REPUBLIC ACT NO.

7659

AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof, states "Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it"; WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society; WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability to maintain peace and order in the country; WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes; chanrobles virtual law library Now, therefore, Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy in a just and humane society; Sec. 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos. "No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court. "Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos." Sec. 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters

"Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in the Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers. The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters.

"Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances: "1. "2. Whenever Whenever they the have seized have a vessel their by victims boarding without or means firing of upon saving the same; or;

pirates

abandoned

themselves

"3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape." Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to read as follows: "Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or

present,

he

shall

suffer

the

penalty

for

the

offense

which

was

not

prosecuted.

"If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." Sec. 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows: "Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death." Sec. 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: "1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. "2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

"3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. "4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. "5. With evident premeditation.

"6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse." Sec. 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age. "If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal." chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: "1. "2. If If the it kidnapping shall or have detention been shall have committed lasted more than public three days.

simulating

authority.

"3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. "4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. "The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed." Sec. 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: "1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. "2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been inflicted.

"3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted. "4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263. "5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases." Sec. 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn: "1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions. chanrobles virtual law library "2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not. "3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure. "4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities. "5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance. "Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law. "The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn: "1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government. "2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials. "If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: "1. "2. When By the woman using is deprived force of reason or or otherwise intimidation; unconscious; and

"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. "The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. "The death penalty shall also be imposed it the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

"1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. "2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

"3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. "4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

"5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease. chanrobles virtual law library "6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency. "7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation."

Sec. 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State." Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the Philippines any prohibited drug. "Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. "Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in any form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place. "Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary. "Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any prohibited drug. "Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. "Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other plant which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.

"The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his part. "If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender." Sec. 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug in the Philippines. "Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any regulated drug. "Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows: "Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used in any form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place. "Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act No. 6425, is amended to read as follows: "Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 750 50 40 200 40 40 grams 40 grams grams grams or or grams grams or more grams or more more more of of or or of or of marijuana cocaine shabu more more or more indian resin or of methylamphetamine of hemp or cocaine or marijuana of opium; morphine; hydrochloride; heroin; marijuana; resin oil; or

hydrochloride;

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.

"Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. "Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, administration, delivery, transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds of the crime including but not limited to money and other obtained thereby and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs as well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without delay. "Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos." Sec. 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows: "Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining." Sec. 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces. "Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." Sec. 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Sec. 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years. chanrobles virtual law library "Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years. Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty. "Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Arresto mayor. Arresto menor. The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months. The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine." Sec. 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18)

years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. "In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter." Sec. 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: "1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

"1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances. chanrobles virtual law library

"The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. "An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. "2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. "3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, of from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. "4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. "5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: "(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; "(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime or which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and "(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. "Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. "For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener." Sec. 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.chanrobles virtual law library "If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthesized at the moment of the execution.

"As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be changed to gas poisoning.

"The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the judgment has become final." Sec. 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40. "In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power." Sec. 26. All laws, presidential decrees and issuances, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Sec. 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the approval hereof. chanrobles virtual law library

Euthanasia (from the Greek meaning "good death": , eu (well or good) + , thanatos (death)) refers to the practice of ending a life in a manner which relieves pain and suffering. According to the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, the precise definition of euthanasia is "a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life, to relieve intractable suffering."[1] Euthanasia is categorized in different ways, which include voluntary, non-voluntary, or involuntary and active or passive. Euthanasia is usually used to refer to active euthanasia, and in this sense, euthanasia is usually considered to be criminal homicide, but voluntary, passive euthanasia is widely non-criminal. The controversy surrounding euthanasia centers around a two-pronged argument by opponents which characterizes euthanasia as either voluntary "suicides", or as involuntary murders. (Hence, opponents argue that a broad policy of "euthanasia" is tantamount to eugenics). Much hinges on whether a particular death was considered an "easy", "painless", or "happy" one, or whether it was a "wrongful death". Proponents typically consider a death that increased suffering to be "wrongful", while opponents typically consider any deliberate death as "wrongful". "Euthanasia's" original meaning introduced the idea of a "rightful death" beyond that only found in natural deaths. During the Second World War, the Nazis ran a "Euthanasia Programme", codenamed Action T4, which was supposed to grant "mercy deaths" to incurable patients. In practice it was used to exterminate "lives unworthy of life" as part of their "racial hygiene" concept and, as a result, at least 200,000 physically or mentally handicapped people were killed by medication, starvation, or in the gas chambers between 1939 and 1945. Tony Hope, Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of Oxford, says that it is problematic to apply the term "euthanasia" do describe Action T4, as the term "implies that the death is for the person's benefit. What the Nazis did was to kill people without any consideration of benefit to the person killed."[2] Euthanasia is the most active area of research in contemporary bioethics.[3] Like other terms borrowed from history, the "euthanasia" has had different meanings depending on usage. The first apparent usage of the term "euthanasia" belongs to the historian Suetonius who described how the Emperor Augustus, "dying quickly and without suffering in the arms of his wife, Livia, experienced the 'euthanasia' he had wished for."[4] The word "euthanasia" was first used in a medical context by Francis Bacon in the 17th century, to refer to an easy, painless, happy death, during which it was a "physician's responsibility to alleviate the 'physical sufferings' of the body." Bacon referred to an "outward euthanasia"the term "outward" he used to distinguish from a spiritual conceptthe euthanasia "which regards the preparation of the soul."[5] In current usage, one approach to defining euthanasia has been to mirror Suetonius, regarding it as the "painless inducement of a quick death".[6] However, it is argued that this approach fails to properly define euthanasia, as it leaves open a number of possible actions which would meet the requirements of the definition, but would not be seen as euthanasia. In particular, these include situations where a person kills another, painlessly, but for no reason beyond that of personal gain; or accidental deaths which are quick and painless, but not intentional.[7][8] Thus another approach is to incorporate the notion of suffering into the definition.[7] The definition offered by the Oxford English Dictionary incorporates suffering as a necessary condition, with "the painless killing of a patient suffering from an incurable and painful disease or in an irreversible coma",[9] and this approach can be seen as a part of other works, such as Marvin Khol and Paul Kurtz's "a mode or act of inducing or permitting death painlessly as a relief from suffering".[10] However, focusing on this approach to defining euthanasia may also lead to counterexamples: such definitions may encompass killing a person suffering from an incurable disease for personal gain (such as to claim an inheritance), and commentators such as Tom Beauchamp & Arnold Davidson have argued that doing such would constitute "murder simpliciter" rather than euthanasia.[7] The third element incorporated into many definitions is that of intentionality the death must be intended, rather than being accidental, and the intent of the action must be a "merciful death".[7] Michael Wreen argued that the principal thing that distinguishes euthanasia from intentional killing simpliciter is the agent's motive: it must be a good motive insofar as the good of the person killed is concerned,[11] a view mirrored by Heather Draper, who also spoke to the importance of motive, arguing that "the motive forms a crucial part of arguments for euthanasia, because it must be in the best interests of the person on the receiving end."[8] Definitions such as that offered by the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics take this path, where euthanasia is defined as "a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express

intention of ending a life, to relieve intractable suffering."[1] Beauchamp & Davidson also highlight Baruch Brody's "an act of euthanasia is one in which one person ... (A) kills another person (B) for the benefit of the second person, who actually does benefit from being killed".[12] Draper argued that any definition of euthanasia must incorporate four elements: an agent and a subject; an intention; a casual proximity, such that the actions of the agent lead to the outcome; and an outcome. Based on this, she offered a definition incorporating those elements, stating that euthanasia "must be defined as death that results from the intention of one person to kill another person, using the most gentle and painless means possible, that is motivated solely by the best interests of the person who dies."[13] Prior to Draper, Beauchamp & Davidson had also offered a definition which includes these elements, although they offered a somewhat longer account, and one that specifically discounts fetuses in order to distinguish between abortions and euthanasia:[14] "In summary, we have argued ... that the death of a human being, A, is an instance of euthanasia if and only if (1) A's death is intended by at least one other human being, B, where B is either the cause of death or a causally relevant feature of the event resulting in death (whether by action or by omission); (2) there is either sufficient current evidence for B to believe that A is acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose, or there is sufficient current evidence related to A's present condition such that one or more known causal laws supports B's belief that A will be in a condition of acute suffering or irreversible comatoseness; (3) (a) B's primary reason for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or predicted future) suffering or irreversible comatoseness, where B does not intend A's death for a different primary reason, though there may be other relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current evidence for either A or B that causal means to A's death will not produce any more suffering than would be produced for A if B were not to intervene; (4) the causal means to the event of A's death are chosen by A or B to be as painless as possible, unless either A or B has an overriding reason for a more painful causal means, where the reason for choosing the latter causal means does not conflict with the evidence in 3b; (5) A is a nonfetal organism."[15] Wreen, in part responding to Beauchamp & Davidson, offered a six part definition: "Person A committed an act of euthanasia if and only if (1) A killed B or let her die; (2) A intended to kill B; (3) the intention specified in (2) was at least partial cause of the action specified in (1); (4) the causal journey from the intention specified in (2) to the action specified in (1) is more or less in accordance with A's plan of action; (5) A's killing of B is a voluntary action; (6) the motive for the action specified in (1), the motive standing behind the intention specified in (2), is the good of the person killed."[16] Wreen also considered a seventh requirement: "(7) The good specified in (6) is, or at least includes, the avoidance of evil", although as Wreen noted in the paper, he was not convinced that the restriction was required.[17] In discussing his definition, Wreen noted the difficulty of justifying euthanasia when faced with the notion of the subject's "right to life". In response, Wreen argued that euthanasia has to be voluntary, and that "involuntary euthanasia is, as such, a great wrong".[17] Other commentators incorporate consent more directly into their definitions. For example, in a discussion of euthanasia presented in 2003 by the European Association of Palliative Care (EPAC) Ethics Task Force, the authors offered: "Medicalized killing of a person without the person's consent, whether nonvoluntary (where the person in unable to consent) or involuntary (against the person's will) is not euthanasia: it is murder. Hence, euthanasia can be voluntary only."[18] Although the EPAC Ethics Task Force argued that both non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia could not be included in the definition of euthanasia, there is discussion in the literature about excluding one but not the other.[17] Classification of euthanasia Euthanasia may be classified according to whether a person gives informed consent into three types: voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary.[19][20] There is a debate within the medical and bioethics literature about whether or not the non-voluntary (and by extension, involuntary) killing of patients can be regarded as euthanasia, irrespective of intent or the patient's circumstances. In the definitions offered by Beauchamp & Davidson and, later, by Wreen, consent on the part of the patient was not considered to be one of their criteria, although it may have been required to justify euthanasia.[7][21] However, others see consent as essential. Voluntary euthanasia Main article: Voluntary euthanasia Euthanasia conducted with the consent of the patient is termed voluntary euthanasia. Active voluntary euthanasia is legal in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Passive voluntary euthanasia is legal throughout the U.S. per Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. When the patient brings about his or her own death with the assistance of a physician, the term assisted suicide is often used instead. Assisted suicide is legal in Switzerland and the U.S. states of Oregon, Washington and Montana. Non-voluntary euthanasia Main article: Non-voluntary euthanasia Euthanasia conducted where the consent of the patient is unavailable is termed non-voluntary euthanasia. Examples include child euthanasia, which is illegal worldwide but decriminalised under certain specific circumstances in the Netherlands under the Groningen Protocol. Involuntary euthanasia Main article: Involuntary euthanasia Euthanasia conducted against the will of the patient is termed involuntary euthanasia. Procedural decision

Voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia can all be further divided into passive or active variants.[22] A number of authors consider these terms to be misleading and unhelpful.[1] Passive euthanasia Passive euthanasia entails the withholding of common treatments, such as antibiotics, necessary for the continuance of life.[1] Active euthanasia Active euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances or forces to kill and is the most controversial means.

Criminal law- Self -Defense A claim of self-defense states that the use of force was necessary for the protection oneself. It is also known as justification for behavior that would otherwise be criminal. The idea is that the person using force and claiming self-defense must have a reasonable belief that the use of such force was absolutely necessary to protect him or herself. Self-defense has limitations. For example, a person can't claim self-defense in resisting arrest by a peace officer. Using Self-Defense to Protect Property A person can't claim self-defense against someone who is protecting real property and knows that the person is claiming a legal right to the property. However, this situation will allow a claim of self-defense when:

The person is a public officer in the performance of official duties or making an arrest The person has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making an attempt to recapture it The person believes that the force is necessary to protect him or herself against death or serious bodily harm

Use of Deadly Force The use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the person believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse brought about by force or threat. Also, a person who initiates an encounter with the use of deadly force can't justify using deadly force to protect himself against retaliation in that same encounter. In other words, an aggressor can't protect himself with deadly force if he was the one that initiated the use of deadly force in the first place. Duty to Retreat A person won't be able to justify the use of deadly force if he knows that he can safely retreat without using deadly force. Also, an encounter that turns deadly won't be justified on the ground of self-defense if the user of deadly force could have merely surrendered an item to the person claiming a right to the item. A person is not required to retreat from his dwelling or place of work unless the person was the initial aggressor in the encounter. A police officer is not required to retreat upon the threat of deadly force by a suspect. Proving Self-Defense When attempting to prove self-defense in a non-deadly case, the defense attorney should attempt to show the following:

The defendant subjectively believed that the force used was necessary to protect himself The defendant believed that the force used had to be used immediately The other person wasn't a peace officer attempting to arrest the defendant The defendant was not protecting property under a claim of right

Rellosa vs. Pellosis G.R. No. 138964. August 9, 2001 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision in our law is not just a declaration of principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or violated, a valid source of a cause of action or defense. The case seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals in not countenancing an attempt to abridge and render inutile a legal right to contest an adverse ruling of an agency of government.

Petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the premature demolition of respondents' houses entitled them to the award of damages. Petitioners pointed out that the order of the Office of the Building Official was eventually upheld on appeal by the Department of Public Works and Highways in its decision of 14 March 1990. Furthermore, petitioners added, the structures subject matter of the demolition order were declared to be dangerous structures by the Office of the Building Official and, as such, could be abated to avoid danger to the public. The Court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code. At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible. Pajuyo vs. CA G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004 Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void. Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra. The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate. We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to said property. We made this declaration because the person who had title or who had the right to legal possession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party instituted the case against squatters or usurpers. In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to the ejectment case. This case is between squatters. Had the government participated in this case, the courts could have evicted the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra. Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own the parties. Such a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of the courts in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as the application of the principle of pari delicto. Squatters would then rather settle the issue of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff and defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose possession of the disputed property. This would subvert the policy underlying actions for recovery of possession. Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain on the property until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not that person. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law. In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The owner can still go to court to recover lawfully the property from the person who holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of government agencies, including local governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws. Republic Act No. 386 The Civil Code of the Philippines Chapter I. Effect and Application of Laws (Articles 1 to 18) Chapter 2. Human Relations (Articles 19 to 36) (For a discussion of relevant issues, please surf to the weblogs Legal Updates, Families of Faith, Salt and Light, and Campus Connection.)

Chapter I. Effect and Application of Laws Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines." (n) Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a) Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2) Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3) Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a) Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a) Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a) Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n) Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6) Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n) Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. (n) Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. (n) Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a) Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

Chapter 2. Human Relations (n) Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution. Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings. Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. Was Lenin Jewish? By Ruth R. Wisse Lenin, 1917.

The Bolshevik Revolution undertook to change history. In line with that aim, its leaders set out to control the writing of history, including by controlling access to the archives that informed it. The scholar Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, who was born in the Soviet Union and studied there before coming to the United States, learned the hard way that history is shaped by how information is managed and made available. He believes that, when it comes to the Russian experience, Jews in particular have a large stake in the integrity of the history-writing process. Confronting the challenge head-on, he has published a book, Lenin's Jewish Question, about the ancestry of the man who masterminded the 1917 Revolution and became the iron-fisted dictator of the early Soviet state. The background is this. The declassification of documents since the collapse of the Soviet Communist tyranny in 1991 has brought irrefutable proof that Lenin's maternal great-grandfather was a shtetl Jew named Moshko Blank. Whether or not Lenin himself was aware of this piece of information is uncertain, but by the time of his death in 1924 his sister had possession of the factsand, by order of the Central Committee of the Communist party, was forced to keep them secret. The order held firm until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. How is a historian to approach this subject? For Petrovsky-Shtern, it is not simply a matter of exposing the truth, which others have already done. In writing his book, he was keenly aware of the way that, in today's Russia, Jews continue to be blamed: by some, for Communism and its depredations by virtue of the fact that a number of prominent Bolsheviks were of Jewish origin; by others, for Communism's collapse. He is especially worried about the former threati.e., the manipulation of truth by today's anti-liberal nationalists bent on overestimating the Jewish role in the evils of Communism. In this book, he tries to set the record straight by proving that, in the key case of Lenin, there was nothing Jewish about the man. One of his tools is genealogy. First of all, Moshko, the great-grandfather in question, converted to Russian Orthodoxy in 1844. He had already seen to the conversion of his sons a quarter-century earlier. Next, Moshko's baptized son Alexanderi.e., Lenin's grandfathermarried a Christian woman of German descent. Finally, Maria, the daughter of this pair, who was clearly not a Jew by any reckoning, married the Russian Orthodox Ilya Ulianov. Thus, by the time we reach their son Vladimir Ilyich, we are four generations away from the original Jewish ancestorhimself, as we have seen, a convert to Christianity. As for Vladimir Ilyich, he became a thoroughgoing internationalist, treating ethnic affiliations of all kinds as strictly temporary evils. Nor is anything to be made of his friendship and collaboration with Jews; behind all of Lenin's alliances, as Petrovsky-Shtern documents, there lay only pragmatic calculation and ideology. "Once you join the Bolsheviks," he writes, "you think class, not ethnicity. Moreover, when you join the RSDRP [Lenin's party], you obliterate your ethnicity and become a class." Genealogy by itself is frivolous that does not recognize the force of human decisions that determine historical fate. But the duty of the historian does not stop there. As Petrovsky-Shtern's title suggests, the question of Lenin's Jewishness was intimately bound up, in the minds of Soviet rulers, with the "Jewish question" itself. The ranks of those rulers included ethnic Jews at the highest levels of the Communist party. Why did they insist on obscuring Lenin's origins? Petrovsky-Shtern thinks it was because the party needed the image of a "pure" Russian founder. Indeed, the Russification of Lenin, the consummate internationalist, was part of a paradoxical process to de-internationalize Communism, and to refashion it as an ideology coterminous with Russian nationalism. Curiously, Petrovsky-Shtern observes, those Communist ideologues of old have their counterpart in today's Russian xenophobes, who cite the fact of a "Jewish" Lenin as further evidence for their thesis that Communism was an aberration in Russian history, a subversive and wholly alien implant with no roots in the pre-Communist Russian past. Thus does one deliberate distortion of historical reality beget its mirror image. This study's insistence on clear distinctions between historical truth and lies is most welcome, and makes a refreshing contrast with much Western scholarship that, in this area as in others, shows a greater interest in blurring boundaries than in achieving clarity. Yet, in striving to avoid ambiguity, Petrovsky-Shtern also inadvertently opens the very door he has tried to close. He has done so by making not Lenin but Moshko Blank into the most fully realized character in his book. And what a character he was. Confined to Jewish small-town life, Moshko took out his resentments on his Jewish neighbors, who fought back by denouncing him to the Gentile authorities. In an intensifying spiral of recrimination, not only did Moshko denounce them in turn but, the records reveal, he became an informer against Judaism itself. We see him urging the Tsar to "reform" Russia's Jews by fiat, and proposing measures for forcibly restricting the practice of the Jewish religion and moving the Jews toward Christianity. This introduction to Moshko almost compels us, in short, to associate his behavior with the brutal, nation-wide suppressions that were among the landmark "achievements" of his great-grandson's career. How, we can't help wondering, might certain aspects of family history, among them the very denial of one's identity and one's God, have contributed to the violent, conspiratorial power-hunger and paranoia of one's descendants? To Petrovsky-Shtern, such speculation is illegitimate, an abrogation of the commitment to precision that is the hallmark of the historian's discipline. In his way of thinking, Jewish converts, whether to Christianity or Communism, are no longer Jews, period, and they should be neither claimed nor charged as such. Yet even if one grants this in principle, there may still be much to learn from the often influential participation of former or ex-Jews in the development of modern anti-liberal movements. Instead of dwelling on the question of Jews and Communism, as many a scholar has done, might historians not do better to focus their attention on renegade Jews and Communism? There, as the Yiddish expression has it, may be where the dog lies buried. Ruth R. Wisse is professor of Yiddish and comparative literature at Harvard. Her books include Jews and Power (Schocken), The Modern Jewish Canon (Free Press), and, most recently, The Glatstein Chronicles (Yale).