Afghanistan Weekly War Update: Losing Influence in the Taliban Core?

July 19, 2011 | 1155 GMT

Two Prominent Southern Officials Killed

Jan Mohammad Khan, Afghanistans senior presidential adviser on tribal affairs, was assassinated July 17 at his home in Kabul at around 8 p.m. Khan, the former governor of Uruzgan province, was killed along with lawmaker Hashim Atanwal and three other people when a suicide bomber and three gunmen attacked Khans home in the Karte Char area of the city. Though the Taliban claimed responsibility, Afghan lawmaker Mohammad Daud Kalakani blamed Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence directorate for the killings. Khans assassination comes less than a week after the death of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and head of the Kandahar provincial council, who was assassinated July 12 at his home in Kandahar city by Sardar Mohammad. Mohammad, who was a close associate of the Karzai family for the last seven to eight years in his capacity as the commander of all security posts in and around the town of Karz, the home city of the Karzai family, shot Karzai several times before being killed by his bodyguards. The deaths of two government officials with strong influence in the southern provinces the Talibans core territory could have serious implications for the Afghan government and its ability to conduct business in the south. Being closely affiliated with the Karzai family and the head of security, Mohammad was a frequent visitor at Ahmed Wali Karzais house, making it possible for him to bypass security while carrying a weapon. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting that Mohammad was a Taliban agent (a routine and expected Taliban response, whether they were responsible or not), but it is far from clear whether this was the case. Mohammad and Karzai had a long-standing association and there were myriad licit and illicit activities in which Karzai was involved that could have provoked personal, criminal or other motivations for the killing. Given that Karzai was a high-profile government official, he would have had tight security around him that would have been difficult for the Taliban to penetrate. Additionally, it seems unlikely that Mohammad would choose to work with the Taliban after being loyal to the Karzai family for several years. Mohammad likely would have known that Karzai had protection and that he would be killed in the process of assassinating him, making the act more likely motivated for personal rather than ideological reasons. Acting Kandahar police chief Gen. Abdul Raziq stated that the involvement of foreign circles could not be ruled out. Several suspects were detained and interrogated in relation to the assassination. Later reports from STRATFOR sources indicate that the assassination might be the result of a feud over finances

arising from coalition contracts. Later, during the funeral service for Karzai held at Red Mosque in Kandahar city on July 14, a suicide bomber staged an attack. The explosive device, hidden in the turban of the suicide bomber, killed Mawlawi Hekmatullah Hekmat, the head of the religious council in Kandahar, along with four other people. It remains unclear if Hekmat was the intended target. There are conflicting reports about the presence of Hamid Karzai at the funeral service, and if the Afghan president did attend he may have been the intended target. It is also possible that the attack may not have been aimed at any particular official at all, but instead may have targeted the large crowd of mourners gathered at the service. This is a critical time for Hamid Karzais government, which is currently trying to hold talks with the Taliban in an effort to move toward a political accommodation and a negotiated settlement as foreign troops begin pulling out of the country. This does not necessarily mean that the Taliban will immediately have more room to operate in the absence of the Ahmed Wali Karzai and Khan. Much will depend on the ability of Karzais replacement to step into the role and wield power through the relationships and networks Karzai built for himself as well as the replacements ability to take the governments relationship with the Taliban in a new direction. What is clear, however, is that the process of political transition is being forced upon Hamid Karzais regime through assassination in a key area of the country at a decisive time, and Kabul has work to do in reconsolidating what position it did have in the south under the presidents half-brother.

Transfer of Power
The targeted killings of three Afghan political figures Khan, Ahmed Wali Karzai and then Hekmat at Karzais funeral in a weeks time comes as NATO is preparing to hand power to local Afghan forces in the northern province of Bamiyan. Additionally, 1,000 soldiers from two National Guard regiments at the Bagram Air Base in Parwan are scheduled to start withdrawing this month. Bamiyan is the first of seven locations that will make up the first phase transferring security responsibility to Afghan forces. The first phase of withdrawal will involve the transfer of power in the provinces of Panjshir, Kabul (aside from the restive Surobi district) and the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam.

All of these locations are relatively calm and have been largely secured by Afghan security forces for some time now. The transfer is a slow and measured process, but it will be important to watch the evolution of the standard for transfers and any potential shortening of timetables associated with the process as well as how sustainable security gains prove as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops begin to pull back from key areas. Meanwhile, Gen. David Petraeus, who will be the next director of the CIA, handed over command of the ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to Marine Lt. Gen. John Allen on July 18. STRATFOR believes and has argued that this is more than a personnel change it is the retirement of a key architect and principal proponent of the counterinsurgency-focused strategy currently being pursued. His replacement by a commander no doubt carefully vetted by the White House is beginning to show signs of how the appointment is intended to reshape and redefine the strategy for the war. The war in Afghanistan appears to be moving away from a focus on counterinsurgency and toward a counterterrorism approach, and Petraeus military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and his newly-appointed position are likely to help with that transition.

Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.