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Freedom of expression has a precarious history in Mexico. For 71 years, Mexico was
ruled by a single party which controlled all levels of political life. The PRI (Partido
Revolutionario Institutional) maintained a tight grip on the media, and freedom of
expression was extremely curtailed. During this period a pattern of impunity for
human rights violations was established. Despite reforms, this historical pattern
persists, including the present impunity for aggression against journalists. During
the rule of the PRI through most of the 20th century, Mexico experienced significant
economic growth coupled with extremely skewed income distribution.
Marginalization from economic and political benefits resulted in the growth of
dissident groups, such as student, labour and indigenous activists. From the 1960s
to the 1980s, during a period known as La Guerra Sucia (the Dirty War), these
challenges to PRI authority were met with extreme repression, including
extrajudicial executions, massacres and forced disappearances. Impunity has
persisted for the overwhelming majority of these crimes.
Extensive electoral reforms eventually led to the federal election of the Partido
Acción Nacional (PAN) in 2000. While the government engaged in a series of
reforms aimed at ameliorating the human rights situation in Mexico, including the
protection of journalists’ freedom of expression, shadows of Mexico’s institutional
history of impunity remain and in many respects there is not robust institutional
support for human rights.
During this period of legal and democratic reform, Mexico has also suffered from
significant growth in illegal drug trafficking organizations (“DTOs”). In recent years,
their influence has spread throughout the country, bringing with it increasing
violence and insecurity.
Mexico has a long history of reacting to threats to its stability with militarization. For
example, Mexico relies extensively on its armed forces to engage in counter-
narcotics and counter-insurgency measures, such as responses to the insurgency
and perceived insurgency in Chiapas and other southern Mexican states in the
1990s. Mexican authorities consider local police forces to lack the technical
expertise and professionalism required to undertake such tasks, in addition viewing
them as highly prone to corruption. This approach has long received political and
financial support from the United States, which has also traditionally viewed the
Mexican military as more reliable than its police forces. Its financial aid to the
Mexican military for counter-narcotics greatly increased in the late 1990s. At that
time, much of the funding came from the International Narcotics Control Account,
administered by the State Department.
After the election of President Fox and the PAN in 2000, violence related to the
narcotics trade began to mount slightly with a small government offensive in the
1
states of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, and along the U.S/Mexico border, with the
purpose of fighting Mexico’s powerful DTOs in those regions. However, violence
and the number of casualties has skyrocketed since December 2006, when
President Felipe Calderón’s newly formed government began a war on the DTOs in
earnest.1 According to The University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute’s analysis
of data from Agencia Reforma Newspaper Group, since January, 2007, 28,228
people have died in drug related violence in Mexico.
2
Those crimes which are investigated are often investigated negligently and are
marred by collaboration with criminal organizations and unlawful investigation
methods, such as the fabrication of evidence, that lead to incorrect results.
The natural consequence that has arisen out of this atmosphere of violence and
impunity has been widespread self-censorship on the part of Mexico’s journalists. In
August, 2008, an international mission of press freedom NGOs confirmed that self-
censorship amongst journalists was on the rise in Mexico, mainly due to fear of
DTOs and mistrust of state and federal authorities, whose lack of response to these
crimes many attribute to their possible links with crime .7 Indeed, journalists labour
under both perceived threats, arising from a state of utter impunity regarding
crimes against the press, as well as direct coercion, both externally and internally
from editorial boards and media owners. A failure to implement a program of state
protection and training for journalists who work in such dangerous conditions leaves
most journalists vulnerable to the violent tactics of their attackers. Low wages and
fear tactics can increase susceptibility to bribes. Some media groups make the
situation worse by keeping journalists as casual employees in order to avoid paying
benefits and having to comply with labour rights legislation.8 If a journalist accepts a
bribe, they are then expected to treat the briber, favourably.9 This already
precarious situation is exacerbated by the dependence of many media outlets on
government contracts, without which many would have to close. 10
There is a lack of solidarity amongst journalists and others in the media industry,
who might otherwise form lobby groups or unions to demand protection and
important legislative changes. 11 This lack of solidarity is particularly great in areas
of high risk, where there is a tendency to lay low in order to avoid becoming a
target. In addition, DTOs have corrupted elements of the press media, which has
6
Sweeney, Bill & Lauren Wolfe & Lew Serviss, eds., “Silence or Death in Mexico’s Press:
Crime, Violence, and Corruption Are Destroying the Country’s Journalism” (September
2010), online: Centre for the Protection of Journalists
http://cpj.org/reports/cpj_mexico_english.pdf at 3.
7
Article 19 et al., “Press Freedom in Mexico: The Shadow of Impunity and Violence” (August
2008), online: http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/mexico-shadow-of-impunity-and-
violence.pdf at 4.
8
Estevez, Dolia, “Protecting Press Freedom in an Environment of Violence and Impunity”
(May 2010), online: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
http://wilsoncentre.org/topics/pubs/Protecting Press Freedom.Estevez.pdf at 15.
9
Estevez, Dolia, “Protecting Press Freedom in an Environment of Violence and Impunity”
(May 2010), online: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
http://wilsoncentre.org/topics/pubs/Protecting Press Freedom.Estevez.pdf at 15.
10
Sweeney, Bill & Lauren Wolfe & Lew Serviss, eds., “Silence or Death in Mexico’s Press:
Crime, Violence, and Corruption Are Destroying the Country’s Journalism” (September
2010), online: Centre for the Protection of Journalists
http://cpj.org/reports/cpj_mexico_english.pdf at 17.
11
Article 19 et al., “Press Freedom in Mexico: The Shadow of Impunity and Violence” (August
2008), online: http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/mexico-shadow-of-impunity-and-
violence.pdf at 15.
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served to create an atmosphere of mistrust between media workers and
journalists.12
The efforts of the Mexican government to protect freedom of expression have been
largely ineffective. In February 2006, the Chamber of Deputies created the Special
Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Journalists (“Special Prosecutor”). When it
was created, the Fox government, still in power at that time, stated that the Special
Prosecutor would be competent to direct investigations and prosecute crimes
committed against journalists in cases where the crime was connected with their
profession as a journalist. In reality, it is not empowered to tackle cases involving
drug traffickers or organized crime, and it has no formal ability to investigate crimes
or make charges.13 The result of this setup has been that, in its first 4 years, the
Special Prosecutor has averaged only one prosecution per year.14 Its institutional
weakness has been exacerbated by weak leadership. A new Special Prosecutor,
Gustavo Salas Chávez, was appointed in February 2010. Mr. Salas Chávez is a
lawyer, although he lacks both previous prosecutorial work experience and a
background in human rights or freedom of expression. It was reported that he was
instructed by the Attorney General Arturo Chávez Chávez to review the office’s
backlog of cases, combat impunity and reorganize the office. In a recent hearing
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Salas stated that the office
was undergoing institutional reform to improve its operations in various areas. He
also stated that the office is planning to expand its duties to include all crimes
against freedom of expression and therefore is changing its name to the (Fiscalía
Especial para la Atención de Delitos Cometidos contra la Libertad de Expressión).
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lack of political will.15 However, the recent killing of a 21 year-old intern
photographer for the newspaper El Diaro in Ciudad Júarez and the paper’s
subsequent plea to the DTOs in an editorial for an end to the bloodshed has led to a
public uproar that has resulted in President Calderón stating, on September 24,
2010, that he will do what he can to expedite legislative reform in this area.
15
Estevez, Dolia, “Protecting Press Freedom in an Environment of Violence and Impunity”
(May 2010), online: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
http://wilsoncentre.org/topics/pubs/Protecting Press Freedom.Estevez.pdf at 17.