Dispatches

Indias Stake In Afghanistan

Shanthie Mariet DSouza

SINGAPORETen years back, India made a difficult choice in Afghanistan. Even as countries joined hands behind the U.S.-led military offensive against the Taliban, Delhi decided to concentrate its efforts on development and reconstruction activities in the war-ravaged country. A decade later, in the face of enormous difficulties and challenges, this soft power strategy has persisted. As the countdown to withdrawal from Afghanistan begins, the international communitys decade-long involvement there has come under renewed scrutinyand the prudence of Indias method of engagement has become increasingly understood. Indias policy in Afghanistan is an extension of its ideational role, pursued for decades. Maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan has been a principal foreign policy objective since the Cold War, which brought the great-power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to Indias doorstep. As members of the Non-Aligned movement (NAM), both Afghanistan and India attempted to maintain neutrality amid the Cold War atmospherics. The signing of a Friendship Treaty in 1950 paved the way for development of friendly relations between India and the regime of Afghan king Zahir Shah, which persisted until the late 1970s. Despite the subsequent deterioration of the regional situation following the Soviet invasion, relations between India and Afghanistanespecially on trade, banking, commerce, agriculture, health, sports, education and cultural exchangesby and large continued uninterrupted. Contacts were only disrupted when the Taliban swept onto the Afghan political scene in September 1996. In post 9/11 Afghanistan, Indias interests have centered on three broad objectives: security concerns, economic interests and regional aspirations. India has revived its historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilizational linkages with the objective of a long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. As part of this effort, India has supported the nascent democratic regime, seeing in it the best hope for preventing the return of the Taliban. India is also looking beyond Afghanistans borders, working to revive Afghanistans role as a land bridge connecting South Asia with Central Asia and providing access to strategic energy resources. Along these lines, India has actively promoted greater trade and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional mechanism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). With the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai in 2001, India announced that it would provide $100 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagementcharacterized by a range of political, humaniDr . ShanThIe M arIeT DS ouza is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Associate Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institutes with which she is affiliated.

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tarian, cultural, economic and infrastructure projects. India today ranks overall as Afghanistans sixth-largest bilateral donor country, having invested heavily in a range of key sectors of the Afghan economy and pledged to do so to the tune of $1.3 billion more in the years ahead. Yet Delhis approach has not been without its critics. The development only paradigm has drawn fire for the perception of piggybacking on the military efforts of the U.S. and NATO-led forces. However, this critique misses the mark; far from being an opportunistic policy, Indias approach has complemented international counterinsurgency efforts and at the same time reinforced existing governance and empowered local Afghans. Unlike other international donors, who have relied on their own agencies and subcontracting (thereby creating parallel structures of governance), most of Indias aid is currently channeled through the Afghan government and works in conjunction with local needs and priorities. Moreover, India has actively provided assistance to womens groups through self-employment generation schemes, health and capacity-building. Such schemes, operational in Kabul and the western province of Herat, are hugely popular among local womens groups, making them long-term stakeholders in rebuilding the countrys social and economic fabric. And this mode of aid delivery has proven effective even in difficult insurgency-prone areas. There is indeed a critical security concern to Indias involvement in Afghanistan, howeverspecifically, the possibility of terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into India. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilizing the region. Since 9/11, New Delhis policy has broadly been in congruence with the U.S. objectives of decimating the Taliban and al-Qaeda and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul. Today, however, a resurgent Taliban and mounting instability have worsened the outlook for Afghanistan. In the coming days, Indias aid only policy is bound to face new challengesand adapt to them. While Delhi resists putting boots on ground, it will need to widen its web of engagement in the rapidly-shrinking political space in Afghanistan. India must revive its traditional Pushtun linkages and at the same time re-engage other ethnic groups as it attempts to strike a balance between continuing support for the Karzai government and increasing its engagement with other factions. By doing so, India will position itself to influence Afghanistans evolving political sphere, and serve as a serious interlocutor in the intra-Afghan and inter-regional reconciliation process now underway. One thing is clear. As a major regional power with global aspirations, India cannot take a backseat in the unfolding struggle over Afghanistans future.

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