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Second Nature and Reection

Second Nature and Reection


Towards a Negative Naturalism Titus Stahl
Institut fr Philosophie der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitt, Frankfurt a. M.

Naturalisms in Ethics
July, 13-14, 2011 University of Auckland, New Zealand

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

What's the point of being an ethical naturalist?

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Why be a naturalist?
Advantages of naturalism:
theoretical advantages

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Why be a naturalist?
Advantages of naturalism:
theoretical advantages But also: captures our self-understanding as autonomous moral agents reference to objective moral facts makes socially shared norms possible ordinary perceptual capacities are sucient to recognize moral features

criticism of

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about naturalism

But there are also problematic aspects of naturalism in regard to its understanding of the activity of

criticism:

problematic account of moral disagreement tendency to support unwillingness to learn problematic account of moral progress

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism

Might McDowell's

second-nature naturalism be able to


solve these problems?

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism

Theoretical move 1:
critique of coherentism and Myth of the Given judgements as answerable to the world only through conceptual character of (natural) human sensibility extension of concept of nature beyond natural sciences

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism

Theoretical move 2:
rejection of subjectivist analysis of secondary qualities rejection of disentanglement theses (fear and the fearful) ineliminability of moral features from description of moral reactions consequence: objectivity of moral properties

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism
The ethical is a domain of rational requirements which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons.

 McDowell, Mind and World

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Advantages of second-nature naturalism

autonomy of moral subjects?

Can second-nature naturalism make sense of the

critical

(A) it allows for an explanation of

moral disagreement

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism
(B) It allows for

reection and reective improvement

Weaknesses that reection discloses in inherited ways of thinking can dictate the formation of new concepts and conceptions the essential thing is that one can reect only from the midst of the way of thinking one is reecting about

 McDowell, Mind and World

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism

(C) It allows for an understanding of

moral progress

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Second-nature naturalism

(C) It allows for an understanding of But there are also

moral progress

conservatism worries.

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism

Criticism 1: Blackburn. Seeing reactions as non-separable


from perception, inference between perception and reaction becomes immune to criticism (cf. the cute and the lewd).

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism

the talk of a special perception available only to those who have been acculturated, simply sounds hollow: disguises for a conservative and ultimately self-serving complacency

 Blackburn, Ruling Passions

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism

Criticism 2: Arguing from within a tradition seems only to


allow very weak forms of critique. No critique of a tradition as a whole.

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism

Two forms of objection: (1) objection to merely internal critique of specic moral norms (2) objection to elevation of a process of education and a character ideal to a necessary condition for morality

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism


Critique of ethical formation: It expresses the suspicion that a critique of reason which still consents to let itself be regulated by the very thing it purports to criticize must harbour tendencies that are not merely `conservationist' but also conservative

 Lovibond, Ethical Formation

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conservatism worries about second-nature naturalism

Two possible responses to these charges of conservatism. (1) Genealogical reectivity (2) Negative naturalism

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 1: Genealogical Reectivity

McDowell's claims about reectivity: honest responsiveness to reective criticism implicit standards for self-scrutiny standing obligation to engage in critical reection But: How?

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 1: Genealogical Reectivity

Genealogical reectivity: Awareness of contingency of character formation Moral condemnation of education might lead to skepticism towards resulting judgements Radicalized version of reective criticism But: Still too tame?

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Revisiting the nature in second nature

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

The meaning of our moral perceptions is given by their integration into a complex second nature which allows us to perceive them to make appropriate a whole range of reactions.

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Breakdowns of second nature: The integration of our


dierent reactive dispositions cannot be achieved in the course of a particular experience.

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Consequences of a breakdown of second nature: second-order attitudes towards own reaction reintegrate second nature but: sometimes we must understand breakdowns as making defects of second nature visible new integration changes meaning of perceived moral properties

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Negative naturalism (i):


breakdowns must be understood as caused by objective moral properties of a situation (in non-pathological cases) breakdowns as opportunity for learning constitute a new role for objective moral properties not exhausted by their role in successful moral perception but: no Myth of the Given, no positive content

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Negative naturalism (ii):


possibility for critique of a second nature as a whole by reference to objective moral facts but: purely negative role of recalcitrant moral objectivity (and subjectivity)

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Negative naturalism (iii): allows criticism of second nature


by reference to moral experience. this respects McDowell's epistemological insights it rediscovers liberating features of naturalism non-trivial conception of nature

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Negative Naturalism in Hegel

Hegel's insights: essentially dynamic conception of human reason Brandom: conceptual pessimism

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Negative Naturalism in Adorno

Adorno's insights: rigid integration of second nature as cutting o real experience need for reection on inexhaustible meaning of non-conceptualizable experience

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Negative Naturalism in Adorno


Dialectics:
It is exactly through [dialectics] that thinking becomes able to let that which is not identical to thinking, which is not thinking itself become visible, but without thereby submitting itself completely to the contingency of that what merely exists. Through dialectics, thinking rather keeps the strength to think even about this non-identical, to think about that which is not essentially thought.

 Adorno, Lectures on Dialectics

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Conclusion

A necessary revision:
If we understand all instances disintegration of second nature as (potentially) making available new experiences, this recommends a liberal, non-deprecatory attitude towards the ethically recalcitrant.

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

Second Nature and Reection

Thank you very much.

http://www.titus-stahl.de stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt

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