Science & Education 11: 124, 2002. 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

What Does Galileos Discovery of Jupiters Moons Tell Us About the Process of Scientic Discovery?
ANTON E. LAWSON
Department of Biology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1501, USA; E-mail: anton.lawson@asu.edu

Abstract. In 1610, Galileo Galilei discovered Jupiters moons with the aid of a new more powerful telescope of his invention. Analysis of his report reveals that his discovery involved the use of at least three cycles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Galileo rst used hypothetico-deductive reasoning to generate and reject a xed star hypothesis. He then generated and rejected an ad hoc astronomersmade-a-mistake hypothesis. Finally, he generated, tested, and accepted a moon hypothesis. Galileos reasoning is modeled in terms of Piagets equilibration theory, Grossbergs theory of neurological activity, a neural network model proposed by Levine & Prueitt, and another proposed by Kosslyn & Koenig. Given that hypothetico-deductive reasoning has played a role in other important scientic discoveries, the question is asked whether it plays a role in all important scientic discoveries. In other words, is hypothetico-deductive reasoning the essence of the scientic method? Possible alternative scientic methods, such as Baconian induction and combinatorial analysis, are explored and rejected as viable alternatives. Educational implications of this hypothetico-deductive view of science are discussed.

Introduction In 1610 in his Sidereal Messenger, Galileo Galilei reported some observations of heavenly bodies made by a new more powerful telescope of his invention. In that report Galileo claims to have discovered four never before seen planets circling Jupiter. As he put it: I should disclose and publish to the world the occasion of discovering and observing four planets, never seen from the beginning of the world up to our times (Galilei 1610, as translated and reprinted in Shapley et al. 1954, p. 59). Unlike many modern scientic papers, Galileos report is striking in the way in which it chronologically reveals many of the steps in his discovery process. Thus, it provides an extraordinary opportunity to gain insight into the thinking involved in an important scientic discovery. Galileos key observations were made during the nights of January 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th in 1610. What follows is a step-by-step
This material is based upon research partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant No. DUE 9453610. Any opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reect the views of the National Science Foundation.

ANTON E. LAWSON

recapitulation of that report followed by an attempt to ll in gaps with what Galileo may have been thinking as he interpreted his observations. Galileos thinking will then be modeled in terms of some current theories of cognition. The intent is to reveal some of the key elements of the thinking pattern that guided Galileos particular discovery and, more importantly, to reveal and model some of the key elements of scientic discovery in general. Such a goal is not merely of academic interest as one of the generally agreed upon goals of science teaching is to help students learn how to do science, i.e., to learn how to think scientically. Consequently, teachers and curriculum developers who hope to attain this goal will most certainly be interested in knowing how scientists are thinking while engaged in scientic discovery. What Were Galileos Observations and Conclusions?
PRIOR TO JANUARY

7 TH

Galileos report begins with mention of his invention of a new more powerful telescope: At length, by sparing neither labor or expense, I succeeded in constructing for myself an instrument so superior that objects seen through it appear magnied nearly a thousand times. . . (p. 58) Thus, Galileo had at his disposal an instrument that allowed observations of nature never before seen. Not surprisingly, he used his telescope to explore the heavens. Again in his words: But without paying attention to its use for terrestrial objects, I betook myself to observations of the heavenly bodies; and rst of all, I viewed the Moon as near as if it was scarcely two semidiameters of the Earth distant. After the Moon, I frequently observed other heavenly bodies, both xed stars and planets, with incredible delight. . . (p. 59) At the time, stars were referred to a xed because they were thought to be embedded in a celestial sphere, which had been postulated to exist within ancient Greek Aristotelian theory; e.g., Holton & Roller (1958, p. 107).
JANUARY

7 TH

During Galileos initial explorations, he made a new observation on January 7th that he deemed worthy of mention. In his words: On the 7th day of January in the present year, 1610, in the rst hour of the following night, when I was viewing the constellations of the heavens through a telescope, the planet Jupiter presented itself to my view, and as I had prepared for myself a very excellent instrument, I noticed a circumstance which I had never been able to notice before, owing to want of power in my other

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

telescope, namely that three little stars, small but very bright, were near the planet; and although I believed them to belong to the number of the xed stars, yet they made me somewhat wonder, because they seemed to be arranged exactly in a straight line, parallel to the ecliptic, and to be brighter than the rest of the stars. The position of them with reference to one another and to Jupiter was as follows (p. 59): (east) (west)

JANUARY

8 TH

The next night Galileo made a second observation: . . . when on January 8th. . . I found a very different state of things, for there were three little stars all west of Jupiter, and nearer together than on the previous night, and they were separated from one another by equal intervals, as the accompanying gure shows. (east) (west)

At this point, although I had not turned my thoughts at all upon the approximation of the stars to one another, yet my surprise began to be excited, how Jupiter could one day be found to the east of all the aforementioned stars when the day before it had been west of two of them; forthwith I became afraid lest the planet might have moved differently from the calculation of astronomers, and so had passed those stars by its own proper motion. (p. 5960)

JANUARY

9 TH

I, therefore waited for the next night with the most intense longing, but I was disappointed of my hope, for the sky was covered with clouds in every direction. (p. 60)

JANUARY

10 TH

But on January 10th the stars appeared in the following position with regard to Jupiter, the third, as I thought, being hidden by the planet. (east) (west)

When I had seen these phenomena, as I knew that corresponding changes of position could not by any means belong to Jupiter, and as, moreover, I perceived that the stars which I saw had always been the same, for there

ANTON E. LAWSON

were no others either in front of behind, within the great distance, along the Zodiac at length, changing from doubt into surprise, I discovered that the interchange of position which I saw belonged not to Jupiter, but to the stars to which my attention had been drawn and I thought therefore that they ought to be observed henceforward with more attention and precision. (p. 60)

JANUARY

11 TH

Accordingly, on January 11th I saw an arrangement of the following kind: (east) (west)

namely, only two stars to the east of Jupiter, the nearer of which was distant from Jupiter three times as far as from the star to the east; and the star furthest to the east was nearly twice as large as the other one; whereas on the previous night they had appeared nearly of equal magnitude. I, therefore, concluded, and decided unhesitatingly, that there are three stars in the heavens moving about Jupiter, as Venus and Mercury round the sun;. . . (p. 60)

JANUARY

12 TH AND LATER

. . . which at length was established as clear as daylight by numerous other subsequent observations. These observations also established that there are not only three, but four, erratic sidereal bodies performing their revolutions around Jupiter. . . These are my observations upon the four Medicean planets, recently discovered for the rst time by me. (pp. 6061)

What Was Galileos Thinking Pattern?

BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AS A SOURCE OF HYPOTHESES

I now turn to an analysis of Galileos report in an attempt to ll in gaps with what Galileo may have been thinking. Lets start by considering what Galileo initially brought to the table. In other words, what was Galileos background knowledge? Presumably this knowledge will serve as a source of hypotheses when the need arises. It is safe to assume that Galileos knowledge about heavily objects included at least the following three categories: 1. some objects the xed stars are immovable because they are embedded in an external celestial sphere; 2. some objects within the celestial sphere the planets orbit the sun (e.g., Earth, Venus, Jupiter); 3. some objects moons orbit the planets that orbit the sun (e.g., our moon).

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

Presumably these categories of heavenly objects function as mental models by which observations can be assimilated (cf., Grossberg 1982; Johnson-Laird 1983; Piaget 1985). In other words, when new objects are seen, they can be assimilated into one of these categories. Also, if the category into which the new objects should be assimilated is unclear, the categories will function as hypothesized categories into which they might be placed (cf., Gregory 1970), i.e., Observation: Three new objects are seen. Question: What are they? Alternative Hypotheses: They might be xed stars. They might be planets. They might be moons. The process of using these categories as alternative hypotheses has been referred to as analogical reasoning or analogical transfer in that the new observation is seen as similar to, or analogous to, prior observations. Several additional examples can be found in Biela, (1993), Finke et al. (1992), Gentner (1989), Koestler (1964), and Sternberg & Davidson (1995). It should be pointed out that the processes of assimilation and hypothesis formation take place largely at the subconscious level. Also in many cases, the analogical transfer requires more insight than shown in Galileos case because the distance between the analogous category and the target phenomenon is greater, e.g., Darwins use of articial selection as an analogue for natural selection, Kekules use of snakes eating their tails as an analogue for the benzene ring.

GALILEO S THINKING ON JANUARY

7 TH

Recall that concerning his January 7th observations, Galileos stated: I noticed a circumstance which I had never been able to notice before, owing to want of power in my other telescope, namely that three little stars, small but very bright, were near the planet. This is statement is important because it suggests that his new observations have been immediately assimilated by his xed star category (listed as 1 above). But Galileos continued thinking led to some initial doubt that he was really observing xed stars as this following remark reveals: . . . and although I believed them to belong to the number of the xed stars, yet they made me somewhat wonder, because they seemed to be arranged exactly in a straight line, parallel to the ecliptic, and to be brighter than the rest of the stars, equal to them in magnitude. Why would this observation lead Galileo to somewhat wonder? What could Galileo have been thinking that raised doubt? Of course we can never really know what was on Galileos mind. But perhaps he was thinking along these lines: If. . . the three objects are xed stars and. . . their sizes, brightness and positions are compared to each other and to other nearby stars, then. . . variations in size, brightness and position should be random, as is the case for other xed stars. But. . . they seem to be arranged exactly in a straight line, parallel to the ecliptic, and to be brighter than the rest of the stars.

ANTON E. LAWSON

Therefore. . . the xed star hypothesis is not supported. Or as Galileo put it, yet they made me somewhat wonder. So Galileos overall thinking pattern may have gone something like this: rst a new observation is made, next an initial hypothesis (they are xed stars) is generated, then reective thinking about the initial hypothesis occurs, i.e., If. . . they really are xed stars, and. . . I do such and such, then. . . such and such should be seen. But. . . such and such is not seen. Therefore. . . I have some doubt about my initial hypothesis. Part of this thinking can be characterized as hypotheticodeductive because it is initiated with a hypothesis (i.e., the observed objects are xed stars). The hypothesis is then assumed to be correct and a test is imagined (i.e., their sizes, brightness and positions are compared to each other and to other nearby xed stars). The hypothesis and planned test are then used to generate an expectation (i.e., variations should be random). In other words, thinking may have followed an If/and/then deductive pattern (e.g., If A > B, and B > C, then A should be >C).

GALILEO S THINKING ON JANUARY

8 TH

The next night Galileo made a second observation. Again in his words: . . . when on January 8th, I found a very different state of things, for there were three little stars all west of Jupiter, and nearer together than on the previous night, and they were separated from one another by equal intervals, as the accompanying gure shows. (east) (west)

The new observation puzzled Galileo and raised another question. Once again in Galileos words: At this point, although I had not turned my thoughts at all upon the approximation of the stars to one another, yet my surprise began to be excited, how Jupiter could one day be found to the east of all the aforementioned stars when the day before it had been west of two of them. . . But why did this observation puzzle Galileo? Basically the puzzling observation was that the stars were now closer together than before and all were west of Jupiter, but still along a straight line. I believe that this observation was puzzling because it was not the expected one based on the xed star hypothesis, i.e., expectation their positions relative to each other should be the same and they should not pass Jupiter; observation the stars are closer together than on the previous night and they are now all west of Jupiter. Galileo continues, . . . forthwith I became afraid lest the planet might have moved differently from the calculation of astronomers, and so had passed those stars by its own proper motion. This statement suggests that Galileo has not yet rejected the xed star hypothesis. Instead he has generated an ad hoc hypothesis to possibly keep the hypothesis alive. In other words, Galileo thought that per-

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

haps the astronomers made a mistake. He thought that perhaps their records were wrong about how Jupiter is supposed to move relative to the stars in the area. Lets call this the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis. How could Galileo test the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis? Consider the following: If. . . the astronomers made a mistake (astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis) and. . . I observe the next night (planned test) then. . . Jupiter should continue to move east relative to the stars, and the objects should look like this: (east) (west)

Of course we can not know if this is what Galileo was really thinking, but if he were thinking along these lines, he would have had a very clear expectation (prediction) to compare with the observations he hoped to make the following night.

GALILEO S THINKING ON JANUARY

9 TH AND 10 TH

Galileo continues: I, therefore waited for the next night with the most intense longing, but I was disappointed of my hope, for the sky was covered with clouds in every direction. But on January 10th the stars appeared in the following position with regard to Jupiter, the third, as I thought, being hidden by the planet. (east) (west)

What conclusion can be drawn from this observation in terms of the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis? Consider the following argument: If. . . .the astronomers made a mistake (astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis) and. . . I observe the next night (planned test) then. . . Jupiter should continue to move east relative to the stars, and the objects should look like this: (east) (west) (expected results)

But. . . the objects did not look like this, instead they looked like this: (east) (west) (observed result)

Therefore. . . the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis is not supported (conclusion). Lets return to the report to see what conclusion Galileo drew. Galileo states:

ANTON E. LAWSON

When I had seen these phenomena, as I knew that corresponding changes of position could not by any means belong to Jupiter, and as, moreover, I perceived that the stars which I saw had always been the same, for there were no others either in front or behind, within the great distance, along the Zodiac at length, changing from doubt into surprise, I discovered that the interchange of position which I saw belonged not to Jupiter, but to the stars to which my attention had been drawn. . . (p. 60) So Galileo concluded that the astronomers had not made a mistake (i.e., the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis should be rejected). In other words, the changes of position were not the result of Jupiters motion. Instead they were due to motions of the stars.
GALILEO S THINKING ON JANUARY

11 TH AND LATER

Having rejected the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis, Galileo is left with the task of formulating another explanation for his puzzling observations. It is not clear exactly when he formulated a viable explanation, but the following observation and remarks make it clear that he did not take him long: Accordingly, on January 11th I saw an arrangement of the following kind: (east) (west)

namely, only two stars to the east of Jupiter, the nearer of which was distant from Jupiter three times as far as from the star to the east; and the star furthest to the east was nearly twice as large as the other one; whereas on the previous night they had appeared nearly of equal magnitude. I, therefore, concluded, and decided unhesitatingly, that there are three stars in the heavens moving about Jupiter, as Venus and Mercury round the sun. (p. 60) Galileos remarks make it is clear that he has conceptualized a situation in which these objects are orbiting Jupiter in a way analogous to the way Venus and Mercury orbit the sun and in the way our moon orbits Earth. Thus, he has rejected the xed star hypothesis and accepted an alternative in which the objects are orbiting Jupiter. How could Galileo have arrived at such a conclusion? Consider the following: If. . . the objects are orbiting Jupiter (moon hypothesis presumably drawn from his prior knowledge his moon category) and. . . I observe the objects over several nights (planned test) then. . . some nights they should appear to the east of Jupiter and some nights they should appear to the west. Further, they should always appear along a straight line on either side of Jupiter (expected result). And. . . this is precisely how they appeared (observed result). Therefore. . . the moon hypothesis is supported (conclusion).

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

Figure 1. One cycle of hypothetico-deductive reasoning presumably used by Galileo during his discovery Jupiters moons.

Galileos previous statement continues as follows: . . . which at length was established as clear as daylight by numerous other subsequent observations. These observations also established that there are not only three, but four, erratic sidereal bodies performing their revolutions round Jupiter. . . These are my observations upon the four Medicean planets, recently discovered for the rst time by me. (pp. 6061)

How Can Galileos Thinking Be Modeled?

GALILEO S THINKING AS HYPOTHETICO - DEDUCTIVE SCIENCE

The present hypothesis about the nature of Galileos thinking, and more generally about the thinking involved in scientic discovery, is that it has as its core an If/then/Therefore pattern. The pattern involves, in order: (1) making a puzzling observation, (2) formulating a causal question, (3) formulating one or more hypotheses, (4) using a hypothesis and an imagined test to generate expected results/predictions, (5) making actual observations and comparing them with the expected observations, and (6) drawing conclusions as to the extent to which the initial hypotheses have or have not been supported. This hypothetico-deductive thinking pattern can be modeled by the series of boxes shown in Figure 1.

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GALILEO S THINKING WITHIN PIAGET S THEORY

ANTON E. LAWSON

According to Piaget (1985), cognition involves equilibration with its duel processes of assimilation and accommodation. Galileos hypothetico-deductive thinking ts nicely within Piagets theory. Within that theory we can say that Galileos initial observations were immediately assimilated by his xed star schema (i.e., I noticed. . . that three little stars. . . were near the planet). This assimilation then soon led to a small amount of disequilibrium when his xed star hypothesis was initially tested (i.e., yet they made me somewhat wonder). This initial disequilibrium resulted because certain characteristics of the new stars differed from typical stars (i.e., they were in a straight line and equidistant from one another). Disequilibrium then grew when subsequent observations also did not match expectations drawn from the xed star schema (i.e., How could Jupiter be found to the east of all the aforementioned stars when the day before it had been west of two of them?). But Galileos disequilibrium did not last long. After rejecting the ad hoc astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis, Galileo rejected the xed star hypothesis. This rejection then led to an accommodation as Galileo generated a new hypothesis the moon hypothesis which the evidence supported. Generation and test of the moon hypothesis enabled Galileo to assimilate all of his observations without disequilibrium. Thus, equilibrium was restored.
GALILEO S THINKING WITHIN GROSSBERG S THEORY

We can go farther than Piagets general concepts of equilibration, assimilation and accommodation to think about Galileos thinking. Grossberg (1982) introduced a theory of information processing complete with an account of activity within successive slabs of neurons within the brain. It should be pointed out that Grossbergs theory does not contradict Piagets theory. Rather it adds to it. Grossbergs theory (part of which is represented in Figure 2) can be used to understand what might have been going on in Galileos mind in terms of neurological events. Figure 2 depicts two successive slabs of neurons in the brain, F(1) and F(2) . According to Grossberg, sensory input X(t), (e.g., light coming from the three objects near Jupiter on the night of January 7th) excites an electrical pattern of activity at slab F(1) and sends a signal to inhibit nonspecic orienting arousal (OA). The electrical pattern X1 at F(1) then excites another electrical pattern X2 at the next slab of neurons at F(2) , which feeds signals back to F(1). In the case of Galileos initial observations, the pattern at F(2) corresponds to his star category and initially matches the pattern at F(1). So all is well both neurologically and conceptually. But as reported, Galileos continued thinking led to a partial mismatch (e.g., his star category implied that stars should not be lined up along a straight lines and should not be equidistant from each other). This partial mismatch led Galileo to somewhat wonder. Neurologically speaking, a mismatch (i.e., a new observation that does not match an expectation), causes quenching of activity at F(1) and shuts off inhibition of OA. OA is then free to search for another pattern (i.e., another

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

11

Figure 2. Grossbergs model of the match and mismatch of activity patterns on successive slabs of neurons in the brain. Input X(t) (e.g., three spots of light near Jupiter) excites an activity pattern at slab F(1) and inhibits orienting arousal (OA). The pattern at slab F(1) excites a pattern at slab F(2) , which feeds back to F(1) . A mismatch (i.e., a new observation that does not match an expectation), causes quenching of activity at F(1) and shuts off inhibition of OA. OA is then free to search for another pattern (i.e., another hypothesis) to match the input.

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ANTON E. LAWSON

hypothesis) to match the input. In other words, with Galileos continued observations and thinking, the mismatch between the patterns at F(1) and F(2) presumably became so great that activity at F(1) was quenched. Thus, inhibition of orienting arousal was shutdown. Orienting arousal was then free to excite F(2) leading to a search for another pattern of activity to hopefully match the input pattern at F(1). On the conceptual level, Galileos mind was now free to search for alternative hypotheses (e.g., the planet hypothesis, the moon hypothesis) to replace the rejected xed star hypothesis. Once an activity pattern at F(2) was found that actually matched the input pattern at F(1), orienting arousal was shut down and Galileos search was complete. He had discovered four new moons orbiting Jupiter.
GALILEO S THINKING WITHIN LEVINE AND PREUITT S MODEL

A more detailed way to model Grossbergs basic ideas has been proposed by Levine & Prueitt (1989). Lawson (1994) used Levine & Prueitts model to account for the processes involved in simple hypothesis testing and in descriptive concept acquisition. Figure 3 suggests how Levine & Prueitts model may also be used in the present context. As you can see, the model includes feature nodes referred to as F1 . These nodes code input features (e.g., number of spots of light, the sizes of those spots, their positions). Nodes in F2 code for categories into which the input can be placed (e.g., xed stars, planets, moons). Once again, these categories serve as alternative hypotheses. The model also includes habit and bias nodes. Habit nodes detect how often prior classications have correctly and incorrectly been made. The bias nodes are affected by activity in the habit nodes and by reinforcement. Details of network function can be found in Levine & Prueitt (1989) and Lawson (1994). The important point in terms of the present argument is that information processing, whether it involves basic descriptive concept formation, simple hypothesis testing, or the discovery of Jupiters moons, is basically a hypothetico-deductive process of matching new input with prior categories stored in memory. Said another way, scientic reasoning processes are hypothetico-deductive in nature because the brain spontaneously processes new input in a hypothetico-deductive way.
GALILEO S THINKING WITHIN KOSSLYN AND KOENIG S MODEL

Kosslyn & Koenig (1995) have proposed still another neurological model in which Galileos thinking can be understood. The model argues that the ability to visually recognize objects requires participation of the six major brain areas shown in Figure 4. Kosslyn and Koenig view these six areas as subsystems operating within the overall visual system - other sensory input is processed with analogous systems and subsystems. According to the model, visual input rst produces a pattern of electrical activity in the occipital lobe, a subsystem referred to as the visual buffer. Input from the

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

13

Figure 3. Levine & Pruietts model of neural activity including feature, category, bias and habit nodes. The feature nodes code observable input features (e.g., numbers, sizes, positions). The category nodes represent prior knowledge categories into which the input may t (e.g., star category, planet category, moon category). The habit and bias nodes keep track of past decisions and inuence subsequent decisions.

eyes produces a spatially organized image on the brain surface within the visual buffer. Next, a smaller region within the visual buffer, called the attention window, is selected for detailed processing. The activity pattern in the attention window is then sent along two pathways (on each side of the brain) one that runs down the lower temporal lobe and one that runs up to the parietal lobe. The lower temporal lobe, or ventral subsystem, constructs object properties, such as shape, color and texture, while the upper parietal lobe, or dorsal subsystem, constructs spatial properties, such as size and location. Patterns of activity within the ventral subsystem are matched to patterns stored in visual memory. If a good match is found, the object is recognized. Otherwise, it is not. The dorsal subsystem of the parietal lobes appears to encode input used to guide movements such as moving

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ANTON E. LAWSON

Figure 4. Kosslyn & Koenigs model of the visual system consists of six major subsystems. The order in which information passes from one subsystem to the next is shown. The subsystems generate and test hypotheses about what is seen in the visual eld.

the eyes or reaching. The neurons in that region either re just before, or register the consequences of, such movements. Outputs from the ventral and dorsal subsystems come together in associative memory, which is located roughly in the middle of the brain the primary structures being the hippocampus, the limbic thalamus and the basal forebrain. The ventral and dorsal subsystem outputs are matched to patterns stored in associative memory. If a good match between output from visual memory and the pattern in associative memory is obtained, then the observer knows the objects name, categories to which it belongs, and so on. But if a good match is not obtained, the object remains unrecognized and additional sensory input must be obtained. Importantly, the search for additional sensory input is far from random. Rather, stored patterns are used to make a second hypothesis about what is being observed, and this hypothesis leads to new expectations and to further encoding. In the words of Kosslyn and Koenig, when new input is sought, One actively seeks new information that will bear on the hypothesis (p. 57). This information seeking involves mechanisms that shift attention to a spot where an informative part should be located, and the new input is processed in turn. This input is then matched to stored shape and spatial patterns in the ventral and dorsal subsystems. Again in Kosslyn and Koenigs words, The matching shape and spatial properties may in fact correspond to the hypothesized part. If so, enough information may have accumulated in associative memory to identify the object. If not, this cycle is repeated until enough information has been gathered to identify the object or to reject the rst hypothesis, formulate a new one, and test it (p. 58). Kosslyn and Koenigs description of system functioning is about recognizing relatively complex objects present in the visual eld during a very brief time period not distant spots of light seen through a telescope. Nevertheless, the hypothetico-

GALILEOS DISCOVERY OF JUPITERS MOONS

15

deductive nature of this system functioning is clear. And all one need do to apply the same principles to Galileos case, is to extend the time frame over which observations are made observations that will either match or not match expectations, thus allow hypotheses to be tested.

How Many Scientic Methods Exist? As shown in Table I, the hypothetico-deductive pattern of thinking seen in Galileos discovery of Jupiters moons can also be found in the discoveries of other scientists. In other words, scientic discovery can be seen basically a hypothetico-deductive enterprise. However, this statement does not imply that all scientists are aware of their reasoning. Indeed, as in Galileos case, it seems likely that Galileo was very much unaware of his reasoning. He was simply trying to explain what he was seeing. But since Galileos day, scientists and philosophers have collectively become more aware of the thinking patterns that guide scientic discovery. Indeed, many contemporary accounts of science place hypothetico-deductive reasoning squarely on center stage (e.g., Baker & Allen 1977; Carey 1998; Chamberlain 1965; Giere 1997; Hempel 1966; Lewis 1988; Platt 1964; Medawar 1969; Popper 1965). Table 2 lists the basic elements of science as a hypothetico-deductive enterprise. For those scientists who have become aware of these elements, they have become a powerful method. Indeed, for them, the elements have become the scientic method (e.g., Chamberlain 1965; Platt 1964).

DOES BACONIAN INDUCTION ALSO QUALIFY AS A SCIENTIFIC METHOD ?

But do other methods of doing science exist? A well known candidate proposed during Galileos day is Francis Bacons method of induction rst published in two volumes in 1605 and in 1620 (Bacon 1900, revised ed.). Bacons brand of induction is generally described as a process in which one reasons from particulars to general conclusions. Suppose, for example, you taste a green apple and nd it sour. You taste another green apple and nd it sour as well, and so on. From these particular observations, induction presumably is at work when you draw the general conclusion that all green apples are sour. Clearly research based on this enumerative style of induction does not t the pattern identied in Tables I and II. Others have argued that this sort of inductive reasoning as opposed to a more general sort of induction dened simply as any thought process that increases the semantic information in its initial observations or premises (cf. Johnson-Laird 1993, p. 60; Holland et al. 1986, especially Chapter 11; and Bisanz et al. 1994) is of limited value in science because the world is so complex that if one lacks a hypothesis or theory and prediction to guide ones observations, those observations are not likely to amount to anything of scientic value, e.g.:

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Table I. The use of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in some important scientic discoveries How does blood travel in the body? Marcello Malpighi - 1661 If. . . blood circulates by passing from arteries to veins through tiny vessels (William Harveys circulation theory) and. . . the area between the arteries and veins is examined very closely (planned test) then. . . tiny connecting vessels, the postulated capillaries, should be observed (expected result). And. . . in 1661, 14 years after Harveys death Malpighi focused his microscope at that area and discovered the postulated capillaries (observed result). Therefore. . . this crucial aspect of Harveys circulation theory was supported (conclusion). Does matter consist of indivisible atoms? John Dalton 1810 If. . . matter consists of indivisible particles that have specic weights and combine with one another in specic ways (atomic-molecular theory) and. . . combinations of atoms are separated into their parts (planned test), then. . . the ratios of weights of those parts should be in simple whole-number ratios (expected result). And. . . as Daltons experiments and calculations with gases revealed, the ratios of weights of those parts are in simple whole-number ratios (observed result). Therefore. . . atomic-molecular theory was supported (conclusion). What caused present-day species diversity? Charles Lyell 1854 If. . . organisms changed over time (evolution theory), and. . . the kinds of organisms living in the past is examined in the fossil record (planned test), then. . . the younger, higher rock layers should contain more fossils of present-day species than do the older, lower rock layers (expected result). And. . . when Lyell compared fossil sea shells collected from four different rock layers, he found that the percentages of present-day species increased from the oldest to youngest layers from 3%, to 17%, to 42% and nally to 96% (observed result). Therefore. . . support for evolution theory was found (conclusion). How are characteristics passed from parent to offspring? Gregor Mendel 1866 If. . . genes for seed color and shape assort independently when pollen and eggs are produced, and recombine randomly during fertilization (independent assortment and random recombination claims of Mendels theory), and. . . second generation plants that presumably carry the YyRr genotype are crossed with other YyRr plants, or with themselves (planned test), then. . . four types of seeds should be produced in the third generation plants i.e., yellow-round, yellow-wrinkled, green-round, greenwrinkled, in a 9 : 3 : 3 : 1 ratio respectively (expected results). And. . . when Mendel conducted the test crosses, he counted a total of 556 seeds. Of these, 315 were yellow-round, 101 were yellow-wrinkled, 108 were green-round and 32 were green-wrinkled (observed results). These numbers are very close to the expected 9 : 3 : 3 : 1 ratio. Therefore. . . support for these postulates was obtained (conclusion). What is inside atoms? Ernest Rutherfords discovery of the atomic nucleus 1907 If. . . atoms consist mostly of uid globules with a few tiny, solid electrons oating about (Thomsons theory) and. . . an alpha-particle emitter is aimed at a thin piece of metal foil with a photographic plate placed behind it (planned test), then. . . most of the alpha particles should pass straight through the uid part of the foils atoms and should strike and expose the photographic plate in a spot not much greater in diameter than the initial beam (expected result). And. . . Rutherford found that the beam passed straight through the foil, but was somewhat broadened, or scattered. However, some of the particles came straight back. Therefore. . . support for Thomsons theory was found as was evidence that most of an atoms mass was concentrated in a minute atomic nucleus.

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Table II. Steps in hypothetico-deductive science 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Identify a puzzling observation. Identify and state the central causal question raised. Search the literature and your own knowledge base for as many possible answers as possible. Arrange the possible answers (the alternative hypotheses) more or less in order from most to least plausible. Try to gure out how to test the alternatives more or less in the above order. State as clearly as possible the predicted results of your planned tests. Conduct the planned tests and record results. Compare predicted and actual results. Draw conclusions.

A moments reection reveals that data collection in the absence of a hypothesis has little or no scientic value. Suppose, for example, that one day you decide to become a scientist and having read a standard account of the scientic method you decide to collect some data. Where should you begin? Should you start by cataloging all the items in your room, measuring them, weighing them. . . ? Clearly theres enough data in your room to keep you busy for the rest of your life. (Schick & Vaugh 1995, p. 191) Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a denite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. (Popper 1965, p. 46) How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it to be of any service. (Charles Darwin, as quoted in Schick & Vaughn 1995, p. 191) In sum, the maxim that data should be gathered without guidance by antecedent hypotheses about the connections among the facts under study is selfdefeating, and is certainly not followed in scientic inquiry. On the contrary, tentative hypotheses are needed to give direction to scientic investigation. (Hempel 1966, p. 13) Inductive theory provides no formal incentive for making one observation rather than another. Any adequate account of scientic method must include a theory of incentive or special motive. We cannot browse over the eld of nature like cows at pasture. (Medawar 1969, p. 29) The fact remains that the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, has nothing to do with and even contradicts todays form of science. (Malherbe 1996, p. 75) Induction, i.e., inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientic procedure. (Popper 1965, p. 53)

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There is no such thing as inductive logic. (Musgrave 1999, p. 395) Based on the view expressed in these quotes, it should not be surprising to nd that even Bacon himself did not use enumerative induction in his attempts to do science. According to Jevons (1969), in Bacons attempt to discover the nature of heat, Bacon came to the startling correct conclusion that heat is a motion of the smaller particle of bodies. But he did so not using induction, but using hypotheticodeductive reasoning. To which Jevons added: It seems an amazing sort of conjurers trick to play on oneself. And yet one should not, perhaps, blame him too much for having have-deceived himself into a belief in true induction. Plenty of others have, after all, been equally mesmerized by his eloquence, or at least deluded by the same appearances, and they include scientists of great distinction. (Jevons 1969, p. 71) Clearly, we can lay Baconian induction as a scientic method to rest. In fact, if we accept Popper and Musgraves position, then such a cognitive process does not even exist and Bacons brand of induction becomes the scientic equivalent of the non-existent substance called phlogiston and the psychological equivalent of the non-existent force called suction. In other words, human intuition may strongly suggest that such a process is at work, but upon closer inspection, we may nd that the mind simply does not work that way. Rather, it would appear that the mind does not wait around for multiple exemplars before generating an idea about what is being observed. Indeed, had humans ever existed who actually used such a slow approach to information processing, it seems likely that natural selection would have seen to it that they, and their plodding inductivist genes, were eliminated, perhaps by some predator whose avoidance required a faster mode of information processing. As an aside, the conclusion that Baconian induction as a mental process does not exist is particularly interesting given the growing number persons in science education who are attempting to conduct qualitative research based on such an approach (cf. Lincoln & Guba 1985; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
IS COMBINATORIAL ANALYSIS AN ALTERNATIVE SCIENTIFIC METHOD ?

Perhaps you are familiar with a research approach sometimes referred to as combinatorial analysis. This approach is often used by chemists when attempting to discover a chemical for some specic job say cure a disease. The approach basically amounts to modifying a complex chemical over and over again, or systematically forming various combinations of chemicals, until one modication or combination happens to work. Use of this approach can be seen in the classic research of Paul Erlich conducted during the early 1900s (De Kruif 1926). In 1907, knowing that arsenic was poisonous, Erlich began painstakingly modifying an arsenic-containing compound called Atoxyl. Each modied form was injected into mice infected with a trypanosome (Trypanosoma equinum). Finally in 1909, on the 606th try, Erlich found a modied

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compound that killed the trypanosome and spared the mouse. When compound 606 was injected into people suffering from syphilis - a venereal disease caused by the spirochete Treponema pallidum the spirochete was killed and the people were spared. Therefore, Erlich had discovered a cure for syphilis. Does Erlichs approach constitute an alternative scientic method? If we consider each of the 606 chemical compounds as a random attempt at a disease cure, then it would seem so. Certainly, Erlichs approach seems to rely more on trial and error and on luck than on guiding hypotheses, theories and predictions. But a closer look at Erlichs discovery of compound 606 reveals that it was in fact hypothesis driven. During the 1880s, Erlich became fascinated with the use of dyes to stain tissues. At rst, he used his dyes on preserved tissues. But in the late 1880s, he began injecting them into living animals. When he injected methylene blue into a rabbits ear, he discovered that the dye traveled through the rabbits body until it reached and stained only the nerve endings. This observation lead Erlich to advance a hypothesis with a bold prediction. In Erlichs mind, living tissue was really nothing more than complex chemicals, just like his dyes. Also Erlich believed that chemical reactions were very specic. For example, chemical A might react with chemical B, but not with chemicals C, D, and E. So when he saw that the methylene blue stained nerve endings and nothing else, he predicted that chemicals could be injected into infected animals and that the chemicals would attack and kill only the infecting microbes. Thus, the reasoning that guided Erlichs painstaking and lengthy research can be seen as hypothetico-deductive, i.e.: If. . . living tissues consist of chemical compounds and chemical reactions are selective (selective chemical reactions hypothesis) and. . . an arsenic-containing chemical compound, which is known to react with and destroy living tissue, is systematically modied and then injected into animals infected with microbes (planned test) then. . . eventually a modied compound should be found that will interact with and destroy the microbes and spare the infected animal (expected result). And. . . compound 606 was found to do just that (observed result). Therefore. . . the selective chemical reactions hypothesis is supported (conclusion). Seen in this light, the chemists approach of modifying and/or combining chemical compounds to produce a desired effect may differ in degree from the more insightful use of hypothetico-deductive reasoning employed by Galileo, but it does not differ in kind.
IS THERE ONLY ONE SCIENTIFIC METHOD ?

Having rejected combinatorial analysis as a true alternative to hypotheticodeductive science, and having rejected Baconian induction as a method at all, are we then left with hypothetico-deductive science as the only method of doing sci-

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ence? Could hypothetico-deductive reasoning be at work in all important scientic discoveries? Certainly this singular view of scientic method is not without its detractors. For example, Ein et al. (1999) recently echoed the often voiced view that multiple scientic methods exist (cf. Botton & Brown 1998; Kimball 1967; Lederman 1983; Lederman et al. 1998; McComas, 1996; McComas et al. 1998). Regrettably these authors do not identify what those other methods might be. Nola (1999) does mention several alternative scientic methods and discusses the business of trying to decide among them. Nola seems to be arguing that it may not be possible to decide among alternative theories of scientic method because doing so would require one to adopt a particular scientic method to test the alternatives. And in Nolas view, we can not decide what testing method to use until we know which method is the right one! This apparent paradox appears analogous to trying to decide if an external world really exists. Elsewhere (Lawson 2000), I have argued that we can never know for certain if the external world does or does not exist. But this of no practical consequence because even the simplest of behaviors requires that we assume that it does exist and then behave accordingly. If that subsequent behavior is successful, then we not only retain that behavior, but we also have evidence that our initial assumption about the existence of an external world is correct - in spite of our lack of proof. The same may hold for testing alternative theories of scientic method. By analogy, we may never know for certain which theory of scientic method is correct. But that does not matter. Instead we proceed by assuming that each in turn is correct and then see where each gets us. For example, to test the hypotheticodeductive theory of scientic method, we rst assume that this is how science is done and then attempt to generate several predicted consequences (e.g., whenever an important scientic discovery is made, an analysis of the scientists thinking will reveal that he/she generated and tested alternative hypotheses during the discovery process). We then compare our predictions with evidence. A good correspondence between predictions and evidence would support the theory. Presumably, this approach works in that it has helped us understand how Galileo and a few other scientists have made their discoveries. Alternatively, if one adopts a Baconian theory of scientic method, one would be obliged to use his methodology to test his theory. Consequently, one would observe several examples of science at work and then let enumerative induction take over in hopes that the true scientic method would emerge from the examples. How might this work? Suppose we start with a case study of Galileos discovery of Jupiters moons. Do we examine Galileos report for evidence of enumerative induction? This may seem like the reasonable thing to do. But according to Bacons rules, we cannot do this because this would amount to generating the hypothesis that induction is at work and then using this induction hypothesis to deduce an expectation about what should be seen in the report. In other words, we would be using the hypothetico-deductive method! In short, we would nd that Bacons inductivist theory of scientic method does not work. Therefore, evidence would

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be obtained to allow the rejection of this alternative. I predict that other alternative theories of scientic method would run into similar problems. Conclusions and Educational Implications Regardless of the number of scientic methods that may ultimately be identied, the present analysis suggests that many, if not all, scientic discoveries are hypothetico-deductive in nature. Given that several studies have found that many secondary school and college students exhibit difculties in reasoning in a hypothetico-deductive manner, and that these difculties lead not only to difculties in problem solving and understanding science concepts, but also to difculties in understanding the nature of science, more emphasis on teaching students to reason hypothetico-deductively is urged (e.g., Cavallo 1996; Germann 1994; Germann & Aram 1996; Hurst & Milkent 1996; Johnson & Lawson 1998; Keys 1994; Kuhn 1989; Lawson 1992a; b; Lawson 1999; Lawson & Thompson 1988; Lawson & Worsnop 1992; Noh & Scharmann, 1997; Shayer & Adey 1993; Westbrook & Rogers 1994; Wong 1993; Zohar et al. 1994). Certainly a start could be made with an astronomy lesson in which students make the same observations made by Galileo on the night of January 7, 1610. Students could then attempt to explain those observations through the generation of alternative hypotheses and expectations. Student brainstorming could then be followed by subsequent observations in which the alternative hypotheses are tested by the comparison of expected and observed results. Indeed, a general pattern of instruction could emerge in which a variety of student explorations lead to puzzling observations. These puzzling observations would then lead to the posing of causal questions and to the generation of alternative hypotheses. Then students would be challenged to test those alternatives through the explicit comparison of expected and observed results. Although the present advocacy of such a hypothetico-deductive mode of instruction is not necessarily new, very few science curricular materials currently exist in which these elements are explicitly included. Therefore, what curriculum developers need to do is to design more lessons in which these elements are made explicit. References
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Cavallo, A.M.L.: 1996, Meaningful Learning, Reasoning Ability, and Students Understanding and Problem Solving of Topics in Genetics, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 33(6), 625 656. Chamberlain, T.C.: 1965, The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses, Science 148, 754759. Originally published 1897. De Kruif, P.: 1926, Microbe Hunters, Harcourt Brace, New York. Eln, J.T. Glennan, S. & Reisch, G.: 1999, The Nature of Science: A Perspective from the Philosophy of Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 36(1), 107116. Finke, R.A., Ward, T.B., & Smith, S.M.: 1992, Creative Cognition: Theory Research and Practice, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Galilei, G.: 1610, The Sidereal Messenger, in H. Shapley, S. Rapport & H. Wright (eds.) (1954), A Treasury of Science, Harper & Brothers, New York. Gentner, D.: 1989, The Mechanisms of Analogical Learning, in S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Germann, P.J.: 1994, Testing a Model of Science Process Skills Acquisition: An Interaction with Parents Education, Preferred Language, Gender, Science Attitude, Cognitive Development, Academic Ability, and Biology Knowledge, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 31(7), 749783. Germann, P.J. & Aram, R.J.: 1996, Student Performances on the Science Processes of Recording Data, Analyzing Data, Drawing Conclusions, and Providing Evidence, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 33(7), 773798. Giere, R.N.: 1997, Understanding Scientic Reasoning (4th ed.), Harcourt Brace, New York. Gregory, R.L.: 1970, The Intelligent Eye, McGraw-Hill, New York. Grossberg, S.: 1982, Studies of Mind and Brain, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands Hanson, N.R.: 1958, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science, The University Press, Cambridge, England. Hempel, C.: 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E. & Thagard, P.R.: 1986, Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Holton, G. & Roller, D.H.D.: 1958, Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. Hurst, R.W. & Milkent, M.M.: 1996, Facilitating Successful Problem Solving in Biology through Application of Skill Theory, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 33(5), 541552. Jevons, F.R.: 1969, The Teaching of Science, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. Johnson, M.A. & Lawson, A.E.: 1998, What are the Relative Effects of Reasoning Ability and Prior Knowledge on Biology Achievement in Expository and Inquiry Classes?, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 35(1), 89103. Johnson-Laird, P.N.: 1983, Mental Models, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Johnson-Laird, P.N.: 1993, Human and Machine Thinking, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. Keys, C.W.: 1994, The Development of Scientic Reasoning Skills in Conjunction with Collaborative Assignments: An Interpretive Study of Six Ninth-grade Students, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 31(9), 10031022. Kimball, M.E.: 1967, Understanding the Nature of Science: A Comparison of Scientists and Science Teachers, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 5(2), 110120. Koestler, A.: 1964, The Act of Creation, Hutchinson, London. Kosslyn, S.M. & Koenig, O.: 1995, Wet Mind: The New Cognitive Neuroscience, The Free Press, New York. Kuhn, D.: 1989, Children and Adults as Intuitive Scientists, Psychological Review 96(4), 674689. Lawson, A.E.: 1992a, The Development of Reasoning Among College Biology Students, Journal of College Science Teaching 21(6), 338344.

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