

,
During the morning.. t~ 1st Batta lion of the 501st att a cked .:m.d s ei zed
DINTrn . Four hu ldre d Md' tvf~'iy:- Pri~6i1ErS"!ier~···t. akl$o\ ·.tn;".t;h:is
, .
action . The 2d

• •
"

, .
 •

Battalion continued a clos e- in def ense of VECHEL.

,

The Jrd Battalion conducted

exten sive p atrolli..1'lg to thE.! n ortn and west f r om a strong point at EErtDE.

Th~ 1 s t Battalion of th e 502 d continued t he def ense of ST . OE.DENROD3 .

DJ,lring thC3 afternoon tho 2d an d 31'0 Ba ttalions 'tI'~ re ..Qrp.eZ'ad t o pr oc Gcd ST . to.
OEIENitODE and t he Regiment charged '1dt h t he dafen s~ of the ST . O!IDUt.lOm~ are a.
By 2:i.OU t h.:: a'l tiN Rcsime nt was cl osed in the area a'1d had taken up strong
defensive posit .i ons .
,;
During t he night t~ 1st Battalion of t he 506 th was or d~ r9d to p r oceed to
ZaN i n ord..::r to assi s t i n the der an se cf t ,'_ :..:Qtl brid ~c against t h~ cx pcct '::d
e nemy attat:k . 'llie P'-+-.t ali on v/{::1t into p~ o;...~1 at 0 60J and in con j unction wi t h
e l emen ts of the 1s"':. 3C'i:.taliO:l of t he 3~'1', G<.'1.d one comp any of t he 3 26th Eng:ine ~ r~ J
r ~P dlhd th", c:.i" .~ ck on t tl':; b:.. ldge l aw1cu . . d by t,le 107th Panze r Br i gad e at about
0630. The 2l! Ba t t alicn of til ~ 506th, riding tanks 01 t h e squadron of t he 15/19
Hu.ssa:::'s , attack ~d th~ en~my rear aIle. a sharp on£agcm....nt t ook plac e a t NUNEN .
The 3rd Battal ion of tOE: 506th rt,:;mained i n EINDHOVEN as ~",girna nt a l rl.ese rvc . At.
0900 the, 4l+th Armored Hcgimcm t was attacne d to t.ho Div i sion and proc{)ed€;d towa rd
h'F,Tl.:mm L'1 a f urth cr attempt to destr oy the e n(;JUj' attacki ng t h" ZON b ri dge .
I nt er mi ttent t ank a.'1d i nfan t ry fighting took place t he r emainder of t rHJ d~ .

The 2d and 3rd Bat talions of t he 327th r t: liev.:;d t he 502d of the d ef ense
of th e s ector eas t o f ZON and t he landing ZO ~ and Divis ion serv i ce ar~ a. The
321st Glider Fi eld Artill<; ry Battalion was att ached to t he 327th and fir e d
missi ons in suppor t of that mit d uri ng t he d<\y . At 1500 Battc:lry "B" of t he 3 77tt.
arri-lcd b;:r parachute and joined it s Batta1.::.m. The 377th then mov e d t o ST.
OEDENP.ODE in suppor t o f t l:e ;02d Parach~te Infantry . Battery nA11 of the Blst
Ant i- Tank Batta::' i on was atta che d to t he 327th and Battery nc" to the ; 0 2d.
Bat ter-.f uB " r Gro.ained in defense of t he ZON brid g~ .

The 1 s t Bat talion of t he 5015 t cros se d t ne WII.I...aS VAART CA NAL in the

early f.1.or nin:; at HEESkIJK and conducte d Gxtensive patrolling during t h e day . At
IB45 an attack WllS made on SCHIJNDEL and the northwe st s e ction of th e town was
s 0i zud at approxirnatdy 2215. The 2d Battalion r emai n.:: d at VECHEL . The 3rd
Batt al ion moved a t 1 745 t o the wast a nd cut t he 5T . Ol£DENrtODE - 5CP..IJNDEL Road
i n the vi cJ.ni ty of t he rai l r oad station .

The 502d Par ac hut e Inf antry, 'nith t;1_ 3 77th Parachut e Fiel d Artille ry Bat­
talion at tached , continued to GAPand its u-: f~ nsiv~ pOSitions in t hE: ST. OED9.nWDE
ar ea . "B" Compal'1Y of th e 1st Battalion r ~ce ived a strong enemy attack fran t he
northwes t i n thoJ e arly aftur n oon , but h~ ld its position .

The 1st Battali... n of t .le .506 th continu~d its de f ensl.! of the ZQN bridge .
The 2d Batt.alion wo r ki ng with th o 15/19 H... ssars and the 44th Tank f(~g ime nt J at ­
tacke d t he ene'ny nE:aI' NEDEltilETI'EN. The enell\Y witndr ew in t h<l fac ~ of chis attack
and at l20J cont a ct was lo st. The 2d Battalion went into a def l:ln s iv e position in
t he vi ci nity o f TONGElliE for the night . The 3rd Battalion was order e d to ST.
OEDEl'ffiODE as Divitiion rte sarv e . . The Reg iJnent was given a warnin~ orde r that it
would p r obab ly move to UDEN o n tho; follc,..dn g day.

At 0300 the 3rd Battalien of tile 506th Parachut e Infantry closed in the
ST . OEDENRODE are a, moving up from EINDHOVEN. At 0500 order s wer .; receiv ed
that this b a ttalion, as we ll as a ll ot.h(! r ul cruents of the r egiment , would mov e
to UDEN l;ithout d el ay . Movement wa s to be by mot or and marching . Th e 3rd
Bat tall.on b.Gg an it s Jilove to UDEN, by marchill 6 , at 0900. '!h e 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their mov ~ nts, pi e cemeal , as transportation became aVailable
during t he day .

The advance de tachment of th e 506tn , consisting of approximately 150

officers an d m~n from Regime ntal Hea dquarters and othe r units of the r egiment,
pas s e d t h r ough VECHEL at 1000 . Immediate ly after passing through the en ell\Y cut
t he ma.J.n highway b etwe en VECHEL and UDEll , and this detachment bc catJle isolatod
in UDEN.
- J ­
 Tho 107th Panzer Brigade, after withdr awing f r oJu ,its attac , on t he JON
bridge on D f 4, moved und~r cov er of dar kness to lHP , and in . th~ Aat ~ morning
of D f 5 launched an all- out a t tack to s eize th~ town of VECHEL and d~stroy the
bridge s th<.,l r c . E..'1erny forc e s in this attack He r a \::st imatud as thr~i3 battall.ons
of 53 troops , suppo rt,-d by 30 t o 40 tank s and a rtil lery .

By 1200 , t ho 20 Battalion 50lst astrid ~ thtl V£;(11EL - 'liEP Road, was bein g
hard pr ~ss~d , Additional troops w ~ rG started tOh ard V£CHEL ano Gb n~ral llcAuliffe
was placed in cowroand of troop s in t.he area and cnarg;d witn de.fc!l1sc of till.; tonn
and bridges , ht s.bout 1400 ~n~m,y t anks cut the highway nortn.... i:ist of Vl:;Ci-iEJ., and
dc.stroyud transport pu-kt:.d on th>3 high,my . Bat t.ary IIB" , 8j.~t AT Hattali!)n,
arriv>Jd at the Sa.410 ti.~ , ",em, i nto act- i on on t.n e higm,cy· U1d ilnm..:d.io.t cly d ~s tr ­
oyad a !..ark V tank 1ew:lir.o th~ attack . Tno 2d Bat tll~on 506 took posi t ion on
t :ll.. l u ft or' the. 2d Battulion 501, \\-1...th t hu 1st 8<:.tt a 1ion 401st G1 i d::r Infantry on
i t s 1.:.f t . \ ,ith t n .... !).ss:'st .:mc.;. of British ...rti1lcry g!ltr.<Jr .::d froru. th... nighVi~ ,
t he. attl;l.\:k f r ot::. cJiP \; ~ t · r ....-;ml s~d - b' d<.rk. At abo ut l40U ,jm..my infnntry, '"lith tC:1flk
s upport, u.t't.acT• .!o -m""1 \l~ no.:: ane l fl·O!".;. 1.11.... nor thwl.;st t o'o'IU'd til~ high\\UY briclgt:.
soutnwes 't. 01 VECrlEL. COJ!":pu.·..({ 118 ft , 506 , \'I hich WCl S i n VEX::tiEL on its \i~ to lJD~ ,
was turned ar ouno , d cplo~rc.d nd...r t.ik bridg.... and r e pul sed the. a t tack , "Iith t h~
as sistw.c e of e l oclUl ts o f thiJ 44th Tunk rt.ogi t:lt)nt .

D-<lrifl-t; the i:: ft~ rnoon t il... t!llcfilY kWlc"'l..;d ~ .11 I1ttl,. ck .:.g:linst t ilt: t OVln from
tht.> :l arth, und w..;rE;: fin .::J.1y h21t..;d just. s. ~ . ,0.,: tne ruilroad brld 15 .:.. by ~l ..:fJ~t s
of t he. 2d B..l.t.tallon , 501, and on... pl;::.too~. u ..' uti u COIJp.ll1.r J 506, Vlhich h . . .d t ake n up
;.:. c.. f.:ns l.v_ posit..:'0.1 tIllJrC '"" S:1o rt tiui.i.l 0... £01·" .
Th..: ,mcrr.y Nn...wcd t hci.r att acks from tnu south .:md SOUt.hUilSt. d ...rl.!1g t nt.
la t.... aitl..rnoon , but by noVi ., ddition" l for c~s h~ci ,:.rrivco and "nt...::y ...t t,~ck ',~aS
stopp~d . By d ....r k th ... 506 (l~ss 1st B.~ltt .:. lion ana th..:. d~t'.l.C ni:l.....nt cut off at UDEN) ,
tho 327th Gll.d er lnfar, try , t ~ Division rtt.connal.ssa,ncc Pl '!t oon, t ho.; 32lst Glider
Fh.ld i\l' t i llc ry B~ tt alion, Batt ery "BII , 81St .... 1 3att~ lio n , toe. 2d Bi:..tt.u.lion 501st
Parachute lnf:mtry , uni t he First Squ r~dro:l, 44tn Ro~'a l 'i'~ rieg im~nt fiR-d <:.rriv c d
ana foraod thll task force und e r G_n<3T[~:!. i.l.cA1.H.u'FB chi!l'g\.!d '"lith ,101d:ne; tho::: V.l!:CHEL
e.r .J:l. .

In the mC3ntim-- th ~ 1st B at ~. lion of t ho 501 att ~ck~ d ~ t dawn 3l1d h~d oc ­
cupi ..,o ;111 of SCHIJNDEL by 0915. Some pris oners y.'l.l r t1 t oken in t ill S opi; r .:ition .
About 1200 or der s weN r o:lclliv cd for tho 1st B;~t tal l.on t.o proc o...d to n!ilBOSt..:n,
sciz..; t he town, .md previdu no rt h~rn fl~ll'lk protoction fo r VECHEL. Tne m.OV ~Illen t
was cornpl ... t e d by 1 700 , !ll1d tht;! b,'-lttalion t ook up Ii strons dcfton s iv {: posi t i on in
and a r ound th,J town . The 3rd B!::.tt<ilion, whic h h.:1d adVJ'lCdd t ow:lI'd ::iC!"fIJNDLL i:1
t h~ Joo r ni.ne:: and join ~ d forc es with t h.:: 1st E.l.t'L<l lion in s ei zi ng SC::IIJNDLJ., was
ord",r .::d to El!1tDE , ..-mor c! u. took up t! d..:fl.>nsl.v ,- posl.t.).on ~uardin5 V~C I-EL fro.rn t he
w.zs t.

Th.; 502d P.lI' .:lChut~ L1f ilntt'l' cxt ~nc;,:d its dcf..m si ve PQsitions during the d.v .
i! ouGn ts of t ~c 1st Battulion cade cont ~ ct wi th tn ~ j r d a~tt alion 501 south of
SCHIJNDliJ., w d join~ d forc ... s in clc61lir16 out s ev_ r 11 .:nt.:Jl\i' strol16 points a l ong tne
SCHIJNDEL - 5T . O'';DEllrtODE hiin..", .

Thu 32?th Glider I nfi..nt r y \"I ~ S ord<.lT J' ,. 't 0930 to proc eed to VECHEL, eond
mOVEmle nt oogan a t 1030 , t h oJ 3 r c 3att:llior.... .;.rucl: .::.nd th... 1st and 2d Eatt..ll ions
by marching . Th .... 1st and 3rd Bat talions ~., ...:r... co.mitt...'d on both s ideS of t n.., b ridg~
invrwdi a t~ly upon :',l'ri val; th~ 2d Bat l;alion continu... d into V'.c;~Hh.L ..nd bcc<:1J!o.c t ... sk
forc e; r ... sc;rvc . Tn~ ta~n of Vt,;CHEL W...l.S h<:ciVily slll.: llt.d during tn ~ l .::.t ..: ::fttornoon
and .:lllrly (;v..:lning .

Soon a f 'l..er davlO th~ tlnoulY launch<;d smnIl s s <.: ~~ da fe­ -t. !
siv c posit1ons s outheast of VEGHEL . Tht:.s ~ w ~e .,~ -..dt.t1Olil.. difficulty . ,i,."
Durirt" t h,,- ni gnt plullS \'j <.:! r oJ drawn up which c.:.r. lla d r aj) _ Brit: · s h Ar~r~d 'Bhg :'::d~ ,
r ec.:.ll .:d from toc NIJ1.iEGEN :.J.Nd, to ~ldv.:.n c ", on VECt~ frolil UD~~ , join forc e s with
t h~ 2d Buttalion of th oJ 506, which W,.s t o advelJ'lC (; [rOOl V"~CHhl. t OHerd UDEN , .:'.nd
cl.....' r t.h o r o:z.d in ord t> r that til .; f10\1 of tr Sfic Lli6ht. b... r l;sum""d . r'olloHing t hat,
t hl.. Armorl.ld Br ig.1dc W,J. S to swing s hh rply south :uti cut off t he ,.melD,,}' CSC'-lPv route
through ERP .

• •
 carried ou~ .
•
The 2d Battalion of t hc 506 mad~
•
Due to_ cQm.uunicaj,~O..l1 J!ifficult ics , that pa rt of tne plan calling f or the
advance Tn forc e and encircling movehicnt of t..~G British Armo r ed Brigade was not
contact with a patro l of t he Ar­
more d Erigade no r-the a st of VEGHEL aoo ut 1700 . By that. ti.ute th~ en~I;~f had beg un
hi s withdrm-.al, a:1d soon tooreaft ~ r cant.ac t Was lost.

. .D~l.~ tho' f.l?rr:illg th e lst a nd 3rd Battalions o f , t .1e 50~~~1 ' ~~

rns . . . .
liYt ~tW lC~
the l.r QGlcn31.Vtl POSl.tl.OI1S we st and north of EERDE ~ 'e
wit h ":.he 3rd Battalion generally alone; the ratir e h t t 1Jj'
tho ls" ""T.tation from ENlDB d<lo SOll"h " 0 th o m:9ft 'B '.t;\Jubli .'
co ntinu,;d the closu in dcf""nse of Vi!.GHSL, with the ;06 6i"~"'n O~fur.S1V.;;;. mi~·~jons
to t~_ ncrtht!3.st and south . Th..: 327th lIas assi6l1od a d(lf.Jr.,:,i' /o sector nort:. of
VECH1:t .

The 502d Parachll':.G L'1fantry cont.) '1" :.ts defense of :3T . O~l?:2lf.dO!E, y!it h
th ~ 377t .1 Pi::U' 3.chut..; F·.t. ~.d Artillery i3at l"" in c!J.J't.!et s~pport .

f.:i.lri.1.i,i t.,_ cisy s .'.t h ·)... i d.;:r s l'- ri al a.l'rJ.v~d bri nging r ...r;.a.i.lIi06 'Jlcmcrl ts o f
t he- 32"' t::t GlidE:i r I nfantr:' a.,;:. til.:. 907th Glid0r t'i.:: ld Ar till",ry Bat talion . T'ne se
troops H-.!r u r::ov ... d iror.J..... diat~1y to the V~~I£L aro;:a , and tno;: <;07th }' i tlld Al'tilltlF,f
Bat ta.lion wa s p1ac\;;d in diru ct sup!Jort. of t •.I1..: ,Olst Parae hut;; I nfantry. Tne 321st
Glider Fi eld Al'tilh:ry Batt-alion was attaco~d to t hoJ 506t n Parachut.e Infantry ,
and f H ed SC\I:.l'al I.lissions duri n,; the day .

At dawn r econnaissa:lC{; as fer as ERP :i.lxi i eat ,.ld tht) c nel:\Y h ad made good his
withdl'6.Wal to th<:l south..last} and th'>! area \"las clear of ~ n ellly troops . nl:; 506 th
Parachute hfantry, ...Iit h t he 321st Gli d(; r Fl.;:ld hr till 0ry va.tta l:Lon and B&.tt",ry tlB!
8 lst AB loT Batt al l.on att.ached , was or d.;r ;.:d to UDi:~ t o t<ikc ov...r tn e defens\} of
t hat a r~a .

TIl.: Ol ....ision Cotmland Post was (.loved frOfil 3T . Oh;Dl!1~rl0Db. to VECHEL at 1000 .

The: 327th Glide r Infantr y was assigned th ~ t a.~ k of der~ndi.ng VECHEL, with
t he 907th Glider Fi 0ld Artill ery Bat talion in 5cncl r al ~uppor t . The 2d Battalion
501 was r ....l ei... s ed from. its ddensiv.... assibfll'Jcnt i n V':;CHEL and joined its r egiment
in t hb EEhDE area, as H.eg ime::ntal hcs .... rv o;: . Battery !lA lI, 8ls t AT Battalion , conti­
nue d a ttucht! d to the 501 s t, wi th thcl 907th Gliccr .F i el d .f\rti l:cr'"! in direct suppor t

'The 50 2d continued t.he defense of tnl.l ST . OE.DEN!WD!l: aNa . Bhttcl rics 110 11 ,
"E", and "F II , th e Anti- aircraft Batt e ri ~ s of t...'1c dlst AT Battalion , arrivo.;d in the
s eabornll eche l on and w~rl;) ass ie;..'1~d to prot <J ct th ~ Division S,-rv icc Ar:Ja northwe s t
of ZOO .

A.t 1000 the enet:!y l aunched a series of probin.-J at.-tacks .?..gainst the 50ls t
d""f<3ns ivtl po siti on , IlOVing f rot:!. SCHIJlJDEL toward KOEV.l!t!Ul~G . Two ~Of!lriln i cs of the
50 2d v;cri; dispat ched t o KOEVE.rtING to int .::;rcept this forc o , r eportl..d to bv two tankE
and about forty infantryl,ICn. ';1'nq iJn<!my for cO;.! mov lld r upidly, howevEr , and Here
aliilOSt in KOLVi'lt I N"G '.'In ....n Gompanit.ls !lO" and IIn ll of t n ..: 502d arriv<.:d . 'ilia two COnl­
pani .::;s held KOb."1JRiUNG , but oould not pr....v""nt tnt. ...nemy from cutting th..; h~ghVlay
northwc st of KOhiVii:kmG just b ofori..! da rk. Under cov l.> r of diil'knt.!s~ t h~ un tlmy built
up hi s f orc es with tanks , solf-propell ed aitIlJ,.1c: , a.-w f a irly l:ir~t; i nfantry unit~
using' th ~ corridor he: had f ound ~ t"W ..: .... n t nc.. :Dl st and to", 502d . .

o ..t
~
8

Durin5 tho ni ght tlHl 506th with Bat ter i c s UBI! 8J.s t AT Batt al ion , and the
321s t Glider r'i uld Art illt;ry Bat talion att a cn-d d , was ordl..r od to return to VEl.!HEL
from th ~ UDE!"! are/:!. . · i.~OV clm.:m t bl.!gc:.n at Q300, and. ~t dayli g ht t hese unit s WE.rc just
cast of VECHEL. At 0915 t he 506 , with one squadron 44th Itoya l !.'~ J1.&gi.rnen-t
at~chcd , a t1:.<lckod the e nemy at KOEV.21tI NG . The utt...CK pr o~ rdS.scd. f ...,vora bly for
S0100 2 , OCO yards , wh'::n botll nttacki."cl: battalions (form3tion , 1st and 3rd B...I.tt....l ion
abr ~as t, astri d~ th", main roed) were p inned do~n by wc ll - diru ct ~d art lilury on,~
sJml l Ul'ms fi r a} 3I1d fir ... frol:;' t anks dug in i..I.lone; t ru rO llct... Thl.! 2 d B~~a6 ~
th..n ordcrad to llX<.:cut.) b wide env'lopm~nt of th ~ enell\Y ! s S Of
it s mOVCl.l....n t nt 1 400 . I n thw os.::Ilt i m", el t:ment s of ~
.
o ~t ~
h~~
i '
g~rlj
, ' l.:tlr
-;w'U /.
:
- 5 ­

l t . - .
lEW
strong aroored force s , bega'1 an a"dvan ce froe. tne south . The SOlst and Coopanies
"D tI and !t all of the ;02d assisted by providing bases of fire for the at.tackinG
f or ces . B~' darkness t he eneL\Y hao been cleared fr aj all b ut a very s.:tal l area
s outh of ~~e r oad .

The 50 2d continued its de f ense of the ST . OEDE:'JrlOD3 area , the 327th i t s

de fens e of the V3CHSL area, a:1d the 5Ol st. its defens e of t!le b.EltD~ area . All
t h ree r egi.i.1ent s had several s uall scale ene.v att.acks launched ag ainst tneir posi­
tions durJJ1b the day.

The 506th resUL1.e d t he att. ack soon after daylit;!nt , and by 0900 had d r iven
t he en e.~ no r t h of t he hiKhway and LBde contd.ct wit h t !l:! 501st on the right . The
Britis !1 for ces conti n ued t he attacr<: to t he :1orth , p inch in~ out. t.le 506th and
Companie s ir D" and. Utili of the 502d . At 130 .... '.:. ..e 506 , ·.dt h a t. tach:r.ents Vias ordered
to r e turn to the UD=:,N are a . n It; i.lovement ',. ..:ot:lpletec by 1700 .

The 5C~d ~ on'ti nuc d it s defe nse of the 5T . QE,D~lt!tODE area, Cor.lpD.llies no" am
"Hit r eturlll.ng t o Regin.ental cont rol at l50t. .

The SOlst and the 327th continue d their de f ensive cissions , both r e g irr~nts
r epel1il16 s:.lall scale ener.\y
, attacks d.rriIl6 the day .

D /10

No change in unit dispositions . Several eneJJ,Y inf l.ltration attempts on

front of 501st and 327th repelled.

,
• - 6 ­

•
 •
CJ.SUALTIES OF 10lST AIRB O;l11E DIVISION
FOR THE PEl IOD D TO D H ID 10
•
Unit Kill ed \"founded ~.!i s sing

Di visl. on HOEdquer ter s 1 2 2

Hq Co & h!P Pla t oon 0 4 1

5 01st }"'erac!'.ute I nfantry lO S 338 65

5 02d Parachut e Inf antry 1 03 450 75
5 06th Parachute Infantr y 74 304 43
327th Glider Infan t ry 39 137 159
4015 t Glider rnf an 'try
12 64 26
321st Gli der Fiel d Ar t i ll ery Bn .
2 17 23'
907th Gl i dEr Fiel d Arti ll ery Bn .
10 17 98
377 th ?arec hute Fiel d Ar tiller y Bn .
1 29 ·4
81s t .AS Antiaircr aft Battcl ion 7 21 1

326 th AS :Glgineer Ba ttalion 13 41 12

l O! s t Airborne Si gna l Company a
1 8
426th Airborne Quar termas t er Co. 0
1 o
eO l s t .AS Or d Ue i nt Co . 1
o 2
326th AB Me dical Company ('I 2 2

Hq & Hq Btry . Div . Ar ty 7 5

lOl s t AS Re coJmai s s ence Pla toon 1 1 12

TOTAL 373
1436 547

GRAND TOTAL - 2356

ANNEl( 00 . 5
'.
 • , •
Air SuPport Request; 101 'liB D ~v ision
Thl'u 26 Sept, 1944

No . Tine of He ues t Area and Ull:tur.o of Tc.r et

1. 20 ~eo t 0555 Jl r !!1cd Recon a er !iu..,e"', Nl"!der­

\"je t ten and Helrnond. T .~
l"C"?<,rtec1 t:nd e. t tack r ted
on Zon .
2. 20 sept 1?00 Tnc Recan r oed ~/E fr oa Bokst el Not r evorted
t o Best and r oad E from Oil'schut
t o Best . Tpr.ks r eported Ir.oving:
t owe.rd Best.

3. 20 Sept ~ Bo~b areo 431.<27 ~/w t o 1.£1<.17 F Not r e?ortcd

t o 496.;uS N/V: t c ~S4.'"';'2 . (Nunan
t o Eee kstraat). 200 t!...nks :.'nd
v cli11clLs ..

4. 22 Sept llCP. Beitb roud from Beckel ,,:e5 t. to Messege r eceived

Er p . 400 t vnks Uld veh icles . 1310 I1 T(.r get
~ cc ept ed . Esti­
mat ed tin:e: of
rivQl t o follow . "
o la~er cessage.
5. 22 Sopt 1315 Tec Reen ~ r e~ 5240 t o 5840 t o Dc l~'.yed on nccount
5234 t o 5834 . ( Er~ , Bookel l nd of weat her. Uo
S/fl of Volkel ) . Cc'nc !'Jn tr: tion of r usults r eoor ted .
t rnks rnd vehi cles .

6. 22 Sopt 1522 Arr.lcd Recon r o ~d Udt::n to vachel . Not r eportt:ld .

30 t r nks und inff ntry on ro ~a .
7. 23 Sep t 0610
- Ar med Recon c.ret Ht ,·V":'!.. . Erp ,
Boc kel nnd Kr('.rnJ:lr...
trr.tion t - nks r nd v. .~
'_ccn­
•. . .
Pos ition of our
troops r equest ed .
tie informed 1000
yd s:'fet y li.:ni t .
Mission crncelled
by G3 -t l655.

8. 24 Sopt 0905
- Arncd Reccn er ct 5632 t o 5641
t o 5932 to 5941. Tf'nks :o nd
vehicles .
l!.t1;lcd
im'~3~~ble .
for pin-point
t: rgr.~s .
of orell
i:e~on
Asked
L::t er
mess"'gE. s""id oissio;
r efused- fri ends in
".r£U. •

9. 24 Sept 1740
- Ar med Reccn 1000 yd radius
E 425369 . Tr nks , vehiclos
rnd r rt illery moving S/E.
Not r t!ported

10. 24 Sopt 1745 Armed Roc cn r r o~ Schijndel Postponed on

c ccount of ViCf t her.
·(lJ!l5).
11. 25 Sopt ~ I:.r mcd Roccn er c:" St. Michiol s Not. r eported
Go s t el t o Schijnccl t o Di nthLr
to Berlicuo,T" nks , vehicilis,
r.nd infl' ntry.
:'rt ~ll~ T'J

DEClA STflEO

 No . Time of Request Ar er "nd N" t urc of T r g(.;t R~sult s

12. 26 ~o o t
-
0744 Bomb wo~x.!s
squr...res
N of Ccr.d in gr i d
4340, 44J9 ~ n rl A539 ,
::: I so villi..gos of BeW', Dinthor
rnd Hces,djk . T: nk~, "' hi cl~s J
115ket'~
smoke
f or r L'f.
on
t~ rget s .
could not corply .
Baug r.t t.- eked [ t
t'. rtilbr"/ ,mel infrntl'.\ . 1045 . Civilirns
r uport 8 HunE
kill ~d . Our nit­
nCss (lc..scr ibod
vehicles ees trqr c~ .
B.- l -..nc & of t '!rg~ t s
not r eported .

Not e -- The how' in t he t ii:!... of r.:.:quf::~t is t he timf.: t he rnessrc(:; W'l".S 1 cknowlet1.ged by"
t he Net Con trol 3t· ticn . The t ipt...~oF!.gin ~n ~~ cJ'sc~ ,Ir s much ~ r lier but
f.uc:: t o t r' nsaitting !lifficult ies t h(; NCS coulc' not be r e" c he<~ or t ho l!lcsst'gc. '.'irS
not cl cl' rly r eceivcc' . 1. 11" !""upport n!isLions l ....t (. r t hnn 2h sept (J]44 '.'Gr e h·· 'ndleC
t hru Sri t i sh ch"nnc1.s . Our nes claSen )0 Sept 2400 .

, - 2 ­

It

• •
 •
•

1. Following is a report of all res up,l lids oolivONd by parachute and

glide r to the l Ol s t Airborne Division in opor ation Uarke t :

•. Df 1
(1) 'l'Ncnty- two ( 22 ) glidors, CG- 4- A, to DZ lr\,tr .

lUhRTJt>AAS TU!

JlOiOUlIT A1iUUNT PffiCli'.N'l'...GE.

DELIVlIIillIl ru;cov <RED !!ECOV,ru;o

Rati ons , type UK11 7, 668 7, 668

SIGi>iAL

Battery, BA- 37 540 540 10CY,t.

Batt ery, BA- 38 '/'i.O 720 100%
Batt ery , BA- 39 48 48 100',6
Batt ery, BA- 40 48 48 100%
BattEry , BA- 41 20 20 J.O<Y,o;
Battury, BA- 48 60 60 100';'
Battery, BA- SO 168 168 100%
Vlirc, \1- 110 on re.- 4 (32!t lilile s) 65 65 100»
\jire , h-1.30 on DR-4 (24 failt.ls) 12 12 l W",

Ca rbine , cal . . 30 24, 000 24, 000 100%

Cal .•30, AP, 8/clip 64,512 64,512 10l1,6
Cal. . 30, AP- Tr (4-1 ) belted 80 ,000 ~O, OOO 100;0
CaL .45, SU; and Pistol 14,000 14,000 lOa,;
60mm Mortar , HE 1,152 1,152 l 00:t
811Ml Mortar J ( It ) 52~ 528 l OU);

Dextrose , btl. 1,,0 lijO lOO~

Sodium, Citrato , box 120 120 100:0;
Sulfanilamide, box 240 240 100'. .
~.ate r, dist . box ..sO IJ<O l~
Plasma, pkg . 360 360 lOOp
Bandage , gauze , box 2, 040 2,040 10""

Cotton, absorb~t, pkg . 360 360 l00't

Plast er, adhe siv e , apl . 21/J 240 lOOp
Splint, basswood, s at . 480 480 1()()P
Splint, ArIlt' klg ~ Ring , ea. 60 60 10""
Splint, wire ladder, ~& . 480 480 lW..o
Pentothal, sodium, box 240 240 100:0;
Alcoh ol, btL 120 120 l OOp
Morphine , box . 240 240 100%
Sulfadiaz1n6, pkg . 600 600 100:'
Band&gG , plaster of paris, ctn. 720 720 100%
Dressing , first - aid, large, ell . 480 480 loo~
Dressing, first - aid, SJllC!.U, e ... 1,440 1,440 100%
Blank~t, wool, OD , bU . l dv 180 100;0
Litt er, foldl.ng , lll w.unw.l, ea. 00 60 l CXYp

P£RC",n"GE OF fGCOVERY Or' GLIDili rthSU? e LY 1'Oi< D f 1 100»

- 1 ­

ANNE.X NO . 7
E
•
 , .
(,2) ";r\e nundr ed t'W GntJ-o~
(by p., rachute)

, ; .,cl,it1';.;c.,.,ioSTffi

PCT rCT
lCD RCD
Rations , . type "A" iJ",4OO 3, 480 24 ..1 2 , 3bV 1, ,00 63 . 5
Gasolinl:!, gel s . 1,260 125 '1 .9 200 100 50 .

Dl 1I ," 17 . D". 11
.. II 56 . 0

Battery , IL.-3 7 300 o 0 75 o o

Bett .;ry , BJI.- 38 500 o 0 125 ' .. o o
Batt_,ry, 8....-39 50 0o
Batkry , BrI- 40 50 0o
Bntt£ry , BA-41 15 o 0
Bat t :.ry , 811.-48 2$ 29 100 , 5 o o
Bc.tt ... ry ~ BA-~ 50 o 0 20 o o
Battery , 0 ..,.- 30 500 o 0 100 o o
8att~ r'y , B..-70 5 o o
"_ir,; , i,- 110 on 00- 4 (Lli l ... s) 45 11 24 . 4
~,irc , ~' -130 on Dr- 4 (clli::! s) 30 8~ 2H .3
,lire , ;11- 1.30 on
Ilt- B (ulil dS) 5 5 100 .
Radi o, SCR- olO 3 1 .3
Radi o , SCR- JQO- n 3 o 1 o o
Radio , SCR-536 16 o \J 4 o o
R~d io , 3Ot- b94 3 o 0 1 1 100 .
Mino D~ t.~ctor, SCR- 62 5 4 o 0 1 1 lDO .
T~laphone , E~8 -B 15 o U 1 l' 100 .
Switchboard, BD-71 1 1 lOu .
S\~ i i:.c hboard , · BD-72 1 1 100 .
Mast Suc tion , MS - 49 10 o 0
u.... s t Saction , US- 50 10 o 0
lA..:i.ntlln21lCll Equip ., liE- 53 1 o 0
B.:t t ... ry , B.i- 2 2() o 0
Battl".r.:r , &.-23 10 o 0
Batte ry , BA-27 10 o 0
Coil, C- 161 2 o 0
Tcl ce;ra.::>h, TG-5 1 o 0
T3.g , 1£- 72 1 , 250 o 0
Conv~t cr , L.- 209 2 o 0
1!65SugC Hook, M-.110 200 o 0
hue, ftL- 27- n 1 o 0
i«,.;,;l Equ..i.pm... nt , CEo-II 2 o 0
Crank, CG-4-", 4 o 0
Tap. , TL-83 50 o 0
Tape , T1- 94 25 o 0
Cliinbor::J, LC- 6 1 o 0
-.TC9 I E.q.npt.ll3nt , TE- 33 40 o 0

Flashl.lght:, l'Jr.122- n 50 o 0

Lamp; Lll-35 100 o 0

Gl ov ae , LC- IO 10 o 0

Test Sot , I - 56 1 o ti

Tast EqlJipml.! nt , 1 o 0

PF.R~NT,\GE OF SIGI4l\L E.~UIPi£.JJT Fu!.COVEilliD

pz. 1I ,~ u 9. 4 Dl 11\ II

CktI:t,,,,~<;1
, Call.ber . 30 Ai> 8 clip 1<lU,000 0 0 24 , 000 21, 000 87 . 5
Carbine , Cal .30 427, 000 41, 664 9. 7 93, 500 53 , 7~ 57 . 5
Cal . . 30, AP, 5 clip 30, 000 0 0
Cal . . 30,oall- AP, c t n . 20, 000 12 , 000 f:iJ .

Cal . . 30, tracer, ctn/ clp 15, 000 15, 000 100 .

•
1,500 1, 500 100 .

•
,
;
,

ordnance (Cant lrl )

j
• > DZ "W
11
~
, DZ It A"
Hfl' ill.!!' peT 1J.fJ: HIIT PCT
ITEM DEL ReD RCD DEL RCD RCD
cr l. . 30, t r r-.cer J hP be l t ed 430,000 93,000 21.6 120,000 80 , 000 66 .7

3~l:1~~~wlt~
Cd . .4 5, S?rJ nnd Pi s t ol 133,000 66 ,600 50.
e,1. . 50, IIP-}-T (2- 2-1) 31, 000 ~6 , 710 86 .
370Cl. Grul , SV
37t'J:1. , HE
37!!'..I:I C"llr.ist er /
57m:::l , ER. SABOT
57crn , HE
360
180
60
·.240
600
64
0
0
240
352
1 .7
9
100 .

58 .6

11
60mm Mortar, HE 5,850 IJ 07 ~', 18·4 1,350 900 66 .7

6 0mn Mor t ...r , Ill . 234 3.4 54 54 100 .

81!ll!3 lI\'ol't~r, Lt . 2 , 700 ;: ,;,:' 83 .4 606 300 49.5

81m~ Mort"'r , Hv . 540 5':'0 100 . I II 60 54.

Blr.tn S::!ol-::e 162 162 100. 33 33 100.

75nM Ho~ . HE , M54 1 ,680 500 29.7

7S!:'.;, Ho,:/ . HE , ~i48 1, 200 505 42.

75r.1tl HOll . £IRok~ 144 0 0

1 ~t;:1r1l Rot,' . HE , !.t 54 310 353 44.1

~::-::I:pj HOH . HE, :~8 540 0 O.

1')5.rJl How . t:r.loke \.t. 100 0 O.

'!O ~tml He'."l . AT / l 160 0 o.

~~ckct, HE , ftT ~. 1,900 1,419 74.7 240 100 41.7

\',.r enf'.cle , hnnd, fr ".g . 7 , 200 2 , 275 31.5 1,200 900 75 .

Grenree , hand, off 3,600 0 0 600 0 0

J t,;-rcn:-de , r i f lo , I'T ~
Gr eru:.de , r i fle , fl· ~ g .

2 , 470
1,000
250
150
10. 1
15.
260
100
.210
90
80.8

90 .

Gr enr-,\e , rifle , smoke 500 140 28. 50 50 100 .

Sjgnal, I.C, AN, (3 color.) 300 0 O. 100 0 o.

Cr rt. rifle , gr ennde , ll/:J 2;000 0 o. 200 150 75 .

C l't, rifle , g r enr de , rAJ 200 150 75 .

r CI'rt. !'.UX . gr enr.de , r:t7 200 0 o.

PERCEIIT.'GE OF iJIMUNITION RECOVERED DZ " FI1 32 .7 DZ II l~ n 64 .4

.r";JDIChL

Dextros e , bt·l . 120 }C 25 . 18 6 33 .3

Sod , C i t ~a~~ , box 40 30 25 . 6 4 06 . 0
S lll fan11<:.r..:itie , box 160 40 25 . 24 8 33.3
\l ster, ch::t , J box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100.
Pls&llla, pkb '
Band~ge, g~u ze , box
=40 60
10
~5 .
25.
36
6
12
6
33 .3
100 .
Cotton , ;'. ;.3orbent , pkg . 240 60 25 . 36 12 33.3
Plast er , a:1Ilesive , spL 160 40 25. 24 8 33 .3
Spli nt , bc a~INood , s e t 60 10 16.6 9 9 100.
Splint , Ar-=u' 1.e5 ~ rUng 40 10 25 . 6 2 33 .3
Splint , vH.:-e , ladder , ea. 150 30 2u . 15 15 lOU •
.!''':1;nto thal , s C'dium, box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100.
Alcohol, ethyl, qt . 2 0 0
,~l coaol, denat ur ed, pt. 12 1 B.3 6 4 66 .6
l:.or imi ne J box 125 30 24 . 25 d 32 .
Sulfadi azine , pkg . 225 50 22 . 2 :;4 20 58.8
Bandage , pl ast er pariS 40 10 25 . 6 6 lOU .
Dressing , f l.rst - a:;.d , large }CO 70 23 .3 45 16 35 .5
Dr essl.t1g , f~ r s t - ai d, small · 960 240 25 . 156 48 30 . 7
.Glen1tet, v.oo1 , 0 . 0 . 120 30 25. 24 6 25 .
Litter , f ol di ng , aluminum 40 10 25 . 6 2 33 .3
SplJ.nt , ¥Il.re , gauze, roll 50 10 20. 7 0 0
T;"RCFJiT. GE 01' li;LDIChL E\(J'".JY!ffiJT itECOVEiiZIJ
DZ II •• " '<3 .1 DL. u.ro ll 52. 2
Crl"J,lIC. L ;u\rtF ..utE

Dttt~SSifltl: 3
Grenade, nand, smoke, He, Md
;:;'r.mRde , hand , inc endl.sry, AIJ- 14
Grenade , n&nd , siooke , uP , 1:- 15 t'
- 3­
 ,
".

C ~emical Warf are (Cant 'd)

M.IT htlI' PCT

Dl1. t!Q.!l RCD

Grenade , hand , sMoke , co l ored , ii-18 , orange 12 12 100 .

Grenade , !land , smoke, col or ed , !.i- ld , gr""en 6 6 100 .
Grenade , hand , smoke , col ored , !.- l d, r ed 6 6 100 .
?ERC::"''-t.,.·Jo\~ OF CH4.iICAl. r.J\lt.FArtE ~i.! I!Jl£lJ'i' tt.:;CO/.cltill - 90 .
El:Gn~ mt

ComfXlsit icn J 0 - 2 250 250

100.
Caps , blasting , spec ial , non- el ectr ic <5 o O.

louse , bl ast ing , tim~ , (1<X) , roll ) 1 o o.

r"use , lighte rs 25 o v.

Prima--cord (100 ' roll) < o. o.

Eags , sand 500 o (j,

P J'C:>iiT~GE OF EtIGIllEiil< EQ,hPW:llT l<ECOV£HED 16.6

PlliCE/lT;,GE or' Jili)OV ",H Ql, rt£SUP?LY ,.0., D I 1
Glid or r .. >1.. 1:1 - 100'-p
PrCht . N "; ll~ 'i,l y - 39 . 6'p
b. D f J
(1) Tni r ty-five ( 35) C-47 pl anes t o DZ u\ , n (By Parachut e)
,lJnHT!;rl;.iAS TErt

.wr ",,'I: PCT

DEL RCD .teD

.1ations , t y pe "K" 9, 120 216 2. 4

3~s J vlr.y l 285 30 10. 5
r-"'CiliIT.GE QUARTEl!lJASTER 1~ RECOVERED 6. 5%
•.iED1C.L
Dlankio t s , woo l , 0 . 0. ~ J 700 600 22 . 2
Litter s , f olding 272 120 44.1
Bundles , Ji sc . tiedica l sup~ lie 6 12 5 41. 6
J 5.9%

Radio J SCR- 694 4 2 50.

?::JlCj,}jTAGE OF SIGNhL 1TEloS RECOVERED - 50"
PEHCl'lIT;,GE OF ,,~COVl:l<Y 0;.' rtESUPJ'LY FO" D f J
Parac hut e r e su ~ply - 3O . ~

c. 0 f 4

( 1) Thir t y (JO) C- 47 planes to Ol " .. ". (By par,cnut e)

1/U.utTcllM.>ST.:R

1} , 96O 4, J2O 30 .9
PEltCElI'fAGE OF RECOVEl<Y OF ,tES Ul'J'LY FOJ< 0 f 4
Parachute re s upply' - 30 . 9 ~
d. D /6 I
(1) Four (4) g lider s CG- 4- A t o DL. cr., II .

•
- 4-

,
• •
f
• SIGj.jhl.
•
nl!T ",: ,:r PCT
D.c.L ~ fi CD
Il.re, ' :- llO-mi . 20 20 100 .
R'\dio , SCrt- 536 I. 4 100 .
h-'3.' li o , SeR.­ 6I0 2 2 100 .
?3.dio, &CH.-6,. 4 4 4 100 .
~ att ~rie s , BA-30 1, OW 1, 000 100 .
Ba t.t er i e s , Bh- 39 150 34 22 . 6
oatt e rl. ~s , BJ~- 40 25 24 90 .
':)att,; r i as , 8j~- 70 100 72 ,/2 .
:-!o.. ssD..!:.e Boo1.. 5 , l:J.­ 210 300 50 10 . 0
-'rape , TL·-83 l Ou l eO lOU .
1'ape J 'rlr94 100 100 l uv .
Fle::.s nlight, TL-I U -~~ l uO l VO lOU.
P-=..."'l.CbhT•.GE or' SlGNhL E.-,!U IP~T ~ OV1!HED ~3 . 9~
ORDN/liCE
Gun- Stlb- l.18Ctlinc , liAl 15 15 lOU .
w,rter, 6Omm, l!2 2 2 100 .
Launcher , gr e.'1.ade, 1J7 8 d 100.
Launchor, gr el.111de , we 5 5 l OV e
:;loth , vd_ping , Ibs . 200 200 100 .
:'atches , ~otton , ~ 10 l.() 100 .
Pwadl ator, 1/4 t on truck 4 4 LOO.
Kit , tira r epair, cold patch 6 6 100 .
RLf I e , U.S. Cal . . 30, Yl 20 20 10 0 .
l'EitCEi'oJ'1'.tGE OF ORDN;l,ICE ~ IPllliNT RE~OVu{£D 100%

e. D f 8
(1) Thirty- four (34) C- 4? plane s to DZ Irion • (By parachute)
OltDNnlICE
75.iIl!:l How . a.rMiW1ition 2, 800 1, t>OO
?El!Ci:riT.Gl; Of RESUPPLY rl:>C0VEltY FD.i D f s
f. Percent age of r~ c ove ry of resupply for entire operation .
Gl, der Resup"ly - 95 . 9~

Prcnt . Hesu~p ly - 41 . 4~

2 . rlQY r esupply recovared by units and not de liv er ed to Dlvision d~~ps are
not lIlcludcd i n t otals as figures "Ie re not r eporte d .

3. Tne r eport is a clear indic ation that glide r r esupply is considerably

more effective as practically 100);. of t hIS co ntent ~ of ,;11der s was r ecov ered .

4. The last r esupply by air on D I 8 t i \d S tho bost g aug~ on effect i veness

of p arachut e r es upply . Accordirl6 to report s from tho r ear base , tnirty - four (34)
pl anes ~1~t h six r~ck loads and t hr ee door loads uach \'Ie r e delivered . hl l r ack
loads VH.. re dr opped in a very smal l area and we re re cove red wl.tnin a feVl hour s. No
doo r l oads we r e s een comifl6 down. Tnis i s eit h ~ an indication t hat tne door loads
¥ler e disc hur ged far from t he t&rget arca or the door loads we re ac t. ually not l oadod .

5. H~ s upply by ParachutoO c ould bE; effcctlVoJ if only rac Y. loads "Jere use d and
all pl anas di schal'Ged t il..::i r loads oVt:r t.he idontifl.cation marker s on t he &round .
:' t. i s be lieved that door l oads snould not normally bd used as i t causes too great
b. dl.sp;:'lrsion of s upplie s and might enable th ~ eneJIV t o obtain a v6ry ru.gh perc<Jnt agc
of t he tot al s up) ll. ~s dropped .
- 5 ­
 HEAo..tUA.~'lElt ::' 1013T nIrt&k.I\1. D:LVISIUN

Offl.ce of t.he D~vl.sion Corrlaunder

"
f APO 472, U, S . Army
15 Oct ober 1~44

Purticipation of the 101st Airborne Dl.vl.sion i n

t ne pe riod D - D .;. 10 ~

TO COl!mandbg General , Fi rst Allied Airborne l-!,;llCi~ ­

(Tnr u Commanding Gene ral , XVIIl Cor;>s (~)

1. nle attached r eport on Operation r.LlliKE.T prepared by Brigadie r General

G. J . Higgins is forwarded approved Wi th the followi ng comm~ nts .

2. EFF~CT OF THE DAYLIGH! OttOl' ON OP:a.AT !q.!. l.iAPJI.ET . ~eration ltUtl~h'T

di !'fered f r oo. a :"l ot-her Air bo r ne operations and exercises in the co..lpactne s s and
accuracy of the D da.y landings . Apart from t he navig ational skill and steacil.neS5
under fi:"e shown by Troop Carrier pilots , t he factor contrJ.butl.ng most to t his
ac curacy was the decision to s t ag e the 0p sl·ar.. ':O!'l. in daylight . Daylight allo'lled
the operation to be put on successfull,y ;:...t }, l:I. lllinimum of preparation . Th.ere ~.as
no s pecial point i ng fo r Operation i.iAn};,ET on the part of All'borne Troops wnere.:~s
a full-dr ess re hearsal V'Jould have been indispensable had tne operat.ion been l.n
darlmess . Daylight simplified the marshalj"in~ and pilot&6e problet:lS of Tr oop
Carrier C~Naan d as well as the assembly of Airborne troops on the g round . The
r apidity of this assembly permitted the accomphsnment of the l.lll.tial Gr ound
misslons on schedule . Because of the accr.ring advantages it is felt t hat consi­
de rable boldnes3 is justl.fied in choos i ng d<\)'light rl:l.tner t nan darkne ss f or an
Airborne operation if, as in ....ARKET J the enemy is on t a e run and air suprem<lcj'
co;r.plete .

3 . RJ..TE OF BUILD- UP OF THE 101ST 1I.ntBOrli\E DIVISION. It re~ui r ed seven

da;y s t-o bril16 in a ll toe Airborne eltltne-nt s of the l Olst Airbo r ne Dl.vision . Dcri ng
this time the Divl.sion was obl iged to protect the landil'lg field wl.th considerab le
f or c es while c arrying out its grou."1d missions . Tnis requirement for landi n& f:l.e l d
pr otec tion r educed the strength available for t ne essent ial tasks of t he Oi vision .
This inevitable dlversion of st.r eflbtn :LS a factor which lnust be borne in mind in
ass igni~ missions to an Airborne DiviS i on .

4 . TROOP CARnD.R riL?FtESENTATI0:-i I,)U Trlh GkOUrID . General Higgins in p arat;rajJh

4 f comr,IEmts on the n eed o f a...'1 Air Force control unit. on the g lider iiele . T1,is
would nave been nost useful l.n 1-JJiKET alld sho uld not be overlooked in f utW'e
Airborne operl:l.tions . A Troop Carr l.er officer on tne g round could nave raci oed
back local weather conditions and exercised air t.ra ific control . Also , hQ could
have relayed the latest L.' lformation r egardi.fJt; the tactical situation on the
ground, t .IUS preventing air format i ons fr om flying over a b att le in progres s .

5 . CC'lS'IR LCTI ON OF LJUt DnlG S'!1<I?S. o.- J~ . ion J.1J\rtKBT included plans for the
r onRt.ruction of landing strips t o bring in . l' t rWlsported units and supplies .
This was never possible beca USe of enemy a.ct.ion ad jacent to t he narra." corridor
a long th e E.indhovcn- Ar nhem nighil B\{ and the absence of ade quate t r oops to cl ear
and control the nec essary landmg fi eld ar~a . As t he 3ituation. is alw,\:,s going
to be extreme~ uncertain whenev er Airborne t r oops land b~hind hos til~ lines ,
the construct i on and protect ion o f a landing field does not ap~6d r f easible withou t
an entir e Airborne diviliion wit h the sol e mission of securing the field .

6 . Ant ltESUPPLY . Operation Wuil\.t!."T provided valuab l e le sson s in air resupp1.Y .

At presQnt, th e data are not comple t a so t hat concl~sio ns are tent~tivc . nowever ,
it Wa3 a.'llply ~rovo d that slider r esupply is much l!Io r~ ~rfi c1en t than supply by
parachutl:..! . The lat t e r was only about 50~ effective and would have been inadequate
i n it:l' elf t o main sin t n~s Di vis.lon f or any cOllsiderabl e pU rl.od . Exper l.E<nce in
Op{;ration t.tARKET er.tphasize~ that air r es upPly r e~ins an emi;rgcncy fOC:t hod \'lith a
l ong way t o go before it can be r cl it:d upon to supjJort Ai rborne troops 1..!1 nU'iIOer
for an l..nd Q finl.t~ period . .
 7.
-

GROUND O?EllATION3 01" T:-tE lOlST ADIDQtNE DIVISIOIL The witial ground
::dssion of tha Division Nquired its disper $ ion in thr ~c ar...:'1S &lOfiJs, a corr ido r
about f1ft&e n miles in l engtn . This dispos ition made the rtirbol'nt. troops weak
at every critical point 4nd made' necessa ry tho t.lost cnor,sc tic sniftiflt, of troops
to moet the numerous threats as t he} dcv~loped a long this l ong corr idor . Had
anything IGSS t h an a superior parachute drop beon rcccivodd t.h~ I . ss i on Cli;;ht ,.ell
have failed, wholly or in part . As it was , tne issue hung in c. nice ba.lance on
sevc.ral occasions b..f or", t he Airborne tr oops r.:.stored th e sit uation . TOl;;. cxporl­
onc e gai ned by the Di'/1 5ion gav e r on~wed fo rce: to the oQlviction t ll;"'t. an hirbornc
division i s capable of ex er1.l.ng e. st..r0rl6 e: f f or t in but a sin~l CJ 0 ir ection &c a
given time .

- 2 ­
 .~ ....... •

•
'
HEADQUARTER& lOlST AIRBOrn,,; DIVISIOil
Office of the Asst. Div. Comdr.
APO 472, u. S . Army
12 October 1~44

SUB.BCT: Report on Operation dARKET .

TO Cor.unanding General, l Olst Al.rbol'.•l! Divis l.on.

1. GEUuf.." L : In accor da.'1.r::e ;dth verbal instructions Comrnandind Gener<..l

lOls't i,irborne Division , t he fol2.owin~ report on tlle participation of the l Olst

Airborne Division i n Operati on ;.!Alti\=.T i s her eby subJutced . This report cov er s

t he operations of the lOls~ Al.rborne Divisl.on frorr. D to D I 10 incl us ive (Sep­

t embe r 1'1 to 27, 1944). T'ne r eport. i s divided into tilree par ts : First , the

oovement of personnel ailel equipment f r oti. the UK to 'Lile combat zone in a parachilte

ec helon, · a glider echelon, a'1d a seaborne eche l on ; second , t he t acT"leal ope r ations

of t he Divi s~ onJ and units thereof, fr oo the init ial l anCing by paracnute unt il

D f 10 inc lusi ve , at. which tL"!'le thf::! ta ctical s i t.Llation beci:uile luo.re or less s ta­

bilizedj and thi rci, ~e neral cormnents 00 vario.us o perational and adruinistl'ativ e

matte r s peculiar to. an airborne oper ation .

2. Il:lVEOiElIT TO COiJl.T 20$ :

a. Parachute Echelon : To:. parach..tte echelon of t.he least Airbo.rne

Divi sion consisted of 436 C- 4? transpo rt plane s c.:J'rJin& 50.,16 6, tsOO paraChutis ts
af the Divis ion. Fo ur hundred twent;r- fou r planes dror:-ped an D-Day, ana. 12 planes
carryini: Batte r; "BII, 377tn Parachute Fi eld il.rti :le~ Bb.tt.alion , ,dth 140 person­
n el and 6 guns" droppe d on D f 3 . Of the 436 planes 'dh ich took off, 434 dropped
paracilutists in a hiohly satisfactory aarL'1e r (center o.f impact H~S soone 1,500
yards s hort of th~ selected DZ in one case and abwut. J r.dles north.lest. of t he
s e l ect ed DZ in a.'lother cas e . b b oth cases howev tl r, the drop pattern 'tlas excel­
l ent and all p arachJ.tist s of t he s eri als were dr opped to. 6 ctb,:lr) . Only two plane s
failed to. dro.p parachutis ts an t ne sel ected DZ ' s , and these bo. pl&nes Vle r e shot
dawn on th e fli ght in and prio.r to r eac il.in ~ the DZ 's . All parachut.ists jwtped
from the ~e planes , and 8 fr oo one plan e ane ;:. fr oul d'lother evem. ually joi ned the ir
units ill th~ combat zona . Jump casualitc..; ., J .·O less t nan 2% of the total number
jwnped . The av er ago time of assefilbly was .!.. ... .;Llt one haul' fo r each battali o.n . All
initial o.bj ectives HeN r cach(;d prior to. da!';(fltl ss . H.ccovc;: ry o f equipldim t aver&.g6d
ov er 9 5 ~ . to'our Pathfmd <:lr p l anes precedt:d t he sel'.i al s by 15 minutclS . Three of
the plan.-;s dro.pped wi.. tnout incident on th e s~lec t ed DZ' s . One plane 'lias shot down
s eve ral miles short of the DZ in ~nauy t~rritory an.d no. inf o.rmation i s avai lable
on .t his p lane:. (For details o.f pa rachut ~ ...:cne lon, see Annex No . 1 ) .

b. Glidor Echelo.n : A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from d f::!par­
turB bas e s in thY UK aVer a period of 7 day s . S~ven hundr ed and sixty- sev e n of
these g liders landed wit llout incid ent on t h03 dcsignatf;ld Ll. Appro.ximately 5,000
man t ook o.ff fr om t il", UK and some 4, 800 eventually jo.in<3 d thf:;ir units in the
cor..bat zon ~ . Som~ 30 Gliders aN unaccountad fo r on t his date , practically all
of which are assum~d to have dropped in anemy terr1to.ry . The bJ.id er lift on D 2 t
was dispe r sed becaUSe of heavy fog enco.unt€ Tl!d over to.:; Channt:l and alo.ng the
co.ast , Of som.: 384 g lid.::rs t hat too.k off on this dat. d , only 2:>9 land ~d safe ly on
tho desiQ'latcd LZ . !Aany o.thl.! rs retum~d to the UK or lande d an the conti!'le nt in
en61l\Y or fri e ndly t" rritory. No further glioo;;:r st;:rials we re aO"om aft.l:lr D f 6,
but Sa.:10 500 p.Jrsonne l and IJss..,nti ... l equi .rna'lt ~·. e r c flown in by C-47 transport
to t h". Bruss~ls Airport and join".d thl:. ir units i n t n,j combat zon~ by D flO. (For
Qe tails of g lider e chelon s~e Annex No . 2) .

c . Soaborne Echelon : Tne s,Jabornc acholon of th u Dl.vision consisted

of 1077 pcrsannd and 444 v o;: hicle s o.f all typc1S . Thl.s eonelon loaded on D 1 and t
sail~d frem SOUTIWlPTON an D f 2. It arrived at OUA.HA B~CH an D of ), "l'lheN it wa s
divided into t .... o serials. The first s ~rial left t il<:.l beach on tht3 r.D.ornin6 of D f )
and arriv~d at BOURG-LEOPOLD an tne ev~nlng af D f 4. It clo.sed in the Division
servi'cG are a at ZON 0:1 th~ evening o.f D f 5. The seco.nd s a rial luft Q}AAHA BEACH
on th\.; eve ning: o f D f J , arrived at BOlF..G - lEOPOLD an D t
5, and clost.>d in the
Divisio.n s Ol'Vice aro a on the d\lo:;nil16 at D f 6 . (For de tail s of seaborne ecno:::lo.n,
se e An nux No . J).

- 1 -
 3. TACTICAL OPERATIOIIS :

a . The Division mis si ons called f or the seizur e of t he four hi6hway

and railwa7-bri~es o ver the Aa RIVElt ar.1 r/Illl:J-.!S VAnRT CANAL at V2.CHELj t he se iz­
ure of the high..... s.;' bti d5e over too DO:..fL1:i:L rlIVER at 5T . O~Nrl.{JDE; the se i zure of
t.hehigh\tsy b ri dg~ over the \ ilUEl..JJlr~A CANJ..L at ZON ; and th", se i~ur € of EIlillliOVEN
and the (.lain lrignway bri dges over tiw: strca-'ls in ' that city . The Di\'is~on objec­
tiv~s Wti ZO t;- 5pr ~ad ov~ r a r oad di;jtance of some fift een miles .

2.. Th<.! 501st ParachLt. & I nfantry , land ing on t\.;o DZ l s nt;ar VECffi:L,
seizod all four bridc;es withO-tt incident . Tile 502C! ParaCi1l..1td I nfantry l anded near
ZON, a nd with one batt.al i on s....i zed the main hi ,;hway brid5~ noar ST . CEDE..~iiODE .
The 506th a l so landed nt! ar ZOIi and s eiz~d too C:mal crossing , but only Gftur t he
enemy had blo'.'ol1 the bri dge . The 506th s ~iz .. d ZItJD,iOVEH short ly D.ft ~ r noon the
next day .

£. L"l an offort to s e cure an a:tol'fu"l.t e crossillt( ov er the \HLHEr..:n:NA

CA.NAL, d11d also 'to block ..:m.:;r.v~ t ra ffic bot"ec n EDmHOVEN and HERTOGEJlBGSGH , one
comp<my of t he 502d waS d~s patcf)c d to s(::ize t hd l!i c;h\'Iaj' bri dg..:; near h .~ T . This
comp:my s IJizcd and h\'!l d t he bri dg"" for a f ew hour s , but w:!s driven of!' just before
dork . The cnl:l'fl.y r ushod stro rlb r e inforcements to t his point, a.'1d h ~ ..vy casualties
w ~rG suffer e d by botn sidos in t he stiff fie:;hti ng: t~t t ook p l ace on D f l a nd
D f 2 in the attempt to secure t his crossing . Tile bridge was f ina lly blown by the
cn~ be foro it could be captured , but th~ eneqy forc e d cr~nd~ it WdS compl~tely
wipe d out .

Q. On th (; ~v eni.ng of D f 2 th ~ cnf;my made a r :1i d on th"" brid6e dt ZON

with t anks unci scl f - pr opallbd g un s. 50100 d atllug: "Ias C<.lusuQ, but the b ridge was

he ld i ntact . The next mor ni ng Gn e ne~ tank - infnntr,y o.tt ~c k was m3d~ , but was

he ld off . The 506th , ri ding Br i tish tanks , mada an att~pt t o c ut the a ttackinb

forc e off fr om. t h.;; south, but til e ~nE:!ilY held h.l:y points :lno ... v t: m.u~lly ',iithdrew

his forc os in good orde r.

£ . On th ~ mornin g of D I 5 th <1 enemy sev e r e d tn~ m'lin hishwc.y be tween

VECHEL .:lnd UDEN, and made a strong attempt to : > e iz(:: t ho t o\m of VE'::H2L and des troy
t.he bridges . All aVJ.ilabl e el&nents of t oo Division wl;l r e r usned t o the vicinity,
and us th ey arr i v ed t nr oll6hout. the d ay vIera forme d int o a t c:.sk fo r CE: under Gene r a l
Mc AULIFFE and dispose d to fi~E: t the enemy thrc~ ts . Confus ~d fi 6hting conti nued
dur ing the ont ir..: day and l at e jnto the nil;ht , with infant ry ana t.....nkS a.ttacking
fro lu s..:verul di r~c tions siro.ult<JIl<:: ous ly . Enemy jJ~ne tr ations. wer" made to within
500 yards of t h~ bridbes , but VJer e Eiventufl.lly beate n uack . Th... at tCtck wo.s r ""n":;;led
th e n ... xt morning , but tho; de ft-nsc held firtJ.ly . ToC! 2d B<1.tt alion 506t h then
attacked towards UDEN, and lIw.de cont ::..ct \litol : patrol of the Guards Armor6d Divisie»
advanCing 0:1 VECHEL froc UDEJL The em.:r.J.,Y . fo rced to "Iithd raw toward Er.P, and
the road r eopened . By dawn t ~ nex t !ilorr.::' t~ t.lloJ eneh\{ had withdrawn frOJ :I. t he
VECHEL area to th.... southeas t.

f. On th e afte rnoon of D t 7 the cOl::!fn,y attacked fr om t he northvjest ,

cut. t h~ main highway between VECHEL and ST . OBDEl.JRODE, and took up a dt!fcnsive
posit.ion astrid e the ro.1£!. 'rn e 50o, with tanks cl.ttachl.!d , a ttacked on th;,; mo rnir.g
Of D f 8 h nd by dark had driv en t he enemy frofel a ll but a portion of this position .
The next morning t he att ack was continued , in conjunction with British Armor ad­
vancing in forc e f r om ST . OEDElJHODE, E'n d thE;. r oad clGar ~d .

g . From time of landin g to D t 10 , tha dneF.lY probed t he Di vision

sector s contL~ uously, ~ d PJanY small skirmishes oc curr~ d ~ac h d ~· . De f ens iv e
positi ons , t he main h~h\'l ay , <m.d t ho br idge s ov e r the Canals and riv 0r s ware sub­
j ~ ct ad to intuTiaitt <Jnt artillary and J.1ort,!r fi r c . TU \J Cl.ty of EINDHOVEN was
heav ily bombl.ld on t hG Gven ins of D f 2 . ( Fo r i lt!d t ectic~ op>:ll' ations , see
o
Annux N . 4) .
4. GJ::N);R.\I. CO:!l!llNTS :
n- U
'II _"!; •
U ~
QJ
"'"

,g. C:>..Sualtics : Fro:n D to D f 10 incl usiVe, t he c a sualUo.)s of the WIs t

Ai rborne Divis...on were 'is follows : Killed - 373; 'W ounded - 1436; missing - 547j or
a grand tot<il. o f 2,356 non- c ffl:!ctiv es , of a tota l o f 13 , 112 who dntor dd th~ cOJJbat
...rea. (For dutail ed r oilport of cas ualtks, s ee Ann""x No . 5) .

- 2 -

•
,

g.
• •
Prisonars : A total of 3, 5L I-l'isoners wl;:r e captured by thl! WIst
Airborne Division f r om D to D f 10 , inclusive .

£. . i:::vucuction: Thcl 326th Airbornu /.i"~~~~~:~t\~¥

couba t e.r ca i n t wo ech~lons . Th e f ir st eChcl lon,
nl:l including an att <,. che d sur6ical team: arriv e.d
noon of D-Day . The second ccnclan consi s tin6 of
Glide rs, arriv ed on t ~ ~tc rnoon of D f 1 . Lrunediat€~· upon th e l anding of t he
.first. c che.lon, a t.empo r ary hosp i tal w.... s s e t up on tne s outhe rn edg~ of the 5lider
lendlr.g .1'i c ld . First casunl tit!s vli:! r e t rc<lted at 1500 and at 1700 t he f ir st ma jor
surgical op~ r at i on was pc r fonood . At. ldeO c. ho::;pi t c.l a t ZON was t ak im QV lSr and
per s onnel end .:l quiptnen t «loved . ThE: tr Ga tuh~nt of cas u 'iltie s wus ' carr-l e:o on under
very good c ondit i on3 . By 2400 D - Duy , 10 7 c<:.s .uti ti.lS h'ld be en ~vici.tttld and t r e a ­
t f::d at ttua hospita l. Upon the £'Xriv al of the s .... ccud o cnl;:lon , lit.t .:r bearer and
ambulance sections we re sent to th~ i r r -=sp~ ctiv e r eg imenta :md ev".!cu...'lt.iol1 from
r egim,Jnta l and batt alion aid s t .? tions was quite r.::.pid . By th <> rn::lr!'ling of 0 f 2 ,
conta ct was cstablishcld with thc 501st at ~~'If.L and an att ~ched p l at-f)':.:J of the
50th Fiold Hospit al wus sant to establis h u stuti on at VEC'i-IEL. '1':'13 1'7.l:r1 ;~~ dica. l
Collecting COr.l.pany establi sh>3d cont~~ ct with t h0 Divis i on :":",di cal CC'Ii'.p..:lY at 1500
on D f 2, end ip~t i al evac uat i on begun to t r~ 24t h Lvac ~~ti on P.osr ~ tal at BOU~-
LEOPOLD. DU<3 to tactice.l requirem-ents a.nd t he: li;iI'6G amount. of t! :~ ffic moving
north , littl u ...v a cuation W:lS ac compli sh<.ld until 0615 D f 3, at w n ~ c h time normal
eva cuation bdGan . On D -I 3, 30 ambulan ces ,.LOd 4 - 2~ t on tr ucks ~V tc'lC1ted a ll
avai u\ble c ases to the 24th E\l acua tion Ho spital e.t BOUHG- LEC?OLD. F:-om D -1 3 to
D -I 10, imme di a t e ev acuati on of c a s u31~ics took pla c~ .
Q. Air Suppo rt: In gen Gr a.l, r >;'1u·. ;sts for air suppor t mssions wer e
handl e d s a tis f a ctor ily by means of t he A:i:~ , . ,;ort Pe.rtr w~ich l and.;; d by Glide r on
D-Day, Bad wea.th,:: r, transmission dirt'::. ~ _ ~ s , and hiti he r priority miss ions
r esulte d in m.;:ny r .J qu(;;s ts b!;in6 r e jected or ...nable to b~ flown . (See Annex No . 6
for d etailed r eport ) .

£. . Glid e r Heception : Anticipa ting considerable cOnfUSJ.OII in unit

as s embly when a lar5c n Uliib~ r of gli ders l anded on one fi ~ld , a. Div ls;~on glider
r e ception party consisting of 5 offi ce r s and 20 enli s t ed men f r o.•1 v ,\::i.O":'s units of
the DivislDn C.?r.1e i T! wi t n the f irst glider eche lon on 0 - Da,Y . Th :"g p rty i'unc ­
tiono;: d extr eme ly well and in g r eat part was res ponsible for t il..:. r a pi ci -;l.nd orde rly
assl;J'Ublint; of unit s . Despite c ar ef ul briefin 5 , it was fouud i:aprdctJ.cable to
eXpdct $ lJ.do;: rs t o l und near prede t e r minad points or in smell al'el!.S c r f i elds . The
most prac t icable solution appear s to be to stRtion 6ili des at many points ov.:;r the
cn t ir~ l andi ng ar eC!. end h ava t hese gtI J.de s go to thd n ear ust 5li de rs wh~n tht:::y land:
ori<mt t.hem, 2nd give them the assembly point s ele cted for t he uni t. This hl\::l tnod
worked v ery we ll and in all but 5. f ew cases , units ass l;lffibl ed r api dly and without
Confus ion.

K. Air Force Control Unit: It is beli ev e d des irable to hav e a senior

officer from t he Troop Car ri er Command a rriv e with the first e cnelon of g lide rs in
a sit uati on of tnis kind . He should be provided with a r adio se t cu.p.:lble of direc1
communi cation with a control st ation at the departure airfields. In this way , he
could tr ansmit on- the - spot information as to weather conditions, t ho t a ctica l si­
tuation, end t oo g lider fi .;lds that are clo..lar for t he r e cepti on of that 6lider
lift. It i s beli ev e d th~t many plan e s were unne ce ssnrily s no t down by p a ssin5
ov er enemy held strong points , and which could have b ewn .;l.voidcQ hnd late info r­
mation be en g iven tne pilots as to the t actica l situa tion .

g. Us e of Glider Pilots: The nced for a regulr~ rly constitut ~ d t acti­

cal and c\dm in i str ativ ~ o r ganiza tion of g U,. :r pilots w ~.s quito..! appar ent on this
ope r at ion. Tn eoretic ~\ liy th,; p ilots jo ir_ ~,", ~h i;:ir t.l ctic _l organuation after
l andi ng and ope1'£.ttJ d und 03r tho;: s enio r officoJr of t ru:.t organiza tion . J;lctu a l ly, it
was impos sibl t.: fo r any one office r to control th:: lar ge nW.lbe r of glider pilots
who arriv ed in t he combat area. Tne r e vi e r.., fil."'Il1y .inst.'tnces of indivJ.du(.l pilots
l eavin6 their assign ed are ~s and di supptJaring . Glid ~r pilots we r d us~d for loc~l
protection of v a r~ous in s t a ll ations ne!1r th l;! LZ, the Divi.sion CP, and thc Division
Se rvic e hf ea , a nd in gener a l, perforued exce llent work i ndi vid u ~~ly . Sev er a.l
volWltarily joined cOOIbat tro ops and pcr tic ipa.tt!d i n ground fighting in the
vicinity . It i s bc liev ed tha t an organiz iition in which tht:: chain of COlcLlIlHnd is
strongly forg~ d is .;sscn tia l if glid er pilots ar o;: to b~ used mos t ~ ffi c ient~ in
an a irborn ~ opera tion .
 -
' -'

h. Res~ : See ffiL~ex No.7.

5 . A fin a l r eport will be submitted '(jhen the Di vision compl e te s l.ts par­
ticipat ion in the Ho lland campr~gn.

- 4 ­
•
•• ,
•• !.~
•
 ANNEX NO.4

TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISION

D -DAY

The parachute echelon or the Division began its drop at 1300 on D-1).::,-,
Septembe r 17, 1944. .The 501st Parachute Infantry, with two pl atoons 326th ~n
Airb9rne Engineer Battalion attached, dropped on two DZ':; 2

VECHEL and the other some 3 miles northwest of VECHEL.

1st Battal ion, landed on DZ "All west of VECHEL,

1500 had seized all initial objective~ which were

t he two Railroad Bridges over the HILlEMS VAART No
r e sistance was encounter ed on this DZ. The 1st on DZ tt A_l" ,
in the :vicinity of KASTE!ll., assembled and reached VECHeL by 1700. The 1st
Battalion received some resistance from scattered ene~ troops in the vicinit y
of the DZ. Scvne resistance from scattered ene1l\Y groups was en oo untere d i n i:. ~e
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the town was made by the en~ .
At dark th~ regiment was well dug in and s et ·to def end the town agains t any
e nemy attack . Ail bridge s were seized in-tact. The Engineer De t a chment imme­
diately began t he eoostruction of a second bridge across the ~fI LLI..].l.S VAART
CANAL in order to permit two-wqy t r affi c i f the situation so r equired .
The 502d Parachut e Infantry witn three platoons 326th A1rbomt:l Eng ineer
Batt.a lion att ached , landed on Dl IrB" without enemy opppsition and ull bo.ttalions
WB.r e as sembl ed by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded t o 3T. OED1~ltotOD~ and after
a skirmish, seized the town and its objective, the bri dge over the D<l~ rtIVER,
i~- t a ct. This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had the s 1 t uation
well in hand. Comparw llHH of the 3rd BatUilion ..proceed.ed to the H.l.ghway Bridge
a t · BEST; secured it initially against little enemy resistanca, but wa s f erc e d to
witndraw just before dark by reason of a stro~ endOy COWlt e r utta ck. '1'h ~ remain­
der of tht: 3d Batta lion was then dispatched to join UHI! CompaI\Y J with or der s to
s e cur e t-he bridge the next morning . The remainder of t ile Re giindl"lt went into
Di viSion Res erv e in the vicinity of WOlFSl.VINKL.

The 506th Parac hute Infa ntry landed on DZ IIcn .without enen\y opposition.
Companie s of th e 1st Batt3.1ion departed inunediatcly v;ithout formal as sl?:mbly in
an effort to s e.cure. the thr e e bridges over the HILH.i:::LMINA CANAL in t he vicinity
of ZON b~ for e th ey could be blown by the eneJOY . Sc att er e d an.ml,}' r -:;s istan co wa.s ·
e ncounter ed be for ~ re aching the main bridge and forward elements were within
100 yards of this bridge wh en it was blown by the r etr e ating en emy . ( It was
found t hat the. other two bridges had bean blown several ·days beforl?: ). The
Regiment pegan ·the . crossing of th e Canal by various ~ xpf;!di ents, and by 2 400 the
entire r egim ent was on the south side of t n~ Canal and had a bridgehend exten­
ding some 2,000 yards.

The Cornaiand Echelon of Division Headquarters jumpe d with t h~ 502d Para­

chut e Regimffit and establiShed an init ial Command Post at ZON. Some 70 gliders
ca rrying additional Command personnel, the He connaissance Pl atoon, Signa l and
Me dical personnod l, and some transportation for tne comba t units, landE:!d on t he
LZ abou t pne hour after the parachute. landings. Overall time of landing of a ll
parachutis.ts and gliders was on e and one-half hours . Comnunic ation was e stab­
lished with all e l ements except the 501 by dark on this d at e .

The 501st Para chute Inf antry continued the defense of VECHEL throughout
t h~ dsy. Communication wa s estab11shed with Divis~on a t ·0 600 . S ev ~ ral light
snem y (ltL.ii cks wer e r epulsed , but no major d ffort to r l: ! trievc t h.:.: to\1n wa s mad e.
Th ~ 1st .Batt alion of t he 502d Par <.~ chute I nfantry continue d to hol d ST. OEDENltODE
and lik ewise repelled .sever al light enemy . attacks. The J rd Bl'l tt alion of the
l 502d attaCke d at first light L~ an e ffort tQ r e tri eve th e Highway Bridgo at BEST,
but suff a red heavy ca s ualtie s at the hands of the enemy forc e which ha d been
strongly r e inforced during the night. Thd 2d Battalion via s then order ed to
a.ssist .t hl? 3rd Ba ttalion in s e; curing ·the .. bridge s. The Batt alion penetr at ed to
t he outskirts ofr BEST, but wus forceq to withdraw by heavy' artille ry J mortar,

lilEfl
-ruld SI" a1J. ~m s fire., and took up a de f ens.ive position on t he: l e ft of · the 3rd

eastof the highW~fac'r: t:C~-:fcnSDrCll iAHigl

Battalion. At dark the entire regiment less the 1st Batta lion was in . a defensiv e

~~s~~~~
1

 ,
The 506th .Pa.rachute .In.fantry , with the .)r~ ,Battalion le ~dil1gJ ·adv·anc,e d .
on EIIJP1:IOVEN ·.at fi r st. light .. ~E.l , 3rd. B att~ ion wa s held up a~ .VlO~SE!., . ~me mile
north of the city;, by determined enemv .resi.:$t(JIlce. : Tha 2.d Battalion made .8 wide
enve.lopmen~·· to the , (Jil.st o~ thtl c~ty", outfl~ed t~e enemy. d~e.ns·es, arid se¥e d
"
the -t,OW)"l '<It 1300. Con~ac.t wa s - ltli;l:\e w.i.th ;d.. ..'British. ftcconnaiss'ahce Patrol .a~ ' :
1215 nor~h of;- the .pity" ·and 'o\Ii. th ·tbe main Britisll. Forces . at 1900 just sou,t h of
t hd .city . .At : dark t he Regi..L1~nt WD, S' in contr.ol of t he .entird city 'rutd ;', a3 i l)
·position def ending. t he imp~rt~t 'bridge s in t tte ,cit,Y_w.hich· we r o. the mai,n
obje C:ti:v..<::s.
.: .
At 3.bout 1530/ 39~ 42B gliddrs c¥ ryin g t he 3rd Bat tali on of. tl'Y.: 327 t.h, .
the En ginee r .B,t..tclion, th e r ~ai n dcr of t ,he Me dic al. und Signp.l COfDpan i es ,.
e l ements of t he 377th Para chut e. Field. Artille :.';y Bat talion, and additionill supp ly
a nd administr<:L tiv e ve hiCle s ', a rrived in' th~ comb at a r e a . Th~ 3td B3.tta.l1.c.l1 of
·t he .327th was assign dd the mission of providing loca l prote ction for the 1.2 and
th~ Divis ion service are a.
,. .". ~ . ' "

, Britis~ , Forc e s , :r eached , th <3 south side. of tlW: Can:ll at ZON at, aPrr(J x~tely
2100 ·an.d iinm~dia.tQ ly b ~g an the cons~ructi on 'of a briSig03 ,. ~ross the Cunal.

.The bridge acros'::. ,thQ. Can{ll wa S compl et ed ' ,duriqg tho;) night undo at 0615
laading 610ments of th e Ho us e hold Cav<ilry and Guards Annored Divi s ion b(;lgan
crossing . The se S atrll:l l eading e l~ ents p...!.ssed through ST. OEDENliODE Cil1d VEc.;HEL
by 0645. One Squadron of t he .1 5/19 liussars V({l ~ . attached ,to th e. 5.0qt h at ~ ND!{OVEN
and· one Squadron to ..th", 502d at. ZON. . " ,.
.. .., ,. ' . . ., .
liCit qompany ..o f t h<:! 501st Wa s order~d to .send ond platoon to DL'IIT'"'.I!<H . Re port:
from this comp any j,ndi.c a~ed the dl1 !3AY 'Y"a s i n som.; forc~ .in ilnd aro llOd this town .
'Ih.; .3d BatttJ.ion of ,th e 501st was ord er e d ta.. m9V c 'from VECHEL to BERnE. and t£1ke
up a strong de fensiv e position a t . th at , p oi:.:~ . The remainder of th e 501st con ­
tin).l(;d in i.!. cJ,.osc 1[:
defens~ ,of . ,VEC~ ' and .during .the., d<:.y th 0 2d Battalion
r epuls ed · an enemy atta ck from t h e. QorthVit:st . estima t ed. a t . ov ~r 250 Infantryman .
During t he l a t e ev ening, Company ItE" was driven bacX fr'om its out pO!"it pos1tion
a bout 200 .y3.I'ds by a we ~ exe.cute~. night at~ h ck , by enemy parschuti,,:,t.5 .

First Batta lion · oi the: 502d, · conti.nue d . in the def e ns e of ST ., OEDEt'ffiODE . .

Thf;; -2d Batta,li on att<.cke d at 0600 in another . attempt to s eize t he higrrtlay .bridge
at BEST. !bis attack . was repulsed by th~ enemy . At 1415 the Regim~nt, 1~ ss .
the 1st Batta lion; rein-forced by onc . squadron of .t he . '15/19 HU,s s ar s , l cJ.lUlch~ d a
c070rdinat~d .ltta ck against the. enemy position. this att a ck Wd S very succ e ~sful
and the objcctiv~ seized at 1800. Fifte en..8Bmm. guns. we'r e ' destroye d, 1,056 .
prisoners taken, !Jll..d ·.over·.300 . enemy · .deud laf,t on . t.he . .fi~ ld after this battle'.: ~,.
~

The sQ6th P.urCichutc. Infant"ry' · ~·stahlishe.a , strong point; ~ast and we.st
of EINDHOJEN and 'c ontin'ued eXt ensive patrols with the squadron of the 15/19
Hussars a ttache d .

A third ' goUder lift began to ~.iv e . at , about ' 'currying the 1st and 1460
3rd B<'.tta1ions of the 327.th, thg Blst .Anti.- Tank Battalion , th e . 377th Parachute
Field Ar till c'r y 'a.:J.ttplion (lc.ss Battery . IIBtI),· and the :9t>7th and 321st Glider
Field Arti llery Bat t ·a lions. Due to log. .enco.tintered. enrou'te~. only . U..portion of
tnese Wl).ts a,rriveq. E1 emen~s of t~.~ 327~h. we~:e, gi v'e'n ' t .he .mission,' of ,protecting
the glider ,landing field :and ~si.~ti~ ~h e at.t a ck pf the 50.2d i f ne~ess·ary. At
about 1700 enemy tanks ,we.~e r epor,ted approaching Z.oN f:rpm the soutl').c.a st .and i:1
f",w minut.e s· later sever~ l .·tan,k,s apPl"Pach~d. ~xit.bio. ..a·, fc~.. hundre,d y a rds. of the ZON
bridge dnd shelle d .the .b~j.9.ge, .tb .I1 , ,D1vi~0l:1, cp:, . pnd, .. tlf .. ~rnm . , Little damage iias
don ", and ·the . tanks,..w.itharew when . AT guns , arriYed fran , tne gilder lending fi eld .
'!Wo t.3!lks we re knocke4 .ot,lt, by. AT, fire. :, . . . ' .. ....: . ..
,. , .'
.
. , ..:,..;
..
DIJ .. " ; : '.:~' : ...' , ~ . " ..
' .1 . : ':, ' . .. ., .. ....j : :' ~' . ' , ' :. ,

Division Co1lll'l'lC.l'ld ' Post moved to ST. OEDENR~ a t 1200 .

.,.
During the morning, t~ 1st Batt alion of the 501st atta cked Dnd seized
DINTER . Four hund r ed and\·trworrtY. ·pr'1s·orr~rs~er:e. t'a}ren .in , this action. Th.2d
, . , .. , . ' " .. '
I

 •
Battalion continued a cleGG- in de f e nse of VEa-IEL. Tho 3rd Battalion conducte d
extE>.n sive p atrolli:tg to the n ortn and west fran. a strong point at ElliDE .

Th~ 1s t Battalion of th e 502 d continued t he def ense of 3T. OEDEloffiOD3.

Dp.ring the aft ernoon tho 2d and 3rd Batt .3.'_ .. 5 w..:r e ora .;;r ed to proceed to 5T.
OErEN!-tOllE and t he Rl;;siment c harge d 'Wit h t. ,~ a:.:i";:,nsc of tm, ST . OEDEJ:B.Om:: a.,--e 8 .
By 210-...1 thc £ntir"", l-1.egiment . . ias closed i n the area and had t aken up strong j

def,,":l·'1 iv.., positions .

During t he night the lst Battalion of the 506t h was order ed to procee d to
ZON in ord ~r to as sist in t h.e def ense aT t he ZON brid,se against t he <:lx pcct od
enemy at\.s, e,;k . Tt:.e E.:\r.t alion wa.'1t into position at 0600 and in conjUnction with
elem..:nts 0 t he Is":' Ba·~:'ilion of t ho:; 32'"/t.n and one company of th~ 320th EngineL rs,
r ~p ~~ 11ed t h!.l att.e;ct< on t n,;: bridge lawlcllcd by t Ile.. l07th Parlzer Brl.gade at about
0630 . 'rh~ 2f~ Ba t t alicn of tne 506th, ridi~ tanks 0 .... the squadron of the 15/19
Hussars , attack )o. tho; en~ roar aud i:l sharp eng agcffi.. . nt t ook place at NUNEN .
The 31'd Battalion of too 506th r emaine d in EINDHOVEN as Rl:lgiiuental rlcservc . A.t
0900 t h;:, 44th Arr.:ore ci }b gilllent was attacned to t ho Division and proc Eed6-d toward
HEI..l!ONU i.Tl a f urther attempt to d es troy t he am.my attacking t he ZON b ridge .
Int ermittent t ank and inf<>nt ry fi ghting took plac ~ the r emainder of t he day .

Th e 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 327th r &licv<3'd t it:; 502 d of th e def ense
of th e s ect or east of ZON and the landing zo nu and Division servic e area . The
321st Gli der Field Artille ry BatAilion was attached to t hc 327th and fired
mi ssions i n support of that unit dw-i ng the day . At 1500 Batt..;ry uB u of the 377th
arriv.::ld by parachut u and joined its Battal::..on. Tne 377th then mov ed to ST .
OEDENP.ODS in support of t na 502d Parachute Infantry. Bat t ery HAn of t he 81st
Anti- Tank Batta1.ion was attached to t he 327th an d Battery nc n to the 502d .
Batter:J nBn r emained in defense of the ZaN bridge .

Toe 1st Battal ion of t ha 50lst cr Os{i-.... d t nG WIllEt.S VAART CANAL in th e

early mor ning at I-rFJ:.S', HJK and conducte d ~ ," " Isive patrollin,s: during thl;;! day . At
1845 an a ttack Vias i::.ad.! en S:;:fI JNDEL ami trw nOl"th\~est s ection of 'th a town was
s ei zf..ld 1::I.t appl'o.:u.ll.at cly 2215 . The 2d Batt alion r emai ned at VECHEL. The 3rd
BattiJ.l :'on (:loved a t 1745 to tile west. and cut tne ST . OEDENrtODE - SCHIJlIDEL Head
in t he vicl.nity of t he rail r oad station .

The 502d Parachute Infantry, ...with the 377th Parachut e Fi eld Artille ry Bat­
talion at tached , continued to expand its defensive positions in t hu ST . OEDEk~ODE
area . US" Company of th~ 1st Battalion received a strong ent!lllY attack irem the
northwest i n t h~ e arly aftC!rnoon, but h<.: ld its posi tion .

The 1st Ba ttali~ n of t ,le 506 th continued i ts de fens ~ of the ZON bridge .
'!he 2d Bat'Lalion worki ng with th ~ 15/19 H... ssars and the 44th Tank Regiment, at­
tacke d t he enemy n&ar NEO&H,\iETl'EN . The encmy witndrew in th<J fac t.! of this attack
and at 12)) cont ac t was lo st . The 2d Battalion went into a def ~ nsiv e position in
t he vicinity of TONGELRE far the night . The 3rd Bat talion was ordurod to ST .
O~DEiIlRODE as Divi s ion rte: sarve . The Regiment was given a warning order that i t
would pr obab ly mo ve to UDEN on the follO\'lin g day.

At 0300 the 3rd Battali. n of tna 500th Par achut e Infa ntry closed in the
ST . OEDENFDDE area , moving up from EINDHOVEN . At 0500 or der s wora receiv ed
that this b a ttalion, as well as all other cl em ents of the r egiment, would move
to UDEN '.vi thou'L delay. Uovemun t was to be by motor and marching . Th e 3rd
Battall.on b..;gan its move to UDEN J by marchin tS , at 0900. Th od 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their mov eme nts , piec~ealJ as transportation be c am~ available
during t he day.

The advanc e detachment of the 506t .., consisting of approximat e ly 150

offic ers and m ~n frcrll rtegir.tental Headquartlolrs and othe r units of the r egiment ,
passed through VECHEL at 1000 . I mmediate ly after passing through the enemy cut
tho; fJa.J.n highway between VECHEL and UD~J, and this detachment bcc8fJle isolate d
in UOEN .

- 3 -
 ·s
Tho l07th Panzer Brigade , after withdrawiq& ~its ~ attack on the tON
bridge on D I 4 , moved unddr cover of darkn es s to ERP, and in t he latc morning
of D I 5 launched an all- out attack to s~i ~o th~ town of VECHEL and destroy the
bridge s thr.:re . Enel!\l~ forc e s in this att a.::J ~ ·.:c r ~ €:s t imated as t hNG battall.ons
of 5 5 troops, suppo rt'_d by 30 to 4D tank s c.nd artil le ry.

9y 1200 , thoJ 2d Battc.lion 501st astrid~ t h~ VECHEL - mP Rood, was being

hard pr e ssad . Additional t roops w.;;r<:; started tOh ard VECHEL ana Ge ndral lk:Auliffc
was placod in comrnand of troops in the area and cnarg~d with d£ifansc of thQ town
and bri dges . At about 1400 enemy t anks cut tn!J nighYlay nortu<.!ast of "JECtiEL and
d€s troyt,;d t r ansport parkbd on th.., highway . . Batt ... ry 11 Bn , Blst AT Bat.taJ..ion,
arriv ~d at the s ame tim!:> , ;Ient. into action on t:1 " hignHCI,Y c-J1d i.mru..:cii.lt ...J.y d.::s tr ­
oyed a Uark V t~~ l eudino th~ at~ack . Tno 2d B~tt~lion 506 t ook posi t ion on
t n.Co l e ft Ol the 2d Battalion 501, 'lith tnIJ 1st B...tt a1ion I.iDlst Gli der Infantry on
it s l e ft . t ith t ne .3.SSi::;t CltC":' of British eo.rtil1ery g1.t.n0r ~d from th ... nighway ,
t he atti;l.ck l r o;.! BriP ll;.,.e- r ...puls;::.d by durk . At a bout 1400 .:lm.. r.lY inf.ll'lt ry , \:ith ti1llk
suppcr t, at1..a cl~ <Jd a.J trid~ tnt.> Cane l from t tl... northw(';st t ow l..rd t i) ... high'·l o..v bridge
so uth't. es ~ 0.1.' V:gcHBl. Company liEu , 506, \'Inieh W-'l,S in VB:liEL on i ts weyr to UDiN ,
wa s t urned oun d, deployed nOt.r the: b ri d6... and r opulsad th" 'llt 't uck ; with t hEl
as s i stance of e 1 er.l~ t s o f the 44th T.:ilk ttogi t:lt:nt ,

Durine; th:; c:. f t<Jrnoon t ilL. t.ln e..oy 1a Wlch.:ld rill i..ttt.ck ~u.inst t Il~ to;-1n froH!
t hf.; n orth, und w..:r~ fi:wlly halko just.. short 0 1' tn~ ruU r o<ld bn.dg", by (';cl~lents
o~ t ht. 2d Bdt ~.:J.ion , 501 , and one pl .::.t oon of Utili COIJPGl1Y , 50 6, which h_d t.tKCn up
:.:. ckf03nsiv .... pos i non th~ro .l. sno rt t1.i..... b.... .:oro .

Tho..: un'..;u.y runoYicd t hdr attad..s from t n~ south <lIld south~ ~s~ durl116 toe
l a t ,- aftl.rnoon , b ut by now n dd ~t ion al for c.; s had .... rriv ed and .... n...r.:y ~tt.<!.ck ,iliS
s topped . By dC\r k t h<:1 506 ( l ess 1s t B.1.t.t .:.lion and t h... d.... trlCn:~...nt c ut off at UDEN) ,
t he 327th Glider Infan try, t h:. Division &conncussanc<:l P13t oon, t J1...: 32lst Glider
Fio;ld nI' tillE. ry B\lU.al ion, &'tt ery liEU, Blst ,." T Satt:-J.lion, t n<.. 2d Battalion 50lst
Perac hutc Inf3nt ry, and t he First Squ adr o~ ;t.l Roya l T~k rlcgimunt had ~ rriv e d
and forClod th ~ t ask !'orc e unde r G.... no3I"nl ".' . . ! li. charg..:d with Lloldmg tht: VKCHEL
\lr ar. .

In tho mO :ll1tifa.... th.... 1s t Batta lion of tht:: 501 i-lt t \l ckc:d at d awn :md had oc ­
c upi ,;d 1111 of SCHIJNDEL by 0915 . Sor.te 400 pri soners w",r <: t.:tken i.n t liis op ~ l' ..J. t ion .
About 1200 orders WlO: r ", r~c,J iv c d for the 1st Bht tahon to proc e",d to ·"ElBOS ~rl,
SCiZ0 thu to"....n, o.l. nd pr ov i de north~ rn f1,~k p ro tection l or VECHEL. 'I'nt: mOV <:1me n t
was compl et e d by 1700 , Qlld t he b;':l.ttal i on t ook up ci. s trol16 d uf", ns~v () position in
and around th.1 t own . Th..: 3rd B.:!.tt.. . lion, vlhi ch had adv.:ncL:d t ow:..rd $CrUJNDl:.L in
th~ j.lJ rnin ~ 6l'ld join;;!d forc e s with t h~ 1st BJ.t".) lion in s .)i zing SC:lIJNDbL, Vias
or d ~r~d to EK'tDE, wh<Jr<:1 ~t took up J. d.;: f'..;n:nv ~ POS~t..l.O:1 g uarding V ~CtffiL fr oo the
Y/0S t .

Th~ 502d Par~chuw Inf ;mtry cxt ..;nd<:d it s d.... r ,msivE: positions during the day.
Elancnts of t he 1st B at ~~ li o n m3dc conta ct wi t h th e ; rd B~t t\llion 501 south of
S CHIJNDE.L, end j oinl;l d f or c!;s in clc&lung out s ev .Jr -Jl <:n GlIl"i' s trol16 points along tne
5CHIJNDilL - 5T . O'';DENrtODE hi.hw;,.y .

'Iho 327t.h Glider Inf ,....nt ry w... s ordor t..d at 0930 to proce ed to VECiiEL, ~d
movement b <;1gan a t 1030, t h.3 3rd Batt:J.lion by truck .:md th'"- 1st and 2d Bat tJ.l..ions
by ma rching . Tn\;; 1st and 3rd Batt:).l.i ons \'I..,r u comitt..:ld on both sid... s of t nd bridg...
LnmOJdi at ely upon :-.r riv lIl; t he 2d Bat t..alion continu\.d into VE.;HbL :..od b c ci.1tn<;: t Cl.sk
f orc e r .... s crv o . Th\3 tom of VgCHEL W<.I.S hCciVily SIH.:lh:d during t h <.! l e t cl ..J'tt;rnoon
and vu rly <:v vn ing ,

..,
Soon e f l,..or demn the enGlIW l a unchod sJ'c.~:l scc.lu :l.ttilcks ag~i-nst th", aJjun- '
siv a posihons southeast of VECHEL. 1"n",$_ '.-1 ~~~ .:. :1.;:; 1~ o.! f 'td tilOut. ·difficulty. .II
DoJri~ t n.:o nig ht plans Y/~l'C drawn up Ylhicn c· . .ll" d tort Kt-British iU'ffior ed Brlg~de,
r ec::.llcd from t hE. NIJLiEGEN nl'lola, t o .ldv,:illc ... on VECtlE.L from UDlil-J , join forC e S with
t hz 2d B<ltt:J.1ion of th e 506, which W'I S to advanc G from V'.t:CHEL towc.rcl UDE."J , .::.nd
cl\.p.r t..h~ rO :ld in ord ~ r t hat til .:! flo \1 of tr .rfic might b ..., r t;stJm.:!d. }-'01lo\1in.g tha t ,
t ho ArmoNd Brigade \'fa S to swing sharply south t:.n::l cut off t he enemy csc ap ~ route
throuj;h mP .

- 4 ­
•

• •
 ) -----,

•
Due to conruuni ca t i o n difficult ies J t hat pa. rt of t ne plan c a lling f or t he
advanc l:: i n f orc e and e nc ircli ng ll'.ov e.t.lcnt o f th~ Bri t i sh Ar mor ed Brigade was not
can'i ed o ut. . '!he 2d Batt alion of th.... 506 nad1.,; con t act wi th a patr ol of t ne Ar­

hi s wit.hdr a\ial , a:ld soon the r e aftIJr cont act was lOSn"
mored Br igade nor theast o f VECHEL aoo ut l 'i\XJ . By that. ~ to", anelo\y had V"OOgun "":":I ~

•
~
• (
~ ~
I r·
.J
Dltrl.~ the nor ru.ng the ls t and 3rd Battal ions ~()16t r <Y&djfrst':;; d
t h"" i r dCl...."13iv.: posi tims we st and n or t h of EEfillE, and a t da:'k W9r~ dep~(l7ed
wi tt . . h..:= 3r1 Bat,talion gl; ne rally alont, tne ra l l r oad f rol:! th<d CMal t.o l£.:'r-f,E . and
t m 1st B...tt.aEon f r om E!!"RDE dUtl south t o th e main nig :1W417 . Tho 2d Batt.~l.1.un
co ntinu .::.d thd clost; in def ense of V3GHEL , with t ne ;::)6 6i',...n o:!l,;.nsl.v..,. mis'!ion s
to th... ncrtile3st and south . Tho 327th l'/as a ssi gned & d(:i.J!~ ~ i ,/o c;,actor nort:l of
VECH' ~ .

The 502d P ~a .. hlt. e InfantrJr con ti . ' .ts ddcr.su of ::5T . O~D.:il'JHOD£, ,dth
th o 3 77tll Par"lChl:l:d F· -:.d Art':':i.lor y Batt _ in ~l. ..~~ct. :mpport .

DiJrLlg t!lr.. ds.y OJ. .'~t.n (hid.::r s a ri al ar r l.v..;!d brillbii"ig .NI..a:i.lli l"l6 <.!l..::.:ncn ts of
t he 3L'l tn Glid6r Iufant.r~- ~ th..: 9G7th Glidar l i... ld Artilll7;:r y Ba.t talion . The se
t r oops \"I~rJ G:ov~d i mm~diat~ly to thl,.) Vbv~ art.:a , and tnu 907th f:it.ld Artille I"J
Bat ta:ion was pl ac",d in di r<Jct. s up:)or t 01' '[.:10.,: ;Ol st far a c hut~ I nfant ry . Tnc 32lst
Gl i der }'i dd Art i h :ry Batr.alion was at tac ncd to t rw 506t h Para c hutto: Infant rJ ,
and fl.r <.3:c scv;.rallJi ssltJns duri n.,; t ll... day .

At da\';n roco nnais s a nct:: as f ar as ~kP i Ud i cat o;.d ~ he c neny had oade good his
Withdrawal to t.h~ south .Jast , and th ", ar(.a \laS c l~Cl. r of en~,""Cf t r oops . '!he 506th
Parachute Infantry, ;/i th tn c 321s t Glidc r FLld hrti ll<J r y Battah on and B &.tt. ~ ry liD'
8lst AB sT Bat-t al l.on a t tac ned , wa s or d.Jr i.! d t o UO'::;'v t o t ako OVe r t ne dGf cnsa o f
t hat B.r1..la .

Tha D~ visi on Conrnand Post was !Joved f rolil .3T , O.t;DWrlODl:. t o VECtiEL at l OCO .
•
TIm 3 27th Gli der Infantr y was assigned t h ) t as k of def&nding VECHEL, wi t h
t he 90 7th Glid er Fi .-;! l d A rt ill~ry Bat t alion i n gvn~ r al suppor t. Th:J 2 d Eatt a l ion
50 1 was r .... 1Ot. s ed f r om i t s dt:f ensivu assiblu.lCnt i n Vi.GHEL and joined i t s r ct;imc nt
in t h .... EERDE are a , as ltag i..-:H:.nt a l Rt:s....rvu. Batte ry ul'. u, 8Is t AT Battalion , conti­
n ued at t uchud t o the 5Olst, wi th t h..:: 907th Glider :icld Jl.r til:cry i "!. d::"r ~ c t support

The ;J2d cont inued t ha def ense of t nu ST. OEDBN..'WDE ar..::a . :a...tt<3 ri~s "D",
liE", and 111-' ", th e Anti-a ir c raft Bat tfo:ri os of th..:! tHs t AT Batta lion, c:rrivoJd i n the
s eabor n l3 e che l on and war ,;! as si6na d t o Pl~ot ~ ~ th...: Division Sa rvicc Ar .1C:!. nortil'o';c s t
of ZOlI.

At 1000 th~ en ~ l a unche d a ser i es of pr obi ~ at tacks against ~ he 50:st

dl.> f cnsiv<J positi on , mov i nC!l: fr oo SCHI JNDEL to'·'ard h.03:VclUUG . ?wo (:OC:f'aai z s of t he
502d wert: di spat c hed t o KOEVUi,ING t o int ~r cep t thl.s fo rco , r epor t ....d ·t o C{.; t . . . o tankt
and about fo rty infantryl..!,m . Th~ ,-, n~c!y ror c ~ moved Tupl.dly , howev Er , and wer e
alClOs t in KOLV:hh I I~G wh.. . n (:Q'lI.p ani~s liD" crJ.d llri" of tll ...: 502d arriv \,;d . The two com­
pani es h..J..d KO~'lJ ERING , but roul d not. pr t..v""nt tn ~ ....ner:lY f rom c ut t i n6 th... h l.g:hYlay
northwes t of KOEVE.K II~G j us t b u!o N da rk . Under covo r of darkno:J s :; t he cnCf<W bui l t
up his f or cos vli t h tanks , self-prope lled artille r-J , a., d f a irly l!i.rl!u i n.fan try , un it ~
US i ng th e corri dor he nad found but w,;.. . n t hl:> 501st. 1.l.'10 thoJ 502d .

Dw-ing th o ni i;ht til i.! 506tn 'w ith Bat t'-r i c s uB" 8ls t AT Batt al ion, and t he
321s t GlidGr Fi.... l d Art i l l er y Ba t t alion at t acn~ d , waS o rd ~ r e d t o r~ t ur n t o V E~HEL
f roCil the UDEN aTO l:!. . j,:CN o;;tn:;nt b.;!grul at 0 300 , and at ¢ayUg ht t jl~S .... un its wc:.ro j ust
east of VEC'rlEL . At 0915 t h\.l 506 , with on y squadron 44t h noy al T~ . h"' 5irne nt
attached, "'l t tu ck cd t hu enemy at KOEV cltI UG . Tu", .... t t ack pr 06 r ds s od f~vor ablY f or
so!oo 4 , 000 yards , wh.::n bOt H at t c:.ckin6: bat t aU ons ( f ormation , 1st a nd 3rd B.J.tt..J. i on
abr . . as t , as t ri d ~ th u main FOed) wer e pi nned down by w e ll - d l. r~ c t ~ d ar t~l~ry and
s~l l aI'f.13 fir.. , m d fi r .... froln t anks dUG in ul ol'l6 t oo r o ad .. Th~ 2d B...t t:;> hon vms
t hJl ordo r ....d to cXucut u ;", \'V id e . mv lJlopm... nt of .U1 1.'l eneLItY ' s southern flo:mk , ....nd bet:~lri
i t. COVocMt ,t1400. tho.,. ont~" :1.;~ts the5otU£cfASSlll
In of
 , '

strong araored force s, beg an an advance fl'!), tne south 'tfie~ol's t and "CofJp:m.es
"orr and tf j-{11 o~ t he 502d assiatE; d by proviti:'!\, bases of "ire for the attacking
force s . By darkness t he eneqy had been clear ed fr aJ. all but a very sl.lall area
south o~ th~ road .
The 50 2d continued it s defense of t.h e 8T. OEDE1~t<ODE area, the 327th its
defense of t he VECHEL area , and the ;ellst. its defense of tne ~<DE area , All
t hree regi.L1ents had sever al sn aIl scale me.":\,}' attacks launched against their posi­
tions durlnb t.he day .

The 506th r esur.1ed t he att.ack soon after daylibnt , and by 0900 had d r iv en
the ene.uy nort.h o t' the highway and l.lade conti:l.ct with too 501st on the ri6ht. The
Br i t i sh forc es contin ued the attact{ to the north , p inchi.'16 out t,\e 50 6th and
Companies nOli and Il d l! of t he 502d . At nov tne 506 , .... it .:l at.t acru:.ent s Vias ordered
to r eturn to the UD3N area . Tu !::! I.lOVe:r..ent was cOClpleted by 1700 .

The 502d continued its defe:1Se of t he 5T . OEDbtll.'ODE area, COMpanies "0" arxl
IIH" r eturnin~ to Re6i !:lenta1 c ont rol at 1500 .

The 50lst and t he 32?t h co ntinued their de f ensive mis si ons , both regiments
r epe llillt; 5r.1al1 scale enemy a t tacks dlring the day .

D /10

l~o change in unit dispos itions . Sever-al ener.ty i nfiltrat ion attempts on
front o f 501s t and 3 27th repell ed .

, I
- 6 ­ ,

 •
CJ..SUAl!rI E3 OF 10!ST AIRB011lE DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD D TO D FLUS 10

unit YJ. ll ed
.. ,

Di v isi on HGe.dquar ters 1 2

Hq Co & UP Platoon 0 4 1
501s t Faracr.u te I nfan try 108 338 65
502d Parachu t e Inf antry 103 450 75
506th Parachu t e Inf antr y 74 304 43
3 27 th Glider l o t an try
39
137 159
40 1a t Gli der In!'anU'y
12
64 26
321s t Glider Fi e l d Artill ery Bn .
2
17 2]'

907 th Gl ider Field Artil lery Bn .

10 17 98
377t h Parac hute Field Ar t illery Bn .
1 29 4
Bl st .AS An tiai rcraft Ba t tcl i on
7 21 1n
3 2 6 th .AB :Eng i neer Battalion
13 41 12
l Ol s t Airbor ne S i gna l Compa ny
0 1 8
426 th Airbor ne Q.uarterl'l".as t or Co .
0 1 o
801st .\B Or d t :a l n t Co . 1 o 2
326th AS r~edica l Company 0 2 2

Hq &: Hq Btr y . Di v . Arty 1 7 5

l Ol st AS Reconna i ssance Pl atoon 1 1 12

TOTAL 373
1436
547

G.~;.ND TOTAL - 2]56

ANNEX NO . 5

~EClAS~~fltL
 • Air SuPport Recuclt s 101 ~ /~D~vision
Thr u 26 Sept 1944

1. 20 ~e" t
-
0555 Arl.'led Reean c:.rer Ht.:nen , Neder­
we t ten and Helmond. T Bnl~s

r epor t ed ~~nd e t tF.ck expect ed

Not r eported

on Zon .

2. 20 Se?t 1700 TRC Recan r oad fiE fr on BckG t el No t r epor t ed

t o Best and r oad E fr om. Qir scitut
to Best. Tpnks r eported moving
t 07i'ar d Best .
3. 20 Sept ~305 Bol:l.b ar ea 4~/"<'2:> s/TI t o 4£1217 ? Not r e~rt od
t o 496415 Il/,!; to £64-:;:2. (Nun6n
to EBckst r aat} . 200 t~nks ~nd
v~I,':'cl(.s .

4. 22 Sept 1102 Bo;r.b roed fro~ BClokel \,:,cs t t o Mess~e r eceived

Erp . 4 00 t ,..nks L.nd ve:hicl es . 1310 !1TLrg ct
rccept ed . Est i ­
ru'l.t ed t imt:l of
o.r r:,v'f."l t o f ollow. "
No ~ er Dessage.
5 . 22 s ept 1315 T: ,C RecJ'1. - r ev 5240 t .M..O t o Dcl~'.Yed on a cc ount
5234 t o 5834 . ( El'~ ) , Bockel l nd of weat c er . IJe
t/n of \folkel ) . ConcFn trl t ion of r ~s ult s r epor ted .
t ~nk s rnd vQr~cl as .

6. 22 S.pt 15?2 Art10d Recon r O:1d Udt.:n t o Vecbel . Not r eported .

30 t ~ nks and inf.nt ry on r o ~d .
7. 23 Sept 0610 pr mod Recon ca-et H<..uvcl , Erp , Position of our
Bocteel nnd Krt'I"nr;c. ...r. Conc on­ troops r equest ed.
tr ~tion t r nks ~nd vuhiclcs . no infor ced 1000
yd s ··fety limit.
rUssion c:-ncclled
by G3 ct :>.655 .

8. 2/,. f'cpt 0905 J\rtIcd Rec on I;'. r c( 5632 t o 5641 ~, n"lcdi:e.!on of VI er

t o 5932 t o 5941. T.,nks I'nd 1o:)c·3d:.tle . Asked
vohicles . f or r in - point
tr rgr~s . .Lr. t cr
mess"'sc. s"id oiss101
refu~cd -friend s in
"..r(;t •

9. 24 Sept 1740 Ar med Recon 1000 yd r ndius Not r t.:ported

E 425369 . T.~~s , vehicl es
r n(1 r rtillery moving P,/E.

10. 24 sept 1745 Ar med Recon r.rer. So: . . ';,1 Post poned on
recount of wor ther.
Ul!.<5) .
11 . 2 5 Sopt 0645 Armed Rt..con :-.r e ~ St . Michit:l s
Gvst el t o Sc hij n ~c l t o Djn t hbr
t o Bcrli cun ,T"nks , v chlc~s ,
: rti1l8ry r:nd infr ntr y .

•
No . Time of Request /o, r e." -r.ad N~ tur c of T. r g(.t Result s
12 . 26 Se,t 0744 Bomb wOo:'ds N of Cc.n; 1 in &r id i.skct: f or r ee'.
squU'cs 4340, 44J9 n~1 "539 , s~ok~ on t ~ r&ets .
. Iso viII· ges of Belli. 1 'nthor Could not cor-ply .
:.nd Hccs~;ijk . T: nks) 'J' hicles J Beug r, t t~ckcd ~ t
r'Itill!;;l'J' ~ nc1. infc.ntry . 1045, Civi li~ns
r oport 8 Huns
kil10d . Our ~i t­
ness c1escriof'd
v(:;hicles (~(::stroyed .
B. l ~.nc E:: of t r.r gtit s
not l't.por t ed ,

Not c-- The hour :'n the t i.""!l: of r eques t is t bb tim"" thl: moasre" \'Ir S, CknOt'16{1.gcd by
t hE: Net Control 3t~tion . The t il!ll..: of origin in m=ny crsen >'it'S much t..: xlie.r J but
e.UE: t o t r : mo:1itt.ing Aiff icul t ie~ t he NCS coule' not be r O" chat! or t he n1<.; ss:'gc. wt' s
not c 1cf:.1'ly r cc:::iv et' . I.ir .?upport oisE.ions l ll t t,r t hnn 26 Sept 0744 wor e h·'nr11ec
thru Sri t ish ch,,'nn<::l& . Our ncs closen 30 ,sept 2400 .

- 2 ­

 •
\

llESUPfLY

1 . Following is a repor t of all resup~ li ~s de l ~a

glider to the l Olst Airborne Divi sion in ojJ<.!I' ution r.iark 6~

•. Df 1
t1) Twenty-two (22) g lide rs, CG-4- l\, to DZ UtI! .

NhRT~Tfi!

",!OUNT A1iuU,)T PtRCl!1·jThGE

ITri..\! DELIVERED RECOVJillED ~COV ,ru:D

nations, t ype 11K" 7,668 7, 668 10 (1,.0

SIGliAL

Batt er.f J BA- 37 ,40 540 10Cl';b

Batt ery , BA- JB no 720 100%
Batt ery, BA- 39 48 48 100%
Battery, BA - 40 48 48 100%
Batt e ry, BA-41 20 20 l.CO%
Batt e ry , BA-48 60 60 1()(),l,
Battery , BA- BO 168 168 100%
Viire , \1- 110 on 00- 4 (J2~ mile s ) 65 65 100%
~dre , rl- 130 on 00- 4 (24 milos) 12 12 l 00'p

OlillNA!.CE

Carbine , cal . . 30 24, 0:::0 24, 000 l ClO';6

Cal . . 30, AP, 8/clip 64,512 64, 512 1()(f,i
Cal . . 30, AP- Tr (4- 1) bel ted dO ,("'00 "0, 000 100;6
Cal. . 45 , 51L and Pistol 14, W U 14,000 100:0;
601Ml Mortar, HE 1, 15 2 1,15 2 100%
8laru Mortar, (It) 528 528 100J;
i;:ili;[lICaL

Doxtrose , btl. ldO 180 100»

Sodium, Cit rate, box 120 120 100;6
Sulfanilamide , box 240 240 lO[},o
~ j ate r , di st . box 480 480 1O<J>,
Plasma, pkg. 360 }60 100~
Bandage , gauze , box 2 , 040 ~,040 l UCI,O
Co ~ton, absorb~nt , pkg . 360 360 100%
Plaster, adhEsiv e , apl . 240 240 10 0'~
Splint, basswood, set . 480 480 l 00j;
Splint, Arm;' ~ g ~ Ring, ea. 60 60 100%
Splint, wire ladder , ~a . 480 480 l00'h
Pe ntothal, sodiUl!l, box 240 24U 100-,6
Alcohol, btl. 120 120 lO[},o
Morphine , box. 240 240 100%
Sulfadiaz1n6, pkg . 600 600 100;';
Bandaf:;i3 , plaster of pc.ris , ctn . 72U 720 100%
Dres sing , first - aid , large , ea . 480 480 100'~
Dr eSSing , first-aid, small , 6h . 1,440 1 , 440 100:;,
Blanke t , wool, 00, 6a. ldG 180 100,.,
Litt ar , folding, a lW>ll.nW,l, ea . 1:0 1:0 100.%

P£aCll'ITAGE OF R.lCOVERY OF GLID;li rilllU?eLY ,'Od D f 1 100;':'

- ! ­

ANNi£X Nu . 7 tASSlfffD
 (2) voe ilundred D-~4 })lanc s to DZ 11",," end Df.. 111\"
(by

~~~ r¥.~~Tr..R

u r 1!i!."T PCT'­ , "':':T nL"T rCT

IT~: D"", «CD !i.CD D.c.L .•CD ReD
R&hons , typ e 1ti{1I 14, 4W }, 480 24 . 1 2 , 3bV 1, 500 63 . 5
Gasolint.. J gal s . '1, 260 .. 125 , ,9 200 100 50 .

?!.rlC£l·rrJ·.G::B Or' ~tJ...rtT...r"?J../IST..ili .boc.iHr..::.!Jn n.XuV&..r..D

D£ II •" 17 . . D~ tI .' II 56 .0

-SIGh'-'-'
---
Battery, Bh-37 300 0 v 75 0 0
Batt. ... t:·, Bk-38 500 0 0 125 0 u
Batt.:r;r , Bh-39 50 0 o·
Battvry , B.-40 50 0 0
Battt.ry , BA- 41 15 0 0
)'9 100. 0
Batt.;;.ry , B.-48
E:!..tt ....ry, B4- 60
Battery , B.-3()
29
50
500 °
U
0
0
5
20
100
U
0
°
0
0
Bat.kry J Bi.- 70 5 0 0
:'Ii r e , i.- liO on IR- 4 (IJil,s) 45 II 24 . 4
\ I~re, ~ , - 130 on Dr- 4 (;:til.s) JO 8, 2B .3
~,i re , :'. - 1.)0 on 00.- 8 (f,uIdS) 5 5 100 .
Radio, SCR- blO 3 1 33 .3
R.adio , seR- JOO-. 3 0 0 1 0 0

Radio , SCR- 536 16 0 0 4 0 0

R3.dio , so;,- 694 3 0 0 1 1 100 .

Mino' Dat ... ctor J SCR- 625 4 0 0 1 1 100 .

T~laphoneJ E~d-B 15 0 u 1 1 100.

Stli tchbocrd , BD-71 1 1 lOu .

Swit.chboard, BD-72 1 1 100 .
Mast S.-Jction J 16- 49' 10 0 0
M.-~st Scct i on," U:3- 50 10 -0 0
UolintonanC<l Equip ., UE-53
1 0 0 , . ..
B... ttQry , B,l-2 20 0 0
Batt(;ry , Bh-23 10 0 0
Bl!ttory , Bil-27 10 0 0
COil, C- 161 2 0 ''>
T€ l o?a~Jh J TO- 5 1 0 v
T~g, 1£- 72 1,250 0 0
CotlVlJI't",;r , L - 209 2 0 0
WSSUl;\J Hook, l4-~lO 200 0 0
..xle, l!L-27- . 1 0 0
neal Equ."i.pm... nt , CErll 2 0 0
Crank, 00-4-A 4 0 0
Ti:!pe , TL- 83 50 0 0
T~pe, TL- 94 25 0 0
Climbers, LC- 6 1 0 0
Tcc..l Eq..u.pr.1ent , TE- 33 40 0 0
Fl a.5h~ht , TL-122- . 50 0 0
Lsmp, 111-35' 100 0 0
Gloves , Lt- lO 10 0 0
Test Sat , I - 56 1 0 0
T.:st Eq...dpm..lnt , ~ 0 0

PERCENT.,CE OF SIGlI.,L E ,UL':k~NT Fu.COV=O

DZ II,," 9.4 •
. Dl ,) II
33 . 3

O<rti",~CE
Cabber . JO AI' 8 c ...ip l SU, OOO 0 0 24 , 000 21,000 87 . 5
Carbine, Cal . 30 427, 000 41, 664 9.7 9~,500 53 ,760 57 . 5
Cal. . 30, AP, 5 clip 30, 000 0 0
CaL .JO ,Dall- AP , ctn .
Cal. .30, trace r,
. ctnf p 2iJ, OOO
15,000
60 .
100 . I 500 1 , 500 100 .

4
Or dn~ce (Cont 'd) • .MJI'
DEL
i r.n'
ReD
, peT
ReD
IJ.IT
DEL
DZ "A"
PCT
ReD
C ~ l. . JO, tr:-.cer, liP belt ed 430,000 93,000 21.6 120,000 I ao,ooo ~ - 66 . 7'")""'"
C{~ l. .45, S!'.G nnd Pist ol 133 ,000 66 ,600 50 . ~ 33 ,000 10 , BOO 32 . 7
Co l. . 50 , /,P -I-T (~ - 2-1 ) )1 , 000 :-'6 , 710 86 . 1 1 , 320 1,320 100 .
37mLl Gun , SV 360 64 17 . 7 _ ~--.....-:'~
37t:t:', , HE 180 n 0 ­
J7rL-:I C"111nist er 60 o
·. 2i~O :d.u

T~r.C\~~\~\~!fl£.n

S 7~ , BR. SAM
57nm , HE 600 352
60mm. Mort ~ r , HE 5, 850 1,078

8M~'
60mr. Mort rr, Ill . 234 S
8lmn Uort :cr , Lt . 2 , 700 ;: , 253 • 606 300 49.5
81nm 'or t ~ r, Hv . 540 540 100. ill 60 54 .
81~!:l. S::loke 162 162 100. 33 33 100 .
7Sr.L"l How. HE , r.~ 54 J. ,680 500 29 .7
75t'J:l HO'it . HE , ri48 1,200 505 42 .
7Sr.m How . Smoke 144 u o
1:J5:-w.: Hmi . HE, U 54 310 353 44 .1
l:)':;;',.:"l Hon . HE, :~4S 540 o Q.
IJ:'J1I.':! How . er:'loke 100 o O.
: 05L1r:l HOi/ . ! T 160 o O.
:t ~cko t, HE, .~ T 1,900 1 , 419 74. 7 240 100 41. 7
.;-,t'tln"cs, hc.nd, fr-:-.g . 7 , 200 2 , 275 31. 5 1,200 900 75 .
Gr"~ccl", hond , off 3 ,600 o o 600 o 0
{jr cl)[ de , rif l e , I' T 2 , 470 250 10 . 1 260 .210 80 .8
Gr enr.rle , rifle , f rr.e . 1 , 000 150 15 . 100 90 90 .
Gren~ {l e , rifle , smoke 500 140 :18. 50 50 100 .
~ ignU , I.C, J<N , (J color s) 300 o O. 100 o O.
Cr r t . r 1f 1e , gr ennde, rA6 2, 000 o O. 200 150 75.
Cort, rifle, Bren"de, MJ 200 150 75 .
Cr r t . !'.UX . grenr:de , r{(7 200 o O.

PERCF.N"r ' GE OF iJ.\MUNITION RF,cOVERED

DZ fl \"! 11 32 . 7 64 .4
f';:.1H~~ .

Dextrose , btl. 120 30 . 25 . 18 6 33 .3

Sod , Ci1:: ,:t~ , bo)f,. 40 30 25 . 6 4 66 . 0
Sul fani ·.t~e , box 160 40 · 25 . 24 8 33 .3
~t a t e r, c:!t:.t . , box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
Plabrlla, 'pkb . 240 60 25 . 36 12 33 . 3
Band ~~e , g~u ze , box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
Cot t on , .ehdorbent , pkg . 240 60 25 . 36 12 33 . 3
Plaster , 2. ...1j,esive , spl. 160 40 25 . 24 8 33 .3
Splint , be~6'lioo d, se t 60 10 16 . 6 9 9 100 .
3plint , Ar ""\r Leg ~ rt1n6 40 10 25 . 6 2 33 .3
Splint , ~~:e , ladder, ea . 150 30 20 . 15 15 100 .
?'}n t ~)thal , s C'diwr. , box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
Alcohol , ethyl , qt. 2 o 0
r:l co. lol , d'-l . t ..1I'ed, pt . 12 1 8 .3 6 4 66 . 6
L:.or .t->l1ine , box 125 30 24. 25 a 32 .
~u l f adiazine , pkg . 225 50 22 . 2 .,4 20 5a . 8
B~~dage , plaster paris 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
~essins: , flr ~ t - a.:;..dJ large 300 70 23 . 3 45 16 35 . 5
Drc ssin& , f1r st - aid , small 960 240 25 . 156 4!J 30 .7
~lcnkot , wool, 0 . 0 . 120 30 25 . 24 6 25 .
Litter , folding, aluminum 40 10 25 . 6 2 .J3 . 3
Spl~nt , lure J gauze , r oll 50 10 20 . 7 o 0

DZ ",." ~J .l 52 . 2
C~Cl'o L ~ A..'lF~
Grer.ade , hand , smoke , He, Md 25
;jr enad~ , hand, inc end 1.:lrY , A.N - 14
Grenade , Iland , SIIlOks, .IP , L~- 1 5 •
, 25
12
62
12
25
- 3-
 • =

Chemical \jarfare (Cont ' d)

~~. PCT
ReD aGD
Grenade, hand , sMoke , colored , ii- lS, ora.rlge 1< 12 100 .
Grenade , "nand , smoke, colored , .Ll- ld , grt::e.n 6 6 100 .
Grenade , hand , smoke , colored , .:..- 16, r eo 6 6 100 .
?.ERc,:,:,'I ~w.. GF Cii~.ICAL .wtFJl.t(.!:o; ~i...lrl:Eifl' h....COJ.ch.cJ) - 90 .
El:Gli!E.iR
Compos1tion , C- 2 250 250 · 100 .
Caps , blasting , sp ec ial , non- ele ctric l5 o o.
rus e , blasting , tim!:! , (100 ' roll) 1 o o.
Fuse , lig hter s 25 o v.
rrima--cord (100 ' roll) < O. o.
136.6s , sand 500 o u.
p JtC31~Tl\Gli: Qf 1!iJGlNE.&.Jt E.lU .I.?W!NT r-..EC uVcltED 16. 6
PERCbilTnG" OF &J;O/utY or' rtbBUfPLY ,A., 0 I 1
Glidor r ~supplJ - l Q(Yp
PrC llt . r ~ supply - 39 . 6)'
b. D I- 3
(1) Tnirty - five (35) C-4? y. 't, " to DZ U\j ll (By Parachute)
.lUh H'~,:_.$rr.rl

...If A...!"I' ?CT

DEL kCD •.cD

t1.ations , t y pe "K" 9, 120 216 2. 4

)ae;s , vl.nyl 205 30 10. 5
."..J.c;';IIT,GE QUAHT!!lll.IASTER l TEiZ RECO/ElillJ 6. 5%
•.:EDI C;u'
Blank~ t s , wool , O. D. £,700 600 22 . 2
Litters , f old ing '<72 120 44.1
Bundles , ili sc . ~dic al s up~ ~es 12 5 41.6

Radio , SCa- 694 4 2 50.

P:ItCDITJlGE OF SIGNhL l TEI.s RF£OVffiED - 50~

PEHCl'lITaGE OF rtOCOVl1<Y Of rlESUPPLY FO~ D I- 3

Parachute resu~ply - JO .B»
c. D I 4

(1) Thi rty (30) C- 47 plane. to Dl w,.". (By paracnute)

I5Urut l.o!.ttl.....tSTI!R

Rations , type "I\." 13 , 960 4, 320 30 .9

PIihCDI 'UGE 01' RF£OVThY OF rtESlJI'PLY "Ott 0 I- 4
Parachute resu~ply - 30 . 9!.o
d. D I- 6
(1) Four (4) g lider s CG- 4- A to Ol lI , jl ll.

- 4 ­

•
 _. --
• SIGi..".L

.J!T peT
D:',1 RCD
.I ~ re , ~; - llO-mi . 20 20 I OU .

R.:l.dio , SCR- 536 4 4 100 .

,facii o, sen-610 2 2 100 .

:·t",di o , 5c:.~··694 4 4 100 .

jat t~riss , OA- )O 1, OW 1 , 000 100 .

Batteries , Bh- 39 150 34 22 .6
5at:.t.~rJ.e s , fu .-hO 25 24 96 .
:-)atte r it::s , B~ ~ - 70 100 72 72 .
~ Bs abe Books , ~- 2 l0 300 50 16 . 6
Tape , IL- 5J 100 leO 100 .
Tape , 1'1- 94 lOu 100 100.
Flas.!light, TL-lU - :, 1 ...;0 lW lOU.
p..:...iCL.::T..~IE OF SlGNJJ. E ..:U IPt-ii!.NT R..oI£Ov.ltED b J , 9~

Gun- s ub- :llaC!linc , ' Al 15 15 LOO .

....ortar , 6OJam, U2 2 2 100 .
~"s:.lI1chel ·, gr enada , U? 8 8 100.
~·,.:;.u.."1.cher , gr ;;:l1ade , £.is 5 5 100 .
<,loth , 'lliping , Ib s . 200 200 100 .
"tc:~ches , cotton, ~ 10 10 100.
".......aiator, 1/4 ton truck 4 4 l OO .
Kit , tiro r epair, c old patch 6 6 100 .
ft.. flfj , U. S. Cal. . 3 0 , :.l 20 20 100 .
pwJj.c~'l'.~ m: OF ORDN;lfCE 3'.;UI Plli:NT RE~OV11ffiD 100%

e. D I 8
(1 ) Thirty- foUI' (34) C- 47 ,>l U.1:::3 to DZ 1; ,11 • ( By parac hute)
OllDlinliCE
75m:n Ho-,j . amnunition 2, BOO l , 6CO 64. 2
?EaC;;:l'iT"Gb Or' ru;sUNLY i,,"CU'iEltY FOd D I 8 64 . ;;tj,
f. Percentage of r~cov e rs of r esupply for ent ire operation.
GIlde r He6up~ ly - 95.9~

Prcnt . Resu!)vlJ.' - 41.4:.0

2. J~ resupply recovered by units and not delive r ~d to D1vision dump s ar~

n ot J.nclud ~d in "Lotals as fi gur es "'lere not r eported .

3. The r epo rt is a ch'! ar indic :ltion that glid e r !,6suppl;).· is considcrabl,;{

.'!lor e ~f f ective as practically 100)' of the contents of c;lidoars was rt:lcov er ed .

4 . !'he last r~supply by air on D I 8 gives the best gauge on eff activ enes s
of p arachut e r es upp ly . i.CCOrdine:: to reports fro m th o r ear "\.l ase , tnirty - foLlI' 1.34)
planes "W1t h six rc..i.c k loads and thri::le door loads each l'lere delivered . ./'.11 r ':"CI{
l oads were dropped in a v er y small ar ea. and werE: recov e red wl.tnin a f ew hours . No
door l oads 'hC r a see n COmill5 down . Tui s is eithtll' all i nd ication t hat t h~ door loads
\. ~re dis char ged far from t he ta.rget arca or t ne door load s wer f; act.:JalJ...:y not loaded .

5 . li3 s upply by Paracnut~ co uld bt. c ff cct lV<.3 i f only rac;': loads were u s ed and
all pl anas discharged t llui r l oads oVur "LIlo idontl.l'l.catl.on ("Juker s on 1...11e 6round .
: t. is be liev ed that door loads snould not normally be used a s it caUSGS too g r eat
to dl.sp.-.:rsion of supplieS and might enable tn3 enem,y to obtain a v ery (ugh percant age
of the total sup~l l.~ s dropped .
 HEAD. ~U ~T!!.:t~ •
10131' AlliBlJt.:J..-E. D:LV IS! "
OffJ.ce of t. he Div ision COn:n.:LO• V
, ,
Il ~ APe 472, U. S . ,.MW ....
Oc t obOt' U~~ i
r.
Purticipation of the l Olst Air borne Dl.vl.sion in Op er ation l.iI.ri.h..:1'l' for
the period 0 - 0 I 10

C ommandL~g General, Fl.rst Allied Airborne Army

(Tnr u COIr.rranding General, XVIII Corps (Ab)

1. 'Ihe attached report on Operat i on t1ArlIGf.T pr epared by Brigadier General

J. Higgins is forwarded approved (lith the follovling COO'UD.f:mts .

§IT.~CT OF THE DhYLIGHT iJttOf Oli. OFSf. ATJqN. fiARhET. ~eration i.!iA."ti~i:T
fro,:!. all other Airlx>rne operations and exercises in the co{,~actness and
of t.he 0 day landings . Apart from the navigati onal skul and steael.nes s
und er fire s hown by Troop Carrier pilots , tho factor contrl.but~n.5 tI'k)st to this
accuracy \1a3 the decision to stage the operation in daylight . Dayll.g ht allowed
t he ope ration to be put on successfully with a .mini.mum of preparation. There ~, as
n o special pointing for Operation l'.iArtl'.ET on the part of All'bome Troops wnere",s
a full-dress rehearsal would have been indispensable had the operat.ion been l.D
da rknes s. Day light simplified the marshalling and pilotage problems of' Troop
Carr ier COJ,..Inan d as ·lIell as the assembly of Airborne troops on the g round . The
r ay i dil:.:,- o f t his assemgl.Y permitted the acco;npl~snment of the in~tial bround
mis61.0nS on s ch edule~ Because of the accruing advantages it is felt that cons i­
d~ r ab le boldnes d is just~fied in choosing dayli 6 nt ratner than darkness for an

Airborne operation if, as in .,.AR1,:ET, the enem,y is on t :1e run and air supremacy

c o;,lplete •

.3. RJ... 'fE OF BUILD-U? OF THE 101ST AThBO:ti-iZ OI'; ISION . It required seven
days to brinb in all ~ne Airborne elernents' -;('·t:1e lOlst Airborne Dl.visl.on. During
t hi s time t h e Division was obllg ed to prot ect t he landi l'll;. field .ntn considerab le
. force s \~i1 ile carryi ng out its s:r oWld missions . This r equirement for lap.dint; f :L e I d
prot.6ction r ed'J.ced the strength available for tne essential tasks of the Division .
This inevitable dl.version of s Lre!l6tn l.S a factor whic h lnust be borne L"1 mind in
ass 7&.g ning mis51.0ns to an Airborne Division.

4. TR.(X)P Cp..Rtt. .Illi rtl::.PftES EN'TATlu:~ uN TrlE Gi'(OUI~D. General Higgins in parabrsph
4 f com.ments on the need of an Air Force control unit on tile 6 lid er fielo . 'IHi s
would nave been most useful in uJJ{ K~T and should not be oV(:;l"look,:,d in .future
Airborne operations. , A Troop Carrier officer on the growld could have radioed
back local \'leather conditions and exercised air tra f f ic contr ol. Also, he could
have rela,red the latest information regardil1& the tactical situat.ion on the
ground, t .IUS pr ev enting air formations from flying OV er a battl e in progress.

5. C(US'f:RtcTION OF LAN DING STRIPS. Operation iJARKi:;T included plans for the
construction of landing stri ps to bring ill air tra{!sported units and supplies.
This was never possible because of im·emy action adjacent to the narr ow corrJ.dor
along th e Eindhoven- Arnhem oighway. And the absence of ade quate troops to cl ear
and control the necessar,r landlJ1g fi e ld area. As toe situation is always going
to be extremely uncertain whenever Airborne troops land b~hind hostile lines,
the construction and protection of a landing field does not appear f easible without
an entire Airborne divi IO ion with the sole mission of securing the field.

6 . AIR HESUPPLY . Operation MAtiKET provided valuable lessons in air resupp~ .

ht prescnt, th e data are not complete so that conclusions ar c t ent.c.:.tiv o . iiowt;;ver,
it Has amply iJrOV od t hat glider res upp ly is much more ,d'ficient than supply by
parachute. The latt e r was only about 50~ eff~ctiv ~ and wo uld hav e been inad~ouate
in i t. ~elf t o maintain tnl.s Divis:J..On for a n, b id~ rable pur l.od . ExpEOrH::n Cd i n
Op era tion MARKET eMphas iZes that air r asu:.J., ~ :.;,,!b. ins an dtn.:..r gc cy method wi t:t a
long way t.o go be:'or e i t can bu rdi-ed upou -to stJP!=Jort Ai rborn() troops l.n nuw{.1;'
for a n l.nde hnl.t '" }J'Criod .

- 1 -
 7. GROUND 0,) TIONS OF r:lli, 1015 '1' .l.. IRBOtNZ DIVISION . Th e l.nitial bround
mission of the Division r equired its di 5~ O)l'sion in thr eo ar",as alont, a corridor
about fifte e n miles in l eng th. Th is dispos ition made: the Airborne troops \"Ioak
at every critical point CLnd made: n.;cessar:, tho most one r~c tic Stlu tiflb of troops
to moet the nutr.orous threats as they d~v ."loped along this long- ce .'ridor , Had
anything l ass t han a superior parachut..:. drop beon received thQ lussi on oiJ ht ,.e ll
have fail ed , wholly or in par t . AS it Vias, the issue hung in b nice ba l anco on
several 'occas ions bdfore the Airborne troops r ", stored th e situat ion . Tn ~ {;xp<;lr i­
on ce gain~d by th o Division gavD r onc'Woc force to tho cCClviction t llut an ....i.l'bomo
division is capabla of eXdr tl.ng a st..rollg effort in but a single d irection Cit. a
given t ime .

~~2Y~L
Major Genoral, USA,
Commanding .

- 2 -

• I •
 • HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Asst. Div .
• APO 472 , u. S. Army
12 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Operation ~KET.

I
TO Conmand ing General , lOlst Airborne Divi

1. GENEaAL: In accordance witil verbal instructi ons Commanding General

l Olst Airborne Division, the 20110'llin5 report on the p articip ation of the l Olst
Airborne Division in Operation MARKET i s he r eby submitted. Thi s r eport covers
the operations of the l Olst Airborne Di vi s i on fr om D to 0 I 10 inc l usive (Sep­
tember 17 to 27 , 19M.) . The repor t is divided into three parts : First , the
r.tOvem.ent of personnel and equipment froiT: t he UK to tne cor.!hat zone in a parachute
echelon, a glider echelon, and a seabo rne echelon ; second , t he tactlcal operetions
of the DivisJ..on , and units thereof, fr om t he init i a.l l anding by parachute until
D f 10 inclusive, at which titre thtl ta ctic a l sit ua.t ion b ecame JUor e or less sta­
bilized; and third, general cOOl.ment s on various 0 perat l.onal and admin istr at i v e
matters peculiar to an airborne op eration .

2. kVV];;lEtlT TO Ca mAT ZO)IE :

a. Parac hute Echelon : Tre parachute eChelon of the l Ols t Airborne

Divi sion consisted of 436 C- 47 tran sport pla!1es car r Jing SOlue 6 , I1.cYi par achutists
of the Division . Four hundred twenty - rou r planes dropped on D-Day , and 12 planes
carrying Battery IIBu, 377tn Parachute Fiel d Artille ry Battalion , with 140 person­
nel and 6 guns, dropped on D f 3. Of the 436 planes which took off, 434 dropped
parachutists in a highly satisfactory oanner (center of impact \iClS some 1 , 500
yards short of the s e l ected DZ in one case and about 3 miles nor thWes t of the
selected DZ in another casl::l. In both cases hOYlevtr, the drop patte rn was excel­
lent and all parachutists of the serials were dropp ed t og~ tfl.:lr) , On ly two planes
failed to drop parachutists on t he selected DZ's, and t hese two plan es we re shot
down on th e night in and prior to reac n in ~ the D2 '.s . All paracnutists jumped
from these planes, and 8 from on e plane 8l1 d 2 frolll Cllother event ually joined the ir
uni ts i n t hf:! combat zone . J ump casuali tcCi '" i)!'e less toan 2% of the tot al number
jwnped. The av er age time of asse{,lbly was b.t.vut one hour fo r each bc..ttal ion. All
initial obj dctive s i'lc r e r eached prior to darknes s . Rccov(;: ry of equipi,ten t average d
oy er 95 ~ , Four Pat hfl.nd~r p l anes preceded the se rials by 15 mi nutes . Thr ee of
the planes dropped witoout incident on the s elected DZ l s. One plgnEl was shot down
sev eral miles short of the DZ in o::neruy territory and no info r mation i s available
on t ilis p lan;:;. (For details of parachuti:l e che lon, see Annex No . 1 ) .

b, Glider Echelon: A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from d epa r­
tur i:; bases in t ha UK ov e r a peri od of 7 days. S<::ven hundred and sixty- seven of
these g liders landed wit hout incident on t he dc:signated Ll. Approximat e ly 5, 000
men took off fr om the UK and some .4, 800 eventually joined. their unit s in the
COli'bat zon ~ . Some 30 6:liders art! lUlaccounte d for on this dat e , practically aU
of which are assurncd to hav e dropped in enemy t erritory. The glid er lift on D 12
Vias disp<:: r s;;;d be caus e of he avy fog encountt:lrcd ov er th~ Channel and along the
coast . Of sam.; 384 g liders that took off' on this date, only 2D9 lande d safely on
the des i gn at e d L 2 , Many others r e turn ed to the UK or landed on the continent in
enemy or fri e ndly te rrit ory. No further gl id.e r Serials wer e floVin afto;;r D f. 6,
but 50ao 5<X> p..Jrsonnal and '}s s.;ntic:i.l equiJXli31 t ','Ier e flown in by C- 47 tr ansport
to th~ Bruss els Airport and join..,d tht::ir units in tne combat zon t! by D flO. (For
Qe tails of g lider echelon s ee Annex No .2),

c. Seaborne Echelon: The scat:Jbrne e chelon of the Division conSisted

of 1077 per;onn~l and 444 v e hicle s of all types . Thl.s eClle lon load ed on D t 1 and
saile d from SOU'I'HAMPTON on 0 t 2. It a rrived a t OUAHA 8:E...aCH on D f. 3, -where it Vias
divided into two serials. The first serial, l eft t he beach on th..; lllorning af 0 t J
and arriv ed at BOURG-LEOPOLD on the ev onlng of D t 4. It closad in the Division
se rvice are a at ZON on t hd evening of D t 5. The s e cond s.;rial l~ft OMAHA BEACH
on the evening of D .; ) , arriv ed at BO URG - lEOPOLD on D t 5, and closed in the
Division serv i ce ar ea on t he ev..,ning of D f 6 . . (For details of s e aborne ecnelon ,
see An nex No . 3) . .....:;,
~"".....a~!.z~..~::s~~::s'
~....
- 1 -
 s1 ....

•
3. TACTICAL OPERATI ONS : ,

a. The Division mis sions called for the seizure of the four h i~Vlay
and railway-bri dges over the Aa RIVEtt and uI LLEMS VAART CANAL at VECHEL; t he seiz­
ure of the highway bridge over the D01lliEL rlIV:Hlt a,t ST., OEDE..!'iftODE; tne se i zure of
the highway bridg.:= over t he \ilIHELMINA CANAL at ZON; .and th~ seizure of BINDHOVEN
and the raain hignway .bri dge s ov er t !1e s'treams in tlia~ .c;~ty . The' Divisl.on obje c­
tiVdS were sp r ~ad av er a road di s tan ce of some fifte.en I41es: "
, '" J •
..
b . Thb 501s t Parachute Infantry, landing .on t\~o nit s 'rlbar VEGHEI:,.
s e i zed all four brid 6 es wit hout incid~nt . Tne' ~ 2d Parachute-Intantr-.f l andect near
ZON, and with one battalion Sei zed the main hiGhw ay br.idge . ne ar 51 . OEDl£NHODE .
The 506th also landed near ZON and seized the C<ll1ctl cr ossing , but only aftl:T t he
enemy "had blo ....n the b r i dge . The 506th s eiz;;d EHmHOVEN shor t ly aftl:! r noon the
next day .

£. In an effort , to secure an a~ ,' Ilat ,e crossi ng ove r t he \UIJ!EL:dINA

CANAL, and als o to bloCk ,m0f.'Cr tl'a ffic be . 1 Eli'WHCNEN and Hm'IOGElffiOSCH , one
c ompal\Y ,of' the 502d vms dispatcned to seiz.... 'the hi tihWaJ bridge ne ar BEST ~ This
comp.:my seized a!.1Ci h<Jl d th e bridgt:! for a f ew ho ur s , but was driven orf just be fore
dark. The e null\}· 'r ushed stro llb r e i nforcemen ts to t his point, and flt:avy cas ualties
were suffe r e d by both s idcs in t he stiff f ighti ng thc.:.t t ook p l ace 'on D f 1 a nd
D t 2 in t he a tt empt to sccura t his cr ossing. The bridge was finally blm-m by the
enemy before it could be cap tured, but t h~ en e~ forc e defending it w ~s complet e ly
wi ped out';" "

.2. On th (: ~ v ening of D f 2 tho:: en emy made u. r aid on t ho:: brid6e <:it ZON
with tank s u.nd self-prop<31lJ.:d g un s , Solie darlluge 'flas cd.usa o, but the bridge was
he ld inta.c t. Th~ n ex t morning a n enenw 'tank - i nfa.ntry a ttack was Il'!.:lde , but wa s
he l d off . The 506th, riding British t ~ks , made an attempt to cut the a ttacking
forc e off fr om t he s outh, but thc en~tl\Y held h iOlY points and e ve nt ua lly withdrew
his forc os i n good ordG r ,

£. On the morning of D f 5 th a enemy s eve r ed t he rr.ain highway be tween

VECHEL and UDEN, and made a strong a tt empt to seiZe t he to''" of VE,;HEL and de stroy
the bridges . All av a i lab l e elements of thd Division w~ ra r usned t o the vicini ty ,
a nd a s they ;lI'r ived t hr oughout. t he day were forme d into a t ask force und er Gene r a l
McAULIFFE and di spose d to nr;~ t t he enumy threats . Confused f i snting continued
dur .irlg the ent ire day and lat c in to t he night , with infantry ano wnxs a ttacki ng
froll! seve r .."l directions simultaneous ly . Enemy pen<:!tr a tiop5. wer... made to within
500 y ards of t he bri dges , b ut were eventu....lly b eat ..,n back . Thl; at tack was r ene\ied
the next mo rning , but the de f enSe held firmly'. The 2d Battalion ' 506t h then
attacke d towards IJDEN, and I'lade cont act with C:1 patr ol of the Guards Armora d Divisi Oi
a dvancing on VECHEL from UDEN. Tht! enotny was forc ed t o ;iithdr aw t oward EHP, and
the r oad r eopened . By dawn the next morn in.; t.lla ene[1IY had withd r awn from t he
VECHEL area to t he southeas t.

f. On t he af t e rnoon of D I 7 the ent:my attacked fr om the nor thwes t,

cut t h~ nw.in highway between VZCHEL and ST . OlWENRODE, and took up a defonsive
POSit ion as trid e the ro ad. Toe 506 , with tanks at t ache d, attacked on th e [,lo rning
of D f 8 C:1nd by dark had driv en the c'nemy frola a ll but a portion of this position.
The next morning t he attack was continued, in conjunction with Briti sh Armor ad­
v ancing in 'f o r oe from ST . OEDENRODE, elld the road clear e d .

6.' From time of landin g to D l ID, the enemy probed the Division
s e ctor s continuously, <!Il d many Sllie.ll sk irmishes occurrdd uach day . Defensive
positions, t ile main highway , and t he brid ges ov e r the Canals and riv ers wer e sub­
j ~cti!d to inte r /uitt ent artille ry and mort ,!!, fire . Tn~ city of EINDH9V£N W1l6 ,.;.
heavily ,bomood on t ht;! ev ening of D f 2 . (Fo r a", Jt'1~4 thct::tcai~ operatiol;'l 9 ~e '
Annox No .4). ~ ';\ •

4. GI:J~~A1 co:mh:NTS :

.@:' Ci\sualti es : From D to D f 10 '~.~~.~!~:~d,, ~the casualtius of the l Olst

Airborne Divis..on were as fOllows : Kille d - 3 - 1436 ; missing - 547; or
a grand t ot al of 2, 356 non- cffe ctiv es , of a , 112 who ~nte r cd th!:.l combat
a rea. (For d etail ed r eport of casu alties, see 5).

• •
- 2
 £. Prisoners : A tot al of 3,511 prisone rs were captured by the 101st
Airbor ne Division f r om D to D f 10 , inclusiv ~J7 tc."l (", '....1. ' ~.-t'~,.:\ 'til
£ . Evacuation: Th~ 326th Airborn \) riedic al Company arrived in the
co.wat a r ea i n t.,.;o echelons. The first echelon, consistl.n6 of 52 mOdlCi:\.l person ­
na l including en att ached surgical team , arrived in 6 CG4A Gliders on the c..fter ­
noon of D - D3.Y . The second ce nelon consistirlg kc?'' - ~91i~EM'S0J¥1EiS~4 ~e
Glide rs, arriv ed on t i'kl af t ernoon of D 11. ~aL~e:J.Y ~ft.tJoh\ e ,~ ~
first e chelon , a t empor ary hospit al w... s set up Jn~fW ~ oJeherrl e ~ , n ,.
l ending f i eld . First casualties were tre~ted a . 500 an~ at l ~ tfle ~st major
surgi cal opGr ation W3S pe r fo r med . At 1800 a hospital at ZQN was taken oVer and
personn el end equipmen t moved. The t rcatfil.:nt of casualties was carricO on under
very go od condit i ons . By 2400 D - Dc;,y , 10 7 c<ls~ties had been admittt:!d and. trea­
t ed at Uua hospital. Upon the ar r ival o f t he s econd ocneloll , litter bearor and
ambulance sec tions we r e sant to thGir r ~sp~c tiv e r egiments and ev~cuation from
r egimenta l and batta lion aid stations was quite r apid. By th\; morning of D t 2,
contact was es t ab lished with the 50lst at '- '"1J. <l<"ld an a tt <:!.ched pl J.tor)fl of th e
50 th Field Hospital WuS sent to establisL ,_t.ion at VECHFJ. . Tr.e i" ):ird .L.~A.ical
Col l ecting Comp<.m;)' establi sh..:d conta ct "lit l tj,":' Divis~on iJc:dical CcroPll:1Y at 1500
t
on D 2, <.!1ld l.ni.t.ial ev e:.cuation begun to .. he 24th Evacuation Hospit.al at BOU:tG­
LEOPOLD. Due to tactical r equirements und the large amount of traffic moving
north, l ittl ,;:; evacuation was ac c ompli sh~ d until 0615 D f 3 , at Which time normal
ev a >!uation b ~ga.n . On D f 3 , 30 1J.!Ilbulances ..1l1.d 4 - 2~ t on tr ucks evacuat ed a ll
av ai l able c ases to the 24th Evacuat i on Hosp ital a t BOURG- LEOPOLD . From D 3 to t
D f lO, imme diaw evacuation of casualti es took plac e .

1. Air Support: In genc r ~ l, r equ ~sts for air support missions were
handl ed satisf ac t ori l y by means of th,= Air Suppo rt Party which landed by Glider on
D - Dey , Bad weath~ r, tran smis sion difficulties , and higher pr ior ity missions
r esu lte d in maly r eq IJes ts bGing r ~ j ect ed or unab1~ to be flown . (See Ann",x No .6 ·
for d etailed r epo rt).

e . Glid er N.eception : Anticipa ting conside r able c onfus1.on in unit

assembly when a la r5~ number of gliders l snded on ont: field , a Di visl.on g lider
r e cep tion par ty consisting of 5 offi cers and 20 enlisted men frol,t v '".l'i::l us Wlits of
th<;! DivislOn came ill with "the first g,lide r echelon on D - Day . ';'h1.5 party fWlC ­
tioned extremely well Dnd in g rc nt part was responsible for tht.. r apid ~.md ortifJ rly
assemb l~ of units . Despi t ~ c ar ef ul briqfi." 6 , it was found iJDpro.ct1.cab1e to
exp.:lct g~de r s t o l and near prede terIiuned points or :in small tU'eHS or fi~lds , The
most prac t icable solution appdars to be to st a tion 6U id ~s at many points ovur the
entire l anding a r ea and have t hl::l sEl gUlde s g o to th.,;: near est G li d~ rs when thc::y l and,
orient t hem, and giv e ther... the a ssembly point s elect ed for th e unit. This hLCt hod
work ed ve ry we ll and in .:.11 but a f ew cases , units as s <3mbl o d r apidly and wi t hout
C.onfusion .

f, Air Force Control Uni t : I t i.~ be lieve d desir able to have a seni or
officer from the Troop Car ri er COlrmand a r r:"vc with the fi rst ecno.lon of g lide r s in
a situa tion of t his kind , He should be provided with a r adio set c apable of direct
convnuni cation with a contr ol station at the d eparture ai r fields . In this way , he
could tr ansmit on-the - spot i nforme.tion as to l'l cE:l.th~ r conditions, the tOl. ctical si­
t uation, end t oo g lide r fi ~ lds th at are cl~n r for t he r e ception of that gl ide r
lift. It i s be li eved t hat many planes Wl::lr d UIU1e ci::ssarily Shot down by p assi ng
over enemy h~ ld s trong poi nts, and which could h ~ve been avoided hnd l at e info r ­
mation been given t he p i lots as to t he t ac tical s it uation.

g . Us e of Glider Pilots : Tht: nee d for a r egula rly constitute d t acti­

c a l ~nd admb l i strativ e o r ganizati on of glider pil ots w ~ s quit~ ~ppa rent on t his
ope r a tion . Theoret i c ~ lly the pilots joined their t Ci. ctlc . . . l organuation ait.; r
l anding and open:tod und er the senio r offic e r of t h.::.t organiz&tion . Actually, it
was impossibl~ fo r any one office r to control th~ large n umbPr of glider pilots
who arriv ed in t he combat area. T"nere we r e fil ,my .insti!.nces of indivld ua.l pi lots
l eaving t~ir assi gn ed are~s and dis npp ~a ring . Glider pi lot s we r e us~d f o r loc ~l
prot t:c tion of va r lOUS ins t a llations near th ~ LZ, the Division CP , and the Division
Service Ares , and in gene r a l, performed ~ xc e l1 ent work i ndi vidur'. lly" S"!v o:;! r a l
voluntarily joined combat tro ops and pur ticipat cd in ground fighting in the
vicini ty . It i s be lieved th"Lt an or ganiz ation in which t hE:: chain of COJ,II.Th.lOd is
s trongly for g~d is ~ss~n tial if gli de r pilots arc t o b~ u s~d mos t dffi ciuntly in
I' ~ ~~ ~ .r,' I r. ""',
llEbL,j"r~ ~h Q ~ ...;
an a irborn. operati on . ...

..
 h. Resuppl,y :

5 . A final r~port will be subrrJ..tt ed . 'n the: Division complete s ~ts par­
ticipation in the Holla!ld camp r..i. 6 n . ,.

",
•
 ANNEX NO. 4

TAC TICAL OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISI ON

D - DAY
'!he parac hut e echelon o f the Divis i on began its drop at 1300 on D-D~· J
Septembe r 17, 1944 . The 501s t Par ach ute I nfant r y , with two platoons 326t h
Airborne Engine~ r Battalion attached, droppe d on two DZ ' s j one ~ miles west o~
VECHE.1. GIld t he otHer some 3 mil es northwe st of VEGH3L. The Regiment , less the
1st Bat.t alion, l anded on Dl "A" west of VECHEl, proc eeded to t hat t o;,n Mol bY ii\
1500 had s e iz ed all i nitial objectives which were the two Highway Eridges arid ~ t'
t he two Hoo.il r oad Br idges ove r the l,lILLEMS VAART CANAL and t he An rtiv er . l:~o
r e sistanc d was en count er ed on t his DZ ; The 1st Bat tal ion l anded on DZ "1.._111 ,
i n t he vicinity of KAST~J , assembled and r eached VECHAL by 1700 . The 1st
Battalion r ec ei vdd some r cs ist ~~ce from scat ter e d enemy troops L~ t he vi cini ty
of the DZ. Som; r esi s t ance from. scattered enemy gr oups was enoount ered ill the
t aking of VECHEL, b ut no or ganized defe nse of t he town was made by the enemy .
At dark the r egi men t wa s Vle ll dug in and set to defend the t own agdnst a ny
enem~y a tt. ack . All br i dges were seiz ed in- t act . The Engineer Detacl'b1l8!1t imme­
di ate l y began t he construction of a s econd bridge across t he iiILI.J:::...;s VAART
CANAL in order to per mit. t wo-way t r affic if the situation so r equired .

Tne 502d Para c hut e Infant r y witn thr ee platoons 326t h lb.rbor n.:l Eng i neer
Bat talion at tached , l anded on Dl IIB I1 without enemy 0PiJos i tion and all ba t t alions
\I,81'e as sembl':'l c by 1500 . The 1st Battalion .proc e ede d to ST. Ol:illENrtO~ and af t er
a skirmish , se ized the town and its objective , the br idge ov er t he IXA!.lli'L nI VER ,
in- t act. Thi s Batt al ion then pr oceed ed to dig in and at dark had the s ~tuntio n
well in hand . GClInpuIV 11 HI' of the 3rd Battal i on proc e eded to t he HJ.g.J.:lw~· Br i dg e
a t BEST; sec ured i t initi ally against l itt l e en emy r eslstanc e , but wa s f orced to
witndr aw j us t befo re dark by r eason of a strorl5 .m.;my cowlte r at.tack . '!'he r emain­
der of t he 3d Batt :;.lion was then dispat c hed to j oin "H" Company , nith or dE:: r s to
SE:! C\lr c t ho b ridge the nr::x t morning . The r emainder of t ile negi.m,; ,.,t wen t i nt o
Divi sion Heser ve i n t he vicini ty of WOlFS.c.V I NKL .

The 506th ParllC hut e Infant ry 1.::.11d.;;o on DZ "c" wit hout enemy opposit i on .
Compan i es of t h~ 1st BattJ.1ion dep art ed Ulffid01<.ttcly ...; it hout. f o rmal assembly in
an effo r t to sccur~ tne t hr e.., bridge s ov ~ r t he . \1llifi:.UlINA ChN.-\L in t l'k. vicin i t y
of ZON b ~far e t hq could bot blown by t he eneu\y . SC<"l. t.t lolr ed .m ..mlY r ..,sist.mco was
enco unter e d be for e r eachi ng the main br idge Wld forw ard o}...:ruents we r~ .... i thin
100 yard s o f thi s bridge when i t Vi as blOom by t ha r etr eating i3!1Gr.'.y . ( I t was
foun d t hat t ha otner t~o bridg~s ha d bean blown seve r al d~s bef orE::) . The
Regim6l1 t .ct:lgan t he crOSSing of t he Canal by various expedi ent s , and by 2400 the
entire r egiment wa s on t he south s i de of th e Canal ~d had 3 bridgehead exten­
ding socre 2, 0 00 yar ds .

The Command Eche lon of Divi Sion Headquarters j umped with t he 502d Par a­
chut e Regiment and e st ablisn ed an initi al Command Post at ZON . Som.:: 70 glider s
car~ing additional Command personnel , the He co~laiss an c e Pl a toon, Si gnal and
Medi cal per sonnel , and some t ran sportation for the comba t units, lan d~ d on the
LZ about on ~ hour aft er t he parachute landing s . Ov erall time of l andi ng of a ll
p ar ~chutis ts :md glider s was on ~ and one- half hours. Communic ation was e s tab­
l i shed with all e l e.nents except the ::01 by dark on this d at e .

Di 1
Th ~ 50lst Parachute Inf antry continued t he defens e of V~CHEL throughout
the day. Communic ation wa s es t a bll s hc:d witn Di vi s ion a t 0 600 . Sev er e.l light
enem y at~ a ck s wer e r epul sed, but no ma jor e ffor t to r ~ tri ev e th ~ town wa s made.
The .lst Battalion of t he 502d Para chut<3 Infantry continued to hold 5T . OEDENXODE
and likewise r ep e lle d sev ,;r.ll l ight {:nc.rny a tta cks . Thg 3r d Br:.t t a lion of t he
502d a t t .acked at f i r st l ight in an ef for t to r c t ri av ~ the HighWay Bridgl: a t BES T,
but suff ~ red heavy ca sua ltie s at t he hand s , 0£ t ne cn ~ fo r Ce whi ch ha d been
strol"..g ly r e inforc ed durAng t he nig ht . Tn", 2d B:::.ttalion waS then or der ed to
assist th~ 3 r d Ba tt alion in s e curing t hc bri dge s . Tho BJ. tta l i on penetra t ed to
t he outskirts of ~ES T , but w...:s f orclold to withdr a w by h<.;;J.vy artille ry J morta :r:,
an Sl'll arm~ ~l.TC , fufd to oK up a as .; ns iv i:l position on the. l e ft of t ne 3r d
Bat tal ioh . At dark t he enti r e r egiment l e ss t hu 1st Ba tt a lion wa s in a d e f ~ nsiv c
po si t i on e<).st of the hi ghway f aclll.£ t.h13 enemy de f ens e s a r ound the Highway Br idge
at B&'l T.

'"
 Tho 506th Pa r achut u Infantry ) r d Battalion l eading , advanced

on EJJlDHOVEN a t fh'st light . · The. Jrd ..!.:m wes huld up a t ~IOENSEL , one mile

north of th:: city, 'by dcte rm.iIl~d enemy r :;;~l;;l;t..ance . The.2d Battalion made a wide

enveloprilt:mt to th~cast. of t.~ city, outflu.-lked the enemy def ensEls , and seized

t hoJ t o~·'I1 ~t 1300. Cont act waS mad~ with a Brit.i sh Fc.cconnaissWlca Patro l at

1215 north of t h~ cit~· , and l'lLt-:l the main Britian Forces :J.t 1900 just. south of

th~ city . At dark ttK. Regi.J:J.ent. :....as ·i.n controi of tnQ cllt ir..; city iind ... ,~s :i.n

position dufcnding thu important oridg~s in tn& city whicn Vlerc: the (lat.")

obj.;:ctivds .

At about 1530, so~ 428 gl i d~ r s c_rrying the 3rd Batt~1on of t,~ 327th ,

t h~ Eh s inccT uatt&lion , the. r e.'J.aindcr of· tn", Mudicc.l l.!..'1d Signal CO.°.lpunies .

clam.e°nt.s of tne 377th :Para chute Field Artill-ery a attalion, and additi.on ... l s upply

and e.dministl';.:.tive ve tu.cl~ s, arr ived in the comb ~t area . Tllo:I 3rd B3.:'i:.al . cn of

t he 327tn w<Js assignoJd th~ mission of providing lo cal prota ct.l.on for t l .,.; LZ an d

the · Division se rv ice a Na .

British Forces re.:'l.ched t h~ sOllth sida of th~ C;mul at ZeN at aprj rex:i.mat~ ly
2lOC and ~~udi~tc ly b ~gan tha construction of a bri dg~ acr oss ~~~ Canal .

Dt 2
The brid ge ~c ro ss the Canal was coo:.pl Gtcd duri ng th~ nigh .. uud a t 0615
l eaoing sl~IJt:.IOts of tntl HOllSeholQ Cavalry ;md Guards Amo:t'dQ Divif:lor, b",gm
c r ossing . These s ame l oJacing ell:t.lcnts JkA.sse d throU6n ST . OED~rlODE :.nd Vb;CHEL
by 0645 . One Squadr on of tht; 15/19 Huss<ll'S Was attached too tne 50bth at 3lNDHOVEN
and O:lC Sou.:ld
- ron to the 502d ' .
at ZOH .

" e n Comparct of thQ 5Qlst was ord~' d to send on': '! platoon to DINF:i . Rf:port;
from this COf.!;>any indicated the t:me.rny w<.:.s j , somd forc<J in unci aroW1d t.ms t o\.'n.
'Ih e 3d Batt c.lion of' tho[:! 501st w;;s order.... '; .. 0 , .•C:Nd fr om VECHEL to .EER.DE and take
up a strong ,cef&n3ivQ position a t ·that point. . Th ~ remainder of the 501s t con ­
tinued in u close in defense o~ VECHEL and during t !h.; d~ th ~ 2d Batt3.lion
r ..pul s{;d an enemy attack froni the northvl(';st est:i;.~.tod at. oVer 250 u...l::!ntryme.n .
During the l~~ tb even ing, COlOpany liEU was drive n ha ck fr em its out.pn;t position
about 200 Y:D"ds by a well executed night att a ck by enomy par3.chllt.i3 tS .

Fir st Batt~l ion of t~ . 502d continued i n t he defonse of ST. OED~NRODE .

The 2d Battalion att<:.cked a.t 0600 in c.noth~ r att empt to seiZE:: the highw2Y bridge

at BEST . This a.tt ack was r ep ulsed by t he enemy . At 1415 the Rdgiru'>;o'!1t, h:S5

t h.; 1st B.:.t tz.lion, r~in forc ed by one squadron of t ho· 15/19 HllSsars , launcC1~d D.

co-o r dinattld .tttack age.i nst the enemy posit i on. TI1is attack: WdS VGry succ~~sf ul

end ~~~ objocti v ~ seized at l sba . · Fifteen 88rnm guns were destroyed , 1, 056

prisone r s taken , -nd ov er 300 en~ dead loft on the fi ~1d after this battlc .

The 506th P<:rac hu te Inf..a1try ds t f1 bl~ShCd strong points east and w~st
of EINDHOVEN ~d continued cxt~nsive patro l s wi th the s quadron of th e 1 5/ 19
Hussars A. twch~d:

A thir d glid ;€ : r lift b~g.an to ~rrive ·ut about 1400 carrying t he 1st and
3rd B<>.ttulions of the 327th, the Bl st Anti- Tank Ba.ttalion, th d 377th Parachute
Field Art illery B.:tttal ion (less Bat t ,,;ry. "Bn), and t hG 907th and 32lst Gli de r
Field Arti U..,r y Battalions. Due to fog enco unt er~ d ttnroute , only a porti on of
these units urr i,ve d . .EltU:lcnts . of t h~ 32?th 'wero gi. wn the mis si an of prote:cting
t he glid~r landing fi Gl d and as sist i ng: t hll att a ck of t nd 502d if necessary . At
about 1700 enemy tanks wer a r eported approilching ZON fro m th(l so utheast and C!.
f aW mi nutes latt.r s6v ~ral tanks approached within a f ew hundred y .:rd s of the ZaN
bridgo .ll\d shdlled t n~ bridge , t ho;! Division ~.? ) .md tn& t mm . Littl ~ d' e..' as
d~:md a nd th e tunks withdr ew wh-.;n AT· ·guns · , t ne. glider --1.8.nding fie
Two t.:l1l.ks were kno~ef!. o"Utp Y-b ire : :\

DIJ
Divisio~ Command Post ~Fed t o ST. OEDSNRQoE a t · 1200 .

During th o morning , t re 1st Batt ...licn of th ~ 501s t atta cked ond s~izcd

DINTI1L Four hundred r.nd twenty prisoI1~I.:~.e,.

.. --' -. ..--,-".,_..; :,;"".
.
~en
. ..,\ ~~ ­
in th is action . The 2d

.-':t " : ..... ~

~ .' ~ ,.

·J.,S;;j~
extensive patrolling to th
•
t: ! nor
•
Battalion continued a close-in def~nse ' of lot..(}{ EL. The Jrd Battalion conducte d
.tn , and west 'from a stro'n g point· at EEitDE.

to
, '

The 1st Battalion of the 502 d continued the defense of 3T. OEDEi>ffiODl:i:.
09ring the afternoon the 2d and 3rd
OEDENH.O DE and t he Regiment charged with the def
By 210? th e ~t~re R.egiment was closed in the a
defe ns~v.; posltlOns .
B~ttalions
E-""Ct:J;'I;-
were ordered to proc eed t o
hi. t,i e u SJ.
I
FI
f
a

During the night the 1st Battalion of the 506th was ordere d ' "("o proc eed tc)
ZON in order to as sist in the dor ens:; of the ZON bridge aga inst the expe cted
enemy atta ck . The Ba.t.talion went into po s.i .tior: at 1)(,00 8..1J in conjunction wi th
elements of the 1st Bat~~lio n of t h~ 327th 2nd C~ ~ company of the 326th Engine~rs,
r epe lled th~ attack on tne bridge. launcHcd by t Ile 107th Panze r Brigade at about
0630. The 2d Bat t ali vn of the 506 t~, ridi~g tanks Ql the sq~adron of the 15/19
Hussars, a ta cked the enemy rear and' a Sharp eneLagem~nt took place at NUNEN.
The 3rd Bat.talion of t h8 506th r emaine d in EINDHOVEN as Regimental Reserve . At
0900 t he 44th Armore d ltegimcnt was attacned t o t he Division and proceeded toward
HELMOND in a furti1 er att cmpt to destroy t he enemy attacking tho ZON bridge.
Intermittent tank and infantry fighting took plac e the remainder of the day.

The 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 327th r e lieved the 502d of the defense
of the sector east of ZON and the landing zone and Division s~rvice area. The
J21st Glider Fie ld Artille ry Battalion was attache d to too 327th and fire d
missions in support of that unit during the d<\}' . At 1500 Bat tdry uB" of the 37 ?t~ .
arrived by parachute and joined its Batta~on. The 377th th en moved to S
OEDENRODE in support of tiJ.;! 502d Parachute Infant r y. Ba a " All e 81st
Anti-Tank Battalion was attached to the 32 7::'h and Battery ne" to .the 502d.
Battery frB U remained in defense of the Zc., ....dcge .­

D I 4
The 1st Battalion of the 50lst crossed the WILI.EMS VAART CANAL in the
early morning at HEES~jJJK and conducted extensive · patrolling during the day. Ai
1845 an attack was made on SCHIJNDEL and the northwest section of the town was
seized at approximat ely 2215. The 2d Battalion remained at VECHEL . The 3rd
Battalion mov ed at 1745 to the West and cut the ST. OEDENkODE - SCHIJNDEL Road
•
in the Vicinity of the railroad station.

The 502d Parachut e Infantry, vdth the 377th Parachut e Field Artille ry Bai.·
talion attached, continued to expand its def ensive positi ons in th0 ST. OEDENRO··,
area. nB n Company of th e 1st Battalion r eceived a strong enemy att ack from the
northwe st in the early afternoon, but held its posit i on.

The 1 st Battali:..n of t. le 506th continued its defens ~ of· the ZON bridge .
'Ine 2d Batt-alion working with th e 15/19 H....ssars and t he 44th Tank Regiment, at ­
tacked the enemy nl::: ar N"iDE}t ~ETI'EN . The ene.IIIY withdrew in the f ace of this attaC'.c
and at 12:)) contact was lost , The 2d Batt alion wi3nt into a defenSive position i n
the vicinity of TONGElRE for the night . 'me Jrd Battalion was ordered to ST.
OEDENRODE as Division keserve . The Reg iment was given a warning order that it
would probably move to UDEN on the follOlOing day.

At 0300 the 3rd Battalien of t ne 506th Parachute Infantr,y closed in the

ST. OEDENRODE area, moving up from EI Nr:iVVEN . At 0500 orders were r eceived
that this battalion, as well as all ot h .~· . .Jt1<m ts of th~ regiment, would move
to UDEN . ~~i.tho.ut cLelay... Movemen t was t o .. ~ oy motor and marching. The 3rd ­
Battal~on bogan its ulove to UDEN, by marcniu5 J at 0900. The 1st and. 2d -Satta­
during the d"l'_
lions~tiated their ~nts J pi ~emeal as transportat on eeame aVailable

The advance detachment of ti1e 506th, consisting of approximat e ly 150

officers and men from Regimental Headquar~~ and other units of the r egiment,
passed. thr?ugh VECHEL at l~OO. Immedia te ~aftt:! ~ passUlg through the enemy cut
themaW highw"l' between VECHEL
in UDEN_ .­
and UDEN, '
• ..
'
-;- -
0
'E
am! th,s ' detaCcl~SSlf1E
' ~
I

w
.

= C~;; .....:
 •

Tho l07th Panzer withdrawing from its attack on the tOO

brid ge . on ,D t 4, :movad ' . covet of darkn.Js s t o .ERP, and .i .I.1 .,1;.ht.l latd morning
of 0 15 launched"ralf"'aTI-out -attackito ' sci:.c the town of ~.l;!:tml.. and ' destroy t he:
bridge s thl.lr u . Eneoi'-forc<3s in - this attaC!. ~.;c ru estimatutl ~' thN~ batt.al~ons
of 53 troops, sup.iJort_d -b jiJO ·to 40 tank s a!1Q artillery. . ' . ' ,_t·
,
By.. l.z....:O, tn.... 26 Battalion 501st astridt: thu ViCHKL - b1f.P ri.oa.d , was being
hard pl:_ss,)d . Additional troops wvr c start ed to\.. ard YECliEL..¥o Gcn",rai. ~ 1i.uliffc
was plac\.!d i n cooc.'l.and of 'troops in the area and cnargl3d viitri 'def~n s ;: of tho t ,o'.ln
•• • • • r • _ .-­

and bridgt!.:J . ht about l4OO" ~nf::my tanks cut the highvla,y . nor~~I\';H..~t of V1~CHE.L and
dcstroy~d t.ra"lsport pe.rko;;d on thu highwuy . Batt,Jry li B": .9.~s"~ AT t3attri.lion j
arriv...:d at t.he same ti.m.i., .,eng' into action on tno higr~\, c:,· . •r.4· i..Wm,;.dl at cq . d,"str­
oy~c. 3 llar~: V tank loaduI6 t.ilt}'· a't.t.ack. rho 2d .Bf:.t~:ll~l;>n 5Q~ 't~~. position on
t :1f l.~!'t or' the. 2d Battalion 501, v.ith th\J 1st Battalion L.Olst 'Gli der In fantry on
i ts left . \,it h tn ... assist~lce of Brit. ish C1rtillcr',f gntnatd front th..; hig:hvJ~' ,
t h" attack ,froo ZhP \;:- '1 r"pulsod by d:..rk . At about 1400 om,my infMtry, \lith t ~k
suppor t, ,utt..ac!.. oJd ce triJc tn.;: CD.11a1 from thl.. northwest t o\>H.rd t h ... hi ghMlY brid g(;
soutnv.c:st. o.r" VECHEL. Ccc,pany U n 1i: 506" 'ijhiC;~ \;as irJ .v~HU. on its "¥;e;! to UDm ,
VIas t urnt;!d around , dcp1oy__ d nd<..r th..:. bridge clt'. d,. r opu~s e d the ritt-~ ck; .' with ,the"
as sisUncc of e 1 iU,h.;nts o f the: 44th Tenk ,lt4.J~al~t·. .. .: \ .....
. , . . . . ";.
D.. .l rinb, tho.; c:. f -cornoon t tL UfltUlly ~unGlhod '~.n " t ti'ck ' ..g:!inst tn~ .·to\1n ~ fro!!l
t ht. north , '!!ld... w ,,:..l'~ ri:'l:J.lY ilaltl.:d JUSt sh oR 91' t..,~ r <.:.~lro.."!d orl.de;~ by ':;]:3'".tents
of \.~ ... ~d. E,J.t"t~J.on , 501, and on", p1.aoon of util I COJ..p.my ,' ;0 ,Tv.hich h:::.d;, t cl<:tn , up
<.. d~L'.;n3 J.v ... posit1on t iwro:; a. snort ,tililc , b"JOI'(L
.. . ..
The..: ... n ",my runcwed thGir att acks- from t n..: sQuth und sou t-hcast durmg t.n.Ul
lat... afternoon , but by noVi ' :)dd1tiona l,forces h.3,cI ·.:~riv.:!a cmd ",nt:.11\}' r~tt.<!'Ck \iaB
s topp.::d . By dark thd 506 (l ess 1st B.1ttulion cl1.d tofu.. dvt.:J.ctJ.:lt:nt cut ;off at:VDEN),
t h(.. 327th Gll.df:: r Infa'1.try, t re Division Rc. conn~ss ancQ Pl 'ltoon, t hu 321st Glider
Fi~ld ...r t illc ry Bo.ttalion, Battery nB n, alst ,:..T Se.tt1:l.~ionJ tnt. 2d Battalion 501st
Perachut c Infantry, o.ro the Fir~t Squ<>.dI'o:1. .. tn RQya1 'J.~~k rlogimcht hnd a rriv ed
and for ced the task forc e unde r G..m crnl '- .. F"i. chars" d \~it.h tloHllIlg the VKCHEL
a r .:lc,.

In the mc:mtim... th ... Is t Batt ~.lion of tne 501 A. th, ck~d at d'3''In and hlld oc­
cupi", d 1111 of SCH IJNDEL by 0915. so~ 400 prisone rs VI(:Irt;! t ~<:: n in t ,u.s opl.:r ution.
About 1200 orders weN reC0ivcQ for tno 1s t B.1tt a1l.on to prog,ca..cLto_ nEIB(5\.J{,
seiz...:. th e town, "md prov i da north~rn fl~!l1k p rot c cttbn for VECHEL. Tna novement
was completed by 1700, and the b attalion took u a strong d ~ fe n s iv" s it·
.:md ar ound tho town, Tho 3r a t <.1 ion, Whi ch do a vc.ncc: " ovn rd' SCiUJNDl:..L in
th~ j;D.rnin ~ e:nd~1iiZd forc es with th..: 1st B.ltt..l1.ion in 'soizing SCHIJND.cI., WCiS
o r d"r~d . to E~DE , wncrd l.t took up ~ d Q funs1v ~ .pos1~10n g uarding V~CH&L from thd
west .

To<:: 502d P.:1To.chutt: Inf antry cxt und(;::d its dc.. f l3I].s1.vEi' 'positions during ' the day .
Elolumts of t he 1st Batt.alion lilade. conta ct with tho) )rd B:.ttalion 501 south of
S CHIJNDhl., .md jo in~d forc(;s in clc<llll.Il6 out, ~ ev .Jr 1~ t.mt..llij' strong point.s along tne
SCHIJNDEL - ST . O~DENrtODE highw.y.

Tilt. 32?th Glid~r Inf<.ntry wc=. s ord o r~d t;!t 0930 to proceed 'to VECHEL, cJ1d
l!lOvemont bi::lgan a t 1030, th1o! 3rd Batta lion by truck und ·th... 1st cmd 2d Batt.llions
by ma rching . Tn"" 1st and 3rd Battalions \'I..,r a c:pm;litt od ori bo'th sidds' of tlk: bridgf;:
LMloJdiat cly upon rr rivnl.; t he 2d Bat ...a lion continue..:d 'intO VECHEL and bdCami::: t ask
forc e r ~SCl rv c . 1"n>3 tam of VBCHEL W.lS nt:o::.vily sl1<; 11(;d during t tl.). lo.t e :::.i1;.f::rnoon
and e~ rly uvcning . .

..
Soon a f~e r dawn the o::n6 ICff launched sfl.ll l sc::.le :lttacks aguinst th.:: dEf en­
siv e posihon s southOllSt of VECHEL . , Th... st. w.jrJ 11.::ld off ~tnout difficulty.
D.xri~ tn ~ nignt pl<lIls wer e drawn up whicn c :.l1.:.d for ::. British Armor ed Br~g.~de,
r e c ~1 1 cd from too NIJiAEGEN nN cl, to . l dv!.Ilc ... on VECtD::.L irofil UDJ!:tJ, join forc es with
"'h~ 2d B.lttu lion of th o 506, whico Wd S to advunce fran Vt.iCHEL towcrd UDEJ-l ,' end
d\"~r t.h;;: rO.:ld in order t.hat th~ flow of tr, Jfic might boJ rc's'UDldd. i'ollowing th.'lt,
t h ... Ar mor ..id Briga de ~.J.S to swing sharp),y south !l.rx:2 cut off the ..meoy QScap~ route
t hrough mP . '

•
carried out.
•
Th e 2d Battal ion of to u 506 mad ~
•
Due to cOlDl1unication difficulties , that pa rt of toe planRi a 1ling for th£l
advance in forc e and e nc ircling moji1(,lont of t.l-te- British Armor ed :t3rigade was not
cont act with a pa trol of the Ar­
mored Br igad e n ortheast of VECHEL abo ut 1700 . By t hat tiill~ tht; 1:::lnl:liLW had beg un
his wit hdr awal, and soon t m reaftclr cont act was lost .

Durine; t he mormn g th e 1st and Jrd Battalions of t .le 501st readjuste'd

t h~ irdefensiv e positions west and north of EERDE, and at dal~k Wer e deployed
with th~ 3rd Battalion generally along the railroad from t~e Canal to ~tE , and
t he 1st Buttalion f rom EERDE due south to th e main highway . The 2d Batta11vn
contirlu(;d the clos\,; in de f en se of VECHEL , with tne. ;06 6i'l-' n o~feD.s l.v e mise-ions
to the ncrthe3st and south . Tnc 327th \las a ss i gned a. def cr: :"'Jo ~e~to r n ort.1 of
VECHFL.

The 502d P.J.ra('h L.*~ c Infantry continued .its d...fcnsG of ST . Oi!.D2NrtODF~, with
th e 3 7?tn PaJ,9.ch'.li:.;;; Fi& "' d Arti lle r y 3att.ali o.:1 in dJ.Nct support .

I1..u"ing the d&y fl !;.th Glid.::r s e rial arnv cd bril1bing r emaini ng: c1.:..rnm ts of
t he 327 tn Glide.r Infantr;__ am t he 90?th Glider Fie ld Ar til ~ry Ba t talion. The se
troops w~rl.1 mov ~d imr:l.... diatuly to tht.: ThCHEL ar ..:a, and t n..., 90 7th Fi t:.ld Artiller,{
Battalion Vi a s plac~d in direct sUPIJort of tn ..: ,Olst ParachuttJ I nfant r y . Tne 321st
Glider Field Artill ery Batt.alion was attach<ld to tiw 506t h Parachute I nfantry ,
a.'1d fllea s ev..Tal lJ.ission s durin ;; t h<> d ay .

At da\~n rcconnai s san c~ as far as B:.hl' i..Y!d i cat ~d t h~ vneoy had made good his
wi thd::a.wal to t.no:.: sout h-.Jast, and th o.; arua was cl ~ ar of enM.y troops . 'Ih~ 500th
Parac.Jutc Infantry , wit h t.he 321st Glide r Fi ~ld hrti ll ~ ry 1:$attab.on and B& t t~ ry !1m'
Blst AB aT Bat t a.l~on attacned , was or d<;l r~d to UDiN t o t<ikc OVer tne def ense of
t hat ar;,;a .

The Divisi on CotDuand Post was I.roVlo:d from 3T . Ol:!;Dlil>l'rlODh t o VECrlEL at 1000 .

The 327th Glide r Infantry was assignee! t h J t as k of defending VECHEL, \'lith

t he 90 7th Glider Fi ..::ld Artill~ ry Battali on in gen<;! r al suppor t . ThoJ 2d Battalion
50 1 was r ""loc s ed from its dcfensi v... assibflI_lcqt i n V3GHEL and joined it s r egitilcnt
i n t he EERDE area, as RG6imen tal R.es...-rv... Battery !lA11 , Bls t AT Battalion , conti­
n ued attache d to t he 501st, wi th th~ 90 7th Glid er Fiel d Artillerj L~ dir e ct suPvor t

The 502d continued tha defen s e of t ne ST . OEDEN..tWDE ar ~a . Bhtt cl rio::s "DIt,

liE n, and "F It, th e Anti- aircraft Batteri es of th e gIs t AT Batt alion, arriv ~d in t he
s eaborn ~ eche lon an d wer e assi 5l1ed to pr ot e ct thu Division Se rvice Area nor thwe st
of ZON.

At 1000 the en~ l a unch ed a seri es of probing attacks again st t he 501st

d ~ fen s ive
position, mavin!!; fr om SCHI JNDEL toward KOEV.liliING. Two l:om.panic s of t he
50 2d were di spat che d to KOEVEnING to int ercept this forc o , r r::portud to be; t wo tank~
and about forty infantry-IUal _ Th e i.m~n-IY for ce movl3d r ~pi dly , howev ",r, and were
almost in KOE'lbltI I>l'G wh ...n Goolpan i ~s "Dn rod uri" of til ", 502d arriv ud . The tl'olO COf.l­
pani cs held KO:l!."VERI NG, but oould not pr...v ..nt tnlt> cl1~my from cutting t h ... h J.gh\·Ia.Y
northwe s t of KO:l!.VEitlliG j ust bufort: da r k . Under cov () r of darkn..J s ::; t he enell\Y built
up his f or cos with tanks , s olf- pr ope lled ar-, il::'zT",f, and fairly lar5'" infan try uniUi
using th e corridor hI.> nad found w t wel,..n to . ... . . l .s t ·and th<J 502d .

nis
During t ile night th u 506th wit h Batter ies "BII Blst AT Batt al i on , and the
32lst Glider }o'ioJ l d Artil1er ;;t Bat t a lion att ach~ d, was or dcrod to r .J t urn to VECHEL
frorJ th03 UWJ area . i..iov o;:m;mt bIJgan at 0300 , and at dOlYlight th~ s u unit s wlt>ro jus t
cast of VECHEL. At 0915 tho.; 506, wit h one squadron 44th L1.oyal T<.:nk x ~g irnent
attached , a t ta ck ed th() en ~ at KOEVcltI NG . 'rhe a tt.... ck p r o&r dsscd f ...vora bly fo r
some 2 , 000 y ards , when botn at t CJ.c~-A b attalion s (formation , 1st and 3 r d B.J.tt_+.ion
abr uas t, ast rid ~ th u main ro ~ d) were pinned down by wc l l -di r~ ct ~d urt~11Jry and
smal l tu:m3 fir ~ , .::nd fir.::. f r olil t anks due in <.Iloll6 t a.; rO f'_ d . Th~ 2d .B<.:tt l:L ~on was
t h..n ordcr lJd to execut e 1.1 wid () ~v t.; lopm;Jnt o f th ~ onelI\Y ' s southern fLmk , ..l!ld hegar.

­
its JilOVullU1 t a t 1.400 . In th u f.l6ll.t1 tiru<; el ~ents of thd}Oth B r~ti sh Division, with

_. - 5 -
 . ---­
strong am.ored forces , began an a dvan ce £tOfl tne south. T~)3 50lst and Coap Cll'li es
"0" and "HI1 of the 502d_.assiBted by providing bases of fire f or the attackL,
f orce s . By -darkness t he ene"lY had be en cleared fr oo a ll but s. very s.clall area
south of the road .
The 502d continued its defense of the ST . OEDE1JF(ODE. area, the 327th its
defense 01' the VECP.EL area, a.'1.Q t h.e 501st. i ts defens e of t oe hFltDE area . All
t hree r egiIlents had several sn all scole ene.':\}' attacks launched 'against t.neir pos i­
tions durlllb the d~ .

DO
The 506th resllL'led tre attack Scan afte r daylie;ot, and by 0900 had driven
the eneJ.V no r th of the highway and l.lade contC:lct \'lith tre 501s t on the i-l 15 ht . The
British forces continued tne attack to the north, pinchin6 out tile 506th and
Companies " 0" and ilrll1 of the 502d . At 1300 tile 506 , with at..t ach:!1ent s Vi as ordered
to r et urn t o the UDEN area. nlt~ r.1OVet.ler:t \; - conpleted by 1700 .

The 502d cor.t.inucd its' defense of ".l~ 3T . OEDi:£J.~WDZ area, Cor,!panies "D" an:!.
IIH" re turnill~
to !te~JJle nt a1 cor.trol at 1 50(,; .

The 50lst and t he 327t h co ntin ued their de fens i ve r.U.ssions , bot h r egiments
repelling s!.lall scale ene.~ attacks d..u"i1'l6 the day .

D flO

No change in unit dispositions . Several ene:.;..! in f~ltration attempts on

fr ont of 501st and 327th repelled .

d
,

• •
 • •
AiP SuPpor t Reaue st5~Ol A/B ~»±sion

No . Time of Re uest
. Thru 26 Sept 1944

Area nnd Nature of Tc.r et

1. 20 Rept 0555 Armed Recen ar en Nunen , Neder­

wet ten and Hclmond . TClnks
r eported and at tack expect ed
on Zan .
E
2. 20 sept 1700 TRC Recon r oad S/E fro:., Bakst el Not r eported
t o Best and road E f r om Oira r-hut
t o Best. Tpnks repor ted moving
toward Bes t.

3. 20 Sept ~305 Bo"b area 484.222 S/W t o 481217 E Not r eport ed

to 496?15 N/fl t o 484.222 . (Nunan
t? aeekstraat ) . 200 tLDks and
·!j;;hicl es .

4. 22 Sept 1102 Boob r oed from Bockel ~es t to Message r eceived

Erp . 400 t c.nlcs Lnd vehicles . 1310 "Tcrget
ccce9ted . Esti­
mated time of
IU'r ; vq1 to follow. "
No la..er oessage .
5. 22 sept 1315 T ~cReen Rren 5240 t o 5840 to Delayed on account
5234 t o 5834. (Erp , Boekel "nd of weather. No
S/W of Volkel). Concentrction of r esults r eported .
t anks nod vehicles .

6. 22 Sept 1522 Arl!'lcd Recan r oad Ud&n to Vechel. Not r eported.

]0 t rnks and infcntry on r ondo

7. 23 Sept 0810 Jir med Recon nre(l. HI;luvel, Erp, Position of our
Bockel nnd Krc~~evr. Concon­ troops r equested .
trr'tion t f' nks ('cd ve:hicl es . We informed 1000
yd spfe t y limit .
Mission c~ ncelled
by G3 e t 1655 .

8. 24 Sept 0905 Ar~od Recon cr ee 5632 t o 5641 Ar med :t~con of nrel)

t o 5932 t o 5941. T.nks end imposs~blc . Asked
vehicles . f or pin- point
t :"'r gcts . Lc t cr
me ssC'ge sr.id I:lissi Ol
r efus ed- friends in
Qr e[ •

9. 24 Sept 1740 Armed Recon 1000 yd r ndius Not r tlported

E 425369 . Trnks, vehicl es
~nd ~ rtillery moving S/E .

10. 24 Sept 1745 Armed Recon c.r er. Schij ndel Postponed on
l'.ccount of wer ther .
~5) .
11. 25 Sept 0645 Jlrmcd Racon ('. ren St . Michiel s Not r eported
Gest el to Schijndel t o Diother
t o Berllcum,T ~nks, vehic ~ s ,
,'.rt1l1ery {'.od infr ntry.

Annex No . 6

DECl
- SFIE0
 •

No. Time of Request /Ir e::. t.nd Nr ture of Tcr gct Results

12 . 26 Se~t 0744 Bomb woods N of CencI in grid !\s k~c.:!. for r ed

squcres 4340, 4439 ~nd 4539, smoke on t ~ rget s .
l: lso vill r.ges of Beug , Dt nthe r could not conply .
rnd Hees1'I ijk . T ~ nks; . vehicle s , Beug nt U' eked [ t
crtillery nn0. inf~ntry . 1045. Civili:ns
r eport 8 Huns
killed . Our ''fit ­
ness cescr ibud
ve hicl ~s {lest r oyed.
B[ l~~c e of t r. rg~ t s
not r epor t ed .

Not e-- The hour i n t he t~e of r c.quest is t he time the cesse-go \11:5 Icknowledged by
t he Ne t Control S t ~ t ion . The time of origin in mr ny cns es Wl\S T.luch c.t:rlilll', but
(!u e t o trl.nsrait ting (~if ficulties thE;; NeS couli! not be r el'.ched or t he r.t8ss"ge wr s
not clenrly r ece ived . 1 i r Support ms tions b,t Gr t hnn 26 Sept 0744 wer e h"ncUeci
thru Brit ish c hl'nnels . Our NCS closed 30 Sept 2400.

I
•

• " -
- <

.,
•

• •
 •
,,
•
"

1. Following is a report of all resuP.jli03 S dul iv c r~ d by parachute and

gl~ dtl r to the l Ol s t Airborne Ih vision in orl w-ut.ion ..:arkt. t :

•. 0 f 1

~ 1) 'I\'Ic:nt y-two (22 ) gl lda rs J ,-. ·.· ..;.- A, to DZ "\," .

N.:OUllT A1ivUNT PiliCh..:IT..-.GE.

gg,ffiiitED fuC0V.,,RJ;D !!:ECLiV ~D

iiations , type 11K" 7, 608 7, 666

<lot t ery , B-'- 37 ~40 540 100;>

Battery , 8.\- 38 "1'-0 720 100%
Batt e ry, BA- J9 48 48 100''';
Batt <::l rj' J &.- 40 I.B 4d 100%
Battt. ry, bA- 41 20 20 10()~
Battl.: I'j' , HA-h8 60 60 100;>
Bat.t o:>ry J 810.- 80 168 168 1lXl;>
Ilirc , \, - 110 on 00- 4 (J2 ~ Qilc s) b5 65 100:.
Ilirc , \1- 130 on 00.- 4 ( 24 ailu s) 12 12 100', .

Carbine , c al. . 30 24, 000 24, 000 100'):

Ca" .• 30, AP, 8/ clip 64, 512 04,512 10<1;&
Cal . .3U, AP- Tr ( 4- 1) bel t ed ~ , OOO ~O , OOJ 1()(J.6
Cal. . 45, SU, and Pis tol 14, 000 14,000 100,0.
60Jntn i:.iortar , 1£ 1, 152 1, 152 100:.
81ar.. worter J (It) 5~g 528 1(0)'

Daxt ros c , btl..

100 l dO l OOp
SOdiUr.l, Ci t rato, box
120 120 1(0).
Sulfaml .u.lidc J box
240 240 100'~
'1,atE:r J dist . box
..so 4<>0 lOO'..
Plasma, Pk6 .
360 ; 60 10 0 ,0
Band"s c , !!\:auzc , box
2, 040 2,040 100,0.
Co ~ to n J ab s o rb ~t , pkg .
3<JO 360 1(0»
?l~s t Qr, adhbsiva, apl.
240 240 100,0.
Splint, ba SSi'iOod , snt .
480 4!lO lUO'~
Splint , ...rat" .l.dg ~ Ring ,
ea , 60 60 100%
Splint J \;'irc l e dd ar, 0;:"" .
400 400 100:.
Pent othal , sod i UIl, box
240 240 100;6
Al coho l , btl.
120 120 100;"
IIOOrphinc , box . 240 240 loo~
Su l rQd i az~ n e , pkg . bOO 600 100:­
Bana ubU , pl ss t or of p e r~s, ctn .
72U 720 100:>;
DrOBSi "6 , first-aid, l arge , ea .
480 J,lJU 100~
Dr Iil ssing , firs t-ai d, small, Ch .
l,44u 1 , 440 100%
Bl ankC! t, hool, OD, ~ u .
l du 180 100,.
Litt tlr, f ol dlJ'lg , lll wllnuL1, 6 B. .
bV 60 100;"

pffiC.Jlr"CE OF R.>COVEllY 01' GLIIl..i<. ,u,sUi">'LY r"Oit D f 1 loo~

.'

Arnn:..x tl0. 7
•
r (2) vrlG hundred
~achute
3-24 'planus t o OZ
~ -
" : . II
-
and DZ. II h ll

4'"r~;I,slLR
!Jd'r ,",T peT MT .u..'r PCT
I TEii ~ DEL ~ ItCD Dci. !f,.C D RCD

Rations , type IIKu 14, 400 }.,480 24 . 1 2 , ) bu 1, 500 63 . 5

Gasoline, gals . 1 ,26C 125 9.9 200 100 5Ci •

P!l1.~ AG;)) Or' ~il.~Tci!l T~ i.,;jIr....-.t!.i~T tW;oV:&t.::.D

Ol II ..
" 17 . o. .
11 . II
56 . 0

SIG1· ·~ j~

Batt ory , Dh- 37 300 0 0 75 0 0

Batt £.lj. , BidS 500 0 u 125 0 u
Batt\,;ry , llh- 39 50 0 0
Batt~ry , B.- 40 50 0 0
Ba tt(;ry , Bh- 41 15 0 0
Batt.:.ry , 8&- 48 29 29 100. 5 0 0
Fbttt.ry, BA- SO 50 0 0 20 0 0
Battery , B.'- }O 500 0 0 100 0 0
Batte ry, 8/,- 70 5 0 0
lo~irG J i~ - 110 on 00- 4 ( Iuil... s) 45 II 24 .4
llire , ',/- 130 on Dr - 4 (milGs) }O 8~ 28 .3
Ilire, ~j - 130 on OH-8 (miles) 5 5 100 .
Radio J SCR- 610 3 1 3J .3
Radio J SCR- }OO-. 3 0 0 1 0 0
Radi o, SCR-536 16 0 0 4 0 0
« .:.d10 , 5Clt- b94 3 0 0 1 1 100 .
Yine Dct",ctor, SCR- 625 4 0 0 1 1 lOO.
ro l~phone , EJr8- B 15 0 u 1 1 100 .
Switchboard, BD-71 1 1 l Ou .
Sv!i t chboard , BD-72 1 1 100 .
Mes t Section , 1\5- 49 10 0 0
iL-').st Scction , J.1S- 50 10 0 0
haintonanc ~ Equip., i.lE-53 1 0 0
Bc:.. tt ury, BA- 2 20 0 0
Ba.ttery , B.- 23 10 0 0
Battery, BA- 2 7 10 0 0
Coil, C- 161
Tc l ogra..?h , TG-5
Tag , lC- 72
2
1
1,250
0
0
0
u
0
-
Conv lJI'tcr, '- 209 2 0 0
Mos s ugo Book, ....210 200 0 0
ilXle , RL- 27-.rl. 1 0 0
heel Equipm,<;;lnt , CE- 11 2 0 0
Crank, CG-4-A 4 0 0
Tc!.pe, Tl-83 50 0 0
T.:!pc , TL- 94 25 0 0
Climber s , LC- 6 1 0 0
Teo1 Eq.up!.limt, TE- 33 40 0 0
Flashlight , TL-122- ;; 50 0 0
L_ , Ul- 35 100 0 0
Glovas , LC- lO 10 0 0
Test Sot, I - 56 1 0 0
Test Eqllipml.! nt, 1 0 0
PEIc.CENT"GE OF SIGi'l,.. L E. ,;UIt>:iillT lu!.COVllihD

Cal1ber . 30 AP 8 C..i..l.p
Dl n,,"

180, 000 G o
I
87 . 5
n
Carbine, Cal . 30 427, 000 41, 664 9.7 57.5

•
Cal . . 30, AP , 5 clip 30, 000 0 o
Cal .. JO ,tiall- AP, ctn . 2u ,000.. 12,000 bU .......

•
Cal . . 30, tracer, c tn/ clp 15,00<1' 15,000 1,500 1,500 100•
'.
..
 Ordnance (Cont 'd)

IIIIT PCT [.IJIT PCT

RCD RCD RCD ReD

C~l. . )0, tr~cer , hP baIt ed 430,000 93,000 21.6 80 , 000 66 .7

Gel. .45, 5/,1:; nne Pist ol 133,000 66 ,600 50 . 10 , 800
Ge1. . 50, [,P- I -T (2- 2-1)
371:1.":1 Gun , SV
37rz:. , HE
371:1tl C:-nnist er
57m."!'l , BU . SABOT
31, 000 26 ,710
360
180
60
', 240
64
o
o
240
86 .1
17.
o
o
100 .
1
t
57"", HE 600 3'52 58 .6
60mm Mortnr , HE 5,850 1 , 078 18 .4 1,350 900 66 .7
60mn Mortrr , Ill . 234 8 3.4 51, 54 100 .
8lmm Uortl1r , Lt . 2 , 700 2 ,253 8) .4 606 300 49 .5
81~m Morter , Hv . 540 540 100. 111 60 54.
Bloom S:"!oke 162 162 100 . 33 33 100 .
750n HOR. HE , M54 1,680 500 29 .7
75i:T: HO'.I . HE , r148 1, 200 505 42 .
7500 How. Smoke 144 o o
105"., HOI; . HE,l.l 54 310 353 44 .1
:;)~!. ~"'1 How . HEi :.v..B 540 " V.
1~5~~ How . Scoke 100 O.
l05tu:l How . /l.T 160 v O.
:lccket, HE, /IT 1,900 1 ,419 74.7 .240 100 41.7
;.rennce , h'md , frn.g . 7,200 2,275 31.5 1 ,200 900 75.
GraM_eEl , hend , off 3,600 o o 600 o o
Grcnrde , r i f le , ~ T 2 ,470 250 10.1 260 210 SO . S
Gr enr.de , r ifl e , fr~g . 1, 000 150 15. 100 90 90 .
C r cn:'~le , r ifl e , smoke 500 140 28. 50 50 100 .
Signal , te , AN , (3 colors) 300 o o. 100 o O.
Cr rt. r ifle , grennde , rth 2;000 o O. 200 150 75 .
Cl rt, rifle , gr en('de , fA3 200 150 75.
Cl' rt. f.UX . gr enr-de , M7 200 '0 O.
PERCENT: CE OF "lU~UNIT IO N RECOVERED
DZ "WI! 32 .7 DZ "Ie"
l~JDICAL

Dextrose , btl. 120 30 25 . lS 6 33 .3

Sod, Ci:.:"a.:.;; , box 40 30 25 . 6 4 06 . 6
Sulfani '~o::' 1e , box 160 40 25 . 24 S 33 .3
bater, d~~t ., box 4D 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
Pla sma, f'k~ . 240 60 25 . 36 12 33.3
BandQge , g~u ze , box 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .
Cot ton, a=30rbent , pkg. 240 60 25 . 36 12 33 .3
(las ter , adhesive , spl. 160 40 25. 24 S 33 .3
Spl int, be3 b~ood , set 60 10 16.6 9 9 100.
Splint , Ar.-:t' Le6: ~ !tina 40 10 25 . 6 2 33 .3
' Splint, w~re , l adder , ea . 150 30 20 . 15 15 lDV.
:-",m tt,lthal , 5C'dium , 'cox 40 10 25. 6 6 100 .
Alconol , ethyl, qt . 2 o 0
A1conol, denHtured, pt. 12 1 8.3 6 4 66.6
tior;>nine , box 125 )0 24 . 25 a 32.
~ul f adi~ , ine , pkg . 225 50 22 . 2 34 20 58. 8

Bandage , plaster paris 40 10 25 . 6 6 100 .

Dressing , fust - a.l.d , large 300 70 23.3 45 16 35 . 5

DrOSSl.rtg , fl.r s t - aid , small 960 240 25 . 156 4B 30 .7

nlanket, wool , 0 . 0 . 120 30 2,. 24 6 25 .

Litter, f oldi ng , aluminum 40 10 25 . 6 2 33.3
Spll.nt, w~ re, gauze , roll 50 10 20 . 7 o 0
PERCENTnGE OF ~DIChL E,JU~n ~~
• Dl ",. 11 £3 . 1 52 . 2
Crl.c2iIC.,.,i. ,/AttF..uili
Grenade, nand , smoke , HC , Ud
Gro1nCl.d e , hand , ince nd~ary ,
Grent.:.de , iland , smolte , loP ,
 -.
"
Chemical \iarfare ( Cont'd )

Al..T I'\:T
DEL RCD

Grenade , hand, sJ:lOke, col ored , " - LO . orange 12 12 100 .

Grenade , nand , smoke , col ored , ~-ld , green 6 6 100.
Grenade, hand, smoke , col ored, ~-ld , ' r eo 6 6 100 .
~EP..cEm~~ OF CH.!L.ICAL f.Att.FArtE ~U IPi:ENT tt.8COJcltill ­ 90.
Z!:GlllZill
Compos1tion, C- 2 250 250 100 .
Caps , blasting , sp ec ial , non- elecLric <5
o O.
Fuse , blasting , time , ( l<X)'roll) 1
o O.
Fuse , lighters 25 o u.
Prima- -cord (100 ' roll) < O. O.
Bags , sand . 500 o u.
P!l(Ci:l.T"GE or' EIlGI NEEk E.l<l"~T JID:0VEkED 16 . 6
PERCEl'lT"a.> OF Iili:OV ilIlY or' rtiSUPPLY rCA, D f 1

Glider r esupply - loa~

Prcht . resupply - J9 .6~

b. D f 3
(1) Thirty- five (35) C-4? pl anes to DZ "I J" (By Paraohute)
,lUhHTEru.;;.sTEd

.wr &.J.'T PC T
Q§!, kCD <!C D

.~tions , t ype "KII 9,120 216 2.4

lags , vlnyl 285 JO 10 . 5
. -<,cElIT.GE QUAHTEllLASTER rTE1i5 RECOV ERED 6. 5%

.'EIJIC~
Blanke t s , vl ocl , 0 , 0 . :.c ,700 600 22 . 2
Litte r s, f olding 272 120 44 .1
Bundles , ilisc . iJedical supp lies 12 5 41. 6
35.9%
SIGNj\L
Radio , .3Crt-694 4 2 50.
p:"".C~l·r~GE OF SIGN.L l TEl.s RECOYffiED - 50~

PlliCHllThCE D)' J(l!:COVEkY Or' llliSUPt'LY FOn D f 3

Parachute r esupply - JO , ~

c. D f 4

(1) Thirty (30) C- 47 planes to Dl ".. ". (By pal'achute)

~UAAT'~.;s TER

Rations , type "1\ 11 13, 960 4, 320 30.9

PIlrtCEllTAGE Of RECO'ID<Y OF ,tFSUFYLY fO!< D f 4
Parachute re supply - 3 0 . 9~
d. D f 6
(1 ) Four ( 4) gliders CG- 4- A to Dl Jr. l " ,

- 4­

•
 , •

nliT iWT PCT

ITEM DEL lLCD RCD
. il.re , f"-ll~mi . 20 20 100 .
"P.::I.dio , SCH.- 536 4 4 100 .
.":adio, SCR- 610 2 2 100.
~adio , SCH.- 69 4 4 4 100 .
~att e ries, EA-30 1,000 1,000 100.
Batter ies, 8;.- 39 150 34 22 .6
Batt er:u;! s , BJt- 40 25 24 96.
Batte ries, & - 70 100 72 72.
?I.o s sage Books J 1,- 210 300 50 16.6
Tape , TL-83 100 100 100.
Tape , 1'"1,-94 lOu 100 100 .
Flasnlight, TL-l22- h 100 100 100.
P:;JWENLGE Or' SlGNhL E.;lJIPMi.NT fu.CO'ffllED o3 . 9~
OrtDNJIICE
Gun- SLl.b-I,lscrlinEl , MlAl 15 15 100.
.r..:ortar, 6Ornm, 12 2 2 100 .
~aun ch er, grenad e, U? 8 Il 100.
~ aun cher , grenade, M8 5 5 100.
.;l oth , wiping, Ibs . 200 200 100.
~a tches, cotton , M 10 10 100 .
~4d iator, 1/4 ton truck 4 4 100 .
~it , tire repair, cold patch 6 6 100 .
Rl.fle , U. S. Cal. .30, m. 20 20 100 .
PEf(.Ci!Wl'~GE OF ORDN:.NCE EQUIPllliNT REl.XNUtED 100%
PEHCENT~GO: CI' msUPPLY RECOVEr<Y Fat D I- 6 - 91. 9%

e. D I- 8
(1) Thirty- four (J4) C- 47 planes to DZ ".:" . (By parachute)
OI<DNnNCE
75.nm HOil . amnW1ition 2,800 1, 000
?EHc;l1IThGl:. Of RESUPPLY rto.C0 V-LltY FOrt D I- 8
f. Percentage of recovery of resuppl,r for entire operation .
G~d er rtesup~ ly - 95 .9p

Prcht . Resu~p ly - 41 .4p

2 . JIIlY resupply recovered by units and not de liv er ed to Duision dumps are
not lllcludad in t otals as figures Vlere not r eported .

3. rne r eport is a clear 1ndic ation that g lider r €supp~ i s considerably

more effective · as practically lOO~ of the content~ of bl1dcrs was recov ered .

t
4. 'Ills last resupply by air on D 6 gives th o best gauge on eff~ctiveness
of parachut e re supply . According t o reports from tho rear base , tnirty - i'otU' (34)
plane s Wl.t h six rack loads and three door loads ~ach wora deliv ered. nll rack
l oads we re dropped in a very small ar ;,-;a and were re covere d wl. tnin· a few haUl'S . No
door l oads we re se en comins down . Tilis is o:1ither an indication that the door loads
,Iere di schurg6d far from the t&rget area or tne door loads were aC1..ually not l oaded.

5 . liasupply by Pc:..rachutc could be o:ffoc Uv ~ if only rack loads were used and
al l plan as dischargtld t ht.d r loads ovo)r the idontif1cation r.u:.rkers on the gr oWld .
: t is be liev ed that door loads should not normally b~ used as it causes too g r eat
~ disp~rsi o n of supplias and might en ab l ~ th3 enemy to obtain u very h1gh percentage
o f the t otal suppli ~ s dropp ed.
- 5 ­
#O~l-075
~~ . - - .. " ....

~ - ..

Al 7 '
- 0r.. ',1
t;:

:~-..