AN1091

Modern Philosophy Jasper Reid

Lecture Nine

Leibnizs Monadology: a summary of the argument (i) There must be simple substances Everything that exists must either be a unit or a collection of several such units. But, if there were no units, then there would be nothing to get collected together either, and hence nothing would exist at all. So there must be simple substances, which we will call monads. (ii) These monads are not extended Anything extended must be divisible, and hence will not be simple. Being simple, therefore, monads cannot be extended. Consequently, they must not be thought of as material atoms (which in fact cannot exist at allmatter is not merely divisible, but infinitely divisible). (iii) There are infinitely many monads in the universe As we observed in the last lecture, Leibniz believed that the best of all possible worlds would be the one that displayed its creators perfection to the highest possible degree. His infinite creative power in particular would be displayed by a world that contained infinitely many things. (iv) Perception Every monad has a perception, which is an internal representation of the state of the entire universe. Gods perception of the universe is absolutely perfect, through and through, but a created monads perception will be much less perfect. Most of it will be confused, with only a certain portion of the universe getting represented distinctly. Every monad will have its own unique perspective on the universe, perceiving a slightly different part of it distinctly. But note that, even though most of it will be pretty confused, the perception of every monad really will include a representation of absolutely everything in the universe.
each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe. (56). Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, corresponding to the different points of view of each monad. (57) Monads are limited, not as to their objects, but with respect to the modifications of their knowledge of them. Monads all go confusedly to infinity, to the whole; but they are limited and differentiated by the degrees of their distinct perceptions. (60).

(v) Apperception Perception, for Leibniz, is merely a representation of the universe. Notwithstanding the usual connotations of the term, a Leibnizian perception should not be thought of as a psychological state. In particular, there need not be any conscious awareness of this representation. Indeed, most monads will be perfectly oblivious to the fact that they contain such a representation at all. However, there will be some monads that do have a conscious awareness (apperception) of at least some parts of their perception, and here things do begin to take on a more psychological character. All monads have

perception. Those monads that dont merely have perception but additionally have apperception qualify as souls. When a monad has not merely perception and apperception, but reason too, it will then earn the title of a mind. (vi) Bodies A body is an aggregate of monads. Indeed, every body, no matter how small, will contain infinitely many monads. (This must be so, because bodies are infinitely divisible, so there will need to be enough monads contained in each body for there to be something left in each piece after it has been divided infinitely many times). When none of the monads that go into constituting a body possess apperception, the body will be an inanimate one. When, however, an apperceptive monad is to be found amongst them, this one will constitute the soul of a living organism. And Leibniz believed that there were many more living organisms in the universe than one might ordinarily expect. He was active during the very period when new research in microscopy was first beginning to reveal micro-organisms, smaller than anything that had hitherto been seen; and his belief was that, as a matter of fact, there was life all the way down:
we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls in the least part of matter. Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond. And although the earth and air lying between the garden plants, or the water lying between the fish of the pond, are neither plant nor fish, they contain yet more of them, though of a subtleness imperceptible to us, most often. (66-68).

(vii) Well-founded phenomena But bodies are clearly extended. And didnt we say that monads were unextended? In that case, then how can a body be identified with an aggregate of monads? Surely no matter how many unextended things one puts together, even infinitely many, extension can never be generated out of them. Leibniz would reply that, as a matter of fact, a body, in itself, is not extended, any more than its individual component monads themselves are. Its extension is a phenomenon, which results out of the way it appears in perception. An aggregate of monads is not actually extended, but it is represented as extended. So is extension just an illusion, then? Leibniz would certainly resist saying that it is just an illusion. He uses the analogy of a rainbow. A rainbow is phenomenal, in the sense that its appearance will vary according to the position of the observerthe familiar arc of coloured light isnt really out there, objectively existing in a definite location. So is a rainbow just an illusion? Well, no, not really. There is still something out there, independent of the observer, which is producing this subjective appearance for the observernamely the sunlight itself and the raindrops through which it is getting refracted. Look at them up close, and you wont see a spectrum of colour. But they are nevertheless providing a fully objective grounding for that appearance. Likewise, although Leibniz would say that extension is a phenomenon, he would also point out that this phenomenon is well-founded, in the sense that there is something out there, existing independently of perception and providing an objective grounding for the phenomenonnamely the aggregate of monads themselves. Its just that the way that these are represented in perception doesnt reflect they way they really are in themselves.

(viii) Space and time For Leibniz, everything to do with space gets turned on its head. Suppose a friend of yours is a hundred yards down the road. You see him, but only very indistinctly, so much so that you cant be certain that its really him. Then he gets closer, and this enables you to make him out more distinctly. Ordinarily, one would be inclined to say that it is because he has got closer that you have become able to see him more distinctly. But what Leibniz would say is that, as a matter of fact, his spatial relation to you derives from the quality of your perception. A monads location in the universe is determined by its perspective thereon, rather than vice versa. Leibnizs great rival, Isaac Newton, postulated an infinite absolute space and time, distinct from, prior to, and underlying all things, providing creatures with their locations. Leibniz rejected this. Space and time, for him, were merely relative, arising out of the way in which creatures were ordered within perception. In his correspondence with Newtons supporter Samuel Clarke, for instance, he pointed out that, if there had been such things as infinite absolute space and time, then God could have had no reason to create the universe in one position rather than another. But this would both conflict with His wisdom, and also violate the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason that Leibniz endorsed (that everything that happened needed to be fully determined to happen by a sufficient cause).