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Naturalisms in Ethics
July, 13-14, 2011 University of Auckland, New Zealand
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Why be a naturalist?
Advantages of naturalism:
theoretical advantages
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Why be a naturalist?
Advantages of naturalism:
theoretical advantages But also: captures our self-understanding as autonomous moral agents reference to objective moral facts makes socially shared norms possible ordinary perceptual capacities are sucient to recognize moral features
criticism of
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
But there are also problematic aspects of naturalism in regard to its understanding of the activity of
criticism:
problematic account of moral disagreement tendency to support unwillingness to learn problematic account of moral progress
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
Might McDowell's
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
Theoretical move 1:
critique of coherentism and Myth of the Given judgements as answerable to the world only through conceptual character of (natural) human sensibility extension of concept of nature beyond natural sciences
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
Theoretical move 2:
rejection of subjectivist analysis of secondary qualities rejection of disentanglement theses (fear and the fearful) ineliminability of moral features from description of moral reactions consequence: objectivity of moral properties
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
The ethical is a domain of rational requirements which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons.
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
critical
moral disagreement
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
(B) It allows for
Weaknesses that reection discloses in inherited ways of thinking can dictate the formation of new concepts and conceptions the essential thing is that one can reect only from the midst of the way of thinking one is reecting about
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
moral progress
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Second-nature naturalism
moral progress
conservatism worries.
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
the talk of a special perception available only to those who have been acculturated, simply sounds hollow: disguises for a conservative and ultimately self-serving complacency
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Two forms of objection: (1) objection to merely internal critique of specic moral norms (2) objection to elevation of a process of education and a character ideal to a necessary condition for morality
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Two possible responses to these charges of conservatism. (1) Genealogical reectivity (2) Negative naturalism
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
McDowell's claims about reectivity: honest responsiveness to reective criticism implicit standards for self-scrutiny standing obligation to engage in critical reection But: How?
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Genealogical reectivity: Awareness of contingency of character formation Moral condemnation of education might lead to skepticism towards resulting judgements Radicalized version of reective criticism But: Still too tame?
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
The meaning of our moral perceptions is given by their integration into a complex second nature which allows us to perceive them to make appropriate a whole range of reactions.
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Consequences of a breakdown of second nature: second-order attitudes towards own reaction reintegrate second nature but: sometimes we must understand breakdowns as making defects of second nature visible new integration changes meaning of perceived moral properties
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Hegel's insights: essentially dynamic conception of human reason Brandom: conceptual pessimism
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Adorno's insights: rigid integration of second nature as cutting o real experience need for reection on inexhaustible meaning of non-conceptualizable experience
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
Conclusion
A necessary revision:
If we understand all instances disintegration of second nature as (potentially) making available new experiences, this recommends a liberal, non-deprecatory attitude towards the ethically recalcitrant.
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt
http://www.titus-stahl.de stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt