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AFGHAN DETAINEE DOCUMENT REVIEW:

REPORT BY THE PANEL OF ARBITERS ON ITS WORK AND METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING WHAT REDACTED INFORMATION CAN BE DISCLOSED

The Honourable Claire LHeureux-Dub The Honourable Frank Iacobucci April 15, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE............................................................................................................................ I I. II. III. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 WORK ASSIGNED TO THE PANEL BY THE MOU ...........................................3 THE PANELS APPROACH AND WORK IN REVIEWING NSC REDACTIONS .................................................................................................6 A. Introduction.......................................................................................................6 B. Relevant Case Law............................................................................................7 C. The Panels Approach to Reviewing NSC Redactions .....................................10 Overall Approach............................................................................................10 Detainee Information.......................................................................................11 Confidential Communications with Foreign Officials and Organizations .........12 Criticism of Foreign (primarily Afghan) Institutions and Officials...................13 Information about or from the ICRC ...............................................................15 Third party Information...................................................................................17 Names of Afghan Officials..............................................................................17 Information relating to Special Forces .............................................................17 Information about Gun Shot Residue Testing ..................................................18 D. Status of the Panels Review of NSC Information ...........................................18 PANELS APPROACH AND WORK IN REVIEWING INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND CABINET CONFIDENTIALITY ..........................................................................19 A. Introduction.....................................................................................................19 B. Solicitor-Client Privilege.................................................................................20 Legal Requirements ........................................................................................20 Status of the Panels Review of Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims....................21 C. Cabinet Confidentiality ...................................................................................22 Legal Requirements ........................................................................................22 Status of the Panels Review of Cabinet Confidentiality Claims ......................23

IV.

APPENDIX: Memorandum of Understanding dated June 15, 2010

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PREFACE It is with heavy hearts that we write these words in tribute to our colleague on the Panel of arbiters, the Honourable Donald I. Brenner, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. An outstanding lawyer, jurist and reformer, Don contributed greatly to our work under the Memorandum of Understanding. As recently as two days before his sudden passing, we and Don met all day, and made great progress, aided by Dons typically insightful comments and collegial approach. Although he is, tragically, no longer with us, we can say that this report reflects Dons views, and for that we are deeply grateful. We offer his family our profound condolences.

Claire LHeureux-Dub

Frank Iacobucci

I. 1.

INTRODUCTION On June 15, 2010, the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister, the

Honourable Michael Ignatieff, Leader of the Official Opposition, and Mr. Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the Bloc Qubcois, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) in order to resolve a dispute respecting the disclosure of government documents relating to the transfer of Afghan detainees from Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities. 2. The MOU, a copy of which is an Appendix to this report, provided for the

appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee of Parliamentarians, composed of one member and one alternate member from each of the parties whose leaders executed the MOU, and a threemember Panel of Arbiters, which it stated was to comprise three eminent jurists, who shall have judicial expertise. The MOU gave to the Committee the task of reviewing the information in the documents that had been redacted by the government for reasons of national security, national defence and international relations and referring to the Panel the redacted information the Committee decided should be disclosed because it is relevant and necessary for holding the government to account. The MOU gave to the Panel the role of determining how the information referred to it may be made available to Members of Parliament and the public without compromising the interests the redactions are intended to protect. 3. The Honourable Stphane Dion, Mr. Luc Desnoyers, Mr. Laurie Hawn, Mr. Pierre

Lemieux, Mr. Richard Nadeau, and the Honourable Bryon Wilfert were appointed as the members of the Ad Hoc Committee. We, together with the Honourable Donald I. Brenner, were appointed as the three members of the Panel. Following our appointment, and with the assistance of our staff, we worked in conjunction with the Committee, the Privy Council Office, and the Department of Justice to carry out the tasks assigned to us by the MOU. 4. Tragically, on March 12, 2011, Donald Brenner passed away suddenly. Before his

death he made a significant contribution to the approach taken by the Panel and the preparation of this report, and he participated fully in the determinations made by the Panel up to his untimely death.

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The purpose of this report is to explain how we have carried out the tasks assigned to

us by the MOU, and in particular the methodology we have used for assessing whether and, if so, how redacted information referred to us by the Committee can be disclosed. The report describes: (a) the work assigned to us by the MOU, its relationship to the work carried out by the Committee and by government officials, and the steps we have taken to carry it out; (b) our approach to reviewing redactions made by the government on grounds of national security, national defence or international relations; (c) our approach to reviewing redactions made by the government on grounds of solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet confidentiality; and (d) 6. the status of our work.

Together with this report, we had planned to deliver to the Committee the first set of

documents that we have reviewed in accordance with our mandate under the MOU and that are ready for release. Our intention was to continue to deliver documents to the Committee as we completed our review of them and they became ready for release. 7. As the Committee members and the government officials who have been involved in

this document review process are aware, this is the first time that a mechanism like that set out in the MOU has been adopted in Canada or perhaps anywhere else. Carrying out the complex tasks assigned to us by the MOU has called for difficult judgments. In making those judgments we have been mindful of the high importance of the interests at stake in this process. We have also had to consider and weigh a variety of factors, circumstances, and potential consequences. We recognize that at the margins informed decision-makers can differ on these judgments. However, we can say that what follows in this report and in our determinations reflects our collective best efforts to arrive at our decisions through collaborative discussion and careful evaluation to reach conclusions that we believe are faithful to the letter and spirit of the MOU.

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8.

We are grateful for the cooperation and assistance we have received from the

Committee members and government officials in working through these issues and developing solutions for these novel problems. Our discussions with the Committee members have been constructive and professional. The Committee members have been conscientious and committed in carrying out the role assigned to them in this process. 9. We also wish to recognize the ongoing contribution of our staff, both in providing us

with the information, analysis, and support necessary to enable us to make our determinations, and in the painstaking and time-consuming process of implementing our decisions that we describe below. Their insights and their hard work have been invaluable. II. 10. WORK ASSIGNED TO THE PANEL BY THE MOU The Panels work, like that of the Committee and the government in relation to this

process, is governed by the terms of the MOU, which was entered into in order to resolve a dispute that arose between the House of Commons and the government. 11. On December 10, 2009, the House of Commons adopted an order for the production

of government documents related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities. As the signatories to the MOU have acknowledged, these documents contain information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national defence, international relations or national security if publicly released. The order made no provision for confidential treatment of this information. 12. On April 27, 2010, the Speaker of the House of Commons concluded that it was

within the powers of the House of Commons to ask for the documents sought in the order. However, the Speaker suggested that a mechanism be put in place by which these documents could be made available to the House without compromising the security and confidentiality of the information they contain. In accordance with the Speakers suggestion, all parties reached an Agreement in Principle on May 14, 2010 to establish a mechanism of this kind. The MOU, which was intended to implement the Agreement in Principle, was subsequently executed by the leaders of all parties except the New Democratic Party.

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13.

The MOU provided for the establishment of the Committee and the Panel. It granted

to the Committee access to all documents listed in the December 10, 2009 House order, including all relevant documents related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the period 2001 to 2005 in order to understand the transfer arrangements post-2005, subject to strict confidentiality measures. It provided for the Committee to receive these documents in a manner that would disclose to Committee members the information redacted by the government on grounds of national security, national defence or international relations. It also established two distinct processes for reviewing redactions that the government had made to the documents: (a) an NSC information process for documents containing information the government has redacted on grounds of national security confidentiality, national defence or international relations (which we refer to together as NSC); and (b) a privileged / confidential information process for documents containing information the government has redacted on grounds of solicitor-client privilege or Cabinet confidentiality. 14. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the MOU set out the process for reviewing redactions made on

grounds of national security, national defence or international relations. That process calls for the Committee to determine the information that is relevant and necessary to disclose, and the Panel to determine how the relevant and necessary information will be made available without compromising national security, national defence or international relations. 15. Paragraph 5 states: With respect to every document that has been redacted, the ad hoc committee will determine whether the information therein is relevant to matters of importance to Members of Parliament, particularly as it relates to the ongoing study on the transfer of Afghan detainees currently under way at the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, and whether the use of such information is necessary for the purpose of holding the government to account. The decisions of the ad hoc committee related to relevance shall be final and unreviewable.

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Paragraph 6 states: Where the ad hoc committee determines that information is both relevant and necessary, or upon the request of any Member of the ad hoc committee, it will refer the disputed information to a Panel of Arbiters, who will determine how the relevant and necessary information will be made available to Members of Parliament and the public without compromising national security, national defence or international relations either by redaction or the writing of summaries or such techniques as the Panel may find appropriate, bearing in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency. The Panel of Arbiters should regularly consult with the Members of the ad hoc committee to better understand what information the Members believe to be relevant and the reason why. The decisions of the Panel of Arbiters with respect to disclosure shall be final and unreviewable.

17.

As the terms of these paragraphs demonstrate, the MOU grants to the Committee the

sole responsibility for deciding what information redacted on national security, national defence or international relations grounds is relevant and necessary to disclose, and to the Panel the sole responsibility for determining how information will be disclosed without compromising national security, national defence or international relations. Paragraph 6 states that the Panel should regularly consult with the Committee members to better understand what information the members believe to be relevant and why. But the Panel makes the final decisions with respect to disclosure independently not only of the Committee but also of the government. 18. Paragraph 7 of the MOU sets out the process for the review of information that the

government believes should not be disclosed on grounds of solicitor-client privilege or Cabinet confidentiality. Paragraph 7 states: The Panel of Arbiters can determine, at the request of the government, that certain information should not be disclosed due to the solicitor-client privilege. The Panel of Arbiters, after consultation with the Clerk of the Privy Council, can also determine, at the request of the government, that information constituting Cabinet confidences should not be disclosed. In both such cases, the Panel of Arbiters shall determine how information contained in the documents may be made available to Members of Parliament and the public without compromising

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the solicitor-client privilege or the principle of Cabinet confidentiality, by such techniques as the Panel may find appropriate, bearing in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency. Should the Panel of Arbiters decide that certain information should not be disclosed, the Panel will provide the rationale for its decisions to the ad hoc committee. III. A. 19. THE PANELS APPROACH AND WORK IN REVIEWING NSC REDACTIONS Introduction The Panels first and primary task under the MOU is to review the NSC redactions

information redacted by the government on the grounds of national security, national defence or international relations which has been referred to the Panel by the Committee. As discussed below, this review has been complex and challenging, requiring the review of many thousands of pages of documents and numerous meetings between the Panel and its staff and the Committee, as well as meetings and communications with government officials. One of the main complications has been the technological and security issues involved in reviewing these documents and preparing them in a form that is acceptable for disclosure. This process requires not only that the Panel and its staff review and assess all redactions referred to it by the Committee but also that the Panels decisions then be implemented by preparing each document using software that permits the lifting of redactions of information that the Panel has determined can be disclosed or the summarizing of information in a form that is useful for the purposes of disclosure but that does not compromise national security, national defence or international relations. 20. In carrying out its review of NSC redactions, the Panel has taken into account the case

law that has been developed by the courts in determining, under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act,1 claims that information should not be disclosed on the grounds that disclosure would injure international relations, national defence or national security. Although, as discussed below, the Canada Evidence Act does not apply to the Panels work, and there are significant differences in wording between section 38 and the MOU, the section 38 case law

R.S,C. 1985, c. C-5.

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has been helpful to the Panel in developing its approach to reviewing NSC documents. The Panel has also benefitted from briefings that it and its staff have received from government officials, who have explained how and why in their view the disclosure of the redacted information would compromise national security, national defence or international relations. B. 21. Relevant Case Law National security has been defined in a leading case as at minimum the

preservation of the Canadian way of life, including the safeguarding of the security of persons, institutions and freedoms in Canada.2 Courts have identified the types of information that might be injurious to national security as including information that would identify or tend to identify human sources and technical sources, identify or tend to identify targets of surveillance, identify or tend to identify methods of operations and operational and administrative policies, or jeopardize or tend to jeopardize the security of telecommunications systems. 3 22. National defence has been defined in the same case using the following broad

definition, taken from Blacks Law Dictionary: 1. All measures taken by a nation to protect itself against its enemies. A nations protection of its collective ideals and values is included in the concept of national defence. 2. A nationals military establishment.4 In another case, a judge found that the disclosure of a videotape and transcripts relating to the Bosnia conflict would be injurious to national defence and international relations. The videotape depicted aerial bombing carried out by NATO-led forces in Bosnia. The transcripts contained information respecting intelligence, intelligence capabilities, command and command structure of the various forces in the Bosnian theatre of war, policies relating to the conduct of military operations, military operations, the role and conduct of certain participants in the Bosnian theatre and the identity and sources of targets. The judge found that disclosure of some portions of the information would, among other things, undermine the trust necessary to
2

Canada (Attorney General) v. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar, 2007 FC 766 at para. 68 (T.D.). 3 Henrie v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1989] 2 FC 229 at paras. 29-31 (T.D.), affd [1992] F.C.J. No. 100 (C.A.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Kempo, [2004] FC 1678 at paras. 89-92 (T.D.); Singh v. Canada (2000), 186 F.T.R. 1 at para. 32 (T.D.). 4 Arar, note 2 at para. 62.

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make NATO effective, compromise Canadas role as a member of NATO, make Canadas allies reluctant to share intelligence in the future (denying Canada access to information necessary to protect civilians and troops) and compromise NATOs and Canadas ability to conduct future military operations.5 23. The Panel also notes that section 15 of the Access to Information Act,6 which provides

for the non-disclosure of records containing information the disclosure of which would be injurious to the defence of Canada, includes as examples information relating to military tactics or strategy or relating to military exercises or operations; information relating to the quantity, characteristics, capabilities or deployment of weapons or other defence equipment; information relating to the characteristics, capabilities, performance, potential deployment, functions or role of any defence establishment, military force or unit; and information obtained or prepared for the purpose of intelligence relating to the defence of Canada or an allied state. 24. International relations has been recognized in the case law as raising important

interests for several reasons. Among the most important, Canada is a net intelligence importer, and therefore has an interest in maintaining reciprocal relationships with the policy, intelligence and security agencies of other nations, particularly those of its closest allies.7 As well, Canada relies on its relationships with foreign nations to pursue its foreign policy objectives, and promote human rights democracy and good governance abroad.8 Among the information most frequently engaged by the international relations interests is information protected by the third party rule and criticisms of foreign countries or governments. The third party rule states that communications and documents obtained in confidence from third parties, generally allied states, should not be disclosed without the prior consent of the

Ribic v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCT 10 at paras. 14-18 (T.D.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, 2003 FCT 43 at paras. 14-15 (T.D.); affd, Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246. 6 R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1. 7 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para. 68; Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 549 at para. 93 (T.D.); Arar, note 2 at paras. 77-78, 80. 8 Khadr, note 7 at para. 74; Arar, note 2 at paras. 85-90

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providing third party.9 Criticisms by Canada of foreign governments may be protected by the international relations interests, but not where the Canadian governments sole or primary purpose for seeking non-disclosure is to shield itself from criticism or embarrassment.10 25. In determining possible injury, courts applying section 38 have considered the

perspective of the informed reader and the principle of the mosaic effect. This requires consideration of whether a person who is both knowledgeable regarding security matters and is a member of or associated with a group which constitutes a threat or a potential threat to the security of Canada could piece together items of information that might seem innocuous in isolation to arrive at damaging deductions.11 The courts have cautioned, however, that this principle should not be over-extended there must be some genuine basis for concern based on the particular facts.12 26. The section 38 case law has established that information that has made its way into the

public domain will generally not be protected from disclosure. However, the courts have recognized exceptions to this general rule where only a limited part of the information was disclosed to the public, where the information is not widely known or accessible, where the authenticity of the information is neither confirmed nor denied, and where the information was inadvertently disclosed.13 27. Although we have taken account of this section 38 case law, neither it nor the process

for its application has any direct application to our work under the MOU. Section 38 applies only in a proceeding before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information, a description that does not apply to the Panel. In addition, the language of section 38 is different from the language used in the MOU in a number of

Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, 2007 FC 490 at para. 139 (T.D.). The Federal Court has set out three caveats to this rule: (1) Canada must attempt to obtain consent to disclosure before it can rely on the third party rule; (2) the rule does not apply when a Canadian agency was aware of the information before having received it from a foreign agency; and (3) the rule does not protect the mere existence of a relationship between Canada and a foreign state, absent the exchange of information in a given case: Khawaja at paras. 146-148. 10 Arar, note 2 at paras. 82-84 11 Henrie, note 3 at para. 30 12 Khadr, note 7 at paras. 74-77; Arar, note 2 at para. 84 13 Arar, note 2 at para. 56.

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important respects. Among other things, paragraph 6 of the MOU requires the Panel in making its determinations to bear in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency, without, at the same time, compromising national security, national defence or international relations. C. The Panels Approach to Reviewing NSC Redactions Overall Approach 28. Taking into account all of these considerations, we have adopted the following

approach in reviewing the NSC redactions referred to us by the Committee. We emphasize that we have not dealt with any redactions in portions of documents that were not referred to us. (a) First, we begin our review of every redaction with the presumption that the information that has been redacted should be disclosed, consistent with the MOUs basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency. (b) Second, we ask ourselves whether the presumption is rebutted because disclosure would compromise national security, national defence or international relations. (c) Third, if the presumption is rebutted, we assess whether the redacted information can be summarized for disclosure purposes without compromising national security, national defence or international relations. Only if it cannot does the information remain undisclosed. 29. We have found that the NSC redactions referred to us by the Committee tend to fall

within the following categories: (1) detainee information, (2) confidential communications with foreign officials and organizations, (3) criticism of foreign (primarily Afghan) institutions and officials, (4) information about or from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), (5) third party information, (6) names of Afghan officials, (7) information relating to Canadas Special Forces, and (8) information about gun shot residue testing. We set out below the approaches that we have developed for each of these categories. We have done our best to apply these approaches consistently. However, as we found in

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reviewing redactions made by government officials, this is very much a human process, and it is inevitable that there will be some inconsistencies despite the best-intentioned efforts to avoid them. Detainee Information 30. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information about detainees

captured and in most cases transferred by Canadian Forces. The information contained in these documents includes the exact date of capture and/or transfer; the location of capture; the number of detainees captured or involved in a particular incident; the gender, age, name, nationality, tribe and date of birth of detainees captured or involved in a particular incident; and the identity of the country or entity to which certain detainees were transferred. 31. Our approach with these documents is to disclose only information that will not, either

by itself or in conjunction with other information, reveal the identity of, or permit identification of, detainees. We have adopted this approach in large part because we accept the concern expressed to us by government officials that detainees and their families face a real and continuing threat from enemy forces of retaliation and serious physical harm. Our approach is to disclose the following information: the month and year of capture, transfer, or release, but not the date or time; an approximation of the number of detainees captured, transferred or released in a particular operation (e.g., fewer than 20), but not the exact number; and general information about physical condition, but not information about specific ailments or diagnoses. We leave redacted information disclosing gender; age (unless the detainee is under the age of 18, in which case we will disclose that the detainee is a minor (as defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child14)); name (including fathers name and grandfathers name); identification number; nationality; place of capture; and tribe/region. 32. Certain of the documents referred to us by the Committee contain redactions that refer

to the length of delay between the transfer and the request for notification to the ICRC. We discuss the ICRC and its role in Afghanistan below. Government officials have advised us that, in some cases, the release of this information could lead a reader to determine the precise

14

Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.

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date of capture, and thereby gain insight into the pace of Canadian Forces operations. To avoid the compromise of national defence that this would entail, we have substituted the exact length of delay with an approximation. Confidential Communications with Foreign Officials and Organizations 33. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information about the substance

of communications between Canadian officials and officials from foreign governments (primarily Afghanistan) or national/international organizations, such as the ICRC and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). We have addressed communications with the ICRC as a separate category, below. Also addressed below as a separate category are diplomatic communications that amount to criticism by Canada of Afghan institutions or officials. 34. Government officials expressed serious concern about the disclosure of

intergovernmental communications. They told us that all diplomatic communication is undertaken with the expectation of confidentiality, and that disclosure of confidential communications would cause serious harm, regardless of the substance of the communication, and whether the speaker is Canada or a foreign government. They emphasized that the chilling effect of disclosure of confidential intergovernmental communications cannot be underestimated. They also emphasized that even in circumstances in which some communications have been disclosed, further disclosures would cause incremental harm. The government officials also raised a specific concern about the substance of demarches, which are official diplomatic communications, often intended to be and regarded by the recipient as very serious. Government officials told us that their ability to effectively deliver these demarches, and the willingness of foreign officials to respond candidly and usefully, depends on confidentiality. 35. Bearing in mind the governments concerns, but also the primary objective under the

MOU of disclosure and transparency, our approach is generally to summarize these communications, using wording appropriate to the context to avoid comprising national security, national defence or international relations. There are instances in which information can be or has been publicly disclosed in a certain context (e.g., as a statement of Canadas

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position on an issue), but we have summarized the same or similar information when it appears in a formal or informal diplomatic communication. This is because the concern about disclosure generally relates to the fact that the communications are diplomatic communications, and to preserving the trust and confidentiality inherent in those communications, more than to the substance of the communications, save for certain cases. However, where information has been disclosed in another document in a similar context, we have disclosed it. 36. With respect to these and other categories of documents, our staff have, to the extent

possible and feasible, carried out regular reviews of credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations to assess whether the redacted information is in the public domain. If it is, we have generally disclosed it. Criticism of Foreign (primarily Afghan) Institutions and Officials 37. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain Canadian criticism of, or candid

negative commentary about, Afghan institutions or officials. Some documents also contain Canadian reporting about criticism by one Afghan institution or official of another. The main concern with releasing this information is that doing so could undermine Canadas relationship with officials in the government and justice sector. This could in turn impair Canadas ability to continue to train and build the capacity of these officials and their institutions and jeopardize the reforms that Canada has been able to achieve to date. 38. Taking into account these concerns, and considering the different types of documents

referred to us, we have adopted the following approach to documents containing candid criticisms and assessments by Canada, based on our assessment of the extent to which disclosure of the redacted information would compromise national security, national defence or international relations. (a) If the assessment can fairly be attributed to Canada, the Canadian government, a department of the government, or a very senior official of the government, we generally summarize it. The level of detail in each summary will depend on how specific and how critical the assessment is, and who is the object of the criticism, and what adverse impact might therefore flow from disclosure.

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(b)

If the assessment appears to be merely speculation by a non-senior Canadian official, we generally either leave it redacted or summarize it at a very high level, making it clear in doing so that the assessment is the view of the individual, and not the government of Canada.

(c)

If it is in the public domain (in media reporting for example) that Canada or Canadian officials hold a particular view or have arrived at a particular assessment, we generally disclose that view or assessment. If the assessment or view simply appears in media reporting, but without any indication that it is Canadas view or assessment, we generally summarize rather than disclose it.

39.

Where we encounter criticism originating not from Canada but from a foreign

government or institution, we take a slightly different approach, on the basis that criticism of one foreign institution by another, while it might be relevant and important, is not Canadas information to disclose. This rationale flows from the third party rule, which, as described above, provides that intelligence and information received from a foreign government, as well as the source of that intelligence or information, should not be disclosed without permission. If the source of the criticism is revealed by name or position, we generally leave the criticism redacted. If the source of the criticism is not disclosed (even if the originating institution is disclosed), we generally provide a high-level summary of that criticism. 40. We exercise our judgment in each case to decide whether the information at issue is

truly critical, and therefore would be harmful if released. We are less concerned about disclosing information that is not obviously critical, and more concerned about disclosing information that is highly critical or expressed in very inflammatory language. The object of the criticism and the specificity with which it is expressed are also taken into account. 41. Finally, we note that one type of commentary that arises frequently in the documents

is Canadian assessments about mistreatment and/or torture in certain Afghan facilities. In view of the importance of the issue of mistreatment, our general approach, depending on the language used, is to release, rather than summarize, these assessments.

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Information about or from the ICRC 42. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information about or from the

ICRC. Information relating to the ICRC falls within a unique category to which we have given careful consideration. In addition to obtaining briefings from government officials about ICRC information, our staff discussed the ICRCs role and its concerns respecting the confidentiality of its information directly with ICRC officials. 43. The ICRC is an independent, neutral and impartial humanitarian organization

headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. The ICRC has described its role in Afghanistan as including protecting detainees, helping them to maintain contact with their families, monitoring the conduct of hostilities and acts to prevent international human rights law violations and assisting the wounded and disabled.15 44. The ICRCs mandate is expressly provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the

1977 Additional Protocols to the Conventions, as well as its Statutes, those of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the resolutions of the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The ICRC operates in approximately 80 countries and deploys over 12,000 staff worldwide. In order to carry out its work in a neutral and impartial manner, it has a long-standing policy and practice of confidentiality. The ICRC requires confidential bilateral communications with the authorities with which it deals and expects such authorities to respect and protect the confidential nature of its communications. The confidential nature of the ICRCs communications is essential, among other things, to enable the ICRC to conduct a dialogue with states or organized armed groups involved in armed conflicts, to persuade the parties to an armed conflict to allow it to exercise its right of access to conflict areas, and to protect ICRC staff in the field. 45. The unique role of the ICRC and the confidentiality of its working methods have been

recognized by international tribunals. The ICRCs claim to confidentiality was initially upheld in a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia involving a case in which the Prosecutor intended to call a former ICRC employee to testify. The Tribunal
15

The ICRC in Afghanistan, online at http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asia-pacific/afghanistan/ index.jsp.

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determined that the ICRC has an absolute privilege to decline to provide evidence in connection with judicial proceedings as a matter of both international treaty and customary law.16 This decision has been followed by the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.17 The privilege over ICRC communications has also been incorporated into the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court.18 46. Mindful of the ICRCs concerns, considering its important mandate and taking into

account our staffs discussions with ICRC officials, we have adopted the following approach to reviewing redactions respecting information about or from the ICRC. (a) We disclose the fact of any discussions or meetings with the ICRC. The ICRC advised our staff that it is publicly known and expected, by virtue of the ICRCs mandate under the Geneva Convention, that the ICRC meets with state authorities to remind them of their international obligations. (b) Generally speaking, we do not disclose any information or communications flowing from Canada to the ICRC. There may be instances is which we disclose in summary form information communicated by Canada to the ICRC on issues that are peripheral to the detainee issue. (c) We do not disclose any information, even in summary form, about or from the ICRC that is directly attributed to the ICRC or that it can be inferred comes from the ICRC, unless it has already been publicly disclosed. We may disclose the substance of information, likely by way of summary, communicated by the ICRC, where it is not attributed to the ICRC directly and it is not otherwise apparent that it comes from the ICRC. Given the ICRCs role and privileged access to information about detainees, it will be obvious in many cases, even

16

Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, 27 July 1999. 17 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals, 11 December 2002, para. 32; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55, Reasons for the Chambers Decision on the Accuseds Motion to Exclude Witness TQ, 15 July 2005, paras. 14-16. 18 Rule 73, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court.

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where information is not attributed to the ICRC, that the ICRC is the source of this information. Where that is the case, we leave the information redacted. 47. This approach applies to all information flowing between Canada and the ICRC,

whether it is information about or assessments of Canadian procedures or information about or assessments of Afghan facilities and national authorities. From the ICRCs perspective there is no basis on which to distinguish these types of information. Third party Information 48. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information from third parties,

such as foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations like NATO or NATOs International Security Assistance Force. In accordance with the third party information rule, described in paragraph 24 above, our approach is to not disclose or summarize third party information, unless it has already been publicly disclosed. Names of Afghan Officials 49. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain the names of Afghan officials,

including senior Afghan officials. Our approach is not to disclose these names except where the information, including the name, has already been widely disclosed. As is the case with the names of Afghan detainees, there are in many cases serious risks that an Afghan official referred to in the documents may be subject to retaliation or serious harm if the Afghan officials name is identified. In addition, there are risks that disclosure will compromise Canadas relationship with the Afghan government. We have summarized information where it can be summarized without identifying the Afghan official involved. Information relating to Special Forces 50. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information about Canadas

Special Forces in Afghanistan. In view of the nature of their mission, information about the activities of Special Forces is not ordinarily publicly available. Recognizing the operational security issues involved, our approach is not to disclose or summarize information about Special Forces activities except where it has already been disclosed. The information that

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appears to have been publicly disclosed includes the following: (a) the presence of Special Forces in Afghanistan; and (b) the general nature of the role of Special Forces in Afghanistan. Information about Gun Shot Residue Testing 51. Certain documents referred by the Committee contain information about the use of

gunshot residue (GSR) testing in Afghanistan. The government has publicly acknowledged that the GSR test is used by Canadian Forces. Our approach is to disclose information in documents relating to the use of the test and results obtained in particular circumstances, but leave redacted other information to avoid compromising national defence. D. 52. Status of the Panels Review of NSC Information As a result of its review of the documents it has received from the government, the

Committee, has referred approximately 2300 pages of documents to the Panel for its consideration. In some instances the Committee has referred entire documents to the Panel; in other instances only particular pages, paragraphs or passages have been referred. 53. In October 2010, to facilitate the Panels work and enable it to begin to release the

results of its NSC determinations without waiting until it had completed its review of all of the documents referred to it, the Panel invited the Committee to identify documents from among those referred to it that the Panel would review on a priority basis. The Committee initially identified a priority subset of documents in October 2010, supplemented its list of these documents in mid-December 2010, and further refined the list in March 2011. The subset comprises some 1450 pages of documents. 54. The Panel has completed its review and determinations in respect of the priority subset

of documents identified by the Committee, and also reviewed and made determinations with respect to a number of documents on the longer list of documents referred by the Committee to the Panel. Where only a portion of a document has been referred to the Panel, the Panels determinations relate only to redactions that appeared in the referred portion of the document; again, we have not dealt with any redactions in portions of the document that were not referred to us.

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55.

A long and complex process must be completed in order to implement the Panels

decisions. This implementation work is carried out by a specialized unit within the Department of Justice, which has the technology and resources to carry out these tasks, using special secure software so that redactions can be lifted or the information in them summarized in a form that is useful for the purposes of disclosure but that does not compromise national security, national defence or international relations. Once the Panels decisions have been implemented, the documents are given to us and our staff for a final review before they are ready for release. The process is painstaking and time-consuming, though that is a necessary corollary of the sensitive and confidential nature of the task. 56. As a result of the need to undertake this process, while the Panel has completed its

review of the priority subset of documents, those documents are not all yet ready for release. However, at the Committees suggestion, we have further prioritized 113 of these documents. They comprise the first set of documents that we have reviewed in accordance with our mandate under the MOU and that are ready for release. A set of these 113 documents, reflecting the results of our review, is available for provision along with this report. The table of contents of this set of documents specifies the portions of the documents referred to us by the Committee. We had contemplated that we would continue to deliver further sets of documents to the Committee as they became ready for release. IV. PANELS APPROACH AND WORK IN REVIEWING INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND CABINET CONFIDENTIALITY Introduction The Panels second task under the MOU is to review the governments redactions on

A. 57.

grounds of solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet confidentiality. This is the process described in paragraph 7 of the MOU. In contrast to the NSC process, the Committee has no ability to refer redactions of these classes of information to the Panel. Indeed, in contrast to NSC redactions, the Committee does not see redacted information that is subject to these claims unless the Panel decides to lift the redactions or summarize the redacted information. 58. The MOU includes among its recitals the following statement:

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Recognizing that Cabinet confidences and information subject to solicitor-client privilege are classes of information that the Parliament of Canada has long recognized are sensitive and may require protection from disclosure. 59. As set out above, paragraph 7 of the MOU states: The Panel of Arbiters can determine, at the request of the government, that certain information should not be disclosed due to the solicitor-client privilege. The Panel of Arbiters, after consultation with the Clerk of the Privy Council, can also determine, at the request of the government, that information constituting Cabinet confidences should not be disclosed. In both such cases, the Panel of Arbiters shall determine how information contained in the documents may be made to Members of Parliament and the public without compromising the solicitor-client privilege or the principle of Cabinet confidentiality, by such techniques as the Panel may find appropriate, bearing in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency. Should the Panel of Arbiters decide that certain information should not be disclosed, the Panel will provide the rationale for its decisions to the ad hoc committee. 60. In carrying out its tasks under paragraph 7 of the MOU, the Panels approach is to

apply the law of solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet confidentiality, keeping in mind the basic objective of maximizing disclosure and transparency to which the paragraph refers. Our methodology entails (1) applying legal requirements to determine whether the claim of privilege or confidentiality is validly made, (2) if it is, determining whether the information subject to the claim can be made available in summary form without compromising the privilege or confidentiality, (3) if this is possible, determining an appropriate summary, and (4) if this is not possible, maintaining the redaction. B. Solicitor-Client Privilege Legal Requirements 61. Under Canadian law, solicitor-client privilege is close to absolute. Courts in Canada

have held that solicitor-client privilege is a substantive legal and constitutional right that is

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fundamental to the proper functioning of our legal system.19 It applies broadly to all interactions between client and lawyer when the lawyer is engaged in providing legal advice or otherwise acting as a lawyer rather than as a business counsellor or in some other non-legal capacity. It extends to communications between government officials and government lawyers just as it does to any other lawyer-client communications.20 62. There are four basic prerequisites for solicitor-client privilege to apply: (1) there must

be a communication between the lawyer and client; (2) the communication must be for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice; (3) the communication must have been made in confidence with an expectation of confidentiality; and (4) the communication must be based on the lawyers professional legal expertise. Unless it is waived by the client, solicitor-client privilege generally lasts forever.21 Status of the Panels Review of Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims 63. The Panel has completed its review of the majority of the redactions from documents

provided to the Committee to date that are based on claims of solicitor-client privilege. As part of this review, the Panel instructed its staff to seek further information from government officials so that it could be satisfied of the basis for the claims. In the course of this process a number of claims of privilege were withdrawn, in whole or in part. 64. Applying the relevant law, the Panel determined that with limited exceptions, the

claims of solicitor-client privilege were well founded: the large majority of the claims met the four prerequisites for privilege set out above. 65. In cases in which we determined that these prerequisites were met, so that the claim of

solicitor-client privilege is properly made, we considered, in accordance with our mandate in the MOU and our methodology, whether summaries of the redacted passages or at a minimum the facts which they contain could be provided without compromising the solicitor-client privilege. In our judgment this has not been possible. First, to do so would

19 20

Descteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860. Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.). 21 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319.

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disclose the subject matter of a request for legal advice, and thus compromise the privilege. Second, to do so would be inconsistent with the rejection by the Supreme Court of Canada of a distinction, in determining whether privilege is made out, between legal advice and an account of the underlying facts.22 Both are presumptively protected by privilege. 66. We have prepared for transmission to the Committee along with this report a list

setting out (1) the documents in relation to which claims of solicitor-client privilege have been withdrawn, in whole or in part, (2) the documents that are the subject of claims of solicitor-client privilege that the Panel has determined to be well-founded, and (3) the documents that are the subject of claims of solicitor-client privilege that the Panel has determined not to be well-founded. 67. We have also arranged for transmission to the Committee along with this report fresh

copies of the documents that were the subject of solicitor-client privilege claims that have been withdrawn or have been determined by the Panel not to be well-founded. In these versions of the documents the redactions made on the basis of these claims have been lifted. C. Cabinet Confidentiality Legal Requirements 68. In contrast to the law of solicitor-client privilege, the common law respecting Cabinet

confidences, which applies to the documents reviewed by the Panel under the MOU, does not provide for an absolute privilege from disclosure. The Supreme Court of Canada has held instead that, as a matter of common law, Cabinet confidences should be disclosed, unless disclosure would interfere with the public interest.23 However, the Court stated that because Cabinet documents can concern the decision-making process at the highest level, courts must proceed with caution in ordering their disclosure. 69. The Court set out a number of considerations that are relevant in determining whether

disclosure would interfere with the public interest. These include the level of decision-making to which the information relates; the nature of the policy concerned (e.g., documents relating
22 23

Maranda v. Qubec (Juge de la Cour du Qubec), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193. Carey v. Ontario, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637.

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to national security or national defence might be treated differently than documents relating to tourism policy); the particular contents of the documents; whether the information relates to allegations of government wrong-doing, so that disclosure may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of government; the date of the documents or information and whether the policy-making process to which it relates is still ongoing; and the importance of producing the documents in the interests of the administration of justice, having regard to the importance of the case and the need or desirability of producing the documents to ensure that it can be adequately and fairly presented. Cabinet confidentiality may extend beyond Cabinet documents per se; it may, for example, apply to communications between or involving Ministers. 70. The common law of Cabinet confidentiality has been largely superseded at the federal

level by section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, which creates an absolute bar to disclosure where Cabinet confidentiality is properly claimed under that section. However, section 39 applies only where the issue of disclosure arises before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information. Because the Panel does not meet this description, section 39 is inapplicable to the determinations the Panel must make as to whether Cabinet confidences should be disclosed. Status of the Panels Review of Cabinet Confidentiality Claims 71. The government provided the Panel only recently with its claims of Cabinet

confidences in relation to the documents provided by the government to date. The Panels intent has been to complete its review of the redactions based on these claims as expeditiously as possible.

Claire LHeureux-Dub

Frank Iacobucci

EXAMEN DES DOCUMENTS SUR LES DTENUS AFGHANS

RAPPORT DU GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES RELATIVEMENT SON TRAVAIL ET SA MTHODOLOGIE AFIN DE DTERMINER QUELS RENSEIGNEMENTS CAVIARDS PEUVENT TRE DIVULGUS

Lhonorable Claire LHeureux-Dub Lhonorable Frank Iacobucci Le 15 avril 2011

TABLE DES MATIRES PRFACE............................................................................................................................ I I. II. III. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 LES TCHES CONFIES AU GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES ...................3 APPROCHE ADOPTE PAR LE GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES LGARD DES CAVIARDAGES VISS PAR LE PROCESSUS CSN.................6 A. Introduction.......................................................................................................6 B. Jurisprudence pertinente....................................................................................7 C. Approche applique par le Groupe dexperts-arbitres lexamen des caviardages viss par le processus CSN ........................................................10 Approche gnrale ..........................................................................................10 Renseignements sur les dtenus.......................................................................11 Communications confidentielles avec des reprsentants et des organisations de ltranger .............................................................12 Critiques lgard dinstitutions et de reprsentants de ltranger (surtout de lAfghanistan) ...........................................................................14 Renseignements au sujet ou en provenance du CICR.......................................15 Renseignement provenant de tiers ...................................................................18 Noms de reprsentants de lAfghanistan..........................................................18 Renseignements sur les forces spciales du Canada .........................................18 Renseignements sur les analyses des rsidus de poudre canon ......................19 D. tat de lexamen des caviardages viss par le processus CSN..........................19 APPROCHE ADOPTE PAR LE GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES LGARD DES RENSEIGNEMENTS ASSUJETTIS AU SECRET PROFESSIONNEL ET DES RENSEIGNEMENTS CONFIDENTIELS DU CABINET ................................................................................................................20 A. Introduction.....................................................................................................20 B. Secret professionnel avocat-client ...................................................................21 Exigences juridiques .......................................................................................21 tat de lexamen des renseignements assujettis au secret professionnel ...........22 C. Renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet........................................................23 Exigences juridiques .......................................................................................23 tat de lexamen des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet ........................25

IV.

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PRFACE Cest le cur lourd que nous crivons ces mots en hommage notre collgue du Groupe dexperts-arbitres, lhonorable Donald I. Brenner, ex-juge en chef de la Cour suprme de Colombie-Britannique. minent avocat, juriste et rformateur, Don a fait une contribution norme aux travaux relatifs au protocole dentente. Deux jours encore avant sa disparition subite, Don et nous avons pass la journe ensemble et avons fait de grands progrs, notamment grce aux observations perspicaces dont il avait lhabitude et son esprit de collaboration. Bien que, malheureusement, Don ne soit plus auprs de nous, nous sommes en mesure daffirmer que le prsent rapport reflte ses vues, et nous lui en sommes grandement reconnaissants. Nous offrons sa famille nos profondes condolances.

Claire LHeureux-Dub

Frank Iacobucci

I. 1.

INTRODUCTION Le 15 juin 2010, le trs honorable Stephen Harper, Premier ministre, lhonorable

Michael Ignatieff, chef de lOpposition officielle, et M. Gilles Duceppe, chef du Bloc Qubcois, ont conclu un protocole dentente (le protocole ) visant rsoudre un diffrend relativement la divulgation de documents gouvernementaux propos du transfert des dtenus afghans par les Forces canadiennes aux autorits afghanes. 2. Le protocole, dont copie est en annexe au prsent rapport, prvoit la cration dun

comit spcial de parlementaires, compos dun dput et dun dput remplaant de chacun des partis dont les chefs ont sign le protocole, et dun Groupe de trois experts-arbitres, compos de trois juristes minents qui auront lexpertise judiciaire . Ce comit spcial a pour tche dexaminer tous les renseignements caviards par le gouvernement pour des raisons de scurit nationale, de dfense nationale et de relations internationales, et, sil estime que la divulgation de cette information est pertinente et ncessaire, dans le but dobliger le gouvernement rendre compte, de renvoyer celle-ci au Groupe dexperts-arbitres. Conformment au protocole, ce dernier a t charg de dterminer la faon dont pourraient tre communiqus ces renseignements caviards aux dputs et au public sans compromettre les intrts que protge le caviardage. 3. Lhonorable Stphane Dion, M. Luc Desnoyers, M. Laurie Hawn, M. Pierre Lemieux,

M. Richard Nadeau et lhonorable Bryon Wilfert ont t nomms membres du comit spcial. Nous deux, ainsi que lhonorable Donald I. Brenner, avons t nomms membres du Groupe dexperts-arbitres. Depuis notre nomination, avec laide de notre personnel de soutien, nous avons travaill conjointement avec le comit, le Bureau du Conseil priv et le ministre de la Justice lexcution des tches qui nous ont t confies en vertu du protocole. 4. Lhonorable Donald Brenner est malheureusement dcd subitement le 12 mars

2011. Avant son dcs, il a contribu de faon marquante l approche adopte par le Groupe dexperts-arbitres et la rdaction du prsent rapport; jusqu sa disparition tragique, il a particip pleinement aux dcisions du Groupe. 5. Le but de ce rapport est dexpliquer la mthode que nous avons suivie pour effectuer

les tches confres par le protocole dentente, et plus particulirement la mthodologie qui

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nous a servis dterminer si linformation caviarde que nous renvoie le comit spcial peut tre divulgue, et dans laffirmative, de quelle faon elle doit ltre. Le rapport explicite : (a) les tches qui nous ont t confies aux termes du protocole, leur relation avec le travail ralis par le comit et des reprsentants du gouvernement, et la mthode utilise; (b) la mthodologie applique notre examen du caviardage effectu par le gouvernement pour des raisons de scurit nationale, de dfense nationale ou de relations internationales; (c) la mthodologie applique notre examen du caviardage effectu par le gouvernement eu gard au secret professionnel avocat-client et la confidentialit des renseignements du Cabinet; (d) 6. ltat de nos travaux.

De pair avec le prsent rapport, nous avions prvu remettre au comit la premire srie

de documents que nous avons examins conformment notre mandat aux termes du protocole et qui sont prts tre divulgus. Nous avions lintention de continuer remettre des documents au Comit au fur et mesure que nous en aurions complt lexamen et quils seraient prts tre divulgs. 7. Comme en sont conscients les membres du comit et les reprsentants du

gouvernement impliqus dans le processus dexamen des documents, un mcanisme comme celui prvu dans le protocole na jamais t adopt au Canada, ni mme peut-tre au monde. Afin de nous acquitter de cette tche complexe, nous avons d porter des jugements difficiles. Ce faisant, nous avons gard lesprit la grande importance des intrts en jeu. Nous avons aussi pris en considration et soupes divers facteurs, circonstances et consquences potentielles. Bien que nous reconnaissions le possibilit que des dcideurs clairs puissent diverger dopinion sur ces jugements, nous pouvons toutefois affirmer que le contenu de notre rapport et de nos dcisions tmoigne de notre effort collectif, las suite de discussions et dvaluations attentives, pour dgager des conclusions qui, selon nous, sont fidles tant la lettre qu lesprit du protocole.

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8.

Nous sommes reconnaissants aux membres du comit et aux reprsentants du

gouvernement pour leur assistance et coopration dans le traitement de ces questions et de la rsolution de cette nouvelle problmatique. Nos discussions avec les membres du comit ont t constructives et professionnelles, et ces derniers ont assum leur rle de faon consciencieuse et motive. 9. Enfin, nous souhaitons souligner l apports continu de notre personnel, qui, dune part,

nous a fourni linformation, les analyses et le soutien ncessaires nos prises de dcision, et dautre part, ont consacr beaucoup defforts et de temps la mise en uvre de ces dcisions, comme nous le dcrivons ci-dessous. Leur contribution et leur travail infatigable nous ont t dune aide prcieuse. II. 10. LES TCHES CONFIES AU GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES Le travail du Groupe dexperts-arbitres, tout comme celui du comit et du

gouvernement en ce qui concerne ce processus, est dtermin par les termes du protocole dentente, conclu afin de rsoudre un diffrend entre la Chambre des communes et le gouvernement. 11. Le 10 dcembre 2009, la Chambre des communes a adopt une ordonnance de

production de documents gouvernementaux propos du transfert par les Forces canadiennes des dtenus afghans aux autorits afghanes. Or, comme les signataires du protocole lont reconnu, la divulgation de certains renseignements contenus dans ces documents pourrait porter prjudice la dfense nationale, aux relations internationales ou la scurit, tant donn quaucune mesure de traitement confidentiel de linformation nest prvue dans cette ordonnance. 12. Le 27 avril 2010, le prsident de la Chambre des communes a conclu que la Chambre

navait pas outrepass ses pouvoirs en requrant les documents viss dans lordonnance en question. Le prsident a toutefois suggr linstauration dun mcanisme par lequel ces documents pourraient tre mis la disposition de la Chambre sans compromettre la scurit et la confidentialit des renseignements quils contiennent. Conformment cette suggestion du prsident, tous les partis ont convenu dans un accord de principe, le 14 mai 2010, dtablir ce

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mcanisme. Le protocole dentente, qui met en uvre laccord de principe, a subsquemment t ratifi par le chef de tous les partis, sauf le Nouveau Parti dmocratique. 13. Le protocole dentente a cr le comit et le Groupe dexperts-arbitres. Il accorde au

comit laccs tous les documents en version caviarde et non caviarde figurant lordonnance du 10 dcembre 2009, y compris tous les documents pertinents concernant le transfert des dtenus afghans de 2001 2005, pour la bonne comprhension des ententes de transfert conclues aprs 2005, selon de strictes mesures de scurit, de dfense nationale ou de relations internationales. Deux processus distincts dexamen des caviardages effectus par le gouvernement sont prvus dans le protocole : (a) CSN ce processus sapplique aux documents contenant de linformation caviarde par le gouvernement dans lintrt de la confidentialit lie la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou aux relations internationales (rsumes par lacronyme CSN ); (b) secret professionnel/principe de confidentialit un autre processus sapplique aux documents contenant de linformation caviarde par le gouvernement en raison du secret professionnel avocat-client ou du principe de confidentialit du Cabinet. 14. Les paragraphes 5 et 6 du protocole dfinissent le processus dexamen des passages

qui ont t caviards pour des motifs de scurit nationale, de dfense nationale ou de relations internationales. Le processus prvoit que le comit doit dterminer quels sont les renseignements pertinents devant tre divulgus, tandis que le Groupe dexperts-arbitres doit dterminer la faon dont ces renseignements seront communiqus sans compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. 15. Le paragraphe 5 se lit comme suit : Le comit spcial dterminera si linformation dans chaque document ayant t caviard est pertinente, eut (sic) gard aux sujets dimportance pour les dputs, en particulier si elle concerne ltude sur le transfert des dtenus afghans actuellement mene par le Comit spcial de la Chambre des communes sur la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, et si lutilisation de cette information est ncessaire dans le but de demander des comptes au

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gouvernement. Les dcisions du comit spcial concernant la pertinence seront dfinitives et chapperont au contrle judiciaire. 16. Le paragraphe 6 se lit comme suit : Si le comit spcial estime que linformation est pertinente et ncessaire, ou la demande dun membre du comit spcial, il renverra celle-ci au Groupe dexperts-arbitres qui dterminera la faon dont seront communiqus ces renseignements aux dputs et au public, sans compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales, que ce soit la censure, la rdaction de rsums ou toute autre technique juge approprie, compte tenu des objectifs fondamentaux visant maximiser la divulgation et la transparence. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres consultera rgulirement les membres du comit spcial afin de mieux comprendre quels renseignements les dputs estiment pertinents et leurs justifications. Les dcisions du Groupe concernant la divulgation seront dfinitives et chapperont au contrle judiciaire. 17. Comme le dmontrent les termes de ces paragraphes, le protocole confre au comit la

seule responsabilit de dterminer quels renseignements caviards pour des motifs de scurit nationale, de dfense nationale ou de relations internationales sont pertinents et dont la divulgation est ncessaire. Il confre au Groupe dexperts-arbitres la seule responsabilit de dterminer la faon dont seront divulgus ces renseignements sans compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. Au paragraphe 6, on peut lire que le Groupe dexperts-arbitres doit consulter rgulirement les membres du comit afin de mieux comprendre quels renseignements les dputs estiment pertinents, et pourquoi. Toutefois, en ce qui a trait la divulgation, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres prend les dcisions finales de faon indpendante, sans lintervention du comit ou du gouvernement. 18. Le paragraphe 7 du protocole dfinit le processus dexamen des renseignements qui,

selon le gouvernement, ne devraient pas tre divulgus en raison du secret professionnel avocat-client ou du principe de confidentialit du Cabinet. Le paragraphe se lit comme suit : Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut dterminer, la demande du gouvernement, que certains renseignements ne devraient pas tre divulgus en raison du secret professionnel qui lie lavocat son client. Aprs avoir consult le greffier du Conseil priv, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut galement dterminer, la demande du gouvernement, que linformation qui constitue des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet ne devrait pas tre divulgue. Dans les deux cas, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut dterminer comment communiquer aux

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membres du Parlement et au public, laide des moyens quil juge opportuns, linformation contenue dans les documents sans compromettre le secret professionnel avocat-client, ni le principe de confidentialit du Cabinet et sans perdre de vue que lobjectif est davoir la plus grande divulgation et la plus grande transparence possibles. Si le Groupe dexperts-arbitres est davis que certains renseignements ne devraient pas tre divulgus, le Groupe dexpertsarbitres fournira les raisons de sa dcision au comit spcial. III. A. 19. APPROCHE ADOPTE PAR LE GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES LGARD DES CAVIARDAGES VISS PAR LE PROCESSUS CSN Introduction Conformment au protocole dentente, la principale fonction du Groupe

dexperts-arbitres est dexaminer les caviardages viss par le processus CSN, cest--dire les renseignements caviards par le gouvernement dans lintrt de la scurit nationale, de la dfense nationale ou des relations internationales. Cette activit sest avre complexe et charge de dfis : il y avait des milliers de pages de documents examiner, de nombreuses runions entre le Groupe dexperts-arbitres, son personnel et le comit organiser, ainsi que des rencontres et des communications avec les reprsentants du gouvernement coordonner. Lune des grandes difficults relevait des facteurs lis la technologie et la scurit dont le Groupe devait tenir compte dans lexamen des documents et leur prparation en vue de leur divulgation. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres et son personnel devaient tout dabord examiner et valuer tous les caviardages ports son attention par le comit, puis voir lapplication de ses dcisions en faisant traiter chaque document au moyen dun logiciel permettant de supprimer les caviardages jugs inutiles, ou encore en rsumant linformation de manire ce quelle puisse tre divulgue sans compromette la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. 20. Dans le cadre de son examen des caviardages viss par le processus CSN, le Groupe

dexperts-arbitres a tudi la jurisprudence des tribunaux afin de dterminer si, en conformit avec larticle 38 de Loi sur la preuve au Canada1, certains des renseignements ne devraient pas tre divulgus parce quils pourraient porter prjudice la dfense nationale, la scurit nationale ou aux relations internationales. Mme si la Loi ne sapplique pas au travail du

Lois rvises du Canada 1985, chapitre C-5

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Groupe dexperts-arbitres, et que le libell de larticle 38 diffre grandement de celui du protocole dentente, le Groupe sest nanmoins appuy sur la jurisprudence labore sous larticle 38 pour dfinir son approche lexamen des documents viss par le processus CSN. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a galement bnfici de sances dinformation lors desquelles des reprsentants du gouvernement lui ont expliqu comment et pourquoi, leur avis, la divulgation des renseignements caviards compromettrait la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. B. 21. Jurisprudence pertinente Dans un arrt-cl, il a t tabli que la "scurit nationale" sentend au minimum de

la prservation du mode de vie canadien, notamment de la protection de la scurit des personnes, des institutions et des liberts au Canada2 . Les tribunaux ont dtermin quels types de renseignements sont susceptibles de porter prjudice la scurit nationale, soit ceux qui : rvlent ou tendent rvler lidentit de sources humaines ou techniques; rvlent ou tendent rvler des cibles de surveillance; rvlent ou tendent rvler des mthodes de fonctionnement ou des politiques oprationnelles ou administratives; compromettent ou tendent compromettre la scurit des systmes de tlcommunication3. 22. Dans le mme arrt, on dfinit la notion de dfense nationale au moyen dune

traduction libre de la dfinition donne dans le Blacks Law Dictionary : 1. Tous les moyens pris par une nation pour se protger contre ses ennemis. La protection, par une nation, de son idal collectif et de ses valeurs collectives est comprise dans la notion de dfense nationale. 2. Larsenal militaire dune nation4. Dans une autre affaire, le juge a conclu que la divulgation dune vido et de transcriptions relatives au conflit en Bosnie porterait prjudice la dfense nationale et aux relations internationales. La vido montrait un bombardement arien effectu en Bosnie par les forces diriges par lOrganisation du trait de lAtlantique

Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Canada (Commission denqute sur les actions des reprsentants canadiens relativement Maher Arar), 2007 CF 766, paragraphe 68 (1re instance) 3 Henrie c. Canada (Comit de surveillance des activits de renseignements de scurit), 1989 2 CF 229, paragraphes 29 31 (1re instance), dcision confirme 1992 ACF no 100 (CA); Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Kempo, 2004 CF 1678, paragraphes 89 92 (1re instance); Singh v. Canada (2000), 186 FTR 1, paragraphe 32 (1re instance) (en anglais seulement) 4 Arar, remarque 2, paragraphe 62

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Nord (OTAN). Les transcriptions comprenaient de linformation sur les services de renseignements, leurs rapports, le commandement, la structure de commandement des diffrentes forces prsentes en Bosnie, les oprations militaires, les politiques sur la conduite des oprations militaires, le rle et la conduite de certains acteurs, ainsi que lidentit des sources et des cibles. Le juge a dtermin que la divulgation de certains renseignements pourrait notamment : branler la confiance ncessaire pour permettre lOTAN dtre efficace; compromettre le rle du Canada en tant que membre de lOTAN; rendre les allis du Canada peu disposs lui communiquer des renseignements (ce qui empcherait le Canada daccder linformation ncessaire pour protger les civils et les troupes); compromettre la capacit de lOTAN et du Canada de mener des oprations militaires dans lavenir5. 23. En outre, il est noter que larticle 15 de la Loi sur laccs linformation6, qui

prvoit quil est possible de refuser la communication de documents contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait de porter prjudice la dfense du Canada , fait tat des exemples suivants : des renseignements dordre tactique ou stratgique ou des renseignements relatifs aux manuvres et oprations; des renseignements concernant la quantit, les caractristiques, les capacits ou le dploiement des armes ou des matriels de dfense; des renseignements concernant les caractristiques, les capacits, le rendement, le potentiel, le dploiement, les fonctions, ou le rle des tablissements de dfense, des forces, units ou personnel militaire; des lments dinformation recueillis ou prpars aux fins du renseignement relatif la dfense du Canada ou dtats allis. 24. Daprs la jurisprudence, les relations internationales prsentent un grand intrt

pour plusieurs raisons. Lune des plus importantes est la suivante : le Canada est un importateur net de renseignements sur la scurit. Il se doit donc de maintenir des relations rciproques avec les organismes dorientation, les services de renseignements et les agences de scurit des autres nations, et surtout de ses plus proches allis7. En outre, le Canada

Ribic c. Canada (Procureur gnral), 2003 CFPI 10, paragraphes 14 18 (1re instance); Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Ribic, 2003 CFPI 43, paragraphes 14 et 15 (1re instance); dcision confirme dans Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Ribic, 2003 CAF 246 6 LRC, 1985, chapitre A-1 7 Charkaoui c. Canada (Citoyennet et Immigration), [2007] CSC 9, paragraphe 68; Khadr c. Canada (Procureur gnral), 2008 CF 549, paragraphe 93 (1re instance); Arar, remarque 2, paragraphes 77, 78 et 80

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dpend de ses relations avec les autres nations pour atteindre ses objectifs en matire de politique trangre, ainsi que pour faire la promotion des droits de la personne, de la dmocratie et de la bonne gouvernance ltranger8. Les renseignements les plus souvent soulevs dans le contexte des relations internationales sont les renseignements protgs par la rgle des tiers ainsi que les critiques de pays ou de gouvernements trangers. En vertu de la rgle des tiers, les renseignements obtenus dun tiers, habituellement un tat alli, ne peuvent tre communiqus sans lautorisation du tiers en question9. Les critiques de gouvernements trangers formules par le Canada peuvent tre protges dans lintrt des relations internationales, sauf si lunique ou principale raison pour laquelle le gouvernement veut faire interdire la divulgation est sa volont de se soustraire la critique ou dviter lembarras10. 25. Lorsquils ont appliqu larticle 38 pour dterminer sil y avait eu prjudice, les

tribunaux ont pris en considration les principes d observateur bien inform et d effet de mosaque . Pour ce faire, ils se sont demand sil tait question dune personne [] qui sy connat en matire de scurit et qui est membre dun groupe constituant une menace, prsente ou ventuelle, envers la scurit du Canada [] , qui pourrait interprter un renseignement apparemment anodin en fonction des donnes quil possde dj, et qui serait ainsi en mesure den arriver des dductions prjudiciables11. Les tribunaux incitent toutefois la prudence en soulignant quil ne faut pas dpasser les limites du raisonnable les inquitudes doivent tre fondes sur des faits prcis12. 26. Selon la jurisprudence relative larticle 38, linformation qui relve du domaine

public nest gnralement pas protge. Cependant, les tribunaux ont reconnu que cette rgle

8 9

Khadr, remarque 7, paragraphe 74; Arar, remarque 2, paragraphes 85 90 Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Khawaja, 2007 CF 490, paragraphe 139 (1re instance). La Cour fdrale a formul trois rserves par rapport la rgle des tiers : 1) le Canada doit avoir tent dobtenir un consentement la communication des renseignements avant dappliquer la rgle; 2) la rgle na aucune pertinence lorsque lorganisme canadien a connaissance des renseignements avant de les avoir reus de lorganisme tranger; 3) la rgle na pas pour effet de protger la simple existence dune relation entre le Canada et ltat tranger, en labsence dun change de renseignements dans un cas donn. Khawaja, paragraphes 146 148. 10 Arar, remarque 2, paragraphes 82 84 11 Henrie, remarque 3, paragraphe 30 12 Khadr, remarque 7, paragraphes 74 77; Arar, remarque 2, paragraphe 84

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gnrale ne sapplique pas lorsque seulement une partie de linformation a t communique au public, lorsque linformation nest pas largement connue et accessible, lorsque lauthenticit de linformation na t ni confirme ni infirme, et lorsque linformation a t communique par inadvertance13. 27. Mme si nous nous sommes penchs sur la jurisprudence relative larticle 38, cet

article et son application nont aucune incidence directe sur le travail que nous devons raliser dans le cadre du protocole dentente. Larticle 38 ne vise que les procdures devant un tribunal, un organisme ou une personne ayant le pouvoir de contraindre la production de renseignements , description qui ne sapplique pas au Groupe dexperts-arbitres. En outre, le libell de larticle 38 diffre de celui du protocole dentente sur un certain nombre de points importants. Notamment, le paragraphe 6 du protocole dentente contraint le Groupe dexperts-arbitres prendre ses dcisions en tenant compte [] des objectifs fondamentaux visant maximiser la divulgation et la transparence , et ce, [] sans compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales . C. Approche applique par le Groupe dexperts-arbitres lexamen des caviardages viss par le processus CSN Approche gnrale 28. la lumire de tous ces facteurs, nous avons adopt lapproche suivante pour

examiner les caviardages viss par le processus CSN ports notre attention par le comit. Nous tenons prciser que nous ne nous sommes penchs sur aucun caviardage dans les parties de documents qui ntaient pas vises. (a) Premirement, nous abordons lexamen de tous les caviardages en prsumant que linformation caviarde devrait tre divulgue, en conformit avec les objectifs fondamentaux visant maximiser la divulgation et la transparence.

13

Arar, remarque 2, paragraphe 56

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(b)

Deuximement, nous nous demandons si la prsomption a t rfute parce que la divulgation compromettrait la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales.

(c)

Troisimement, si la prsomption est rfute, nous dterminons si linformation caviarde peut tre rsume de manire ce quon puisse la divulguer sans compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. Sil est impossible de le faire, linformation ne sera pas divulgue.

29.

La plupart des caviardages viss par le processus CSN soumis notre examen par le

comit faisaient partie des catgories suivantes : 1) renseignements sur les dtenus; 2) communications confidentielles avec des reprsentants et des organisations de ltranger; 3) critiques lgard dinstitutions et de reprsentants de ltranger (surtout de lAfghanistan); 4) renseignements au sujet ou en provenance du Comit international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR); 5) renseignements provenant de tiers; 6) noms de reprsentants de lAfghanistan; 7) renseignements sur les forces spciales du Canada; 8) renseignements sur les analyses des rsidus de poudre canon. Nous dcrivons plus loin les approches labores pour chacune de ces catgories. Nous avons tent autant que possible dappliquer ces approches de manire uniforme. Cependant, comme nous avons pu le constater en examinant les caviardages effectus par les reprsentants, personne nest parfait, et il est invitable que certaines incohrences ressortent malgr tous les efforts dploys pour les viter. Renseignements sur les dtenus 30. Certains des documents rfrs par le comit contenaient des renseignements sur des

personnes captures et, dans la plupart des cas, transfres par les Forces canadiennes. Parmi ces renseignements taient inclus : la date exacte de la capture ou du transfert; le lieu de la capture; le nombre de personnes captures ou impliques dans un incident donn; le sexe, lge, le nom, la nationalit, la tribu et la date de naissance des personnes captures ou impliques dans un incident donn; le nom du pays ou de ltablissement o les dtenus ont t transfrs.

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31.

Notre approche lgard de ces documents est la suivante : les renseignements

divulgus ne doivent ni rvler ni permettre didentifier lidentit dun dtenu, quils soient pris isolment ou en conjonction avec dautres renseignements. Nous avons adopt cette approche en raison des inquitudes dont nous ont fait part les reprsentants du gouvernement, qui estiment que les forces ennemies risquent de faire subir aux dtenus et leurs familles des reprsailles et de graves prjudices corporels. Nous avons dcid de divulguer les renseignements suivants : le mois et lanne de la capture, du transfert ou de la libration, mais non la date et lheure; une estimation du nombre de personnes captures, transfres ou libres dans le cadre dune opration donne (p. ex., moins de 20), mais non le nombre exact; des renseignements gnraux sur ltat de sant des dtenus, mais rien au sujet des maladies et des diagnostics. Les renseignements suivants demeurent caviards : le sexe; lge ( moins que le dtenu ne soit g de moins de 18 ans, auquel cas nous indiquons que le dtenu est mineur, suivant la dfinition donne dans la Convention relative aux droits de lenfant14); le nom (y compris le nom du pre et du grand-pre); le numro didentit; la nationalit; le lieu de la capture; la tribu ou la rgion. 32. Dans certains des documents ports notre attention par le comit, les renseignements

concernant le temps qui stait coul entre le moment du transfert et celui de la notification du CICR taient caviards. Il est question du CICR et de son rle en Afghanistan plus loin. Les reprsentants du gouvernement nous ont aviss que, dans certains cas, si linformation tait divulgue, le lecteur pourrait dterminer la date exacte de la capture et ainsi se faire une ide de ltat davancement des oprations des Forces canadiennes. Pour viter de compromettre la dfense nationale, nous avons remplac la dure exacte par une approximation. Communications confidentielles avec des reprsentants et des organisations de ltranger 33. Certains des documents dont nous avons t saisis par le comit renfermaient de

linformation au sujet du contenu de communications entre des reprsentants du Canada et des reprsentants de gouvernements trangers (surtout de lAfghanistan) ou dorganisations nationales ou internationales, comme le CICR et la Commission indpendante des droits de

14

Recueil des traits du Canada, 1992, no 3

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lhomme en Afghanistan. Les communications avec le CICR ainsi que les critiques formules par le Canada lgard des institutions et reprsentants afghans font toutes deux lobjet dune section distincte. 34. Les reprsentants du gouvernement ont formul dimportantes rserves par rapport la

divulgation des communications intergouvernementales. Ils ont soutenu que toutes les parties concernes sattendent ce que les communications diplomatiques demeurent confidentielles, et que la divulgation de communications confidentielles, peu importe leur nature et leur provenance, entranerait de graves consquences quil ne faut pas sous-estimer. En outre, ils soutiennent que mme si des communications ont dj t divulgues, la divulgation dautres renseignements ne ferait quempirer la situation. Les reprsentants du gouvernement se sont dits inquiets du contenu des dmarches, qui sont des communications diplomatiques officielles gnralement trs srieuses tant du point de vue de lexpditeur que de celui du destinataire. Ces reprsentants nous ont dit que leur capacit dentreprendre et de poursuivre ces dmarches efficacement ainsi que la volont des reprsentants trangers dy rpondre de manire sincre et utile reposent sur la confidentialit. 35. Gardant lesprit les proccupations du gouvernement, mais aussi les objectifs

fondamentaux du protocole dentente, soit la divulgation et la transparence, nous avons dcid de rsumer les communications en utilisant une formulation adapte au contexte, afin dviter de compromettre la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. Lorsque linformation ou une information semblable avait dj t divulgue ou tait susceptible de ltre dans un contexte bien prcis (p. ex. une dclaration sur la position du Canada lgard dune situation donne), nous lavons quand mme rsume lorsquelle figurait dans une communication diplomatique officielle ou non. Les proccupations souleves ne concernent pas tant le contenu des communications que leur caractre diplomatique. Il est ncessaire de prserver la confiance et la confidentialit qui leur sont inhrentes. 36. En ce qui concerne cette catgorie ainsi que dautres catgories de documents, notre

personnel a, dans la mesure du possible, rgulirement pass en revue linformation des mdias crdibles, des rapports gouvernementaux et des rapports dorganisations

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internationales, afin de dterminer si les renseignements caviards taient dj dans le domaine public. Dans laffirmative, nous avons gnralement dcid de les divulguer. Critiques lgard dinstitutions et de reprsentants de ltranger (surtout de lAfghanistan) 37. Certains des documents ports notre attention par le comit renferment des critiques

ou des commentaires ngatifs formuls par le Canada lgard des institutions ou des reprsentants de lAfghanistan. Dautres font tat de critiques formules par une institution ou un reprsentant afghan lgard dun autre. Les reprsentants du gouvernement sinquitent principalement du fait que ces renseignements pourraient nuire aux relations du Canada avec les reprsentants du gouvernement et avec le systme de justice, ce qui pourrait en retour nuire lhabilit du Canada de former ces reprsentants et institutions et de renforcer leurs capacits, et mettre en pril les rformes que le Canada a russi instaurer jusqu prsent. 38. Compte tenu de ces proccupations et des diffrents types de documents qui nous ont

t rfrs, nous avons adopt lapproche suivante relativement aux documents contenant des critiques et des commentaires formuls par le Canada dont, selon nous, la divulgation de linformation caviarde serait prjudiciable la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou aux relations internationales. (a) De manire gnrale, lorsque le commentaire peut tre attribu au Canada, au gouvernement du Canada, un ministre fdral ou un de ses hauts fonctionnaires avec une certitude raisonnable, nous le rsumons. Les rsums sont plus ou moins dtaills dans la mesure o le commentaire est explicite et critique, la personne vise et le prjudice que pourrait causer leur divulgation. (b) De manire gnrale, lorsque le commentaire semble relever de la spculation et quil a t formul par un reprsentant canadien ntant pas un cadre suprieur, nous conservons le caviardage ou nous le rsumons de manire trs gnrale, en insistant sur le fait quil ne sagit que de lopinion dune personne et non de celle du gouvernement du Canada.

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(c)

De manire gnrale, sil est du domaine public que le Canada ou un de ses reprsentants est dune opinion donne ou a mis un certain commentaire (si un mdia en fait mention, par exemple), nous divulguons cette opinion ou ce commentaire. Si un mdia fait mention du commentaire ou de lopinion sans toutefois indiquer quil provient du Canada, nous le rsumons au lieu de le divulguer.

39.

Lorsque la critique na pas t formule par le Canada, mais plutt par un

gouvernement ou une institution de ltranger, nous adoptons une approche lgrement diffrente. Nous estimons quil ne revient pas au Canada de divulguer une critique formule par une institution trangre au sujet dune autre, et ce, mme si elle pouvait savrer pertinente et importante. Ce raisonnement repose sur la rgle des tiers (voir plus haut), en vertu de laquelle les renseignements de scurit et linformation obtenus dun gouvernement tranger, ainsi que leur source, ne peuvent tre divulgus sans permission. De manire gnrale, lorsque lidentit de la source est donne (nom ou poste), nous conservons le caviardage. Dans le cas contraire, et mme si le nom de linstitution dorigine est donn, nous fournissons gnralement un rsum global. 40. Pour chacun des documents, nous utilisons notre jugement afin de dterminer si

linformation constitue rellement une critique et si elle serait dommageable si elle tait divulgue. Les renseignements qui ne sont pas manifestement critiques nous proccupent beaucoup moins que les renseignements qui sont trs critiques ou dont le langage est incendiaire. Nous valuons galement lobjet de la critique et son caractre explicite. 41. Finalement, nous avons not des commentaires, assez frquents, formuls par des

reprsentants du Canada au sujet de mauvais traitements et de tortures infligs dans certains tablissements de lAfghanistan. Vu limportance de la question des mauvais traitements, notre approche gnrale, selon le langage utilis, consiste divulguer ces renseignements au lieu de les rsumer. Renseignements au sujet ou en provenance du CICR 42. Certains des documents soumis notre examen par le comit contiennent des

renseignements au sujet ou en provenance du CICR. Les renseignements relatifs au CICR

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sont dans une catgorie unique sur laquelle nous nous sommes penchs avec beaucoup dattention. En plus de nous renseigner au sujet du CICR auprs de fonctionnaires, notre personnel a discut, directement avec des reprsentants du CICR, du rle de lorganisation et de ses proccupations concernant la confidentialit de ses renseignements. 43. Le CICR, dont le sige est Genve, en Suisse, est une organisation indpendante,

neutre et impartiale qui uvre dans le domaine de laide humanitaire. Le CICR dcrit son rle en Afghanistan comme suit : protger les dtenus et les aider rester en contact avec leurs familles; surveiller les hostilits; prvenir les violations des droits de la personne; aider les personnes blesses et handicapes15. 44. Le mandat du CICR est tabli dans les Conventions de Genve (1949), dans les

protocoles additionnels aux Conventions (1977), ainsi que dans ses Statuts, ceux du Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge de mme que dans les rsolutions adoptes par les Confrences internationales de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge. Le CICR est prsent dans environ 80 pays et compte plus de 12 000 employs lchelle mondiale. Afin de fonctionner en toute neutralit et impartialit, il mise depuis longtemps sur la confidentialit dans ses politiques et pratiques. Il exige des communications bilatrales confidentielles des autorits avec lesquelles il travaille, et sattend ce que celles-ci respectent et protgent la confidentialit de ses communications. La nature confidentielle des communications du CICR est notamment essentielle pour lui permettre de dialoguer avec les tats et les groupes participant aux conflits arms, de persuader les parties en cause de respecter son droit daccs aux zones de conflit, et de protger son personnel sur le terrain. 45. Le rle unique du CICR et la confidentialit entourant ses mthodes de travail ont t

reconnus par des tribunaux internationaux. Le droit du CICR la confidentialit a pour la premire fois t confirm dans une dcision du Tribunal pnal international pour lancienne Yougoslavie. Un procureur voulait appeler un ancien employ du CICR tmoigner, et le Tribunal a dtermin que lorganisation avait le privilge absolu de refuser de fournir des

15

The ICRC in Afghanistan (en ligne) http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asiapacific/afghanistan/index.jsp.

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lments de preuve dans le cadre de procdures judiciaires compte tenu des traits internationaux applicables et du droit coutumier16. Ont suivi les dcisions de la Chambre dappel du Tribunal pnal international pour lancienne Yougoslavie et du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda17. Le privilge du CICR lgard de ses communications a galement t intgr au Rglement de procdure et de preuve de la Cour pnale internationale18. 46. Compte tenu des proccupations du CICR, de son important mandat et des discussions

qua eues notre personnel avec des reprsentants du CICR, nous avons adopt lapproche suivante pour examiner le caviardage des renseignements sur le CICR ou provenant de celui-ci. (a) Nous faisons mention des discussions et des rencontres du Canada avec le CICR. Le CICR a indiqu notre personnel que le public sait quil rencontre les autorits gouvernementales pour leur Genve. (b) De manire gnrale, nous ne divulguons pas les renseignements transmis au CICR par le Canada. Il peut arriver que nous rsumions les renseignements communiqus au sujet de questions entourant le dossier des dtenus. (c) Nous ne divulguons pas dinformation qui se rapporte au CICR ou qui en provient, et qui puisse lui tre attribue directement ou par dduction, moins quelle nait dj t diffuse. Il nous arrive de divulguer le contenu des communications, habituellement au moyen dun rsum, lorsque linformation nest pas directement attribue au CICR et quil nest pas possible de le dterminer. Compte tenu du rle du CICR et de son accs privilgi aux rappeler leurs obligations internationales, en vertu du mandat que lui confrent les Conventions de

16

Prosecutor v. Simic, affaire no IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness , le 27 juillet 1999 17 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Appeals Chamber, affaire no IT-99-36, Decision on Interlocutory Appeals, 11 December 2002, paragraphe 32; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, affaire no ICTR-2000-55, Reasons for the Chambers Decision on the Accuseds Motion to Exclude Witness TQ, le 15 juillet 2005, paragraphes 14 16 18 Article 73, Rglement de procdure et de preuve, Cour pnale internationale

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renseignements sur les dtenus, il est souvent vident que linformation provient du CICR, mme lorsquelle ne lui est pas attribue. Si cest le cas, nous conservons les caviardages. 47. Cette approche sapplique tous les renseignements qui circulent entre le Canada et le

CICR, quil sagisse dinformation ou dvaluations portant sur les procdures du Canada ou dinformation ou dvaluations sur les tablissements et les autorits de lAfghanistan. Selon le CICR, rien ne justifie que lon diffrencie ces types de renseignements. Renseignement provenant de tiers 48. Certains documents ports notre attention par le comit contiennent des

renseignements provenant de tiers, comme des gouvernements trangers et des organisations intergouvernementales (comme lOTAN et sa Force internationale dassistance la scurit). En conformit avec la rgle des tiers, qui est dcrite au paragraphe 24 ci-dessus, nous ne divulguons ni ne rsumons les renseignements provenant de tiers, moins quils naient dj t rendus publics. Noms de reprsentants de lAfghanistan 49. Certains documents dont nous avons t saisis par le comit contiennent les noms de

reprsentants afghans, y compris de cadres suprieurs. Notre approche est de ne pas divulguer ces noms moins que linformation nait dj t diffuse grande chelle. Comme cest le cas pour les dtenus, il est souvent trs probable quun responsable afghan dont le nom est mentionn dans un document fasse lobjet de reprsailles ou subisse un grave prjudice. En outre, il est possible que la divulgation de tels renseignements compromette les relations entre le Canada et le gouvernement de lAfghanistan. Lorsque possible, nous avons rsum linformation sans mentionner de noms. Renseignements sur les forces spciales du Canada 50. Certains des documents ports notre attention par le comit contiennent des

renseignements sur les forces spciales du Canada en Afghanistan. Vu la nature de leur mission, linformation sur leurs activits nest pas habituellement rendue publique. Compte tenu des enjeux entourant la scurit, nous avons dcid de ne pas divulguer ni rsumer les

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renseignements relatifs aux activits des forces spciales, moins quils naient dj t diffuss. Les renseignements qui semblent avoir t rendus publics sont les suivants : a) la prsence des forces spciales en Afghanistan; b) la nature gnrale du rle des forces spciales en Afghanistan. Renseignements sur les analyses des rsidus de poudre canon 51. Certains des documents soumis notre examen par le comit contiennent de

linformation au sujet danalyses de rsidus de poudre canon menes en Afghanistan. Le gouvernement a publiquement reconnu que les Forces canadiennes procdent de telles analyses. Selon lapproche que nous avons adopte, nous divulguons les renseignements sur lutilisation des analyses et les rsultats obtenus dans des circonstances prcises, mais nous conservons les autres caviardages pour viter de compromettre la dfense nationale. D. 52. tat de lexamen des caviardages viss par le processus CSN Le comit, aprs avoir pass en revue les documents quil a reus du gouvernement, a

soumis environ 2 300 pages de documents lexamen du Groupe dexperts-arbitres. Dans certains cas, le comit a saisi le Groupe dexperts-arbitres de documents entiers, tandis qu dautres occasions, il ne sagissait que de quelques pages, paragraphes ou passages. 53. En octobre 2010, afin de faciliter son travail et de lui permettre de divulguer le rsultat

de ses travaux avant davoir examin tous les documents, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a demand au comit de lui indiquer quels documents il considraient prioritaires. Le comit a prsent une liste de documents prioritaires en octobre 2010, liste qui a t allonge la mi-dcembre 2010, puis prcise en mars 2011. Quelque 1 450 pages sont vises. 54. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a termin son examen des documents prioritaires, et a

aussi pris des dcisions concernant un certain nombre de documents figurant sur la liste intgrale. Lorsque seulement une partie dun document est vise, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres ne se penche que sur les caviardages figurant dans la partie en question; encore une fois, nous ne nous sommes penchs sur aucun caviardage figurant dans une partie de document qui ntait pas vise.

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55.

Un processus long et complexe doit tre suivi pour appliquer les dcisions du Groupe

dexperts-arbitres. Ce processus incombe une unit spciale du ministre de la Justice qui dispose des technologies et des ressources ncessaires pour supprimer les caviardages jugs inutiles et rsumer linformation dune manire qui ne compromette pas la scurit nationale, la dfense nationale ou les relations internationales. Pour ce faire, lunit utilise un logiciel spcial et scuritaire. Une fois les dcisions du Groupe dexperts-arbitres appliques, les documents nous sont rendus et notre personnel les examine une dernire fois avant de les divulguer. Il sagit dun travail laborieux et chronophage, mais il est ncessaire compte tenu du caractre dlicat et confidentiel de la tche. 56. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a termin son examen des documents prioritaires, mais

ils ne sont pas tous prts tre divulgus en raison de ce processus. Cependant, la suggestion du comit, nous avons augment la priorit de 113 de ces documents prioritaires. Il sagit du premier lot de documents que nous avons examins suivant le mandat que nous confre le protocole dentente et qui sont prts tre divulgus. Ce lot de documents, qui reflte les rsultats de notre examen, est disponible avec ce rapport. La table des matires de ces documents spcifie les portions des documents qui nous ont t rfrs par le comit. Nous avions envisag de continuer fournir des lots de documents au comit au fur et mesure quils seraient prts. IV. APPROCHE ADOPTE PAR LE GROUPE DEXPERTS-ARBITRES LGARD DES RENSEIGNEMENTS ASSUJETTIS AU SECRET PROFESSIONNEL ET DES RENSEIGNEMENTS CONFIDENTIELS DU CABINET Introduction La deuxime tche qui incombe au Groupe dexperts-arbitres en vertu du protocole

A. 57.

dentente est lexamen des caviardages des renseignements assujettis au secret professionnel et des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet. Il sagit du processus dcrit au paragraphe 7 du protocole dentente. Cette tche diffre du processus CSN en ce que le comit ne peut pas soumettre ces caviardages lexamen du Groupe dexperts-arbitres. En fait, le comit ne voit les renseignements caviards que si le Groupe dexperts-arbitres dcide den supprimer le caviardage ou de les rsumer.

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58.

Dans le protocole dentente, on peut notamment lire ce qui suit : Reconnaissant que les renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet et les renseignements protgs par le secret professionnel avocat-client sont les catgories de renseignements que le Parlement reconnat depuis longtemps comme tant confidentielles et pouvant tre exemptes de divulgation.

59.

Le paragraphe 7 du protocole dentente prvoit : Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut dterminer, la demande du gouvernement, que certains renseignements ne devraient pas tre divulgus en raison du secret professionnel qui lie lavocat son client. Aprs avoir consult le greffier du Conseil priv, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut galement dterminer, la demande du gouvernement, que linformation qui constitue des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet ne devrait pas tre divulgue. Dans les deux cas, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres peut dterminer comment communiquer aux membres du Parlement et au public, laide des moyens quil juge opportuns, linformation contenue dans les documents sans compromettre le secret professionnel avocat-client, ni le principe de confidentialit du Cabinet et sans perdre de vue que lobjectif est davoir la plus grande divulgation et la plus grande transparence possibles. Si le Groupe dexperts-arbitres est davis que certains renseignements ne devraient pas tre divulgus, le Groupe dexperts-arbitres fournira les raisons de sa dcision au comit spcial.

60.

lgard des tches dcrites au paragraphe 7 du protocole dentente, le Groupe

dexperts-arbitres a dcid dappliquer les lois relatives au secret professionnel et aux renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet, tout en gardant lesprit les objectifs fondamentaux visant maximiser la divulgation et la transparence. Notre mthodologie consiste 1) dterminer la lumire des exigences juridiques si le secret ou la confidentialit peuvent tre valablement invoqus; 2) dans laffirmative, dterminer si linformation vise peut tre divulgue de faon rsume sans droger au secret ou la confidentialit; 3) si cela est possible, rdiger le rsum appropri; 4) si cela nest pas possible, maintenir le caviardage. B. Secret professionnel avocat-client Exigences juridiques 61. En vertu du droit canadien, le secret professionnel avocat-client est quasi absolu.

Daprs les tribunaux du Canada, le secret professionnel est un droit fondamental reconnu par

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la loi et par la Constitution qui est essentiel au bon fonctionnement de notre systme juridique19. Il sapplique toutes les interactions entre un avocat et son client lorsque lavocat est retenu pour offrir des conseils ou pour remplir dautres fonctions dordre juridique, plutt quen tant que conseiller oprationnel ou des fins non juridiques. Il sapplique aux communications entre les reprsentants et les avocats du gouvernement au mme titre qu toute autre communication entre un avocat et son client20. 62. Pour que le secret professionnel sapplique, quatre conditions sont requises : 1) il doit

y avoir une communication entre lavocat et son client; 2) la communication doit avoir comme objectif la formulation ou lobtention de conseils juridiques; 3) la communication doit tre effectue en toute confidentialit et avec une expectation raisonnable quelle demeurera confidentielle; 4) la communication doit reposer sur lexpertise professionnelle de lavocat. Le secret professionnel est gnralement dfinitif, moins que le client ny renonce21. tat de lexamen des renseignements assujettis au secret professionnel 63. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a substantiellement complt sa revue des

renseignements caviards dans les documents remis au Comit jusqu ce jour et assujettis au secret professionnel. Ce faisant, il a donn instruction son personnel dobtenir de linformation supplmentaire des reprsentants gouvernementaux afin de sassurer du bienfond de cette demande. Au cours de ce processus, lassujettissement de certains renseignements au secret professionnel a t lev en totalit ou en partie. 64. En application de la loi pertinente, le Groupe a dtermin que, quelques exceptions

prs, lassujettissement de ces renseignements au secret professionnel tait fond : la plupart des renseignements satisfaisaient aux quatre conditions nonces ci-dessus. 65. Lorsque nous avons dtermin que des cas satisfaisaient ces conditions, de sorte que

la revendication du secret professionnel tait bien fonde, nous nous sommes demand si, conformment notre mandat daprs le protocole et notre mthodologie, un rsum des

19 20

Descteaux c. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 R.C.S. 860 Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.) (en anglais seulement) 21 Blank c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2006] 2 R.C.S. 319

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passages caviards voire les faits minimums quils voquaient pouvait tre divulgu sans droger au secret professionnel. Nous avons jug que cela ntait pas possible. Premirement, le faire aurait divulgu lobjet dune demande davis juridique et donc drog audit secret. Deuximement, le faire naurait pas t conforme au rejet par la Cour suprme du Canada dune distinction pour ce qui est de dterminer si ce secret porte sur lavis juridique ou le compte rendu des faits sous-jacents. professionnel. 66. Nous avons dress, pour la remettre au Comit en mme temps que le prsent rapport,
22

En principe, tous deux sont protgs par le secret

une liste 1) des documents pour lesquels la revendication du secret professionnel a t juge non fonde en totalit ou en partie; 2) des documents assujettis au secret professionnel pour lesquels le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a jug que la revendication dudit secret tait fonde; 3) des documents assujettis au secret professionnel pour lesquels le Groupe dexperts-arbitres a jug que la revendication dudit secret ntait pas fonde. 67. Nous avons galement prvu remettre au Comit en mme temps que le prsent

rapport des copies rcentes des documents assujettis au secret professionnel pour lesquels on a retir la revendication audit secret ou le Groupe la juge non fonde. Dans les versions de ces documents, les caviardages effectus par suite de la revendication du secret professionnel ont t supprims. C. Renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet Exigences juridiques 68. En revanche, le droit commun entourant les renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet,

qui sapplique aux documents examins par le Groupe dexperts-arbitres dans le cadre du protocole dentente, nexclut pas compltement la divulgation. La Cour suprme du Canada a plutt dclar que, sous le rgime du droit commun, les documents du Cabinet doivent tre divulgus, moins que cela ne porte atteinte lintrt public23. Cependant, puisque ces

22 23

Maranda v. Qubec (Juge de la Cour du Qubec), [2003] 3.S.C.R. 193. Carey c. Ontario, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637

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documents concernent le processus dcisionnel lchelon le plus lev du gouvernement, les tribunaux doivent agir avec prudence en ordonnant leur production. 69. La Cour a dress la liste des facteurs dont il est pertinent de tenir compte pour

dterminer si la divulgation serait contraire lintrt public : le palier du processus dcisionnel dont relve linformation; la nature de la politique en question (p. ex. des documents relatifs la scurit nationale ou la dfense nationale peuvent tre traits diffremment de documents sur une politique en matire de tourisme); le contenu des documents; la divulgation peut savrer ncessaire pour assurer le bon fonctionnement du gouvernement sil sagit daccusations de prvarication dans la conduite des activits du gouvernement; la date figurant sur les documents ou linformation et si le processus dcisionnel est toujours en vigueur; limportance quil y a produire les documents dans lintrt de ladministration de la justice, en tenant compte de limportance de la cause ainsi que de la ncessit et de lopportunit de produire les documents afin que la cause puisse tre plaide dune manire adquate et quitable. Le privilge de confidentialit du Cabinet ne se limite pas aux documents du Cabinet. Par exemple, il peut sappliquer aux communications entre ministres ou auxquelles participent des ministres. 70. Au niveau fdral, le droit commun relatif aux documents confidentiels du Cabinet a

t dans une large mesure remplac par larticle 39 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada, qui permet de refuser la divulgation si le privilge de confidentialit du Cabinet est bien justifi. Cependant, larticle 39 sapplique uniquement lorsque la question de la divulgation est soumise un tribunal, une personne ou un organisme qui a le pouvoir de contraindre la production de renseignements. Puisque le Groupe dexperts-arbitres ne correspond pas cette description, larticle 39 est inapplicable ses dcisions de divulguer ou non des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet.

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tat de lexamen des renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet 71. Le gouvernement vient tout juste de soumettre au Groupe dexperts-arbitres ses

revendications quant aux renseignements confidentiels du Cabinet figurant dans les documents produits par le gouvernement ce jour. Le Groupe dexperts-arbitres entend terminer son examen des caviardages le plus rapidement possible.

Claire LHeureux-Dub

Frank Iacobucci

Page 1 of 7

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(fewer than 30)

(fewer than 15)

(fewer than 15)

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(fewer than 30) (fewer than 15) (fewer than 10) (fewer than five)

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(fewer than 30)

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[Allegations of detainee mistreatment and a possible response were discussed.]

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[Allegations of detainee mistreatment and a possible response were discussed.]

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(fewer than 30)

(fewer than 10)

(less than 3 month stay)

(more than half of the fewer than 10)

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(18

(25

(fewer than 30) 4

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All four

(Some)

four (some)

2 month stay

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(fewer than 10)

(fewer than 10)

JUN

All

(fewer than 10)

(more than half of the fewer than 10)

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in solitary confinement

(A senior NDS Official)

(the senior NDS official)

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the consequent delay in access to the cells (could theoretically raise concerns about mistreatment.)

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[Canada's preference for a spot check approach to verifying the release of detainees was stated.]

or it may be that Sarpoza staff had been reluctant to release (a subset of prisoners)

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(fewer than 20)

(fewer than 15)

(fewer than 10)

(fewer than 15)

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(moins de 20)

(moins de 15)

(moins de 10)

(moins de 15)

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(fewer than 20)

(fewer than 15)

(fewer than 10)

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(fewer than 15) (fewer than 10)

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(fewer than 30)

(fewer than five)

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(fewer than 30)

were
(fewer than five)

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(moins de 30)

(moins de cinq)

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(moins de 30)

(moins de cinq)

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(minor)

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(fewer than five)

(fewer than 10)

(fewer than 20)

(fewer than 15)

Aug

other

(fewer than 30)

(a senior official)

(fewer than 20)

(fewer than five)

(fewer than five)

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