Shohan Shetty Professor Stephen Rosen Government 98sp 5 May 2011 A Time to Re-Visit: US Foreign Policy Toward Iran

Robert Litwak writes, Throughout history, dissatisfied stateshave rejected international norms and the status quo. This is a normal condition of international relations.i Among the most uncertain of the United States international relations is that with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the rhetoric surrounding the United States perspective of Iranian policy has at times characterized the Middle Eastern nation as irrational.ii And, Iranian political and religious leaders have not hesitated to ascribe pejorative terms, such as the Great Satan, to the United States and American political leadership.iii While these examples describe the sentiments of the more extreme poles of the political spectrum, they are important dynamics to consider in analyzing Iranian-American relations, and especially important for the United States as we move forward in solidifying our foreign policy with the nation. The questions that must be answered should shed light on why this antagonism exists in Iranian-American relations: What actions have American political leaders defined as irrational? Why does such vitriolic rhetoric exist in this relationship? More importantly, can anything be done to mitigate the situation? Can the relationship between the United States and Iran be salvaged in the 21st century? An important issue that Robert Litwak identifies in American foreign policy is that more than two decades after the Iranian RevolutionU.S. relations with Iran remain powerfully influenced by its legacy.iv Much of that legacyhas relegated Iran to the status of rogue state, and this history, coupled with the charged rhetoric utilized by the leadership of both nations, has calcified a relationship that demands re-visitation. In the past decade alone, Iranian political action and events have significantly altered the dynamics surrounding Iranian-US relations, and

suggest it is more viable and more necessary than ever to make a concerted effort to redesign our foreign policy toward Iran. A re-visitation of Iranian-US relations first requires a more contemporary analysis and discussion of Irans classification as a rogue state. Specifically, a major issue concerning Iran is why it is a rogue state, and what motivations or conditions prompt irrational behavior, as perceived by the United States. A better understanding of these elements allows the United States to both better predict Iranian political action and predict responses to international action. With this knowledge, we can revisit the Iranian-US relationship, and answer these important questions concerning the future of the United States and Iran. This re-visitation cannot be fully promoted without a discussion of why the contemporary situation serves as an important and time-sensitive situation to address this outdated relationship. Wright and Bakhash have claimed that we currently benefit from a window of opportunity where this relationship may still be salvaged, if proper and thoughtful political action is taken to mitigate the situation.v Specifically, contemporary events have demonstrated a changing and stronger nature in the opposition pressures that shape Iranian political action. The first Iranian pressure that will be analyzed is a constant identity crisis Iran has suffered from since its inception in 1979. Immediately following the Iranian revolution, a chiasm was sensed. This was due to the fact that the revolution was comprised of a diverse coalition of secularists, liberals, and fundamentalists uneasily cooperating in the overthrow of the monarchy.viThe election of President Mohammad Khatami has reinvigorated this crisis, and exposed the development of two concurrent revolutions in Iran: one that continued since 1979, predominantly promoted by conservatives and the established leadership of the Iranian government, and one of a more moderate, disaffected population who is uncomfortable with the

direction of the countrys policies since 1979, and demand a liberalization of society and entrance into the family of nations. Favoring a moderate, Western-sympathizing candidate over the hardline cleric has formalized for the first time in decades an undercurrent of opposition that has remained marginalized within the Islamic Republic, empowering this silent majority to pressure Iranian leadership for change and reconciliation with the West. Secondly, and relatedly, Iran has consistently experienced legitimacy issues, which have only increased in recent years. The culmination of these legitimacy issues has been the Green Revolution response to the alleged tampered Iranian elections in 2009. In this powerful and unprecedented demonstration, the domestic populations dissatisfaction with the political leadership and regime in Iran reached a critical mass. Largely, the population reacted to the allegations of a fraudulent election, though the deteriorating economic health and civil society in Iran played an important role in heightening Iranian feelings against the government. The Iranian peoples courageous actions represent the most serious challenge to the established authority in Iran, and further demonstrate the Iranian peoples discontent with the Iranian governments representation of their will. This analysis will begin by analyzing the etymology of Irans classification as a rogue state in order to suggest a re-classification by the United States and consequently a reduction in the hostile rhetoric surrounding the relationship. Then, the focus will shift once again to the various pressures, and their changing nature in the recent past, that affect Iranian political action. Specifically, the historical pressures of Irans identity crisis and legitimacy issues will be applied to two cases: the election of President MohammadKhatami and the Green Revolution of 2009. The application of these historical frameworks of political pressures to these recent political events will demonstrate the opportune political climate in Iran that demands the United States

make a serious effort to better understand Iran and why increased irrational activity in Iran is largely the governments only remedy to these increased challenges to its power. The Importance of Iran Before moving into the analysis of core Iranian principles and motivations that shape the nations politics, the importance of this endeavor must be justified and demonstrated. For years, scholars have proposed that the time is ripe for changing the dynamics of the Iranian-US relationship. Despite many opportunities, the two nations have been unable to reconcile their issues and move toward a more reliable co-existence, in large part because of this lack of understanding. Yet, the opportunity has not yet passed; it is still plausible for the United States to take active steps toward forging good relations with Iran, if it takes the time to better understand the nations political motivations. Primarily, Iran represents an important actor in Middle Eastern politics. This region of the world has become increasingly interesting for scholars and crafters of international politics. Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Republic, the United States of America has stood alone as the worlds single super power. And, as a result, the winners of the Cold War, the West, have increasingly dominated international politics and shape the landscape of an increasingly more connected global community. As the arbiters of important resources, their requirements for membership often mandate that countries assimilate to a series of guidelines. These standards, however, are shaded by Western ideology and principles, and tend to conflict with the foundations of many Middle Eastern governments. The minutia of these differences will be addressed in the next section of the paper, detailing how the Western foundations of ideas such as rationality and the family of nations inherently marginalize nations that do not share these views. While some standards may not be compromised in the

minds of Westerners, it is increasingly problematic and futile to demand nations with various ideological foundations to assimilate to one universal school of thought. Therefore, a better understanding of Iran and its political actions will shed light on the more macro-level relationship between the West and Middle East, and can help arrive at a more plausible and amicable incorporation of Middle Eastern nations into the global community. Secondly, the nuances of politics in Iran are important, as many important questions pertinent to the stability of the global order remain unresolved and unclear. An incomplete understanding of Iranian motivations and pressures forces the United States to remain in the dark about its future, as well as the future of the world order. More importantly, these factors allow Iran the ability to dictate the pace of international affairs to some degree; because policy makers are unsure of how Iran will respond, as evidenced by traditional references to the nations actions as irrational, proactive political strategies are difficult to formulate. Without a complete understanding of Iranian responses to US policy, political leaders fear an unexpected reaction and subsequently temper their own actions. Thus, if the United States is to make a determined effort to seek peaceful relations with Iran, it is of the utmost importance that we better understand Iranian politics. Iranian politics do not necessarily conform to Western-based politics, yet command a degree of power in the shaping of the international community. Failing to explore the questions that remain in this field would be irresponsible on behalf of the United States. Our nation must be the initiator of securing diplomatic relations with other members of the global community. Irrationality Revisited In a Foreign Affairs article from 1993, Samuel Huntington wrote, The American quarrel with Iran should not be construed as a clash of civilizations or opposition to Iran as a theocratic

state. Washington does not take issue with the Islamic dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran.vii This sentiment increasingly became the stance of the United States of America, as the nation articulated their specific foreign policy toward Iran. Historically, previous administrations have attempted to dismiss the concerns suggesting the United States is solely interested in spreading democracy. Rather, American leaders have stressed the threat Iranian leadership poses to the established order. They argue that Iran has consistently espoused beliefs and supported action that directly goes against the well-being and interests of the family of nations, constituted by the international order.viii Still, scholars and Iranian citizens alike vocalize concerns. As they perceive the United States, legitimate actions taken to secure their nation are categorized as irrational because they go against some interests of America, and not because they are truly irrational. Naturally, the polarization of these two camps has increased over time, and has led to a stalemate and an increasingly unclear understanding of what both sides feel and believe. In order to do this, we must revisit important definitions that have become common in political rhetoric surrounding US-Iranian relations. Revisiting these definitions, and more specifically the essence of what it means to be irrational or a rogue state, will be an important step moving forward in normalizing Iranian-US relations. Evolution of Irrationality Roxanne Euben notes, Rational Actor Theorydefines rationality in terms of selfinterest and utility maximization. Irrationality is defined as the opposite, as action manifestly not self-interestedinattentive to objective conditions of risk and reward.ix This model of behavior is prevalent in contemporary foreign policy analysis. The theory attempts to give nations the opportunity to predict the actions and reactions of other international actors to a set of policies by generalizing key elements of the decision-making process. This theory purports to do so by

identifying those principles of human behavior that are constants, uniquely human characteristics that are immutable over cultural, geographical and other differences between nations and actors. If correct, the rational actor theory can be an important tool in crafting foreign policy, because it offers a rudimentary means of better understanding external actors actions through these identified shared, human constants. Specifically, the rational actor theory makes generalizations regarding the motivations of individuals. To do so, it suggests that political actors, nations, are comprised of humans who all implicitly make decisions with regard to a specific variety of pressures and motivations. While there are varying priorities and degrees, the theory argues that these generalizations are still a good guideline for helping determine and predict political action. Paralleling models in other disciplines, this theory suggests that universal aspects of human psychology impact the decision-making of political actors, namely self-interest, pursuit of goals, knowledge of means and consequences, [and] cost-benefit calculus of risk and rewards.x These are considered the most important elements of human decision-making, and therefore the most relevant factors in determining the motivations of political action. Yet, these most important elements of human behavior largely derive from Western principles and foundations. The ideas of self-interest, goals, risks and rewards are all common diction in our lives, and concepts we are already familiar with because of the traditions we were born into. And, in many ways, rational actor theory is embedded within Western rationalist categories.xi The importance the model places on these parts of the Western tradition seem reasonable and easy to generalize for those accustomed to Western life. The trouble this theory runs into is that this Western-influenced definition of rationality has been generalized over time to the only definition. That is, many assume that because these

principles of human behavior seem to direct human action in many instances, they are now standards, rather than defining elements, of rationality. In fact, it seems irrational, for lack of a better word, to suggest that the entire world need to ascribe to one standard of logic and thought. In such a diverse world created by numerous cultures, nations and ideologies, it becomes increasingly problematic to generalize human behavior. That is not to say that it cannot be done; and, when it can be done, it is a useful tool to both help understand decision-making at the individual level and, consequently, the actions of international political actors. But, this exercise is only relevant when the actors in question subscribe to these aforementioned elements that constitute the rational actor theory. It is perfectly reasonable to imagine an individual or culture that is motivated by some other pressures than those defined by Western tradition and culture. Granted, it is difficult to do so; it requires us to think in a way we are not accustomed to doing. Nonetheless, it is an important consideration to understand and identify. Political action need not conform to a generalized, Western-influenced definition of rationality, if there is some set of rational principles that the actor is using consistently and appropriately in arriving at its decisions. Put simply, rational actor theory and Islamic fundamentalism start from antithetical assumptions about human behavior.xii The incompatibilities arise from the generalizations made by the rational actor theory. Specifically, Western tradition values human sovereignty and knowledge, evidenced by democracy; these are the same qualities Islamist fundamentalists consider to be the essence of moral corruption.xiii Critical assumptions of goal-oriented behavior and perceived self-interest are, in traditional rational actor theory, in competition with religious fervor, ecclesiastical power, and unexamined thought.xiv Yet, these are among the cornerstones of Islamic fundamentalism. Specifically, Islam allows, and encourages, the injection of religion

into politics; Litwak explains that Sunni fundamentalists do pursue goals, with the caveat that these are moral imperatives, not simply self-interests.xv Spreading the Muslim faith and extending the reach of Islam is, in fact, an activity that poses considerable personal risk to individuals, yet they pursue it because of this belief in a higher calling. As Euben notes, Despite claims to being a scientific, objective approach to politics, rational actor theory is premised upon a rational-irrational dichotomy that has been defined within a very particular cultural tradition.xvi To suggest all cultures must conform to the Wests definition of rationality to be considered rational betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the complexities and nuances of Iran, and global politics in general.xvii Rational actor theory is a useful tool, and extremely helpful in many instances to determine political action by providing basic insight into the decision-making of political actors. However, its ability to generalize behavior is not all encompassing. It cannot account for rational action motivated by pressures outside of its understanding. It is built on Western world defined by human knowledge and power, clashing directly and constantly with other conceptions of the world, such as those defined by divine sovereignty.xviii Constructing A Definition These are the challenges, then, that policymakers face when attempting to utilize the Rational Actor Theory in helping predict political actions of other actors in the international community. As discussed above, the theory is by no means perfect, and while it is an important tool, a failure to completely understand its generalizations risks miscalculations on a national level. Unfortunately, history reveals these very pitfalls are ones Americas current foreign policy

toward Iran suffers from, which demands re-visitation if the United States wishes to make a meaningful effort toward normalizing relations with Iran. The United States generalizes foreign policy to some extent; namely, the era following World War II saw the introduction of a new political term: the rogue state. Robert Litwak explains this term is a political category employed by one or more of the great powers with a stake in the maintenance and orderly working of the international system.xix Thus, this classification was intended to identify irrational states that subverted authority and stability in the hopes of enticing chaos. Former President Reagan solidified this working definition of rogue states, identifying them as outlaw governments who are sponsoring international terrorism against our nationmost of the terroristsare being trained, financed, and indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments- a new international version of Murder Incorporated.xx Interestingly, Reagans quotation explicitly defines rogue states, for the first time, as nations with interests against America. Traditionally, the term had been couched in suggestions that it was a classification generally prescribed to nations with erratic and irrational behavior. However, increasingly in the second half of the 20th century, the rogue state approach to classifying nations became a product of Americas unique political culture, its civil religion.xxi This rhetoric pitted nations with interests contrary to those of the United States as evil and rogue. Increasingly, these two separate characteristics (irrational action and anti-American interests) became collapsed into the rogue state political definition. Thus, over time the term rogue state expanded its definition, particularly in how it was influenced by the other nations interests in relation to the United States. This resulted in irrational becoming synonymous with against

American interests, and has come to dominate the definition of a rogue state in American foreign policy during the late 20th century. Irrational Iran? Where does Iran fit in the discussion of American foreign policy and rogue states? Americas stance toward Iran has undergone considerable change since the Islamic Republics foundation in 1979. More important than the specific changes the relationship has witnessed over time is the precedent for the two nations to adapt foreign policy based on the actions of each other and their own initiatives and interests. These are important considerations, and when they adjust, our policies must shift accordingly. Irans transition to rogue-state status came around the time that the definition of this political term began to change from deplorable domestic actions to foreign policy against the interests of the United States.xxii And while there were human rights violations in Iran, the nations relationship was still coveted by the United States as a link to the Middle East. However, the Revolution of 1979 placed a government in power that utilized foreign policy initiatives in support of Islam, such as assistance to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or opposition to the Middle East peace process, for domestic political purposes.xxiii The Revolutions new actions forced America to suggest the irrationality of the new regime, and speak out against it as a rogue state with irrational tendencies. However, as the previous analysis shows, a closer examination of Iranian political action reveals that these are not irrational action, but rather action that is motivated by a source outside the scope of Rational Actor Theory. Different worldviews and philosophies have created two nations that refuse to recognize the others decision-making. Iran is not irrational; they are goaloriented and pursue interests. However, these interests and goals derive from a higher order, and

not simply from sources of self-indulgence. There can be no value judgment ascribed to these models; they are simply different, and motivate individuals differently. As a result, incongruent policy initiatives have been exacerbated by a lack of understanding, leading to a contentious relationship between the US and Iran. Why is this important? First, redefining irrationality allows the two nations to dilute the charged rhetoric surrounding the relationship, which is making it difficult to compromise and normalize relations. While name-calling is not the worst element of our relationship with Iran, it is an important one that can be easily fixed and immediately help ameliorate relationships, if we can make an effort to better understand Irans decision-making. Unfair characterizations of Iran as irrational have traditionally left the relationship stagnant and unchanged despite efforts by both parties to the contrary. Additionally, and arguably more importantly, it reveals the potential of these efforts. Recognizing Iran as rational and simply at odds with us politically makes it a viable exercise to seek compromise and negotiations with the nation. It would be a waste of time to craft nuanced policy for a nation whose reactions cannot be explained, or at least basically predicted. Yet, this reclassification and new political status makes normal relations with Iran tenable once more, and a distinct possibility worth advocating for since the election of Mohammad Khatami. With this new perspective, it is both reasonable and believable that the United States takes issue with the behavior of Iran, and not the regime itself. This is not to say that the United States need approve of their foreign policies or condone actions that go against our own interests. Still, the psychological shift in defining Iran as rational is an important one that will make amicable relations with Iran a distinct possibility in the near-term, and at least partially opens this door of opportunities for the two nations.

Moving Forward: A Changing Iran Dispelling the myth of Iranian rationality is meritorious, but it is hardly sufficient. The United States has weathered a contentious relationship with Iran for decades not simply because of incorrect classifications. This is undoubtedly an element of the solution, but there are other issues that must be addressed in order to consider revisiting the United States relationship with Iran. Primarily, there must be discernable shift in Iranian policy, which is the impetus administration after administration has waited for. Admittedly, this has not happened yet; however, an analysis of contemporary Iran identifies tangible changes in Iranian society that suggest this shift has already occurred in the peoples minds. Specifically, Iran has two major pressures that have traditionally sparked political action: an identity crisis, and a legitimacy issue. Both of these domestic pressures have crept into the political arena, and have increasingly influenced political action by the Iranian state. Moreover, by identifying the exacerbation these two pressures underwent in the past decade, we see an Iranian state controlled by conservatives, but populated by a much more liberal, West-accepting public, ready to make the transition into the world order and join the family of nations. Explaining Irans Identity Crisis Irans violent inception in 1979 was a momentous event, but it hardly created a unified nation. The revolutionaries were a diverse coalition of secularists, liberals, and fundamentalists uneasily cooperating in the overthrow of the monarchy.xxiv And, while the overthrow of the shah united these forces, the elimination of their common enemy revealed how truly different these groups were. Thus, since 1979, there has been a constant domestic struggle to define how the government should act, and what the government should pursue.

Effectively, the identities can be separated into two broad categories: the Conservatives and the Reformists. The Reformists faction is a loose coalition of centrists and Islamist leftists who emerged during the mid-1900s[primarily] protgs and close relatives of Khatamis predecessor [Rafsanjani]who began to liberalize the regime.xxv This undercurrent opinion was actually responsible for radicalism during the 1980s, largely because the Conservatives marginalized them from power. Conversely, the conservatives are an amorphous coalition whose main focus now is to stop the reformists efforts to promote political and socio-cultural liberalization, which threatens their control over key state agencies and what they regard as the main achievements of the revolution. xxvi Thus, the revolution brought these two sides together by identifying a common enemy, but once the shah was removed, these two incompatible sides were forced to coexist and attempt to represent these diverse views. Arguably the biggest point of contention, and the one that will be discussed at length, is affinity for the West and Western principles. Simply put, the conservatives remain loyal to all tenets of the Iranian revolution in 1979. That is, they staunchly advocate theocratic principles and ideology. Moreover, they maintain that revolutionary activism abroad [should] remain an integral part of Irans identity.xxvii They want to spread Islam and its teachings to its neighbors and the rest of the world. This is often the most contentious policy pursued by Iran, because it affects all other policies (i.e. Middle East peace, nuclear weapons accumulation, relations with Israel, etc.). Finally, they denounce the West: Democracy and liberalism, both which are inspired by Western culture must not become encrusted in the foundations of the Islamic regime.xxviii These policies outline the conservative stance, and detail Irans overall foreign policy throughout the years, led by conservatives such as Supreme Leader Khomeini. However, contemporary analysis reveals a much stronger and emboldened reformist faction in Iran,

reflecting a dissatisfied population that feels the government has pursued the wrong goals and forgotten its promises in 1979 to the people. Most importantly, the people of Iran stress reconciliation with the West, and a dialogue to better understand both sides of the debate.The reformists favor more liberal policies and a conciliatory approach toward the West. However, they do not have access to the state apparatus tools like the conservatives.Clearly, this division is an important one for Iranian domestic politics, and one that continues to plague the nation in the present. Case Study 1: The Election of President Mohammad Khatami (1997) As Litwak writes, Contending visions of Iran as an ordinary versus a revolutionary state is a major cause of the political schism evident with in the Teheran regime and Iranian society at large.xxix While this issue of identity has been at the middle of Iranian foreign policy issues for years, it has only recently attained public notoriety and expression. The election of Mohammad Khatami for the first time articulated this undercurrent opposition, bringing it to the forefront of issues in Iran. Most importantly, Khatamis election demonstrated the widespread nature of this second identity, and just how unresponsive the Iranian state had become to popular sentiment. The election ushered in a new era of opportunity to change Iran permanently and toward a more democratic, liberal society. Why was 1997 such a momentous era for the reformists? A few explanations help understand why the manifestation of this second identity occurred in the late 1990s. Primarily, a series of events in the late 1980s ended the wary consensus underpinning of the theological regime: the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and emerging demographic realities.xxx Together these issues fragmented the already weak coalition that

supported the revolution of 1979. This increased the strength of the reformists, as they grew increasingly disenchanted with the state of affairs in Iran. Secondly, throughout the 80s, the liberal faction of the Iranian state had been growing steadily. However, they were still responsible for much of the radical action in Iran during the decade. As the outsiders to political power and influence, they relied on radical tactics to gain support and call for an end to the regime in an increasingly authoritarian state. However, their embarrassment in the 1992 parliamentary elections led to an abandonment of many radical tenets of their policy initiatives.xxxi Instead, they tempered the focus of their movement to accepting democracy and other Western-assimilation policies. This once again helped garner a broader movement, and proliferated the liberals ideology and suggestions throughout the Iranian state. Finally, the demographics of Iran had significantly shifted by the 90s. The population of Iran was significantly slighted toward the youth. (See Appendix A) As a result, many citizens grew up in the Islamic Republic of Iran, without a stake in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In 2009, 68.3 per cent of the 71 million-strong population [of Iran was] under the age of 34; these students and youths had no point of reference to compare their experience to, save that of the United States.xxxii Plagued by unemployment and a sputtering economy, these youths viewed Conservative clinging to the 1979 Revolutions edicts as attempts to preserve their positions of privilege, rather than a substantial claim to some higher source of legitimacy. Indeed, data from the period between 1979 and 1997 demonstrate an increase in protest activity, suggesting the growth of the opposition movement in Iran. Repression marred the early years of the Revolution: the new government silenced 26 major newspapers and magazines from mid- to late-August in 1979xxxiii, while executing at least 4,400 in the first years of the revolution.xxxiv These numbers may be skewed by the Revolution itself, but the repression in the

later years increases. Amnesty International reported that in mid-1988, the pattern of political executions changed dramatically from piecemeal reports of executions to a massive wave of killings over several monthsofficially reported at over 2,000 names[though] opposition groupshave suggested that the total was much higher.xxxv These estimates place the death toll between 6,000-10,000, many in the course of a systematic political elimination of revolutionary allies turned opposition from the debunked coalition.xxxvi That is, the political executions included, and often times targeted, those supporters of a more moderate approach to politics, who favored a less revolutionary-spreading Iran for one that focused on its population and reduced repressive actions. The government simply did not tolerate the opposition, using these forms of repression, censorship to close all parties exceptthose which act in a proper manner.xxxvii This intolerant attitude defined the hard-liner conservatives of Iran. And, these individuals had to increasingly suppress a burgeoning and growing opposition. It was in this context that the 1997 elections were held, and the Mohammad Khatami unexpectedly rose to power as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Election results showed Khatamis victory was a sign of many more landslide victories for the reformist movement in the late 1990s: the opposition won 70-75% of the vote in the 1997 presidential election, the February 1999 Municipal Council elections, and the February 2000 Parliamentary elections.xxxviii As the first major victory for reformists, Khatamis election came with questions and predictions, centering on the dynamic nature of this vote. Political scholars and Iranian citizens alike touted his presidency as a transformation of the political environment in Iran. While Ayatollah Khamenei and others continued their anti-Western pronouncements, President Khatami espoused a conciliatory approach[proclaiming] great respect for the American people and a desire to have a dialogue of civilizations.xxxix Khatami called for this dialogue again a year

later, in January of 1998, and his commitment to better understanding America and revisiting the relationship between Iran and the US halted American conservative calls for stricter sanctions and containment toward Iran.xl From the time Khatami took office, the administration focused on promoting political liberalism.xliSpeeches and initiatives reflected an affinity for more openness and a more robust civil society. Censorship on a few major newspapers was lifted, in the hopes of promoting free speech in Iran for the first time.xliiEffectively, the presidents support of civil society and attempts to expand civil liberties in Iran both opened the society to more freedom and drew the ire of conservatives in positions of authority. In fact, these reforms that were backed by a huge amount of popular support required a great deal of courage, as they necessarily contradicted the official stance of the Iranian state, and threatened the power of the conservatives. Still, Khatami did not initially back down, and helped vocalize the main concerns of the reformist movement in Iran. These first few years of Khatamis presidency are very revealing, in that they show for the first time the formal political stances and initiatives of the undercurrent opposition in Iran. While the identity crisis in Iran was tangible to those in the nation, the oppression and censorship of the region allowed for little insight into what the dissent was referring to. However, electing a moderate former minister of culture over a virulently anti-American cleric in the Iranian presidential election in a landslide election gave Khatami an unprecedented mandate to enact reformist policy and reform.xliiiAnd, the early period of his presidency reflects an affinity for the West, and meaningful calls for dialogue and discussion. Based on the actions and statements, Khatami seemed genuinely interested in revisiting Iranian-US relations. Obviously, his policies and actions are a reflection of his constituents preferences, who clearly, and for the first time

formally, expressed interest in increasing relations with the West and moving away from the Revolutionary state bent on spreading Islam that had dominated conservative ideology. And, the repression observed by Iran during the late 1990s can now be explained as a reaction to this challenge to the governments control from this identity crisis pressure. While reformist and pro-American interests dominated the early years of Khatamis term, initiatives at liberalizing Iran were stymied by a powerful conservative backlash.xliv Although the people favored these policies, the conservatives mobilized their state capacity and institutional power, using repressive tactics to undermine any popular support for change to the regime. The conservative reaction employed informal channels as well: Conservatives begancampaigns of terror that targeting intellectuals, writers and activists, unleashed vigilante groups on student gatherings and street life , the main sources of reformist support.xlv This was nothing new to Iran, nor to the opposition movement. But, what had changed was the formal expression of the reformists goals; importantly, they demonstrated a popular demand for amicable relations with the West and a de-prioritization of spreading Islam and the revolution in favor of joining the family of nations and entering meaningful dialogue with the West. Iran of the mid-1990s was a nation that was intellectually invigorating, politically vibrant, and hopelessly, perhaps irrevocably polarized.xlvi Unfortunately, Khatamis presidency did not bring about a new Iran. However, Khatamis election was so widely touted and is still remembered for a reason: it demonstrated for the first time an explicit expression of this undercurrent opinion in Iranian society. Never before Khatamis election had the opposition been so robust and mounted such a coordinated and widespread movement against established authority. Never before Khatamis presidency had such radical and liberal polices been actively

pursued by an Iranian regime.These measures were all met with oppression, demonstrating that irrational Iranian behavior increasingly identifies a more Western, democratizing public opinion. And, this oppression cannot negate their birth and proliferation in Iranian society. Khatamis election was not successful for its results per se, but rather for the opportunity for those in the reformist camp to articulate for the first time on the national stage their platform and visions. It formalized and demarcated the identity crisis of Iran: two camps of individuals, one in support of Western reconciliation and one determined to continue the spread of Islam and denouncing principles of the West. And, as the nation moves into the 21st century, reformers and liberals in Iranian society are only growing more courageous and willing to act for the changes they believe in. Irans Questions of Legitimacy While Khatamis election was a victory for those Iranians marginalized by the identity crisis in Iran, soft-liners and moderates in Iran increasingly joined the camp of the reformists as the regime lost legitimacy in the decades following the Revolution of 1979. Conservatives and hard-liners viewed this legitimacy issue as related to the identity crisis, and continually attempted to intensify spreading the Islamic revolution within the region, believing revolutionary activism abroad is an integral part of Irans identity and a source of legitimacy at home.xlviiBut, the population is more concerned with the forgone promises of the Revolution, and specifically the economic situation of Iran. They have grown irritated at the regimes lack of responsiveness to their needs. The elections of 2009 ignited 30 years of dissatisfaction with a repressive regime that has denied even the most basic civil liberties to its citizens, and ultimately demonstrated once again that the people of Iran do not stand entirely with their government. More importantly, this evidence shows that the population is more willing than ever to renegotiate relations with the

West, and the United States, if it means the realization of a more responsive and nurturing government. The Iranian government has grown out of touch with the population, which has exacerbated issues of its legitimacy, and unfortunately has prompted even stronger conservative measures and repression in attempts to solidify their leadership. Issues of Iranian legitimacy originated with respect to the direction of the Islamic Republic. As mentioned previously, the coalition that prompted and executed the Revolution of 1979 had varied preferences, resulting in a dichotomy of Iranian identities. Many other issues became salient, however, as the regimes rule solidified and took form. These are issues leaders of the 1979 revolution promised to address, but in large part have failed to do so. Thus, the people of Iran are left wondering what the government has done, and why they havent addressed pressing issues that affect their nations people.Namely, civil liberties and the economy are now the priorities for Iranian citizens. They are increasingly demanding for economic reform, growth and stability. And, they are increasingly asking to do so without fear of terror or oppression. They want the freedom to voice their opinion and elect their leaders and representatives. These are the issues, then, that came to the forefront of the 2009 Iranian elections. The governments quest for an Islamic revolution has taken too long, and too much of a toll on domestic issues.A combination of economic woes and alleged election tampering forced the people of Iran to mobilize and protest in numbers only comparable to the Revolution of 1979. These contemporary protests once again demonstrate an important element for American foreign policy-makers to identify and address. Clearly, the Iranian government is losing legitimacy. Not only are the people of Iran seeking to reconcile relations with the West, as demonstrated in previous sections of this paper, but they are increasingly losing faith in their own regimes ability to deliver for its people. This lack of legitimacy is exacerbated by the domestic issues concerning

Iran, and is creating an opportunity for new policy and stances to further illegitimate the current Iranian regime and their anti-American stances. Case Study 2: The Green Revolution of 2009 In many ways, the 2009 Revolution represents more than a reaction to possible corruption or control. Rather, the Green Revolution was an expression of sentiments of illegitimacy within the population. Iranian society was tired of suffering while the government promoted contentious and anti-Western foreign policy. Domestic issues grew unbearable as living standards and the economic health of the nation deteriorated. Moreover, what little recourse the people had in the form of elections were first ultimately stifled, as in the case of the Khatami administration, or completely ignored, as it appeared in 2009. This was the last straw, so to speak, for the Iranian people, who erupted in protest and opposition to the governments alleged tampering of election results, hoping to once again spark the revolutionary spirit of Iranians, this time to take down the very regime that same spirit created 30 years prior. Leading up to 2009 Iranian statistics since the Revolution of 1979 depict a nation in trouble, both economically and in terms of repressing civil rights. Most of the data reveals disenchantment with the nations leadership and priorities, while in some cases this sentiment is strong enough to promote outright protest and calls for regime change. Clearly, Iranians are unhappy with the current state of affairs; however, they also feel that a lack of civil society and liberties necessarily bars them from articulating these concerns, leaving them helpless, desiring some sort of recourse and relief. A recent Terror Free Tomorrow survey polled Iranian public opinion, determined to identify where public sentiment and Iranian policy diverged. The results of the survey confirmed

the discontent that plagued Iranian society and threatened the legitimacy of the Iranian political leadership. In fact, many responses revealed public opinion that directly contradicted the policies pursued by the Iranian government, further evidencing a disconnect between the leadership and public. (For below data regarding TFT survey, please see Appendix B-D) In terms of the economy, these studies revealed that public sentiment prioritized this above all other initiatives pursued by the government. Nearly 80% of Iranians approved full inspections of the nation and guarantees to ensure no nuclear weapons in exchange for trade and investment, assistance for peaceful nuclear energy, investment in energy, and/or humanitarian assistance. Overall, 80% of Iranians prioritized improving the economy, compared to only 29% that prioritized developing nuclear weapons and 33% supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. While almost a quarter of the population opposed relations with the United States, 85% approved US assistance with peaceful nuclear energy, and 68% favored normal trade and full recognition. In fact, a majority of Iranians claimed they would endorse recognizing Israel and Palestine separately in exchange for US recognition and trade. Moreover, the CIAs statistics of all nations pegged Irans GDP growth rate at a dismal 3%, ranked 130th in the world. Amuzegar writes, GDP at constant prices declined by some 1.5% a year on average between 1977/78 and 1987/88. Inflation in 2008 was 11.8%, 204th in the world, and unemployment was up to 14.6%, 147th in the worldxlviii, though Amuzegar notes that private estimates put total unemployment at twice that figure. xlixA survey by World Public Opinion.org concluded similar results regarding dissatisfaction with the economy. Surprisingly, a majority of Iranians did not blame the political leadership for the economic situation, explaining their lifestyle was better or the same as 2005.l The data for civil liberties is sparser, in large part because Iran does not publish official figures regarding the repression of civil liberties and political executions. Still, the available

evidence suggests national leaders oppress the general public and stifle civic participation and opposition. In 2007, the State Departments Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor created an official fact sheet, detailing the situation regarding human rights and civil liberties in Iran. Specifically, the State Department condemns Irans rule by unelected leaders: the document explains that in December 2006, the Iranian regime disqualified thousands of candidates, including many reformists, on purely ideological grounds [and] crack down on media outlets, blocking Irans citizens from access to unbiased information.liSince 2000, the regime closed more than 100 newspapers and magazines, punishing any interpretation of insulting Islam with death. Also, the document details the deteriorating environment for the support of human rights in Iran. Namely, the State Department identifies President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads appointments to leadership positions in the regime as serious human-rights abusers along with his increased censorship and restriction of academic freedom.lii The WPO survey also demonstrated Iranian support for democratic principles, such as free elections (82%) and free press (55% important), though these were secondary to improving the economy and not entirely supported when it was suggested these freedoms could destabilize the government.liii Finally, nearly 80% of Iranians polled in the TFT survey favored democracy where all leaders are elected. The previous statistics all point to a glaring inconsistency between public opinion and Iranian policy. Over time, these issues of economic health and civil liberty repression have caused the Iranian government to lose legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Though, interestingly, Iranians are committed to the Iranian system of government. While they feel the specific regime may lose legitimacy over time, they remain loyal to the system and try to find ways to liberalize and fix the current system of government. 2009: A Culmination of Dissatisfaction

Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri predicted, Gengis-like behavior, acting against the people and law, isolating thinkers, paralyzing the government will lead things to an inauspicious end .liv His prediction seemed to come to fruition in 2009, as Iranians took to the streets to protest a fraudulent election with allegations of ballot rigging. This tampering with what civil liberties remained in Iran forced many into the streets, for the first time since 1979 coordinating such a widespread and forceful protest against the ruling power of Iran. The nation, and the world, watched how the leadership would react to the allegations and demands for recounts. To the uninformed observer, it would appear the 2009 elections carried some special salience or included some excessive abuse of civil rights to merit a largely unparalleled demonstration in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, as demonstrated earlier, this was not a reaction to one presidential election. Ahmadinejad s supposed re-election in 2009 was the last in a long list of grievances the Iranian government had committed against its own people. Years of economic stagnation, civil repression, and failures to secure promises of the 1979 revolution wore down a patient public. Many of these individuals did not even share in the ruling government s conservative and at times radical ideology. Yet, by and large, they persisted, as the government promised to address their concerns and fulfill its obligations of the 1979 Revolution. What reformists principles that did surface in the 30 years were systematically suppressed by a conservative government that both feared and did not entertain opposition views. This final encroachment on Iranian elections by the increasingly authoritarian Iranian government fueled a spirit within this opposition movement, who finally lost all faith in the ruling regime s ability to relate to its people and represent the popular will. Believing the conservative clerical leaders had become too focused on the

wrong objectives, the protesters flooded the streets of Tehran, hoping to end decades of oppression. Political pundits drew parallels between the protests of 2009 and the Revolution of 1979. Some consistencies between the events were the levels of public dissatisfaction with the government, feelings of a lack of government representation of the popular sentiment, and the Iranian leaderships refusal to acknowledge the widespread protests occurring against the regime.lvIn these ways, the Iranian landscape mirrors that of 1979. And, while there was no overthrow of the government, the issues of legitimacy and representation remain salient and unanswered. The Iranian government will struggle to continue governing with any sort of mandate after the 2009 protests, because it is clear that many Iranians do not support the current leadership Moreover, because they believe their votes have been fraudulently uncounted, it will be difficult to maneuver politically in the years to come. Governments Response The government has largely maintained that legitimacy derives from a higher authority than the people, referring to its theocratic foundations. Government officials believe the body of Islamic law that exists in the Quranhas been accepted by Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obediencethis consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people.lviWhat legitimacy they derive from the people, Iranian leaders argue, is in their acceptance of the Quran and Islamic principles. Ultimately, the government sees the people as corruptible and fickle, whereas the mandates of Islam are unwavering. This logic, unfortunately, ensures that legitimacy issues of the regime compel conservative, radical leaders in power to pursue even more radical policy, with the hopes of legitimating their actions through this higher calling. For example, calls for liberalizing policies result in a heavier hand of

oppression and terror, with the hopes of remaining true to the higher calling of Islam amidst perceived corrupted views of reformists. Ironically, promises to improve the economy and increase civil liberties are the very political capital revolutionary leaders used to amass the victorious coalition of 1979. Even Ayatollah Khomeini, who now represents a past Iranian regime of oppression and economic distress, promoted these very tenants in his call for revolution against the Shah. Prior to the Revolution, Khomeini identified an unjust economic orderhundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all forms of healthcare and education and reconciling the oppressors and oppressed in Iranian society.lviiYet, pre-revolution Irans economy was far from stagnant, enjoying positive growth every year between 1963 and 1977.lviii And, civil liberties have continued to be suppressed by the new Iranian government, as conservatives increasingly try to stay true to a core set of radical principles irrespective of public opinion. The suppression of the 2009 protests in Iran, as well as the alleged election manipulations, all signal a weak regime in Iran grasping for power. Their irrational action, such as continued support for advancing the Islamic revolution and a commitment to more radical policies, all demonstrate a conservative reaction all too familiar to Iranian politics. Oppressive and radical action taken by the Iranian government cannot be regarded as derived from the peoples support, but instead in reaction to the loss of the peoples support and legitimacy in the Iranian state. The 2009 Green Revolution demonstrated an explicit condemnation of the Iranian regime, and calls for an end to the suppression of civil society in Iran. Criticisms Despite the emotional and courageous acts of the 2009 protests in Iran, the analysis of the events reveals something troubling. After Mohammad Khatami was elected president in 1997,

many scholars proclaimed that the event marked the theocratic regimes last chance for survival through a religious reformation, and the establishment of a gentler, kinder Islam.lix While the polls show a clear loss of governing legitimacy in the eyes of the people, Iranians still remain loyal to the system of government.lxYet, the protests of 2009 did not call for anything new. Unlike the Khatami administration, they did not increase formal initiatives for liberalization of Iranian society. The protests did not demand a Revolution, like those of 1979. Instead, these were largely efforts to protect the integrity of the current system. The Iranian Revolution advocated for a complete change in government structure; these protests demonstrated dissatisfaction with the government, but not necessarily the structure. Thus, the protests of 2009 demonstrate a misunderstanding of Iranian public opinion in 1997. Many expected this to be among the final stands for the Iranian government as it was structured, and that subsequent calls for government change would entail a complete overhaul of the system. While the credibility of the Iranian regime is questioned and constantly at issue for the Iranian people, it seems they remain loyal to the theocratic system of government currently in place. Not even the poor economic situation and consistent repression exercised by the Iranian government has prompted a call for systematic change in Iranian governance. These developments suggest it is unlikely for Iran to popularly advocate for major overhauls in the system of government in Iran, even though poll numbers suggest they would prefer some democratic changes. However, the protests of 2009 still do demonstrate a concerted effort to liberalize and affect change within the Iranian government system. Moreover, they once again demonstrate an Iranian society that is determined to change the nations actions and position in the world order. The Iranian public needs support from the world to continue this reformist,

peaceful revolution, in order to continue pressuring the unresponsive government to grant concessions and realistically change the Iranian domestic situation and foreign policy orientation. Conclusions The Middle East is a fascinating study for contemporary foreign policy scholars because of its constantly changing dynamics and interesting nuances that help shape politics in the region. In the past six months, we have lived through an era that may very well go down in history as a similar time-period to the end of Communism and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. In the past few days alone, we may have seen the collapse of an empire of hate and fear created by radical Islamic groups; for too long, the Arab world has been personified by these individuals actions and extremism, and the past few days, months and years may truly see a transformation in how we perceive our Muslim brothers and sisters and guide us to more peaceable relations with the Middle East. Yet, these are only possibilities and hopes contingent on how we as the United States and the greater global community adapt to this changing situation. While it is unclear how these events will shape our future, it is clear that the Middle East, and specifically Iran, is undergoing a very important change. Not since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 has emotion, unrest and courageous protest been so publically demonstrated. More importantly, the intensity of the changes in Iran over the past decade has truly demonstrated that Iran is ready for a more amicable relationship with the West. What radical and contentious action we have seen from Iran largely is a product of conservative leadership dictating policy that is unrepresentative of the nations sentiments. These leaders, who came to power with the Revolution of 1979, hold on to the principles of the Islamic Revolution, and truly believe that the liberalizing nature of Iranian society is their failure,

requiring a more stringent commitment to Islamic principles and the spread of Islam. Consequently, harsher civil suppression and more concerted efforts to support Islamic revolution in the Middle East is not irrational action, but rather a response to the increasing challenges by the people to the leadership of the Iranian government. Committed to their beliefs and their higher calling, these leaders push forward with or without their countrys support. The stage is now finally set. Meaningful discussions to improve relations between the United States and Iran are no longer some lofty, future dream, but have the possibility of becoming reality in the near-term. What is required is an identification of this window of opportunity, and a capitalization on this opportunity by both Iran and the United States. And, to do this, we must revisit our views toward Iran, our classification of the nation, and our foreign policy initiatives toward them. If we do so, it seems reasonable that recent events will demonstrate how outdated our perceptions of Iran are, and will merit a re-evaluation of foreign policy with the Islamic Republic. And this, truly, will be the beginning of the end of our misunderstood relationship with Iran.

Appendix

Appendix A: Comparison of UK and Iran populations (2008). From BBC News Online

Appendix B: Terror-Free-Tomorrow Survey Results, Priorities of Iranians (June, 2007)

Appendix C: TFT Survey Results, Relations with the United States (June, 2007)

Appendix D: TFT Survey Results, Current Government System (June, 2007)

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