Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

123968 April 24, 2003

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J.: The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law, the February 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an action for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation. The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows: On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners. The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim: xxx xxx xxx

That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect. xxx xxx xxx.3

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of Donation4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina. In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, to wit: Tax Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands.

Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando, La Union a complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas who were alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for the cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the partition of the properties among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of their shares. The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer6 that the donation in favor of Ursulina was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code,7 hence, the deed did not have to comply with the requirements for the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is null and void as the ground mentioned therein is not among those provided by law to be the basis thereof; and at any rate, the revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint in court within the prescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the complaint was filed, already lapsed. By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa,8 found for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus: WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition of the estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs. SO ORDERED.9 The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestina retained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion that the donation is mortis causa,10 and that while the deed contained an attestation clause and an acknowledgment showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the acknowledgment was defective as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the deed before the notary public, thereby rendering the entire document void.11 Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of Donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis causa.12 On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the ground mentioned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the trial court held that the legal grounds for such revocation as provided under the Civil Code arise only in cases of donations inter vivos, but not in donations mortis causa which are revocable at will during the lifetime of the donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to comply with the formalities required therefor, the Deed of Revocation was a superfluity.13 Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court erred: I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY CELESTINA GANUELAS; II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;

III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA GANUELAS.14 Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main consideration for its execution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the donor's death;15 that the provision on the effectivity of the donation after the donor's death simply meant that absolute ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor's death;16 and that since the donation is inter vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760,17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil Code. In a letter of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this Court's January 28, 1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for failure to submit the name and address of their new counsel, explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are "willing and ready to waive whatever rights" they have over the properties subject of the donation. Petitioners, who were required to comment on the letter, by Comment of October 28, 1998,21 welcome private respondents' gesture but pray that "for the sake of enriching jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and resolved." The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.22 Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24 If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.27 The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29 More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.30 More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied) To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.33 In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained provisions almost identical to those found in the deed subject of the present case: That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x. the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis supplied) In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-quoted provision conclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did not contain any clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor's death. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.35 As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of Donation to be mortis causa. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur. Puno, J ., took no part. Knows one of the parties. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 24955 September 4, 1926

JULIAN SOLLA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. URSULA ASCUETA, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Marcelino Lontok for plaintiffs-appellants. Antonio Belmonte, Miguel Florentino, Jose A. Espiritu and Camus, Delgado and Recto for defendantsappellants. VILLA-REAL, J.: These are two appeals by the plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which is as follows: The court finds that the plaintiffs Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor are the surviving legatees of the testratrix Maria Solla; that the plaintiff Julian Solla and Lucia Solla are heirs of Sergio Solla; Ambrosio Lagmay is the heir of the deceased Cayetana Solla; Francisco Serna, 2. and Juana Baclig of the deceased Josefa Solla; Pedro Serna and Agapita Serna of the deceased Jacinto Serna, and that Pedro Garcia is nephew and heir of the deceased Matias Seveda. That the defendant Ursula is the widow of the deceased Leandro Serano; that the other defendants Simeon, Cesario, Santiago, Primitiva and Maxima, surnamed Serrano, are the children and heirs of the said Leandro Serrano, who died on August 5, 1921; that Simeon Serrano is the executor of Leandro Serrano and possesses the property claimed by the plaintiffs. That Leandro Serrano during his lifetime also possessed and enjoyed the said property up to the day of his death; that this property, the possession or delivery of which is sought by the plaintiffs, should be separated from the estate of Leandro Serrano, with the exception of the parcel of land bought from Matias Seveda, Exhibit 5; and the defendants, especially Simeon Serrano, are ordered to separate and deliver the same to each and everyone of the plaintiffs together with onehalf of the fruits, or the value thereof, from September 5, 1921; that the parcels of land referred to are indicated in Maria Solla's will Exhibit B and more particularly described in plaintiffs' Exhibit A. It is ordered that a partition, in accordance with the law, be made of the land in which the plaintiffs have a participation. It is also ordered that the defendants, especially, the executor Simeon Serrano, deliver to the plaintiffs their respective share in cash or in other property, as a legacy, with one-half of the costs against each of the two parties. It is ordered.

In support of their appeal, the defendants-appellants assigned the following supposed errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: 1. The trial court erred in holding that the lack of appropriate description of each parcel of land claimed is no bar to this action, and that said defect was ignored in the stipulation of facts; 2. The trial court erred in holding that at the trial of the case the attorneys for both parties also agreed before the court that the latter might decide the case on Exhibit A is evidence of the plaintiffs, and in holding that said Exhibit A is a correct statement of the property left by the deceased Maria Solla and that the attorney for the defendants admitted it as such; 3. The trial court erred in not considering in its judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the defendants as evidence, and considering the document Exhibit 4 of said defendants as deficient, weak and worthless evidence; 4. The trial court in not holding that the action of the plaintiffs in this case has prescribed; 5. The trial court erred in interpreting and holding that paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will, Exhibit C, ordered the delivery of the legacies left by Maria Solla in her will Exhibit B, to the plaintiffs, and that said paragraph affects each and everyone of the parcels of land in the property deeds of Leandro Serano, Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and in holding that the said paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will cancels all of the rights acquired by him, and is the immediate cause of the action brought by the plaintiffs; 6. The trial court erred in not holding that the third clause of Leandro Serrano's will, Exhibit C, refers only to the pious bequests specified in Maria Solla's will, Exhibit B; 7. The trial court erred in ordering the separation and delivery of the unidentified and undetermined estate of Leandro Serrano, together with half of the fruits or their value from September 5, 1921, and in ordering the partition of the unidentified and undetermined property between the parties without designating the shares; 8. The lower court erred in ordering the defendants to separate and deliver the property in question to the plaintiffs, as well as one-half of the fruits of the same from September 5, 1921; 9. The lower court erred in not holding the same of the property of Maria Solla was inherited by Leandro Serrano by universal title and some by renunciation and sale by the legatees, which title was further protected and cleared by acquisitive prescription, and in not holding that said property of Maria Solla was merged with the estate which passed into the hands of the universal heir Leandro Serrano; 10. The lower court erred in holding that the property in question does not belong to the estate of Leandro Serrano; 11. The lower court erred in issuing the order of December 13, 1924 reinstating Rosenda Lagmay as one of the plaintiffs, and in holding that Lucia Solla is one of the plaintiffs when her name as such plaintiff had been stricken out; 12. The lower court erred in not considering the last amendment presented by the plaintiffs to their amended complaint; 13. The lower court erred in not considering the amended answer of the defendants of October 14, 1924; 14. The lower court erred in denying the motion for dismissal of September 3, 1924; and

15. The lower court erred in denying the motion for a new trial filed by the defendants. On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellants, in support of their appeal, assign the following supposed errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: (1) The trial court committed an error in holding that the silence of the plaintiffs leads to the belief that they consented to the exclusive enjoyment of the said property by Leandro Serrano; and (2) in not ordering the defendants, as heirs of Leandro Serrano, to render an account to the plaintiffs of the products of the lands of the deceased Maria Solla from the time the said Leandro Serrano took possession thereof as executor of the deceased Maria Solla. The case having been called for trial on October 15, 1924, the parties submitted the following statement of facts and petitioned the court to render judgment thereon: AGREEMENT Both parties admit the following facts to be true: 1. Da. Maria Solla died in June, 1883, in the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, leaving a will executed and recorded in accordance with the laws then in force, but which had not been probated in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. There were named in said will, as legatees, Sergio Soll, Cayetano Solla, Josefa Solla, Jacinto Serna, Rosenda Lagmay, Silvestra Sajor and Matias Seveda, and Leandro Serrano, as universal heir, with their shares given them by the will above-mentioned. 3. Said legatees or their descendants or heirs did not judicially claim their legacies during the lifetime of Leandro Serrano, of which he had taken possession, neither was any testamentary proceeding instituted for the settlement of the estate left by Maria Solla and that Leandro Serrano did not deliver the legacies in question, which he possessed in his name until his death, having declared the property for taxation as his own and collected the income therefrom for himself. 4. That the plaintiffs Julian Solla, Lucia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Rosenda Lagmay, Francisco Serna, 2. Juana Baclig, Pedro Serna, Agapita Serna and Pedro Garcia are the descendants or heirs of some of the original legatees, two of whom are the plaintiffs Silvestra Sajor and Rosenda Lagmay; and the defendants are heirs of Leandro Serrano. 5. That the said legacies produce 35 uyones of play net annually, and maguey, which the plaintiffs claim amount to P1,000 as against P300 claimed by the defendants. 6. That the property of the legacy situated in Cabugao passed into possession of Simeon Serrano by virtue of Leandro Serrano's will as executor thereof, and that said legacies have been and are mixed with other property of the estate of Leandro Serrano. The plaintiffs present as evidence their Exhibits B and C and the defendants also present as evidence their Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Therefore, both parties pray Honorable Court to render upon the stipulation of facts, the facts proven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs against defeated party. Vigan, October 14, 1924.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO DIRECTO Attorney for the plaintiffs (Sgd.) MIGUEL FLORENTINO ANT. BELMONTE Attorneys for the defendants Later in the morning of the same day the parties again appeared before the court, and the following proceedings were had: A little after ten. COURT. Attorneys Antonio Belmonte and Antonio Directo again appear and ask the court to receive their respective documentary evidence in this case. Attorney Directo presents Exhibit A, which is certified copy of the clerk of the court and is made a part of the complaint. exhibit B is a certified copy of Mria Solla's will and plaintiffs' Exhibit C is a certified copy of Leandro Serrano's will. BELMONTE. I agree with the stipulation of facts that these documents are integral parts thereof and the court should consider them as such. COURT. Have you any objection? BELMONTE. There is an agreement between both parties that there will be no objection, that is to say, that all the evidence may be admitted as part of the stipulation. COURT. The exhibits mentioned in the stipulation are admitted as part of the same. BELMONTE. The defense also presents Exhibit 1, as evidence and as an integral part of the statement of facts, which is a duly registered possessory information; Exhibit 2 is also a duly registered possessory information; Exhibit 4 is a public document wherein the legatees renounced the legacies in question; Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale; Exhibit 6 is a Spanish translation of Exhibit 5; Exhibit 7 is a composition title issued by the State, all of which refer to the land in question. COURT. Each and every one of the exhibits presented by the Attorney Belmonte also forms a part of the stipulation of facts between both attorneys and are admitted. BELMONTE. And with this presentation of evidence we submit the case for the decision of the court. Exhibit A mentioned by the parties in their second appearance, consists of a list of the property which it is said was left by the deceased Maria Solla. Exhibit B is the nuncupative of the said deceased Maria Solla executed on April 19, 1883. Exhibit C is the will of Leonardo Serrano, universal heir of Maria Solla, executed August 22, 1921. Exhibit 1 is a possessory information proceeding covering 15 parcels of land situated in the municipality of Cabugao, Province of Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on April 1, 1895, and registered in the

registry of deeds on April 25, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his application, claims to be the absolute owner in fee simple of said 15 parcels. Said petition is supported by the testimony of Julio Solla, Apolonio Solla, Mauro Solla and Juan Solla, children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatees named by the deceased Maria Solla. Exhibit 2 is another possessory information proceeding covering 36 parcels of land situated in the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on March 20, 1895 and registered in the registry of deeds on May 20, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his petition, also claims to be absolute owner in fee simple of the said 36 parcels ands is supported by the testimony of Juan Solla, son of the legatee Sergio Solla. Exhibit 3 is another possessory information proceeding covering 65 parcels situated within the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on March 26, 1895 and registered in the registry of deeds on April 24, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his petition, claims to be the absolute owner in fee of said land. Exhibit 4 is the record of certain proceedings of the president of the municipality of Cabugao at the instance of Leandro Serrano in which formal renunciation of their respective legacies is made by the legatees named in Maria Solla's will. Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale made by Matias Sevedea in favor of Leandro Serrano of one parcel of land instituted in Cabugao which he had received from Maria Solla as a legacy. Exhibit 7 is a royal title issued by the Spanish Government in favor of Leandro Serrano to six parcels of land situated in the barrio of Alongoong of the municipality of Cabugao of the Province of Ilocos Sur. It also appears from the record that Leandro Serrano took possession of the property left by Maria Solla immediately after her death which occurred on June 11, 1883, and continued in possession of the same until his death, which took place on August 5, 1921, having instituted possessory information proceedings, declared the property for taxation, paid the land tax on the same and enjoyed its products exclusively. On account of the intimate relation between them, we shall consider the first two assignments of error together. The defendants-appellants that the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs' Exhibit A as a part of the stipulation of facts, disregarding the complete absence of a description of the land which they to recover. From folio 2 of the transcript of the stenographic notes it appears that on the morning of October 16, 1924 the attorney for the defendants, Mr. Antonio Belmonte, agreed to the admission of all of the documentary evidence presented at that time as a part of the agreement, among which is found the document Exhibit A, which contains a list of the supposed legacies left by the deceased Maria Solla, to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs, with their respective descriptions, which were the subject-matter of the complaint herein, leaving to the sound discretion of the court to weigh the same. It is true that the court found that six of the parcels described therein were the exclusive property of Leandro Serrano and are covered by the royal title, Exhibit 7 of the defendants, but this does not in any manner mean that the other parcels were not those left by the testratix Maria Solla to her brothers and nephews. Therefore, the first and second assignments of error are groundless. In regard to the third assignment of error of the defendants-appellants that Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 having been presented as evidence by the defendants and admitted by the plaintiffs as an integral part of the stipulation of facts, it was an error not to give full weight to said documents.

The fourth assignment of error of the defendants-appellants raises the question of prescription of the plaintiffs' action. It appears from the stipulation of facts that, aside from the renunciation mad by the legatees of their respective legacies, according to Exhibit 4, Leandro Serrano was in possession of the property left by Maria Solla from June 11, 1883 until August 5, 1921, having obtained a possessory information in his favor, which was duly registered in the registry of deeds, exclusively enjoyed the products thereof, declared it as his property for the purpose of taxation and paid the corresponding land tax thereon, without any of the legatees or their successors in interest having formally nor judicially claimed any title thereto or asked for any share of the products, or contributed to the payment of the land tax. Furthermore, in the possessory information proceedings wherein Leandro Serrano claimed to be the absolute owner in fee simple of the lands involved therein, the children of Sergio Solla, one of the legates of the deceased Maria Solla, testified in support of the petitions. So that under the provisions of articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code, as well as the provisions of sections 38, 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have lost by, extinctive prescription, not only all right of action to recover the ownership of the property left to their predecessors in interest, but also whatever right of ownership they have had to the same because of Leandro Serrano's exclusive, open, peaceful and continuous possession which was adverse to all the world including the legatees and their successors, for the period of thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, evidenced not only by his applications for possessory information, but also by his exclusive enjoyment of the products of said property, even if it is considered that the legatees have not renounced their part in the legacy has given him, by operation of law, exclusive and absolute title to the said properties. (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 869.) The fifth and sixth assignments of error raise the question of the true interpretation of the provisions of the last will of the testratix Maria Solla in regard to the obligation imposed upon the universal heir named by her, Leandro Serrano, and of the provisions of the last will of the latter in regard to the obligation imposed by him upon his heir, and executor Simeon Serrano, one of the herein defendants-appellants. The following are the pertinent parts of Maria Solla's will: I also and order that there be given, in the way of legacies, to my brother Sergio Solla and sisters Cayetana Solla and Josefa Solla, to my nephew Jacinto Serna and to Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor whom I have raised, and to my servant Matias Seveda, distributed in the following manner . . . I also declare that I have no forced heirs, my parents and my two sons having died, and I am at liberty to name any their I care to and whom I consider proper. Therefore not having anyone who inspires me with confidence and is willing to comply strictly with my orders and requests in this will, I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson, as my universal heir who is a legitimate son of my son Modesto Solosa, and is single; and besides I have raised him from infancy, and have not yet given him anything notwithstanding that he has always been with me, always helping me; and I desire him to comply with the obligation to give or deliver to the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena for an ordinary require mass for the first eight days thereof and on the ninth, or last day, a solemn requiem mass, with vigil and a large bier, for these masses and for the repose of my soul and those of my parents, husband, children and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death he will insist that his heirs comply with all that I have here ordered. The pertinent parts of the will of Leandro Serrano (Exhibit C) are as follows: Third. I command my executor to put all of my property in order, separating first the property of his deceased grandmother Capitana Maria Solla, because she directed in her will that her

property be distributed strictly in conformity with her wishes and as she earnestly requested the compliance of her bequests I obligate my heirs to comply with the same; for that reason it is my wish and I really should like to deliver it to my granddaughter, Corazon Serrano, my adopted daughter, but as she is already dead, I deliver it to her father Simeon Serrano because among my children he is the only one who is very obedient to me and I hope he will comply with all my orders and those of his grandmother Maria Solla. In fact he is the only one of my children who was able to help me in all my troubles and he is the most obedient one of them; because, although I became angry with him and threatened him many times, he paid no attention to my reprimands. Such is not the case with my other children, who, when I became a little angry, each time drifted farther away and have never offered me any help, which had accused me much pain, but, nevertheless, they continue to be my children and I do not exclude them. xxx xxx xxx

Fifth. On occupation of the fact that all of the property of the deceased Capitana Solla was given to my son Simeon I order him not to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of my grandmother and also of nine and to have a mass said on the first and ninth days of the yearly novena and that he erect a first class bier. xxx xxx xxx

I insistently order that the property of my deceased grandmother Capitana Maria be disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine. As may be seen Maria Solla named grandson Leandro Serrano in her will as her universal heir to her property and ordered him to strictly comply with her orders and requests and that at the hour of his death to make the same insistence upon his heirs to comply with all that she has ordered. As may also be seen Leandro Serrano named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate that which came from his deceased grandmother Maria Solla, which he gives to his said son Simeon Serrano and orders that same be disposed of exclusively in conformity with the wishes of his said grandmother, not forgetting the souls of all of his grandmother's relatives and of his own for whose repose nine masses were to be said annually during nine days, with a solemn mass on the first and last days. Now, then, what are the orders and requests that Maria Solla wanted the universal heir named by her in her will, Leandro Serrano, to faithfully comply with and to make his heirs comply with, and what are the orders of Maria Solla which Leandro Serrano ordered his executor and heir Simeon Serrano to comply with? In the first place, there is the distribution of the legacies given in her will to her brothers, nephew, protegees and servant. In the second place, the delivery of a sufficient sum of money to the parish of Cabugao for the annual novena, consisting of eight ordinary masses and one solemn requiem mass, together with vigil and bier on the last day for the repose of the soul of the testratix and her parents, children, husband and other relatives; and in the third place, the order that Leandro Serrano demand, with the same insistence, that this heirs comply with all that she had ordered. Leandro Serrano have complied with all of these commands and orders during his lifetime, some wholly and others partially. The orders and requests that he could and should have fully complied with during his lifetime were to distribute the legacies and to order his heirs to comply with all her wishes specified in her will. The order or request that he was able to comply with only partially was to deliver to the parish priest a sufficient sum of money necessary for the annual masses for the repose of the soul of Maria Solla and her parents, husband, children and other relatives.

It is not logical to suppose that Maria Solla in ordering Leandro Serrano to insist in his will that his heirs after his death comply with all the requests contained in her said will, referred to the orders and requests that he could and should comply with during his lifetime, because neither is it logical nor reasonable to suppose that she for a moment doubted that the person whom she had named as her universal heir for, according to her, he was the only person in whom she had any confidence would comply with her requests. If that is so, Maria Solla could not have referred to other than the pious orders and requests, because, by reason of their nature, they were the only ones which Leandro Serrano could not wholly comply with during his lifetime, but that his heirs would continue to do so. And Leandro Serrano, in complying with the requests of Maria Solla in his will by ordering his son Simeon Serrano, to whom he bequeathed all of the property received from the former, to comply with all of the requests of the same, could not have meant but those requests which Maria Solla wished complied with by the heirs of Leandro Serrano which are those relating to the pious bequests. She confirms this on the fifth clause of her will quoted above, in which she says: "On account of the fact that all the property of the deceased Capitana Solla is bequeathed to my son Simeon I order him not to forget the souls of my grandmother's relatives." From this is evidently appears that Leandro Serrano bequeathed all of the property of the deceased Maria Solla to his son Simeon Serrano only in order that he might comply with her pious requests. Furthermore if to ease his conscience it had been Leandro Serrano's desire to deliver the aforesaid legacies to the legatees or to their successors in interest he would have done so during his lifetime or would have said so clearly in his will and would not have given all of his said property to his son Simeon Serrano. In order to determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in his position, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, should take into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will executed. (40 Cyc., 1392.) Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will. such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases. (40 Cyc., 1399.) In the present case, it clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla's intention, in ordering her universal heir Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the compliance of which she had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the application of the words "all that I have here ordered" used by the said Maria Solla and the words "all her orders" used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to the pious orders and substituting the phrase "in regard to the annual masses" after the words used by both testators, respectively. The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro Serrano mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will relative to the legacies and not to pious bequests exclusively. As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth, the points raised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said two assignments last mentioned. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error made therein are without merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the conclusions we have arrived at with regard to the assignments of error made by the defendants-appellants. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must be, as hereby, reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants. C. de la Victoria for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator. Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil. 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said: . . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her

witnesses. And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil. 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared: From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate. What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appelleepetitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil. 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed. Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193). In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

G.R. No. L-23770

February 18, 1926

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE CALLEJA, defendants-appellees. Domingo Imperial for appellant Mariano Locsin for appellees. AVANCEA, C.J.:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral. On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas. The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary proceedings. From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which this property came. This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff. The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable property. The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:

For the foregoing reasons it is held: 1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral should die before them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent. In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000, without express pronouncement as to costs. The other defendants are absolved from the complaint. Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor (reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost importance to determine the time when the land acquired the character of reservable property. It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into a contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will to make a partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes testate estates like the one now before us. When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions must be passed upon by the court. For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said partition was approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the following language: The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of the inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of inventory and the consequences thereof. xxx xxx xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue

of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court. As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha. It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868 tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the reservation now under consideration. In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this obligation. If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt that she could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises whether the latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the reservees to commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha. In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation. Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father

Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation. The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the return of these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this security, the recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the property is required by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse when the property has been sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the case of Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that: * * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse. Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided. The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990 SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, Petitioners, vs. VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, Respondents. PARAS, J.: Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows: chanrobles virtual law library The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation since.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20) Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit: ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ. II chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN. III chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR. IV chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN. V chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO. VI chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. VII chanrobles virtual law library THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS. From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We find merit in the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows: Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17) Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that: To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child - for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935) Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry

Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision of the respondent court, which is that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that: . . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by succession, their alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches. The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531) chanrobles virtual law library Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her onehalf of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39) chanrobles virtual law library The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

Miciano v. Brimo (case where the decedent wanted RP laws instead of his turkish law to apply to the intrinsic validity of his will and whoever contests it loses his "mana" - note that in the end, RP laws still applied by the processual presumption as no evidence of turkish law presented): Although Andre Brimo opposed his brother's will, he's not deemed to have contested the legacy because the choice-of-law clause in the will was contrary to law -but since there's a policy of giving primacy to the last will and testament of the testator, the court should have adopted a policy centered approach instead of the mechanical application of lex nationalii. MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH: decedent was a resident of RP, executed will in RP, intended RP law to apply, will concerned properties located in RP - can justify application of RP Law DISINGENUOUS CHARACTERIZATION (applicable choice-of-law rule is determined by how the issue was characterized by the court. So if characterize the main issue to call for the forum's application of its own susbtantive law): here, court could characterize the main issue as a property case instead of succession to justify the application of RP laws - lex rei sitae UV Cayetano v. Leonidas Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leave anything to her father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything) Facts

Decedent: Adoracion Campos Surviving heirs: Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina -Hermogenes executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion -11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. - An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes: will in question is a forgery intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him - Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests): confirms validity of will -TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate inRP - Hermogenes filed a petition for relief: withdrawal of his opposition was secured through fraud + motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. -TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of it WILL: Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of Pennsylvania at the time she made the will She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated and registered in Penn. after her death WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of the will? YES HERE. GR: probate court's authority is limited only to: the extrinsic validity of the will due execution testatrix's testamentary capacity Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law X: where practical considerations demand intrinsic validity to be passed upon WON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime? YES 1.It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent: law of 2. Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code] Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give away entire estate to strangers! 3. WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of share) is against public policy? NO -used Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals UV Interpretation of Wills -governed by rules of interpretation of decedent's NATIONAL LAW Ambiguity... GR: where terms clear and unambiguous, lex intentionis should be followed (A1370) X: ambiguous: intention of the party or the exact meaning may be inferred by referring to the context of the instrument itself Referring to testator's contemporaneous and subsequent acts in keeping with the nature of the document Presumptions

 Interpretations of ambiguous phrase should be determined accordance w/ the laws and customs of the state most probably in the mind of the grantor or testator when he used the words, and which he is presumed to be most familiar [SPECIFIC LAW IN MIND] Different dispositions: interpretation by which dispositions would be operative shall be preferred [interpret for validity] >>>presume that the testator intended a lawful will Revocation Art. 828: will revocable at any time before the death of testator >>>cannot waive or restrict right to revoke a will Art. 829: Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on: Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis) 1. 2.Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili) Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP: 1.Law of the domicile 2.Law of the place of revocation Art 830: When wills deemed revoked in RP: 1.By implication of law 2.By some will, codicil, or other writing, executed as provided in the case of wills 3.By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other persons in his presence and by his express direction Problem: Testator domiciled in State A, already had a will. Revoked will in accordance with laws of State A. Transferred domicile to State B, where revocation done in State A invalid. Died in State B. Is the revocation valid? Common law: apply law of domicile at time of death RP: law of the place of revocation Probate -adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed with all the formalities required by law -authentication of the will -merely procedural: follow law of the forum BUT: look at foreign law if suit made as to extrinsic requirements in the execution of the will When will shall be disallowed (rule 76, section 9, ROC): (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. -proving wills made in foreign country: prove 1.Will duly executed in manner required by law 2.Testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution of will TESTAMENTARY CAPAITY: capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty [Jocson v. jocson] -wills made and probated in foreign country in accordance with laws of that country [Rule 77, section 1]: should be filed and recorded in the proper RTC Due execution and testamentary capacity of testator does not need to be proved again (note: sabi ni Sir B it should still undergo probate proceedings in RP) Art 817, NCC (same ~ similar to Sec 636 of old CivPro rules): A will made in the Philippines ...by a citizen or subject of another country, ...which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, ...and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,

shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. Common law: o Movable properties: will admitted to probate valid at the last domicile of the testator as valid everywhere o Immovable properties: probate of the will in his last domicile does not affect the conveyance of land which is subject to lex situs

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984 POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents. Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner. Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent. On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos. Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines. On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the

intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him. On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made. On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit: At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos. WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed. On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case. The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980. On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided: Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982. A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983. Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when: 1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will. 2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court. 3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession 4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955). The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the

petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same. The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478). In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him. This contention is without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: Art. 16 par. (2). xxx xxx xxx However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled: It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of

successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. xxx xxx xxx The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing. Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that: SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984). WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Bellis vs. Bellis G.R. No. L-23678 (Case Digest/brief) Procedural Facts: Case filed in Court of First instance of Manila, which overruled Petitioner's opposition approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Substantive Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S. A died testate. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He left the bulk of his testate to his legitimate children resulting in the impairment of the legitime of his other heirs (illegitimate children). Issue: Which law shall apply in executing the deceaseds will ---Texas law or Philippine law? Held: The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Reasoning: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

.R. No. 139868

June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3 In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin. On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5 On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips

was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8 On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10 The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12 Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13 Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards entire undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15 On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent. Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides: WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering: (a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and (b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey. SO ORDERED.18 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19 Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that: A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED. B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20 Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21 Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22 Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubreys estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws. Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will bequeathing entirely her estate to

Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards estate. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26 The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29 In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioners acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31 It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof. Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed. Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35 Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36 Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld. It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied) Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied) While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38 Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property. In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit: xxx It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiffs adopted daughter Kyle Guersey. Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied) This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42 The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows: Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43 In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audreys conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent. Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote: A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said. Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail over Audreys and Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46 x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47 Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property. Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public

domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen. In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.