Bruce Kay (King Coca)

Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path Author(s): Bruce H.
Kay Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. vi+97-127 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166160 Accessed: 27/10/2010 19:10
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Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "KingCoca" and Shining Path The scope and intensity of political violence in a democratizing society are influenced particularlyby regional opportunities arising from state weakness that favor the formation of coalitions against the state. The illicit market for coca in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley fostered a tactical alliance between Shining Path guerrillas and coca producers that funded Shining Path's national presence. Falling coca prices in the 1990s, combined with key state-strengthening measures under the Fujimori government, destroyed that relationship and weakened the guerrilla organization.
ViolentOpportunities: TheRise and Fallof "KngCoca" and ShiningPath

Bruce H. Kay
n the mid-1980s, the guerrilla movement known as Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) had yet to attractbroad support among Peruvians, most of whom still favored the democratization process that the nation began in 1980. The guerrillas also lacked the economic resources needed to underwrite a revolutionary strategy that, they conceded, could take decades to carry out. Their control over the Upper Huallaga Valley's coca economy during its boom phase in the late 1980s and early 1990s brightened their prospects considerably. A dynamic enclave in an otherwise dysfunctional economy, "King Coca" afforded the guerrillas both support and resources with which to project such a formidable national presence that, by 1992, they could credibly claim to be on the verge of "a strategic equilibrium"with the state.1 Today, "KingCoca"has gone bust while the legal economy recovers. With most of its leadership behind bars, a battered Shining Path still festers but no longer poses a threat to the state. Veteran Senderista commander Oscar Ramirez Durand (known as "ComradeFeliciano") was captured by the Peruvian army July 14, 1999. These are encouraging developments after a decade-and-a-half of violence that claimed more than 27,000 lives. Yet the reversal raises broader issues. Among them is the phenomenon of insurgency in the context of democratizing regimes. Scholars recognize that social violence can intensify as a regime democratizes, but they have yet to specify the conditions under which democratization would have this perverse effect (see, for example, De Nevers 1993). This article argues that the scope and intensity of political violence in a democratizing society are influenced not by structuralfactors that spur discontent, by increasing poverty or inequality, but by regional opportunities arising from state weakness that favor the formation of coalitions against the state. Factors that expand or limit opportunities for armed conflict can have significant impact on the stability of such coalitions and the severity of violence. This study's point of departure is dissatisfactionwith the literatureon violent rebellion. First, the literature'spreoccupation with the success or failure of guerrilla movements (for example, Dix 1984) neglects important intermediate cases that carrylasting repercussions. Among these cases are 97
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the "chronic insurgencies," movements that last for years or even decades yet neither topple a regime nor suffer complete defeat by the state. These groups may not manage to seize state power, but they do mobilize support, control territories, and unleash social energies that shape polities in profound, if more subtle, ways than revolution. That such insurgencies persist amid civilian, if not fully democratic, regimes in Latin America (Colombia and Peru) and Africa (Uganda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Mali) suggests that the chronic insurgency may be a semipermanent feature of some societies that have undergone a democratic transition. A second problem with the literatureis the widely held assumption, other things being equal, that a democratic transition has a salutaryimpact on violent conflict. On its face, this assumption seems intuitive. If revolution is likeliest in countries that practice political exclusion and repression (Skocpol and Goodwin 1994), then it seems to follow that a regime opening defuses tensions that may lead to violent conflict. The point is not that restoring the ballot guarantees tranquility,but rather that it confers a degree of legitimacy that nonelected regimes tend to lack, allowing discontent to be expressed peacefully and within formal channels, undermining the rationale for armed conflict. Rebel groups that fail to renounce armed conflict as their country embarks on a democratic transition are thus thought to face defeat or surrender, particularlyif they lack support at the onset of democratization. Ryan (1994) reduces this effect to a simple formula: "the smaller the revolutionary coalition [at transition time], the larger the number of potential supporters for the regime will be, and the greater its potential capacity to isolate the revolutionaries and preclude an insurgent victory." The broader the guerrillas'pretransitioncoalition, in contrast, "the greater their capacity to mitigate the potentially marginalizing effects of the democratization process" (1994, 30). All of this is reinforced by what, for many analysts, is the most salient fact: no guerrilla movement has ever toppled an elected government. While rebel groups do renounce armed conflict after a transition to civilian rule, often as a condition of the transition, a number have survived such transitions to revive and expand the armed conflict as their rival regimes grew more inclusive and gained wider support. If the potential for violence does not automatically decrease after a democratic transition,and indeed appears to increase under certain conditions, the literatureis only marginally helpful in specifying those conditions. Traditionalapproaches identify structuralconditions that lead to mobilization and rebellion, such as inequalities in land or income or frustrated expectations that cause discontent (for example, Gurr 1970; Midlarsky 1988; Muller and Seligson 1987). Such approaches are useful in explaining occurrences of rebellions, but they rarely account for their timing, intensity, or fate. Alternative approaches that focus on the capacities of political institutions to control
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conflict are also helpful but of limited utility. The familiar assertion in this vein is that while discontent is prevalent, large-scale violence is rare. Whether or not violence erupts depends, in this scenario, not on the degree of discontent but on the capacity of the state to demobilize conflict. States with diminishing resources or rising burdens-"weak" states-afford violent actors greater room to maneuver, and thus are thought to allow violence to spread and make revolution more likely (Skocpol 1979; 1994). The explanation for political violence offered in this article goes beyond social structuresand political institutions to opportunities favoring chronic insurgency in the democratic context. Its goal is to explain why violence may persist without resolution and vary in intensity and location. Its focus is the opportunities that state weakness creates in regions of a country wherein rebels can forge the alliances required to exert control over regional resources. The analytical approach synthesizes resource mobilization (RM) hypotheses with an assertion common to literatureon state reform.The RM perspective holds that discontent is not enough to generate an armed opposition movement; instead, a group's capacity for armed conflict depends on its ability to organize people and get them to commit resources to the movement's goals (Jenkins 1983). Although the term has been stretched over a wide swath of tangible and intangible assets, from ethnic, religious, and linguistic ties to regional identities, manpower, land, and money, "resources" are understood here in a narrow sense, as foreign exchange-generating commodities and as control over their production and distribution. The RMapproach dovetails with recent literatureon the state, which holds, among other things, that the state's capacity to maintain order, enforce the rule of law, and carry out administrative and distributive functions varies territorially.Some areas of a country have a more palpable state presence than others-more government offices, more law enforcement, more visible police and government officials. Consequently, citizens living in comparatively "stateless"areas have a different relationship with the regime than those residing in areas where the state has an assertive presence, and are relegated to what O'Donnell (1994) calls "low-intensity citizenship." Fusing these two assertions suggests a variable distribution of opportunities or constraints to guerrillawarfare, a "politicaland economic opportunity structure"that includes the scope of state authority and the regional economy.2 The areas where state weakness and economic resources intersect provide rich opportunities for guerrillas to coalesce with regional actors and to acquire power disproportionate to their numbers, even in societies that ostensibly favor ballots over bullets. Policies that seem to undermine regional economic interests can bolster support for violent actors, strengthen antiregime coalitions, and increase
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the opportunities for extralegal activities. The point is not that rebel support may be reduced to rational calculations, or that socioeconomic factors, identity, culturalties, and ethnic hatreds play no role in the spread of violent conflict. The argument is that however prominently it figures in the origins of rebellion, discontent cannot account for its persistence. Even amid widespread discontent, rebels who lack the resources to wage war face uncertain prospects. Peru's Shining Path is a case in point. A small, geographically marginal group when it launched guerrilla warfare on the eve of Peru's democratic transition, Sendero's initial growth in the central Andes paralleled the growth of a large and influential legal left. Its subsequent expansion into the Huallaga Valley occurred, paradoxically, during a progressive government led by Peru's largest mass-based political party, the Alianza Popular RevolucionariaAmericana (APRA),which held power from 1985 to 1990. Sendero's campaign in Peru intensified, moreover, without any significant foreign support, and it spread from povertystricken to more affluent areas in the central jungle and along the coast. All the usual constraints to rebellion, in other words, failed to function normally in the Peruvian case. Meanwhile, inequality and poverty, factors believed to spur rebellion, can account for neither the timing of armed conflict nor the geographical range and intensity of violence once it began. Focusing on regional opportunities for armed conflict, on the other hand, can help to explain how Peru's guerrillas successfully forged alliances in regional strongholds and maintained an active presence in a democratizing society. Specifically, a booming market based on the illicit production of coca, a market capable of thriving as the legal economy soured, gave the guerrillas the resources to intensify their campaign and to project their influence on a national level. The collapse of the coca economy, coupled with aggressive institutional reforms, altered the regional structure of opportunities, weakening a critical rebel stronghold and reducing violence. The following section examines the conditions that gave rise to the alliance between guerrillas and coca growers during the market's boom phase, the 1980s. The third and fourth sections examine the market's bust in the 1990s, particularlythe facets that weakened the guerrillas' alliance. The conclusion offers observations on the case and its implications for violent conflict in the era of democratization. BOOM: OPPORTUNITIES FOR VIOLENCE Peru's high-jungle Huallaga Valley, stretching north from Huanuco Department to neighboring San Martin,had been a colonization target since the conquest, yet roads were not built there until coffee and tea plantations attracted settlers in the 1940s. A highway through Peru's interior and
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agricultural incentives accelerated the valley's population growth in the 1960s. The military government, however, replaced private land ownership with state-managed cooperative farming in the 1970s, a failed experiment that left a growing local population bereft of opportunities in a complete vacuum of state authority. Such propitious conditions for an illicit enclave economy coincided with two other developments. The first occurred in the structure of the international trade for illicit drugs. Rising cocaine consumption in the United States, combined with more sophisticated trafficking and moneylaundering techniques, fueled an unprecedented demand for coca in the valley, where the soils were ideally suited to the crop. With coca prices fetching up to 30 times more than other crops and the gold rush mentality luring large numbers of immigrants, cultivation exploded in Peru, from a few hundred hectares in 1973 to 18,230 hectares by 1978 and, by a conservative estimate, 125,730 hectares by 1990 (Rementeria (1995, 98, table 5). As its economy sank into recession in 1983, Peru became the world's leading exporter of cocaine paste, the semifinished product used in cocaine, supplying between 65 and 70 percent of the world market (Alvarez 1992, 76). Coca farmers in the valley sold their harvests to local firms, which converted the leaf into cocaine base. This was smuggled by air to laboratories in the Colombian jungle, run by cartels in Medellin and Cali, which refined the base into the endproduct cocaine hydrochloride. Through the "airbridge"with Colombia, the valley was thus integrated into a billion-dollar export market, the fortunes of which depended on a thriving external demand. In the 1980s coca production was a significant factor in Peru's economy. It earned between US$800 million and $1.2 billion annually, a third or more of the value of Peru's legal exports and more than the combined value of copper and petroleum, its two biggest exports (Alvarez 1992, 76). Coca was also a major source of jobs, employing between 165,000 and 279,000 people, or 3 percent of the workforce during the late 1980s (Alvarez 1992, 81). Such an abundant source of jobs in a depressed economy was not unwelcome from the point of view of national politicians, many of whom hesitated to interferewith activitythat, although illegal, contributed more than marginally to national income.3 President Fernando Belauinde Terry (1980-85), who, during his earlier term (196368), had encouraged migrationto the valley, paid lip service to drug control but delegated enforcement to local police forces known to be corrupt. His successor, Alan Garcia(1985-90), cooperated with U.S. drug control efforts to gain debt relief and development funds, but later encouraged the reinvestment of drug money as foreign exchange dried up, granting immunity to traffickerswho repatriated hard currency (Lee 1991, 277).
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The coca boom coincided with a sea change in national politics: the transition to elected government in 1980, following 12 years of military rule. Peru's democratization process enfranchised a wide range of parties with mass bases, including APRAand the Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left), a coalition of Marxistparties that scored key victories in the 1983 municipal elections, including those in Lima. With Peru entering a period of participatory government, Sendero Luminoso, the only leftist group still espousing violence, seemed anachronistic. Sendero's ideology, rooted in Maoism and indigenous communism, fell outside the leftist mainstream and was believed unlikely to have a broad appeal. Its largely (it was thought) peasant base was considered a liability outside Ayacucho, its departmento of origin, which was believed to possess uniquely explosive conditions for conflict (McClintock 1984). Peru's political parties, however, failed to make significant inroads in the Upper Huallaga Valley, which remained an organizational no-man's land in the 1980s, even compared with neighboring provinces. With few civic associations and weak ties to national politics, the valley was poorly positioned to advocate its legitimate political needs on the national level. Among those needs were order, stability, and protection for its growing population of coca cultivators. In the power vacuum of the valley in the mid-1980s, drug traffickers ran rampant, used bribes and coercion to secure immunity from arrest by corrupt local police, and employed hired guns to force farmersto deliver coca on time and at low prices, under threat of death (Tarrazona-Sevillano 1990). It was into this milieu of disorder amid expanding opportunities that Sendero made its firstforays in the valley, pressured by a militaryoffensive in the highlands in 1983-84 to disperse its forces in search of new bases. Whether opening the Huallaga front was part of the guerrillas'strategy, an escape from military occupation, or an accident of geography (the valley borders the central Andes) is unclear. Sendero apparently saw the conditions it needed to gather fighting contingents, in addition to a neglect by the state and peasants willing to participate. Sendero did not actually attract a following among the valley's peasants, however, until after Garcia's election. It was thought that the change in government from the center-right coalition of Belauinde to the center-left coalition led by Garcia, a president with an ambitious developmental agenda and a majority in the congress, would marginalize the extreme left and undercut the rationale for violence (Crabtree 1992, 10111; Rudolph 1992, 69-93). In reality,Garcia'spolicies fueled an agricultural crisis that led to immense growth in coca production. While violence ebbed in the Andes, Sendero was gaining a foothold in the valley, attacking the region's few government facilities and producer groups in an effort to seize territorialcontrol.
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Peru's other guerrilla movement, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tuipac Amaru (MRTA), formed in 1984, marshaled its forces into the Huallaga in 1986, hoping to broaden its predominantly Limabase. But the Senderistas regarded the MRTAas tainted by "revisionism"and saw the group as a rival and a threat. Sendero, the stronger of the two, joined with local drug traffickers to push the MRTAnorth to the Central Huallaga Valley, establishing a "liberatedzone" between Tocache and Uchiza. (For detailed accounts of the confrontations, see McClintock 1988.) Sendero thus had established control over the Upper Huallaga Valley by June 1987. The absence of state authority in the region allowed the guerrillas to perform statelike functions, from protection and "law" enforcement to conscription and taxation. Its relations with the local population were symbiotic. Coca producers regarded the Senderistas as allies against traffickers and their hired guns and, subsequently, against forces seeking to eradicate coca. Sendero therefore did not need to rely on coercive methods to impose its authority,as it had done in the central sierra (Isbell 1994). While many younger Huallaga residents did embrace Sendero's ideology and objectives, local cadres were reportedly less doctrinaire than their counterparts elsewhere (see Quehacer 1994). Besides protecting growers, Sendero performed an intermediary role, acting as a kind of armed union for the growers, forcing traffickers to pay higher prices for coca than farmers could negotiate for themselves. The guerrillas also enforced a restrictive social order-punishing drug users, closing down bars and brothels-which was popular with valley residents, who preferred Sendero's harsh justice to the corrupt formal system (Gonzalez 1989). Having created order while increasing local incomes, the guerrillas garnered a base of support in the Upper Huallaga Valley and formed a local army of more than a thousand militants. Thus did the Regional Committee of the Huallaga become one of the most powerful regional commands in the Senderista organization (Mineo 1994). Territorialcontrol also afforded Sendero criticallyimportantaccess to hard currency. With the valley's 120-odd local airstrips now in guerrilla hands, Sendero guaranteed traffickers access to covert airstrips in areas under its control, provided protection and warning of police and military with these forces in the course of counternarcotics movements, and interfered In exchange, drug pilots were forced to pay the guerrillas operations. landing fees (US$3,000-$10,000 per flight), bringing in anywhere from $20 million to $250 million between 1987 and 1993.4In addition, the guerrillas reportedly charged coca growers "revolutionarytithes" in exchange for protection and price mediation (Kawell 1989). Precisely how these funds were disposed of is unknown, but a large quantity, perhaps several hundred million dollars, was stashed in bank accounts both inside and outside Peru. Drug funds also paid cadres' salaries, purchased arms, and financed operations. By the early 1990s,
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militants received approximately $250 to $500 per month, along with food, housing, and cash to cover expenses. This sum was several times higher than the salaries paid to teachers, the vocation of many who joined Sendero (McClintock 1996, 40). Senderismo therefore represented a viable career path to younger, opportunity-deprived Peruvians, affording a degree of upward mobility that the larger society lacked. Drug funds were also used to buy weapons that could not be acquired through theft and ambushthe assault weapons, grenades, and mortars characteristic of Sendero operations in their more developed phase. In sum, coca revenue had a major impact on Sendero's development, allowing it to consolidate its regional base. Drug money also enabled the guerrillasto project a stronger national presence, giving Sendero the financial wherewithal to advance into Lima. Indeed, the Senderista Central Committee, which included Sendero's founder, Abimael Guzman ("ComradeGonzalo"), had by this time moved its headquarters to Lima.This accelerated phase 4 of the group's strategy, which involved expansion into urban areas and procurement of bases of support in Limaand other coastal cities (Tarazona-Sevillano1990). In Lima, the Senderista "LimaMetropolitan Committee" had begun to assume a higher profile, launching attacks against government targets, infiltrating labor unions, and forminggroups of its own in the surroundingshantytowns. It is likely that funds obtained by the Huallaga Regional Committee financed all these activities. The guerrillas'approach in the HuallagaValley differed from its usual ideological dogmatism and sometimes seemed more flexible and pragmatic. For example, although it publicly railed against cocaine use and dealt harshly with users in its own ranks, Sendero's leadership reportedly saw no ethical or ideological contradiction in its profitable Huallaga operations and did not prevent peasants from marketing their produce, as in the Central Andes. Cocaine consumption was "a consequence of the putrefaction of the imperialist system," while coca cultivation and consumption were an integral partof Andean economy and culture (PCP 1997; see also Crabtree 1992, 118). Clumsy attempts by Peru and the United States to eradicate coca during the 1980s did much to galvanize the guerrilla-coca coalition in the valley. Determined to make supply reduction a political priority,the United States in the early 1980s pushed Peru into a series of control programs aimed at eradicating coca, most of which were carried out by local police with logistical support provided by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).5These programs proved ineffective, yielding only tiny, localized reductions as overall cultivation continued to rise. They did manage, however, to stir up hostility among the local farmers, who, having unsuccessfully resisted eradication, began to respond violently to its intensification in the late 1980s (Morales 1989). Combined with the
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growing presence of U.S. law enforcement agents, the government's attempts to destroy coca proved a valuable recruiting, mobilizing, and propaganda tool for the guerrillas. Assassinations of eradication workers and sabotage of government facilities increased during this period, often abetted by locally recruited Senderistas. When Peru authorized the spraying of coca fields with chemical herbicide in 1989, for example, several thousand cocaleros demonstrated, highway access to the valley was barricaded, and another wave of guerrilla attacks began, causing the U.S. and Peruvian governments to jettison the program and turn instead to eradicating seedbeds and seizing harvested leaf (Palmer 1996, 182). To avoid exacerbating the guerrilla war, in 1990 the United States began to steer its drug policy away from coca plantations to "higher-value" producers (that is, firms) and traffickers.Negotiations with Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia in Cartagena in 1991 concluded with an agreement on a strategy aimed at strengthening source countries' detection and monitoring capabilities in order to promote interdiction-the disruption of the flow of drugs and chemical precursors-and the seizure of traffickers'assets. A primary goal of this so-called Andean Strategy was to destroy Peru's air bridge to Colombia. Operations involved obliterating clandestine airstrips, monitoring airspace, and intercepting smuggling aircraft,and brought a wave of U.S. personnel and aircraftto the U.S.-builtbase in SantaLucia(see Perl 1996). The strategy did not sit well with Peru's armed forces, which had long resisted involvement in the drug war for fear it would drive cultivatorseven closer to Sendero. The Peruvian militarypreferred to launch an aggressive counterinsurgency in the Huallaga Valley, even seeking tactical alliances with coca growers to rout the guerrillas, whom it considered a far greater threat to internal security (Palmer 1996, 184). The Peruvian army had attempted just such a strategy in 1989, relocating its base from the Central to the Upper Huallaga Valley and changing its primarymission to confront Sendero directly. Appointed to supervise operations, General Alberto Arciniega Huby aggressively pursued the guerrillas while treating the cocaleros as allies in the conflict ratherthan as enemies of the state. ("Itold them they were not considered delinquents but participantsin the informal sector." Arciniega Huby 1994, 116).6 This strategy succeeded temporarily. Senderista forces fled the zone for seven months, and Arciniega was credited with having destroyed a guerrilla camp and communications base, for which he received local support. The military'sintrusion into an area in which antidrug police had jurisdiction, however, exacerbated rivalries between police and army forces. The army's collaboration with cocaleros also emerged as a point of contention with the United States. Peru ultimately removed Arciniega from his post and withdrew army headquarters to Tarapoto, leaving the police in charge of the valley. The army strategy also reportedly stimulated drug
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trafficking in the zone. Following the military withdrawal, Sendero subsequently resumed control over the valley, where it maintained a significant but apparently eroding base of support until at least 1993. The Peruvian government would later embrace a more militarized strategy in the valley, partlybecause of the lessons learned from the army's temporary success against the guerrillas. The cocaleros' behavior suggested that local support for Sendero was relatively "soft."The acquiescence of Huallaga Valley peasants to guerrilla occupation and control did not necessarily extend to active support for revolution, notwithstanding Peruvian and U.S. policymakers' tendency to lump coca producers and Huallaga residents were prepared guerrillas together as "narcoguerrillas." to tolerate Sendero only as long as its interference did not adversely effect their economic interests or endanger their personal security. For their part, militaryauthorities could count on local cooperation as long as they could offer some guarantee of security and did not forcibly wean farmers from their dependence on coca cultivation. The military'stolerance of the coca crop might have offended policymakers outside Peru, but as a strategy it eventually evolved to the point of engaging civilians as allies against terrorism. BUST: MARKET FORCES AND STATE STRATEGIES The opportunity structurethat afforded Sendero support and resources in the Upper Huallaga Valley during the 1980s changed in the 1990s through a combination of market forces and the antidrug policies enacted during President Alberto Fujimori'stwo terms (1990-present). The firstsignificant change resulted from a majordrop in coca prices. Like all commodities, cocaine and coca fluctuate in value according to changes in demand and supply. Cocaine prices have declined several times since the 1970s. The first dip occurred in the late 1970s amid the bloody battles between the Medellin and Calicartels for control over the New York and Miami markets. A second drop, in 1983-84, came in response to the rise of new Colombian cartels and the resulting saturation of the cocaine market. The third trough, in 1989-90, resulted from the intensification of drug control in Colombia. The fourth, in 1992-93, followed the demise of the Medellin cartel afterthe death of the Colombian kingpin Pablo Escobar, and the production and cultivation of other illicit drugs (mainly heroin) in Colombia. Coca prices have been only partly sensitive to the ebb and flow of cocaine prices. For example, coca prices rose in 1984 as cocaine prices fell because of Sendero's mediation in the Huallaga, which redistributed a larger profit share from a shrinking market to cultivators in Peru. Prices plummeted in Peru and Bolivia in 1989-90 after a steady increase throughout the 1980s. Bolivian prices recovered from their June 1991
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nadir, while Peru followed a more volatile pattern:a surge to US$4.50 a kilo in 1992, followed by a drop to $1.00-$1.50 a kilo in 1993-94; another peak (US$4.40 a kilo) in October 1994; and less than a year later, a decline to US$0.40 betweenJune 1995 and February1996 (see figure 1; UNDCP 1997; Sober6n Garrido 1998b). The most recent price trough, since 1995, has been the longest. One incomplete explanation is that the markets for cocaine and coca have become saturated through overproduction, eroding the value of the crop and its derivative. Increases in the efficiency of cultivation and production, a reduction in the real costs of production, the sharp economic imbalances that enticed would-be producers to a crowded market-all these factors contributed to overproduction relative to a stagnant world demand. Cocaine demand in the United States remained inert in the 1990s, with a drop in overall consumption offset by increases among "hardcore" users.7 The stagnation of demand in the United States and elsewhere may also reflect a change in consumption habits, from cocaine to opiates (heroin, for example) and synthetic "designer drugs,"both of which have diverted demand in recent years (RAND 1994; Sober6n Garrido 1997). Indeed, resurgent heroin demand spurred opium poppy cultivation in Peru and Colombia (Schemo and Golden 1998). While Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia produced eight hundred to one thousand metric tons (MT) per year of cocaine in 1995, U.S. consumption stayed at around four hundred MTand the rest of the world at around two hundred MT, forcing the cartels to stockpile two hundred to four hundred metric tons per year (Cabieses 1996). Market forces do not account for all the variation in coca prices, however. At least some of the price erosion was the result of aerial interdiction and the resultant ebbing of drug flights into the Upper Huallaga Valley. Flight cutbacks in 1989, following Colombia's crackdown on traffickersafter the assassination of the Liberalpresidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan, partly explain the 1989-90 price dip. The rebound in 1992 may have occurred after flights were resumed as militaryefforts were diverted to counterinsurgency. The plunges in 1993 and 1994-95, however, can be attributed to the success of aerial interdiction. In 1993, interdiction was held up by wrangling over the legality of aircraft interception under internationallaw, which forced the United Statesto shut off its radarand stop sharing intelligence with Peru. In late 1994 and early 1995, the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) confronted a conflict with Ecuador along Peru's northern border, which diverted its resources and allowed drug flights into the valley to resume, boosting leaf prices. When the border war and legal conflict were resolved, interdiction resumed, drug flights declined, and coca prices plunged again (Clawson and Lee 1998, 138). Interdiction had two effects on illicit cultivation. The first, irrefutable effect was the "balloon"effect-the dispersion of illicit production when
Figure 1. Coca Leaf Price in Peru, June 1989-June 1997 (in U.S. do $5.00 -
$3.00
.-
--
.-...--
.......
$2 ..0-.. . .00
...
L .......... ......... -.....L ...... ... . ......
.... .. . ...-..,.-
' $1.004Q
-:
? --
:??
June 1989
Feb. 1990
Oct. 1990
June 1991
Feb. 1992
Oct. 1992
June 1993
Feb. 1994
Oct. 1994
Source: Comisi6n Andina de Juristas 1997.
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Table 1. Coca Production in Peru, 1987-1996 Gross cultivation (hectares) 109,155 115,530 121,685 121,300 120,800 129,100 108,800 108,600 115,300 95,659 -13,496 Mature harvest (metric tons) 191,000 187,700 186,300 196,900 222,700 223,900 155,500 165,300 183,600 174,700 -16,300 Est. Peru market share (percent)a 65 64 63 64 67 67 57 57 57 56 -9 Potential paste (metric tons)b 1,107.8 1,088.7 1,080.5 1,142.0 1,291.7 1,298.6 901.9 958.7 1,064.9 1,013.3 -94.5
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Change
aEstimate based on gross cultivation in Peru and total world cultivation. bEstimate based on .58%of mature cultivation in MT. Source: U.S. Department of State 1997.
intensive enforcement is applied to a single area, a phenomenon observed in eradication programs elsewhere. Cultivation spread from the valley's main cuenca cocalera (coca-producing enclave) to "mini-cuencas"in the lower jungle. Farmers, some of them migrants from the valley, began cultivating areas to the northeast and south. From the 1980s through 1991, the Upper Huallaga Valley produced half the coca in Peru; by 1994, it accounted for only 27 percent. Aguaytia and the Apurimac Valley, meanwhile, both saw large increases, from 8 and 10 percent of total cultivation respectively in 1990 to 20 and 16 percent in 1994. Growth was also noted in the Central and Lower Huallaga Valleys, in northern San MartinDepartment (Department of State 1996). (Another force that drove production to new enclaves, aside from interdiction,was a root fungus that appeared in the valley in 1991. See De la Puente Mejia 1994). A second alleged effect of interdiction plus the fluctuatingmarket has been a drop in coca cultivation nationwide in favor of legal crops, such as rice, coffee, and corn. If official figures can be believed-and there are skeptics-coca cultivation dropped from 129,100 hectares in 1992 to nearly 95,700 hectares in 1996 (see table 1). U.S. and Peruvian government sources also report an 18 percent drop in production between 1996 and 1997, to roughly 94,000 hectares, which would represent the largest reduction since the illicit marketcame into existence (UNDCP 1997). Other estimates put the total area between 50,000 and 70,000 hectares. The decline in cultivation is probably exaggerated because of the distortions associated with monitoring it. Coca has moved into other areas
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not under general aerial surveillance, which thus can escape detection. Even if a decline has occurred, market forces may override the interdiction effect as rebounding prices induce cultivation in newer enclaves and perhaps, again, in the valley. Interdiction can hinder a recovery only if the profit gap between coca and legal crops narrows and alternatives to the air bridge are held to a minimum. Alternatives to the air bridge, however, have proliferated with a vengeance. Adapting to the risks associated with aircraftpickup, traffickers rely to a larger extent on ground, maritime,lake, and river routes to deliver paste to labs in and outside Peru. Boats now transportcoca paste along the tributariesof the Marafionand Ucayali riversand an arrayof Amazon routes across the Brazilian and Colombian borders. Heavier river traffic has strengthened the position of traffickersin the so-called Andean Trapezoid, whose vertices encompass the cities of Caballococha (Peru), Leticia (Colombia), and Tabatinga (Brazil). Clashes among paramilitaryforces, drug traffickers, the Peruvian and Colombian armed forces, and Colombian guerrillas in this zone bear a striking resemblance to the Upper Huallaga Valley situation a decade ago. Traffickersnow transport larger quantities of coca paste by truck to the coast, through the southern Andes to Pisco and Lima or through the central Andes and jungle to Lima, Chimbote, and Piura. Overland paste shipments that reach the coast are transported to offshore barges floating in international waters, processed into cocaine, and then shipped along ocean routes to distributionnetworks in Mexico, California, and Vancouver. Low-volume "ant traffic"-individual couriers transporting cocaine across Peru's southern border with Chile and its northern border with Ecuador-is also on the rise, partly because of new border permeability created by more open trade policies (Soberon Garrido 1997). New smuggling routes and falling coca prices are accelerating a restructuring of the market toward greater vertical integration. The proliferation of processing labs detected in Peru over the last few years are illustrates that Peruvian drug "firms" manufacturing higher quantities of cocaine, bypassing the Colombian connection, and reaping the profits from the endproduct (U.S. Department of State 1996). The need to import coca paste into Colombia, meanwhile, has been reduced by an expansion of coca cultivation in Colombia itself. Peru remains the largest coca supplier, but its market share has fallen as Colombia's has risen, from 9 percent in 1988 to 13 percent in 1995 and nearly 41 percent by 1997 (U.S. Department of State 1996; UNDP 1997, 17-19; Schemo and Golden 1998, A12). Because the Colombian strain is of lower quality, Colombia's coca growth has yet to offset the decline in Peru, though that relationship could change as its crop's potency improves. Also driving market changes is aggressive law enforcement outside Peru, notably Colombia's 1995
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crackdown on the Cali cartel, which yielded the arrestof kingpins Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Santa Cruz Londofio. The stimulation of domestic production of value-added products with lower cost inputs has allowed Peru to compete with Colombian firms in the more lucrative cocaine production and distributionmarkets, leaving Peru better poised to reap the benefits of a market upswing. THE WEAKENING OF SENDERO Coca's recent downward cycle, in sum, has had a variable impact on Peru's drug problem as producers adapt to the new environment, find new ways to bring goods to market, and position themselves to capitalize on a recovery. Yet the coca bust has so far had a definite impact on Peru's guerrilla problem. Falling coca prices combined with declining air traffic deprived Sendero of its major foreign exchange source, the landing fees and other levies charged to pilots on paste pickup operations and to other traffickers.It is hard to estimate this effect in quantitativeterms, but the loss of control over the Upper Huallaga Valley and its aerial link with Colombia probably represented tens of millions of dollars in lost revenues to the guerrillas. The proliferationof overland and riversmuggling routes reduced the cultivators' dependence on guerrilla intervention, sapping Sendero of much of the loyalty it enjoyed in the valley and diffusing protection payments and profits to a wider arrayof actors. The dispersal of cultivation made guerrilla control less feasible, particularly as new areas under cultivation had historically greater civic organization, stronger ties to the national political system, and more diverse economic bases, all of which would thwart guerrilla advances. The Central Huallaga, for example, which extends north from uanjui to Tarapoto (in San MartinDepartment) and the Lower Mayo River, both regions that have seen growth in cultivation, possesses a stronger set of popular organizations (De la Puente Mejia 1994). In the ApurimacValley, meanwhile, government and nongovernment alternative development agents have forged more cooperative relationships with the local populations, based on voluntary crop substitution programs (Washington Post 1997). A direct consequence of the guerrilla-cocalerorupturewas a decline in guerrilla-perpetrated attacks and fatalities. As table 2 indicates, the reduction of violence in the valley actually preceded the nationwide decline in violence following the capture of Guzman and other Senderista leaders in September 1992. This finding suggests that shrinking regional opportunities had an independent impact on regional violence. Still, the often-made observation that "coca, more than the army, is defeating Sendero" exaggerates the case. As table 2 shows, the departments of San Martinand Huanuco accounted for more than 20 percent of all registered
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Table 2. Subversive Incidents in Huallaga Valley Departments, 1985-1996 San Martin Huanuco Peru total
Number Percent Percent Number Percent Percent Number Percent of annual of of of annual of change incidents change total incidents change total incidents total 4.1 84 0.4 8 1985 2,050 2.2 0.24 1.88 0.9 -0.35 1986 55 23 2,549 0.82 4.0 2.6 100 1987 65 2,489 -0.02 1.83 0.28 3.4 0.19 1988 83 119 4.9 2,415 -0.03 2.4 106 -0.11 3.4 -0.07 77 1989 0.30 3,149 4.0 101 -0.05 3.6 0.45 1990 112 2,779 -0.12 6 4.0 -0.01 0.00 -0-0.41 2.2 1991 111 2,785 94 1.6 48 -0.20 0.08 -0.15 3.1 1992 2,995 0.21 4.6 58 89 -0.05 3.0 1993 1,918 -0.36 0.11 -0.02 4.8 57 99 8.3 1994 1,195 -0.38 7.5 93 0.63 1,232 0.03 1995 133 0.34 10.8 -0.20 12.0 81 9.2 1996 106 -0.13 883 -0.28 Total 1,000 3.8 962 3.6 26,439
of Source: 1997. Peru,Ministry Interior incidents in 1996, compared to less than 5 percent in 1985. Thus while violence had declined in the valley by this time, guerrilla activity was still higher than in any other area of Peru except Lima. Nationwide, violence declined from an average 1,890 incidents per year (157 per month) between 1981 and 1990 to 1,480 annually (123 per month) in 1992-93. These numbers dwindled to 243 reported events, a monthly average of 40, by 1996 (DESCO 1998). Organizationally, the guerrillas suffered major setbacks, especially with Guzman's capture. Casualty figures one year before and after the capture show a striking reversal, from 3,044 victims in 1991 to 1,188 in 1993, marking the capture as a turning point in the conflict (IDL 1994). Violence has since continued to taper off but with intermittentspasms of activity, notably in 1995 with increases in San Martin,Huanuco, and the jungle provinces of Ayacucho. The government's antidrug strategy had a definite effect on regional opportunities for guerrillawarfare. The militarywas authorized to participate in antidrugoperations aimed not at peasant cultivatorsbut at firmsand traffickers.The military'srenewed involvement in the early 1990s reflected a change in domestic politics following PresidentFujimori's1992 autogolpe, an ostensible justification for which was to wage war on drug trafficking. The government viewed such a visible, military-ledwar on drugs as a way
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to mollify its overseas critics and mitigate sanctions imposed in the wake of the coup. A progovernment congressional majorityelected in November 1992, moreover, gave Fujimorileverage to extend greater powers to the army. Following a major purge and shuffling of its leadership by the president, the militaryassumed a much largerrole in law enforcement than it had previously been willing to embrace. In April 1992, a Peruvian Air Force (FAP)base was established in the valley, equipped with T-32 Tucano and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft,for the specific purpose of controlling airstrips and intercepting illegal flights. In November 1993, the armywas authorized to pursue and detain those implicated in drug traffickingin areas lacking a national police presence, which included most of Huanuco and San Martin departments. These deployments augmented drug arrests and seizures. Seizures of coca paste rose from 7,572 kilos in 1992 to 19,145 kilos in 1996. Arrests rose annually as much as 60 percent in 1994-95. The average increase in Peru for drug arrests between 1992 and 1996 was the highest in the region (OAS 1998). Amid these successes, though, were disquieting signs that military corruption stemming from the drug trade was rising at an alarming rate, which only intensified with the military'sgrowing presence in the valley after 1992 (see Starnet al. 1995; Menzel 1996; S 1994, 32-39,73; RiveraPaz 1994, 11-12). Civilian authorities are seldom allowed to conduct inquiries into military involvement in drug trafficking. Unable to assert their jurisdiction,civil authoritiestypically abdicate responsibility for sentencing officers convicted by civilian courts. Efforts to investigate and prosecute civilian officials have been similarly thwarted. The traffic of chemical precursors suggests another area of official corruption. Large quantities of the reagents (sulphuric acid or kerosene) needed to break down coca leaf into paste flow freely into coca-producing regions without undue interference from the police or militaryforces that control roadway access to the region. While seizures of these precursors have risen, the volume intercepted is trifling, less than one percent of the total needed for current paste production levels (Kuner 1997). Finally, there are no indications that money laundering has declined as the government has taken a more assertive stance against trafficking.Estimates of money laundering in Peru vary from US$800 million (OFECOD 1994) to US$2 billion (Congreso Constituyente Democratico 1995). Fueled by external and domestic pressure, these corruption concerns prompted the government to withdraw the armed forces from the valley in April 1996 and hand counterdrug responsibilities back to the national police. Aerial interdiction remained part of the FAP's mandate, and the navy was authorized to continue patrolling river and sea routes. The government also established CONTRADROGAS(Comisi6n de Lucha Contra el Consumo de Drogas), a civilian drug council staffed by govern-
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ment and nongovernment experts, to coordinate the various agencies involved in antidrug efforts and implement key aspects of the antidrug strategy. By late October 1996 it was clear that the militarywould play a limited role in drug policy and an influential role in counterinsurgency, and that the police would get a broader mandate to oversee drug law enforcement. Alternativedevelopment has been another feature of Peru's antidrug policy in the 1990s. From the moment he took office in 1990, President Fujimori insisted that the United States tone down the military emphasis of its drug strategy and provide support for policies intended to wean farmers from coca, such as crop substitution and other subsidies for growing legal crops. He even turned down $36 million in U.S. military assistance that had been authorized for Peru in fiscal year 1990 (Palmer 1996, 184-85). Fujimori'sstance led to a bilateral agreement in May 1991 releasing some $111 million, most of which ($86.5 million) was earmarked for nonmilitary assistance, including funding for the dormant U.S.sponsored crop-substitution programs launched in the 1980s. Although thwarted by economic and political instability as the economy absorbed the impact of a stabilization policy in 1991-92, the government subsequently, as public finances improved, launched a variety of social development policies aimed at the ruralpoor. Spending on ruraldevelopment and infrastructurein San Martin and Huanuco, bankrolled by the increasingly powerful Presidential Ministry,rose dramatically during the period 1993-95.8 The government has employed three types of strategies to entice farmers to grow other crops: handing out land titles, providing technical assistance to increase the productivity and profitability of alternative export crops, and building roads to connect the remote agriculturalareas to markets. Land titling began as early as 1991, but it has suffered from a lack of credit, with the result that farmers who actually own land in the valley constitute a minute fraction of the roughly two hundred thousand farmers residing in the region, although that number is increasing. Technical assistance is plagued by a similar lack of funding, but has had limited success in inducing farmers to shift to legal crops. How a broader transition to legal crops is supposed to occur is still unclear, because Peru still lacks many facilities (dehydration, canning, refrigeration)needed for their export. Nevertheless, pilot projects initiated in 1996 in the Apurimac Basin have shown promise in promoting coffee, cacao, or rice cultivation (Washington Post 1997). Still, farmers and technical experts are pessimistic about the prospects for such programs when coca prices recover and the profit asymmetrybetween coca and legal crops returns. Discouraging signs that coca prices are on the upswing may weaken the argument for a more generalized application of alternative development strategies.
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The government's alternative development strategy, as outlined in the National Drug Control and Prevention Plan passed in 1994, aimed to reduce coca cultivation by 50 percent by developing new sources of income for would-be coca farmers. Two government agencies were created to implement the projects, funded by bilateral donors and multilateral banks. As with other executive branch institutions, however, both the Independent Alternative Development Authority (Autoridad Autonoma de Desarrollo Alternativo, AADA) and the Institute for Alternative Development (Instituto para el Desarrollo Alternativo, IDEA) have been politicized, hampering the execution of projects (Soberon Garrido 1998a). The projects sponsored by these agencies have emphasized infrastructure (construction of roads, schools, and other facilities), in keeping with the Fujimori government's overall "social investment" policies. Lines of transportationand communication connecting the Upper Huallaga Valley to the rest of Peru have also been improved, generating short-term employment, which helps to maintain support for the government. Yet another factor undermining guerrilla opportunities in the valley was a major shift in the government's counterinsurgency strategy, from a centralized approach to one that was more decentralized and societally based. A key component of the new strategywas the establishment of civil defense committees, also called rondas campesinas. The emphasis on rondas signaled a shift in the military'sapproach to subversion, which had heretofore favored the "internal war" strategy employed with such disastrous effect in Ayacucho during the 1980s and which earned Peru's militaryone of the worst human rights records in the hemisphere. Even in the late 1980s, however, army commanders in the afflicted highlands had already begun coordinating with civilians to form and arm peasant patrols to stand watch over their communities and fend off guerrilla incursions. That limited application isolated Sendero from communities in the central sierra, and the isolation lowered the rates of violence in afflicted highland departments. As greater numbers of communities embraced the patrols and worked more cooperatively with regional militaryauthorities, the rural resistance to Sendero began to coalesce (Degregori 1998). The strategy of using civil defense committees struck a receptive chord with the incoming Fujimori government in 1990. The Fujimori government codified the approach in a controversial set of decrees in November 1991, many of which ultimately were implemented over the objections of Peru's opposition-dominated congress. Key provisions of the decrees handed functions previously reserved for civilian regional authorities over to regional political-militarycommanders (jefespolftico-militares) in the areas that were under a state of emergency, suspending constitutional guarantees (including human rights). Regional commanders received control not only over local and regional civilian authorities but also
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over the flow of state funds into the emergency zones. They were also given the authority to promote, legally incorporate, and arm civil defense patrols. Constitutional issues aside, the ronda strategy achieved dramatic results in the sheer numbers of communities and individuals integrated into the civil defense system and in the system's impact on violence in the Andes, which continued to fall. Victims of violence in the most afflicted department, Ayacucho, for example, dropped from 809 in 1991 to 47 victims in 1992 and 224 in 1993 (Degregori et al. 1996). In 1993 the armed forces once again moved their base of operations from the Central Huallaga to the Upper Huallaga Valley. This time their strategy was not to form tactical alliances with coca growers, as they had done in 1989, but to organize, arm, and coordinate activities with the rondas, much as they had in the highlands. Communities in the Central Huallaga had already formed rondas and thus enjoyed a degree of autonomy from military control, a development partly attributableto the region's traditionally stronger grassroots. Organized in 1991 and 1992 to expel drug traffickersand combat petty crime, the CentralHuallaga rondas later assumed a broader role in organizing local elections and fending off guerrilla advances, an experience repeated in villages along the Upper Mayo River. Rondasin the Upper Huallaga, in contrast, were organized by the army under Legislative Decree 741 specifically to confront subversion. They remained under zonal military authority. Unlike their highland counterparts, the rondas in the valley had to deal with the threat posed by guerrillas and their collaborators in the drug trade, and therefore sought to coordinate activities with coca growers to ensure their participation. Both types of civil defense committees were successful in expelling Senderistas from the bloodiest battlegrounds of the Upper Huallaga Valley. Coca growers, no longer viewing Sendero as vital to either their economic interests or personal security, began to cooperate with regional commanders against the guerrillas. The army complemented its organization of rondaswith coordinated attacksagainst guerrillasas it attempted to deliver the coup degrace to Sendero. A series of offensives from September 1993 to May 1994 succeeded in dislodging many of the three thousand or so remaining Senderistas in the region. The army also captured key commanders, forced others to flee or surrender, and pushed Sendero's operations south to Huanuco or to the ApurimacValley (Mineo 1994). This campaign, like the earlierone, gained notoriety for its human rights abuses (see CNDH 1994). Despite the attacks, however, the damage to the structure of the Senderista army (the Ejercito GuerrilleroPopular) was minimal, and the Regional Committee of the Huallaga, the Senderista cadre in charge of collecting levies from local traffickers, was left intact (Mineo 1994). Nevertheless, the leaders of the regional Command of the Huallaga,
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identified by their noms deguerre as Artemio and Pepe, were in retreatby the end of 1994. The balance of power in the valley had tilted against the guerrillas.The emerging structureof authoritycomprised the rondas, local military commanders, drug traffickers,and some civilian authorities. This new authority structure, while no longer conducive to guerrilla warfare, was still highly susceptible to the corrupting potential of the drug trade. The government's counterinsurgency strategy also included the development of a sophisticated state intelligence apparatus, coordinated
by the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional,
SIN). Before 1990, there were at least six independent state intelligence agencies, one for each branch of the armed forces and two run by the national police. These agencies were placed under the control of SIN, which fostered more efficient interagency coordination. Higher state allocations for surveillance equipment, salaries, and training had a direct payoff when operations carried out by the national police Special
Intelligence Groups (Grupos Especiales de Inteligencia, GEIN) and the National Directorate Against Terrorism (Direccion Nacional Contra el
Terrorismo, DINCOTE) managed to infiltrate Sendero. In June and September 1990 and January 1991, agents discovered caches of Senderista information detailing the names of militants and their aliases, organizational networks, propaganda, and other documents. This intelligence groundwork led to the arrestof Guzman and other high-rankingSenderistas the following year. Intelligence strategies after the capture further weakened Sendero. The call by Guzman and the other jailed Senderista leaders for a "peace accord" in 1993-94, for example-an astonishing turn of events that SIN brokered-had a dramatic and demoralizing effect on the Senderista leadership. The proposed accord split the organization into two irreconcilable factions, which analysts dubbed Red Sendero and the Gonzalists. Led by "Feliciano,"Red Sendero dismissed the accord as a government hoax intended to discredit Guzman; they favored continuing the armed struggle against all odds. The Gonzalists supported tactical reconciliation with the state to sustain the organization until conditions permitted them to resume the armed conflict (Toche 1996; Burtand Lopez Ricci 1994; PCP 1993). Senderista disunity deepened as a result of Decree Law 25499,
known as the Repentance Law (Ley de Arrepentimiento), passed on
October 24, 1993, which offers leniency or amnesty to captured Senderistas who turn informers. The government has successfully used the Repentance Law as an intelligence-gathering vehicle to weaken both Sendero and the MRTA.Senderistas once stood out for their boot camp discipline, morale, and religious reverence for "ChairmanGonzalo" in jail; but the "softening"of Guzman, combined with the incentive to would-be informants, undermined militants' morale, enticing them to disclose the
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identities and whereabouts of their comrades at large, intelligence that had eluded authorities a decade earlier. The result of this effort was a dramatic increase in guerrilla cells destroyed and militantsarrested, to the point that mug shots of captured guerrillasbecame a regular feature in the Peruvian press between 1993 and 1995. Despite these setbacks, however, Sendero, or what remains of it, continues to function at low intensity in areas of the jungle, most visibly in parts of the Huallaga, Apurimac,and Ene-Tambo valleys. While Sendero is clearly trying to reestablish a presence in the Upper Huallaga, most guerrilla confrontations in the last few years have occurred in the newer coca regions in the central jungle, including the jungle provinces of the department of Ayacucho, Sendero's cradle, and areas of Huanuco and Ucayali. Most of the guerrilla-perpetrated deaths have been civilians, though the majority of guerrilla actions continue to be acts of sabotage rather than killings (DESCO 1998). Although the Senderistas may occupy small villages occasionally, are incapable of holding territoryfor any length of time. In October they 1997, about one hundred Senderistas briefly took over the town of San Miguel, in LaMarprovince of Ayacucho. Other Senderista militantsdid the same in the villages of Palo Huimba and Sachavaca near Tingo Mariain the Huallaga Valley in April 1998, and in Pampas, Padre Abad, and Aguaytia inJune 1998. A recent development is the violence against members of the Ashaninka indigenous group in the SantaCruzValley. There, in the central jungle, the social conflicts created by the onset of oil prospecting have brought the Ashaninkas into bloody contact with the Senderistas again, ten years after political violence drove the Ashaninkas out of their native territories in the forested provinces of Satipo and Chanchamayo, Junin Department (OGD 1998). While the Red faction, formerly led by "Feliciano," maintains its strongest presence in the jungle, the Gonzalist, pro-peace accord faction surfaces sporadically in Limaand parts of the sierra(Toche 1996; Burt and Lopez Ricci 1994). In Limaand regions to the south, specifically Cuzco and Puno, the guerrillas have shifted to a strategy of propaganda and actions that stop short of direct confrontation with state forces. The Gonzalists appear to be returning to their roots, appealing to civilians much as Sendero did in its developmental days, though with no signs of significant success. The Gonzalist goal is characteristicallylongterm: to preserve the party core and salvage what remains of the organization until conditions permit renewed violence. Red Sendero's objectives are more immediate. Searching for resources to sustain combat, Red Senderistas have not shunned collaboration with the drug trade. Indeed, they appear to be selling protection to traffickersand firms and may be directly involved in cultivation and production (see, for example, Drug Trafficking Update 1995). Red Sendero is thus one of many armed
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protection groups working directly or indirectly for drug operatives. Protection profits tend to be more diffuse, however, with no single group controlling the cash flow as Sendero did a decade ago. The new, weaker guerrilla alliances with the drug trade are a far cry from the coalition that Sendero forged in the valley, but they do raise concerns about a resurgent rebellion. While the guerrilla coalition of the 1980s and early 1990s hinged on a genuine, if ephemeral, base of support, the currentrelationship appears to be a defensive and subsistence strategy, a means of averting capture and total military defeat rather than a viable plan to develop guerrilla warfare and seize state power. Nevertheless, Senderismo has by no means exhausted its potential to wreak havoc. As long as Sendero preserves some link to the drug trade, the organization may retain the capacity to wage low-intensity war for years, though most Peruvians currently repudiate its ideology, goals, and methods. A sensible drug policy may prove critical to maintaining the guerrillas'isolation from civil society. In this regard, the government's 1996 decision to resume the forced eradication of mature coca plants represents a step toward reestablishing the disastrously adversarialrelationship with coca producers that characterized the 1980s. Intensifying eradication may generate impressive statistics,but it alienates the constituencies that sought guerrillaprotection a decade earlierand may cause them to seek protection again, affording Sendero another opportunity to recover peasant support. On the other hand, the valley's peasants are now well armed and organized into rondas; they may be capable of resisting eradication efforts themselves. Neither scenario bodes particularly well for political stability in Peru. CONCLUSION This article has examined the formation and disintegration of a violent coalition forged between guerrillas and coca producers in Peru. A "stateless"and politically isolated region long neglected by policymakers, the Upper Huallaga Valley was also home to a multimillion-dollarmarket and inhabited by a weakly organized civil society in search of protection. Exploiting these opportunities in the 1980s, Sendero provided that protection and gained an abundant source of revenue and support. But guerrillasupport in the Huallaga Valley, as in other regions of Peru, proved ephemeral, a confluence of interests combined with guerilla exploitation of local grievances to provoke confrontation. Shrinking opportunities in the 1990s, caused largely by the coca crash, tilted the regional balance of power, weakening interests that bound coca producers to guerrillas and allowing the state to act against the insurgents. With the coca economy in flux and producers adapting to a
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changing market, a divided Sendero is in the throes of an organizational crisis from which it is unlikely to recover in the immediate future. For the Peruvian government, some of the ground gained against subversion has been compromised by the pernicious problem of drug corruption. President Fujimorihas long held that militarycorruption is an "individual"and not an "institutional" problem, but the evidence suggests that corruption is indeed a pervasive institutional problem that the government has taken few steps to deter. Official corruption in Peru lacks the systematic organization it has in Colombia, but it continues to hinder military effectiveness and to erode the rule of law. Several theoretical conclusions can be drawn from this case. First, rebel groups are less likely to acquire broad support against a democratic regime, and thus are unlikely to succeed in bringing about a revolution. Rebel groups may evolve, however, into chronic insurgencies, fueled by political and economic opportunities that perpetuate conflict indefinitely and undermine democratic institutions. In extreme cases, chronic insurgencies can evolve into rival sovereignties, as has occurred in neighboring Colombia. Indeed, Sendero's role in the Upper Huallaga Valley is perhaps most comparable to that of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),a predominantly rural-basedorganization that controls coca-growing areas of the country and maintains symbiotic ties with coca growers and drug traffickers.Like Sendero, the FARChas operated as an armed trade union representing the growers by boosting paste prices and preventing abuses by drug cartel personnel while ensuring trafficker access to covert airstrips (Reyes 1996). Similar alliances have developed in Africa during the past decade, following a regional wave of transitionsfrom militaryto civilian rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Liberia,the National PatrioticFrontof Liberia (NPFL) formed alliances with Muslims involved in the lucrative crossborder diamond trade to gain access to foreign exchange. So completely did it control legal enterprises, from mining to timber, that the NPFLcould offer foreign firms access to local resources in exchange for weapons, communications facilities, and training (Reno 1996). In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which, like Sendero, initiated armed activities following elections, parlayed its position along the northern border into a kidnapping and smuggling operation. In Senegal, separatist rebels in the Casamance region forged ties to cannabis growers and traffickers. Drug money also maintains separatist armies operating in the northern regions of Burma (Shinn 1998). In the former Yugoslavia, Albanian separatists trafficked in heroin to buy arms and support terrorist activity against Serbian authorities in Kosovo. In each case, the collaboration with illicit markets has been a source of organizational capabilities for groups engaged in internal warfare.
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When rebels "capture" illicit markets, they acquire power disproportionate to their strength in numbers, a synergistic capability that destabilizes elected regimes while advancing the strategy of revolutionaries (if not the cause of revolution), creating the foundation for chronic insurgency. This conclusion has policy implications for places where drug producers and guerrillas overlap. Eradication programs are problematic as long as illicit crops remain vastly more profitable than legal crops; such programs are also singularly ineffective in curbing illicit cultivation and may drive participants into protective alliances with regime foes. Such coalitions in areas dominated by an illicit market are by no means unique to Peru. In Colombia, where guerrillas control nearly one-third of the national territory,the government's coca and opium poppy eradication initiatives, begun in 1995, proved disastrous to stability, cementing relations between FARCguerrillas and drug producers.9 A more effective strategy, suggested by the Peruvian case, is to change the opportunity structure underpinning violent coalitions by imposing state authority in ways that engage, not threaten, local interests. Although interdiction has been a success in this regard, accelerating the decline in coca prices and thereby weakening the guerrillas, it has caused adaptations in the drug trade that carryserious consequences for stability. Time will tell if alternative development constitutes an effective weapon in what has been a losing battle against drugs, for producers and traffickersexcel at adapting to control strategies as long as profits are still to be made. If ever there were a time to expand these efforts in Peru, however, thattime is now, while the bear marketfor coca has made farmers receptive to legal crops. Even if it does not ultimately succeed, the alternative development approach has the added virtue of extending recognition to a reality that policymakers ignored for years: that the drug trade is inextricably tied to larger social problems that cannot be "solved" simply by expanding police or military power. The Peruvian case also illustrates how state policy can play a constructive role in demobilizing violent conflict and restoring order. Strengthening the capacity of the state in traditionally"stateless"areas can rein in violent movements and create space for civil society to take root. Regarding the effects of state strengthening on democratic government, this case is inconclusive, for the Fujimorigovernment's reputation does not rest on its deep respect for democratic institutions. Indeed, some analysts shun the use of the "democratic"label in the Peruvian case altogether (McClintock 1998). There is no question, however, that a state capable of establishing authority in remote and inaccessible zones is an essential condition for any political order, including a democracy. Building a decentralized system of authority that is rooted in civil society yet integrated with the state may ultimately be the best deterrent against future guerrillaresurgence.Whetherthe Peruviansolution, the rondas campesinas,
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evolves into a permanent, formal set of institutions capable of extending the rule of law into stateless regions remains to be seen, but it does promise to transform rural society in ways consistent with the state's interest in preserving order. A final conclusion concerns the evolution of popular support for internal warfare in the democratic context. The decline of guerrillasupport following the crash of "King Coca" shows the fragility of an alliance so reliant on a bull market for a commodity subject to boom-and-bust cycles. It also illustrates the pragmatic and ephemeral nature of support for guerrilla movements in an age in which Marxistideologies have lost much of their resonance as revolutionary principles. Yet if guerrillas have so far failed to mount a successful challenge to a democratic regime, the transition to democracy does not, as some analysts maintain, spell an end to internal warfare. The very process of democratization can create opportunities for actors seeking to achieve political goals through violence. A society in flux, in which institutions are still developing to cope with the expansion of citizen demands and participation, may present unexpected chances for violent actors to ally with civil society around needs the new regime is unable to fulfill. Elected governments revealed to be antagonistic to citizen interests can unwittingly fortify these alliances, with disastrous consequences for political stability. Guerrillasurvival beyond the democratic transition does not, therefore, rely on broad sympathy for revolution. Support may be amassed and, as in Peru, "bought"by protecting an illicit market that benefits a large regional constituency. But let the buyer beware: when illicit markets fail, opportunities for the formation of violent coalitions may evaporate, leaving revolutionaries and their former supporters to fend for themselves.
NoTE
Paul IvanLlamazares, The authorthanksPabloDreyfus, Jonathan Hartlyn, for Posner,and ElianaVillarMarquez theircommentson an earlierdraftof this article,and the anonymousreviewersof the journalfor theirthoughtful critique. for Sober6nGarrido his insights. to He would also liketo expressgratitude Ricardo for The authorbearssole responsibility the contents. 1. This being the penultimatehase of the guerrillacampaignbefore the Coca" intendedto denote the is seizureof power.See PCP1992.The phrase"King economic dominance of coca in a defined geographicalarea, Peru's Upper use the Cotton," label historians to Valley.The namederivesfrom"King Huallaga of cottonto the antebellum South.Itcaptures U.S. describethe singular importance the region'sdependence on the fortunesof a single crop. adds the economic 2. "Politicaland economic opportunitystructure" whichusuallyrefersto to the conceptof politicalopportunity structure, emphasis the the dimensionsof a politythatencourageor discourage developmentof social movements(Kitschelt 1986;Tarrow1994).The state is defined,followingWeber
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1958, as an entity distinct from society, regime, and economy, a set of institutions that "successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate force for the execution of its orders." The state's basic interests are external defense, domestic stability, achieving hegemony over alternative organizations that interfere with territorial control, and obtaining the means for state action. 3. The Banco Centralde la Reserva bought some three million dollars a day on the "parallelmarket"(Congreso Constituyente Democratico 1995). 4. A document seized by Peruvian counterterrorist police in August 1993, purportedly a Sendero accounting ledger from the Tingo Maria area, contained detailed information on income and expenses. The arrestof the Peruvian drug lord Demetrio Chavez Pafiaherrera ("Vaticano") confirmed that he had paid the guerrillas five thousand dollars per flight and three dollars per kilo of coca paste (El Comercio 1994). 5. Programs included the Upper Huallaga Valley Coca Reduction Program (CORAH)and the Upper Huallaga Special Project (PEAH). PEAH (1981-93) was designed to develop infrastructure and provide credit for farmers to grow alternative crops. CORAH, an eradication initiative that tried everything from uprooting crops to spraying them with herbicides, was implemented in 1983, with logistical support and protection provided by the PeruvianCivilGuard.For a critical review of drug policy, see Youngers 1992. 6. Arciniega also denounced U.S. policy in the valley (Quehacer 1989-90). This may have been the last straw for the Peruvian government; his command was terminated a few weeks after the interview. 7. In 1995, 1.5 million Americans were cocaine users, a 74 percent decline from 5.7 million a decade earlier. The approximately half-million first-time users in 1994 represented a 60 percent drop from approximately 1.3 million new users core"users accounted for two-thirds of U.S. per year between 1980 and 1984. "Hard demand (Everingham and Rydell 1994). 8. The social policies included nutrition assistance, public works, and infrastructuredevelopment. For a more detailed account of the fiscal impact of privatization and tax reform, see Kay 1996-97. 9. When FARC guerrillasshot down aircraftspraying chemical herbicides and crop-dusting helicopters and planes, intercepted radio messages revealed that traffickersoffered guerrillas$200,000 for every plane they shot down (Brooke 1995; see also Comisi6n Andina de Juristas 1998). REFERENCES Alvarez, Elena H. 1992. Coca Production in Peru. In Drug Policy in the Americas, ed. Peter Smith. Boulder: Westview Press. Arciniega Huby, Alberto. 1994. Civil-MilitaryRelations and a Democratic Peru. Orbis 38, 1 (Winter): 116-20. Bagley, Bruce M., and William O. Walker III, eds. 1996. Drug Trafficking in the Americas. Coral Gables: North-South Center Press. Brooke, James. 1995. U.S. Copters Are a Target in Colombia. New York Times. March 27: A7. Burt, Jo-Marie, and Jose Lopez Ricci. 1994. Peru: Shining Path After Guzman. NACLA Report on the Americas 28, 3 (November-December): 6-9.
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Cabieses, Hugo. 1996. iCoca y narcotrafico en crisis?Quehacer 102 (July-August): 42-49. Centro de Estudios y Promoci6n del Desarrollo (DESCO). 1998. Violencia y seguridad en el Peru de hoy. Reporte Especial no. 84. April. Clawson, PatrickL.,and Rensselaer W. Lee III. 1998. TheAndean CocaineIndustry. 1st paperback ed. New York: St. Martin'sPress. El Comercio (Lima). 1994. January 28: A17. Comisi6n Andina de Juristas. 1998. Informativo andino. 134 (April 17). Lima. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH). 1994. Lossucesos delAlto Huallaga, March-May 1994. Lima:CNDH. Crabtree,John. 1992. Peru Under Garcfa:An OpportunityLost.Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press. De la Puente Mejia, Juan. 1994. En el Huallaga, aun es noche. Quehacer 87 (January-February):40-45. De Nevers, Renee. 1993. Democratization and Ethnic Conflict. Survival 35, 2 (Summer): 41. Degregori, Carlos Ivan. 1998. Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho. In Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995, ed. Steve J. Stern. Durham: Duke University Press. 128-57. Degregori, CarlosIvan,Jose Coronel, Ponciano del Pino, and Orin Starn,eds. 1996. Las rondas campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso. Estudios de la sociedad rural no. 15. Lima:Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP). Dix, Robert H. 1984. Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail. Polity 16, 3 (Spring): 42346. Drug Trafficking Update. (Lima). 1995. 6, 61 (May 8): 7. Everingham, Susan S., and Peter C. Rydell. 1994. Modeling theDemandfor Cocaine. Santa Monica: Rand. Gonzalez, Rafil. Coca's Shining Path. 1989. NACLA Report on the Americas 22, 6 23-24. (March-April): Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. WhyMen Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Instituto de Defensa Legal (Lima) (IDL). (1994). Sendero en cifras: terror y figura ... hasta la sepultura. Nos. 71-72 (December): 32-37. Isbell, Billie Jean. 1994. In TheShining Path ofPeru, 2d ed., ed. David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin'sPress. Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology 9: 527-53. Kawell, Jo Ann. 1989. Going to the Source. NACLA Reporton the Americas 22, 6 (March-April): 15. and the LiberalState in Peru, 1990-1995. Kay, Bruce H. 1996-97. "Fujipopulism" Interamerican Studies and WorldAffairs 38, 4 (Winter): 55-98. Journal of Kittschelt, Herbert P. 1986. Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. BritishJournal of Political Science 16, 1 (January):57-85. Kuner, Thomas P. 1997. Peru's War on Drugs. In Peru: Beyond the Reforms.Lima: Comission for the Promotion of Peru (PROMPERU).
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Lee, Rensselaer W. III. 1991. The Political Economy of the Andean Cocaine Industry. In At Issue:Politics in the WorldArena, ed. Steven L. Spiegel. New York: St. Martin'sPress. McClintock, Cynthia. 1984. Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso. WorldPolitics 37, 1 (October): 48-84. . 1988. The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case. Journal ofInteramerican Studies and WorldAffairs 30, 2-3 (Summer-Fall): 127-52. . 1996. Unpublished ms. [See Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: ---El Salvador's FMLNandPeru's Shining Path. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998] . 1998. Should the AuthoritarianLabel Be Revived?The Case of Fujimori's Peru, 1995-1998. Paper prepared for the 21st InternationalCongress of the LatinAmerican Studies Association, Chicago, September. Menzel, Sewell. 1996. Fire in the Andes: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru. Lanham:University Press of America. Midlarsky,Manus I. 1988. Rulersand the Ruled:Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence. American Political Science Review 82: 491-505. Mineo, Liz. 1994. La batalla continua en el Huallaga. Ideele (Lima) no. 71-72 (December): 55-59. Morales, Edmundo. 1989. Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. Inequality and Insurgency. American Political Science Review 81, 2 (June): 425-51. Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (OGD). 1998. The World Geopolitics of Drugs. Annual Report 1997. Paris: OGD. O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. The State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems. In Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform:Theoreticaland ComparativePerspectivesforthe 1990s, ed. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acufa, and Eduardo A. Gamarra.Coral Gables: NorthSouth Center Press. 157-80. Organization of American States (OAS). 1998. Inter-AmericanDrug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). Boletin estadistico 1998/Statistical Summary 1997. <www.oas.org> Palmer, David Scott. 1996. Peru, Drugs, and the Shining Path. In Bagley and Walker 1996. 179-200. Partido Comunista del Per( (PCP). 1992. Historic Speech from the Dungeons of the Enemy. September 24. Documents of the Communist Party of Peru. <http://www.blythe.org> . 1993. InternationalDirective of the Communist Partyof Peru. December 1. <http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/docs-en/directiv.htm> . 1997. The Peruvian Narco State. <http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/intro> (Posted June 24.) Perl, Rafael. 1996. U.S.-Andean Drug Policy. In Bagley and Walker 1996. 23-42. Perf. Congreso Constituyente Democratico. Comisi6n de Fiscalizaci6n. 1995. Informe final del Grupo de Trabajo de Estudio e Investigaci6n del Narcotrafico. Lima. September 15: 4.
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Perfu.Ministerio del Interior, Oficina Ejecutiva de Control de Drogas (OFECOD), Direcci6n General. 1994. Plan nacional de prevenci6n y control de drogas, 1994-2000. Quehacer (Lima). 1989-90. Interview with Alberto Arciniega Huby. No. 62 (December-January): 38-43. . 1994. La guerrilla anda en blue jean. No. 87 (January-February):41. Rementeria, Iban de. 1995. La elecci6n de drogas: examen de las polifticas de control. Lima:Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert. Reno, William. 1996. The Business of Warin Liberia.CurrentHistory 95,601 (May): 211-15. Sf (Lima). 1994. El boom del narcotrafico en las narices del ejercito. February 28March 6: 32-39, 73. Reyes, Alejandro. 1996. Drug Traffickingand the GuerrillaMovement in Colombia. In Bagley and Walker 1996. 121-30. Rivera Paz, Carlos. 1994. Lo verde y lo blanco: los militares y el narcotraffico. Argumentos 16. Lima:Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. 11-12. Rudolph, James D. 1992. Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis. Westport: Praeger. Rumrril,R6ger. 1993. Principio del fin de la guerra en la valle del Huallaga. Ideele (Lima) 59-60 (December): 100. Ryan,Jeffrey I. 1994. The Impact of Democratization on RevolutionaryMovements. Comparative Politics 27, 1 (October): 27-44. Schemo, Diana Jean, and Tim Golden. 1998. Bogota Aid: To Fight Drugs or Rebels? Uneasy Allies: A Special Report. New YorkTimes.June 2: Al, A12. Shinn, James. 1998. Asia's Drug Menace and the Poverty of Diplomacy. Current History 97, 618 (April): 174-78. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ----. 1994. Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda, and Jeff Goodwin. 1994. Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World. In Skocpol 1994. 259-78. Sober6n Garrido, Ricardo. Analyst, Comisi6n Andina de Juristas, Lima. 1997. Author interview. Lima,July 9. . 1998a. Author interview. Lima,July 8. 1998b. Personal communication. July 9. Starn, Orin, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, eds. 1995. The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics. Durham: Duke University Press. Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela, with John B. Reuter. 1990. Sendero Luminoso and the Threatof Narcoterrorism.Washington Papers series. New York:Praeger/ Center for Strategic and International Studies. Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, CollectiveAction and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Toche, Eduardo. 1996. dRegresaSendero? Quehacer 102 (July-August): 36-40. United Nations Drug ControlProgram(UNDCP). 1997. WorldDrugReport.London: Oxford University Press. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for InternationalNarcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 1996. International Narcotics ControlStrategyReport.March.Washington, DC: Department of State.
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. 1997. International Narcotics Control StrategyReport.March. Washington Post. 1997. As Coca MarketGoes, So Shall They Reap. November 18: A15-16. Weber, Max. 1958. Politics as Vocation. In From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. Youngers, Coletta. 1992. Peru Under Scrutiny:Human Rightsand U.S. Drug Policy. WOLAIssue Brief 5: Issues in International Drug Policy. Washington, DC: Washington Office on LatinAmerica.

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Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path Author(s): Bruce H.

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STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN

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