City of Manila v.

Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines

Case No. 23G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981) FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annualrealty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447),which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent taxand fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limitset by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125,effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional onehalfpercent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested theOrdinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is voidas it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manilashould reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Constructionsustains the City of Manila s contention that the additional one-half percent realty taxis sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that the total realproperty tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum . While the 1949Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax.The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposedby municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty taxthat would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real PropertyTax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That wasalso the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) En Banc, Regala (p):7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant splea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of thepeace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purviewof Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omissohabendusest, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casusomisus canoperate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.The application of therule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but ratherfrom a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislativeenumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did notexclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include thejustice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge includingtherein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of AgrarianRelations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits

J.M. Tuason& Co. v. Mariano &Aquial& Cordova

Case No. 64G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978) FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ow

nership of a parcel of landlocated in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had beenfraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizaland that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners)pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of LandRegistration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrombe declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. TheTuason s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since theywere able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided uponby the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pilivs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving thevalidity of OCT No. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 5b

Pilar v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 242G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100 FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the positionof member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three dayslater, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commissionimposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions andexpenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate musthave entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributionsand expenditures since he was a non-candidate , having withdrawn his certificateof candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to filehis statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew thesame, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidatewho pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 ofResolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificateof candidacy . LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2