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Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha

Contention one: Reliance The plan results in a full withdrawal from Europe Tertrais 09 [Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS). He graduated from the Institut
d'tudes politiques de Paris in 1984. He holds a Master's degree in Public Law (1985) and a Doctorate in Political Science, NATO AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, online]

A Demand by a Host Nation for the Withdrawal of US Nuclear Forces. It is possible that a NATO host nation might demand the withdrawal of the US nuclear forces stationed on its territory. The Greek precedent would prevent other NATO members from asserting that such a withdrawal would necessarily lead to an unravelling of the whole nuclear-sharing arrangement. Such a demand would in all likelihood be 95 driven by domestic political and sovereignty considerations. (Some European political leaders have called for the withdrawal of US weapons in recent years, and public opinion in host countries tends to have negative views of this nuclear presence.7) The deployment of missile defences in Europe may be used as an argument to claim that such a presence is no longer necessary. In such a scenario, NATO would have to consider that there could then be a domino effect and that other nations would follow suit especially if the initial demand was made publicly, as it probably would be if it was driven by domestic political considerations. There is also the possibility that one or several NATO nations might refuse to give a nuclear role to the Eurofighter (Typhoon) aircraft, which is due to be the successor to the F-16 in several NATO nations. This might be for such countries a soft way to put an end to their nuclearsharing role, even though US nuclear forces could remain on the territory of some European countries for US use. (NATO is believed to currently maintain[ing] US nuclear weapons dedicated to US use in four countries: Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Weapons deployed in Belgium and the Netherlands are dedicated to host nation use.) Additionally, plan solves international TNW reliance
Potter et. al. 09 (Miles Pomper, MA, editor of Arms Control Today @ ACA, Nikolai Sokov, Ph.D., is senior research associate at James Martin
Center for Non-proliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, William Potter, Ph.D., is Institute Professor and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf)

The longer the stalemate over TNW continues, the greater the chance the negative features associated with the U.S. and Russian TNW will spread to other countries. The arsenals of short-range missiles and other delivery vehicle in China, India, and Pakistan continue to grow along with the potential risk that they
will be fitted with nuclear weapons. The bulk of the (still very small) arsenals of the latter two consist of short and intermediate range weapons, which are apparently not permanently equipped with nuclear warheads. Consequently, they present the same challenges of unauthorized access as described above

Reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons in these countries and potentially in China is also fraught with the danger of crisis instability along the lines outlined above. Early practical steps by the United States and Russia to reduce and eventually eliminate their TNW stockpiles could contribute in a tangible way to averting the same threats and challenges in other nuclear weapons states.
with regard to American and Russian arsenals.

TNWs in Europe serve no strategic purpose and removal wont effect credibility extended deterrence solves Woolf 2/2 [Amy F., February 2, 2011, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional
Research Service, Report for Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf]//Abraha
The

United States, its allies, and analysts outside government engaged in a heated debate over the role of and need for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in the months leading up to the completion of NATOs Strategic Concept in November 2010. In early 2010, political leaders from several NATO nationsincluding Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norwaycalled for the United States to remove these weapons from Europe. They argued that these weapons served no military purpose in Europe, and that their removal would demonstrate NATOs commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, a vision supported by President Obama in a speech he delivered in April 2009. Those who sought the weapons removal also argued that NATO could meet the political goals of shared nuclear responsibility in other ways, and that the United States could extend deterrence and ensure the security of its allies in Europe with conventional weapons, missile defenses, and longer-range strategic nuclear weapons. 83 Moreover, some argue, because

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these weapons play no military or political role in Europe, they no longer serve as a symbol of alliance solidarity and cooperation. Germany will boot TNWs now but they will just be redeployed UPI 2010 (Oct. 7, United Press International, Germany to do away with U.S. nukes? http://www.upi.com/Business_News/SecurityIndustry/2010/10/07/Germany-to-do-away-with-US-nukes/UPI-60991286444698/)//Abraha

Guarded by U.S. soldiers, an estimated 22 U.S. nuclear weapons are locked away in the bunkers under the Fliegerhorst Buechel, an airbase in Rhineland-Palatinate run by the German Luftwaffe. The B-61 thermonuclear bombs, which can be
dropped from low-flying jets at high speeds, signify the ultimate nuclear deterrent: They're 13 times more devastating than the bomb dropped over Hiroshima in 1945. As part of a nuclear weapons sharing deal with the United States, the German Luftwaffe pilots in their Panavia Tornado bombers stationed at Buechel are training in the deployment of the weapons. Germany's Rheinische Post newspaper Wednesday reported that the German

plans to decommission its entire Tornado fleet by 2013, at the latest. The move would essentially end the nuclear weapons sharing deal with the United States and force Washington to either take the bombs back or station them elsewhere in Europe.
Bundeswehr

And they will be deployed Turkey --- only the plan results in complete withdrawal Weitz 10 [April, Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, the Hudson Institute, THE
FUTURE OF NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON TURKISH SOIL, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412-TRA.pdf]

As part of the current NATO deliberation, there have been proposals to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey as part of an alliance-wide consolidation of NATOs TNW arsenal. Some proponents of retaining NATOs nuclear-sharing arrangements favor removing them from those European countries that no longer want them on their soil and relocating them into those countries that do, which might only include Turkey and perhaps Italy.
that they will play an essential role in NATOs security policies and that their preferences will have a major impact in shaping the alliances nuclear policies. Insofar as some

If NATO withdrew U.S. TNW from all other European countries, the Turkish government could find it uncomfortable remaining the only NATO nuclear-hosting state, and might request their removal from its territory as well. But then Turkey might proceed to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in any case for the reasons described above. CONCLUSIONS: The Obama administrations decision to deploy U.S. missile defenses more closely to Turkeyand thereby ensure its protection from an Iranian nuclear attackshould help assuage Turkish concerns. But the most profitable non-proliferation tool in Turkeys case would be to assure Turks

members of Turkeys security community are still concerned by Russias nearby nuclear and conventional security forces, then NATO initiatives aimed at linking any withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Turkey would presumably be welcome in Ankara. The recently concluded New START Treaty does not address TNWs, but negotiations between Russia and NATO might be warranted, with some level of Turkish participation. NATO enlargement in Europe increasing the chances for war --- only withdrawal eases tensions Pikayev 09 (Alexander, Head of Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations at the Academy of Sciences, and Member of International Institute of Strategic Studies, TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS,http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Pikayev_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf)

after the accession to NATO of the Baltic States, the problem of tactical nuclear weapons control became more acute. The buffer that separated Russia from NATO disappeared; territories of NATO member-states surrounded the Kaliningrad region. Also, the Baltic States are located in close proximity to both Russian capitals, Moscow and, in particular, St. Petersburg. The narrow depth of defence, an extremely short missile and strike aircraft flight time, if they are
In Europe,

and a most serious overall imbalance benefiting NATO in terms of conventional arms and forces, cannot but attract Russias attention to tactical nuclear weapons as a means for neutralising Western superiority, both quantitative and operational. It must however be emphasised that so far, the NATO eastward enlargement has not been accompanied by the deployment of nuclear weapons and their most destabilising delivery means to the territories of new member states of the Alliance.
placed in Latvia and Estonia,
So far Brussels has on the whole observed the provision of the RussiaNATO Founding Act, signed in 1997, which contains a clear obligation in the provision that the Alliance does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member countries. This his document is not legally binding but its political importance makes obvious violation of its provisions difficult. However, in 2006 the

announced its plans for deploying by 2011 its third missile defense area in Poland and the Czech Republic. That means the relocation of the anti-missile detection radar from Kwajalein to the territory of the Czech Republic and also construction of anti-missile silos in Poland, just a few kilometers from the border of the Russian Federation. For interception missiles, it is proposed to deploy ground-based interceptor (GBI) type systems, assembled from two stages of Minuteman ICBMs. In Russia, these plans have aroused serious anxiety due not only to the possible strategic imbalance, but also to the fact that systems, which are to be deployed in Poland, may have tasks that are different from those that are announced. These antimissiles theoretically have the ability to strike not only ballistic missiles on their flight trajectory, but also ground targets. The flight range of a two-stage rocket is equal to the flight range of a medium-range missile. In other words, there are suspicions that attempts are being made to bypass the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, prohibiting and eliminating short and medium range missiles. Such missiles are feared as
Bush Administration

having the potential for a surprise disarming or beheading strike on key command and control facilities that are located in many parts of European Russia, with a flight time in the order of five minutes. Although the INF Treaty has provisions exempting the ballistic missiles of such range if these are created and tested for BMD or Air Defence purposes (Art. VII), Moscow may be very conservative in its assessments and project the worst case scenario, as far-fetched or unlikely as it may be. In November 2008 President Medvedev announced Russias intention to respond if American missiles appeared on Polish

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territory.

Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha One such response was the deployment of Iskander tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad

region. These missiles are dual purpose, i.e. they can be used both with conventional and nuclear warheads. The Russian President did not say whether these missiles will be of the nuclear or nonnuclear type. Thus, the absence of legally-binding agreements on TNW in Europe, alongside erosion of other international legal regimes for arms limitation, has brought about a real danger of the revival of a nuclear standoff on the European continent as early as the beginning of the next decade. Such developments can be forestalled not only by political dialogue about missile defense, but also thorough

control over tactical nuclear weapons. In the middle of the 1990s, the USA made it known that, under certain
conditions, it was ready to accept legal obligations regarding non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member countries, if Russia agreed to some limitations in turn. In 1997, in the Helsinki Declaration of the results of the RussianAmerican summit, the parties managed to place
on record a provision regarding the start of consultations on limiting tactical nuclear weapons. However, later disagreements over the ABM Treaty did not allow Russia and the USA to make progress in this area. In addition to the Founding Act, deployment of nuclear weapons by the USA in Central and Eastern Europe is made difficult by the PNI and the INF Treaty. In accordance with Article VI of the NPT, all nuclear states must, in a spirit of goodwill, conduct negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Tactical weapons are no exception.

Russia, in principle, has declared its readiness

as the initial precondition for the start of negotiations on TNW, Moscow presumes that other countries too would follow the example of the Russian Federation and would to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territory. Under discussion
to continue dialogue with interested countries for further nuclear disarmament, not excluding limits to TNW. However,

weapons to of radical Islamist ideology on internal terrorism is particularly important because, as opposed to traditional internal terrorism, it and to withdraw a few hundred obsolete warheads from Europe, which represent a certain terrorist risk, is particularly disappointing against the existence of such weapons,
are with locking devices that would stop unauthorised access to them. Possible vulnerability of these

within national boundaries. There the weapons would be kept until their complete around 400 American gravity nuclear bombs stored in six European countries, five of which are nonnuclear-armed members of the NPT.
and also their delivery targets via armaments belonging to non-nuclear-armed countries members of rage facilities located

And the latest evidence proves Russia will respond with TNWs Woolf 2/2 [Amy F., February 2, 2011, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional
Research Service, Report for Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf]//Abraha

Russias nonstrategic nuclear weapons pose a risk to the United States, its allies, and others because Russia has altered its national security concept and military strategies, increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. Some fear that Russia might resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict along its periphery, which could lead to a wider conflict and the possible involvement of troops from NATO or other neighboring countries possibly drawing in new NATO members. Some also believe that Russia could threaten NATO with its nonstrategic nuclear weapons because Russia sees NATO as a threat to its security. Russian analysts and officials have argued that NATO enlargement, with the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO members close to Russias borders, demonstrated how much NATO could threaten Russia.
Many analysts argue that

Scenario 1: TNWs create a use it or lose it mentality --- massively heightens the risk of nuclear war Perkovich 09 (George, Ph.D., vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment, May 2009,
Paper commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Extended Deterrence on the Way to a NuclearFree World, p. www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf) The discussion thus far relates to visibility and the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. Stability is another important factor in assessing extended deterrence. Whether in Europe or in East Asia, the argument can be made that visible deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the

territory of other states might actually exacerbate instability in crises. Such forward deployed weapons could provide incentives (or pressure) for an adversary to strike these weapons early in a conflict to prevent their first use on the adversary. This is especially true for land-based nuclear weapons that can be identified and targeted by an adversary. Russia presumably knows the locations of the bunkers that store U.S. bombs dedicated to NATO, as well as the airfields hosting the designated delivery aircraft. If and when war appeared imminent or was already underway, Russia could feel pressure to destroy these weapons before they could be used. The U.S. and NATO states could correspondingly feel pressure to use these weapons rather than risk losing them. This
would simultaneously exacerbate crisis instability and debate within NATO which, depending on how it was managed, could enhance or weaken deterrence of escalation.

The greater the incentives to target such nuclear weapons and/or to use them rather than lose them, the greater the risks of nuclear conflict. Yet, the greater risk of nuclear conflict could inspire caution and efforts to end or at least de-escalate the crisis or war. On one hand, it could be rational early in a conflict for the U.S. to remove vulnerable nuclear weapons to avoid the use them-or-lose them dilemma. But this could weaken deterrence even as it reassured
allied states and Russia that nuclear war would not ensue. On

the other hand, to show resolve and strengthen deterrence, the weapons could be left vulnerable in theater as a trip-wire meant to demonstrate resolve and credibility of nuclear deterrence. Such dilemmas point to the inherent ambiguity and dilemmas of extended nuclear deterrence. In todays world, where the probabilities are low of large-scale Russian aggression or Iranian nuclear attack against NATO states, or Chinese invasion of Japan or Taiwan,

it is unreasonable not to focus on abating underlying security dilemmas and

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reducing threats rather than concentrating on strengthening nuclear deterrence. If removal of visible and vulnerable nuclear weapons could contribute to broader improvements in security relations, including arms control and confidence building measures, relying on invulnerable U.S. strategic submarines for ongoing nuclear deterrence would seem wise. Broadening the framework of analysis and international dialogue this way deserves greater consideration.
That risks extinction Shorr, 01 - expert with Foreign Policy In Focus (Ira, Nukes Remain on Hair Trigger October 10, http://www.fpif.org/articles/nukes_remain_on_hair_trigger)
While these actions helped the nuclear superpowers back away from using weapons of mass destruction at a precarious time, it's sobering to note that

the U.S. and Russia are still courting nuclear disaster. Despite no longer being strategic foes, they still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert--poised for a quick launch. This is a threat that no missile defense system will ever be able to protect us from. Keeping nuclear weapons on a hair-trigger means that leaders on both sides have just minutes to assess whether a warning of an attack is real or false. And while the threats we faced during the cold war came from Soviet strength--the danger today comes more from Russia's weakness. For example, Russia's troubled economy has led to the profound decay of their early warning satellite system. A fire last May that destroyed a critical facility used to control Russian warning satellites has made things even worse. Dr. Bruce Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information, has concluded, "Russia has completely lost its space-based early warning capabilities. In essence, their ability to tell a false alarm from a real warning has been nearly crippled." False alarms on both sides have already brought us to the brink of nuclear war. What will happen now if there is a war in the volatile neighborhood of Central Asia--a region that includes nuclear powers
India, Pakistan and Russia? Former Senator Sam Nunn brought the point home in a recent speech: "The events of September 11 gave President Bush very little time to make a very difficult decision--whether to give orders to shoot down a

Our current nuclear posture in the U.S. and Russia could provide even less time for each president to decide on a nuclear launch that could destroy our nations."
commercial jetliner filled with passengers.

Scenario 2: TNWs cause Lithuanian counterbalancing and aggression in Kaliningrad Irzikevius 08 (1/31/08, Lithuania possesses means to complicate Russias nuclear ambitions in
Kaliningrad,http://irzikevicius.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/lithuania-possesses-means-to-complicate-russias-nuclear-ambitions-in-kaliningrad/)

should Russia decide to deploy a nuclear weapon in its Kaliningrad enclave, Lithuania would have to block the eastern neighbours military transit through its territory, a Lithuanian political scientist has said. The interview was
As the BNS reported
conducted with the director of Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Raimundas Lopata. The political scientist told the BNS that with regards to the reasoning afloat from Russia about potential deployment of a nuclear weapon in its Kaliningrad enclave neighbouring Lithuania and Poland that such proposals coming from the experts of cold war are beyond all

chief of Russian Armed Forces Main Directorate for Combat Training and Service, Vladimir Shamanov mentioned on 30 plans to adjust the deployment of military blocs in Russias Kaliningrad enclaves special district. Furthermore, Leonid Ivasov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues, appended this statement with a comment to Russias news agency Interfax, saying that should the US go through with its plans, Russia would deploy Iskander operational-tactical missile complexes (OTMC) and a tactical nuclear weapon in Kaliningrad to suit. If this was a fact, the Lithuanian state would have to respond accordingly, prepare for hazards and at least cut off military provisions to Kaliningrad, which currently have to pass through
sensible limits. The BNS reminded that the

January that the Defence Ministry, in view of US plans to create an anti-missile defence system (ADS) in Europe,

Lithuanian territory, said Lopata in an interview to BNS, adding that it is still unknown whether the nuclear weapon that was previously deployed in Kaliningrad has in fact been lifted from there. In the opinion of the political scientist, Russias decision to deploy a nuclear weapon in the enclave bordering with Lithuania and Poland would be a completely inadequate reaction on Russias part to US plans to

Russias nuclear ambitions would not only be a challenge to Lithuania, but the entire region and strategic partners as well.
deploy an anti-missile radar and a missile silo in Poland. Lopata notes that it is no secret that the US system is not pointed against Russia. The political scientist remarked that

Aggression in Kaliningrad escalates to war --- perceived as encirclement Saradzhyan 09 (9/11/09, Simon, Fellow @ the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Russias Suport for Zero: Tactical Move or
Long-Term Commitment?,http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19551/russias_support_for_zero.html) Russian generals think hypothetical attack by

nuclear weapons could be used to stop an overwhelming aggression by conventional forces, including a NATO on the Kaliningrad exclave. Such proposals are being made, former senior Defense Ministry official Viktor

Zavarzin said in September 2008 when asked if Russian authorities are considering whether to deploy nuclear weapons in this Baltic exclave. 35 At the time, there was no need to deploy such weapons, but, in principle said Retired Colonel General Zavarzin, who is now chairman of the State Dumas defense committee. The Defense Ministrys press service declined to comment on Zavarzins statement, but noted that he is of course a statesman. 36

, there are no international legal constraints that would prevent Russia from doing so,

U.S. papers reported, citing U.S. intelligence sources, that Russia had already moved nuclear weapons to the exclave, but Russian officials denied this. The generals also have gamed out such scenarios. In the summer of 1999, the Russian armed forces gamed out use of nuclear weapons to stop aggression from the West. The exercise, dubbed Zapad-99, or West-99, and held in the wake of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, demonstrated explicitly Russias growing reliance on its tactical nuclear forces in planning to repel a hypothetical NATO aggression. 37 An unprovoked Western attack on Kaliningrad was the central scenario in Zapad-99. Having failed to stop the enemys advance by conventional means, the command of the
In 2001,

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defending side ordered Russian long-range aviation to send one bomber to simulate the firing of a Kh-15 cruise missile on the battlefield. conflict

Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha This strike made the enemy stop out of concern that the could escalate into an all-out war.

Causes nuclear war Bildt and Sikorski 2010 [CARL and RADEK, February 1, Next, the Tactical Nukes, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html]//Abraha
We understand that Russia is a European power, but we

urge Moscow to make a commitment to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from areas adjacent to European Union member states. We are thinking of areas like the Kaliningrad region
and the Kola Peninsula, where there are still substantial numbers of these weapons. Such a withdrawal could be accompanied by the destruction of relevant storage facilities. But these measures should only be seen as steps toward the total elimination of these types of weapons. The need for deterrence against rogue nations could amply be fulfilled with existing U.S. and Russian strategic assets. With

tactical nuclear weapons were designed for outdated, large-scale war on the European continent. Their use would have brought destruction to Europe on a scale beyond comprehension and would in all probability have lead also to the destruction of Russia and the United States in a strategic nuclear duel. One thing is absolutely clear: The time has come to cover sub-strategic
some exceptions, nuclear weapons with an arms control regime, which would look like the one that was established long ago for strategic arms. We still face security challenges in the Europe of today and tomorrow, but from whichever angle you look, there is no role for the use of nuclear weapons in resolving these challenges. Such weapons are dangerous remnants of a dangerous past and they should not be allowed to endanger our common future.

Extinction Starr 2/7 [Steven, 2011, Member of International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation and Physicians for Global survival, a
medical technologist and avid writer in the prevention of nuclear weapons, Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=213]//Abraha

nuclear war. Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history. We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race devastate the Earths environment and ecosystems threaten continued human existence. nuclear war means global nuclear suicide.
The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a
? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals through their Otherwise, military and political capacity to utterly leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence. We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that

Scenario 3: TNWs in India and Pakistan ensures nuclear war Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, MA, is Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Ziad Haider, Charles Thornton, Are Tactical
Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia? http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17725558/ Nuclear-Weapons-in-south-Asia)

The most prominent applicable dilemma associated with the use of tactical, battlefield, or short-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicle relates to escalation control. Any use of such a weapon - even a singular demonstration shot by the weaker party to signal the urgency of stopping a threatening advance - presents a strong likelihood of uncontrolled escalation . The leadership of the
country that is warned by a singular nuclear detonation, including a low-yield detonation in a remote area that does not produce immediate casualties, would need to make momentous, nation-threatening decisions very quickly. Questions would immediately arise as to whether a

singular nuclear detonation would be followed quickly by many more, either through a breakdown in command and control or in anticipation of punishing strikes, as the stated nuclear postures of India and Pakistan promise. As western
deterrence strategists concluded, escalation control is far easier below the nuclear threshold than across it. In both circumstances, the prerequisites of escalation control include properly functioning lines of communication, trust in the messages received, correct calculations of an adversarys intentions, cool-headedness in excruciatingly difficult circumstances, and the ability of national leaders to slow down the clock for decision-making when time is of the essence. The imperative of speedy decisions would fall most heavily on rivals whose nuclear assets are most susceptible

to preemption or whose targeting strategy depends heavily on striking quickly. Conflict between India and Pakistan escalates to nuclear war Blank 09 (Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College, Prospects for Russo-American Cooperation in Halting Nuclear Proliferation, March, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=892)
In the context of that DPRK-Pakistani relationship, we need to remember that

the single biggest proliferator in the last

generation has been Pakistan through the A. Q. Khan operation that has been extensively described at least as regards its public record.85
Khan (whom it is difficult to believe was not working with the knowledge and consent of Pakistani military and political authorities) sold centrifuge and

India and Pakistan are expanding the number, range, and type of their nuclear weapons and missiles, e.g., moving to submarine-based systems
other technologies to North Korea and Iran as well as to other proliferators like Libya.86 As noted above, and developing the capability for strikes across a greater distance with conventional missiles, e.g., the Agni missile.87 Both states are also developing new and advanced conventional weapons that could be used in a bilateral or proxy war between them or between one of them and the others proxy. Indeed, recently there have been charges that Pakistan continues to sell nuclear technology and that Khans former middlemen are still trying to acquire those technologies.88 Thus the

danger of a conventional war between India and Pakistan or proxies acting in their behalf

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presents the real possibility of an escalation first to missile war and then nuclear war. Indeed, as the stabilityinstability theory tells us, the possession by both sides of nuclear war capability paradoxically makes the region (or the world) safe for conventional war

stability at the nuclear level creates the paradox of giving openings to governments or even to terrorist groups to trigger instability at lower levels of conflict. Those crises could then spiral out of control into bigger wars. The many crises in the region, the last one being in 2001-02, indicate just how precarious regional stability is, and Pakistans continuing ambivalence about supporting terrorist and Islamist military forces in Kashmir and against Afghanistan provide ample opportunities for such a war to break out.
in the belief that the other side will be deterred due to the aggressors possession of a nuclear capability. Thus

Contention 2: is Russia Unilateral reduction is key to calling Moscows bluff on TNW reductions and redeployment withdrawal will be reciprocated Potter et. al. 09 (Miles Pomper, MA, editor of Arms Control Today @ ACA, Nikolai Sokov, Ph.D., is senior research associate at James Martin
Center for Non-proliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, William Potter, Ph.D., is Institute Professor and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) Breaking the U.S.-Russian deadlock on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/breaking-the-us-russian-deadlock-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons)

Moscow's position on nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been inflexible and stagnant. And its agreement to begin negotiations on them has been linked to U.S. acceptance of the idea that nuclear weapons should only be based in national territories--i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Effectively, Russia is betting that NATO, which is the custodian of the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, will refuse to accept that principle, and therefore, it will not have to take meaningful measures to address its own nonstrategic weapons. Calling Moscow's bluff could be the key to meaningful progress. If U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe, it would be hard for Russia to continue stonewalling. While such a
For many years

step is bound to generate controversy in the United States and NATO, especially in Eastern Europe, it is likely to have little impact on U.S. and alliance security, despite assertions to the contrary. There is little evidence, for example, that Washington would resort to
nuclear weapons use, much less nuclear weapons of a tactical variety, if an attack were to occur. Furthermore, nonstrategic nuclear weapons are no longer frontline weapons. In fact, they currently can reach only a few targets in Russia and relocation further east would violate the 1997 NATO-Russia Charter. More importantly, the presence (or absence) of a limited number of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe can hardly influence the Russian perception of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. And if need be, Washington has many other tools of reassurance it can employ--e.g., new missile defenses and extended air patrols, not to mention its vast strategic nuclear arsenal. Ultimately, the question is about the political will of U.S. leaders, not about

the window of opportunity for using nonstrategic weapons in Europe as a lever to induce change in the Russian position is narrow. The dual-capable aircraft that are intended to deliver nonstrategic nuclear weapons are nearing the end of their
specific assets. Lastly, lifetime. If these systems are allowed to expire, NATO would lose the lever; if they are replaced at high cost, then trading them away would be politically complicated, at best. To utilize

this opportunity, Washington could put forward a statement on its own, or on behalf of NATO, in conjunction with unilateral nonstrategic weapon withdrawal in which it would disclose basic information about its total nonstrategic stockpiles (including those on U.S. territory) and invite Russia to respond in kind. Moscow also could be encouraged to
respond by redeploying its nonstrategic nuclear weapons to bases that are geographically further removed from Europe. There is no guarantee, of course,

would, however, make it for Moscow to continue to stall. If implemented against the background of positive movement in other areas such as strategic arms reduction, this tactic has a good chance of succeeding. After all, something must be done--and soon. The continuing stalemate over nonstrategic nuclear weapons is unacceptable and represents a needless threat to transatlantic security and President Barack Obama's vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
more politically costly, if not impossible,

that unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe would lead Russia to change its position. It

TNWs hinder Turkeys ability to mediate in the middle east Lamond & Ingram 2009 [Claudine and Paul, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states, BASIC No. 11,
http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWi nNATO.pdf] There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,20 more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.21 There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkeys historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkeys location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkeys close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for tactical nuclear weapons. The risk, of course, is that stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO

the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab

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neighbors. There is a fear that they

Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha

undermine Turkeys clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkeys legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction would receive overwhelming public support.2

START recently passed reducing strategic long range weapons Shear 2010 (Michael, April 8, Obama, Medvedev sign treaty to reduce nuclear weapons, Washington
Post,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/08/AR2010040801677.html)//Abrara PRAGUE --President

Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a sweeping new arms reduction pact Thursday that

pledges to reduce the stockpile of deployed, strategic nuclear weapons in both countries and commits the old Cold War adversaries to new procedures to verify which weapons each country possesses. Obama arrived in this historic city Thursday morning to formalize a step toward the vision he laid out here a year ago -- of a world without nuclear weapons. The leaders met privately for about an hour before signing the pact in a ceremony hosted by the Czechs and full of symbolism. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was among the many dignitaries looking on as Obama and Medvedev began signing, at one point exchanging amused glances as if to say, "This isn't so hard." "Together, we have stopped the drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation," Obama said in remarks a short time later. ". . . This day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership." U.S. officials said the full treaty document, just now finished after months of negotiation, would be posted on the Internet later Thursday. The White House also announced that Medvedev would visit the United States for a summit this summer. The

treaty, called New START, imposes new limits on ready-to-use, long-range nuclear weapons and pledges to reduce the two biggest nuclear arsenals on the globe. Both countries will be limited to 1,550 readyto-use, long-range nuclear weapons in addition to the other parts of their nuclear stockpile.

That trades off - Russia will compensate with nonstrategic TNWs Thornton 2006 (Charles L., March 23, Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Consolidation Proposal Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the International Studies Association http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/9/1/p100913_index.html, google)//Abraha

Russia maintains a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. As Russia's long-range strategic forces are reduced under international arms control treaties, the proportion of its arsenal dedicated to short-range tactical missions continues to grow. Russia's tactical forces are largely a Soviet legacy, although Russia has begun to modernize key aspects of its arsenal in recent years. Foreign observers have suggested that Russia's tactical nuclear weapons are destabilizing and pose a proliferation threat. This paper will describe developments in Russia's
TNWs since the end of the Cold War and outline the characteristics of Russia's current tactical nuclear force structure. It will illustrate the unique features of TNWs, as compared to strategic forces, and will cover the roles that TNWs play in Russia's evolving security doctrine. The paper will pay special attention to Russia's own perceptions - and the ongoing debate among Russian experts - of its need to maintain large, secret tactical forces and to the security of the warheads. The paper will conclude by describing implications for NATO of Russias tactical nuclear forces and related policies, and offer policy options for further NATO engagement with the Russian government and military.

That makes Russian TNW use likely escalating to uncontrolled nuclear war and extinction Weitz 07 (Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute,
Russias Nuclear Forces and Their Problems, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/07-09-14_priceponi.pdf)

Russian strategists have long considered using limited nuclear strikes to alter the course of a conventional conflict that Russia risked losing. The January 2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied that Russia could use nonstrategic nuclear forces to resist a conventional attack without engendering a full-scale nuclear exchange. A related function of Russian nuclear forces would be to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try to alter a conventional battle in its favor. Even after one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, Russian commanders might attempt to control further escalation by issuing nuclear threats, showing restraint, or pursuing other nuclear signaling. The problem with attempting to exercise escalation control under combat conditions is that such tactics risk uncontrolled nuclear war. In theory, other possible firebreaks between nonnuclear operations and uncontrolled nuclear escalation might also exist. These could include attempts to enforce distinctions
between strikes against either sides national homelands as opposed to less critical third areas, between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, or even between nuclear strikes against military and civilian targets (i.e., counterforce vs. countervalue strikes). The most plausible line for limiting escalation, however, remains that between using and not using nuclear weapons at all.

And, TNWs will cause nuclear war through intentional use or accidents Potter et. al. 09 (Miles Pomper, MA, editor of Arms Control Today @ ACA, Nikolai Sokov, Ph.D., is senior research associate at
James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, William Potter, Ph.D., is Institute Professor and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf)

both the American extended deterrence and the Russian de-escalation strategies foresee conflicts that start as conventional ones that more or less quickly transcend the
Furthermore, employment of TNW is closely associated with conventional forces:

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threshold into limited

Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha

use of nuclear weapons. The theoretical scenarios of employment of TNW argue for the predelegation of launch authority to combatant commanders in the early stages or perhaps even in the run up to a conventional war with further decrease of crisis stability, diminished control by political leaders, and the lowering of the nuclear threshold. Thus, in a very direct and tangible way the continued existence of TNW in national arsenals enhances the probability of nuclear wear war, whether intentional or by accident, and represents a threat to international security. That causes nuclear winter - even a limited conflict would kill billions Spearow 08 (Jimmy, Teach Peace Foundation Adviser; The US encirclement of Russia is igniting a cold war that endangers us all, http://www.teachpeace.com/encirclingusall.htm) A renewed cold war between nuclear powers also raises the danger of "accidental" nuclear war. Heightened tensions between Russia and the USIsrael increase the likelihood that one of the many false warnings, computer glitches, or other errors will result in an "accidental" yet devastating nuclear war (December 2007 Teach Peace newsletter). Finally, a nuclear war with about 100 small tactical nuclear weapons or far fewer strategic nuclear weapons will result in firestorms and injection of debris and pollutants into the upper atmosphere that will darken the skies resulting in crop killing frosts and nuclear winter. A nuclear winter from even a small nuclear war is likely to result in the starvation of about one billion people. Contention 3: Usability Fearing nuclear weapons are key to preventing their use, but TNWs blur the line between nuclear and conventional making them the only scenario for breaking the nuclear taboo and escalation that makes their use inevitable Rajaraman 02 (R, Apr 22, Ban battlefield nuclear weapons, Professor of Theoretical Physics, JNU,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm)

But there are very sound reasons for vigilantly opposing these battlefield nuclear weapons which pose a grave danger of a different sort, no matter how low their yield. That danger stems from opening, after a very long gap, the
nuclear Pandora's box. It should be remembered that subsequent to the two atom bombs dropped on Japan in rapid succession at the end of World War II, there has been no known incidence of nuclear weapon usage except for tests. This despite the fact that the nuclear arsenals have grown from a handful of weapons in the hands of the Americans to tens of thousands of far more powerful bombs spread among a half a dozen countries. It

is not as if there has been a shortage of major conflicts involving countries possessing nuclear weapons. We have had, among others, the Korean War, the Vietnam war, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Iraqi war, the Sino-Soviet border
skirmishes and most pertinently for us, the Kargil conflict. Some of these were long drawn out wars with heavy casualties. The U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan had to bear the ignominy of losing the wars to smaller and technologically less developed antagonists. One might have imagined that under such severe circumstances nations would employ all available weapons in their power to turn defeat into victory. Yet,

none of these countries used a nuclear bomb even once. There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises. It is this taboo which will be broken if battlefield nuclear weapons, however small, begin to be used. Once the line dividing nuclear weapons and conventional bombs is crossed, it will become acceptable to use "baby nukes" and the radiation deaths that go with it. A gradual erosion of the feeling of abhorrence against nuclear weapons is bound to occur. The use of a sub-kiloton artillery shell in battle by one country will elicit a similar response with possibly a heavier yield weapon, if not in the same war, somewhere else. The ante will keep going up till
eventually the use of bigger multi-kiloton and megaton weapons would be contemplated more seriously as realistic military alternatives. The single largest universal deterrent against nuclear holocaust will be lost forever.

Withdrawal solves the thinkability of tactical usemaking nuclear war irrelevant solving their use

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Berkner 2010 - 2011 Danny Abraha

Schwartz Derber and 90 (Professor of Sociology, Boston College and Doctoral Student in Sociology
(Charles and William, The Nuclear Seduction, p 39-40, http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=d0e796&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e796&brand=ucpress)

The only technical factors that can greatly alter credibility and the firebreak are those that are responsible for the doomsday machine: (1) the fragility of nuclear command and control and (2) the presence of nuclear weapons at the front lines in Europe, Korea, and the Middle East, at sea, and elsewhere. As we have seen, not much can be done about the fragility of command and control. As Ball's painstaking study concludes, "Command-and-control systems are inherently relatively
vulnerable. The allocation of further resources to improving the survivability and endurance of the strategic command-and-control capabilities cannot substantially alter this situation. The capability to exercise strict control and co-ordination would inevitably be lost relatively early in a nuclear exchange." In Europe, another group of experts adds that "conditions are not congenial to major improvements in C3 I."[23] And whatever can be done has less to do with the race to build or control weaponsthe focus of the nuclear debatethan with the organization of the command system. For example, NATO presumably could make it much more difficult for field commanders to obtain the authority and technical ability needed to detonate

more can be done about the way nuclear weapons systems are scattered around the globe. Although modest changes would not make much difference, radical changes could. If NATO units guarding the central European front did not have nuclear weapons, then their involvement in conventional battles could not erupt spontaneously into nuclear war. If American aircraft carriers were not dual-capable, or if they were not sent into war zones, their commanders could not ignite a cataclysm. A thorough removal of tactical nuclear weapons from flash points for conventional war could significantly widen the nuclear firebreak, though possibly at the expense of credibility. Ironically, this one aspect of superpower arms control that bears directly on the risk of global holocaust has received almost no attention during the public debate in the United States. Fear of the bomb is key to prevent global war and chaos Mearsheimer 01 (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics) The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can read to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well a mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even
lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great.

nuclear warheads in the event of a war in Europe. Much

States in the international system also

aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cant just depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves.