TITLE Ladera v.

Hodges

FACTS
1. March 18, 1946 Laderaenetered into a contract with Hodges. Hodges promised to sell lot # 945-D-23 of Ilolo Cadastre subject to certain terms and conditions. After execution of the contract, Ladera constructed a house at 4,000.
(Agreement: Downpayment of 800, Monthly installment of 50, Interest at 1%/month, payable monthly until P2,085 is paid in full. That, in case of failure to make any monthky payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract be taken as rescinded and annulled. That, the sum of money be considered rentals and the vendor be are liberty to dispose the land & all improvements to any person.)

ISSUES WON trial court erred in setting aside the sale for non-compliance with the Rules of Court regarding Sale of Real Property. Hodges contended that the house, being built on land, owned by another person it shall be regarded as personal property.

HELD TC is correct in concluding that the sale was Real Property and the publication required is an indispensable and there being none, sale was void and conferred no title to the purchaser. Art. 344(1) of 1889 CC, provides that: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil , it makes no distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building. Applicable Rule: where the law does not distinguish we shall no distinguish.

DOCTRINE In the cases of immovables by incorporation, the code nowhere requires that the attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. The only criterion is the union of incorporation with the soil.

2. Sept 2, 1946 Ladera failed to pay the installments. Hodges then rescinded the contract. 3.On January 7, 1947, Hodges filed an action for ejectment. The next day, Court of Iloilo rendered upon agreement of the parties, requiring LAdera to vacate and surrender the poseession of the lot and pay P10/month until delivery of land. 4. March 13, 1948 court issued a writ of Execution. Sheriff posted notices of sale at auction but did not publish it in a newspaper of gen. circulation. Ladera was not able to attend the auction. Properties were sold to Magno as the highest bidder. 5. On June 1, 1948 City Sheriff executed a receipt to Lazeda for the satisfaction of Judgment and costs, apparently, the money was not turned over to Hodges. Thereupon, Ladera filed an action against Hodges, Sheriff Balbastro, Magno and Villa to set aside the sale and recover the house. 6. Later, it was revealed that the lot was sold to Atty. Villa, which was purchased on the same day July 6, 1948 to Magno, transaction was not recorded.

Mindanao Bus Co. Vs. City Assessor & Treasurer

1. Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized public lines in Mindanao. 2. Petitioner has its main office and shop at Cagayan de Oro. 3. Court of Tax Appeals holds Minadanao Bus Co. as liable to the payment of the Realty Tax on its maintenance and repair equipment. 4. The Machineries in question is valued at P4,000 assessed by the City Assessor of Cagayan, as these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms. (Equipments: Electric Welder Machine, Storm Boring Machine, Grinder, Battery Charger, Hydraulic Press, etc)

WON Court of Tax Appeals erred in upholding the City Assessor s contention that the said tools and equipments are immovable s and are taxable real properties.

The tools and equipments in question at bar, by their nature, are NOT essential and princial elements of petitioner s business of transporting passengers and cargoes. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its services. Even without these tools, the businesss may be carried on. Thus, the tools & equips are not subject to Realty Tax.

Movable equipments, to be immobilized in contemplation of law, must be essential and principal elements of an industry or works.

TITLE Evangelista v. Alto Surety

FACTS
1. On June 4, 1949, Evangelista, instituted Civil Case No. 8235 of the Court of First, Instance of Manila for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, on June 8, 1949. 2. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951, bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. The corresponding definite deed of sale was issued to him on October 22, 1952, upon expiration of the period of redemption. 3. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. (It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to respondent, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, on September 29, 1950, in compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6268 of the same court for the sum of money, had been rendered in favor respondent herein, as plaintiff therein.) 4. Hence, on June 13, 1953, Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his (Evangelista) title over said house, securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. 5. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera

ISSUES WON a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for the purpose of attachment, as immovable property.

HELD The said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract

DOCTRINE A house is an immovable whether it be erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The parties may agree, however, to consider the house as a personal property. But such agreement is valid only for the purposes of the contract between the parties concerned by virtue of estoppel. Such agreement is not binding to third persons, especially when their rights are prejudiced.

and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40 a month from Oct. 1952 until said delivery, plus costs. 6. On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved said respondent from the complaint, upon the ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is "ostensibly a personal property. 1. Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez refused the offer. 2. Lopez, due to the verbal agreement with Orosa, supplied wood for the construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62,255 but Orosa was only able to pay 20, 848 thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. 3. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, wherein Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and buildings as mortgages. 4. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid materials and was able to get a judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. 5. He was able to obtain a materialman s lien on the building of the theatre. And, also stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. 6.Petitioner wasn t happy because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land are inseparable.

Lopez v. Orosa

WON the building and the land are inseparable and WON petitioner can obtain a lien on the land as well.

NO to both. The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which the construction was made is without merit.
The preference to unregistered lien is only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work was made. The materialman s lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection.

While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of that may constitute real properties could only mean one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property. In the absence of any specific provision of the law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

Tsai v. CA

1. EVERTEX obtained P3Million loan on Phil Bank Comm (PBCom) . EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom a Deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, as security. 2. 4yrs after, PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX of 3.3M loan, and was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list. During the date of execution of the 2nd mortgage, EVERTEX purchased machineries and equipment. 3. 3yrs subsequent to that, due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings. Notice of Sheriff s Sale was issued. At two different public auction, PBCom emerged as the highest bidder, making them owner of the properties. 4. After a while, the factory was leased to Tsai for P500/month. and later on, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai for P9Million, including the conteseted machineries. 5. EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale and conveyance of the properties to PBCom was allegedly in violation of Insolvency Law. RTC held that the lease and sale were irregular as it involved properties not included in the mortgage contract. 1. Goulds Pumps International Phil filed in City Court of Cebu a complaint against Yap and his wife, seekin recovery of P1,459, the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the petitioner s house) 2. The case resulted a judgment in favor of Goulds, as none of the defendants appeared despite notices, having been served upon them. 3. Yap appealed to CFI, yet again he was ordered in defaiult by Judge Tanada, for failure to appear in pre-trial.

WON the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper.

Both RTC and CA show that the intention was to treat the machineries as movable or personal property and that the said machineries were not included in the list of properties appended to sheriff s notice of sale. Moreover, assuming that the properties were considered immovable, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under principle of estoppel.

The fact that the machineries were bolted or cemented on real property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under 415(3&5) as the parties intent has to be looked into. Even if the properties appear to be immovable by nature, nothing prohibits the law from treating them as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.

Yap vs. Tanada

WON CFI erred in declining to annul the execution of the sale of the pump and accessories subject of the action although made without the requisite notice prescribed for sale of immovable.

Yap s argument that the water had become immovable property by its being installed in his residence is untenable. It could be and in fact was separated from Yap s premises without being broken or suffering deterioration.

The water pump does not fit the description in Art.415(3)/ The separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

Machinery Engineering Supplies Inc vs. CA

4.On oct. 15,1960, Judge Tanada issued an order granting Gould s Motion for Issuance of Write of Execution. Yap filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this case. 1. Machinery &Engrng Supplies filed a complaint for replevin against IPO Limestone Co Inc, for the recovery of the machines and equipment sold and delivered to barrio Bigti, Bulacan. 2. March 13, 1953, Judge Pecson issued an order to seize and take immediate possession of the properties 3.March 19 Sheriffs of Bulacan and a crew technicalmen and laborers proceeded and executed court s order. Mngr of the IPO company through a letter executed a protest against the seizure of the Real Properties in question on the ground that they are not personal properties. Contending that the duty of the sheriff is ministerial in nature, they continued. As Roco (pres. of MESI), insisted in dismantling the equipments on his own responsibility, alleging that the bond was posted for, deputy sheriffs directed that supports of the machines be cut. 4.March 20 IPO Co. filed an urgent motion for the return of the properties seized. Granted. March 21 Deputy Sheriff returned, by depositing the properties along the road, without the benefit of inventory and without reinstalling them in their former position. March 24 Sheriff filed an urgent motion, asking the court that MESI be ordered to provide the required aid to comply with the court s order. March 30 Court ordered Prov Sheriff and MESI to reinstate the machineries removed, in their normal and previous condition. May4 Court ordered MESI to furnish the necessary funds and crew to effect the reinstallation within 5days.

WON replevin was applicable to the properties in question.

The special civil action of Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipments in question appeared to be that of attached to the and, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Thereby, it became an immovable.

5. CA decided to uoheldTC s decision. Plaintiff filed for review on the ground that they acted on grave abuse of discretion

Burgos vs Chief of Staff

1. 2 search warrants were issued by Judge Cruz-Pano of then CFI of Rizal, under which the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, were searched and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used were seized. 2. Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles. They also claim that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.

WON some seized properties are to be considered real.

The petitioners at bar do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or bldg on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact being bolted to the ground, remain movable property, susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

The machinery which is movabe by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as agent of the owner. Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on a machinery permanently attached to the ground, the machinery is to be considered as personal property.

Makati Leasing & Finance Corp. vs. Wearever Textile Mills

1. To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing & Finance, Wearever Textile assigned several receivables with the former. To secure the collection of receivables, Wearever executed a Chattel Mortgagae over certain raw materials inventory as well as machinery. 2. Upon Wearever s default, Mkti Leasing filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. Deputy Sheriff was not able ti effect the seizure as they failed to gain entry to Wearever s premises. 3. Mkti Leasing filed a complaint for Judicial Foreclosure. Acting on petitioner s application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure and an order to break open the premises to enforce said writ. 4. The Sheriff, enforcing the seizure order, repaired to the premises of Wearever and removed the main drive motor of the subject machinery. 5. CA set aside the lower court s ruling and prohibited the order. CA ordered the return of the drive motor seized by the Sheriff, based on the ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be subject of replevin.

WON the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the viewpoint of the parties.

Wearever is estopped from claiming that the machine is real property by constituting a chattel mortgage. CA s decision was set aside. Trial Court were reinstated.

FelsEnergyInc vs. Province of Batangas

Sergs Products Inc v PCI Leasing and Finance

The equipment and living quarters of the crew, being permanently attached to the platform, which is also an immovable, are immovables. This is especially so that they are intended to meet the needs of the business and industry of the corporation. The machines, that were the subjects of the writ of seizure, were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements of the industry. The contracting parties however may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.