From Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism: The Intellectual Odyssey of President George W.

Bush

Senior Project submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College by Matthew Orchant

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York May 2011

Table of Contents Page 1- Introduction Page 6- Chapter I: Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism 6- Woodrow Wilson 10- Dwight D. Eisenhower 11- Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger Page 15- Chapter II: Literature Review 15- Deliberate Deception 19- Non-Revolution/Heightened Risk 21- The Elites 24- Bush Unilateralism 27- Conclusion Page 30- Chapter III: Wolfowitz and Powell 30- The Powell Doctrine and Afghan war 32- Testing the Afghan war against the Powell Doctrine 36- The Wolfowitz Doctrine and the Afghan war 40- The Powell Doctrine and the Iraq war 44- The Wolfowitz Doctrine and the Iraq war 47- The Rise of the Wolf and the Fall of the General Page 51- Chapter IV: George W. Bush 51- Governor Bush, 2000 Republican Presidential Candidate 56- President Bush, In the Wake of 9/11 60- President Bush and the Beginnings of the War in Iraq 65- Bush, the 2004 Election 67- President Bush, the Final Year Page 69- Conclusion

Acknowledgements: I wish to thank all of the professors I have had during my four years at Bard, especially those who sat on my moderation and senior project boards. (Omar Encarnacion, Roger Berkowitz, Mark Lindeman, and Sanjib Baruah, that means you.) I particularly want to thank my senior project adviser Michelle Murray for taking me on as an advisee without hesitation and providing me with steady, and incredibly helpful counsel throughout the yearlong process that is Senior Project. I also want to thank the Bard admissions officer who decided my application was worth a second look; without you I quite literally would not be here today. Thank you to my friends, new and old, for always being supportive in what were sometimes trying times. Lastly, thank you to my girlfriend for putting up with my sometimes-ludicrous hours and grumpy spells as I worked to complete this project. Dedication: This project is dedicated to my entire family, Marches and Orchants alike, for guiding and supporting me throughout my academic career and life; without you none of this would have ever been possible. It is dedicated to my mother, who is an aweinspiring source of grace, calm and love in an often-turbulent word. It is dedicated to my father, whos perpetual push for me to refine my ideas and conduct have made me the thinker and man that I am today. It is dedicated to my sister, whos very existence reminds me daily that there is fundamental goodness in the world, as well as people smarter than I am.

1 Introduction Pragmatic Realism and Wilsonian Liberalism represent the two poles of American Foreign Policy as that policy regards democratic promotion abroad. The evolution of President George W. Bushs foreign policy is unique largely due to the fact that he began his Presidency as a Pragmatic Realist, but morphed into a Wilsonian Liberal seemingly over the night of September 11th, 2001. Many pundits, journalists and scholars argue that this dramatic shift occurred with such alacrity, that it could only have been a clever ploy of the neo-conservative right. Impossible, they say, that President Bush truly became a fierce champion of democracy who yearned for wars in the name of freedom. Rather, a multitude of different possible explanations are presented, all of which differ tremendously from the White Houses professed narrative. America went to war in Iraq for oil. Vice President Cheney was the real power in the White House, and he engineered the war in Iraq for the financial gain of his friends at Halliburton. On a different theme, we often hear that Bushs wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are culture wars. This argument varies in focus, sophistication and scope, encompassing everything from Bush hates Muslims to the idea that the President, as an evangelical Christian, felt a sincere calling to use his armies to bring about the end times, and the return of the savior. Another argument posits that the war in Iraq was a personal vendetta for President Bush. Saddam Hussein had tried to kill his father, and now the son was going to kill the would-be murderer. The problem is that none of these theories do a very good job of providing a rationale for how the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq unfolded. I do not deny that President Bush likely harbored ill will towards Saddam Hussein. However, the idea that the entire Iraq war was centered on a personal blood feud

2 seems far-fetched. After all, the first President Bush also defeated the armies of Saddam Hussein, but never felt the need to roll his tanks on into Baghdad. If his own father did not deem it necessary to end Saddams regime and life, it is very unlikely that his son would possess a maniacal drive to do it himself out of some twisted sense of vengeance. On the racial argument, it is impossible to know what thoughts linger in the deepest recesses of a mans mind. Nevertheless, we are able to look at the evidence before us for clues on this issue. It seems safe to say that President Bush was not some sort of closet racist, despite the claims of the popular rapper Kanye West. He did choose African-Americans to be both his Secretaries of State, and his first Secretary of Education. He chose Hispanics for the cabinet positions of Attorney General and Secretary of HUD. He also chose Asians as his Secretaries of Labor and Transportation. True, he did not have any Arabs, or even any Muslims, as members of his cabinet, but such evidence alone does not condemn him as a racist. President Clinton had none either, and he rarely faces such a charge. The evidence that Bushs Middle East foreign policy was racially motivated does not seem to exist. Finally, we come to what has been in my experience the most persistent of the Bush War Conspiracy Theories. The idea that the United States went to war in the Middle East for oil, however, would make infinitely more sense if after assuming control of Afghanistan and Iraq, America had gotten its oil. The fact of the matter is that President Bush never had the United States stake a claim to the oil, which itself serves as a refutation of the idea that this was the purpose behind the war. Well, if not these reasons for Bushs wars, then what could there be? Perhaps the first thing we could do is look at what the President himself said during his terms of

3 office. Through such an analysis, we begin to formulate a picture of what motivated President Bushs foreign policy. George W. Bush, after 9/11, was one of the most ardent voices in favor of democratic promotion abroad in United States history. This is curious for a number of reasons. Firstly, Bush considered himself a conservative. Of course, there are few policies more liberal than one in which one powerful government intrudes upon a weaker sovereign government, removes it, and replaces it with institutions in its own image. Such a policy inherently believes in the ability of big government to solve social problems. Secondly, Bush deplored this rationale for military force right up until 9/11. In his Presidential campaign, he repeatedly attacked the idea of using American military power to promote freedom abroad. Thirdly, the Presidents own father was never a supporter of this Wilsonian style of democratic promotion. While George W. is certainly not the same man as his father, it is still surprising that he would break so cleanly with his fathers foreign policy ideals. Given all of this, it is very strange that by 2004, President Bush declared that the United States would keep its forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq until the job is done, with the job being the creation of a functioning democracy. Yet this is exactly what happened, as the project will document and analyze. This brings us to the question of why?, or perhaps how? How and why did the Presidents foreign policy shift so radically, so quickly from one of Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism? I argue that the President was always a Wilsonian Liberal at heart, but had never had the opportunity to act on those ideals until after 9/11. It was through his wars and promotion of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan that President Bush made the office his own. Contrary to other thinkers, I suggest that he was not convinced of this by an outside third party, or even by his closest advisers. Rather, I argue that his closest

4 advisers were deeply divided on this sort of Wilsonian use of force, and the President chose to use his office to bring them into line, or, in the case of Colin Powell, to kick them to the curb when they did not conform to his vision. This reading of modern history presents a very different picture of President Bush than the one that many readers are used to. I do not believe that the President was a ping-pong ball being racketed back and forth from policy to policy by powerful, shadowy players. Rather, I believe that President Bush saw an opportunity after 9/11 to imprint his own ideals and beliefs upon American foreign policy, and thus the world. This is why the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan became the central issues of his Presidency, this is why he pushed so fiercely for the Iraq war as to cow his own intelligence apparatus, and his congressional opposition into obedience, this is why he ran proudly on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004, and why he chose the spread of freedom as his central message in his second inaugural address. These are not the actions of a thoughtless suit being led from station to station by his handlers, but rather of a powerful President that knew what he wanted to do, and chose to make it happen no matter whether the opposition came from his own White House, the international community, or even the American people. President Bush is often described as a stubborn President. I argue that he was so stubborn because in Wilsonian democratic promotion, he found a cause that he truly believed in. In the project below, I will study the actions and words of President George W. Bush and his closest advisers. I will chart the evolution of the democratic ideals of mainly the President, but also those of Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Through this study I will show that George W. Bush began his rise to the Presidency as a governor with little interest in foreign policy, but then became

5 the most evangelical of Presidential supporters of Wilsonian-style democratic promotion abroad since Woodrow Wilson himself. I will first ground my project in a brief historical review of the ideas of Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism in presidential politics to serve as a basis for my later categorizations of the Presidents words and actions. I will then delve into the academic literature available on democratic promotion and President Bushs engagement with it, highlighting where I agree, and where I digress. I will then analyze the two military doctrines proposed by Bush aides Paul Wolfowitz and Colin Powell in order to outline the Wilsonian Liberal and Pragmatic Realist foreign policies that were available to the President. Finally, I will go through a chronological study of Bushs campaign for, and tenure as President, showing how his words and actions, and those of his advisers, jive more smoothly with my interpretation of the events than those of others in the available literature.

6 Chapter I: Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism Woodrow Wilson Wilsonian Liberalism is first observed in President Wilsons response to the Huerta takeover of the Mexican government, a mere ten days before the start of his Presidency. In 1911 a democratic revolution in Mexico had established Francisco Madero as President. This was followed shortly by a reactionary revolution culminating in General Huerta killing President Madero. US State Department protocol at the time was to recognize the Huerta government, as they controlled the country. Wilson however refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new dictatorship. He first attempted a diplomatic solution, offering Huerta a lack of US intervention if he would make democratic reforms. When this failed, Wilson secured trade embargoes from major allies towards Mexico. He supplied Huertas domestic enemies, Constitutionalists dedicated to democratic government, with weapons. Most dramatically, he blockaded the major Mexican port of Veracruz. Whether the cause or not, these actions led chronologically to the fall of the Huerta government to the Constitutionalists. Wilson predictably trumpeted the achievement, wrapped in the rhetoric of liberal views on human equality. They say the Mexicans are not fitted to self-government; and to this I reply that, when properly directed, there is no people not fitted for self-government.1 Wilsons justification for action was the importance of democracy. He sided against American oil interests when they tried to take advantage of the situation, denying a potential boon to the United States economy. He had a moral sense of right and wrong for his intervention. Do you never stop to reflect just what it is that America stands for? If she stands for one thing more than another, it is for the sovereignty of self-governing
1

Smith, Tony. America's Mission: the United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994

7 peoples, and her example, her assistance, her encouragement, has thrilled two continents in this Western World with all the fine impulses which have built up human liberty on both sides of the water.2 This level of concern for the right to self-government of foreign nations represented a dramatic departure from traditional United States foreign policy. It is important that we identify the moral right, insofar as it exists for Wilsonian Liberalism, with the spread of democracy. For Wilson, the path to universal peace was universal democratization. Wars in service to democratization were mere roadblocks that had to be passed for this greater world order to be brought about. This belief helps to explain the pattern behind his radical interventionism. As he explained during his declaration of World War 1, The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political libertyIt is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.3 For Wilson, and later for George W. Bush, the fight for freedom, so long as victory was likely, was worth the cost of war. This is one of the fundamental differences between Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism, as a Pragmatic Realist would not even include the possibility of freedom in his calculus except as so far as it might determine whether a particular government would be advantageous to American interests. Wilson followed his perceived victory in Mexico with a democratic campaign in
2

Wilson, Woodrow. "Speech on Military Preparedness." Soldiers' Memorial Hall, Pittsburgh. 29. Jan. 1916. Speech 3 Woodrow Wilson, War Messages, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Doc. No. 5, Serial No. 7264, Washington, D.C., 1917; pp. 3-8, passim.

8 the Dominican Republic. General Bordas had been named President by the Dominican congress in 1913 for a one-year term, but showed no signs of resigning at the end of his mandate. This stance led to civil war, with the United States backing General Bordas in the name of stability. However, America also insisted upon supervising elections with a constitutional convention in order to bring true democracy to the country. The ensuing elections saw General Jimenez take power, and Wilsons administration moved swiftly to aid his fledgling democratic government. Unfortunately, this only served to rally nationalist sentiment against the United States and Jimenez. A revolt broke out which was eventually suppressed by American marines. Wilson then ordered the installation of an American military government to keep the peace during the transition to democracy. As we see with such plans to the present day, the United States eventual commitment was much larger and longer than had been initially expected. In the ensuing eight-year occupation the United States engaged in many of the elements that today comprise the concept of nation building. Wilsons administration sponsored massive investment in infrastructure, promoted a more egalitarian system of agriculture and established a national guard to defend the country. By 1922, when the United States supported the creation of a provisional, indigenous, democratic Dominican government, Wilsons term had ended. The aftermath was abject failure. After the American withdrawal from the Dominican Republic in 1924, the country fell into years of civil war before emerging under the brutal dictator, Rafael Trujillo, in 1930. To pair with the apparent success of democratization in Mexico, Wilson had a clear failure in the Dominican. The importance of the Dominican episode in defining Wilsonian Liberalism is not so much the events themselves as the concepts behind them. Wilson believed that the

9 United States has a right to interfere in the internal governance of sovereign nations if those nations are not freely governed through democracy. He further believed that the interference must be directly for the purposes of promoting democracy in the violated nation. Economic, diplomatic and military measures were all acceptable tools to use in the pursuit of this purpose. He explained the wellspring of his devotion to democratic ideals at Sioux Falls in 1919. Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America, my fellow citizensAmerica is the only idealistic nation in the world. When I speak practical judgments about business affairs, I can only guess whether I am speaking the voice of America or not, but when I speak the ideal purposes of history I know that I am speaking the voice of America, because I have saturated myself since I was a boy in the records of that spirit, and everywhere in them there is this authentic love of justice and the service of humanity. If by any mysterious influence of error America should not take the leading part in this new enterprise of concerted power, the world would experience one of those reversals of sentiment, one of those penetrating chills of reaction which would lead to a universal cynicism, for if America goes back upon mankind, mankind has no other place to turn. It is the hope of nations all over the world that America will do the great thing.4 Wilson believed democracy and freedom must be spread to the world, and only the United States of America among all nations is in a position to enforce this spread. The violence that is inevitable during the overthrow of autocratic regimes is a grim necessity in order to achieve the greatness that humankind is destined for, and that America is destined to lead mankind to. These are the bedrock principles of Wilsonian Liberalism, and they continue to have a major effect on United States foreign policy to the present day. Dwight D. Eisenhower President Eisenhower best represents the middle ground between Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism, both chronologically and ideologically. In the 30
4

Wilson, Woodrow. "Address at Sioux Falls." Sioux Falls. 8 Sept. 1919. Address.

10 some years in between the presidencies of Wilson and Eisenhower, the great ideological enemy of free-market democracy had shifted from Nazi fascism to Soviet communism. The result was a Pragmatic Realist school of thought contending that in the fight against communism, support for right-wing dictatorships provided a more effective and efficient alternative to the promotion of free markets and democracy abroad. To an extent, the Republican Party platform under which Eisenhower was nominated rejected these new ideas and sounded like the voice of Wilson himself in its denouncement of the policy of containment as negative, futile and immoral.5 On the other hand, the actions of the former general reflected a strain of pragmatism. While the President supported in words Hungarians fighting for freedom against a communist oppressor, he stopped well short of providing actual military aid to those rebels, a departure from the policy of Wilson in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. In Guatemala, Eisenhowers cold, pragmatic calculations are even clearer. In this South American nation, a fledgling constitutional government was in serious danger of collapsing due to the internal power of the Soviet communist-backed left and the traditional authoritarian right. President Arbenz, though democratically elected, was a close ally of the Guatemalan Communist Party. Although no communist held a cabinet position, communists were his closest advisers and were especially powerful in the agrarian reform bureaucracy.6 In this instance, deference to the sanctity of democracy did not outweigh the realist national security concerns of a possible communist takeover of Guatemala. In 1954, Eisenhower instructed the CIA to organize a coup to overthrow the Arbenz government and give control to their hand picked, right-wing successor,
5 6

Smith, Americas Mission Smith, Americas Mission

11 Carlos Armas. While Eisenhower paid homage to the idea of democratic promotion abroad, it is clear that he viewed such promotion as merely one potential weapon in the greater fight against communism. When other weapons appeared to be more effective, such as support for dictators at the expense of constitutionalist government, they were employed instead. In the end, President Eisenhower disavowed himself of a belief that America was the sole moral compass for the world. He admitted, We are so proud of our guarantees of freedom in thought and speech and worship, that unconsciously, we are guilty of one of the greatest errors that ignorance can make we assume that our standard of values is shared by all other humans in the world.7 Clearly, America had transitioned away from the universalistic moral rhetoric and action of Wilsonian Liberalism. The United States would continue to move further along that path towards a Pragmatic Realist foreign policy.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strayed further from the traditions of Wilsonian Liberalism than did Eisenhower. While his former boss saw fit to use a liberal, moralist rhetoric reminiscent of President Wilsons when discussing foreign democracy promotion, Nixon and his adviser Kissinger saw fit to abandon it. They favored a strictly Pragmatic Realist approach on which foreign policy decisions are made solely on the grounds of United States economic and security interests. The concept of democratic social interests, so dear to the actions of Wilson and the rhetoric of Eisenhower were gone. In their place was friendliness to all regimes friendly to the
7

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford UP, 1982.

12 United States interests, regardless of what those regimes did domestically. Nixon believed that an absence of democratic ideals in a nation that did not threaten American national security was certainly not a cause for drawing the United States into war. There is an international disease which feeds on the notion that if you have a cause to defend, you can use any means to further your cause, since the end justified the means. As an international community, we must oppose this notion, whether it be in Canada, in the United States, or anywhere else. No cause justifies violence.8 It is important to understand what Nixon means here by cause. He is referring specifically to abstract principles that are not directly related to the national security interest. For example, in Nixon and Kissingers estimation, the Vietnam War was necessary in order to enhance the American position in Pragmatic Realist balance of power relations with the USSR. This is certainly a cause, per se, but it was not the sort of cause that Nixon was decrying in the quote above; Wilsonian-style democratic promotion was. In fact, coupled with Kissingers comments in 1973, it can be reasoned that the pair literally thought that no atrocity was too great as to require American intervention for moral purposes. The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy. And if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.9 Furthermore, the only reason to include humanitarian concerns in foreign policy calculus was to prevent provoking widespread resistance that would hurt the American security interest. This is evidenced by a conversation on the use of American WMDs in Vietnam between Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office.
8

Fourenier, Louis. F. L. Q. The Anatomy of an Underground Movement. University of Toronto Press.

9

Nagourney, Adam. "In Tapes, Nixon Rails About Jews and Blacks." New York Times 10 Dec. 2010, U.S. sec.

13 Nixon: The only place where you and I disagreeis with regard to the bombing. Youre so goddamned concerned about civilians and I dont give a damn. I dont care. Kissinger: Im concerned about the civilians because I dont want the world to be mobilized against you as a butcher.10 Nevertheless, this apparent reluctance to use American force in support of ideals clearly cannot be mistaken for pacifism. As Nixon said, Any nation that decides the only way to achieve peace is through peaceful means is a nation that will soon be a piece of another nation.11 In the bipolar world of USA vs. USSR, any and all potential help in the ideological conflict had to be taken advantage of, not alienated. Kissinger explained his Pragmatic Realism simply; America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.12 This ruthless realism led to the opening of China, but also consolidated dictators such as Somoza and Marcoss holds on power. In Nixons second inaugural address he explained his Pragmatic Realism as follows: We shall support vigorously the principle that no country has the right to impose its will or rule on another by force. We shall continue, in this era of negotiation, to work for the limitation of nuclear arms, and to reduce the danger of confrontation between the great powers. We shall do our share in defending peace and freedom in the world. But we shall expect others to do their share. The time has passed when America will make every other nations conflict our own, or make every other nations future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs.13 Like the Wilsonians, Nixon supported interventionism, but never in pursuit of democratic ideals, only for the purposes of defeating the communists. This Pragmatic Realism serves as the polar opposite of Wilsonian Liberalism on the benefits of, desire
10

Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking, 2002. 11 Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York: Arbor House, 1985. 12 D'Souza, Dinesh. What's so Great about America. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2002. 13 Nixon, Richard M. "Second Inaugural Address." Washington D.C. 20 Jan. 1973.

14 for, and national interest in democratic promotion abroad. Kissinger reflects this stance in contemporary times with his 2006 assessment of the impossibility of victory in the Iraq war. If you mean by military victory an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I dont believe that is possible.14

Chapter II: Literature Review The academic literature available on the radical transformation of the central tenets of President Bushs foreign policy is, by necessity, very young. While there is a general consensus that the events of 9/11 provided the catalyst for this change, there are a wide variety of opinions as to how and why this specific change was the result. I have identified four distinct hypotheses in the literature that I consider the most cogent, persuasive attempts to explain this dramatic transformation. In what follows I will examine each of these four theories, and will lay out each of their rationales, before
14

Todd, Robb S. "Kissinger: Military Win In Iraq Impossible." CBSNews.com. 19 Nov. 2006.

15 providing a critique of each as to why they do not adequately explain the evolution of President George W. Bushs foreign policy.

Deliberate Deception Dona J. Stewart published The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administrations Ideological Imagination in Geographical Review in July 2005. In summary, her argument is as follows: The President and his team of advisers were well aware before the War in Iraq that the chances of creating a stable democracy from the ashes of the Hussein regime were profoundly small. Nevertheless, the Bush administration went to war, and portrayed the challenges that would be faced in absurdly nave terms. Because the administration was not nave, they must have been deliberately deceiving the American people and the world. The reason that they did this is that freedom and democracy provided political cover at home and abroad for eliminating a dictator that the President simply wished to eliminate. This deception explains the Presidents apparent shift from Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism as phony, and argues that the change in rhetoric was meant to obfuscate rather than enlighten observers to the dynamics in play. Stewart argues that the Bush administration was aware of the fact that the conditions on the ground in Husseins Iraq were far from ideal in terms of fostering Iraqi Freedom. The 2002 U.N. Arab development report succinctly summarizes the challenges the region faced in terms of democratizing. The Middle East today lacks the domestic conditions that set the stage for democratic change elsewhere. It does not have the previous experience with democracy that facilitated transitions in Central Europenor has the Middle East experienced the prolonged periods of economic growth and the resulting dramatic

16 changes in educational standards, living standards, and life styles that led Asian countries like Taiwan and South Korea to democratic change. The picture is instead one of socioeconomic deterioration.15 It is inconceivable that the Bush administrations diplomatic and intelligence apparatus had arrived at a radically different conclusion. Nevertheless, Stewart attests that when the administration decided to go to war, they deliberately chose to present an absurdly nave view of the situation in Iraq, in order to engender domestic and international support for the war effort. According to the Bush administration, the toppling of the dictator would quickly unleash a democratic tsunami across the Islamic world.16 Stewart asserts there was a major disconnect between what the administration knew to be the case in terms of domestic Iraqi conditions for democracy and what they expressed to the American people. In fact, the administration did not even engage in the sort of activities that could have plausibly improved the situation, such as making a public push for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, the administration sugarcoated the prospects for democracy, not expressing what it knew to be true; democracy in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists would almost surely be detrimental to American interests. This was proven in Pakistan with the United Action Councils refusal to pursue al Qaeda within its borders.17 This entire episode was a deliberate deception perpetrated by the Bush administration and directed at the American people, Congress and the world community. Why would the administration attempt to deceive in this way? Stewart believes
15

Stewart, Dona J. "The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administrations Ideological Imagination." Geographical Review 95.3 (2005): 415 16 Ibid 405 17 It was further proven later in President Bushs term with the electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

17 they wanted to eliminate Saddam Hussein, but the facts on the ground meant that a Pragmatic Realist rationale for war was not applicable. Thus they found a new rationale in Wilsonian Liberalism. This was not a genuine change of heart; it was merely a move for political expediency from an administration that had never stood strongly in either camp. This is aptly demonstrated via one main point. In promoting a platform of reform while maintaining very close ties to clearly undemocratic regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration exposed its policy to criticisms of hypocrisy.18 If the administration were truly committed to freedom and democracy in the region, these ties made absolutely no sense. If they were in fact merely committed to eliminating Hussein, maintenance of these ties actively supported the objective. The change in the Presidents rhetoric on foreign policy was simply political cover to pursue a narrow objective. The administrations deliberate dishonesty succeeded in leading the nation to war for reasons that were different from those that were stated. Critique I agree with Stewart insofar as the Bush administration did present an overly optimistic appraisal of the prospects for American success in democratizing Iraq. I disagree with her as to the reasons that they did so. If the administrations goal was simply to remove Saddam Hussein from power, there were many other easier and less expensive ways of doing so. A simple cruise missile aimed at his residence would likely have done the trick, as would a strike team from the CIA or American Specials Ops. Obviously, this sort of assassination would have damaged American credibility and claims to leaderships of the world community, especially given the illegality of assassination under international law. Nevertheless, it is
18

Stewart, The Greater Middle East, 415

18 difficult to believe that the Bush administration would opt for a full-scale war and subsequent nation building effort merely to provide political cover from the harsh glare of the international community for assassinating Hussein. It makes even less sense in light of the fact that the Iraq War cost President Bush greatly politically, both at home and abroad. Thus, her theory fails to explain why the United States, after Hussein was hanged, continued to sponsor the immense effort of bringing democracy to the Iraqi people. In short, Deliberate Deception does not provide a coherent explanation for the administrations years of nation-building activities in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. The President, even in the face of enormous opposition, stuck firmly to the principle that America would not leave either nation until a stable democracy had been established. Stewart may argue that the administration had different reasons for nation building in Afghanistan as opposed to Iraq, but given the remarkable consistency across both nations of the administrations policy, this explanation is less than satisfying. It seems instead that the Bush administration was in fact deeply committed to the principles of Wilsonian Liberalism; this was not a mere political ploy.

Non-Revolution/Heightened Risk Melvyn P. Lefflers main argument is that the Bush administrations foreign policy was not revolutionary, and in fact was very traditional. The spread of democracy has littered the rhetoric of Presidents from Jefferson to Wilson to FDR to Kennedy. Likewise, an American preference for unilateralism hearkens back to the founding fathers. The contemporary global power dynamic simply lends itself to American unilateralism; this is

19 nothing new, the same thing happened in Vietnam. Bushs use of pre-emptive war is also nothing new in American history. He argues that Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt and FDR all employed the rhetorical justification of freedom in order to prosecute preventive wars. The Clinton administration used similar rhetoric to the Bush administrations as regards unilateralism and pre-emptive war when President Clinton authorized the bombing in Sudan of the al-Shifaa chemical plant, which was supposedly manufacturing weapons for Osama bin LadenNational Security Advisor Sandy Berger made a compelling case: What if we do not hit it and then, after an attack, nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then?19 Leffler argues that the only difference between Clinton and Bush on this issue is that Clinton considered a preemptive strike optional, while Bush considered it mandatory. Critique I agree with Lefflers central assertion that the Bush administrations foreign policy is not revolutionary compared to many other Presidents policies throughout American history. I myself root Bushs eventual worldview in Wilsonian Liberalism. Having said that, I do not believe that Leffler pays adequate attention to the fact that there was a major revolution in Bushs own foreign policy after 9/11. It is true that he addresses this issue, but he fails to provide a compelling explanation for it, reasoning that the administrations threshold for risk was dramatically lowered after 9/11. In contrast, I believe that if anything, the administrations threshold for risk was significantly raised. Before 9/11, as alluded to by Leffler, the Bush administration pursued an isolationist, Pragmatic Realist foreign policy. Afterwards, they launched two expansive, aggressive
19

Leffler, Melvyn P. "Bush's Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy 144 (2004): 24

20 wars and spent greatly in blood and treasure in an attempt to build both Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies. This was not less risky than the status quo, which likely would have been a few missile strikes at terrorist camps in Afghanistan. There is also a strong argument that the most risk averse course of action would have been to invest tremendous resources into homeland security and not to use force in Afghanistan at all. The Bush administration was emboldened by 9/11, not chastened; the new prism20 Leffler quotes Rumsfeld as referring to was about aggression, not isolationism. Yes, the administrations temptation to use force was considerably heightened, but no, this was not due to a dramatic attempt to reduce risk, particularly in the case of the latter Iraq War, where the identified enemy had never successfully attacked Americans on their own soil.

The Elites James Mann argues in his book, Rise of the Vulcans, that the explanation for the change in the Presidents foreign policy outlook from Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism can be explained through a close study of his advisers. In the end, the shift in foreign policy occurred because Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and eventually Rice, outmaneuvered Powell and Armitage in the White House, and thus were able to put their preferred policy into place According to Mann, there were five principles of Vulcanism21 and all of them were present in the rationale for the Iraq war. In Chapter III, I will show how the principles of Vulcanism are almost identical to those of the Wolfowitz Doctrine, first written in 1992. For now, I will explain these five principles from Manns perspective.
20 21

Leffler, Bushs Foreign Policy, 26 This is the name Mann gives for the aggressive foreign policy of the group of Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney and Condoleezza Rice

21 First, was their belief in the centrality and the efficacy of American military power, which they had worked to restore and build up ever since the defeat in Vietnam.22 He argues that the quartet of Vulcans, along with Powell and Armitage, had a collected history of three decades in power at the federal level, and consistently used that power to expand American military capabilities. Vietnam had left a huge impression on this group, but it was not the same impression that was widely reported in the media. Contrary to popular belief that after the Vietnam war the United States was in decline and would eventually be replaced as the worlds premier power, the Vulcans believed instead that the United States was in position to expand its power tremendously in the coming decades and assume its rightful position as hegemon of the international order. The war against Iraq reflected the Vulcans belief in America as a force for good around the globethey portrayed Iraq as merely the first step in an effort to spread democracy throughout the Middle East.23 This belief is readily apparent in much of the rhetoric of the President at the time of the Iraq war. This sort of moralizing in international relations is at the heart of Wilsonian Liberalism, and it is central to the philosophy of the Vulcans. The Vulcans held an extraordinarily optimistic assessment of American capabilities.24 This assessment was reflected in Cheneys ideas that the American army in Iraq would be greeted as liberators. It was inherent in the Vulcans collective belief that the invasion, victory and subsequent transition to democracy would be relatively quick and painless. The war violated many principles of the Powell Doctrine, and Powell
22

Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush's War Cabinet. New York: Viking, 2004: 362 23 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 362 24 Ibid, 361

22 presented a much more pessimistic appraisal of the costs of the war. The optimistic portrayal prevailed, and [o]verall, the Bush administration faced a far more troubled occupation of Iraq than the one for which it had planned. It found itself devoting more American forces to postwar Iraq than it had expected and for longer periods of time.25 The unilateral decision to invade epitomized the Vulcans reluctance to enter into agreements or accommodations with other countries.26 Once again, the Vulcans view prevailed over those of Powell and his Doctrine. While the Secretary of State scrambled to assemble a coalition of nations without UN approval for action in Iraq, in reality the only allied nation that contributed a significant and substantial number of troops to the war effort was Great Britain. The United States invasion of Iraq hardly took place with strong international backing. In this instance, the Vulcans won completely over Powell. Finally, the war in Iraq served as a demonstration of the Vulcans commitment to the strategy Paul Wolfowitzs Pentagon staff had drafted at the end of the cold war: America would build up its military power to such an extent that it would be fruitless and financially crippling for any other state to hope to compete with it.27 The Iraq war was the dramatic expression of the Vulcans success in achieving this objective. The United States decision to invade Iraq showed the administrations comfort with its hegemonic position in the international order. The war in Iraq could not have been attempted if Pragmatic Realist balance of power calculations held sway. If Russia or China chose to aid Hussein, the offensive would have become cost prohibitive. Nevertheless, those nations did not choose to take this route, as U.S. might had become so great that even an
25 26

Ibid, 361 Ibid, 363 27 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 363

23 illegal war could muster no declared military opposition from any state in the system (except for Iraq, of course). Manns central thesis is that the war in Iraq happened as a result of this victory of Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Rice over Powell and Armitage. Bushs role was little more than that of an empty suit.

Critique I agree with much of what Mann put into his richly researched book. Specifically, I agree that there was a divide among the top advisers in the Bush administration along the fault line of Vulcanism and what could be described as Powellism. I also agree that Vulcanism, which for the purposes of my project overlaps heavily with Wilsonian Liberalism, was victorious over Powells Pragmatic Realism. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this was due to some sort of victory by one group of the Presidents advisers. Rather, I believe that the President chose to embrace the principles of Wilsonian Liberalism due to a personal realization that the only way to eradicate terrorism was to spread democracy. The fact that in the absence of WMDs the democratic promotion rationale was the only viable one for Iraq undoubtedly helped, but well before that the President had committed himself to building a democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The evidence suggests that President Bush made a forceful decision on the values of interventionism, and then he naturally chose to articulate it through the language of Wilsonian Liberalism that had already been embraced by Paul Wolfowitz. In short, I agree with Mann that the Wolfowitz Doctrine was the intellectual predecessor to the Bush Doctrine, but I disagree with his central assertion that it was a ring of advisers who determined the course of American foreign policy. The President could have favored

24 Pragmatic Realism instead, and come to rely on the rhetoric of the Powell Doctrine. It was President Bush who drove his foreign policy, not Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld or Rice.

Bush Unilateralism Ivo H. Daadler and James M. Lindsay lay out their Bush Unilateralism hypothesis in their book American Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. This hypothesis is similar to Stewarts Deliberate Deception hypothesis in that they thought the administrations shift from Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism was insincere. Nevertheless, these hypotheses differ significantly; whereas Stewart attributes the change in Presidential rhetoric to a deception perpetrated by the Bush administration in order to gain political support for its goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein, Daadler and Lindsay go further: the change in rhetoric was to counter political opposition to a repeatedly expressed desire in the White House for American unilateralism. To Bush the world was black and white, America was on the side of democracy, human rights and fundamental good. This meant that regardless of international opinion or support, American action, as long as it sprang from American principles, was morally right. Therefore, if other nations did not support American action, then America must act alone. From the start, Bush insisted that the rest of the world be measured by Americas standard, not the other way aroundAfter September 11, George Bush painted the world in black and white, while others, particularly overseas, painted it in shades of gray. He distinguished between those who were evil and those who were good, between those who were for us and those who were against us, between those who love freedom and those who hate the freedom we love.28
28

Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: the Bush Revolution in

25

According to Daadler and Linday, Bushs revolution was one based in unilateralism. George W. Bush was hardly alone in understanding that America possessed unrivaled power especially military power. What made him revolutionary was his willingness to use it even over the strenuous objections of his allies.29 They argue that this faith in unilateralism was consistent. Bushs foreign policy never underwent a dramatic change; the President always favored unilateralism and the war in Iraq sprang from that well.

Critique The biggest problem with the Bush Unilateralism hypothesis is its central tenet that there was no personal revolution for Bush as regards his foreign policy. Daadler and Lindsay, like Stewart, do not attribute the change in rhetoric to a fundamental shift in policy. Bush always had expressed comfort with America acting unilaterally, yes, but it was not until after 9/11 that he expressed any inkling of acting unilaterally to topple a sovereign government and establish a democracy in its place. I agree that the unilateralism was consistent, but unilateralism can be justified both by Pragmatic Realism and Wilsonian Liberalism. The theory does not account for the fact that the shift in Bushs thinking occurred along this axis, and not one of multilateralism and unilateralism. Moreover, by attributing the whole of the Presidents foreign policy to the President himself, to the exclusion of any potential impact from his closest advisers, it Foreign Policy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005: 189 29 Ibid, 188

26 fails to recognize how closely the President had initially hewed to Powells version of Pragmatic Realism, before his move to Wilsonian Liberalism. Likewise, it fails to recognize the fact that Bush chose to articulate his rationale for Wilsonian Liberalism in almost exactly the language of the original Wolfowitz doctrine. Between these two problems, the Bush Unilateralism hypothesis pays merely lip service to a phenomenon that radically transformed international relations. Yes, the President always was sympathetic to unilateralism, and elements of unilateralism were present in Iraq and (to a much lesser extent) Afghanistan, but this alone does not tie together Bushs foreign policy. Rather, it can only be explained as a shift in thinking about Americas role in the world, and that shift occurred without disrupting the unilateral principle.

Conclusion After a review of the available academic literature on the issue, I identified four main hypotheses for explaining the phenomenon of Bushs foreign policy shift. These hypotheses were Stewarts Deliberate Deception, Lefflers Non-Revolution, Manns Elites and Lindsay and Daadlers Bush Unilateralism. I analyzed each of the four in detail, and as evidenced by my critiques, I found none of them wholly satisfying in explaining the Presidents fundamental shift in rhetoric and policy. Through my critiques, I have laid own my own thesis on the issue, which I will compile below. The Deliberate Deception hypothesis, by dismissing the rhetorical shift as deceptive, does not examine the clear connection between the supposedly deceptive rhetoric and the administrations policy. By doing so, its proponents fail to see that

27 Americas foreign policy regarding democratization was remarkably consistent between Afghanistan and Iraq. This is because the wellspring for both was the Presidents shift towards Wilsonian Liberalism. This argument is more satisfying, as it does not rely on the assumption that the Bush administration made an absurd miscalculation of costs of various methods for eliminating Hussein. It also provides a consistent explanation for the Presidents foreign policy, rather than attempt a piecemeal rationale of each nations bilateral relations with the United States. The Non-Revolution/Heightened Risk hypothesis makes a strong case for the historical roots of Bushs Wilsonian Liberalism, but it provides an unsatisfying explanation for why the President shifted to this latter position. Leffler claims that the administrations tolerance for risk was lowered, but the historical record does not suggest this at all. Rather, 9/11 sparked a shift in Bushs thinking from Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism, and that this shift inherently involved a much riskier foreign policy. The Bush who emerged from 9/11 was an emboldened President, not a chastened one. James Manns book, Rise of the Vulcans is an excellent account of the careers of Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Wolfowitz, Armitage and Powell. Nevertheless, the central thesis of his book, the Elites hypothesis, is flawed. Yes, the Wolfowitz doctrine in the end was the intellectual predecessor to the Bush doctrine, but this does not mean that the inmates were running the asylum. Bush had a range of foreign policy options in front of him in the wake of 9/11, not the least of which was the Pragmatic Realism he had championed during his presidential campaign. Wolfowitz did not browbeat or trick George W. Bush into adopting his vision; President Bush had a strong moral commitment

28 to the spread of democracy, and he found a useful articulation of the principles of a foreign policy that could foster democracys expansion in the Wolfowitz doctrine. Mann leaves Bush out of the equation and by doing so fails to realize that Bushs foreign policy was driven by the President, not a series of clever moves in a political chess game among his advisers. The Bush Unilateralism hypothesis fails because in its blind zeal to prove the consistency of the Presidents unilateralism it does not recognize that his foreign policy views shifted dramatically after 9/11 along a different axis. A desire for unilateralism does not explain American action in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the conclusion of major combat operations. A commitment to Wilsonian Liberalism does. In this way, the Bush Unilateralism hypothesis is unsatisfying for the same reason that the Deliberate Deception hypothesis is unsatisfying; neither properly accounts for the events that actually unfolded.

29

Chapter III: Wolfowitz and Powell Within the Bush administration, there were proponents of both Wilsonian Liberalism and Pragmatic Realism. The most important advocate of the former was Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; of the latter was Secretary of State Colin Powell. Powell and Wolfowitz both had strong ties to the Bush family; both had worked for President George H.W. Bush. Wolfowitz served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in that administration30; Powell served as the first African-American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their backgrounds could not be more cleanly juxtaposed; Wolfowitz was an academic and a theoretician, Powell was a career soldier. Given this, it is ironic that Wolfowitz came to be seen by the public during George W. Bushs administration as the White Houses foremost hawk, while Powell was considered its most prominent dove. Considered on this axis, it is unsurprising that both men advocated very different policies to the President on the issue of democratization abroad. The fact that Bush eventually nominated Wolfowitz to be Chairman of the World Bank, while he
30

under Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney

30 asked for Powells resignation, is as clear a sign as any of the total victory of Wilsonian Liberalism over Pragmatic Realism in the George W. Bush administration.

The Powell Doctrine and Afghan War Before his time as Secretary of State in the George W. Bush administration, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for George H.W. Bush, Colin Powell made a series of statements regarding the rationale behind the use of American force. These statements were then compiled by journalists into a coherent military doctrine thereafter known as the Powell Doctrine. This Powell Doctrine cleanly lays out the principles of the generals Pragmatic Realism. The Doctrine is portrayed as a series of questions that must be answered affirmatively before the United States takes military action. The Powell Doctrine 1) Is a vital national security interest threatened? 2) Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3) Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4) Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? 5) Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6) Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7) Does the American people support the action? 8) Do we have genuine broad international support? Powell believed the United States should not take military action if any of the following were true: A vital national security interest is not threatened, we lack a clear attainable goal, we have not yet completely and honestly analyzed the intelligence available in terms of risks and costs, we have not yet made every attempt at resolving the situation diplomatically, we lack a quick, efficient exit strategy, we have not fully

31 considered the consequences of our action, we lack the broad support of the American people, or we lack broad international support. The Afghan war was enormously popular politically at its inception. A series of Gallup polls during November 2001 showed that 89% of Americans thought, America did not make a mistake in sending military forces into Afghanistan.31 The sheer popularity of the War in Afghanistan brought figures from across the political spectrum together in its support. Both Powell and Wolfowitz supported the war for different reasons. It is important to test the Afghan war against the Powell doctrine in order to contrast the results of that test with the later Iraq war. At its inception, the Afghan war was not necessarily an example of President Bush exercising his Wilsonian Liberalism; rather, Pragmatic Realism could also justify his course of action. Such a broad intellectual alliance of support for the war helps to explain its tremendous early popularity. Americans of many stripes supported the war, for a variety of disparate reasons.

Testing Afghan war against the Powell Doctrine Testing the Powell Doctrine: Afghanistan 1) Is a vital national security interest threatened? 2) Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3) Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4) Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? 5) Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6) Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7) Does the American people support the action? 8) Do we have genuine broad international support?

31

Afghanistan." PollingReport.com. Web.

32 Firstly, did the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban government that harbored them in Afghanistan present a threat to a vital national security interest? America had been attacked on its own soil and had lost over 3000 citizens. The prospect of taking no action against the people responsible, and instead allowing them to build up their resources and power and possibly attack again, with even deadlier consequences presents a clear threat to a vital national security interest. The answer to whether or not America had a clear and attainable objective is murkier. At the outset of the war, there were a variety of goals for the offensive. There was the goal of killing of capturing Osama Bin Laden, there was the goal of defeating the Taliban government, and there was the goal of eradicating the al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. While all three of those goals are undoubtedly related, the fact remains that they are not the same, and would not likely be pursued through the same military strategy. Nevertheless, the doctrine does not call for a single attainable goal, but simply a clear attainable objective. It was reasonable to assume in 2001 that the United States of Americas military would be able to capture or kill Bin Laden and wipe his terrorist camps off the map with missiles, while simultaneously winning a conventional war against the Taliban government. It is not as easy to say that the Afghan war passed the Doctrines second test as its first, but on the whole, the test was passed. It is more difficult to argue that risks and costs of the Afghan War had been fully and frankly exhausted. Rhetoric from the White House about Americas role in building a democracy in Afghanistan after defeating the Taliban was conspicuously absent in the build up to the war, and in the fist months of the offensive. Without a coherent strategy for organizing a post-Taliban government, and thus the sufficient appropriation of

33 resources to accomplish the task, it is difficult to argue that the costs of the war had been fully and frankly exhausted. The Afghan war thus fails the third test of the Powell Doctrine. Still, it is possible that Powell, in his new role as Secretary of State, would choose support an enormously popular war if the vast majority of his doctrines tests were passed. I will contradict much of the literature on the Afghan war in saying that all other diplomatic solutions had been exhausted. The key to my argument is that the student of the political build up to this war must understand that the diplomatic solutions were massively constrained by the Presidents non-negotiable demands of the Taliban in order to avert war. As will be examined later, many of these demands were impossible for a government with the limited state capacity of the Taliban to carry out in a timely fashion. Within this framework, Powells non-existent non-violent solutions had been exhausted, barring a dramatic reversal of the Talibans position.32 Therefore, the Afghan war passed the Doctrines fourth test. Due to the problems addressed in the study of the war and the third test, the Afghan war fails the fifth test. There was no plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement. For proof of this, we only need to remember that the Bush administration failed to ever conclude the war, and that in fact it persists to the present day. The war does pass the sixth test, with flying colors. The administration knew exactly what the consequences of their action would be, the declaration and enunciation of an aggressive, interventionist new military doctrine that, ironically, fundamentally broke with Powells. Paul Wolfowitz had been trying to establish it since at least 1992,
32

Perhaps if the Taliban had chosen to apprehend Osama bin Laden and had extradited him to the United States for trial, war could have been averted. Nevertheless, this was obviously no the decision that was made.

34 when a strategy memo leaked to the New York Times laid out a Wolfowitz doctrine that was remarkably similar to the later Bush Doctrine. There was a sense of purpose and careful calculation of consequences in the build up to and prosecution of the Afghan war, easily passing the sixth test. Of all of the tests posed by the Powell doctrine, the Afghan war passes the seventh the most easily. As previously noted, the war was supported by 89% of the American people during the fall of 2001; this figure increased to 93% by January of 2002.33 It was this spectacular performance on the seventh test of his doctrine that allowed him to overlook the failures of the war on tests three and five. Finally, the war also passes the eighth test. 55 nations offered some sort of support for the American war effort, with 28 of them actually sending in people on the ground in Afghanistan.34 The coalition included a wide variety of nations, including 21 of Americas 27 NATO allies. Through the first seven months of the war, for example, Belgium delivered large quantities of food, along with a Belgian C-130 with crew. Canada sent a total of 3,400 troops, including both navy and air force. The Czech Republic contributed 251 trainers, but they were stationed in Kuwait. They did not send any personnel into Afghanistan. France provided extensive humanitarian and logistical support, while also supplying an infantry company to provide security to Mazar-e-Sharif. Germany provided 2,560 soldiers, including army, air force, to navy, and special forces. Italy deployed major naval support to the war effort, along with a plane from its air force.
33 34

Afghanistan." PollingReport.com. Web. United States of America. Department of Defense. Office of Public Affairs. International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism. 2002 and United States of America. Department of State. Congressional Research Service. Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support. By David J. Gerleman, Jennifer E. Stevens, and Steven A. Hildreth. 2001.

35 Polish engineers cleared more than 4000 square meters of land from mines. The United Kingdom sent thousands of highly trained Royal Marines that battled with their American counterparts on the front lines of the war. Support was also offered by nations not traditionally considered American allies, such as Russia, China, and Pakistan. While there is no doubt that the Afghan war was an American-led effort, and that the brunt of the military burden fell upon American shoulders, there is also no doubt that a wide coalition of diverse countries offered substantial material support for the effort. Therefore, it is easy to say that the war enjoyed genuine, broad international support. The Afghan war passed six of the Powell doctrines eight tests. The ones it failed were due to a lack of proper analysis of an endgame for the war. While this factor presents a challenge to the Afghan wars applicability to the Powell doctrine, Secretary of State Powell chose to publicly and aggressively support the war. This was due to the enormous popular and presidential support for the war; Powell decided that in light of the political circumstances, the United States needed to act. The military decisions regarding strategy and exit plan were no longer a part of his portfolio. On the other six tests, all of which are in some way of a diplomatic nature, the war passed, and thus Powell supported it.

The Wolfowitz Doctrine and the Afghan War At around the same time that the Powell Doctrine was forming, and within the same administration, Paul Wolfowitz was authoring a doctrine of his own. As Undersecretary for Defense of Policy, in 1992 Wolfowitz was charged with writing the Defense Planning Guidance, a document intended to relate overall American global

36 strategy to military leaders so that they could sufficiently allocate resources for the years ahead. This document envisioned a new, post-cold war role for America in the world. This document was leaked to the New York Times35 and caused a quite a stir among both Americans and American allies; it was substantially rewritten under the guidance of Cheney and Rumsfeld. Nevertheless, the original document points to a six-point doctrine for the goals of American global strategy.36 1) In the wake of the cold war, America has emerged as the worlds one superpower. The United States must endeavor to maintain this new status quo, and should work to prevent any rival state from acquiring sufficient resources to challenge its hegemonic position. 2) The United States must assume leadership of the global community given its hegemonic position, and must account for the interests of other great powers sufficiently to dissuade them from attempting to challenge American role in the international systems new status quo. 3) Because coalitions are often unstable, they cannot be relied upon for national security. The United States must work to quell this uncertainty as it could lead to threats to its security interests. America must do this by making it clear that the new world order is backed by American power. 4) The United States must selectively address through force wrongs that threaten her own interests, or those of her allies and friends, or the international status quo. 5) Russia is still the most powerful nation in the world other than the United States, and America must work to prevent a resurgent Russia from once again challenging the United States for global hegemony. 6) The United States must remain the predominant outside power in the Middle East in order to ensure the Americas continued access to the regions oil. Testing the Wolfowitz Doctrine: Afghanistan 1) Will action do nothing to adversely effect Americas hegemonic position in the international order? 2) Does action emphasize Americas leadership of the global community? 3) Is the United States capable of continuing the action unilaterally if its allies abandon the cause? 4) Does this action address through force wrongs that affect the United States,
35

I repeatedly queried the New York Times reporter, Patrick Tyler, who broke the story about getting a copy of the original Defense Planning Guidance (which is still classified) for my academic research, particularly because in one section Paul Wolfowitz provided an illustrative example of how the United States might go about a war with Iraq, but I was unfortunately rebuffed. 36 Tyler, Patrick E. "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring That No Rivals Develop." New York Times 8 Mar. 1992.

37 its friends, and its allies? 5) Is the action sure not to embolden and empower Russia? 6) Is the action sure to not threaten Americas predominant outside power position in the Middle East? The Defense Planning Guidance is a military document, and thus the Doctrine is laid out in realist terms. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the Doctrine also supports Wolfowitzs overall Wilsonian Liberal goal of spreading democracy leading to global peace under American leadership. A world where America is the pre-eminent leader of the international community not only militarily, but politically, where the United States is so secure in its hegemonic position that the very idea of another nation challenging that position is absurd is fundamentally ripe for aggressive American interventionism in promoting democratic freedoms through both hard and soft power. In fact, the doctrine can be read as a plan to make that international structure possible. As regards the Afghan war, the doctrine presents no objections. The Afghan war did nothing to harm Americas efforts to maintain its status as the worlds sole superpower. The United States did not commit enough money or manpower to the effort to legitimately threaten its hegemonic position within the world order; the American homeland was also not at any serious risk throughout the war. The Afghan war at its onset enhanced Americas position as world leader. America made it clear that as the worlds most powerful state, it would not tolerate terrorism, and would topple regimes that harbored terrorists who then sponsored attacks on American soil. In this effort, it led a wide coalition of nations, including all of its potential great power rivals.37 Wolfowitz was undoubtedly enthusiastic about the war for
37

In 2001, that list was comprised of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and China

38 these reasons, among others. The United States decision to assemble a coalition of allies to go to war with does not run into serious resistance from the Wolfowitz Doctrines third tenet. While these allies undoubtedly provided substantial support, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not deem anyones support, not even Great Britains essential.38 The war was and remains a predominantly American effort, and thus Wolfowitz reasoned that a collapse of international support for the war would not also collapse the war effort. Therefore the danger that his third tenet warns of was rendered immaterial. The Afghan war directly follows the principle of the fourth tenet, that the United States must selectively use force to address wrongs that threaten her own interests (or those of her allies). The attacks of 9/11 presented a clear wrong that the United States would address through war. No more needs to be said. On the fifth principle, Russia would not appear to gain militarily through an American defeat in Afghanistan; in fact Russia was even a member of the American coalition. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine that Russia would gain a strategic advantage over the United States if the American mission in Afghanistan were successful. Therefore the fifth tenet was not violated. The Afghan war provides some material support for the sixth tenet, as it forced the deployment of much larger numbers of U.S. troops to the Greater Middle East, expanding the United States military presence in the area, and possibly creating a regional political structure more conducive to United States economic interests after the defeat of the Taliban.
38

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans. Rumsfeld quickly backtracked on those comments for obvious diplomatic reasons.

39 We can see that the Afghan war adhered to all of the tenets of the Wolfowitz Doctrine as well as most of the tenets of the Powell Doctrine. The Pragmatic Realists and Wilsonian Liberals within Bushs White House were in relative harmony regarding this conflict. This is reflected in Bushs evolving rationale for the Afghan war; he embraced both the realist tenets of eradicating al Qaeda as well as the idealist beliefs of spreading freedom and righting wrongs. These somewhat smooth waters between the two islands of thought became engulfed in a hurricane in the build up and execution of the 2003 War in Iraq. The disagreements over that war, and Bushs decision to adopt the Wilsonian Liberals position, play a critical role in understanding the evolution of the Presidents foreign policy. The episode ended with the resignation of Colin Powell, and the promotion of Paul Wolfowitz.

The Powell Doctrine and the Iraq war Testing the Powell Doctrine: Iraq 1) Is a vital national security interest threatened? 2) Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3) Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4) Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? 5) Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6) Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7) Does the American people support the action? 8) Do we have genuine broad international support? While the Afghan war adhered to most of the principles of the Powell Doctrine, the Iraq War presented a clear departure from those principles. For this reason, it is unsurprising that Powell offered significant resistance to the Iraq War within the administration. First we must test the Iraq War against the Doctrine as we did the Afghan

40 war in order to note the significant differences. The Iraq War is questionable in the eyes the Powell Doctrines proponents from the very first test. There is no case that Iraq, a nation that had been dormant since the Persian Gulf War, presented a credible threat to vital American national security interests. The counter-argument is that American intelligence had confirmed that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. If such weapons actually existed it is plausible that vital security interests were threatened. Given this, the Iraq War probably passes the first test of the Powell Doctrine. There was a clear and attainable objective to the Iraq War, but a vague and possibly unattainable one accompanied it. The goal of toppling Husseins regime and ending Iraqs weapons program is focused and could be readily achieved through American force. The other goal however, of eventually building a stable and free society for Iraqis is enormous and extremely difficult to envision, let alone achieve. In fact, an important reason that President George H.W. Bush (with Powell as his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) chose not to press on to Baghdad was because he understood how difficult the subsequent nation-building project would be. Given the lack of coherent strategy for dealing with this second objective, the Iraq War fails the second test of the Powell doctrine. The costs of establishing a free and stable government in Iraq were grossly underestimated, as they were in Afghanistan. When the President initiated Operation Iraqi freedom, he clearly did not envision the scope of the commitment that the United States would eventually need to undertake to accomplish its mission. The war fails the third test.

41 The war also fails the fourth test. France clearly believed that the United States was moving much too quickly in its mobilization against Iraq and strongly urged that the United Nations weapons inspectors be given more time to do their job, a position that ultimately resulted in the absence of a second security council resolution explicitly authorizing force in Iraq. From the point of view of many of the members of the security council, as well as a host of voices on the American left, the diplomatic options had not been completely exhausted, especially in light of there being no imminent threat to American security. The lack of an exit strategy is just as obvious in Iraq as it was in Afghanistan, and for the same reason; tens of thousands of American troops remain in Iraq to the present day. The war fails the fifth test. Furthermore, in this case, there was less regard for the full consequences of the war than in Afghanistan. This is reflected in the enduring opinion of the American public that the Afghan war was more justified than the Iraq War, and the perpetual greater favorability ratings of the Afghan war. The Afghan war thus fails the sixth test. The war passes the seventh test as the initial action was supported by 74% of the American people.39 Because the overwhelming support of the American public was critical in convincing Powell to support the Afghan war, it is important to note that the while popular domestic support existed for the Iraq war, it did not approach the near unanimity of the Afghan war. As previously noted, the Afghan war was supported by 89% of the American people. Likewise the Authorization for Use of Military Forces Against Terrorists resolution passed 420-1 in the House of Representatives and 98-0 in

39

"Iraq." PollingReport.com. Web.

42 the Senate.40 In contrast, the Iraq War resolution encountered substantial, if not overwhelming, resistance in Congress. It passed 297-133 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate; Democrats as a congressional caucus opposed the resolution 147-111. From the beginning, the Iraq war lacked the level of public support of the Afghan war; Powell was less likely to be swayed by this more tepid public approval for conflict. Whether or not the Iraq war passes the Doctrines eighth test is debatable. By the end of 2003, the American-led coalition in Iraq included 37 countries. However, many notable members of the Afghan coalition were not a part of the Iraq coalition. France, Germany, Russia and China were all great powers that participated in the first coalition, but not the second. By this measure, all six of the United States potential great power rivals supported the American war effort in Afghanistan, in contrast, only two (United Kingdom and Japan) supported the latter War in Iraq. While the United States did not act alone in Iraq, the fact that two thirds of its potential great power rivals declined to participate, coupled with the fact that due to a lack of specific authorization for the use of force, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the U.S. action as illegal41 shows that the Iraq War fails the eighth test of the Powell Doctrine. The War in Iraq only adhered to one or two of the Powell Doctrines eight tenets, so it is utterly unsurprising that Powell was a reluctant warrior in this war.42 Powell had favored very different measures for dealing with the threats posed by Iraq. In the early days of the administration, before 9/11, Iraq policy was left primarily in [his] hands.43
40

United States of America. The Library of Congress. THOMAS. Bill Summary & Status 107th Congress (2001 - 2002) S.J.RES.23. and United States of America. The Library of Congress. THOMAS. Bill Summary & Status 107th Congress (2001 - 2002) H.J.RES.64. 41 "Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan." BBC News - Home. 16 Sept. 2004. 42 "Colin Powell on Iraq, Race, and Hurricane Relief." ABCNews.com. 8 Sept. 2005. 43 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 301

43 The Secretary of State recommended a program of smart sanctions. These were designed to be lighter on the Iraqi civilians, and harsher on the Iraqi military than the preexisting sanctions. This plan was shouted down within the administration by hawks such as Wolfowitz. At his confirmation hearing to be deputy secretary of defense, Wolfowitz had pointedly asserted that sanctions could be only one component of an effective Iraq policy.44 Wolfowitz himself had long favored a much more aggressive policy in Iraq.

The Wolfowitz Doctrine and the Iraq war Before 9/11, before President George W. Bush, even before President Bill Clinton, Wolfowitz had been advocating an American policy of regime change in Iraq. In January 1998, he signed an open letter to President Clinton, issued by the Project for the New American Century. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.45 The basis for this action was not purely in the interest of strict national security. Wolfowitz had also expressed astonishment that some argued the lack of an imminent,

44 45

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 301 "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq." Project for the New American Century. 26 Jan. 1998. Other notable signatories of the letter included Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, William Cristol, Richard Perle, and Donald Rumsfeld, among others

44 vital national security threat from Iraq barred the United States from military action.46 He felt that argument implicitly accepts Saddams brutality.47 This adds an important moral justification for action, even in the absence of a pragmatic realist rationale, and this sort of position is what makes Wolfowitz a Wilsonian Liberal. Wolfowitz portrayed his vision of U.S. foreign policy as an outgrowth of idealism, in contrast with the strategic thinking of Henry Kissinger and others.48 The basis of Wilsonian Liberalism is, and has always been, that doing what is right by Americas expressed morals is also in Americas national interest. Wolfowitzs unambiguous belief in this synergy is evident to the present day when he advocates for American intervention in Libya by saying It is both morally right and in America's strategic interest to enable the Libyans to fight for themselves.49 Testing the Wolfowitz Doctrine: Iraq 1) Will action do nothing to adversely effect Americas hegemonic position in the international order? 2) Does action emphasize Americas leadership of the global community? 3) Is the United States capable of continuing the action unilaterally if its allies abandon the cause? 4) Does this action address through force wrongs that affect the United States, its friends, and its allies? 5) Is the action sure not to embolden and empower Russia? 6) Is the action sure to not threaten Americas predominant outside power position in the Middle East? To see how the Iraq War jives with Wolfowitzs overall strategy for American hegemony, we must turn again to the Wolfowitz doctrine and test the war against its precepts. On the first precept, the war clearly passes muster, as there is no reasonable
46 47

You will recall that this is the first test of the Powell Doctrine Boyer, Peter J. "The Believer: Paul Wolfowitz Defends His War." The New Yorker 1 Nov. 2004. 48 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 368 49 Wolfowitz, Paul. "The Case for Backing Libya's Rebels." The Wall Street Journal [New York City] 11 Mar. 2011, Opinion sec.

45 argument that the War in Iraq threatened the American hegemonic position. The second principle is more complicated. There is certainly a strong argument that the American decision to go to war in Iraq without United Nations approval undermined American world leadership. Nevertheless, it is important to understand Wolfowitzs own philosophy on this matter. In his opinion, when the United States engaged in morally correct foreign intervention, as he believed the Iraq War was, other nations that might initially be reluctant to send support would eventually come on board. While this did not actually happen, and in the long run it is clear that the War in Iraq fails the second test posed by the Wolfowitz doctrine, at the time of the invasion Wolfowitz thought that the war did in fact enhance American leadership. As demonstrated by the open letter to President Clinton, the Wolfowitz Doctrine states, because coalitions are unstable, they cannot be relied upon for national security.50 This explains Wolfowitzs support for the war despite the lack of UN approval. In the Deputy Secretarys opinion, the United States possessed the military power to unilaterally achieve its objectives in Iraq. Although help would undoubtedly be welcomed, it would only be accepted on the condition that it came with no strings attached in terms of American sovereignty over her own military decisions. This was the case in Iraq, and the war clearly passes Wolfowitzs third test. Wolfowitz held the opinion, unshared by both the State Department and the intelligence community, that all terrorism in the Middle East was linked and that Saddam Hussein must be held at least partially responsible for 9/11. Between this, Husseins perceived refusal to be open with UN weapons inspectors and his sustained violence
50

"Letter to President Clinton on Iraq." Project for the New American Century. 26 Jan. 1998.

46 against his own citizens, Wolfowitz certainly perceived a wrong in Iraq that threatened American interests. Therefore, the fourth test of the doctrine is passed. As in the Afghan war, the War in Iraq had minimal to no bearing on the balance of power between the United States and its old rival, Russia. The fifth test is inconsequential to Bushs second major war. The War in Iraq, at least through the title of its first phase, Shock and Awe was at least partially designed to project the image of American military power throughout the region. The creation of major American bases in Iraq coupled with the overthrow of a hostile regime presumably to be replaced by a more friendly one certainly helped to ensure that the United States remain the predominant outside power in the Middle East[this would help to] ensure the nations continued access to the regions oil. The War in Iraq, like the Afghan war, passed all of the tests posed by the Wolfowitz doctrine. Thus, we should not be surprised to find that Wolfowitz became the administration official most closely identified with the invasion of Iraq. In the midst of the invasion Americans working in the war zone came up with the nickname Wolfowitz of Arabia for the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the phrase captured the degree or intensity, passion and even, it sometimes seemed, romantic fervor with which he pursued the goals of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and bringing democracy to the Middle East.51

The Rise of the Wolf and the Fall of the General From the preceding analysis, it is to be expected that Wolfowitz rose in power during the Bush administration while Powells authority waned until he was eventually
51

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 367

47 asked to resign by Chief of Staff Andrew Card on November 10th, 2004, eight days after the Presidents re-election.52 Despite his best efforts, within the Bush administration the neoconservative Wilsonian Liberals that he had once referred to as fucking crazies had soundly defeated his view of the role of the American military.53 For Powell, although he felt that his support for the war, and particularly his presentation to the United Nations Security Council had permanently tarnished his reputation, he did not regret it. Loyalty is a trait that I value, and yes, I am loyal. And there are some who say, 'Well, you shouldn't have supported it. You should have resigned.' But I'm glad that Saddam Hussein is gone. I'm glad that that regime is gone," he said.54 He echoed this same good soldier rationale in another interview two years later. "We've really got to make the case" against Hussein, Bush told Powell in an Oval Office meeting in late January, "and I want you to make it." Only Powell had the "credibility to do this," Bush said. "Maybe they'll believe you."55 It was a direct order from his commander in chief, and it never occurred to Powell to question it.56 While he may be glad that Hussein is gone, there is no doubt that the Iraq War did not follow the Pragmatic Realist principles put forth by the Powell Doctrine. Therefore, the following excerpt should be read as at least a little tongue in cheek. When Walters pressed Powell about that support, given the "mess" that the invasion has yielded, Powell said, "Who
52

DeYoung, Karen. "Falling on His Sword: Colin Powell's Most Significant Moment Turned out to Be His Lowest." The Washington Post 1 Oct. 2006, Magazine sec. 53 Blumenthal, Sidney. "Colin and the Crazies: The Culling of the US Secretary of State Is Symptomatic of a Swing Even Further to the Right." The Guardian [London] 18 Nov. 2004, Comment sec. 54 "Colin Powell on Iraq, Race, and Hurricane Relief." ABCNews.com. 8 Sept. 2005. 55 This should not be read as the President suggesting that he was asking Powell to lie, rather he was simply expressing that Powell was the person in the administration with the most domestic and international credibility on the issue. 56 DeYoung, Karen. "Falling on His Sword: Colin Powell's Most Significant Moment Turned out to Be His Lowest." The Washington Post 1 Oct. 2006, Magazine sec.

48 knew what the whole mess was going to be like?57 Of course, Powell would be the one to have at least some idea of what the mess was going to be like. The War in Iraq blatantly violated the vast majority of the principles of his doctrine, and that doctrine was explicitly designed to avoid the sort of unorganized, conflicting, vague sets of objectives (experienced by Powell as a soldier in Vietnam) from emerging in Iraq after the end of major combat operations. The fact that the doctrine was deliberately ignored, and that the problems that emerged were exactly those it had been designed to prevent point to the fact that Powell had quite a few ideas about the mess, and that is why he was such a reluctant warrior. Pragmatic Realism had adequately foretold the potential consequences of Operation Iraqi Freedom; its argument simply did not win against the argument of Wilsonian Liberalism in the eyes of the President. Wolfowitz was not a proponent of those sorts of hyper-rational calculations of regional stability as being the main determinant of American foreign policy. Besides, he believed that a democratic Iraq would be more stable than Husseins Iraq, and that regional stability would improve as a result. Wolfowitz observed that some peoplemeaning the realists in the foreign policy community, including Secretary of State Colin Powellbelieved that the Cold War balance of power had brought a measure of stability to the Persian Gulf. But, Wolfowitz continued, Poland had a phrase that correctly characterized that as the stability of the graveyard. The so-called stability that Saddam Hussein provided was something even worse.58 The fact of the matter is that to Wolfowitz, stability itself was not in the interest of American hegemony if that stability came at the cost of gross violations of freedom and human rights perpetrated by hostile, autocratic regimes. The President identified with this
57 58

"Colin Powell on Iraq, Race, and Hurricane Relief." ABCNews.com. 8 Sept. 2005. Boyer, Peter J. "The Believer: Paul Wolfowitz Defends His War." The New Yorker 1 Nov. 2004.

49 Wilsonian Liberal position, and the War in Iraq is the evidence. The American military strategy demonstrated that the Pentagon was beginning to turn away from Powells approach to warfare; the emphasis of the Iraqi operation was not upon the application of overwhelming force, but upon speed and mobility. So too the occupation of Iraq that followed the war seemed to contradict the cautious principles that Powell had set down in the 1980s: a long term commitment of American troops without any clear plan for when or how the operation might end.59 The fact that overwhelming force was no longer requisite to American military action opened up a plethora of options for the advance of freedom through force around the world. The Wolfowitz Doctrine provided a much clearer rationale for the actions of the Bush administration than did the Powell Doctrine and it is unsurprising that the Bush Doctrine that emerged hews so closely to its intellectual predecessor. This foreign policy evolution is sufficiently demonstrated through a close reading of the Presidents speeches, writings and debates, from his time as a Republican primary candidate through the end of his Presidency.

Chapter IV: George W. Bush

59

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 365

50 Governor Bush, 2000 Republican Presidential Candidate President George W. Bushs record must be examined closely to understand his administrations leanings on democratic promotion abroad. This is because those leanings went through many twists and turns throughout his candidacy and Presidency. The Bush that campaigned in 2000 is different from the Bush in the wake of 9/11, who is different from the Bush in the immediate lead-up to the Iraq war, who is different from the Bush who found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and failed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Governor Bush first campaigned for the Republican nomination for the Presidency mainly against Senator John McCain. Here we get our first glimpse of his vision of the role of the United States in democratic promotion. The issue was raised in the Republican primary debate in Phoenix Arizona on December 6th, 1999, when Gary Bauer challenged the Texas Governor on his support for a closer relationship with China. Bauer characterized this as similar to the Clinton administrations view, and Bush responded. [Y]ou know how to insult a guy to say I follow the policies of Clinton-Gore. I don't. They believe in what's called a strategic partnership. I believe in redefining the relationship to one of competitor. But I believe competitors can find common ground. I think it's in our nation's best interest to open up Chinese markets It's also in our best interest to make sure that the entrepreneurial class in China flourishes. I think if we make China an enemy, they'll end up being an enemy. I think if we trade with China and trade with the entrepreneurial class and give people a breath of freedom, give them a taste of freedom, I think you'll be amazed, Gary, at how soon democracy will come But let me make this clear to you, and to the Chinese: I will enforce the Taiwan relations law, if I am the president. If the Chinese get aggressive with the Taiwanese, we'll help them defend themselves.60 In this rebuttal, Governor Bush laid out his basic guiding principles on international
60

2000 Republican Presidential Primary Debate. C-SPAN. 6 Dec. 1999. Web. Transcript.

51 relations in the context of democracy. He showed a committed faith to the power of the free market to promote democracy abroad, and he considered that an admirable goal of free trade expansion. The end of the quote is more interesting. The Governors strong affirmation of military support for the defense of Taiwan can be taken a number of ways. He did not, for a multitude of reasons, pledge American support for a democratic Taiwanese takeover of China. That position could be described as Wilsonian extremism. Nevertheless, he also did not suggest that American relations with China and Taiwan are defined solely by economics. It is clear that he valued the democratic values of those who struggle for a Republic of Taiwan, and that he thought those interests should play a role in American foreign policy. In this respect, Bush broke with the realist tradition by not leaving his options open on the issue of Taiwan as he sought closer economic relations with China. It would be difficult to argue that this position is in the best interest of the American economy and more difficult still to claim that the United States has a legitimate national security concern in the defense of the Taiwanese. From this vantage point, Bush showed hints of sympathy for some Wilsonian Liberal ideals. Nevertheless, Gary Bauer followed up on that answer from Governor Bush with an attack by focusing on the perceived pragmatic realism in the answer. BAUER: Governor, we would have never made the argument that you just made if we were talking about Nazi Germany. Is there no atrocity that you can think of -- the labor camps doubling in their slave labor, a bigger crackdown, more priests disappearing in the middle of the night? Is there anything that would tell you to put trade on the back burner? BUSH: Gary, I agree with you, that forced abortion is abhorrent. And I agree with you when leaders try to snuff out religion. But I think if we turn our back on China and isolate China, things will get worse. Imagine if the Internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread our greatest export to the world has been, is, and always will be the incredible freedom we understand in America. And that's why it's important for us to trade with China, to encourage the growth of an entrepreneurial class. It gets that taste of freedom. It gets that breath of

52 freedom in the marketplace.61 In this exchange, Governor Bush paid lip service to the idea that some factors could potentially override naked free market capitalism in trade relations, but then quickly reaffirmed his belief that the free market could do what his armies would later struggle mightily at, spreading democracy to foreign nations. In his prior answer, the future President had made clear that aggression towards peaceful, democracy-leaning people such as the Taiwanese could endanger trade relations. But as far as clearly sovereign domestic issues go, his only hesitations could come from an attack on (presumably Christian) religion. From this we have a basic idea that candidate Bush supported the spread of democracy, but he considered free trade the vehicle for its deliverance. His views on the role of the military became more fleshed out after he received the Republican nomination. On his first Presidential campaign, Governor Bush sought to make a national issue out of the military and specifically military spending. He contended that the Clinton-Gore administration had shortchanged the military in funding and that this was bad for the militarys morale, bad for national moral and most importantly, bad for national security. At a campaign rally in Grand Rapids, he articulated his vision. [W]e will treat the people of our military better, so we can recruit and retain the best our nation has to offer. We will add a billion dollars in salary increases. We will improve military housing. We will improve the quality of training at our bases and national training centers, because shortfalls in training can become disasters on the battlefield.62 President Bush made a commitment to increased military spending relative to the Clinton
61

2000 Republican Presidential Primary Debate. C-SPAN. 6 Dec. 1999. Web. Transcript. 62 Bush, George W.. "Campaign Rally." Bush for President. George W. Bush Presidential Campaign. Cornerstone University, Grand Rapids. 3 Nov. 2000. Speech.

53 administration, and he delivered. In eight years in office, not including the expenditures for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that he declined to include in tabulations of defense spending, the Bush administration spent more than one trillion more dollars on defense than the Clinton administration.63 While his increased financial commitment to the military is explicit, what is less clear is the purpose of this commitment. In his speech to the Republican National Convention accepting his nomination he hit the expected notes of national self-defense, but added an interesting twist: A generation shaped by Vietnam must remember the lessons of Vietnam. When America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming.64 This statement can be read at face value as a commitment to not involve America in wars based solely on abstract principles, for nothing could be a less clear goal. It presumably disavows the use of military force for purely economic reasons; as such a cause would surely not be just. Finally, combined with its reference to Vietnam, it refuses to enter the United States military into an open-ended conflict without a prompt exit strategy, for a victory by overwhelming force would not be comprised of over a decade in quagmire. It was a clear affirmation of the principles of Pragmatic Realism as dictated by the Powell Doctrine. In the Presidential debates between Governor Bush and Vice President Gore, the two candidates were asked specifically about their views on the role of the military, and the desirability of nation building. Here we get the Governors clearest exposition on the issue of the campaign.
63

"U.S. Military Spending, 19462009." Infoplease. Web. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904490.html>. 64 Bush, George W.. "Acceptance Speech." Republican National Convention. Republican National Party. First Union Center, Philadelphia. 3 Aug. 2000. Keynote speech.

54 I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. I believe we're overextended in too many places If we don't have a clear vision of the military, if we don't stop extending our troops all around the world and nation building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road, and I'm going to prevent that. I'm going to rebuild our military power. It's one of the major priorities of my administration.65 It is obvious that candidate Bush was opposed to the idea of nation building, a stance that aligned him with the Pragmatic Realist tradition. He reiterated this position in a later debate, specifically deriding the democratic promotion project in Haiti. You mentioned Haiti. I wouldn't have sent troops to Haiti. I didn't think it was a mission worthwhile. It was a nation-building mission, and it was not very successful. It cost us billions, a couple billions of dollars, and I'm not so sure democracy is any better off in Haiti than it was before I think what we need to do is convince people who live in the lands they live in to build the nations. Maybe I'm missing something here. I mean, we're going to have kind of a nationbuilding core from America? Absolutely not. Our military is meant to fight and win war. That's what it's meant to do.66 From this rhetoric, we have an outline of George W. Bushs basic views on the promotion of democracy as he entered office. In short, he believed in American promotion of the spread of democracy, but thought that the free market, as opposed to the military, was the proper vehicle for bringing about political and social change. In other words, Bush thought that democracy should grow organically, not be imposed. The military exists to fight wars, not to build foreign nations. He believed strongly in maintaining United States military superiority and thought that force should be used for the self-defense of the United States and its allies, including some disputed territories such as Taiwan. As such, Bush had emphasized his personal Pragmatic Realism.
65 66

2000 Presidential Debate. C-SPAN. 3 Oct. 2000. Web. Transcript. 2000 Presidential Debate. C-SPAN. 11 Oct. 2000. Web. Transcript.

55 Unfortunately, President Bush would be forced to critically re-examine his beliefs on foreign policy less than a year into his first term in office as a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

President Bush, In the Wake of 9/11 On the night of September 11th, President Bush addressed the nation in the most important speech of his young presidency. The address was the first step in framing the events of the day, and their proceeding consequences. The President made clear that he believed America was attacked because were the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.67 He vowed to hunt down the people behind the attack and called on Americas allies to join in the effort of defending freedom. There was no talk of democratic promotion, simply the defense of freedom from a yet-to-be determined evil. His speech to a joint session of Congress nine days later was far more specific, and reflected a shift in his administrations view of Americas role in the world. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan we see al Qaeda's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized, many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan -- after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid -- but we condemn the Taliban regime.68 It is imperative to recognize that President Bush did not limit himself to condemning the Taliban for providing a safe haven for al Qaeda. He went further and condemned the
67

Bush, George W. "Address to the Nation." The White House, Washington D.C. 11 Sept. 2001. Address. 68 Bush, George W.. "Joint Session Address to the Nation." The Capitol Building, Washington D.C.. 20 Sept. 2001. Address.

56 domestic policies of the government as a way of providing added legitimacy for the coming United States invasion. This is critical because by including this in the justification for the war, it also became a part of the rationale behind and purpose of the war, and thus a part of the necessary conditions for victory. This was not simply a conflict of national security; it was also a conflict of ideas. While President Bush took pains to assure Muslims that this fight was not against Islam, it clearly was against a certain form of Islamic extremism in government that the United States found unacceptable. The President then issued a series of demands of the Taliban that he termed not open to negotiation.69 They involved transport of all al Qaeda leaders to the United States for prosecution, release of political prisoners, protection for journalists, the closing of all terrorist camps, handing over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities, and allowing American inspections of all terrorist camps to assure they were no longer operational.70 Outside perhaps of the protection of journalists, every demand was clearly in the interest of national security and not for political change on the ground. President Bush then vowed to wage a global campaign to eradicate terrorists everywhere. In support of this campaign he declared the existence of a new international dichotomy: those nations that fight against terrorism and those that do not. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.71 In Bushs opinion, a lack of the freedoms traditionally associated with democracy leads to terrorism. The Presidents understanding of the nature of the threat had changed; the preconditions for terrorism
69 70

Ibid. Ibid. 71 Ibid.

57 abroad now constituted a threat to national security, not simply the presence of terrorists themselves. His powerful declaration inherently claimed the right of the United States to fight any nation that harbored terrorists. Given that there are no democracies on that list of countries, it also implicitly declared the right of a democracy to engage in regime change abroad for the purposes of its own security, assuming the democracy was militarily capable. Nothing could be more interventionist, and if the regime change was to be democratic, as it was, then nothing could be a clearer example of Wilsonian Liberalism. While the President had yet to explicitly abandon the opposition to nation building that he had expressed on the campaign trail, the writing was on the wall. The full disavowal of that principle followed shortly after, and was put on display to the nation in the 2002 State of the Union address when Bush delivered the strongest declaration of Wilsonian Liberalisms principles by an American President since Wilson himself. We want to be a nation that serves goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass. All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police. If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic "street" greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration. Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning, and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.72
72

Bush, George W.. "State of the Union Address." The Capitol Building, Washington

58 While Bush did not explicitly commit his administration to the process of nation building with this statement, he did clearly lay out preconditions for what must be the situation on the ground for the United States military to return home. He described the conditions, which all call for a government dramatically different in structure, form and authority from the Taliban, as non-negotiable. This Bush, with his universal moralist rhetoric, and preconditions for the end of conflict was very different from the one who derided the idea of nation building just two years earlier. It is very difficult to imagine a modern state defined by rule of law (constitutionalism), limited power, respect for woman (equality), private property (capitalism), free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance (human rights) that is not a democracy. Bush consistently framed the conflict in terms of this idea that lack of democracy led inevitably to extremism. It was this causal relationship that Bush presented to the United Nations in 2006 when he asked "Will we support the moderates and reformers who are working for change across the Middle East, or will we yield the future to the terrorists and extremists?"73 It is evident that the President believed that promoting democracy was a solution to terrorism. What seems clear is that the Afghan war was principally a war of broadly defined self-defense, but its conclusion would require some form of a democratic state. It was only after many months of ground operations made plain that a nation building project would be required that the Bush administration embraced one. This is different from President Bushs second major war in Iraq, where the concept of spreading freedom was intertwined with national security from the beginning as the rationale behind the conflict. D.C.. 29 Jan. 2002. Address. 73 "Bush to U.N.: Choose between Freedom or Extremism." CNN.com. 19 Sept. 2006. Web.

59

President Bush and the Beginnings of the War in Iraq In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush laid the foundation for the future war with Iraq. Once again, the President asserted, Free people will set the course of history.74 He once again directly compared the modern war against terror to previous wars against fascism and communism. He then went further, defining such struggles as Americas purpose. In all of these efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to follow a process -- it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world.75 Such a statement inevitably evokes memories of President Wilsons war to end all wars. Bush proceeded to single out three countries for posing such terrible threats. These were the axis of evil of North Korea, Iran and Iraq. He spent the most time on Iraq, unleashing a rhetorical assault on its dictator, Saddam Hussein. Unlike the Taliban, Saddam Hussein had not sponsored any attacks on United States soil. Nevertheless, the President claimed that there was strong reason to suspect that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that these weapons posed an existential threat to America and her allies. He buttressed this claim with the further assertion that Saddams Iraq was harboring members of al Qaeda. He argued that given this situation, the United States had a sovereign right to strike preemptively to remove the threat. This concept of pre-emptive self-defense in the eastern hemisphere represented a break in the tradition of the United States armed forces, and is now referred to as the Bush Doctrine.

74

Bush, George W.. "State of the Union Address." The Capitol Building, Washington D.C.. 28 Jan. 2003. Address. 75 Ibid.

60 Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.76 While preemptive self-defense was the principal rationale behind conflict in this speech, it was notably supported by references to Iraqi liberation. And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country -- your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.77 President Bush then concluded his State of the Union Address with an acknowledgment of his belief that freedom is a universal value and right of all people. Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity.78 Such an unequivocal defense of libertys place in the world is about as far removed as a President can get from Nixon and Kissingers Pragmatic Realism. While the President used such moralist rhetoric in his rationale for war when he was speaking to the American (and later, as will be examined, the Iraqi) people, there were no traces of it in Secretary of State Colin Powells address to the United Nations. The presentation that Powell delivered was designed to prove that Iraq was in violation of its disarmament obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 144179 and that violation necessitated United States military intervention. Powell did not once attempt to
76

Bush, George W.. "State of the Union Address." The Capitol Building, Washington D.C.. 28 Jan. 2003. Address. 77 Ibid. 78 Bush, George W.. "State of the Union Address." The Capitol Building, Washington D.C.. 28 Jan. 2003. Address. 79 Powell, Colin. Presentation to UN Security Council on US case against Iraq United Nations, New York City. 06 Feb. 2003.

61 give a moralistic rationale for war; the only scant trace of Wilsonian Liberalism existed in his descriptions of the crimes Saddam Hussein committed against his own people, and that was for the express purpose of displaying the ruthless psychology that made Hussein a threat to the worlds security: My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are movingweapons of mass destruction to keep them from being found by inspectors There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again, against his neighbors and against his own people we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them.80 The Secretary of State further provided a laundry list of evidence that al Qaeda was operating freely in Iraq. The extremely questionable validity of these statements notwithstanding, the argument Powell made was one based strictly in vitally necessary security, not the value of freedom and democracy. As is widely known, the United Nations rejected this presentation by not recognizing the legitimacy of an American offensive in Iraq. Nevertheless, America, with a host of allies, attacked anyway. When the President no longer sought the consent of the UN Security Council, he embraced an even more Wilsonian tone, explicitly championing democratic promotion. In this sense, the administrations failure to secure international authorization for the war was freeing. It is difficult if not impossible to argue to the United Nations Security Council that a sovereign nation be forced to undergo regime change into a democracy. The policy prescriptions suggested by Wilsonian Liberalism are often illegal according to
80

Ibid.

62 contemporary international law; if the war was already to be illegal, then it follows that the rationale could be more explicitly Wilsonian. President Bushs commitment to democracy in Iraq was evident from the wars inception given its name, Operation Iraqi Freedom. The President explained that freedom for Iraqis was a bedrock mission objective in the war when he addressed the nation to announce the beginning of combat. My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail.81 The President was even clearer in his address to the Iraqi people less than a month later. At this moment, the regime of Saddam Hussein is being removed from power, and a long era of fear and cruelty is ending. American and coalition forces are now operating inside Baghdad -- and we will not stop until Saddams corrupt gang is gone. The government of Iraq, and the future of your country, will soon belong to you The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. Coalition forces will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave. Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent, and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world You will be free, free to build a better life free to pursue economic prosperity without the hardship of economic sanctions, free to travel and free speak your mind, free to join in the political affairs of Iraq You deserve to live as free people. And I assure every citizen of Iraq: Your nation will soon be free.82 These words reflect beyond doubt that the President sincerely believed the Iraqi people wished to be free of Saddam Husseins dictatorship, otherwise he would have chosen a different argument to present to them. In much more direct language than he had ever used to engage his domestic audience, President Bush committed his nation to the full81

Bush, George W.. "Operation Iraqi Freedom Address." The White House, Washington D.C.. 19 Mar. 2003. Address. 82 Bush, George W.. "Address to the Peoples of Iraq." The White House, Washington D.C.. 10 Apr. 2003. Address.

63 scale nation-building project of turning Iraq into a free democracy. Not since World War 2 in Germany and Japan had so ambitious a project of Wilsonian democratic promotion been undertaken. President Bush had his first press conference on the war in Iraq on April 13th, 2004, over a year after the start of combat. At this point (and all later points to the present day) no weapons of mass destruction had been found, none of the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons that Colin Powell had assured the United Nations Security Council posed a grave threat to the United States and the world. Given this development, it became increasingly difficult for the President to maintain the argument that the war was a reaction to an imminent threat to national security. Therefore, it is unsurprising that he more closely embraced democracy promotion as the conflicts rationale. In answers to reporters questions, the President stated: A secure and free Iraq is an historic opportunity to change the world and make America more secure They need us there to fight off these violent few who are doing everything they can to resist the advance of freedom Some of the debate really center around the fact that people don't believe Iraq can be free; that if you're Muslim, or perhaps brown-skinned, you can't be self-governing and free. I strongly disagree with that. I reject that, because I believe that freedom is the deepest need of every human soul, and, if given a chance, the Iraqi people will be not only self-governing, but a stable and free society.83 With such a stunningly new take on democratic promotion abroad, it is to be expected that Bushs stances in his 2004 debates were very different from those in 2000.

Bush, the 2004 Election

83

Bush, George W.. "Prime Time Press Conference on Iraq War." The White House, Washington D.C.. 13 Apr. 2004. Address.

64 With no smoking gun in the form of a weapon of mass destruction Americans were growing increasingly skeptical about the war in Iraq. By election time, only 48% expressed approval regarding the Presidents handling of the issue.84 In a desperate attempt to maintain control of the national narrative, President Bush became arguably the most full-throated supporter of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) to ever call the White House home. However, his version of DPT came with a new twist. The President went beyond the standard tenet of the theory: democratic nations do not go to war with each other. He further claimed that democratic nations are more peaceful as a whole, and that only democratic nations were capable of rooting out terrorists from their soil.85 Given this new Bush DPT, it logically followed that the United States has a security interest in the spread of democracy everywhere, regardless of the specific threats posed (or not posed) by non-democratic regimes. He said as much at the 2004 Republican National Convention, when he accepted his nomination. I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedomAnd as freedom advances heart by heart, and nation by nation America will be more secure and the world more peaceful.86 Those comments are arguably more Wilsonian Liberal than Wilson himself. It is hard to imagine that even President Wilson believed the wisest use of force was to advance freedom, as opposed to self-defense. President Bush used the same tact against Senator Kerry in their Presidential debates. We're pursuing a strategy of-- of freedom around the world, because I understand free nations will reject terror; free nations will answer the hopes and aspirations of
84 85

Iraq." PollingReport.com. Web. A dubious claim to say the least given that the cell which launched the 9/11 attacks had been operating for years in America with impunity 86 Bush, George W.. "Acceptance Speech." Republican National Convention. Republican National Party. Madison Square Garden, New York City. 2 Sep. 2004. Keynote speech.

65 their people; free nations will help us achieve the peace we all want... We'll continue to spread freedom. I believe in the transformational power of liberty. I believe that a free Iraq is in this Nation's interests. I believe a free Afghanistan is in this Nation's interests, and I believe both a free Afghanistan and a free Iraq will serve as a powerful example for millions who plead in silence for liberty in the broader Middle East.87 What had begun three years earlier as an unavoidable war of self-defense had expanded to a multiple front war to spread freedom around the world. President Bush narrowly defeated John Kerry in the election, and he took this result as a mandate to continue on his foreign policy path. In his second inaugural address he declared it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.88 Steadily, as the conflicts dragged out with no clear exit strategy, public support for both wars waned. By the end of Bushs presidency only 46% of Americans favored the war in Afghanistan89 and only 33% favored the war in Iraq.90

President Bush, the Final Year As the Commander-in-Chief of two deeply unpopular wars, with an approval rating hovering between the low 30s and high 20s91, George W. Bush sounded like a defeated President. In 2006, Republicans lost both the House and the Senate. In his last year in office, President Bush was defensive of his decisions on the war on terror. In his
87

2004 Presidential Debate. C-SPAN. 8 Oct. 2004. Web. Transcript.

88

Bush, George W.. "Second Inaugural Address." Washington D.C.. 20 Jan. 2005 Address. 89 "Afghanistan." PollingReport.com. Web. 90 "Iraq." PollingReport.com. Web. 91 "Bush: Favorability." PollingReport.com. Web.

66 final press conference, he was questioned about the war in Iraq and admitted that while he agreed there was legitimate ground for debate on some specific decisions during the war, the war itself was just and moral. He emphasized that democracy was rising in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When asked about mistakes he responded: There have been disappointments. Abu Ghraib obviously was a huge disappointment during the presidency. Not having weapons of mass destruction was a significant disappointment. I don't know if you want to call those mistakes or not, but they were -- things didn't go according to plan, let's put it that way.92 While he acknowledged that the imminent national security threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate, in his farewell address, the President defended the fundamental morality of the war itself. America must maintain our moral clarity. I've often spoken to you about good and evil, and this has made some uncomfortable. But good and evil are present in this world, and between the two there can be no compromise. Murdering the innocent to advance an ideology is wrong every time, everywhere.93 Freeing people from oppression and despair is eternally right. This nation must continue to speak out for justice and truth. We must always be willing to act in their defense and to advance the cause of peace.94 In his final days, President Bush stuck to his convictions about the principles of militaryled democratic promotion abroad despite a largely disapproving nation that elected a new Democratic president largely as a referendum on his wars. President Bush exited the White House with very different ideas on the proper conduct of foreign policy than when he entered.

92

Bush, George W.. "Final Press Conference." The White House, Washington D.C.. 12 Jan. 2009. Address. 93 I will let the irony of this statement pass without any comment except this one. 94 Bush, George W.. "Farewell Address to the Nation." The White House, Washington D.C.. 15 Jan. 2009. Address.

67

Conclusion During his Presidency, George W. Bush underwent a clear transformation, changing from a Pragmatic Realist into a Wilsonian Liberal. A number of scholars have attempted to explain this transformation, with hypotheses ranging from the President was lying about the shift in foreign policy, to the argument that there was really no shift at all, to the idea that the President himself had little to no involvement with the decision. All of these theories, for a variety of reasons, are found wanting when stood up against the actual historical record. The Presidents shift from Pragmatic Realism to Wilsonian Liberalism was precipitated by the September 11th terrorist attacks. It did not occur all at once, but the proverbial first domino had fallen. After making that shift, President Bush required a contemporary theoretical rational for the policy of Wilsonian Liberalism that he chose to pursue. He found that rationale in the ideas elucidated in the Wolfowitz doctrine. The result changed the world, and we are still living with its effects to the present day.

68

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