Download WN <«< PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Professor: Ally. Estoli GR No. 153206 ‘AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J. October 23, 2006 ‘Submitted by ‘Submitted on: ONG vs ONG BELLINGAN, Algrace | July 14, 2019 1 Year, Juris Doctor Petitioners: Respondents: ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG. LUCITA ONG DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. ‘The Family Code defines marriage and the family, spells out the comesponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for ‘declaration of nullity and those for legal separation, NATURE OF PETITION: Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of ‘Appeals (CA) which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granting the pelition for legal separation filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. RELEVANT LAWS: ‘Art. 58. A patition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a ‘common child, or a child of the petitioner; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the ife of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. FACTS: 1. Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married ‘on July 13, 1975. 2. Thay have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of ‘majority 3. Soon after three years of marriage, she and Wiliam quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her and her children, 4. On December 14, 1995, a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms. When William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house. 5. On March 21, 1996, Lucita fled a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct, Issues Ruling Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation. YES Ruling In Aticle $5 of the Family Code, a pettion for legal separation may be filed when there is “repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a ‘common child, ora child ofthe peltoner’..or ‘abandonment of peitioner by respondent without Justiiable cause for mare than one year.” ‘As correctly observed by the trial court, Wiliam himself admitted that there was no day that he {did not quarrel with his wife. All William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents. Without merit is the argument of Wiliam that since Lucta has ¢Oe © Not useful ‘abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, folowing AN. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is. ‘abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision, ‘As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has, no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is ented to under the lew. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. & m o> & Home Books Audiobooks DocumerCASE DIGEST: MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 169900; March 18, 2010. This case involves an action for legal separation. In said case, it was ruled by the CA that the one-half undivided share of the erring spouse in the property was already forfeited in favor of their daughter. This ruling by the CA was based on the ruling of the court a quo that the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties. DECISION: The CA ruling is not correct.If there is a decree of legal separation, under Article 63 of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2). The offending spouse has no right to the fruits of the community or conjugal property. Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only the share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of their daughter. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that “[fJor purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of their daughter is not his share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010 MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 169977 INTER- DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, et al., Respondents. CARPIO, Ja Facts: Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo Gozon. Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property. When the Court granted the legalpayment of the said price and he took the possession of the property. When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira. On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment. Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and a i." and/ora ss @ va pronipitory injunction ana/or temporary restraining order. The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property of this case. Issue: Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse, and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.€ Civil Code of the Phil... & Held: No, The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse's written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties. Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be tas im @ eaA £ase Digest No 8 nc Deere ctistacsen profits of the conjugal properties. Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article < © llagay ang iyong komento...ILUSORIO v. BILDNER (GR No 130780) MAY 2000 | PARDO, J. n to live with the other spouse DOCTRINE: No court is empowered awa judicial authority to compel a husband to live with hin wife Tor private reasons, he in at liborty to do so without threat of ‘CASE SUMMARY: Ay. Potenciano Tlusorio refused to live with his wife, Erlinda Husorio Tor personal reasona, One day, aftor a meeting, he did not come to their home in Antipolo City and instead lived was burred from visiting hor husband wo she files a petition for habeas corpus, snalty attached to the exercise of right. ‘a condominium in Makati. The petitioner FACTS: L 8 114UL 1942, ERLINDA KALAW, petitioner, und Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio, contracted marriage. They had Gehildren, namely, Ramon Musorio, ERLINDA ILUSORIO-RILDNER, Maximo Husorio, Sylvia Tusorio, Marietta Tusorio, & ‘Shereen Tusorio, The xpouses lived togethor for 30 yenrs, 1972, the npouxes separated from bed and board (separated legally) for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano then lived in n condominium in Urdancta, Makati, when he is in Manila and at Iusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club, when he's in Baguio City. On the other hand, ERLINDA lived in a house in Antipolo City. 30 DEC 1997, upon Potenciano’s return from the US, he stayed with ERLINDA for & montha in Antipala City, © Their daughters, Sylvia and Erlinda(Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instend of 100 mg Zoloft an anti-deprossunt drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, US. which in turn effected his health deterioration. FED 1998, ERLINDA filed with the IRTC-Antipolo, a petition for guacdianship over the person and property of cian duc to his old age, f 1: eve-night, and impaired judgment. 1 MAY 1008, after attending a meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo nnd instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati 11 MAR 1999, ERLINDA filed a petition bofore the CA for writ of habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that the respondents refused petitioner's demands to sce and visit her husband and barred Pateneinno from returning to Antipolo. 5 APR 1999, aftor duo hearing, DENIED the petition for writ of habeas corpus far lack of unlawful restraint or detention but GRANTED visitation rights to ERLINDA. 11 OCT 1999, filed an appeal via certiorari, asserting that he never refused to sce her. ISSUE: WIN the wife, ERLINDA TLUSORIO, may secure a writ of habeas corpus to campel Potenciano to live with her, NO HELD: 1 2 DISPOSITION: Pet ‘The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus enters only to involuntary and or illegal restraint, Accarding to tho evidence, there wax no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would juatify the issunnoe of the writ. 1, The fact that Potencinno ix nhout 86 years of age oF under medication doos not necessarily render him mentally ineapacitated ~ soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the eapacity ofthe individual to discern his actions. Potenciano was of sound and alert mind having answered all relevant questions asked by the court hence, he posses the capacity to make choices. He also made it clear that he was not prevented from leaving his house or secing people. The CA, a, Exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habens corpus where ERLINDA never coven prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects insanity, 1, Missed the fact that the caso did not involve the right of parent to viait a minor child but the right of a wife to visita hushand. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without the threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potentciano may not be the wubject of vinitation rights against his free choice because such shall deprive him of his right to privacy. ian for writ of Habeas Corpus DISMISSED for Inck of merit.NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997 FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong, were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents’ return. When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specificSeptember 23,1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners, which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, hence, this petition, ISSUE: Whether or Not Nancy and Alex Go should be held liable for the damages sought RULING: Yes. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified. In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof,Ee ——— ee ne eee is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.” In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the latter’s wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for damages. Advertisements Share this: AanRemo vs'Secretary of F... ect ae sesso Facts: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her passport, the following entries appear: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. However, the petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner thus appealed, arguing that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage. Issue: Can Maria Virginia change her surname “Ralloniw to her middle name “Remo” inf ol Remo'vs}secretary of F... Aa < legalvault.blogspot.com maiden name upon marriage. Issue: Can Maria Virginia change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name “Remo” in her replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage? Held: A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband's surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname.In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement Passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with Passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. (Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on RY 169202, March 5, 2010).Lae ed <€ FAMILY CODE OF THE P... DINO V. DINO G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011] ALAIN M. Difio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L, Difio(respondent) got married on 14 January) 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pifias leoiia On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic CTO] Me OMe MANN EMILE] aL| deeply ingrained in her system since her early Aolta 1M oR oi The trial COURT GRanted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the CELEBRATION of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of ABSOLUTE nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon COMPLIANCE with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. III O iser all WOE Ph babi The trial COURT GRanted the petition on the ground that respondent was Psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the CELEBRATION of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of ABSOLUTE TILA LUtT-Ye(MES ll only be issued upon COMPLIANCE with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Trial court, upon motion for _ partial reconsideration of Petitioner, modified its (ol TolES To) holding that cc decree folME-leeol UICC TT AO} marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition Eller oUittel a mtey| Ula er-la tte eee SUSAN ate cae Vettel i Peed Ts Family Code. ISSUE: Whether the trial court iron aM amol ce (state that adecree of absolute nullity of Lnar-TaaTTe[c} Sl ola Wate SIT] after liquidation, Partition, and distribution of the er IACI ol co) lela (sts under Na MCP Ao ett Llu) AOxeYe[ om Dao ACSA recent eos CeO] ATT) Modification, By Tol \eyd SSC Cun Ty oma) Marriage shall be issued upon Lilac WAROy aT trial court’s decision CNT taTe\e waiting for the liquidation, Partition, and Ctrl tcl mteyg ts) MSSM colette under Article 147 of the Family Code.D1stolos Wednesday, September 24, 2014 Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012 FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case. HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debtsaXe ig x Law School Notes and ... lexphil.blogspot.com HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. Michelle Vale Cruz at We day, Sel No comments:Rhapsody Prayer ConferenQ.* There is no such thing as a owerul raver tis peope © Praying to a powerful God. Antonio A.S. Valdes, vs. Regional Trial Court November 10, 2020 by Vala No Comments GR. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.* FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married and begotten five children. Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code which was granted. The judgment rendered includes the custody of children and liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification and asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on theRhapsody Prayer Conferen&d” RHAPSODY .* There is no such thing asa ONLINE PRAYER onecupayer ts oun ri iri praying to a powerful God. Rhapsody of Realities “A jez sought a clarification and asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” ISSUE: -Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated. RULING: -YES. When a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage is governed by the provisions of Article 147. The term “capacitated” in the provision refer: to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of theSenin Rhapsody Prayer ConferenSv” ODY ‘ ‘There is no such thingasa sp ONLINE PRAYER — [esieronen nine aRUARFEDITI praying to a powerful God. Rhapsody of Realities “=r avoid marriage or without the benefit of marriage is governed by the provisions of Article 147. The term “capacitated” in the provision refer: to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38” of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co- ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.”@ Family Code [Case Dig. studocu.com StuDocu Q=za- \teia ocaNPo v. oE0GRACIO OCAMPO {am No. 99008, August 3, 215) acts: Petoner Vrs Sy Ocampo (rein led aPetin for Orclaaton of Ny other Mariage with Dsograce Ocampo (Dea betore Rexional Tal Cou. The tal eur redereéa bechion dering the mariage between Vigna and Deopraci as nll nd veidfomthebeiningunder Ate 36 (onyheogalincapaty) ol he Fry Code The alow deat sit rit of purtton ol heimentoed moperizn andi he led odo so, ahewrng beheld onthe actuals wth regard toad properties, Having fated wages on project atten of hr conus roperi, hearing ensue where the partes aédured evtencen support heir especte stand The ial cour redere the aba Orde stating hate propre ele bythe partesbelong teach ove ofthemon 00 sharing Vina fled Nts of Appeal bere he scour > Beograd led 2 Motion to Deny ander Dams the Notice of Appeal > the tl cout dena aferersdmationta dany ander ums th tie appeal fr i fart, evga tte Mion for Reconsestio >the tra court denied anew the maton» he Cui a Appel denied Vig pps + wirespondent shouldbe deptved at his share nthe cn rosicholegeal reneraty. nership fens yeast bat aio mato: Under the Family Code, the sropertes ate acquit during the arage].he pesumgton hat they av conn Hence, he ‘The anole lw, however nar the leit of he cone {he Family Codeinrition to Artie 17a th Fay Cade ines assets and labity concerned, Ae 129 1 ‘The Court hel that a avoid masiage as io hose decaed vid under Atle 36 of he Family Cde, the property elas of riod cobain greed sie yA 16 Aico Lo he Fay ode ‘Article 147 ofthe Family Code apps to union of parties who are legalycapacitated and nt barred by ary impediment ‘The ted exclsiey wth ech oer as husband ad wile, However, helt mariage was fund tobe voll under A Fay Cade onthe ground ot pychalagalincapacy. Fromtheloregon, property acquired by both moun trough ther work and indutryshoul, hereor, be govern ‘nequlco-ownersp, ny property scared drirg the union lpia face petured to hav ben obtained trout hot ‘Thu, the wl court ae the appt cur caret held hat tepals wil shar on aus art comiderng thst pina faled to prove tat the properties were argued soy ender wn lors ‘kaw we pte hat the fermen spouses bath substan gre that hey aged the suet properties rng the subsitnee of theirmarage. The crises of ean tae declarations are not alien poo overcame the presumption under Ate {ef the Forty Code Al prope seule by he spoes ring the marin, cegrdes n woe mame the properties a reqiterea, bre presumed conleal union prone ote (10 eiekote st 212:23 lad Be x @ Family Code [Case Dig studocu.com StuDocu sumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of F the Family Code, the property relations of the .48.of the Family Code. ‘acitated and not barred by any impediment ye was found to be void under Article 36 of the str should, therefore, be governed by the rules med to have been obtained through thelr joint ‘on equal shares considering that Virginia falled ad the subject properties during the subsistence of to overcome the presumption under Article ¢, regardless in whose name the properties a ‘Commented [CV3P2 Article 105 ofthe Family Code ‘explcy mandates thatthe Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the arly Code ‘without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Chl Code or other laws. ‘Commented [CVIP3]: Article 147. When aman ard 9 ‘woman who are capactated to marry eachother, Ive ‘exclusively wit each other as husband and vif without the benefit of mariage or under avoid mariage, thelr wages and salaries shall be cwned by ther in equal shares and the.. property acquled by both of them through thelr work ‘or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof tothe contrary, properties acquired hile they lived together shell be prenumedte have been ‘obtoined by ther oie efferts, work or Industry, ond shall ‘be owned by them In equal shares, For purposes ofthis ‘2 party who didnot particlpete in the acqulition ‘by the other party of any property shal be deemed to hove ‘contributed jointly Inthe acquttion thereof the former ‘efforts consisted inthe core and maintenance ofthe family ‘and of the household. ‘Commented [CVJP4: The presumption isnot rebutted bythe mere fact thatthe certfiate of le af he property ‘ofthe tax dedaration sn the name of one ef the spouses ‘only Article 116 expressly provides thatthe presumption remain eveif the property s“reghsteredinthe name of ‘one or both ofthe spouses.” E MeV] ecoy ik) Tnmar 250 Quiao v. Quiao Brigido Quiao v. Rita Quiao, Kitchie Quiao, Lotis Quiao, Petchie Quiao, represented by their mother Rita Quiao G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012 Reyes, J. FACTS: Herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision. As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed. Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse. Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the[respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00. [Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children. On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.” ISSUE: What is the meaning of “net profits earned” by the conjugal partnership for purposes of forfeiture under Article 63 of the Family Code? HELD: The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry. The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of “netinquires from us the meaning of “net profits” earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines “net profits” earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the property relations of the parties. Moreover, as to the definition of “net profits,” we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to theIn this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Share this: 6o Categories: Civil Law, Legally Yours Tags: case digest, cases, Civil Law, digest, Family Code, husband and wife, law, law school, legal cases, legal profession, marriage, Persons and Family Relations, Leave a Comment Thousand Skies Back to topjos Ped ae Aiea IVAN 4 A UNI Py amon aed Pari koun dices faa a eas Pes FACTS: e registered owner of 8 Peel iy. Vipa and her husband Levi CP aici Ae aa rem Reni eal Neda eure} mw Jaro, Pee ke executed between Ne PEC Reames co Serena an Le nes Pera a em Fetercey uu pound himself to pay the Pe eu Pr Pema Berea adel TRL tament whatsoever, er eT Le Pee UA Ts PTL ML Lae AR Co ki eee mei mad pa filed a comp! Cec) aes ee a CREM CR rn Aan Nene is Consequently, the estate of Vil Pa noe hi the filing of the complaint, ARE E Pee MC ko od Nr NOOR Ls Meee fli erat Mu a Se ee li eee ce WU Pee Rake MeL cals ela Buea em Cee een ua Pe eR ac ee ee Ra CR RUN CA ko Pe RU en Ry eeu Ree PCR CRU Ur Aone. Pee eau was terminated. Levi sold his property to Rafae him co-owner of the property. Estate filed a petition for review to CA and reinstated the Perea Ue eet ai ether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s decision? Mm O eaV2<2 oe ce) LegRes Lounge: UY vs ... x A erecta ese sate Aa< Ce ee me Oe CCS MRL decision of MTCC. iret ae Re RU RRR: (od Ruling: Ree Ce Complainants by and against corporations, partnerships, or other juridical entities may not filed with, received or acted upon by the CC Mme mC complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no ECCS MON ie mUCee Cm CORUCE iCute meee cn Cnm le Rem Ueonee R CC ar Lees CRE Ren Re CORR end Ce Ree eo Cea eA NCU) one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was Sen CMC RU mC Re as Te ee me DCm Maree directed to vacate the subject property since he is already a co- Oman nS eRe ta Rom mts) a eR Oe Pee a) TS ee Rey Enter your comment Comment as: megalason Sgro12:37 laa Be ay Ne ANitfee Si: Silfefavoln Do lexninja819x.blogspoticom Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson GR 204494 Facts: Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real properties and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina. oralcommon-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina. Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership Held: Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted that their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also, attesting that his marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting his credibility. Lex Ninja s Walang komento: