R 061530Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3492 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 BRASILIA 000156 SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: MAKING THE

3 PLUS 1 WORK REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 000504 B. 08 STATE 671 C. 08 BRASILIA 001264 D. 08 BRASILIA 001664 E. 05 ASUNCION 001363 F. 04 BRASILIA 01291 G. 08 BRASILIA 43 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). 1. (C) Summary: The 3 Plus 1 Mechanism on Security in the Triborder Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay remains, six years after its initial plenary session, the only instrument available to discuss counterterrorism (CT) with regional partners at the policy level. Given the likelihood that the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) will reject new policy-level proposals for regional security cooperation as the GOB focuses on building up a regional security architecture in South America that does not include the United States (i.e., Mercosul working groups on security, UNASUL, South

American Defense Council), re-invigorating the 3 Plus 1 becomes all the more necessary, both as a means of achieving meaningful policy-level commitments from Brazil on this important issue and as a way of maintaining a foothold in regional security discussions. The United States' turn to host the upcoming 3 Plus 1 offers the best opportunity since the initial plenary to shift the dynamics of the mechanism in a way that ensures its effectiveness and our broader security interests in the region. Taking advantage of greater GOB openness to the new U.S. Administration, a concerted USG strategy to implement this new approach that includes careful inter-agency preparation and high-level participation could lay the groundwork for the GOB to accept expanding the scope of the 3 Plus 1 -- substantively, geographically, or both -- to make it a more effective regional security dialogue. End Summary. ------------------------------------3 Plus 1 and the Brazilian Catch-22 ------------------------------------2. (S) The history of the 3 Plus 1 suggests that it will require careful planning and execution to make it a truly effective forum for cooperation. The Brazilians have been consistent in limiting discussions of topics that are not within the established and narrow confines of the 3 Plus 1 (only counter-terrorism, only TBA), and have made it nearly impossible for the USG to propose projects for the four 3 Plus 1 partners to undertake jointly. The Brazilian catch-22 works this way: The GOB refuses to discuss anything but

TBA terrorism in the 3 Plus 1. Although the GOB knows that the 3 Plus 1 is not a forum for sharing intelligence and, as a result, that there is a limit to how much the USG can provide regarding terrorism-related activities in the region, it uses our reticence to share information in this forum to assert that there is no evidence of terrorist activity in the TBA and that, if such evidence does exist, the United States is refusing to show it. (Note: It is not clear the extent to which MRE authorities, who lead Brazil's 3 Plus 1 delegation, are aware of the intelligence sharing between other GOB and USG agencies, or of the intelligence regarding TBA activities that is in the possession of their own agencies. End note.) It therefore dismisses the existence of terrorist activity in the TBA and shuts down most discussions that are explicitly focused on addressing terrorism-related activities. 3. (C) Brazil also parries our efforts by complaining about the supposed sullying of the TBA's reputation, which they say undermines their efforts to promote it as a tourist destination. At the same time, when the United States proposes to discuss security issues that are broader than the TBA, Brazil refuses to discuss them precisely because the issues do not fit the mission of the 3 Plus 1, which is to discuss issues pertaining to the TBA. For example, at the January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil shut down U.S. efforts to discuss protection of food supplies because the issue of food security is not a "TBA problem", but "a universal problem that all countries face." More appropriate forums exist to discuss that topic, according to Itamaraty.

----------------------The Value of 3 Plus 1 ----------------------4. (C) Despite these difficulties, from Mission Brazil's perspective, even under present circumstances, the 3 Plus 1 mechanism serves several important purposes. -Policy-level dialogue: Although law enforcement cooperation with Brazil has always been excellent and fluid at the operational level, 3 Plus 1 is the only sub-regional discussion on these issues in which we participate at a policy level. As in other areas, Itamaraty continues to resist engaging with the United States in regional discussions at the policy level on security issues, even as regional cooperation with Brazil at the operational level is growing. As Brazil becomes more confident in its regional leadership, Itamaraty is becoming more comfortable telling the United States that our presence is not needed. As a result, we believe it likely that Itamaraty will reject USG proposals to establish new regional fora to address security issues and, if sufficiently concerned about U.S. initiatives, might make an effort to quash our excellent operational cooperation. This attitude and concern give added value to working from within the 3 Plus 1, where we already have Brazil buy-in for the United States to participate. -- Networking: Members of the Mission's Law

Enforcement Working Group (LEWG, which includes DEA, DHS (ICE, CBP, and USSS), DOJ (FBI, RLA), DOD (DAO, MLO), and State) who have attended the 3 Plus 1 sessions see value in the networking possibilities created through mechanism. For them, it is an unparalleled networking opportunity for the four countries, each of which usually brings a cohort of officials from their intelligence, law enforcement, and financial agencies, and LEWG members report that useful discussions occur on the margins of the plenary. -- Accountability: The 3 Plus 1 ensures that some accountability exists among the partners, and this could be exploited further. For example, a perennial topic of discussion is the establishment and staffing of the Joint Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguacu, an initiative that, we understand, was first proposed during a 3 Plus 1 plenary. Having announced it at the 3 Plus 1, the Brazilians now have set up a benchmark for themselves that they feel obligated to report and deliver on. Although there remain problems with staffing of the center, it is unlikely that absent the pressure point that annual 3 Plus 1 meetings represent, that Brazil or the other partners would have found the wherewithal to hammer out the legal and diplomatic agreements to create it. Another element of accountability that we have not fully exploited relates to compliance with UN resolutions mandating member states to update their anti-terrorism and terrorism finance legislation (which neither Brazil nor Paraguay have done). During the January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil made vague

statements about several bills dealing with CT that were various at stages of the legislative process, but we know that at the time they made those statements the GOB had already decided to shelve an anti-terrorism bill it had spent several years drafting (ref a). The 3 Plus 1 allows us the opportunity to question Brazil and the other partners as to what progress they have made to comply with basic international norms, and to remind them of their international obligations. -- Information sharing: Even though we rarely come to agreement on new joint initiatives, the Brazilian delegations do brief on what are, essentially, law enforcement measures undertaken by them, such as new surveillance technologies that have been installed, new police and customs facilities that are being built, measures to patrol the riverine frontiers and the Itaipu lake, and the number of interdiction operations performed by the Brazilian Federal Police. Mission believes much of this information is valuable for understanding what the GOB is doing independently and jointly with its neighbors, not all of which is information we receive through other contacts or in the vetted and open way in which it is reported at the 3 Plus 1. -- Moral suasion: Brazilian government officials repeatedly cite their participation in the 3 Plus 1 as a measure of their commitment to combat terrorist activity in the region. During a November 2008 conference on CT jointly held in Brasilia and hosted by the UNODC and the Brazilian government, the head of Brazil's financial intelligence unit (COAF) and the

Brazilian Intelligence Agency's chief of CT analysis both called the 3 Plus 1 an effective mechanism. To the extent that the GOB puts value on the 3 Plus 1, it provides some leverage to encourage Brazil to be a positive partner. 5. (C) As a result of these benefits, Mission Brazil believes the 3 Plus 1 mechanism should be maintained. But we also need to look for ways to make it more effective. We see two main options for improving the mechanism: a somewhat simpler but less satisfactory evolution to a broader TBA agenda, or a more difficult and ambitious effort at restructuring the 3 Plus 1 into a country-wide counter-crime forum. Both of these would be consistent with the ideas presented at the most recent Regional Security Initiative conference (ref b). In either case, we would need to think through our approach to Brazil carefully, make use of the advantages we will have this year as host, and play on what we expect will be a desire on the part of the GOB to show goodwill toward the new U.S. administration in order to have a good chance at officially re-focusing the mechanism into a broader geographic and substantive instrument. --------------------Option 1: Evolution --------------------6. (C) The first possible direction is to begin a push to substantively expand the focus of the 3 Plus 1, to make it, in essence, the most effective Triboder Area-focused mechanism it can possibly be.

This would entail pushing the 3 Plus 1 fully into the transnational crime milieu. Mission believes there is sufficient precedent for encouraging an evolution toward broader transnational crime matters. 7. (C) The 3 Plus 1 is an outgrowth of the Tripartite Command of the TBA, an Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan effort to counter the use of the TBA by organized crime and terrorist groups that was established in 1996. After the September 11 attacks, the TBA countries invited the United States to participate in a sister mechanism to the Tripartite Command, the 3 Plus 1. Although the Tripartite Command was focused broadly on transnational crime and terrorism, the 3 Plus 1, at U.S. insistence focused exclusively on terrorism and terrorist financing, overshadowing and diminishing the TBA countries' focus on other areas of criminality. In fact, a 1998 agreement between the Tripartite Command called for the TBA countries to intensify the fight against terrorism, smuggling (of contraband, arms, people), money laundering, and drug trafficking. 8. (C) Furthermore, a review of the history of the 3 Plus 1 reveals a number of instances were the Brazilians have pushed to include items related to illicit criminal activity in various 3 Plus 1 meetings. Some of these items include: organized criminal activity, cross-border movement of cash, controlling the borders, drug and arms trafficking, counterfeit goods, and improved cross-border customs. For example, during the 2004 plenary the three partners emphasized the need to continue

using the 3 Plus 1 platform to reinforce the fight against organized, transnational crime. Heading the Brazilian delegation, then head of the Ministry of External Relations' (Itamaraty) Office of Transnational Crime (COCIT), Marcus Pinta Gama emphasized the need for greater cooperation among the partners in joint monitoring of air cargo, improved coordination in controlling cross-border movement of cash, and improved joint customs and immigration operations. The story was repeated during a non-plenary meeting of the 3 Plus 1 countries which took place in Asuncion in October 2005 to discuss transborder movement of bulk cash and the illicit use of charities and again in the late-2005 plenary, when Brazil proposed agenda items that included drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, and border controls. The US delegation, supported by the Argentine and Paraguayan delegations, actually pared down this agenda to focus it more heavily on explicit terrorism-related items. ---------------------------------------Option 2: A more ambitious expansion ---------------------------------------9. (C) A second possible direction for the 3 Plus 1 would be to make an effort to expand beyond its narrow focus on the Triborder area and on CT to cover the entire territory of the partners over a broader range of issues. An even more ambitious step would be to invite surrounding nations to participate, initially as "observers."

10. (C) An effort to set a broader agenda could begin by getting the 3 Plus 1 partners to recommit to combating all of the crimes listed in the 1998 agreement (making explicit reference to the agreement in the process), while offering increased USG technical and perhaps logistical support to improve and better coordinate their efforts in those areas. It is critical, if the path of an expanded agenda that includes transnational criminal activity in the entire territory of the partners is followed, that we can justify to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, that there is a concrete U.S. interest in these issues. In the Brazilian view, if there is smuggling activity between Paraguay and Brazil that is a bilateral problem for the two countries to solve. Being able to justify our interest in discussing the broader set of transnational crime issues will require sharing information that reveals how international criminal activity taking place in the region is affecting U.S. interests. This could be dealt with by tasking an intelligence community assessment that is releasable to the partners prior to the 3 Plus 1, even if such an assessment were not itself part of the discussion during the plenary for security reasons. 11. (C) Under either option, some possible additional topics could include, but not be limited to: -- Critical Infrastructure Protection: This is a perennial topic of discussion. It would serve the purpose of continuing to follow up on the Secretary Chertoff visit (ref c). Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) head General Felix

may be in Washington at the same time as the 3 Plus 1 is taking place, and, if he could be persuaded to attend parts of the 3 Plus 1, this and other topics he discussed with DHS Secretary Chertoff could represent fruitful topics for discussion. -- Treasury's proposal for a Financial Threat Assessment: A worthwhile proposal that has not been followed up on since it was brought up at the last 3 Plus 1 in Asuncion. -- Crossborder kidnapping: An area of particular concern to Asuncion. -- Internationalization of gang activity: The growing, and increasingly transnational, threat of Brazilian prison gangs. This will be a tricky proposition, but a seed could be planted for future discussion. In this vein, it would be useful to know whether there is an Intelligence Community assessment, or one could be written, examining the international links of the Brazilian prison gangs (Primeiro Commando da Capital (PCC) and Commando Vermelho (CV) and its international links. If a U.S. connection is found, this could become a legitimate topic of discussion under the 3 Plus 1 rubric. -- Maritime smuggling and trafficking activity: See post's annual terrorism report submission (ref d). -------------------------------------------Strategy for Moving Forward is Necessary --------------------------------------------

12. (C) Success at expanding the 3 Plus 1 will require a careful diplomatic strategy. Brazil is in a comfortable position now -- it gets the benefits of 3 plus 1 without having to make commitments -- so it will be reluctant to accept broad changes to the mechanism. In order to overcome this expected resistance, we must be tactically savvy and employ a wider range of tools that we are not now using. -- High-level U.S. participation: This is a must. Brazil should see that the 3 Plus 1 is a high priority for the United States in the context of the region and that we are committed to making it work. In addition, highlevel participation will likely raise the level of Brazilian participation, with the salutary effect of ensuring that one of our most difficult interlocutors in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, current COCIT chief Virginia Toniatti, is not head of the Brazilian delegation. Not only has she proven resistant to cooperation with the United States on any number of issues of mutual concern outside of the 3 Plus 1, but her rank of minister, allows her to refuse to agree to proposals at the 3 Plus 1 meetings by claiming, plausibly, that she has no authorization to agree to them. An ambassadorial or higher head of the U.S. delegation might cause Brazil to send an equivalent official who does not carry the same negative baggage. -- Homework: The US Del needs to be prepared to

call Brazil on its generalities and contradictions in its statements and positions. Brazil has yet to pass either anti-terrorism or terrorism finance legislation, and a prepared USDel can attempt to get more specific answers on record than vague generalities about "bills that are in various stages of the legislative process." Adequate preparation can prevent Brazil from playing the spoiler, as they did during the 2008 plenary, refusing to discuss Trade Transparency Units (TTU), despite the fact that TTU's had been discussed at previous 3 Plus 1 meetings, during which all the partners had shown keen interest in the U.S. program (ref e). -- Inter-agency Planning: A robust inter-agency preparatory process that includes posts will help ensure that both specific proposals and the way in which they are to be presented have been fully discussed and agreed upon, and that we avoid surprises that make cooperation more difficult. The 2006 Treasury designations just prior to the 3 Plus 1 plenary that year spoiled our CT dialogue with Brazil at the policy level for at least a year, during which time Brazilian officials missed no opportunity to chide the United States for our "unilateralist" approach to the designations. If the United States is proposing a topic for discussion that is not traditionally thought of as falling under the CT rubric, we will need to make the case early with the Brazilians and--as previously noted-- be able to justify why such a topic is a matter of U.S. concern or how it fits into the 3 Plus 1. Mission recommends an annual post-3 Plus 1 internal USG meeting (with the 3 posts included)

not more than three months after the plenary to determine how to do follow-up and to plan the year-ahead agenda leading up to the next 3 Plus 1. -- Patience: We should not expect to be able to accomplish the goal of broadening the 3 Plus 1 at the next 3 plus 1. We should expect to plant some seeds prior to this plenary through Ambassador-level meetings; advance some at the plenary itself; and continue with the push at subsequent follow-up meetings. -- Alternate proposals: We must consider the possibility that Itamaraty will initially reject expanding the 3 Plus 1. It will be necessary to float new ideas. Mission has discussed the following: To challenge Brazil's (largely manufactured) outrage about the demonization of the region, the United States could float the idea that "Triborder" be struck from the 3 Plus 1's official name (or suggest to either Argentina or Paraguay to do so). Another possible way to challenge Brazil's outrage is to propose that Uruguay and Chile be included in a future 3 Plus 1, initially as observers, in order to ameliorate the undue focus on the TBA. The idea of including Chile and Uruguay in the 3 Plus 1 was originally proposed by the former head of the COCIT, Minister (now Ambassador) Marcos Pinta Gama (ref f). Although Pinta Gama proposed it in different setting, it could nevertheless be noted that Brazil had been open to the idea in the past. Although the Mission can accept the 3 plus 1 as is, more careful efforts to re-evaluate our strategy on a regular basis might yield additional options for

advancing our interests through the 3 Plus 1. -- Interim Visits: Mission recommends either a non-plenary gathering as outlined below, or visits to the individual posts by S/CT representatives as a way to push our goals and signal a renewed and expanded commitment to the 3 Plus 1. The United States could propose to hold sub-plenary sessions at the mid-year point on more narrowly tailored themes. These took place in the past: in August 2005, a subplenary was held in Asuncion to discuss illicit use of charities and bulk cash smuggling across borders. Such meetings have tended to be at the technical level, and as a result carry less political baggage. But since 2005, no subplenary meetings have been held. Brazil once proposed to hold a sub-plenary on joint monitoring of air cargo moving through the TBA (an initiative they later backed off from). The United States could propose, for example, to host a sub-plenary to discuss internationalization of gangs in light of our own experience in dealing with Central American gangs in our country. Such a sub-plenary could have participation from Portuguese officials, perhaps as observers, where there are indications that Brazilian gangs may be gaining a foothold. -- Follow-up: Regaining momentum will require USG effort on a year-round basis. There is little to be gained from making proposals at the 3 Plus 1 that are later dropped or forgotten. Treasury's excellent proposal to conduct a joint illicit finance threat assessment was brought up at the 2008 3 Plus 1 in Asuncion. Unfortunately, with no advance notice, it was initially

rejected, and no effort was made to act on Mission's suggestions that we work it in capitals after the meeting. Such an assessment could have laid the foundation for a semi-formal bilateral dialogue in between plenaries and in future 3 Plus 1 meetings. -------------------------If You've Got It, Use It -------------------------13. (C) The 3 Plus 1 as currently constituted is flawed structurally because of its specific focus on the Triborder Area, which narrows potential areas of discussions with the partners, and its now almost exclusive focus on an issue that Brazil sees as distinctly secondary, counterterrorism. Ultimately, in Mission's view, it makes little sense to have a mechanism to discuss CT or broader transnational crime issues by focusing on a small bit of territory that, no matter how problematic, is a small part of a broader security problem in the region. Mission notes that the CT problem in Brazil, not to mention the transnational crime problem, is not confined to the TBA, and that other areas in Brazil, such as Sao Paulo, are of at least equal concern to the TBA (ref g). Brazil, however, currently sits in the driver's seat; it gets to say it participates in the 3 Plus 1 without letting the mechanism produce much of a positive agenda. 14. (C) That said, as Brazilian efforts to build up a regional security architecture with a Brazilian imprimatur-- such as Mercosul working

groups on CT and transnational crime, UNASUL, and the South American Defense Council -- crowd out U.S. leadership and involvement in regional security discussions, the 3 Plus 1 provides a useful starting point and is our only existing foot in the door at the regional level. By exploiting the natural advantages offered from hosting the 3 Plus 1 and using the expected goodwill from the Brazilian government toward the new U.S. administration, we have the best opportunity to reinvigorate this forum and advance our broader security interests in the region. SOBEL (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of