Pearl Harbor

PEARL HARBOR
THE SEEDS AND FRUITS OF INFAMY

PEARL HARBOR
THE SEEDS AND FRUITS OF INFAMY
Percy L. Greaves, Jr.
Bettina B. Greaves, ed.
Foreword by John Chamberlain
LvMI
MISES INSTITUTE
ISBN: 978-1-933550-33-6
Copyright 2010 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute and published under
the Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0. http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/3.0.
For information write the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 West Magnolia
Avenue, Auburn, Alabama 36832. Mises.org.
Contents
Editors Preface, Bettina Bien Greaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Authors Preface, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Foreword, John Chamberlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
PART I: THE SEEDS OF INFAMY
1 U.S. International Policy (19331940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Foreign Relations in an Election Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4 U.S. Military Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6 Modus VivendiYes? No!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7 Japanese Action Appears Imminent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8 Te Countdown Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
9 Tensions Mount. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
10 Signicant Information Known in Washington . . . . . . . 221
11 Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action. . . . . 239
12 December 6, Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
13 December 6, Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
14 Te Morning of the Fateful Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
15 Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! Tis is No Drill! . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
v
vi Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
PART 2: THE FRUITS OF INFAMY
16 Te First Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
17 Te Public Had Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
18 Te Cover-up Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
19 Te Administration Initiates an Investigation . . . . . . . . . 369
20 19421944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
21 1944: A Year of Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
22 Army Pearl Harbor Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
23 Te Navy Court of Inquiry ( July 24October 9, 1944) . . 489
24 1944: A Political Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
25 Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations:
Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
26 Safeguarding Military Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
27 Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack (November 15, 1945
May 31, 1946) Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613
May 31, 1946) Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 667
May 31, 1946) Part 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
May 31, 1946) Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
31 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Appendix: Dramatis Personae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Editors Preface
N
o one can plan history. Every one of usrich and poor, pow-
erful and not so powerful, famous and infamous, important
and unimportantplans his or her actions in the hope of
accomplishing some goal. History is the outcome of countless
such purposive actions, intertwined, interconnected, interrelated.
Although each action is planned by the individual actor in the
hope of achieving some end, history itself is not only not planned,
but unplannable. And so it is with the Pearl Harbor disaster
which launched the United States into World War II. It was the
unplanned, unintended consequence of countless separate pre-
attack planned actions on the part of the principals concerned.
And the post-attack coverup and revelations arose as the unin-
tended consequences of the purposive actions of the principals
concerned.
Te goal of the historian of any historical event is to try to
discover how it happened as an unintended consequence of the
purposive actions of individuals. And that is the goal of this book,
as it was also the goal of the post-attack investigations, to deter-
mine how and why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and how
and why Washington o cials responded as they did. My hus-
band, Percy Greaves, became interested in the pros and cons of
the December 7, 1941 attack from the moment he learned, as
vii
viii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
research director of the Republican National Committee dur-
ing the 1944 Roosevelt-Dewey presidential election campaign,
that the United States had decrypted the Japanese diplomatic
code in August 1940 and since then had been reading many of
Japans SECRET and SUPER-SECRET messages. Tat secret,
of course, could not be divulged so long as the war continued
and we were continuing to decipher Japanese messages and learn
their secrets.
After the war ended in August 1945, Congress established
a Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the attack. As
Chief of the Minority Sta of that Joint Committee my husband
researched the pre-attack background, the earlier investigations,
and the available documents. He helped brief the Republican
Committee members in questioning witnesses as to what was
known in Washington about Japans plans before the attack, what
intelligence and materiel had been furnished the Pearl Harbor
commanders, and whether or not they had responded appropri-
ately, given the available intelligence, materiel, ships, planes, and
men. Te hearings lasted almost a full year. Te Majority Report
continued to place considerable blame on the Hawaiian com-
manders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C.
Short. A lengthy Minority Report held that the blame must be
shared by higher-up Washington o cials.
Upon the conclusion of the Congressional Committee hear-
ings, my husband continued to research the Pearl Harbor attack.
He interviewed surviving participants, wrote and lectured widely
on the subject. My husband completed this manuscript and wrote
the side heads. We proofed it together and checked all the quota-
tions and footnotes against the original sources. But then he was
stricken with cancer, a particularly virulent variety. He died on
August 13, 1984, just over a month after the appearance of his
rst serious symptoms.
By the time my husband died, his eorts had yielded a mas-
sive manuscript. When I reread that manuscript after his death, I
decided that, although the names, dates, and documentation were
Editors Preface ix
all there, it was di cult to follow the sequence of events. Events
alternated with revelations gleaned from the investigations and
revelations alternated with events. Also Percy had included many
lengthy supporting quotations within the text itself, interrupt-
ing the ow of events. In the hope of making the story easier
to understand, I have arranged everything in chronological order
and paraphrased the quotesfrom FDRs inauguration and
his early active intervention in international aairs through the
Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the post attack investiga-
tions, the obstacles placed in the path of investigators, down to
the nal reports.
He and I often talked about this book. As usual I made sug-
gestions; some he accepted; others he rejected. He would say, If
anything happens to me then you can do as you please. Of course,
he fully expected to nish it himself. But time was not given him
to do so.
Although I have reworked my husbands manuscript, it
remains his book. Te research and documentation are his. Te
decision to present events primarily as they were viewed from
Washington was his. My contribution has been to reorganize,
revise, and rewrite his manuscript so as to present the events
chronologically. Troughout, however, I have tried to keep the
book true to his research and faithful to his interpretation. My
guiding principle has always been to present the results of Percys
years of research as faithfully and accurately as possible and to
describe the truth about Pearl Harbor as he saw it.
Although I am sure Percy would have had some criticism of
the way I have nished his book, on the whole I believe he would
have approved. I only wish he could have lived to see the research
of his lifetime published in this form. Any errors or omissions in
preparing his work for nal publication are, of course, my respon-
sibility alone.

MRS. PERCY L. (BETTINA B.) GREAVES, JR.
May 2007
Authors Preface
W
hen the attack on Pearl Harbor was announced on the radio,
my sister phoned. I was outdoors playing touch football
with my nine-year-old boy and some of his friends. I went
inside immediately and turned on the radio. From that moment
on I have followed Pearl Harbor developments closely.
At dawn on December 7, 1941, the Japanese had attacked
the United States U.S. Fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor in the
Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii was then a territory of the United
States, not yet a state. Nevertheless, that blow brought the United
States into the war that had been started in Europe by Hitlers
attack on Poland in September 1939. Te war then exploded
worldwide, with fronts not only in Europe and in the Atlantic
but also in Asia and the Pacic.
Te generally accepted explanation for our entry into the war
was simply Japans unprovoked and dastardly attack on Pearl
Harbor. However, the responsibility for the extent of the disas-
ter was attributed to a considerable extent to failures on the
part of the two commanders at Pearl HarborNavy Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel and Army General Walter C. Short. To
many, this settled the matter; the two commanders were to blame,
held up to public shame, relieved of their commands, and forced
into early retirement.
xi
xii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Te rst hint I had that there was more to the Pearl Harbor
story came in 1944. Te then Republican candidate for President,
Tomas E. Dewey, was trying to unseat President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Several service personnel came to the Republican
National Committeeof which I was then Research Director
with reports that U.S. cryptographers had deciphered some of
the Japanese codes and that Washington o cials had been read-
ing, even before the attack, many of the Japanese governments
condential communications.
Dewey proposed to make a speech on the subject, but was
requested in great secrecy by Army Chief of Sta General George
C. Marshall, not to do so. Our ability to decipher and read Japanese
messages, he said, was still playing an important role in helping us
to win the war in the Pacic and thus to save the lives of U.S. sol-
diers and sailors. Dewey honored that request. When Republican
Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, unaware of the reason for
Deweys silence, also scheduled a speech on the subject, Dewey
asked him not to. Tus the public was prevented from learning
any of the true Pearl Harbor story at that time. And the voters
gave Roosevelt a comfortable victory over his Republican rival.
After the election, I resigned from the Party and turned to
freelancing as researcher and economic columnist.
1945 was an eventful year. On January 20, Roosevelt was inau-
gurated for an unprecedented fourth term. He died a few months
later, on April 12. Te war was not yet over. Vice President Harry
Truman took o ce. Te ghting nally ended in Europe when
Germany surrendered on May 7. And the war in the Pacic came
to an end with the surrender of Japan on August 14.
. . . . . . . .
Rumors had surfaced from time to time, in spite of eorts
to maintain secrecy, to the eect that the attack on Pearl Harbor
might not have been such a complete surprise to the o cials in
Authors Preface xiii
Washington as the public had been led to believe. Several fact-
nding inquiries were set up during the war in the attempt to learn
more. A great deal of information was unearthed, although it was
not then made public. Pressure continued to mount for a full-
edged investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor
disaster. Finally when the war was over, Congress responded.
A Joint Congressional Committee for the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack ( JCC) was set up in the fall of 1945.
Te Democratic majority named six of the Committees ten
members, the Republican minority four. Te Democratic major-
ity controlled the appointment of the Committees Counsel and
sta. Te Republican minority was not given funds for an ade-
quate research sta. As I had earned some respect as a researcher
when working with the Republican National Committee dur-
ing the 1944 presidential campaign, a few persons interested in
having the Joint Congressional Committee conduct a thorough
and unbiased investigation arranged for me to head a small sta
to assist the minority members. Te JCCs reports issued in July
1946 answered some questions but raised others.
My serious interest in Pearl Harbor stemmed from my work
with that Committee. For almost a full year (19451946) I had
spent day and night studying Pearl Harbor documents and explor-
ing Pearl Harbor leads. From that time on, I read everything I
could nd that bore some relevance to Pearl and I tried to keep
current on the subject. Ten, thanks to a small grant arranged by
Harry Elmer Barnes I was able to travel back and forth across
the country to meet and interview surviving principals. When
further funds were not forthcoming, my serious study of Pearl
Harbor was sidetracked for the more urgent demands of earning
a living. Only in semi-retirement have I had time to concentrate
on the subject again.
History is a record of step-by-step progression from the past.
Any event is always the end result of a long sequence of events
stretching back endlessly into the past. Te historian investigating
xiv Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
a particular incident must always decide where to start, how far
back to go. And so it is with Pearl Harbor. Te Japanese attack
in 1941 was the nal outcome of complex, interconnected occur-
rences that had their origins many years before. For the purpose
of this book, I have chosen to trace the conicting forces that led
the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, back to the 1894
1895 Sino-Japanese War.
Events happen; once they are over and done with, they are
irrevocable. Learning after the fact what actually occurred is not
always easy. History needs to be written and rewritten constantly
in the light of newly revealed evidence and newly acquired knowl-
edge in other elds. As previously classied and secret World
War II documents have been released in recent years, consider-
able additional information has become available. To reconcile
the conicting testimony of the many witnesses before the several
Pearl Harbor investigations, to keep abreast of new material as it
becomes available, to integrate new data into the previous body of
knowledge, and to separate the wheat from the cha so as to make
it all intelligible and meaningful, calls for painstaking research
and analysis. Te task of the historian is to try to reconstruct and
report the facts as accurately as possible. As historian, I have acted
as sleuth or detective trying to determine the truth. Te Pearl
Harbor story is like a gigantic jigsaw puzzle, the parts coming
from many dierent sources, each part alone being of little value
until tted into the mosaic. Hopefully this book will supply a few
more pieces to the gigantic Pearl Harbor jigsaw puzzle and thus
make a small contribution to this period in history.
Percy L. Greaves, Jr.
Summer 1984
Foreword
O
n October 28, 1944, in Washington, D.C., I attended a
birthday party given by a friend of mine, the Russian-born
foreign correspondent, Isaac Don Levine,
1
for his wife, Ruth.
October 28 is my birthday too. So it became a double birthday
party.
At that party, a loquacious colonel, assuming apparently that
he was speaking o the record, conded that the United States
had decrypted the Japanese diplomatic code a year or so before
the attack on Pearl Harbor. From that time on, the top U.S.
administration and military o cials had been intercepting and
reading many of the condential messages that passed between
the Japanese government in Tokyo and her emissaries in the
United States and other countries. Tanks to this source of intel-
ligence, the administration in Washington had been privy before
the attack on Pearl Harbor to many Japanese secrets.
Republican presidential candidate Tomas E. Dewey had
also learned this administration secret. But, out of patriotism, he
was not exploiting it during the election campaign that was then
under way. It could be that the Japanese were still using the same
1
Levine later founded and edited the anticommunist journal Plain Talk, a fore-
runner of Te Freeman and National Review.
xv
xvi Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
code, and Dewey did not want to run the chance of alerting the
Japanese to change their code and thus destroy an extremely valu-
able source of U.S. intelligence.
It would have been a real scoop to report this news on the
pages of Life, my employer at the time. But should I? I lost no
time in sending a memorandum to Henry Luce, publisher of Life,
about the colonels disclosure. He reacted as Dewey had. He told
me to le the information away; it would be useful after the war.
Right after the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, Luce
sent me to upstate New York to interview Dewey. After an all-
night train ride, I caught up with him at the Elmira Reformatory,
where he was on an inspection tour. He asked me to join him
in his limousine for the ride to Geneva, his next stop. We drove
along scenic Lake Seneca. But I didnt glance at the beautiful
Finger Lake scenery; I was enthralled with Deweys story.
In September 1944, a tall, dark, and handsome colonel, Carter
Clarke, had delivered to Dewey a letter from Army Chief of Sta
General Marshall. Te letter told Dewey that we had cracked the
Japanese diplomatic code. We were still deriving enormous mili-
tary advantages from reading and decrypting coded intercepts.
American lives would be lost if the Japanese changed their code.
Terefore, it was of the utmost importance that no word about
that should leak out that might reach the Japanese. As a result,
Dewey was persuaded to keep the issues of Pearl Harbor and the
Japanese code out of the campaign. Dewey told me I could use
the story of his gagging, but he warned that I must not reveal
my source. My article appeared in the September 24, 1945, issue
of Life.
Luce then gave me the assignment of attending the hearings
of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack, just then preparing to get under way.
Te Congressional hearings ran from November 15, 1945, until
May 31, 1946, when the last witness appeared. Tose hearings
Foreword xvii
revealed a great deal, but probably even more signicant were
some of the things that they didnt reveal. It was obvious from the
testimony of some of the witnesses that they were trying not to
tell everything they knew.
I recall to this day the dissimulation of one key witness, Captain
Alwyn D. Kramer. As Japanese translator and Navy courier, he
had played an important role in the weeks before the attack on
Pearl Harbor. He had distributed to the top Washington o cials
many, if not most, of the secret Japanese messages intercepted
during that period. He was asked at some length what he recalled
about the messages he had delivered, and to whom. Kramer had
testied in 1944 before the Navy Court of Inquiry. Between then
and his appearance before the Congressional Committee, his rec-
ollections had been refreshed, he said, as a result of his having
been questioned by military personnel conducting other Pearl
Harbor investigations.
Te members of the Congressional Committee noted sev-
eral signicant discrepancies between his testimony to them
and his frank and open statements before the NCI. Two were
especially notable. One dealt with the famous East Wind Rain
message, a false weather report bearing a coded meaning, and
the other concerned the Japanese governments instructions to
their Washington ambassadors asking them to deliver their reply
to the U.S. State Department proposal at precisely 1:00 p.m.
Washington time on Sunday, December 7.
According to Kramers testimony before the NCI, East Wind
Rain indicated impending trouble, perhaps even war, between
Japan and the United States. Concerning the 1:00 p.m. message,
he had reported to the NCI that, when delivering it on Sunday
morning, December 7, he had called the special attention of some
of the recipients to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time was
about dawn in Hawaii. However, he denied to the Congressional
Committee that he had intended to imply that either of these
two messages carried any serious implications. When pressed by
xviii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Committee member Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, he
side-stepped. His earlier recollections had been faulty, he said;
his memory had since been refreshed. Moreover, he atly denied
that anyone had asked him to change his testimony.
. . . . . . . .
Percy Greaves was hired privately to help the minority
Republicans, who had no funds for a research sta. He attended
every session of the Congressional hearings. In the course of ful-
lling my assignment for Life, I saw him there regularly. He lis-
tened intently to all the testimony. Occasionally he would whis-
per in the ear of a Republican Committee member or write him
a note, calling attention to some particular point to pursue in his
questioning.
Percys serious interest in Pearl Harbor dated from those
hearings. He continued to pursue the subject after the hearings
closed. He interviewed participants, read everything he could
nd on the subject and researched all leads. Tus this book has
been many years in the making. I talked with Percy about Pearl
Harbor several times over the years.
Percy had completed a carefully documented draft when
he died in August 1984. His widow, Bettina Bien Greaves, has
done a noble job of reworking his materials, eshing them out,
and preparing his manuscript for publication. His revelations, as
they are presented here, should help future students interpret the
ramications of the seeds that led to the Japanese attack, and
of the fruits of that attack, namely the investigations and the
attempted coverup.
John Chamberlain
January 1991
Acknowledgments
A
s my husband notes in the Preface to this book, his interest
in Pearl Harbor stemmed from his year-long association
(19451946) with the Congressional Joint Committee
to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor. As director of the
Committees minority sta, he studied all the documents furnished
the Committee and attended all the hearings. After the hearings
ended, he received a small grant from Harry Elmer Barnes to seek
answers to some questions raised but not answered by the several
investigations. With money from the grant, he traveled back and
forth across the country in the early 1960s, interviewing individu-
als who had an interest in Pearl Harbor. Here they are, listed in
alphabetical order: Admiral Walter S. Anderson, General Carter
W. Clarke, Curtis Dall, General Bonner Fellers, Admiral Tomas
L. Hart, Admiral Royall E. Ingersoll, Captain Tomas K. Kimmel,
Captain Robert A. Lavender, Admiral Arthur W. McCollum,
Commander Charles C. Miles, Admiral Ben Moreell, Admiral
Joseph R. Redman, Admiral F.W. Rockwell, Captain Laurence
F. Saord, Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth, General Albert C.
Wedemeyer, and General Charles A. Willoughby. Captain Saord
deserves special mention. Percy talked with him many times on his
frequent visits to Washington and Saord described to him in
xix
xx Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
careful detail the Navys pre-war system for keeping secret the
very existence of the Japanese MAGIC intercepts and the infor-
mation they revealed. When Barness funds ran out, Percys seri-
ous study of Pearl Harbor was sidetracked as he returned to the
more urgent demands of earning a living. However, he continued
reading and lecturing on the subject. Only in semi-retirement,
did he again have time to actually start putting the results of his
research on paper.
As I have written, Percy died in 1984. His manuscript was
practically nished. After his death, however, I took over the
task of editing it and readying it for publication. I physically
chopped up the typed manuscript and reorganized chronologi-
cally his accounts of pre-war events and post-war revelations. I
also put the entire manuscript on the computer. I interviewed
several persons: radioman Ralph T. Briggs, the Navy code clerk
who had intercepted the elusive East Wind Rain message,
Admiral Kemp Tolley, commander of the Lanakai, one of the
three small ships ordered by Roosevelt to be commissioned just
before the attack and to take up positions in the South China Sea
in the path of the south-bound Japanese convoys, and Admiral
Kimmels son, Captain Tomas Kimmel, whom my husband had
also interviewed.
As a result of my editing, the manuscript plus its footnotes
became much too long for any publisher to consider. Sheldon
Richman, editor of Te Freeman, helped cut it down. Daniel
Bazikian spent many hours with me proofreading the manu-
script. Two Japanese friendsToshio Murata and Kentaro
Nakanotranslated for me the passage in a book by Japans
chief intelligence o cer in Washington, indicating that a Winds
Execute (East Wind Rain) had actually been received before
the attack by the Japanese embassy in Washington; this Japanese
account was in contradiction of the position of U.S. Intelligence
o cers who refused to admit during the Congressional hearings
that such a message had been sent by Tokyo which could have
Acknowledgments xxi
been intercepted by Saord and his crew before the war began.
And Leo Blum, nephew and friend, visited me several times in
Irvington encouraging me and helping with the manuscript. I
have proted also from the comments made and the questions
asked by many of Percys friends and students, who had been
fascinated by his account of Pearl Harbor whenever he spoke on
the subject formally in lectures and informally in our living room.
I can only hope he would have approved of what I have done to
transform his life-long labor of love into a manuscript suitable
for publication.
Bettina Bien Greaves, Editor
(Mrs. Percy L. Greaves. Jr.)
Part 1
The Seeds of Infamy
1.
U.S. International Policy:
19331940
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Elected President
M
arch 4, 1933, inauguration day, was a gray day in
Washington, a depressing day like the economic depres-
sion that then enveloped the nation. Te sun broke through
the clouds only occasionally as President-elect Roosevelt, exu-
berant over his victory, and outgoing President Herbert Hoover,
gloomy and distressed not only at having lost the election but also
at not having been able to stem the economic downturn, rode
together up Pennsylvania Avenue to the capitol from the White
House. Roosevelt took the oath of o ce, promising to the best
of my ability to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States. Hoover and his entire Cabinet went out of
o ce when Roosevelt was inaugurated and the new president
appointed an entirely new cabinet.
Te Democratic Party platform on which Roosevelt had
run in the presidential election of 1932 had been conservative,
calling for drastic economies in government expenditures and a
sound currency. Te economic crisis, sparked by the 1929 stock
3
4 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
market crash, had deepened between Roosevelts election and his
inauguration. Cooperation between the outgoing and incoming
presidents during the interregnum would have been in order, but
considerable antagonism existed between the two men: Tey had
one inconclusive meeting. Roosevelt was apparently unable or
unwilling to cooperate any further. He didnt want to share the
credit with anyone for what he was going to do.
For a time the new presidents energies were devoted largely
to domestic economic problems. All banks in the country were
closed down on March 6, two days after Roosevelt took o ce.
It was a low point in the countrys history. However, it wasnt
long before the international situation would claim Roosevelts
attention. Te idealism that had produced the League of Nations
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact intended to outlaw war was erod-
ing. Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany, assuming dic-
tatorial powers and beginning to undo the terms of the Versailles
Treaty.
On November 16, 1933, the United States recognized the
government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R).
Te professed purpose of recognition was so that our nations
henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benet and for
the preservation of the peace of the world.
1
Roosevelt named
William C. Bullitt to be the rst U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
Bullitt considered communism a harbinger for the world and was
an enthusiastic proponent of the Soviet system.
U.S.Far East Relations
Te Asian situation was of concern. Japan had occupied
Chinese territory, Manchuria. Many Japanese farmers and busi-
nessmen had moved there to settle and make it their home.
1
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, vol. 1: Te Genesis of the New Deal, 19281932 (New York: Random
House, 1938), p. 472.
U.S. International Policy: 19331940 5
Moreover, the Japanese and Chinese were ghting in northern
China and Russian Communists were helping the Chinese and
pestering the Japanese. Asia was not peaceful. How had condi-
tions reached this pass?
Japan had been almost completely isolated from the civilized
world until 1852 when U.S. Navy Commander Matthew C. Perry
sailed into Edo (Tokyo) Bay on a mission from the United States
governmentto open Japan up to trade. After some time and
a proper display of diplomacy, Perry succeeded in his mission.
Japan westernized, industrialized and her population increased.
Looking for resources to power her new industries, she expanded
onto the relatively empty wilderness of the Asian mainland which
China and Russia had previously claimed. Japan went to war with
China (the Sino-Japanese War, 18941895) in order to bring
Chinese-controlled Korea into Japans sphere of inuence. Ten
after the Boxer Rebellion in China (18991901) Japan cooper-
ated with the international force of British, French, Russians,
Americans, and Germans that lifted the siege of Peking. Some
Japanese remained in northern China and in time Japanese trad-
ers developed a substantial textile industry there. However, Japan
found herself in frequent conict with Russia, whose vast territory
extended east to the Pacic, and who wanted a warm water port.
Te Russo-Japanese War (1904) was sparked by Russian intru-
sions into Manchuria and ended with Japans gaining control of
that province. Japans rule brought law and order to Manchuria
and in time it became one of the most peaceful and stable parts
of China, attracting thousands of Japanese, Chinese and Korean
traders and settlers. Japan was bringing civilization and stability
to the region.
Japan had been an ally of Britain and the U.S during the
Great War (19141918) and she was included in the Washington
Naval Conference (November 12, 1921January 12, 1922) when
the Allied military powers sought to reduce the worldwide arms
race. Te resulting Naval Limitation and Non-Fortication Treaty
cut the British-American-Japanese navies down in size to a ratio
of 5:5:3 for capital ships. In the hope of maintaining peace in the
Far East, an Open Door agreement was reached, providing that
the participant nations have equal commercial rights of entry
into China. Although China was not then a united nation, she
was to have her integrity preserved. Japan was to be restrained
from mainland adventures and to have no military planes or ships
in the mandated islands. Japan resented the second-rate status
to which she had been reduced by the Naval Limitation Treaty,
and also the racial slur inherent when Japanese immigration was
banned by the U.S. Exclusion Act (1924) and by Australias anti-
oriental Whites Only policy. Moreover, Japans relations with
the rest of the world deteriorated in the 1920s. Her markets for
her chief export, silk, suered as a result of worldwide protection-
ism and the Great Depression and yet her dependence on U.S. oil
and raw materials increased.
Tere was an explosion on the Japanese railroad line at
Mukden on September 18, 1931, which was blamed on local
Chinese. One faction in the Japanese military had been pressing
their government to take a more expansionist role in Manchuria.
Te Japanese responded harshly to the Mukden explosion, fought
the bandits and seized several of Chinas northern provinces.
Manchuria gained its independence and then on September 15,
1932, became a protectorate of Japan, Manchukuo.
U.S. Secretary of State Stimson held that Japans intervention
in Manchuria was a violation of international treaties and pro-
posed, in place of the Open Door agreement, a Nonrecognition
doctrine which would deny recognition to any nation which had
acquired territory by aggression. Stimson wanted the U.S. to
impose sanctions against Japan for her aggression in Manchuria.
President Hoover vetoed the idea; he was opposed in every ber
of his being to any action which might lead to American partici-
pation in the struggles of the Far East. In this view he had the
support of the American people.
2
Te League of Nations inves-
tigated the Manchurian incident and issued a report blam-
ing Japan. Japan and Britain disagreed with the Leagues report.
However, it was accepted and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the
League.
After the death in 1925 of Sun Yat-sen, revolutionary leader
and president of the Southern Chinese Republic, Chiang Kai-
shek assumed the presidency. Chiang began trying to unite the
country. Te communists intervened, sometimes for, sometimes
against, Chiangs nationalist forces. Tere was almost constant
ghting by and among Chiangs nationalists, the warlords, the
Chinese communists and the Russian communists. When the
Chinese boycotted Japanese textiles, the Japanese retaliated by
bombarding and sending troops to the Shanghai International
Settlement ( January 28March 4, 1932). Many were killed. U.S.
sympathy was with the Chinese; the Japanese were portrayed as
the aggressors. After erce ghting, the Japanese retreated tem-
porarily, and the boycott was brought to an end. Another time
when Chiang Kai-sheks nationalist forces threatened Japans
economic and industrial interests in Manchuria, Japan called
up 5,000 troops to protect her merchants there. Te Russian
Communists and the Chinese Communists were both heav-
ily involved. Finally, after communist leader Mao Tse-tung told
Chiang that if he stopped ghting the Red Army the Chinese
Soviet government would help Chiang against Japan, Chiang
nally agreed. Te Kuomintang-Communist agreement ( July 5,
1937) called for the nationalists and communists to cooperate in
driving the Japanese out of Peking and the rest of North China.
Peace prevailed there for a time. But not for long.
2
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/1948), p. 233.
Official U.S. Foreign Policy
During the 1930s, U.S. opinion opposed involvement in for-
eign wars. Congress responded in 1935 by passing neutrality leg-
islation prohibiting trade in arms or implements of war with any
belligerent nation. As FDR signed this legislation (S.J. Resolution
173) on August 31, 1935, he explained that it was intended as an
expression of the xed desire of the Government and the people
of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us
in war. Te purpose, he said, is wholly excellent. Emphasizing
U.S. neutrality in international conicts still more emphatically,
Roosevelt added: Te policy of the Government is denitely
committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any
entanglements which would lead us into conict.
3
In spite of FDRs professed neutrality, however, he was appar-
ently already considering the possibility of conict with Japan.
Te O ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) whose duty it was to col-
lect and analyze pertinent information for the Navy, was then
assembling material about potential Japanese and communist
espionage agents. For instance, the ONI carded Japanese resi-
dents in the New York area for use in corralling the individuals
for internment or breaking down any system of espionage or sabo-
tage in the event of a conict.
4
In an August 10, 1936, memoran-
dum to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy,
FDR sanctioned this operation. He expressed his support . . . for
locating all Japanese for possible incarceration in a concentration
camp during a crisis.
5
FDR was a charming, charismatic, and convincing speaker.
From 1935, when he signed the Neutrality Act, until the attack
3
Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses, 1935, vol. 4, pp. 34546.
4
Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Conict of Duty: The U.S. Navys Intelligence Dilemma,
19191945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 65.
5
Roosevelt, August 10, 1936 memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral William D. Leahy. Quoted in Dorwart, Conict of Duty, p. 65.
on Pearl Harbor, he reassured the American people from time to
time of his steadfast commitment to peace.
6
He delivered one of
his most eloquent anti-war speeches in Chatauqua, New York,
only four days after signing the August 10 memorandum about
the possible incarceration of U.S. Japanese residents:
I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen
blood running from the wounded. I have seen men cough-
ing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I
have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping,
exhausted men come out of linethe survivors of a regiment
of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I
have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers
and wives. I hate war. . . .
I wish I could keep war from all Nations; but that is beyond
my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United
States helps to produce or to promote war. . . .
I speak from a long experiencethe eective maintenance of
American neutrality depends today, as in the past, on the wis-
dom and determination of whoever at the moment occup[ies]
the o ces of President and Secretary of State.
7
During this period, Germany and Japan were being driven
together out of fear of the expansionist and disruptive poli-
cies of their common enemy, the Soviet Union. Both Germany
and Japan recognized that the aim of the [U.S.S.R.-sponsored]
Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disinte-
grate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command.
Tey held that the Comintern not only endangers their internal
peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of
6
Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 19321940 (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 15675.
7
Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses, 1936, vol. 5, pp. 28990.
the world.
8
So Germany and Japan decided to cooperate against
Communist subversive activities. On November 15, 1936, they
signed the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.
Prospects for Peace in the Far East?
Tere was a turnover in the Japanese Cabinet on June 4,
1937. Prince Konoye became prime minister. Konoye desired and
sought peace with the United States. But there was still turmoil
and little prospect of peace in the Far East.
In 1937, the U.S.S.R. led Nationalist China to understand
that if it would undertake to oer armed resistance to Japan
it would condently expect the armed support of the Soviet
Union.
9
Not long after receiving this assurance, the Chinese did
resist the Japanese. On July 7, 1937, a Japanese soldier was miss-
ing at the Marco Polo Bridge in China. Te Chinese not only
refused to search for him, they also refused to let the Japanese do
so. Japanese troops resorted to force and soldiers from the two
countries clashed.
Te inclination was to blame this incident on impetu-
ous Japanese soldiers at the scene. However, the fault may not
have been entirely on the Japanese side. Te U.S. ambassadors
in France, China, and Japan all cabled Secretary of State Hull
denying this anti-Japanese contention. Reports had come to
their attention indicating that the Chinese had the encourage-
ment and support of the Russians in ghting the Japanese, that
the Russians had been very generous, that they had furnished
China with munitions . . . costing 150,000,000 Chinese dollars,
8
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War II:
Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and
During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence,
19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 109.
9
Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy,
19331941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. 456.
and that they had even shipped some munitions before China
had promised to pay for them.
10
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew wired Hull that
there was not su cient evidence to justify the hypothesis that
either the Japanese Government or the Army deliberately engi-
neered the [Marco Polo Bridge] incident in order to force a
showdown. Grew also found that communist agitators contrib-
uted to the crisis by disseminating misinformation with regard
to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops.
11

Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out. Tokyo announced a puni-
tive expedition against the Chinese troops, who have been taking
acts derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan. Tis was
the beginning of the undeclared Japanese-Chinese war. Bombers
struck three cities and shelled others as ground troops attacked
Chinese forces all over the Peking area.
Te outbreak of ghting between the Japanese and the
Chinese aroused strong feelings among many in the United
States who had emotional ties to China. Te Neutrality Act then
in force prevented the U.S. from using U.S. ships to send arms to
either side. On September 14, acting under this Act, FDR forbade
the shipment of arms on U.S. government-owned ships to either
China or Japan, thus averting the possibility of a Japanese block-
ade of U.S. shipping had aid to China been allowed. Troughout
this entire period, U.S. and British trade was continuing, in accord
with Chinas agreement to open the country to foreign traders.
In Chicago on October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke
out against nations that were engaging in aggression:
Te peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the
population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining
10
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
Te Far East, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ce), vol. 3,
pp. 136, 165, et passim.
11
Tansill, Back Door to War, p. 460.
10 percent, who are threatening a breakdown of all interna-
tional order and law. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that
the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the
community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients
in order to protect the health of the community against the
spread of the disease. . . . War is a contagion, whether it be
declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote
from the original scene of hostilities. We are adopting such
measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we can-
not have complete protection in a world of disorder in which
condence and security have broken down.
12

Roosevelt had not mentioned Japan, but a State Department
release the next day made it clear that he had been referring to
Japans attack on China;
Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East,
the Government of the United States has urged upon both
the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from
hostilities and has oered to be of assistance in an eort to
nd some means, acceptable to both parties to the conict of
composing by pacic methods the situation the Far East. . . .
In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the
Government of the United States has been forced to the con-
clusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with
the principles which should govern the relationships between
nations. [Te Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928]
13
12
Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce), pp. 38387.
13
Ibid., pp. 38788.
On December 12, the United States was brought close to war
when the Japanese sank the U.S.S. Panay, a U.S. gunboat, and
three Standard Oil tankers in the Chinese Yangtze River. Several
Americans were killed. However, sentiment in the United States
was strongly opposed to war over the loss of a few American
lives in the Far East. Terefore, when the Japanese apologized,
demoted several top military o cials, and paid several million
dollars in indemnity, the matter was considered closed.
Serious ghting continued in China, however. In December
1937, Japanese forces took Nanking, committing mass murder
and rape. Over 50,000 Chinese men were killed, many thousands
more women raped, 200,000 to 300,000 civilians slaughtered.
Japan was clearly the culprit.
Anticipating War in the Pacific
In late December FDR ordered Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll,
director of the U.S. War Plans Division, to London for con-
versations with o cials of the British Admiralty. According to
Ingersoll, it was generally assumed in military circles at that time
that sooner or later the United States would become involved
in a war against Japan in the Pacic, a war that would involve
the British, the Dutch, the Russians, and possibly the Chinese.
Tis London meeting was to explore U.S.-British arrangements
in such an event for command, communications, ciphers, intelli-
gence, etc. Te conference took place during the rst two or three
weeks of January 1938. No rm commitments were made.
14

14
79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 9, pp. 427277. Ingersoll testi-
mony. After the war started in Europe, the 1938 London document became
a dead cat, as Ingersoll expressed it (p. 4273), because Germany was in the
war. The London conclusions were superseded by the ABC-1 plan for military
U.S. cooperation with the British, the plan which was developed in Wash-
ington in 1941.
On November 3, 1938, Japan announced a New Order in
China, a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination
between Japan, Manchukuo [ Japans name for Japanese-occupied
Manchuria] and China.
15
Prime Minister Prince Konoye pointed
out in a public statement that the Chiang Kai-shek administra-
tion in China was little more than a local regime. Konoye declared
further that Japan wanted the development and cooperation, not
the ruin, of China and that she wished to establish stable condi-
tions in the Far East without prejudice to the interests and rights
of other foreign powers. However, Konoye went on: Te world
knows that Japan is earnestly determined to ght it out with com-
munism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevisation of
the Far East and disturbance of world peace. And lest there be
any misunderstanding, he added: Japan expects to suppress in a
drastic manner the sources of the evils of bolshevisation and their
subversive activities.
16
Konoyes position was that Japans conict
was not with China so much as it was with the Comintern that
was backing China.
Japan compared her Manchurian venture to the way England
had acquired her empireIndia, Hong Kong, etc.and to the
way the United States had wrested its western territory from
the Indians. And Japan thought the United Statess Monroe
Doctrine protecting the Western Hemisphere from foreign inter-
vention was similar to Japans wish to preserve Asia for Asians.
17

According to Japans Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (1940
1941) Japan was ghting for two goals: to prevent Asia from
15
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
O ce, 1943), vol. 1, p. 478.
16
Ibid., p. 480.
17
John Toland, Te Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire,
19361945 (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 56.
falling completely under the white mans domination and to save
China from Communism.
18

In the United Statess view, Japans New Order was violat-
ing the rights of Americans in China. In a note to the Japanese
Foreign Minister (November 7, 1938), Ambassador Grew
objected to actions Japan was taking on the mainland. He could
see no reason why U.S. shipping on the Yangtze River should
be restricted, since hostilities in that area had ceased. Grew also
claimed (November 21) that there was no real excuse for the fre-
quent accidental incidents in China involving not only the loss
of American property but the loss of American life and the des-
ecration of our ag.
19

Te Japanese continued to win in China. Tey took Hankow
and Canton. Tey were preventing Chinas access to the coast
and thus making it increasingly di cult for her to obtain sup-
plies. As a result, Chiang was forced to move his government
inland to Chungking. But the Japanese were conquering terri-
tory, not people, and by the beginning of 1939, they were still far
from nal victory. Tey had lost thousands of men, millions of
yen and incurred the wrath of the Western world, and Americans
in particular.
20

In 19371938, the Chinese built the Burma Road over rugged
mountain terraina remarkable feat of engineering. Te Burma
Road was opened on December 2, 1938. War supplies could then
be landed in Rangoon, British Burma, shipped by train to Lashio,
then over the Burma Road to Kunming in Chinas Yunnan
Province, and thence to Chungking.
Although most Americans did not want to become involved
in a war, by the end of 1938, FDR was beginning to resent the
Neutrality Act. His sympathies in the Far East lay with China
18
Ibid., p. 48.
19
Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 807.
20
Toland, Te Rising Sun, p. 54.
in her struggle against Japan. And the Act prevented the United
States from lending support. Out of his desire to aid China, FDR
sought an end to the blanket embargo on shipping arms to bel-
ligerent nations. So in his January 4, 1939, message to Congress,
he launched a campaign for the Acts repeal: [O]ur neutrality
laws may operate unevenly and unfairlymay actually give aid
to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.
21
Congress rejected his
reasoning, and on March 20 the Senate turned down Roosevelts
proposal for repeal. FDR repeated his request. Hull also asked for
its repeal.
Britains Prime Minister Neville Chamberlains view of the
Far East situation diered from that of U.S. o cials. Chamberlain
did not want to prevent Japan from obtaining the military sup-
plies she needed for her campaign in China. He recognized the
actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in
progress and noted that
as long as that state of aairs continues to exist, the Japanese
forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of
safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order.
. . . His Majestys Government have no intention of counte-
nancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of
the above-mentioned objects by Japanese forces.
Chamberlain urged that British authorities and British
nationals in China . . . refrain from such acts and measures.
22
Te United States and Japan had been trading partners for
years. A commercial treaty permitting and encouraging trade
between the two countries had been in eect since 1911. Under its
terms, if one party wanted to terminate the treaty, it was required
to notify the other party six months in advance. In accordance
with that provision, Hull gave the Japanese ambassador notice on
21
Department of State, Peace and War, p. 49.
22
U.S. Congress, Events, pp. 19899.
July 26, 1939 of our intentions to terminate. Tis dealt a heavy
blow to the Japanese economyalso to world trade. And it repre-
sented a signicant deterioration in our relations with Japan.
23
War Breaks Out in Europe
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and
France immediately notied Germany that unless it withdrew its
forces, they would honor their agreement to defend Poland. Hitler
did not pull out. Two days later Britain and France declared war
on Germany. World War II had begun.
At this juncture, FDR again reassured the country of our
neutrality. He went on the radio on September 3 and announced
in his very convincing manner: Tis Nation will remain a neutral
nation.
24
Two days later on September 5, President Roosevelt
issued an o cial proclamation of neutrality prescribing certain
duties with respect to the proper observance, safeguarding, and
enforcement of such neutrality. It called on all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States to exercise an impartial
neutrality.
25

On September 11, only a very few days later, FDR initiated a
secret correspondence with a former naval person in belligerent
Great Britains cabinet. Tis former naval person was Winston
Churchill, newly recalled by Prime Minister Chamberlain to
serve as First Lord of the Admiralty, the same position Churchill
had held during World War I. (Churchill did not become prime
minister until May 1, 1940.) Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy during World War I, had visited England and been
entranced by the British espionage and intelligence services. But
he hadnt then met Churchill.
23
Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 189.
24
25
U.S. Congress, Events, p. 215.
FDRs rst letter to Churchill began: I want you to know
how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty. He
continued:
What I want you and the Prime Minister to know is that I
shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch per-
sonally with anything you want me to know about. You can
always send sealed letters through your [diplomatic] pouch or
my pouch.
26

Tis expression of warm friendship was hardly the impartial
neutrality he was asking of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
U.S. Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic
On September 6, Roosevelt announced that the Navy would
start a Neutrality Patrol of the Atlantic up to 200 or 300 miles
oshore, ostensibly to protect U.S. merchantmen:
Te patrolling ships were to report all belligerent warships,
except convoy escorts, by radio. In the event of a submarine
contact, the movements of the submarine shall be observed
and a surveillance patrol maintained in the general area.
27

And then on September 8, he proclaimed a national
emergency.
28

Disturbed at the delay in getting the Neutrality Patrol
underway, FDR sent a secret message on October 9, 1939, to
the U.S. Navy Department: When any aircraft or surface ship
26
Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jones, eds.
Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1975), p. 89.
27
Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet,
1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 65.
28
sights a submarine, a report thereof will be rushed to the Navy
Department for immediate action. Tis report was to be sub-
mitted in English, permitting anyone capable of monitoring
the Patrols English-language transmissions to benet from the
sightings. Te plane or surface ship, FDR continued,
will remain in contact for as long as possible. . . . Planes or
Navy or Coast Guard ships may report the sighting of any
submarine or suspicious surface ships in plain English. . . .
[L]oss of contact with surface ships cannot be tolerated.
Signed FDR.
29

Most Americans were, of course, very much concerned about
the war going on in Europe. To many it looked like a repeat of
the 19141918 World War. Some wanted the United States to
join England and France immediately against Germany. But
the majority were still anxious to stay out of the struggle. FDR,
always sensitive to public opinion, again reassured the people of
our neutrality. At a New York Herald Tribune Forum on October
26, he stated most emphatically:
In and out of Congress we have heard orators and commenta-
tors and others beating their breasts and proclaiming against
sending the boys of American mothers to ght on the battle-
elds of Europe. Tat, I do not hesitate to label as one of the
worst fakes in current history. It is a deliberate setting up of an
imaginary bogeyman. Te simple truth is that no person in any
responsible place in the national administration in Washington,
or in any State government, or in any city government, or in
any county government, has ever suggested in any shape, man-
ner or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of
29
Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, p. 68.
American mothers to ght on the battleelds of Europe. Tat
is why I label that argument a shameless and dishonest fake.
30
Finally in November, after German Chancellor Adolf Hitler
had attacked Poland and after Great Britain and France had
declared war, Roosevelts campaign against the Neutrality Act
met with some success. Congress repealed the arms embargo,
which had prohibited all sales of military supplies to any bel-
ligerent nation, and replaced it with a cash and carry policy. Te
Neutrality Act of 1939 permitted cash and carry transactions;
arms and other military supplies could be sold to belligerent
nations, if they were paid for in cash, not credit, and if they were
not transported in U.S. vessels.
31
Our Neutrality Patrol had not been in operation two months
when the U.S. heavy cruiser Tuscaloosa, on patrol in the Atlantic,
trailed and greeted by radio the German ocean liner Columbus.
Columbus, on a cruise in the Caribbean when war broke out in
Europe, had managed to reach Vera Cruz, Mexico. Her captain
wanted to dispose of his ship there because he did not believe
he would be able to run the blockade to return to Germany.
However, Berlin ordered him home. He set out on December
13 and soon found his ship accompanied, in relays, by two U.S.
destroyers. As Columbus sailed eastward, Tuscaloosa took over sur-
veillance. In accordance with FDRs directive, it announced in
English every four hours the position of the German ship. Te
British destroyer Hyperion heard the announcement and investi-
gated. She located Columbus on December 19, about 425 miles o
Cape May, New Jersey, and red two shots. Te Germans scuttled
their ship. Two of her crewmen were lost. Tuscaloosa picked up
30
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1939. Portion of address published
in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Repub-
lican National Committee, 1940), p. 37.
31
the 555 German survivors and brought them to this country as
distressed mariners.
32

At the presidents request, little publicity was given this inci-
dent. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. chief of naval operations,
radioed Captain Harry A. Badt of Tuscaloosa asking that he give
the impression his ship had come upon the German liner by
accident and, fortunately, just in time to pursue her humane role.
Captain Badt was to state that the British ship had not appeared
ready to commence an action. Stark noted: We do not desire
you to make public the details of the work of our . . . patrol.
33

Nevertheless, accounts of the event did appear, although they
caused little excitement; people apparently approved, considering
this consistent with the Patrols ostensible purposeto protect
U.S. merchantmenand to keep hostilities from invading our
shores.
FDR again professed devotion to neutrality when he addressed
Congress on January 3, 1940. Te rst president of the United
States warned us against entangling foreign alliances. Te present
president of the United States subscribes to and follows that pre-
cept.
34
Te next day, he appointed Navy Admiral J.O. Richardson
to be commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), replac-
ing Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Richardson was an old Navy hand,
well-equipped through training and experience to take over the
operation of the Fleet. Command was transferred on January 6,
1940.
35

32
33
Ibid.
34
35
The New York Times, January 7, 1940.
U. S. Relations with Japan
Te six months notice we had given Japan of our intention
to terminate our 1911 commercial treaty expired on January 26,
1940. With the cancellation of that treaty, uncertainty prevailed
with respect to U.S.-Japanese trade. Te Japanese were more or
less assured by U.S. o cials, however, that they could expect trade
to continue about as usual. But the abrogation of the treaty meant
that taris, quotas, or embargoes could be imposed at any time.
Te president and Congress were thus in a position to dictate the
terms under which Japan might continue to trade with us.
Japan at this time was trying to establish the Greater East Asia
Co-prosperity scheme New Order that she had announced in
November. On February 1 the Japanese foreign minister invited
other nations to join in this eort. Japan, he said, welcomed
foreign trade and investments, and he asked us to participate. But
we turned a cold shoulder on him and on Japan.
British Military Procurement and Politics
1940 was an election year. FDR decided to break all prec-
edents and run for a third term as president.
For most of FDRs time in o ce, his treasury secretary was
Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. Morgenthau was Jewish and thus under-
standably strongly anti-Hitler, eager to help England and to get
the United States into the war against Germany.
36
Morgenthau
36
As nancial editor from 19341935 of the United States News (predecessor
to U.S. News & World Report), I covered Morgenthau at the Treasury Depart-
ment and came to know him well. Morgenthau was a good friend, condant,
and great admirer of FDRs. He could walk unobserved through an under-
ground passageway that connected the Treasury to the White House, and he
often did so, to report to FDR or to assume condential assignments. Morgen-
thau had a residence in New York State, not far from FDRs Hyde Park home.
He was undoubtedly closer to FDR personally than any other member of the
cabinet and didnt hesitate at times to try to inuence him.
served as Roosevelts designated agent from September 1939
to April 1940, for dealing with the Anglo-French Purchasing
Mission, newly established to handle British and French pro-
curement. His sympathies clearly lay with the Allied cause. He
felt frustrated by the Neutrality Act, which put all purchases on
a cash and carry basis, thus limiting the assistance that could be
given England and France. It was his [Morgenthaus] intention
to help the democracies as much as possible. He was making an
unparalleled eort to supply the Allies
37
and he encouraged the
British and French to make purchases as large as possible, for he
believed they were not arming fast enough.
38
Although the United States was still o cially neutral in the
conict between Germany and Great Britain, Morgenthau, as
FDRs intermediary, was seeking for the allies some of the new-
est superchargers developed by the U.S. armed forces, but not yet
released, as well as certain engines and designs classied as secret.
Secretary of War Harry Hines Woodring, who had assumed that
post in 1936, and Commanding General of the Army Air Corps
Henry Harley (Hap) Arnold refused the necessary permis-
sion. Morgenthau had therefore once again to take the Allies
case to the president.
39
At a White House conference March
12, 1940, he told the president if he wanted me to do this job
[the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission] . . . he would just have
to do something
40
to halt the opposition coming from the War
Department and the military. Roosevelt then announced that, in
Morgenthaus words, there was to be no more resistance from
the War Department. . . . Uncooperative o cers would nd them-
selves assigned to duty in Guam. . . . Well, [FDR said] if Arnold
37
John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938
1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1965), p. 109.
38
Ibid., p. 113.
39
Ibid., p. 117.
40
Ibid., p. 118.
wont conform, maybe we will have to move him out of town.
Te president continued: Arnold has to keep his mouth shut.
He cant see the press any more. Morgenthau was delighted; he
reported to his sta later, Oh boy, did General Arnold get it!
41
At that White House conference FDR revealed that the
British and French were not his only worries. He was also con-
cerned about the U.S. economy. Te New Deal programs had not
solved the unemployment problem. Tere were as many people
unemployed in 1938 as there had been when he took o ce.
Te only way FDR knew to provide jobs to U.S. workers was
by government spending and the European cash and carry war
orders were putting people to work. Tese foreign orders, he
told Morgenthau, mean prosperity in this country and we cant
elect a Democratic Party unless we get prosperity. Secretary
Morgenthau agreed, And hes right.
42

In May, FDR asked Congress for more fundsover a billion
dollarsto pay for 50,000 planes.
43
He was impatient. Only two
weeks later he urged Congress to hurry up with the funds.
44
Tus
in that election year FDR sought to solve his political problem by
putting workers to work on war orders. Te manufacture of 50,000
planes would create jobs. FDR probably gave little thought to the
fact that the cost of these 50,000 planes would be added to the
federal debt and thus to the problems of future presidents.
On April 17, 1940, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned
Japan that the U.S. would oppose Intervention in the domestic
41
Ibid., pp. 11718.
42
This description of the March 12, 1940, White House meeting is based on
Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp.10918. Morgenthau quote appears
on p. 118.
43
Roosevelts message to Congress, May 16, 1940. See U.S. Congress, Events,
p. 239 (May 16, 1940 entry). See also H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply
(London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 127
(the ofcial British history of World War II).
44
Ibid., p.127.
aairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status
quo by other than peaceful processes.
45

British procurement of military supplies from the United
States in that election year was precarious. FDR wanted to help,
but the American public did not fully approve of the administra-
tions partiality for the British and French. Since Roosevelt was
anxious to avoid arousing the opposition of the voters who wished
the United States to remain neutral, the administrations non-neu-
tral agreements had to be made in secrecy.
Tis was the dilemma that was continuously in the mind of the
president and of the Secretary of the Treasury. Te Anglo-
French Co-ordinating Committee was thus made aware that in
the then state of American public opinion the Administration
could not give the Allies all the help it would wish to give.
46

Te assistance Morgenthau could give the British uctuated with
public opinion.
European War Impacts Asian Situation
At this time, the Battle of Britain was in full force over
England with German planes ying hundreds of sorties almost
nightly over London, British airelds and airplane factories. She
was also losing ships to German submarine attacks in the Atlantic
faster than they could be replaced. Her situation was desperate;
she had no ships to spare for the defense of Singapore and could
not aord to expand the war into the Far East. So when pressured
by Japan to close the Burma Road, she agreed. Tus, the main
route by which Chinas Nationalist Army had been able to receive
war materiel was closed for three months from July 18, 1940 to
October 18, 1940.
45
Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 51516.
46
Hall, North American Supply, p. 92.
Upon the defeat of France in June 1940 by the Nazis, the
Japanese began negotiations with the Vichy government of unoc-
cupied France to obtain permission to send troops to French
Indochina in order to prevent aid from reaching China by that
route. Te weak Vichy government, in no position to protest,
nally gave permission on September 23. Te Japanese occupa-
tion of French Indochina then began with the arrival of 6,000
Japanese soldiers.
Japan joined the Axis Powers on September 27, 1940, when
she entered into a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. All
three nations pledged total aid to each other if any one of the
three were attacked by a third party with which they were not
then at war. German and Japanese relations with the U.S.S.R.
were not to be aected.
Te British were anxious to avoid war with Japan at almost
any price. Tey realized their territories in southeast Asia were
vulnerable if Japanese forces should move into Indochina. But
rather than trying to appease Japan into not striking, which they
felt would be interpreted as weakness, they determined to show
rmness. Both the United States and Britain decided that the
best way to oppose Japan was to strengthen and encourage China.
Britain decided in January 1941 to enter into closer relations with
Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would help Britain in Burma
and Hong Kong.
47

Te U.S. government made $100 million available to Chiang
in December 1940 and promised him also a supply of up-to-
date ghter planes. Britain even though strapped nancially,
contributed 5 million to the Chinese Currency Stabilization
Fund and granted export credits to China up to a maximum of
3 million.
48

47
S. Woodburn Kirby, Major-General, Te War Against Japan: Te Loss of Singa-
pore (London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), vol. 1, p. 53.
48
Ibid., p. 58.
U.S. Fleet Stationed in Pearl Harbor
On April 2, 1940, the U.S. Fleet left the west coast for
maneuvers in Hawaiian waters. Since the eet was sched-
uled to return in early May for war games, the families of the
Navy personnel remained on the U.S. mainland. Ten on May
4, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet,
Admiral Richardson, received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
Operations Stark:
IT LOOKS PROBABLE BUT NOT FINAL THAT THE
FLEET WILL REMAIN IN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SHORT
TIME AFTER MAY 9TH.
49
Ten on May 7, Stark again cabled Richardson from
Washington asking him to issue a press release saying:
I HAVE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO REMAIN
IN HAWAIIAN WATERS TO ACCOMPLISH SOME
THINGS I WANTED TO DO WHILE HERE. THE
DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THIS REQUEST.
Richardson was told to delay the eets departure for a cou-
ple of weeks and to carry out regularly scheduled overhauls and
movements. At the end of that time he could expect further
instructions.
Richardson was disturbed at being asked to make a request
for which there was no logical reason. As he explained later, Te
Fleet had just completed its annual Fleet Problem, the culmina-
tion of a years tactical training.
50
Further, although tactical train-
ing of senior o cers could be accomplished in Hawaii, training in
air and surface gunnery, which was also necessary, needed large-
scale facilities not available there. To use the extra two weeks to
49
James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.:
Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 308.
50
Ibid., p. 309.
advantage called for making adjustments that would result in los-
ing three to six weeks out of a tightly scheduled training year.
Richardson felt that the Navy Department had placed him,
the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet, in a com-
pletely false position, with a requirement that he announce to the
public something which, on its very face, every tyro ensign would
recognize as a phony.
51
He was even more disturbed by the cable
he received from Washington a week later reporting on the war
in Europe and concluding:
PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL
REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME.
52
Richardson was very much opposed to retaining the eet in
Hawaii. He went to Washington several weeks later to explain his
reasons to the president in person.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid., p. 311. Te complete cable read as follows:
FROM: OPNAV [O ce, Chief of Naval Operations]
TO: CINCUS [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet]
SOME BRITISH AUTHORITIES FEEL THAT ITALY MAY JOIN
GERMANY IN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMMEDIATE
FUTURE x THIS FEELING IS NOT SHARED BY OTHER
CLOSE OBSERVERS X OUR STATE DEPARTMENT INCLINED
TO DISAGREE x REGARDING DUTCH EAST INDIES JAPAN
HAS MADE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IF TAKEN AT THEIR
FACE VALUE STATE THEY WISH STATUS QUO PRESERVED
x GREAT BRITAIN HAS STATED SHE HAS NO INTENTION
OF INTERFERING WITH STATUS QUO AND THERE IS AN
UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN
OFFICE HAS ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT x PRESENT
INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN
WATERS FOR SOME TIME x HOPE TO ADVISE YOU MORE
DEFINITELY NEXT WEEK x
2.
Foreign Relations
in an Election Year
U.S.-British Cooperation
O
n May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill became prime minister
of England. He wrote Roosevelt on May 15: Although I
have changed my o ce, I am sure you would not wish me
to discontinue our intimate, private correspondence.
1
Te two
men continued to enjoy the close relationship begun shortly after
Britain and France went to the defense of Poland against Hitler
in September 1939. Also about this time, Roosevelt established
the rst hot line telephone in the White House,
2
enabling him,
president of an o cially neutral nation, to communicate privately
with Churchill, head of government of a nation at war. Te hot
line left no paper trail, no printed record, of their conversations.
1
Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds.,
Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P.
Dutton, 1975), p. 94.
2
Richard T. Loomis, Te White House Telephone and Crisis Management,
U.S. Naval Proceedings, December 1969, p. 63.
29
Churchills May 15 letter pleaded to the United States for
help:
I trust you realise, Mr. President that the voice and force of the
United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too
long. . . . All I ask now is that you should proclaim nonbelliger-
ency, which would mean that you would help us with every-
thing short of actually engaging armed forces.
Churchill listed Britains immediate needs:
[F]irst of all, the loan of forty or fty of your older destroyers.
. . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of air-
craft. . . . Tirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . .
Fourthly . . . to purchase steel in the United States.
Churchill continued: We shall go on paying dollars for as
long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that
when we can pay no more, you will give us the stu all the same.
Churchills fth need was to have a U.S. squadron visit Irish
ports, where there had been reports of Germans dropped by
parachutes.
Ten Churchill added: Sixthly, I am looking to you to
keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacic, using Singapore [in
Southeast Asia] in any way convenient.
3
Roosevelt assured Churchill the next day that he was most
happy to continue our private correspondence. . . . I am, of course,
giving every possible consideration to the suggestions made in
your message. Ten he took Churchills several requests up one
by one.
With respect to the destroyers, FDR was not certain that it
would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at
this moment. As for the aircraft, he wrote [w]e are now doing
everything within our power to make it possible for the Allied
3
Loewenheim, et al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill, pp. 9495.
Foreign Relations in an Election Year 31
Governments to obtain the latest types of aircraft in the United
States. Concerning anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition,
the most favorable consideration will be given to the request.
And with respect to steel, he understood satisfactory arrange-
ments have been made for its purchase. FDR was also willing to
consider a visit of a U.S. squadron to Irish ports.
To the request that the United States keep Japan quiet, FDR
responded, As you know, the American eet is now concentrated
at Hawaii, where it will remain at least for the time being.
4
Churchills letter was dated May 15, British time. Given the
ten-hour dierence between London and Hawaii, some 15 to 20
hours could have lapsed by the time, late on the 15th of May,
when Admiral Richardson, commander of the eet in Hawaii,
received the OPNAV (Chief of Naval Operations) cable advising
him that the eet was to remain in Hawaiian waters for some
time
5
(see pp. 2728). In view of the timing, it is not inconceiv-
able that the OPNAV cable was prompted, at least in part, by
Churchills urging.
The European Situation Worsens
as France Falls
William C. Bullitt, whom FDR had sent to the U.S.S.R. in
1933 as the rst United States ambassador to that country, left
Moscow in 1936 to become U.S. ambassador to France.
By the spring of 1940, Britains troops were being hard-
pressed on the continent by the Nazi military forces. In May
they were retreating to Dunkirk on the English Channel. From
there they were evacuated to England, thanks to their heroic and
dramatic rescue by a hastily mobilized British eet of 850 ships,
4
Ibid., pp. 9596.
5
large and small, military and private (tugs, yachts, shing smacks,
launches). Tus, more than 200,000 British, French, and Belgian
troops eluded the encircling Germans (May 26June 4).
By June, the German Blitzkrieg was bearing down on Paris.
Reynaud described Frances desperate plight to Roosevelt on
June 10: For 6 days and 6 nights our divisions have been ghting
without one hour of rest. . . . Today the enemy is almost at the
gates of Paris.
6

Bullitt wrote Roosevelt (May 31, 1940) on behalf of French
Foreign Minister Paul Reynaud that the French were
most grateful for the presence of your eet in the Pacic.
Without ring a shot, it is keeping the war from spreading to
the French and British Empires in the Far East. We hope it
will stay there.
Reynaud requested that the U.S. Atlantic Fleet be sent to
the Mediterranean. By keeping the enemy at bay there, Your
[Atlantic] eet, he said, can play exactly the same role in the
Mediterranean as the U.S. Fleet is now playing in the Pacic.
Incidentally, FDR wrote Reynaud in longhand, further strong
steps were taken yesterday by me in regard to the Mediterranean
threat.
7

Roosevelt again, on June 13, appeared to hold out hope to
Reynaud: [T]his Government is doing everything in its power
to make available to the Allied Governments the material they
so urgently require, and our efforts to do still more are being
redoubled.
8
6
Deparment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce), vol. 1, p. 245.
7
Te New York Times, April 26, 1970, pp. 3031.
8
Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 248.
When Churchill saw a copy of this secret message, he wired
Roosevelt that he considered it absolutely vital that this message
should be published tomorrow, June 14, in order that it may play
the decisive part in turning the course of world history.
9
Ten
Roosevelt must have realized that he had exceeded his author-
ity in giving such an assurance to a belligerent nation. He wired
Ambassador Kennedy in London:
My message to Reynaud not to be published in any circum-
stances. . . . It was in no sense intended to commit and does not
commit this Government to the slightest military activities in
support of the Allies. . . . Tere is of course no authority except
in Congress to make any commitment of this nature.
10
German troops entered Paris on June 14, 1940. On June 17
the French sued for peace. France and Germany signed an armi-
stice ve days later. France had fallen.
FDR Moves toward a Third Term as President
Since February 1940, FDR had been hinting to various friends
and condants that he might run for a third term, thus break-
ing with the precedent set by George Washington and followed
by all succeeding U.S. presidents. He made no public announce-
ment, but he had apparently settled the matter in his own mind
by June.
Because of the international situation, the fall of France,
and his unannounced intentions, FDR considered it important
to have a united country. He decided to replace the two cabinet
o cers who had obstructed some of his foreign-policy initia-
tives and make his cabinet bipartisan. Roosevelt maneuvered the
9
Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved
the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p.185.
10
Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 250.
resignations of Secretary of War Woodring and Navy Secretary
Charles Edison,
11
who had opposed FDRs proposal to transfer to
England some army planes and 50 destroyers
12
and oered their
posts to two RepublicansAlfred M. Landon and Frank Knox,
the 1936 Republican candidates for president and vice president.
Landon turned down the oer, but Mr. Knox accepted, agreeing
to serve as secretary of the Navy.
Roosevelt then looked for another prominent Republican
who shared his views on foreign policy. He turned to Henry L.
Stimson. As Hoovers Secretary of State in the 1920s, Stimson had
long wanted the United States to take a rm stand against Japans
operations on the Asian mainland. His position, recently set forth
in a talk to some of his fellow alumni at the Yale University com-
mencement, was that the United States should reject so-called
neutrality and take a stronger stand against Japan and Germany.
Te next day, June 18, he expressed similar ideas in a radio talk
and his remarks were reported the following morning on page
one of Te New York Times. FDR phoned him that very day oer-
ing him the post of secretary of war.
13
When Stimson asked if the
president had seen the story in the Times,FDR said he had and,
according to Stimsons diary, he agreed with it. Tus reassured,
Stimson accepted the position. He was sworn in as Secretary of
War on July 10, 1940.
Tese two new cabinet o cers soon began to inuence U.S.
foreign policy; some Navy o cials even dated our commitment
to war from about July 1, 1940, when Roosevelt dropped Edison
11
Prior to the post-World War II reorganization of the government, when the
military forces were combined under a single Department of Defense, War
and Navy were separate departments, each with full cabinet ranking.
12
James Farley, Jim Farleys Story (Irvine Calif.: Reprint Services Corp., 1948),
pp. 24143.
13
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/8), p. 324.
and Woodring and replaced them with two men more willing to
follow Roosevelts lead.
Stimson, the new secretary of war, began almost immediately
to push for compulsory military training. His eorts were soon
crowned with success. Te Selective Service Act of 1940 was
passed, and the president signed it into law on September 16.
14
British Secret Agent in the U.S.
By the summer of 1940 Englands plight was desperate.
Germany controlled most of Europe; her planes were being read-
ied for nightly bombings of Britains cities; her U-boats were pre-
paring to attack British shipping in the Atlantic on a massive
scale.
In June the British sent to New York Sir William Stephenson
who opened o ces in New York in Radio City. Ostensibly a pub-
lic-relations man, Stephenson was actually a British agent known
as Intrepid, a secret envoy of Churchills and chief of British
Security Coordination. Intrepids express purpose was to get the
United States into the war. FDR reportedly told Stephenson on
one occasion, apparently he wasnt kidding, Im your biggest
undercover agent.
15
Stephenson met with Roosevelt in Washington. Secret
arrangements were made for U.S.-British cooperation and for
sharing of condential information with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). In retrospect, the foreign-policy decisions
made in Washington from that time on seem to have been aimed
relentlessly at taking the United States down the road to war on
the side of England and against Germany and Japan.
14
Ibid., pp. 34548.
15
William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 127.
U.S. Encourages British Military Purchases
Britains and Frances cash and carry purchases permitted
under the 1939 Neutrality Act were a stimulus to U.S. producers
of arms and other military supplies. Tose huge sales had relieved
much of the mass unemployment that had plagued this country
since the Depression and that FDRs New Deal had failed to
solve. But with the fall of France, only the British were still in a
position to buy, and they were fast running out of cash. Roosevelt
feared that if their purchases came to an end, mass unemploy-
ment would return. He was looking for ways to keep workers
employed when the British could no longer pay cash.
On July 3 Lord Lothian, British ambassador to the United
States, presented to the State Department a formal statement on
the status of his countrys nances. Britain was overcommitted.
Te United Kingdom would pay as long as she could, but
in all frankness . . . it will be utterly impossible for them [His
Majestys Government] to continue to do this for any inde-
nite period. . . . Tis was not a request for credit. Te United
States Ambassador in London had warned that such a request
would be unwise.
Rather, it reected British concern with their need to enter
into long-term contracts so as to feel condent of their sources of
supply. Te British were reassured by Washington o cials. Lord
Lothian was told informally ten days later not to worry too much
on the score of dollars.
16
According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, the presi-
dent personally charged him with the responsibility of seeing
that everything be done for them [the British] so that they could
16
H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majestys Stationery
O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 243.
not quit ghting.
17
Morgenthau asked the British for a detailed
explanation of their nances. In mid-July a representative of the
British treasury, Sir Frederick Phillips, was sent to Washington
to report. Te British were then placing orders for aircraft, and
Morgenthau thought [t]he scope of British purchasing plans
. . . would probably leave England short of gold within six
months.
18

On July 24, Morgenthau gave Arthur Purvis, head of the
Anglo-French Purchasing Mission, bold advice.
Youve talked about how the British would like 3,000 planes a
month; say to [William S.] Knudsen [chairman of the Council
of National Defense], youre ready to order them. . . . Dont worry
about the authorization. . . . [Y]oull get it all right. . . . Youve got
to blu; stick to the 3,000 planes and put it up to Knudsen as
though it were an oer you had been thinking about for weeks.
. . . Tell Knudsen you want 3,000 planes and Ill back you up.
As he recalled later, The tactic worked.
19

On July 25, when reporters asked Morgenthau whether the
British were able to pay for the planes they were ordering, he
replied he was not worried about a lack of funds: they have plenty
of moneyplenty. To the British embassy this implied
ultimate nancial assistance by the United States; no promise
of any kind, however, had been given. . . . Te [British] war chest
was emptying faster than the Treasury had expected. . . . It was
clear that only the United States Government was left; without
its aid purchasing from the United States must cease.
20
17
1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), pp. 171.
18
Ibid., p.170.
19
Ibid., p.175.
20
Hall, North American Supply, pp. 25152.
Yet according to Morgenthau, the present temper of the
country [was] absolutely opposed to making loans, or anything
like that, to the British.
Phillips, the British Treasury o cer sent to Washington to
discuss the liquidation of Englands dollar assets, told Morgenthau
the British planned to sell gold and securities to meet their de-
cit. Tat would have two healthy eects, Morgenthau said. It
would help to nance the purchase of necessary war materials,
and it would demonstrate to the American public that England
was doing everything possible in her own behalf. And the dem-
onstration, that Britain was doing everything she could, might in
time bring American opinion to support a loan or gift.
21
1940 was an election year in the United States. Te British
realized that no aid could be given before the November presi-
dential election.
22
Moreover, the British recognized that any
commitments made should not become public knowledge.
Nevertheless, the nancial talks with Phillips in July were not
too discouraging. Tey ended with an invitation for him to come
again in the autumnafter the election.
23

Because the British were running out of dollars so fast, and
because exposure of Londons plight might threaten negotia-
tions with the United States, British treasury o cials tried their
best to follow U.S. advice. If the British were to expect nancial
assistance from the United States and if the critical U.S. legisla-
tion was to go through as speedily as possible after the election,
the American people had to be persuaded that the British were
doing their best to help themselves, that they were in fact liqui-
dating all their assets and gold. Troughout the summer [1940]
the American Administration had been by no means backward
in telling the British how they could get by until massive aid was
21
Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 17071.
22
23
Ibid., p.250.
forthcoming.
24
Spokesmen for the United States oered many
creative and ingenious suggestions as to how the British might
economize, scrape together as much gold as possible, liquidate
assets in the United States, and even how they might borrow by
oering the British-owned railroads in Argentina as collateral.
Secret U.S.-British Staff Conversations
At the suggestion of the British ambassador, Lord Lothian,
on August 6 FDR sent to London for sta conversations three
U.S. military o cers, representatives of the Navy, Army, and
Air ForceAssistant Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral
Robert L. Ghormley; Chief of the Armys War Plans Division,
Major General George V. Strong; and Commanding General of
the GHQ Air Force, Major General Delos C. Emmons. Tey
sailed on what was supposed to have been a secret mission. But
the news leaked out.
One outcome of their conference was an agreement in prin-
ciple on methods by which the sources of information at the
disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of
the British Government.
25
By agreeing to share our informa-
tion with the British, we were taking one more step away from
neutrality. Te British were anxious that such an exchange of
information should be placed upon a regular basis. Lord Lothian
later revived the proposal.
26
24
R.S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 19391945 (London: Her Majestys Stationery
O ce, 1956), p. 369.
25
Mark Skinner Watson, Te War Department: Chief of Sta: Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Divi-
sion, 1950), p. 115.
26
Ibid., p. 118.
Trade Treaty with Japan Ended
As the United Statess commercial treaty with Japan had
expired on January 26, 1940, Roosevelt was able, on July 5, 1941, to
prohibit the export, without a license, of aircraft engines and stra-
tegic materials to Japan. Ten on July 31, he embargoed aviation
gas. From that time on, U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorated, as
artful diplomacy alternated with concerted acts of harassment.
Te international situation, both in Europe and in the Far
East, was becoming increasingly ominous during the summer of
1940. Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, warned FDR
that an oil embargo might cause Japan to institute sanctions
against the United States, and that sanctions could lead to war. In
spite of his warning, however, we banned the export of aviation
gasoline to Japan. Japan resented this move. To compensate for
the loss, she began to build planes that could operate on ordinary
gasoline.
Japanese Diplomatic Code Broken
In August the U.S. Army and Navy communications experts
succeeded in breaking the top Japanese diplomatic code. Japanese
messages at that time were encoded on an extremely intricate
kind of typewriter, actually two typewriters connected by wires,
with complex coding wheels and switches. When a message was
typed on one machine, the words were printed out mechanically
on the other in code. Every few days the arrangement of coding
wheels and switches was altered so as to change the cipher. To
break this code it was necessary to build a machine that could do
what the Japanese machine could do and that would give the
same results as the Japanese machine would give whenever it was
adjusted. And this task had to be accomplished without having
any clues as to the nature of the encoding typewriter or of when
and how the switches and coding wheels were altered to change
the cipher. It was thanks to a suggestion by Navy communica-
tions expert Captain L.F. Saord that one of his subordinates in
the Army Signal Corps, who had been struggling with the prob-
lem for some time, was nally able to solve the puzzle.
27
After the Japanese diplomatic code was deciphered, the U.S.
government was able to read all of Japans diplomatic messages to
and from Tokyo and her representatives in all the capitals of the
world. We referred to Japans diplomatic code as Purple and to
the information derived from reading it as MAGIC.
Destroyers-for-Bases Deal
Te rst of Churchills several requests in his May 15, 1940,
letter was for the loan of forty or fty of your older destroyers.
27
Captain Saord spent many hours with this author, sharing insights gained
from his pre-Pearl Harbor work in communications and security, and talking
about his experiences and his knowledge of the Japanese intercepts. He played
an important role, not only in deciphering Purple in 1940, but also, as we
shall see, in the post-Pearl Harbor investigations.
According to David Kahn (Te Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing,
London: Weideneld & Nicolson, 1967, pp. 10, 388, 50304):
Commander Laurence F. Saord . . . founded the Navys commu-
nication-intelligence organization. . . . One of his principal accom-
plishments before the outbreak of war was the establishment of the
Mid-Pacic Strategic Direction-nder Net and of a similar net for
the Atlantic, where it was to play a role of immense importance
in the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-boats. . . . He [Saord]
built up the communications intelligence organization into what
later became OP-20-G and, by adding improvements of his own
to Edward Heberns rotor mechanisms, gradually developed cipher
machines suitable for the Navys requirements of speed, reliability,
and security. . . . [H]e is the father of the Navys present cryptologic
organization. . . . Tanks to Commander Laurance F. Saord head
of OP-20-G and father of the Navys communications-intelligence
organization, the United States had, upon its entrance into the war,
an Atlantic arc of high-frequency direction-nders to exploit the
U-boat garrulity.
FDR had replied that he was not certain that it would be wise
for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.
However, he talked with Chief of Naval Operations Stark about
the possibility of making such a transfer.
Stark was a serious, well-rounded naval o cer. His manner
was genial and courteous, not at all gru or rough. He had gradu-
ated from Annapolis in 1903 and had risen up through the ranks.
He and Roosevelt had known each other since 1913, when FDR
was assistant secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow
Wilson. Stark had then been in command of a destroyer on
which FDR used to travel in Maine waters when visiting his
familys summer home on Campobello, a small Canadian island
just across the border from Maine. Te two men had become
good friends.
Roosevelt liked Stark personally and trusted him as a loyal
aide. In 1939, FDR appointed him Chief of Naval Operations.
FDR wrote Stark at that time that it would be
grand to have you here as C.N.O. . . . [Y]ou and I talk the same
language. My only objection is that if we get into a war you
will be a desk Admiralbut I cannot have you in two places
at once!
28

Stark took over as CNO on August 1, 1939.
29
When the question of releasing U.S. destroyers to the British
came up, Stark was opposed. A law prohibited the Navy from
disposing of anything that the Chief of Naval Operations could
not declare unnecessary for the defense of the country and
Stark believed those destroyers were necessary; they were then
28
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 19281945 (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 864.
29
Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1949), p. 46n.
being used by the Atlantic Patrol.
30
In spite of his geniality, Stark
was no doormat that FDR could walk over at will. At times he
spoke up frankly, and he must have on this occasion. FDR was
apparently reluctant also but nevertheless he decided to acquiesce
to Churchills request and let Britain have the destroyers. He told
Stark to make the arrangements.
Stark was depressed by FDRs orders. Tat evening, as Admiral
Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, was leaving
his o ce for home, he just happened to stick his head in Starks
o ce to say good night. He noticed that Stark appeared down-
cast and went in to cheer him up. Stark unburdened himself to
Moreell. Te president had just asked him to give some of the
United Statess over-age destroyers to England. Stark felt that, in
ordering him to arrange the transfer, FDR was asking him to do
something illegal, thus placing him in a hopeless position.
31
Te nal deal agreed upon exchanged 50 U.S. destroyers for
99-year leases on bases on the Grand Banks (Newfoundland),
Bermuda, the Bahamas, in the Caribbean ( Jamaica, St. Lucia,
Trinidad, and Antigua), and in British Guiana.
32
Stark reasoned
and then certied that the exchange . . . would strengthen the
total defense of the United States, and that by this standard
30
1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 9295.
31
Tis high-handed disregard for legal procedure on the part of FDR was not
an isolated incident. Stark mentioned a similar incident respecting a dry dock
at Pearl Harbor (interview with author, December 10, 1962). Tis was long
before December 1941. Moreell, whose Bureau of Yards and Docks would
be constructing the dry dock, asked for written authorization. When the
president refused to authorize the transaction in writing, Stark went out on a
limb and provided it himself. Moreell completed the dock ten months ahead
of schedule, some ten days before the Japanese attack. According to Furer
(Administration of the Navy Department in World War II , p. 426) this battleship
dry dock proved invaluable in repairing damaged ships after the attack.
32
Walter Karig, Battle Report: Te Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart,
1943), p. 25.
these destroyers were not essential to our defense. We needed the
destroyers; we needed the bases more.
33
Te destroyers for bases executive agreement was announced
on September 3 by Roosevelt. Tis deal, he said, had been worked
out
in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majestys
Government in the United Kingdom in the national security
of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of
the United States to cooperate eectively with the other nations
of the Americas in defence of the Western Hemisphere . . . in
view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air
and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana.
34
Te rst contingent of eight U.S. destroyers, renovated and
outtted, was turned over to the British in Halifax on September
9. Little or no publicity accompanied the exchange. Te men who
took these ships to Nova Scotia were told that under no cir-
cumstances were the American destroyermen to permit them-
selves to be photographed in the company of British personnel.
Te destroyers were soon plying the North Atlantic as escorts to
British convoys. Te last installment of ten destroyers was handed
over on November 26.
35

33
Ibid., p. 15.
34
54 Stat Pt. 2, 2405, quoted in U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs.
Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major
International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible
Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944,
p. 255; U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, O ce of the Chief
of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing O ce, 1955), p. 5. See also Department
of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 56465.
35
Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 98102.
On November 1 the Atlantic Squadron of the unneutral
U.S. Neutrality Patrol became known as the Patrol Force of the
newly reorganized Atlantic Fleet.
Retaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor
Te U.S. Fleet, which had left the west coast on April 2,
1940, for maneuvers, had been ordered in May to stay in Hawaii.
Te commander-in-chief, Admiral Richardson, had objected
strenuously, but to no avail. Te eet remained in Hawaii. In
July Richardson went to Washington to present to his superi-
ors in person the reasons why he believed the Fleet should not
be retained at Pearl Harbor. He also sought answers to several
questionswhy the eet was being retained there, how long it
was expected to stay there, and what eorts were being made to
adequately man the eet.
Richardson explained the lack of security at Pearl Harbor. He
described the congestion and the di culty of operating ships in
and out of its narrow entrance. He cited the inadequate facilities
for eet services, training, recreation, and housing. He pointed
out also that the prolonged and indenite stay away from the
mainland during peacetime was bad for the morale of the men.
But perhaps even more important than all these reasons was the
fact that the eet at Pearl Harbor was not in a state of prepared-
ness. If we went to war, it would have to return to the west coast
to be outtted, and that could involve a net loss of time.
36

Richardson met and talked with the president, secretaries of
state (Hull) and Navy (Knox), Chief of Naval Operations (Stark),
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Chester W. Nimitz), the
Army Chief of Sta (George C. Marshall), state department o -
cials, and several members of Congress. His arguments as to why
the eet should not be kept in Hawaii seemed to fall on deaf ears;
36
Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 30718, 38395.
he didnt receive what he considered satisfactory answers to his
questions. He testied later that one of Stimsons anti-Japanese
appointees in the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, appeared
to be exercising a greater inuence over the disposition of the
Fleet than I was.
37

Richardson was called back to Washington a second time in
October, at the request of the new Secretary of the Navy, Knox.
When they met, the talk turned to the possibility of war in the
Pacic. Te British were planning to reopen the Burma Road
shortly so as to be able to supply the Chinese forces from the
south. Roosevelt was concerned about Japans possible reaction.
In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the president,
was considering shutting o all trade between Japan and the
Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol
of light ships in two lines west of Hawaii across the Pacic.
Richardson asked Knox whether the president was consider-
ing a declaration of war. Te Secretary stated that the president
hadnt said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.
Richardson was amazed at this proposal; he said the eet was
not prepared to put such a plan into eect, nor for the war which
would certainly result from such a course of action.
38
Richardson also visited the president. With FDR he went over
the personnel situation, pointing out the need for more enlisted
men. Roosevelt believed that men in mechanical trades in civil
life could be quickly inducted and made adequate sailor men, if
their services were suddenly required. Richardson explained to
FDR that a seasick garage mechanic would be of little use at sea,
and that it took time for most young men to get their sea legs.
39
37
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 1, p. 297.
38
Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 399400.
39
Ibid., p. 434.
Richardson then took up the question of returning the Fleet,
except for a Hawaiian detachment, to the Pacic coast for train-
ing and outtting. Te president stated that the eet was retained
in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining inuence
on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson doubted it would
have that eect, for the Japanese military government knew full
well that the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii was undermanned and unpre-
pared for war. However, the president insisted: Despite what you
believe, I know that the presence of the eet in the Hawaiian
area, has had and is now having, a restraining inuence on the
actions of Japan.
40
Richardson
asked the president if we were going to enter the war. He replied
that if the Japanese attacked Tailand, or the Kra Peninsula
[the southeast Asian peninsula at the southern tip of which
Singapore is located], or the Dutch East Indies we would not
enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he
doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could
not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war contin-
ued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they
would make a mistake and we would enter the war.
41
Te discussion [with the president] waxed hot and heavy. In
Richardsons words,
[I] could not help but detect that re-election political consider-
ations, rather than long-range military considerations, were the
controlling factor in the presidents thinking. It was less than a
month before the 1940 Presidential Election, and the president
was reluctant to make any commitment to increase the number
of men in the Navy, which, due to the location of naval ships
40
Ibid., pp. 425, 427.
41
Ibid., p. 427; Richardsons testimony before the Joint Congressional
Committee in 1945, as related in his book.
in foreign waters, would seem to run counter to his third-term
campaign statements. . . .
Finally, when it became fully apparent that he had no inten-
tion of accepting my recommendations [to permit the Fleet
to return to the west coast], I [Richardson] said to him very
deliberately: Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the
senior o cers in the Navy do not have the trust and condence
in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the
successful prosecution of a war in the Pacic.
Te president, with a look of pained surprise on his face, said:
Joe, you just dont understand that this is an election year and
there are certain things that cant be done, no matter what, until
the election is over and won.
42
Financing of British Arms Purchases Assured
Te president was also seriously concerned at this time with
how the British were to nance their arms purchases. Te British
treasury was fast being depleted. Tere was a growing sense of
urgency in London.
43
It was di cult for them to know how to
proceed. Earlier in the year the president had shown an inter-
est in regard to British assets in Latin America, including the
Argentine Railways. . . . He came back to it again in mid-October
in a talk with the British Ambassador. He thought that by this
means the nancial crisis might be postponed for a month or
two.
44

On October 14 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador, asked
Roosevelt and Morgenthau when British treasury representa-
tive Phillips might return to continue discussions about Britains
42
Ibid., pp. 43435.
43
44
Ibid., p. 249.
nancial resources. Lothian was told it would have to wait until
after the election.
45
Shortly thereafter he returned to England for
a visit.
Te impasse [with respect to Britains nancial crisis] was dis-
guised by the desires and explorations, of both sides, to nd
some way out of the maze. Te Ambassador on his return
from London nine weeks later, reported that the [U.S.]
Administration was still discussing ingenious ways of giving
us assistance.
46
Te British encountered continued vacillation in their deal-
ings with the United States.
Time after time the British side was told to go ahead with
orders, only to nd the way blocked by insuperable di cul-
ties. On 20th October Purvis [Britains purchasing agent in
Washington] reported that in week-end talks with Secretary
Morgenthau at the latters home he had received a complete
green light for the immediate ordering of 9,000 aircraft. . . .
In the next few days Purvis and [Sir Walter] Layton were told
to go ahead with their orders on the assumption that the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation would pay for the capital
cost. An agreement to this eect was worked out with the War
Department. Te admonitions to go ahead continued at inter-
vals through December.
47
FDR Winds Up His Election Campaign
As the election campaign continued, Roosevelt spoke to the
people more than once about his determination to keep the United
States out of the war. For example, in Chicago on September 11:
45
Ibid., p. 250.
46
Ibid., p. 253.
47
Ibid., p. 254.
I hate war, now more than ever. I have one supreme deter-
minationto do all that I can to keep war away from these
shores for all time. I stand, with my party, and outside of my
party as president of all the people, on the [Democratic Party]
platform, the wording that was adopted in Chicago less than
two months ago. It said:
We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send
our Army, naval or air forces to ght in foreign lands outside of
the Americas, except in case of attack.
48
While Roosevelt and his administration were reassuring the
British o and on of U.S. assistance in their war against Germany,
he was reassuring the American voters of our continued neutral-
ity. On October 23, he spoke in Philadelphia:
49
To Republicans and Democrats, to every man, woman and
child in the nation I say this: Your president and your Secretary
of State are following the road to peace.
We are arming ourselves not for any foreign war.
We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or
intervention in foreign disputes. I repeat again that I stand on
the Platform of our Party. . . .
It is for peace that I have labored: and it is for peace that I shall
labor all the days of my life.
48
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Te Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, vol. 1: Te Genesis of the New Deal, 19281932 (New York: Random
House, 1940), p. 313; Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making:
19321940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 31314.
49
Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1940, pp. 488. Partial quote in Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, July 1940August 1,
1944, Republican National Committee, September 1944, p. 50. See also Beard,
American Foreign Policy in the Making, pp. 31415.
Ten on October 30, FDR made a similar pledge to the vot-
ers in Boston:
50
And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you
one more assurance.
I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and
again:
Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.
Tey are going into training to form a force so strong that,
by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war from our
shores.
Te purpose of our defense is defense.
Roosevelt wound up his campaign with talks on Saturday
evening, November 2, in Bualo, New York, and on Sunday,
November 3, in Cleveland, Ohio. In Bualo, he pledged, Your
president says this country is not going to war.
51
And in his
nal address of the campaign, on November 3, in Cleveland, he
said:
52
Te rst purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country
out of war. . . . And through it all [my past record] there have
been two thoughts uppermost in my mindto preserve peace
in our land; and to make the forces of democracy work for the
benet of the common people of America.
50
Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, p. 517; Beard, American Foreign Policy
in the Making, p. 316.
51
Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, pp. 543.; Beard, American Foreign
Policy in the Making, p. 317.
52
Roosevelt, Public Papers, 19281932, pp. 546.; Beard, American Foreign
Policy in the Making, p. 318.
Taking the side of one of two combatants in a conict always
incurs risk. For months, FDR and his close associates had been
secretly encouraging the British to expect continued and increased
U.S. support in their struggle against Germany. At the same time,
they had been reassuring the American people they were doing
everything that could be done to keep the United States neutral
and at peace.
Tese contradictory pronouncements were certainly inten-
tional. Some time later Ambassador Bullitt, a long-time intimate
and adviser of Roosevelts, as much as admitted that this equivo-
cation had been deliberate. Roosevelts White House advisers,
Bullitt wrote persuaded him that if he told the truth he would
lose the 1940 election. Te president knew that war was com-
ing to the American people. . . . Tis was a low-water mark in
presidential morality, Bullitt said, but the president won the
election.
53
53
William C. Bullitt, How We Won the War and Lost the Peace, 2 parts.
Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 8397; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86103.
3.
U.S. Ties to Britain
Strengthened
FDRs Re-election a Victory for Britain
O
n November 5, 1940, President Roosevelt won an unprec-
edented third term, defeating Republican Wendell Willkie.
However, he did not win by as large a margin as in 1936
over Republican Alfred Landon. With the election over and won,
FDR no longer needed to exercise the same caution with respect
to his dealings with England. Just two days after his re-election
he met with British Purchasing Agent Purvis to discuss more
military supplies for England. Roosevelt proposed allocating mil-
itary supplies to Britain and Canada on a fty-fty basis. When
the subject of ships came up, FDR mentioned leasing supplies to
the Allies; and he said nothing about payment.
1
1
H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majestys Stationery
O ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), pp. 25657.
53
On November 8 the SS City of Rayville became the rst U.S.
merchant vessel to be sunk in World War II.
2
It hit a mine laid by
a German raider south of Australia in the Bass Strait. FDR did
nothing about it.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military was continuing to plan for war.
On November 4 Chief of Naval Operations Stark drafted a new
estimate of the world situation for presentation to the secretary
of the Navy. In this draft, presented as a formal memorandum on
November 12, Stark considered four possible plans for action:
(A) limiting American activity to [western] hemisphere defense;
(B) directing primary attention to Japan, and secondary atten-
tion to the Atlantic; (C) directing equivalent pressure in both
theaters; (D) conducting a strong oensive in the Atlantic, and
a defensive [one] in the Pacic.
Stark then argued for his fourth plan, Plan D or Plan Dog as it
was known in service lingo.
3
U.S. Aid to the British
[As] a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into
the conict he [Stark] recommended that the United States
Army and Navy at once undertake secret sta talks on tech-
nical matters with the British in London, the Canadians in
Washington . . . and the British and Dutch in Singapore and
Batavia, to reach agreement and lay down plans for promoting
unity of allied eort should the United States nd it necessary
to enter the war.
4
2
U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, O ce of the Chief of
Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing O ce, 1955), p. 6.
3
sion, 1950), p. 119.
4
Ibid.
U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 55
British Ambassador Lord Lothian had been advised in
October that his discussions with the United States about further
supplies for England would have to wait until after the election.
On returning to Washington on November 23, he spoke with
newsmen. Well, boys, he remarked, Britains broke; its your
money we want.
5
FDR, Morgenthau, and Churchill all chided
him for this calculated indiscretion.
6
In his defense, Lord
Lothian reported to London that
American public opinion . . . was still saturated with illu-
sions . . . that we have vast resources available that we have not
yet disclosed . . . and that we ought to empty this vast hypo-
thetical barrel before we ask for assistance. It was this fact, he
explained, which had induced him to make his statement. It
is clear that the exhaustion of funds could hardly have been
concealed much longer.
7
A week after that, Sir Walter Layton, director-general of pro-
grams in the British ministry of supply, submitted to Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau a paper headed Initial Orders to be placed
for Output. Te British document cited a gure of $2,062 mil-
lion plus $699 million for Capital Investment necessary for
creating New Productive Capacity.
8
Morgenthau immediately
took this document to FDR and asked for instructions. Tus,
Roosevelt was nally forced to face up to the question, which he
had successfully avoided until then, of nancing Britains urgent
purchases.
5
Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. Roosevelt
and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1975), p. 125n.
6
Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved
the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 261.
7
8
Ibid., p. 259.
Roosevelt sailed aboard the Tuscaloosa on a post-election cruise
for rest and reection.
9
While at sea, he received a 4,000-word
plea from Churchill for American naval escorts in the Atlantic,
2,000 aircraft per month, and much, much more. Churchill stated
further that orders already placed or under negotiation . . . many
times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the dis-
posal of Great Britain. Te moment approaches when we shall
no longer be able to pay cash.
10
Te ball was clearly in FDRs
court.
Stephenson, the British agent Intrepid, described the
U.S.-British relationship at the end of 1940 as a common-law
alliance.
11
In other words, the United States and Britain were
bound in a relationship that did not enjoy the blessing or sanc-
tion of law, a relationship that existed in spite of the o cially
enacted U.S. Neutrality Act and in spite of Roosevelts pledges
to the people of the United States that he would not permit the
nation to become involved in entangling foreign alliances or
intervention in foreign disputes.
Lend-Lease for Peace
It was apparent that the British could no longer operate on
a cash-and-carry basis. FDR had been trying for some time to
devise a new arrangement to help England. Finally, he hit on what
became known as lend-lease. On returning from his cruise, he
announced at a press conference a new aid-to-Britain program.
In his folksy manner, he explained:
9
Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941, pp. 26162.
10
Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspon-
dence, p. 125.
11
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 155.
[I]f my neighbors house catches re . . . and I am watering the
grass in my backyard, and I dont pass my garden hose over
the fence to my neighbor, I am a fool. How do you think the
country and the Congress would react if I should put aid to the
British in the form of lending them my garden hose?
12

Tis new lend-lease program was intended to help Britain by
tapping the wealth of U.S. taxpayers.
A few days after FDR proposed his scheme, the German
government charged that U.S. aid to the United Kingdom was
moral aggression.
13
During his December 29 reside chat on the radio, Roosevelt
answered Hitlers charge:
Te Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they
intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own
country but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to
use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.
Te intentions of the United States were completely honor-
able and peaceful, he said:
Tere is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary
Force outside our own borders. Tere is no intention by any
member of your Government to send such a force. You can,
therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as
deliberate untruth. Our national policy is not directed toward
war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and
our people. . . . We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For
12
William C. Bullitt, How We Won the War and Lost the Peace. 2 parts.
Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 8397; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86103. See also
Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941, p. 263.
13
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aairs. Events Leading up to World War
II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to
and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occur-
rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 1, 5.
us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply
ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense
of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrice, as we
would show were we at war.
14
FDR sent his proposal for lend-lease to Congress early in
1941. As noted New York Times correspondent Arthur Krock
recalled,
Congress and the public were assured, on the highest Executive
word, that the measure was a means to keep the United States
from becoming involved abroad, on land, sea and in the air, in
World War II.
For Krock, this constituted gross deception.
[I]t was obviousand so pointed out repeatedly at the time
that militant reaction by the Central Powers and Japan was a
certainty; hence the Lend-Lease Act would inevitably change
the position of the United States from a disguised cobellig-
erenta status previously reached by presidential Executive
Ordersto an active one.
15

Morgenthau testied for lend-lease, saying that its purpose
was to save the British eet as a bulwark in the Atlantic.
16
Te
House passed the bill on February 8, the Senate on March 8, and
the president signed it into law on March 11, 1941.
14
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 599607.
15
Arthur Krock, Te Consent of the Governed, and Other Deceits (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971), p. 40.
16
Meanwhile in the Far East
Te United States put $100 million at the disposal of Chiang
and promised him a supply of up-to-date ghter aircraft.
17
Ten,
in January 1941, Britain decided to enter into closer relations with
Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would be willing and able to
help Britain in Burma and Hong Kong.
18
Moreover, former U.S.
Army Air Corps Colonel Claire Chennault was openly training
his Flying Tigers in Burma for air battle with the Japanese. And
behind the scenes, FDR was supportive. On April 15, 1941, he
signed an
unpublicized executive order authorizing Reserve o cers and
enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, the Naval and
Marine Air services so they could join Chennaults American
Volunteer Group. Since the U.S. was not at war with Japan
and could not deal openly with China, all arrangements had
to be made with an uno cial agency to ensure secrecy. Te
Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company of China was set up
and authorized to hire a hundred American pilots and several
hundred ground crewmen to operate, service and manufacture
aircraft in China.
19

As the British and Dutch were building up their defenses
in the Far East, the Japanese were pursuing their own program.
Tey were concerned not only with the advance of their forces
southward, obtaining supplies of oil, but also with preventing the
17
S. Woodburn Kirby, Te War Againt Japan, vol. 1: Te Loss of Singapore
(London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), p. 38.
18
Ibid., pp. 5354.
19
John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1982). (1983 paperback published by Berkley Publishing, New
York, includes Postscript dated August 21, 1982, p. 127n.)
Communists from harassing their northern border.
20
On April 13,
1941, Japan signed a neutrality pact with Russia to safeguard
her position in the north and to make it possible for her to pursue
her plans southward.
21

U.S. War Planning with Britain
Secret U.S.-British sta conversations, held in Washington
from January 29 to March 27, 1941, led to an agreement on joint
strategy. (American o cials had already met with British coun-
terparts in London in January 1938, before the war in Europe
began, and again in August 1940, after England was at war with
Germany.) Te British sent naval and military o cers as envoys,
attired in civilian dress to conceal the true nature of their mission.
Te stated purpose of these secret ABC meetings (American-
British-Conversations) was To coordinate, on broad lines, plans
for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers and
To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of
Military Cooperation between the two nations. Te agreements
were to cover the principal areas of responsibility, and the
major lines of Military strategy to be pursued by both nations.
22

20
Te Japanese
had four ends in view: to secure their Manchurian frontier with
the Soviet Union, thus enabling them to move southwards without
having to look over their shoulders; to obtain oil supplies and con-
cessions from the Netherlands East Indies by means other than the
use of force, thus making themselves less dependent on the United
States; to obtain complete control of Indo-China, so as to be able to
occupy, at an appropriate moment, Siamese territory as a base from
which to mount an attack on Malaya, and to prevent the United
States either from entering the war on the side of Britain or interfer-
ing with their own plans for their southward advance. (Kirby, Te
War Against Japan, p. 59)
21
Ibid., p. 61.
22
Te agreement arrived at in Washington, known as ABC-1, sup-
planted the one developed in London three years earlier ( January
1938) and outlined procedures to be followed if and when the
United States entered the war. It provided that If Japan does
enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defen-
sive. Te United States was not to increase her present military
strength in the Far East, although she would employ the United
States Pacic Fleet oensively in the manner best calculated to
weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense
of the Malay barrier
23
by diverting Japanese strength away from
Malaysia. Also according to the agreement, the United States
would so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to
release the necessary forces for the Far East.
24

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, chief of the Navys war plans
division, participated in these secret conversations. According to
him, the ensuing understanding was
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 15, p. 1488. See also part 15, pp.
149192:
It was agreed at these meetings that: If Japan does enter the war, the
Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. Te United States
does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East
but will employ the United States Pacic Fleet oensively in the
manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to
support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese
strength away from Malaysia. Te United States intends so to aug-
ment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the
British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary
forces for the Far East.
23
Te Malay barrier was the string of islands, stretching west from Bathurst
Island, just o the northern coast of central Australia, through New Guinea,
Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, to Singapore on the Malay Peninsula. See Joint
Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2864.
24
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1485550.
a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air,
of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British
Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly
engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that
agreement with the British, the WPL-46 [U.S. Navy war plan]
was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was
approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy,
and by the President. Te Navy issued their form of that war
plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection the Army form
of it was issued about August.
25

Turner wrote further,
Te plan contemplated a major eort on the part of both the
principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was
felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility
of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but
at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was
discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United
States would, if possible, initiate eorts to bring Germany into
the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give
strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe.
26

Tus Turner rea rmed that the primary goal of the U.S.-British
agreement was to help England and to target Germany.
In complete disregard of the Neutrality Act o cially in force,
these conversations put the United States denitely in Britains
camp in her war against Germany.
25
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 264; Turner testimony at
Hart Inquiry; part 15, p. 1485. Pencilled notation on United States-British
Sta Conversations Report cover page: Secretary of the Navy Knox on May
28, 1941, and Secretary of War Stimson on June 2, 1941.
26
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 26465; Turner testimony
before Hart Inquiry.
The Undeclared Battle of the Atlantic
Te Germans had invaded and occupied Denmark on April 9,
1940. Exactly one year later the United States assumed respon-
sibility for the defense of Greenland, then Danish territory.
According to the April 9, 1941 agreement between the United
States and Denmark, the defense of Greenland against attack
by a non-American power is essential to the preservation of the
peace and security of the American Continent.
27
FDR wrote Churchill on April 11 that he intended to have
the United States lend still more active support to the hard-
pressed British in the Atlantic. To do this,
We will want in great secrecy notication of movements of
convoys so our patrol units can seek out any ships or planes
of aggressor nations. . . . We will immediately make public to
you position [of ] aggressor ships or planes when located in our
patrol area.
28
Tat same day, the rst U.S. shot was red against a German
target in World War II, although apparently without hitting its
mark. Te U.S. destroyer Niblack had been en route from Halifax
to Iceland, where she was to explore the convoying of ships to
Iceland, which lay within the German submarine war zone. She
responded to an SOS call from a Dutch freighter that was sink-
ing after having been torpedoed by a German sub. Niblack picked
up survivors. When soundings indicated a submarine in the area,
Niblack dropped three depth charges, but no wreckage was seen.
29

Te president was reportedly furious when an account of this
incident appeared in the press.
27
Department of State, Peace and War, p. 642; U.S. Congress, Events, p. 277.
28
Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir Secret Wartime Correspon-
dence, p. 137.
29
19391942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 19196.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Adolf Hitler was taking
great pains to avoid a clash with the United States. On April 25
he cautioned his naval forces that all incidents with American
ships be avoided. Te commander-in-chief of his navy, Admiral
Erich Raeder, was pushing for aggressive action against the United
States. Hitler answered Raeder at a conference on May 22, order-
ing that Weapons are not to be used. Even if American vessels
conduct themselves in a denitely unneutral manner. . . . Weapons
are to be used only if US ships re the rst shot.
30

In late April, Roosevelt extended the Atlantic patrols area
of surveillance from 200 to 300 miles east of our shores, to the
western border of the German submarine war zone or 26 degrees
west longitude, whichever was farther west,
31
and south to 20
degrees south latitude.
32
Tis encompassed the vast expanse of the
Atlantic between Bermuda and the Azores. Arrangements were
also set in motion to strengthen the Atlantic Fleet at the expense
of the Pacic Fleet, by transferring a carrier and ve destroyers
from Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic.
By May, U.S. Navy personnel were ying regularly as pilot
advisers aboard some of the planes the British had received
through lend-lease. On May 26 one of these advisers, ensign
Leonard B. Smith, aboard a U.S.-manufactured PBY (Catalina
Patrol Bomber) over the Atlantic, about 690 miles west of
Brest (France), spotted the Bismarck, a huge German battleship.
Although only fairly recently commissioned, the Bismarck was
menacing British shipping and had already sunk the illustrious
British battle cruiser Hood. When the sighting was broadcast,
other American PBYs with U.S. personnel aboard, as well as some
ten or twelve British warships, joined the chase. Te Bismarck
tried desperately to make port, but failed. She was nally sunk
30
Ibid., pp. 164, 176.
31
Ibid., p. 154.
32
Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 26.
on May 27, after enduring a horrendous bombing; over 2,000
o cers and crew went down with the ship.
33
Te rst U.S. ship to be torpedoed by a German submarine
was a freighter, the Robin Moor, sunk in the South Atlantic on
May 21. News of the event reached the world only when survi-
vors nally landed in Brazil on June 11. Roosevelt was outraged.
But, although some British o cials in Washington, as well as the
Presidents close friend and adviser, Harry Hopkins, wished for
decisive U.S. retaliation, FDR did no more than remonstrate.
34
On June 6 Roosevelt authorized the seizure of all idle for-
eign merchant ships in our ports for urgent needs of commerce
and national defense.
35
German, Italian, and Danish ships had
already been taken into protective custody on March 30 for the
duration of the emergency.
Ten on June 14 Roosevelt ordered Axis funds in the United
States frozen. Two days later the United States requested with-
drawal of German and Italian consular stas by July 10, charg-
ing them with having engaged in activities wholly outside the
scope of their legitimate duties.
36
FDR had long since given up all pretense of applying the
Neutrality Act equally to all belligerents. In his view, Britain had
enjoyed special status from the very beginning of the war. Ten
after Germany attacked Russia on June 21, 1941, FDR refrained
as well from applying the neutrality law to the Soviet Union. He
released Russian credits and promised Stalin lend-lease aid. By
these actions, Roosevelt was further committing this country to
the British cause and against Germany. At the same time that he
33
34
L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Te Undeclared War (London: Royal Insti-
tute of International Aairs, 1953), pp. 51920.
35
Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 9. See
also U.S. Congress, Events, p. 283.
36
Ibid. p. 284.
was allying the United States with the communist Soviet Union,
he was also lending support to the communists on the opposite
side of the worldin China. By cooling down the conversations
the U.S. government had been holding with capitalistically ori-
ented Japan, long engaged in a struggle against the Soviet Union
in Asia, Roosevelt was taking the side of the communists and
thus placing the United States directly in opposition to Japan.
On July 1 the Roosevelt administration exchanged letters
with Iceland, pointing out that it was
imperative that the integrity and independence of Iceland
should be preserved because of the fact that any occupation of
Iceland by a power whose only too clearly apparent plans for
world conquest included the domination of the peoples of the
New World would at once directly menace the security of the
entire Western Hemisphere.
On July 7, the United States occupied Iceland.
37
Te Icelanders
accepted the occupation fatalistically as a necessary evil.
38
The U.S. Begins Escorting British Ships
Te desirability of instigating escort operations to help safe-
guard U.S. and British ships plying the Atlantic was seriously
discussed during the early months of 1941. Stark had pressed for
escorts in June, so as not to let England fall. He proposed at
one time to coordinate the departure of U.S. ships and British
convoys from the vicinity of Halifax. Ten on July 2 the presi-
dent approved the Atlantic Fleets plan for escort operations. Te
occupation of Iceland and the need to assure the arrival there of
supplies and provisions provided the immediate excuse. By late
37
Ibid., p. 288; Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 68687.
38
July the decision had been made to escort,
39
and on August 20,
U.S. ships actually began escorting American and British mer-
chant ships in the North Atlantic to and from Iceland.
40
Te decision to escort was a policy decision, in line with
that of continuing to support Britain and to oppose Germany.
Historian Patrick Abbazia described it as
the logical conclusion of . . . the Presidents previous policy,
his determination to prevent the Germans from winning the
Battle of the Atlantic. It had little to do, as is sometimes said,
with the need to safeguard precious Lend-Lease cargoes as
such.
41
Roosevelt Meets Churchill; They Discuss
Japans Threatening Encroachment
on British in Far East
In August 1941 it was announced that FDR was leaving
Washington on an extended shing expedition. He left aboard
the Coast Guard cutter Calypso and shed o the coast of
Massachusetts for a couple of days. Ten he quietly transferred to
the American cruiser Augusta, which sped north to Newfoundland.
Churchill, traveling from England aboard the British battleship
the Prince of Wales, also headed for Newfoundland. Te two ships
rendezvoused in Placentia Bay, just o Argentia, Newfoundland.
Tere, from August 9 to 12, the two heads of state met, talked,
and entertained one another in turn, each on his respective ship.
On August 11 Churchill wired London from Argentia an account
of his conversations with FDR. He reported to his secretary of state
39
Ibid., pp. 21316.
40
Langer and Gleason, Te Undeclared War, p. 665.
41
for foreign aairs, Anthony Eden, that Roosevelt had agreed to
negotiate
a moratorium [with Japan] of, say, thirty days, in which we may
improve our position in Singapore area and the Japanese will have
to stand still. But he will make it a condition that the Japanese
meanwhile encroach no farther, and do not use Indo-China as a
base for attack on China. He will also maintain in full force the
economic measures directed against Japan. Tese negotiations
show little chance of succeeding, but President considers that a
month gained will be valuable.
Churchills report to Eden continued:
At the end of the Note which the President will hand to the
Japanese Ambassador when he returns from his cruise in
about a weeks time he will add the following passage which is
taken from my draft: Any further encroachment by Japan in
the Southwest Pacic would produce a situation in which the
United States Government would be compelled to take coun-
ter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the
United States and Japan.
42
During their private conference, FDR indicated to Churchill
that because he was uncertain that he could carry Congress with
him in a declaration of war, and because more time was needed
to strengthen Americas forces, he must seek to delay a break with
Japan. Churchill had hoped at this meeting to persuade Roosevelt
to have the United States declare war on the German-Italian Axis.
Churchill told him that he would rather have an American dec-
laration of war now and no supplies for six months than double
the supplies and no declaration. However, Churchill recognized
the presidents constitutional di culties: He may take action as
Chief Executive, but only Congress can declare war. According
42
Winston Churchill, Te Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1950),
pp. 43941.
to Churchill, He went so far as to say to me, I may never declare
war: I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war,
they might argue about it for three months.
43

Although Churchill hoped for a U.S. declaration of war, he
was generally pleased at the outcome of the Argentia meeting.
FDR had in eect agreed to issue an ultimatum to Japan along
the lines of Churchills suggestion. No further encroachment in
the southwest Pacic would be tolerated, or else various steps
would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding
the presidents realization that the taking of such measures might
result in war between the United States and Japan.
44

Te newspapers and newsreels of the day announced the
meeting at Argentia and showed the two men sitting at their ease
on the deck of the Augusta, or attending Sunday church service
on the Prince of Wales. When FDR returned to Washington, he
let it be understood that the only outcome of the meeting had
been the Atlantic Charter,
45
a plan for postwar world peace and
prosperity. Te Charter, signed by both Roosevelt and Churchill,
set forth certain idealistic common principles. Force was to be
abandoned, peaceful trade and economic collaboration among all
nations was to be assured and it was hoped that after the nal
destruction of the Nazi tyranny all men in all nations would be
able to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance and
to live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
43
Ibid., p. 593, Churchill reporting by letter (November 9, 1941) to General
Jan Christian Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, on the
meeting at Argentia.
44
Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (signed by Sumner
Welles, undersecretary of state) between the president and Winston Churchill
at sea, August 11, 1941.
45
U.S. Congress, Events, p. 293; Department of State, Peace and War, pp.
71819.
The Undeclared Battle of
the Atlantic Continues
Te U.S. Patrol Force had seen little activity since late 1940,
when some of its destroyers had trailed several German ships
from Mexican ports until they were intercepted by British or
Dutch ships and then scuttled by their crews.
46
Ten in March
1941, all Axis ships remaining in U.S. ports had been seized. So
when the decision to escort was made, the Patrol Force was sim-
ply diverted from routine patrolling. After August, when convoys
of British and U.S. merchant ships crossed the Atlantic to main-
tain a lifeline of supplies and equipment to England, they were
usually accompanied by U.S. destroyers.
On September 4, the destroyer Greer was on her way to Iceland
with mail and miscellaneous freight when a British bomber over-
head signaled that it had sighted a German submarine in the
area. Te submarine released a torpedo. Te Greer responded with
a depth charge. Te submarine released a second torpedo. Neither
sub nor the Greer hit its target.
47
German submarines had also torpedoed and sunk several
other ships operated by non-belligerentson August 17, the
SS Sessa of Panamanian registry, on its way to Iceland; also on
August 17, the SS Panaman; and on September 6 in the Gulf of
Suez, the SS Steel Seafarer.
48
FDR, stirred to action by the attack on the Greer, issued to
the U.S. Navy serving in Americas expanded defense waters a
shoot-on-sight order. He sounded angry when he spoke to the
nation by radio on September 11:
49
46
47
Ibid., pp. 22329. See also

Department of Navy, United States Naval Chro-
nology, World War II, p. 11.
48
49
Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 73743.
It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas and to
acquire absolute control and domination of the seas for them-
selves. . . .
We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek
it now. . . .
But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait
until he has struck before you crush him.
Tese Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the
Atlantic. Tey are a menace to the free pathways of the high
seas. . . . Te time for active defense is now. . . .
Upon our naval and air patrolnow operating in large num-
ber over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Oceanfalls the duty
of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas
now. Tat means, very simply and clearly, that our patrolling
vessels and planes will protect all merchant shipsnot only
American ships but ships of any agengaged in commerce in
our defensive waters. Tey will protect them from submarines;
they will protect them from surface raiders.
It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the
seas which are vital to American defense. Te aggression is not
ours. Ours is solely defense.
But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian
vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is neces-
sary for American defense they do so at their own peril.
Te orders which I have given as Commander-in-Chief to the
United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policyat
once.
As a result of the presidents order, our destroyers escorting
convoys in the North Atlantic began to engage in active defense.
Tey searched, took sonar readings, frequently made contact
with German submarines, and released depth charges. German
submarines truly learned that they ventured into the vicinity of
British convoys being escorted by U.S. destroyers only at their
own peril.
On September 16, the destroyer USS Kearny, heading
from Argentia to Iceland with a convoy, was trying to corral
late arrivals and stragglers. To discourage a trailing submarine,
the Kearny dropped a depth charge. Te sub launched several
torpedoes. A number of ships in the convoy were torpedoed, set
ablaze, and sunk. Te Kearny, silhouetted against the burning
ships, became an easy target. Te German U-boat red three tor-
pedoes, hitting her almost amidships and causing an explosion.
Eleven men were killed and 22 were wounded in the attack. Yet
the surviving crew members, by prodigious eort, saved the ship.
She limped into Reykjavik Harbor two days later.
50
On September 22 Stark, in Washington, reported to his
Asiatic Fleet Commander, Admiral Hart, on the situation:
So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually,
in it [the war]. . . . If Britain is to continue, she has to have assis-
tance. She will now get it openly. . . . In a nutshell, we are now
escorting convoys regularly from the United States to points in
the Iceland area. . . . [C]ontacts are almost certain to occur. Te
rest requires little imagination.
51
Starks expectations were soon borne out. Active defense
in the Atlantic meant that U.S. ships searched for submarines
and dropped depth charges. Unsurprisingly, a U.S. ship was soon
torpedoed and sunk. In October the destroyer Reuben James was
accompanying a convoy in the North Atlantic. Several submarines
were harassing the convoy. On October 31 a German torpedo
50
51
hit the Reuben James on her side; an explosion burst her in two.
Forty-ve men were saved; a hundred died.
52
Te United States was still o cially neutral. Yet it had seized
Axis ships in its harbors and frozen Axis funds. It was supplying
England and her allies with weapons and supplies. Its ships were
escorting British convoys in waters infested with German sub-
marines, dropping depth charges on them. Its ships had trailed
Axis ships, notied the British of their whereabouts, and stood
by while the Axis ships were sunk. Its ships were being sunk, and
its sailors were being killed. Te president of the United States,
commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy under the U.S.
Constitution, was doing precisely what he had told Churchill he
might do: he was beginning to make war, without declaring
war.
52
Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelts Navy, pp. 297308. See also Department of Navy,
United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 11, and Samuel Eliot Morison,
Te Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second
World War (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 37.
4.
U.S. Military Plans
and Preparations
U.S. Relations with Japan
R
elations with Japan had been strained for some time. Te
Roosevelt administration was fully aware of Japans depen-
dence on imports. Yet, as we have seen, it had terminated
Americas long-standing commercial treaty with her. After
January 1940 Japan had to ask permission on a case by case basis
whenever she wanted to import from the United States. In July
1940 the administration had further prohibited exports to Japan
by requiring her to get a license to purchase aircraft engines and
strategic materials. (When sale of aviation gas, dened by the U.S.
as 86 octane or higher, was embargoed on July 1, 1940, she had
contrived a way to use 76 octane in her planes.
1
) Te administra-
tion was tightening an economic noose around Japans neck bit by
1
Interview by author of Captain Albert E. Hindmarsh, January 9, 1964 (type-
script in authors les). According to Hindmarsh, Japanese language expert
with the O ce of Naval Intelligence before the attack, the July 1941 embargo
of gasoline below 86 octane really hurt Japan.
75
bit, forcing her to look elsewhere for the supplies and materials
she had been accustomed to buying from the United States.
Te Japanese had considerable commercial interests in south-
east Asia, especially in French Indochina (now comprising the
states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). After France fell in June
1940, Japan had negotiated with the Vichy government of unoc-
cupied France for permission to occupy French Indochina, to
take over bases there, and to maintain order. Te rather helpless
Vichy government had agreed. As trade with the United States
became more di cult, Japans interests in Indochina gained in
importance and she turned more and more in that direction for
the foods and raw materials she needed. Trade pacts concluded
later with Indochina assured Japan of uninterrupted supplies of
rice, rubber, and other needed raw materials.
U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan kept Roosevelt fully advised
of her precarious economic situation and urgent need for imports.
Chief of Naval Operations (NCO) Stark had warned the presi-
dent of the danger of imposing an oil embargo on Japan. Stark
had made it known to the State Department in no uncertain
terms that in my opinion if Japans oil were shut o, she would
go to war. He did not mean necessarily with us, but . . . if her
economic life had been choked and throttled by inability to get
oil, she would go somewhere and take it . . . and if I were a Jap, I
would do the same.
2

Many people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, the presidents
wife, were concerned about what Japan might be planning. In
the fall of 1940, she had asked her husband about our continuing
shipment of oil to Japan. FDR answered Eleanor on November
13, 1940:
2
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 32, p. 43. Testimony before the
Naval Court of Inquiry.
U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 77
Te real answer which you cannot use is that if we forbid
oil shipments to Japan, Japan will increase her purchases of
Mexican oil and furthermore, may be driven by actual neces-
sity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we
all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the
spread of war in the Far East. [Signed] F.D.R.
3

Tus Roosevelt had been well aware for some time that stop-
ping the export of oil to Japan was fraught with danger. Japan
feared also that her assets in the United States might be frozen,
making her economic situation still more perilous.
In February 1941 Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador
in Tokyo, cabled his Foreign O ce in London that Japan would
soon move against British-held Singapore, then a vital commer-
cial and communications link between Britain and her overseas
dominions and colonies. Anthony Eden, British secretary of
state for foreign aairs, called Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese
ambassador in London, into his o ce, and gave him a thorough
hauling over the coals concerning the extravagant and sensa-
tional telegrams emanating from the British embassy in Tokyo.
4

When Eugene H. Dooman, counselor at the U.S. embassy in
Tokyo, called on Japans vice minister for foreign aairs, Chiuchi
Ohashi, Ohashi told him that there was no truth whatever in
Sir Roberts prediction. Ohashi said he had repeatedly told Sir
Robert that Japan would not move in Singapore or the Dutch
East Indies, unless we (the Japanese) are pressed (by the imposi-
tion of American embargoes). However, Ohashi went on to say
that if disorders beyond the power of the French to control were
to arise in Indochina . . . we would be obliged to step in to suppress
3
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters: 19281945 (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 1077.
4
1941. vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
O ce, 1956), pp. 3739; Grew memorandum of February 14, 1941.
the disorders.
5
Ohashis assertion was one more reminder of the
danger inherent in imposing embargoes on Japan.
Army Chief of Staff
General George C. Marshall
Chief of sta of the Army at this time was General George
C. Marshall. Marshall had graduated from Virginia Military
Institute in 1901 and began his military career as a second lieu-
tenant in 1902. Te Spanish-American War had just ended and
he was assigned the task of accompanying infantry troops to the
Philippines. He entered World War I as a captain and before it
ended was promoted to temporary colonel. In May of the fol-
lowing year, he became aide-de-camp to the World War I hero
General John J. Pershing, but was returned to his permanent rank
of captain shortly thereafter. After the war he had to begin again
to work his way up to colonel, a slow process in peacetime.
6

General Douglas MacArthur, a contemporary of Marshalls
but a graduate of West Point (1903), became chief of sta in 1930
and served in that capacity until 1935. At that time, Pershing sug-
gested to MacArthur that he promote Marshall, his former aide,
to brigadier general. Marshall had spent most of his career up to
that time in service schools and sta positions and had only just
attained the rank of full colonel. To round out his experience, so
as to become qualied for a generalship, he was given a command
assignment with a top regiment. Tis was during the early years of
FDRs New Deal, when the Army had been asked to help estab-
lish the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Marshall devoted
so much of his energies to the CCC that his regiments train-
ing program was found to have suered seriously. Tus Marshall
5
Ibid., p. 39.
6
Katherine Tupper Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (New York/
Atlanta: Tupper & Love, 1946), Appendix 1, pp. 28390.
missed this opportunity to become a general. Pershing continued
to press Marshalls case, but to no avail. Marshall was relegated to
the position of senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard
(19331938).
7

Trough Marshalls diligence in working with the CCC, he
made a number of friends in the Roosevelt administration. He
came to know several persons of inuence, notably Judge Advocate
Scott Lucas, later a U.S. senator who was to serve on the 1945-
1946 Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl
Harbor Attack; Major General Frank McCoy, Stimsons long-
time aide; and Harry Hopkins, FDRs close adviser. Pershing also
continued to support Marshall. Such friends stood him in good
stead as the years went by.
In July 1938 Marshall was brought to Washington as direc-
tor of war plans. From then on, with the help of Hopkins and
others, Marshall advanced rapidly. He was promoted to briga-
dier general, eective October 1, 1938. On October 15, after only
three months in war plans, he was appointed deputy chief of sta.
On April 27, 1939, it was announced that Marshall would be
advanced over many o cers with more seniority to become the
Armys new chief of sta. He took over o cially on September 1,
1939, the very day Hitlers forces marched into Poland, becoming
in the process a temporary four-star generalfrom one to four
stars in less than a year!
As chief of sta, Marshall was the immediate advisor of
the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military
Establishment. He was also charged by the Secretary of War
with the planning, development and execution of the military
program.
8
Te chief of stas obligation was to report directly to
7
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 18301939,
(New York: Viking Adult, 1963), pp. 29099.
8
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1050. Quoted from Army
regulations.
the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall
proved himself to be a loyal and devoted deputy to his superior,
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Te chief of stas responsibility in peacetimeand the
United States was still at peace when Marshall took overwas
to serve by direction of the president, as Commanding General
of the Field Forces. In that capacity he was to direct eld opera-
tions and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea
forces, and of the GHQ units. If war were to break out, he was to
continue exercising command of the eld forces until such time
as the President shall have specically designated a Commanding
General thereof.
9
Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the
Navy when the eet was in port. More about that later.
Te chief of sta and the president were the only ones with
legal authority to issue command orders to the army commanders
in the eld. Te secretary of war, a civilian, was outside this line
of command.
Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief
of U.S. Fleet, Relieved of Command
In January 1941 Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S.
Fleet (CINCUS), was notied that he was being relieved of his
command in about three weeks. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel
was named to replace him, eective February 1.
Richardson was deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,
as he wrote later, there was some feeling of prospective relief, for
I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, and
I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.
10
9
Ibid.
10
On his return to Washington, Richardson was directed to
report to Secretary of the Navy Knox. When he called on Knox
on March 24, he asked why he had been removed as CINCUS
so peremptorily, after having served only 13 months of the usual
24-month tour of duty. Why, Richardson, Knox responded,
when you were here in Washington last October, you hurt the
Presidents feelings by what you said to him. You should realize
that.
11
Richardsons relief put on notice all top-ranked o cers, includ-
ing his replacement, that Roosevelt would brook no opposition to
his plans. It was a warning to all military o cers that criticism
of FDR, their commander-in-chief under the Constitution, was
not tolerated.
General Marshalls Responsibility
for the Fleet
Marshall appointed Lieutenant General Walter C. Short
to be commanding general of the Hawaiian department, eec-
tive February 7, 1941. Tat same day, Marshall wrote Short that
Kimmel, who had taken over command of the eet in Pearl
Harbor the week before, had written his superior, CNO Stark,
about the serious shortages of army materiel needed for the pro-
tection of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel had referred specically to
planes and antiaircraft guns. Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel
didnt realize that the army was tragically lacking in this materiel
. . . and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other com-
mand in the Army.
Marshalls letter revealed concern for more than just the
Hawaiian situation. Nevertheless, Marshall advised Short that
the protection of the eet was the Armys major responsibility.
Te fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major
11
Ibid., p. 424.
consideration for us. [Italics in original]. . . . [O]ur rst concern
is to protect the Fleet. Marshall told Short of the pressures on
the Department [from other sources] for the limited materiel
we have. However, he believed the existing defenses in Hawaii
would discourage an enemys attack if no serious harm is done
us during the rst six hours of known hostilities.
Marshall speculated on the most likely threat to Hawaii:
Te risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by
Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situa-
tion. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian
Islands so long as we have air superiority.
However, Marshall reminded Short:
Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our
mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and
that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel.
12
Marshall wrote Short again on March 5, requesting an early
review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard
to defense from air attack. And he added, Te establishment of
a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this
end is a matter of rst priority.
13
Marshall recognized that, as
chief of sta, he was responsible for protecting Hawaii, and he
was again calling the attention of his Hawaiian commander to
that responsibility.
12
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 56566. Marshalls
February 7, 1941, letter to Short.
13
Ibid., part 15, p. 1605.
Admiral Kimmel, New Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Fleet, Strives to Build up
Fleets Strength in Pearl Harbor
Kimmel realized that, for strategic reasons, the Fleet did not
belong at Pearl Harbor. He considered Richardsons arguments
against holding the eet there valid. Yet Kimmel realized he
could not oppose the president on this issue and expect to retain
his command. Te best he could do was to try to get the materiel
needed to defend the eet. Over the next year, in letter after letter
to CNO Stark, he asked for personnel, weapons, radar, destroyers,
cruisers, planes, ammunition.
14
CNO Admiral Stark gained a reputation for persistence as
he continued to appeal to Roosevelt for men and materiel. He
once asked FDR for 300,000 men for the Navy. Tere were a lot
of people in the room at the time. FDR, always jovial when he
had an audience, simply threw back his head and laughed. He
then turned to the others in the room and said, Betty, referring
to Stark by his nickname, usually begins working early; he starts
in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up.
15
To strengthen its defenses, the Navy recommended con-
struction of a battleship and cruiser dry dock at Pearl Harbor.
16

However, all the funds then available for construction had been
allocated. Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Navys bureau of
yards and docks, which would be building the dry dock, felt he
should not go ahead without written authorization. He suggested
that Stark ask FDR, in light of the limited National emergency
then in eect, to authorize the funds in writing. Without being
specic as to who had made the request, Stark approached FDR.
When he reported back to Moreell, Stark said he had never seen
14
Ibid., part 16, pp. 222557.
15
Ibid., part 5, p 2273. Stark testimony.
16
Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1959), p. 404.
the president so angry. He pounded the table and asked Who
wants something on a piece of paper? Tell that bureau chief that
he would give him something on a piece of paper, but it will not
be what he expects.
17
So Stark, as acting secretary of the navy
the secretary and assistant secretary were away at the timetook
on himself the responsibility of authorizing the construction. Te
dry dock, completed just ten days before the attack, was put to
immediate use.
Stark wrote Kimmel of the problems he encountered in
obtaining authorization to build up the Navy.
I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get
in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional
men. . . . Te President just has his own ideas about men. I usu-
ally nally get my way but the cost of eort is very great and of
course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute
and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light
from the White House.
18
In answer to Kimmels requests for ships and supplies to bol-
ster the Pacic Fleet, Stark often mentioned the dire straits of the
British, whose economic lifeline was being threatened by German
submarines. He also cited the demands for supplies being made
under the lend-lease program.
Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems
through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task
of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormousalmost
astronomicalquantities of ordnance supplies for the British
Navy and any allies which may survive to ght the Dictators.
19
17
Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the
Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 8788.
18
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2148, Stark to Kimmel,
February 10, 1941.
19
Ibid., part 16, p. 2153. Stark to Kimmel, March 3, 1941.
Admiral Stark Opposes Antagonizing Japan
Roosevelt had been doing his best for months to give the
British aid and comfort, although he had been restrained, primar-
ily by public opinion, from openly involving the United States in
the war against Germany. Stark shared the presidents desire to
enter that war, but he did not always go along with Roosevelts
risky moves in the Pacic.
Starks friendship with FDR was such that he could express
himself candidlyand he often did. On February 11, 1941,
Stark wrote FDR a long memorandum, cautioning against the
tactics he was adopting in the Pacic.
20
Te question of sending
a detachment of cruisers on a tour of the Philippines had been
discussed at a meeting of top administration o cials. FDR had
questioned the desirability of such a maneuver, called it a blu,
and said he did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6 [cruis-
ers] . . . in the Philippines in case of sudden attack. Stark had
then breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty
denitely closed.
21

Stark opposed such a move and he explained his reasons:
22

Sending a small force [of ships to Manila] would probably be no
deterrent to Japan, Stark wrote, and it would not hinder Japans
southward advance. Further moves against Japan could precipi-
tate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan
no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with
Germany whom we all consider our major problem.
Although the Pacic Fleet was weaker in total tonnage and
aircraft than the Japanese Navy, he considered it a very strong
force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a con-
stant serious and real threat to Japans ank. It would be a grave
20
Ibid., part 16, pp. 215051; part 33, pp. 120304.
21
Ibid., part 16, p. 2150; part 33, p. 1203.
22
Ibid., part 16, pp. 215051; part 33, pp. 120304.
strategic error at this time to divide our Pacic Fleet . . . in three
parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacic, and Western Pacic.
If we are forced into the war, Stark continued, our main
eort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against
Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war
in the Far East. Te Pacic Fleet should remain strong until we
see what Japan is going to do. Ten, if she moved toward Malaysia
in southeast Asia, we would be in a position to
vigorously attack the Mandates [an archipelago of south
Pacic islands mandated after World War I to Japan to admin-
ister] and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japans
attack on the British and Dutch.
At the same time, we could continue to lend support to the battle
in the Atlantic.
Stark recommended against doing anything in the Far East
which would reveal our intentions. We should not send any con-
siderable division . . . to Manila [as that] might prove an invita-
tion to Japan to attack us. We should not indicate the slight-
est interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands [lest the
Japanese] smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as
surprise is concerned, might be compromised. Te Japanese are
trained for amphibious operationswe are notand they would
then be able to occupy some of those British-held islands before
we could.
To reinforce this position against doing anything that might
appear to threaten Japan unless we were ready to ght, Stark
quoted from a telegram just received from the U.S. embassy in
Tokyo:
Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentra-
tion of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible
to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such
risks constitute[,] the risk should not be taken unless our coun-
try is ready to force hostilities.
In spite of his reservations, however, Stark told FDR he was
notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we
talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your nal deci-
sion should be to send them.
Although he disagreed with the president, he was ready to
obey orders. He continued his memorandum to FDR:
I just wanted to get this o my chest to you as I always do my
thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a
cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what
you decide.
Stark was above all a good soldier, loyal to his commander-in-
chief.
On February 25 Stark sent Kimmel a copy of his memoran-
dum. He and Kimmel were good friends and had been for many
years, so Stark was straightforward in his analysis of the situa-
tion. Stark wrote Kimmel, as he had told FDR he would, that he
should make plans for oensive raids.
23
He should
study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the
inammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives),
and the eect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on
the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier.
Such adventures, Stark wrote, might appear unjustied
from a prot and loss viewpoint . . . [or] they might prove very
protable. But, he implied, this was immaterial. In either case
(and this is strictly SECRET) you and I may be ordered to make
them. Terefore, Kimmel realized he would be well advised to
consider plans for launching such air raids.
23
Ibid., part 16, pp. 214950. Stark letter (February 25, 1941) to Kimmel.
Te question of sending a detachment of the eet to the Far
East had been brought up several times. Stark and Kimmel both
considered it unwise. However, Stark wrote,
even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up
in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my
view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not.
Te attitude of the people in the country with respect to the
war was confused, Stark wrote. I simply can not predict the out-
come. His memo to FDR represented, he said, his best estimate
of the Far Eastern present situation.
Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor
Requests Intelligence
In addition to equipment and supplies, a commander in the
eld also needs intelligence; that is, information, particularly
information relevant for military planning and preparations. Te
Navy Department in Washington inevitably receives such secret
or condential information, which the commanders in the eld
are entitled to have, and should have, if they are to carry out their
duties. After Kimmel took over command of the eet at Pearl
Harbor, he requested not only ships, men, equipment, supplies,
and munitions, but also intelligence; he asked Stark to furnish him
with whatever information of a secret nature was available.
24

Stark replied that this was the responsibility of the O ce of
Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI is fully aware of its responsibil-
ity in keeping you adequately informed.
25

In 1941, information concerning the location of Japanese
merchant vessels was forwarded weekly from Washington by air-
mail to Pearl Harbor. Tus Kimmel was receiving material on a
24
Ibid., part 16, p. 2229. Kimmel to Stark (February 18, 1941).
25
Ibid., part 17, p. 2160. Stark to Kimmel (March 22, 1941).
regular basis. Given that fact, plus Starks reassurance that ONI
would keep him informed, Kimmel assumed he was being sent,
and would be sent, all the information of value that Washington
could supply.
Security Leak in Washington
Since August 1940 we had been intercepting and decod-
ing messages sent in the Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated
Purple. Tis enabled us to read messages to and from Japans
embassies all around the world. Tese secret intercepts came to
be called MAGIC and were surrounded by strict security. Except
for the cryptographers and translators, they were seen by only a
handful of top people in the administration and the services. Ten
in the spring of 1941 it was discovered that one copy of a decoded
Japanese intercept was missing from the les. A magic transla-
tion . . . was lost in the State Department. Te Army had sent it to
them and it never came back.
26
In the words of Commander L.F.
Saord, then in charge of communications security, all hell broke
loose. A missing message was a serious matter. If the Japanese
learned we could read messages sent in their complex diplomatic
code, which we had deciphered at a cost of much time and eort,
they would probably change it. We would then be deprived of an
extremely valuable source of intelligence.
Saord and the others concerned with security could not
imagine where this missing message had gone. However, in April
and May we intercepted several Purple messages between Berlin
and Tokyo indicating that German intelligence sources, probably
in the United States, believed that the U.S. government had deci-
phered some Japanese codes. Tokyo cabled Berlin on April 16,
We suspect that the several codes I
b
,

80
c
and OITE
d
are being
26
Ibid., part 8, p. 3735.
cryptanalyzed by foreign powers. And from Berlin to Tokyo on
May 3:
STAHMER called on me this day (evening?) and . . . said that
Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization
abroad (orin the U.S.?), and according to information
obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite
(orfairly?) reliably established that the U.S. government is
reading Ambassador Nomuras code messages.
27
As a result, the Japanese warned their embassies to exercise
extreme caution to protect the security of their messages. But,
fortunately for the United States, Japan did not heed, or did not
realize the full import of, the warnings sent her embassy in Berlin.
In any event, her diplomats continued to use their Purple dip-
lomatic code.
The American-Dutch-British (ADB)
Conversations, Singapore, April
Toward the end of April the scene shifted to Singapore,
where a conference of American, Dutch, and British military
and naval o cers, the so-called ADB Conversations, was held
in utmost secrecy. Te principals dressed in mufti (civilian attire)
to conceal the nature of their visit. Te agreement reached on
April 27 was subsequently signed by o cials of the Associated
Powersthe United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands East
Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and India.
28
Te United States
was the only signatory not then in the war.
27
Ibid., part 4, pp. 186061. Tokyo/Berlin cables; part 4, p. 1815, June 23, 1941
Tokyo to Mexico message cautioning vigilance: Tere are suspicions that they
[the Americans] read some of our [ Japans] codes.
28
Ibid., part 15, pp. 155184 (Exhibit No. 50). American-Dutch-British
Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941 (Short Title, A.D.B.), Report.
Te 33-page ADB report that issued from this Singapore
conference was classied MOST SECRET. It described specic
moves on the part of Japan that would force the signers of the
agreement to recommend that their governments take military
action against Japan.
It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would
create a position in which our failure to take active military
counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage,
should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise
our respective Governments to authorise such action:
(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the
Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated
Powers. . . .
(b) Te movement of the Japanese forces into any part of
Tailand to the West of 100 East or to the South of 10
North.
(c) Te movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or
of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships,
which from its position and course was clearly directed upon
the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra [the
narrow strip of land connecting Singapores peninsula with the
Asian mainland] or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed
the parallel of 6 North between Malaya and the Philippines,
a line from the Gulf of Davao [on the southeastern-most tip
of the Philippines] to Waigeo Island [the northwestern-most
island of New Guinea], or the Equator East of Waigeo.
(d) Te movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
(e) Te movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or
the Loyalty Islands [northeast of New Caledonia].
29
29
Ibid., p. 1564.
Te ADB report also outlined cooperative procedures to
be followed by the land, sea, and air forces of the several par-
ties in the event of hostilities. Te United States turned down
a British request at the meeting that it send the Pacic Fleet to
Singapore.
Roosevelt knew these agreements were not constitutional.
Yet he sanctioned and continued pressing secretly for still closer
ties with Britain and her allies. According to Robert Sherwood,
one of FDRs speechwriters and close advisers, Roosevelt never
overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his immediate
or eventual impeachment.
30
From the administrations point of
view, therefore, it was imperative that the very existence of any
American-British joint plans, however tentative, had to be kept
utterly secret. Sherwood called it ironic that
in all probability, no great damage would have been done had
the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans
and the Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the
Congress and the press, American preparation for war might
have been well nigh wrecked and ruined.
31
U.S. Ships Transferred from
Pacific to Atlantic Fleet
In April 1941 Kimmel learned not only that he would not
be receiving the ships he had requested to strengthen his eet,
30
Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 274.
31
Ibid., pp. 27374. Here Sherwood quotes noted historian, Charles A.
Beard:
If these precedents are to stand unimpeached and to provide sanctions
for the continued conduct of American foreign aairs, the Constitution
may be nullied by the President, o cials, and o cers who have taken
the oath, and are under moral obligation to uphold it.
but that he would be forced to relinquish several destroyers and
cruisers to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet. Tis was in accord with
the U.S.-British ABC-1 agreement.
Te entire world set-up was gone into very carefully, Stark
wrote Kimmel on April 19. A detachment of shipsthree bat-
tleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers and two squadrons of
destroyerswas to be transferred from the Pacic to the Atlantic.
But then the president canceled the authorization for the move
and gave specic directions to bring only the one CV (aircraft
carrier) and one division of destroyers. Te president did not
want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously
weakening the forces in the Pacic.
32
However, a week later, after a long conference at the White
House on April 25, it was decided that the most urgent mat-
ter was to go all out in the Atlantic. Stark wrote Kimmel the
following day that he should get mentally prepared because a
considerable detachment from your eet will be brought to the
Atlantic. Stark anticipated the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the
3 BBs [battleships], 1 CV [aircraft carrier], 4 CLs [cruisers] and
2 squadrons of destroyers. And still further detachments from
the Pacic Fleet might be expected. Action on the transfer may
come at any time.
33

In May 1941 a force consisting of three battleships, an air-
craft carrier and appropriate supporting vessels . . . about a quarter
of the strength of the Pacic Fleet, was shifted to the Atlantic
from Kimmels command in the Pacic. Tese ships then joined
in the ever-extending activities of the Atlantic patrol, which
was lending support to Britain.
34
32
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2164. Stark to Kimmel,
April 19, 1941.
33
Ibid., part 16, p. 2165. Stark to Kimmel, April 26, 1941.
34
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Te Undeclared War, 19401941
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 451.
Coordination of U.S. War Plans and
Production
By this time, demands for war materiel were being submit-
ted to the United States from all over the world. Requests for
supplies and equipment were coming in from the British, belea-
guered in the Atlantic and in Singapore; from the Chinese under
pressure by the Japanese; and from our own forces in the eld.
Eective coordination was needed. On May 21, Marshall, under
pressure from the War Department, the O ce of Production
Management, and especially the White House, sought a com-
plete statement of Army needsnot for 1941 and 1942 but for
the actual winning of a war not yet declared. He asked the vari-
ous divisions of the War Department general sta to make stra-
tegic estimates of our ground, air, and naval situations, and to list
items of equipment needed as an aid to industry in its planning.
Te War Plans Division assigned Major (later Lt. Gen.) A.C.
Wedemeyer the immense task of researching and assembling
from widely scattered sources the necessary data on military
requirements, supplies, reserves, and production.
35
United StatesJapan Diplomatic
Conversations: in Washington
Japans Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura, had begun negotiations with the United States. Japan
was willing to make quite a few concessions from her point of
view, and for a while in June 1941, it looked as though an ami-
cable conclusion might be reached. Te major bone of contention
was the presence of Japanese troops in China. In the course of the
discussions, Japan agreed to withdraw most of her troops from
35
sion, 1950), pp. 33637.
China. Subject to further discussion, she would station a few on
the northern border
for protection against the entry of communistic elements from
Outer Mongolia. . . . Te troops which would be maintained for
resistance against communistic activities would not under any
circumstances interfere in Chinese internal aairs.
Japan then presented a draft proposal suggesting that
Roosevelt ask China to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan based
on the principles of:
36
(1) Neighborly friendship; (2) Joint defense
against communism; and (3) Economic cooperation.
As betting an agreement between two sovereign nations,
Japan further asserted that these principles implied: (1) Mutual
respect of sovereignty and territories; (2) Mutual respect for the
inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neigh-
bors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world
peace; (3) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese terri-
tory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between
Japan and China; (4) No annexation, no indemnities; and (5)
Independence of Manchoukuo.
37
Prompted by her desire for reliable sources of raw materials
and given the uncertainty created by the termination of her com-
mercial treaty with the United States, Japans draft proposal stated
further that if the United States and Japan reached agreement on
the basis of these principles, then they would cooperate in pro-
viding each other with access to supplies of natural resources
(such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs.
38
36
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 44445, 44849.
37
Ibid., p. 423.
38
Ibid., p. 462.
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were lukewarm, if not
cool, to these proposals. Tey balked at the Japanese plan for
Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities.
39

On June 21, Hull, handed the Japanese Ambassador a complete
rewrite of the draft proposal.
40
Te talks with the Japanese were
stalled.
Hitlers Invasion of Russia Alters Situation
and Expands Call for Worldwide Coordination
During the night of June 2122 Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R.
Te Soviets immediately became an enemy of Germany, and
Britain immediately became an ally of the Soviets. Once we
learned of Germanys invasion of Russia and of Britains alliance
with the Soviet Union against Germany, U.S. policy shifted. We
released Russian credits, refused to apply the neutrality law to the
Soviet Union, and promised American aid to Stalins regime.
41
Roosevelt called for an additional eort to coordinate war
planning and production. On July 9 he sent an urgent message to
his secretaries of war and navy asking them to
join . . . in exploring at once the overall production require-
ments required to defeat our potential enemies . . . [and] the
munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in
your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate
amount that available to our potential enemies.
42

39
Ibid., pp. 444, 447.
40
Ibid., p. 483. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp.
140001. (7/24/41, re sanctions on Japan).
41
rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 28687.
42
Watson, Te War Department, pp. 33839.
Te assignment Marshall had given Wedemeyer in May, to
determine the needs of the Army, was to be expanded to include
the Navy and Air Corps also. From this a real Victory Program
was to be developed encompassing, by presidential directive
(August 30, 1941), the distribution of munitions as well, not
only to U.S. forces, but also to those of Great Britain, Russia,
and other countries needing our help.
43
Te War Plans Divisions
draft, which Wedemeyer had completed by July 1, became the
basis of the more extensive project, and Wedemeyer was assigned
the major responsibility for the new and larger task.
44

In view of the fact that the United States was still o cially
neutral, security concerning this ultra-secret Victory Program
for the winning of a war not yet declared was extremely tight.
Only ve copies were prepared, each numbered and registered.
Wedemeyer kept his working copy; he gave one to Stimson for
presentation to FDR, and three to his superiors. It was thought
that this very limited distribution would prevent any leak.
U.S.-Japan Relations Treading the Evil Road
As we have seen, the Japanese had received the permis-
sion of the Vichy government of unoccupied France to land
troops in French Indochina and to acquire there the rice and
other raw materials she desperately needed.
45
Both the United
States and Britain objected to these arrangements. On July 23,
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles broke o the talks then
going on with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Te
next day the United States denounced Japans actions in French
Indochina. Ten on July 25, in retaliation for Japans Indochina
moves and against the advice of Ambassador Grew in Japan and
43
Ibid., pp. 34749.
44
Ibid., p. 342.
45
Chief of Naval Operations Stark, FDR by executive order froze
all Japanese assets in this country. England followed suit the fol-
lowing day.
46

Tis brought all trade between the United States and Japan to
an end. Japan had warned that this drastic measure would leave
her in desperate straits. It hurt especially because it deprived her
of regular gasoline from which she had been able to produce
higher grade aviation gas.
47
Back in November 1940 Roosevelt
had been well aware of the crisis that would arise if Japan were
deprived of oil.
Ambassador Grew and Stark understood Japans economic
plight and realized she might go to war if her oil were shut o.
Stark had argued that unless we were prepared for warI do
not mean prepared in the sense of complete readiness for war,
but unless we were ready to accept a war risk, we should not take
measures which would cut oil down to the Japanese below that
needed for what might be called their normal peace time needs
for their industry and their ships. He said he never waivered
[sic] one inch on that stand.
48
Nevertheless, the United States
went ahead and imposed sanctions. Te die was cast.
Stark cabled his three eet commanders on July 25 about the
economic sanctions. It was expected that these sanctions would
include all trade except for a few items for which export licenses
would be issued. He advised the commanders to take appropri-
ate precautionary measures against possible eventualities.
49
All this time, we were still intercepting, decoding, and reading
Japanese messages sent in the diplomatic code, Purple. Among
46
Ibid., p. 290.
47
Interview ( January 9, 1964) of Japanese expert, Captain Albert E. Hind-
marsh (typescript in authors les).
48
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, p. 43. Stark testimony before
the Navy Court of Inquiry.
49
Ibid., part 24, p.1355. Stark testimony before the Roberts Commission,
Exhibit 13.
them was a message dated July 31 from the Japanese foreign min-
ister in Tokyo to Japans ambassador in Berlin concerning their
desperate economic situation.
50
A copy was sent to Nomura, the
Japanese ambassador in Washington. It read in part:
Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third
countries, led by England and the United States, are gradu-
ally becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it
much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life,
must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South
Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asun-
der this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is
being woven under the guidance and with the participation of
England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon
seemingly asleep. Tat is why we decided to obtain military
bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy
that territory . . . and now Japanese-American relations are
more rapidly than ever treading the evil road.
51

After being decoded and translated, this message was dis-
tributed to Roosevelt and his advisers, the few top o cials in
Washington who were privy to MAGIC. Tis cable further con-
rmed Japans economic plight and the impending crisis due to
the U.S. sanctions.
On August 6 Japan again oered to negotiate.
Japanese Prime Minister Fuminaro Konoye, who represented
Japans Peace Party, suggested a personal meeting with Roosevelt,
with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment [in U.S.-
Japan relations] could be brought about. On August 8 Nomura
asked Hull whether it might not be possible for the responsible
50
Ibid., part 12, p. 8.
51
Ibid., p. 9.
heads of the two Governments to meet, say in Honolulu.
52
On
August 17, the United States rejected this proposal. Hull
made it clear that he did not see how conversations between
the two Governments could usefully be pursued or propos-
als be discussed while Japanese o cial spokesmen and the
Japanese press contended that the United States was endeav-
oring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the
United States.
53

The First U. S. Ultimatum to Japan
Te public announcement of the Argentia meeting of
Roosevelt and Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, but
said nothing about the tough words FDR had agreed to address
to Japan as a result of his conversations with Churchill. It had
been mutually understood by the men that the Governments
of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time
to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the
Far East. Terefore, it had been agreed that Roosevelt should
make clear to Japan in no uncertain terms that further aggres-
sion against her neighboring countries would not be tolerated,
that such aggression would force those countries to take mea-
sures to safeguard their rights. Accordingly, once FDR was back
in Washington, he informed the Japanese ambassador (August
17) that
if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursu-
ance of a policy or program of military domination by force or
threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of
the United States will be compelled to take immediately any
52
53
Ibid., p. 715.
and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguard-
ing the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and
American nationals and toward insuring the safety and secu-
rity of the United States.
54

Te next day in a wire signed by Roosevelt, transmitted by the
State Department to the U.S. embassy in London, it was reported
that FDR and Hull had received the Japanese ambassador and
had
made to him a statement covering the position of this
Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further
steps in the direction of military domination by force along the
lines of the proposed statement such as you [Churchill] and I
[FDR] had discussed. Te statement I made to him was no less
vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we
had discussed.
55
Tis statement was later referred to by Stimson and others as
the rst ultimatum to Japan.
Kimmel Continues to Request Men and
Equipment for the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii
Before Kimmel took over as commander-in-chief of the
Pacic Fleet at Pearl Harbor on February 1, 1941, he had had an
opportunity to survey the situation briey. He had written Stark
on January 27 that he was
particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for
the task of defending this base. . . . I think the supply of an
54
Ibid., p. 714. FDRs oral statement to Nomura, August 17, 1941.
55
1941. vol. 4: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
O ce, 1956), p. 380.
adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of
Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority.
Kimmel was also concerned with the personnel shortage and
wrote that he would
probably be required to make recommendations on this subject
shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now ll all ships with
personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase
in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new
construction.
56

Tese same complaints had been made before by Kimmels pre-
decessor, Richardson, just then being relieved of his command.
Once in command, Kimmel continued to bombard
Washington with requests for men and materiel to strengthen
the eet. Yet rather than being strengthened, the eet was weak-
ened by the transfer in May to the Atlantic of almost a fourth
of the Pacic Fleet. Kimmel felt he knew very little of what was
going on in Washington, and he persisted in asking for informa-
tion and supplies.
After Germany attacked Russia, Kimmel wanted to know
how this would aect policy.
57
Whether or not planes are to be
supplied to the Russians may be outside my province, Kimmel
wrote on July 30,
but I do remain keenly aware of our own deciencies in air-
craft. It is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply
planes to any quarter of the globe in which ghting against
Axis Powers may occur.
58
56
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16. pp. 222527. Kimmel to
Stark, January 27, 1941.
57
Ibid., part 16, p. 2242.
58
Ibid.
Again, on August 12, Kimmel reminded Stark of the eets
needs. Kimmel believed the radar equipment was
far behind what it should be. . . . We need more ships of all
types for a successful Pacic campaign but I believe we need
submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we
need battleships. Tis is a vast ocean.
59

Stark sympathized with Kimmels supply problem but was
unable to help. He responded on August 22 to several of Kimmels
more recent requests for men and materiel: I know you want
results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading
to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the pic-
ture presented is not too unsatisfactory.
60
Although Kimmel got
some results over the months he was in command, he generally
got more excuses than results.
The Victory Program Completed
In estimating the military and production requirements of
the nation, Wedemeyer had to seek data from many sources. He
looked into the status of the shipping, munitions requirements,
and munitions production of U.S. troop bases. He explored the
situation and capabilities of each of the major combatant nations,
the capabilities and probable lines of action of both friendly
and Axis powers. It was assumed that the earliest date when
U.S. armed forces could be mobilized, trained, and equipped for
extensive operations would be July 1, 1943.
61
Te presidents July 9 request had enlarged the scope of
Wedemeyers survey. A couple of months later, Roosevelt expanded
the task still further. In a memorandum to the War Department
59
Ibid., part 16, pp. 224345.
60
Ibid., p. 2181. Stark to Kimmel, August 22, 1941.
61
on August 30, he wrote that he wanted the department, working
in cooperation with the Navy Department, to submit to him by
September 10, 1941, their
recommendation of distribution of expected United States
production of munitions of war as between the United States,
Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aidedby
important items, quantity, time schedules, and approximate val-
ues for the period from the present time until June 30 [1942].
FDR also wanted to receive their
general conclusions as to the over-all production eort of
important items needed for victory on the general assumption
that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United
States and her friends is su ciently superior to that available
to the Axis Powers to insure defeat of the latter.
62
Wedemeyer completed his exhaustive study by FDRs
deadline.
63
Japans Peace Party Falls;
Her War Party Takes Over
With our embargo in full eect, Japans economic plight was
fast deteriorating. In a desperate eort to save his government,
Prime Minister Konoye on August 28 renewed his plea for a per-
sonal meeting with Roosevelt in Hawaii. Te administration did
not reply immediately.
By September 23 the conversations with the Japanese ambas-
sador in Washington had practically reached an impasse. Stark
had a condential talk with Hull about the situation and then
reported to Kimmel: Conversations without results cannot last
62
Ibid., p. 348.
63
Ibid., p. 351.
forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might the situa-
tion could only grow more tense. Stark wrote that Hull kept him
pretty well informed and added in a P.S. dated September 29, if
there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you
know.
64
Once more Kimmel felt reassured that he would be sent
any information pertinent to Pearl Harbor.
On October 2, Roosevelt and Hull, after several exchanges
of notes, again turned down Konoyes proposal for a Hawaii
meeting.
Two weeks later, on October 6, Konoye, who had been doing
his best to maintain peaceful relations between his country and
the United States, was forced to resign. Konoyes successor was
an army general, Hideki Tojo. With a government composed pri-
marily of military men, Japans War Party was in control. Te
chances of solving Japans economic needs by peaceful means
faded.
Stark analyzed the Japanese power shift in a cable to his three
eet commanders.
Te resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave
situation X. . . . Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible
by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a pos-
sibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of
these possibilities you will take due precautions including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic inten-
tion nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X
65
In a covering letter to Kimmel, Stark wrote:
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and
the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact
I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps
64
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 221214. Stark letter to
Kimmel, September 23, 1941; postscript dated September 29.
65
Ibid., part 14, p. 1327.
I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows
in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least
until something indicates the trend.
66
Japanese Stocks of Strategic
Materials Dangerously Low
Estimates of Japans stocks of strategic materials fur-
nished clues to the Japanese situation. Lieutenant Albert E.
Hindmarsh, an economic analyst in the far eastern section of
Naval Intelligence, had access to all available intelligence, includ-
ing MAGIC. Hindmarsh was also regularly reading the minutes
of the Japanese parliament. By following its debates, he could
determine how much the Japanese government was paying per
unit for storage of some 23 strategic materials. He then divided
these gures into the total amounts shown in the Japanese budget
for this purpose. In that way, he was able to calculate the stocks of
Japans strategic materials still on hand.
At regular intervals Hindmarsh personally took to Roosevelt
his estimates of the stocks of these various materials. Japans
severest shortage was of oil. Our oil embargo, especially the
embargo on aviation gasoline, was putting Japan in a desperate
plight. Hindmarsh calculated in mid-summer 1941, that she had
on hand about 75 million barrels. In a war Hindmarsh gured
she would need 52 million barrels per year. She had enough mica,
which came from India, for four years. And her stocks of hemp
and sisal were su cient, so she could safely bypass the Philippines.
Hindmarsh was able to explain to FDR that, in view of Japans
economic priorities, she would have to aim rst at replenishing
her oil stocks; he expected her primary objective would be the
66
Ibid., part 16, pp. 221415 (Stark to Kimmel, October 17,1941).
Dutch East Indies, where she might expect to get oil production
going in some six months or so.
67
The October Revolution in ONI
Troughout 1941, a struggle was going on within the Navy
Department as to whose responsibility it was to evaluate secret
military intelligence and pass it along to the commanders in the
eld. Both the chief of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond K.
Turner, and the chief of O ce of Naval Intelligence, Captain
Alan G. Kirk, claimed this responsibility. Te table of organiza-
tion at the time seemed to place the responsibility with ONI.
And Starks March 22 letter to Kimmel supported that position.
68

However, Turner was aggressive and persistent. He nally per-
suaded Stark to reduce ONI to a fact-gathering agency, and War
Plans assumed the responsibility for evaluating available intel-
ligence and for determining what should be sent to the eld
commanders. Tis Occtober 1941 power struggle between ONI
and War Plans confused the lines of communication and created
doubt as to just where the responsibility actually lay.
Ten also in October, Kirk and his top assistant were removed
from duty. According to communications-security chief Saord,
this was the rst time in Navy Department history that both
chief and assistant chief of a bureau had been removed from
o ce simultaneously. Te previous practice had been to remove
only one of the two top men at a time, so as to assure continuity.
Te third man in charge, then in London, was not involved.
67
Authors notes of Albert E. Hindmarsh interview, January 9, 1954.
68
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 215960. Stark to Kimmel,
March 22, 1941.
Berthing Plan or Harbor Bomb Plot Messages
Te shift in ONI leadership took place on October 10, the
day after the berthing plan messageasking the Japanese con-
sul in Hawaii to report the movements of U.S. naval ships in
and out of Pearl Harborbecame available in Washington. Rear
Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, who had been serving as com-
manding o cer aboard the battleship USS Mississippi took over
as chief of ONI on October 15. Prior to joining the ONI, he had
had no experience with naval intelligence other than attendance
at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in
1933 and 1934.
69
Te Pearl Harbor commanders were never advised of the
berthing plan message. Te failure to notify them of its exis-
tence and of the other ships-in-harbor messages decoded
later in Washington, could have been due to failure on the part
of those evaluating intelligence to recognize the importance of
these messages. It could have been due to disarray accompanying
the turnover in ONI personnel. It could have been due to mere
negligence. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither
War Plans nor ONI notied the Pearl Harbor commanders of
those critical messages.
Te U.S. Navys communications personnel in Hawaii were
under instructions to try to solve the Japanese navy code ( JN-
25). Tey were not to spend time trying to decipher Japanese
intercepts in the Japanese consular code ( J-19) or any other
code; these were to be mailed to Washington for decoding and
translating. Terefore, our people in Hawaii made no attempt
to decode and translate these intercepts, but simply forwarded
them, as instructed, to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to
Washington then was not nonstop. It was by short hops and only
69
Ibid., part 4, p. 1724.
twice a week, so it took several days for an airmailed intercept to
reach Washington.
One J-19 message, sent from Tokyo on September 24 to
Honolulu, was picked up in Hawaii and mailed, undecoded to
Washington, where it was decoded, translated, and made avail-
able to the top military personnel in Washington on October 9,
1941.
70
In that message, the foreign minister in Tokyo asked the
Japanese consul in Hawaii to set up a system for making regu-
lar reports on the movements of U.S. ships in and out of Pearl
Harbor. Tis ships-in-harbor message became known as the
berthing plan, or as the rst of the bomb plot messages. Pearl
Harbor was not notied.
On November 15 Tokyo sent a cable to Honolulu, translated
in Washington on December 3, which read, As relations between
Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ships
in harbor report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
71
Pearl
Harbor was not advised.
On November 29 Tokyo cabled the consul in Honolulu: We
have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in
future will you also report even when there are no movements.
72

Washington decoded and translated this message on December
5. Pearl Harbor was not notied.
Many other ships-in-harbor messages referring to Pearl
Harbor, some 39 in all, were transmitted back and forth between
Tokyo and Honolulu during the two months prior to the Japanese
attack. Due to the pressure of other demands on the decoders in
Washington, however, only 25 of these crucial intercepts were
deciphered, translated, and read before the attack.
73
Yet not a sin-
gle one of those 25 deciphered and translated messages was sent
70
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 261.
71
Ibid., part 12, p. 262.
72
Ibid., part 12, p. 263. J-19, #122. (Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941)
73
Ibid., part 12, p. 25470.
to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaiithey were not
even informed of their existence.
To complete the record, it might be pointed out that inter-
cepted Japanese cables revealed to our authorities in Washington
that the Japanese were also watching ship movements in Manila.
Some 59 messages were exchanged between Tokyo and the
Philippines; all but two were deciphered and translated before
December 7. Twenty-seven cables reporting on ship movements
in and out of the Panama Canal were intercepted to and from
Tokyo, 21 of which were deciphered and read before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. We also intercepted eight Japanese cables
between Tokyo and the west coast (San Francisco and Seattle),
another eight that referred to southeast Asia and the Dutch East
Indies, and a couple each concerning Vancouver (Canada) and
Vladivostok (Russia).
74

Te record shows that the ships in Pearl Harbor were those
most closely under surveillance. Yet no hint was ever given
Kimmel or Short that the Japanese, from September 24 on, were
plotting regularly on grid charts the locations and movements of
ships in Pearl Harbor, and forwarding this information to Tokyo.
Nor was any hint ever given Kimmel or Short that as of mid-
November, the Japanese consul had been asked to make these
reports more frequently, at a rate of twice a week, or that he had
been asked on November 29 to report even when there are no
ship movements. In spite of Kimmels several requests for intel-
ligence and in spite of the repeated reassurances that he would
be kept informed, none of these vital intercepts was forwarded to
the Pearl Harbor commanders before the attack.

74
Ibid., part 12, pp. 254, 270316.
111
5.
Talk of Ultimatums
and Deadlines
Japan and Public Opinion
J
apans trade situation continued to deteriorate. Her situation
was desperate. On November 3, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo
cabled Secretary of State Hull that the greater part of Japans
commerce has been lost. Japanese industrial production has been
dramatically curtailed, and Japans national resources have been
depleted. Grew believed that the United States would not be
able to avert war in the Far East by continuing to embargo trade
with Japan.
He saw world political events crowding in upon Japan, forc-
ing her to take some drastic actions. He cautioned that if diplo-
macy failed, if Japan did not succeed in her attempts at reconcili-
ation with the United States, he fully expected she would make
an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri,
to make [her] impervious to economic embargoes. Te United
States should be ready to decide whether war with Japan is justi-
ed by American national objectives, policies, and needs. Grew
left no room for illusions. He warned in his cable that the United
States should not be deceived into thinking that Japan might
not
rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. . . .
It would be short-sighted for American policy to be based upon
the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber
rattling. . . . Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic sud-
denness to measures which might make inevitable war with the
United States.
1

Tere were factions in both Japan and the United States that
wanted to maintain peace. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye had
sought some agreement with the United States and had even
oered to meet with Roosevelt to try to reconcile their dier-
ences. He had been rebued. As a result, he had been forced to
resign. In October a more militant faction had taken over the
government of Japan.
In this country the sentiment against our going to war was
still widespread. Public opinion polls in the spring of 1941
reported more than 80 percent of the people were against becom-
ing involved.
2
Te America First Committee, established on
September 4, 1940, was the most prominent organization that
opposed U.S. involvement in the war. Its national chairman was
General Robert E. Wood, board chairman of Sears Roebuck and
Co. Among its more celebrated members were journalist John T.
Flynn; Alice Roosevelt Longworth, daughter of former President
1
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943). Ambassador
Grews November 3, 1941 cable to State Department, Washington.
2
A poll conducted by public opinion statistician George Gallup indicated that
83% of the people in the United States would vote against a declaration of war
if given the opportunity, although they were still convinced that the Amer-
ican public would take the risk of war to help England win. James J. Martin,
American Liberalism and World Politics (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), vol. 2,
p. 1275.
Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 113
Teodore Roosevelt; World War I aviator Edward Rickenbacker;
Lillian Gish, star of the early lms; Socialist Norman Tomas;
and aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh.
3
Lindbergh, a national
hero ever since his dramatic solo ight across the Atlantic in
1927, became America Firsts most popular spokesman. When
he spoke at New Yorks Manhattan Center on April 23, 1941, the
hall was jammed with 5,500 people. In subsequent appearances
New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Hollywood,
Cleveland, Des Moines, Fort Waynehe attracted even larger
enthusiastic crowds, up to 22,000.
4

Others were also working to maintain peace with Japan.
Among them were religious groups, the Friends, or Quakers, and
the followers of the Reverend E. Stanley Jones, a well-known
Methodist missionary. Reverend Jones believed the Japanese
were tired of ghting in China and were ready to make peace. He
hoped to act as a catalyst, to help the various parties reconcile
their dierences, and had approached high Japanese and Chinese
o cials informally to learn their reaction to his suggestions. He
had talked with o cials in the U.S. State Department, and his
suggestions had been transmitted by memoranda to the presi-
dent. He wanted FDR to send a personal cable to the Emperor.
Jones had also spoken to groups of ministers, usually nding
them receptive to his ideas. By November 1941, Jones seemed to
be making some progress with his suggestions.
Te pro-peace noninterventionists, however, were gradually
being overwhelmed by the pro-British propaganda emanating
from the administration and the mass communications media
radio, movies, newsreels, and major newspapers and magazines.
Although the majority of the people in the United States still did
3
For an account of the America First Committee, see Wayne S. Cole, America
First: Te Battle Against Intervention, 19401941 (New York: Octagon Books,
1971).
4
E. Eastman Irving, ed., Te World Almanac (New York: New York World-
Telegram, 1942), pp. 62, 75, 78.
not want this country to become involved in the war, the climate
of opinion was gradually shifting. Antiwar sentiment was begin-
ning to decline.
Washingtons Far Eastern Policy
Warn Japan, Delay Operations to
Allow U.S. Build-up in Pacific
Rather than wanting to conciliate Japan, Secretary of State
Hull was in favor of issuing an additional warning. Before doing
so, however, he sought to determine the Armys and Navys state
of readiness. Would the military authorities be ready to support
further State Department warnings?
On November 1 the State Department held a meeting on the
far eastern situation. Messages from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
Shek, Chinas head of government at Chungking, and General
John Magruder, chief of the American military mission to
Chungking, were discussed. Chiang was urging that the United
States warn Japan against attacking China through Yunnan, a
province in southern China. To present the Navy viewpoint, Chief
of Naval Operations Stark and Captain Schuirmann, the Navy
liaison with the State Department, were present. Tey pointed
out that Japan had already been warned. Te president had told
Japan on August 17, when he returned from meeting Churchill
at Argentia, that if she continued military aggression against her
neighboring countries, the United States would be compelled
to take action.
5
According to Schuirmann, Hull desired to know
if the military authorities would be prepared to support further
warnings by the State Department.
6

5
Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 71314. FDRs oral statement to the
Japanese ambassador, August 17, 1941.
6
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 14, p. 1063.
Another meeting was held at the State Department the fol-
lowing day. At that time it was proposed that the British send
some planes to Tailand and that Japan be warned against mov-
ing into Siberia.
7
On November 3 the Joint Board of the Army
and Navy met. Fifteen top Army and Navy o cers were pres-
ent. Te deliberations were strictly condential; no hint of them
was made public. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Royal E. Ingersoll, reviewed the far eastern situation. He said that
a decision had been made several months before to make the
major eort in the Atlantic, and if forced to ght in the Pacic,
to engage in a limited oensive eort. Tis was consistent with
the U.S.-British Sta Conversations Report (ABC-1) of March
27, 1941. A major war eort in the Pacic, Ingersoll pointed out,
would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would
have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas, and
this would materially aect United States aid to England. Even
if the eet could be moved to the Far East, he continued, there
were no repair facilities at Manila or Singapore.
8

Ingersoll then assessed the possibility of a Japanese attack.
Japan is capable of launching an attack in ve directions; viz.,
against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Tailand and
against Malaya. He gave his recommendations as to what the
United States should do in each of these ve eventualities. In
case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British
and Dutch positions, the United States should resist the attack.
In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Tailand or China
through Yunnan, the United States should not declare war.
9

Ingersoll felt the State Department was under the impression
that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.
However, he pointed out, our eet was seriously handicapped
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid., part 14, pp. 106364.
9
Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.
at the time for lack of certain major naval units then in the
repair yards. He recommended that oensive action in the Far
East be deferred until U.S. military strength was built up in the
Philippines. From what he said, it was obvious that the U.S. mili-
tary was not eager to provoke a confrontation with Japan. [T]he
present moment was not the opportune time to get brash.
10

Army and Navy Oppose Ultimatum to Japan
Until Phillippine Strength is Developed
Army Chief of Sta Marshall was also at this November 3
meeting. He said he had received information to the eect that
the Japanese expected to decide in a couple of daysthat would
be by November 5what action they would take. He empha-
sized that it would be dangerous to move the augmented Army
Air Force away from its present station in the Philippines for
he believed that as long as it was there the Japanese would nd
action against the Philippines or towards the south to be a very
hazardous operation. Moreover, he expected the Army forces in
the Philippines would be of impressive strength by mid-Decem-
ber and this in itself would have a deterrent eect on Japanese
operations.
11

It was Marshalls position that, until U.S. power was su -
ciently developed in the Philippines so we would have some-
thing to back up our statements, the Japanese should not be
antagonized unnecessarily. Te United States should make cer-
tain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving
face, such as a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade
restrictions.
12
However, he realized that until U.S. forces were
built up in the Far East, the situation was delicate.
10
Ibid., Ingersoll remark at Joint Army-Navy Board November 3 meeting.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.
At the conclusion of these discussions the Joint Board adopted
Ingersolls proposal, with amendments suggested by Stark and
Marshall. A memorandum was to be prepared for the president
opposing (1) the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan, (2) military
action against Japan if she moved into Yunnan, and (3) support
of Chiang Kai-Shek with U.S. military forces. Te memorandum
was to recommend that the State Department postpone hostili-
ties with Japan as long as possible, and that some agreements be
made with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several
months.
In addition to these recommendations, the memorandum
was to (1) point out how a U.S.-Japanese war in the Far East
would impair the help the United States was giving Great Britain
and the other nations ghting Germany, and (2) emphasize that
the United States was not in a position to engage in an oensive
operation in the Far East without transferring to the Pacic most
of the ships now in the Atlantic.
13

Japanese-U.S. Relations on the Brink of Chaos
Our facility in decoding and translating intercepted messages
sent in the Japanese diplomatic code, Purple, had improved dra-
matically. On November 4, we intercepted, decoded, and trans-
lated a message sent from Tokyo earlier that day:
Well, relations between Japan and the United States have
reached the edge, and our people are losing condence in the
possibility of ever adjusting them. . . . Conditions . . . are so
tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in any sin-
cerity to maintain pacic relationships between the Empire of
Japan and the United States of America, we have decided . . .
to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but
this is our last eort. . . . If through it we do not reach a quick
13
Ibid., pp. 106465.
accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured.
Ten, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the
brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending
discussions will have an immense eect on the destiny of the
Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on
the throw of this die.
14

Japan was announcing that a break in the relations with the
United States was imminent. And the top U.S. political and
military o cials who were cleared to read the secret intelligence
known as MAGIC knew it.
Stark and Marshall Memorandum to FDR:
Avoid War with Japan;
Issue No Ultimatum to Japan
As agreed at the November 3 meeting of the Joint Board,
Marshall and Stark prepared a memorandum for the president,
brieng him in some detail with respect to the Far East situation.
One by one they pointed out the various reasons why the United
States should not issue an ultimatum to Japan that might force
her to take drastic action involving the United States in a Pacic
war:
1. Te U.S. eet in the Pacic was inferior to the Japanese
eet and was not in a position to undertake an unlimited stra-
tegic oensive in the western Pacic.
2. U.S. military forces in the Philippines were not yet strong
enough. Tey were being reinforced, however, and it was
expected that air and submarine strength would be built up
by mid-December and that the air forces would reach their
projected strength by February or March 1942.
14
Ibid., part 12, pp. 9293. November 4, 1941 cable #725 from Tokyo to Wash-
ington. Translated November 4, 1941.
3. British naval and air reinforcements were expected to reach
Singapore by February or March.
Marshall and Stark reconrmed the policies and strategies
agreed to in the U.S.-British sta conversations. War between
the United States and Japan should be avoided, they wrote,
while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such
time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose
security to the United States is of very great importance.:
1. Territory or mandated territories of the United States, the
British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies;
2. Certain parts of Tailand in southeast Asia;
3. Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, and the Loyalty
Islands, all in the southwest Pacic.
Te memorandum also stated that:
We should not intervene against Japan if she should attack
Russia.
We should attempt to weaken Japan economically.
We should not send troops to China, but we should give
[a]ll possible aid short of actual war . . . to the Chinese
Central Government.
U. S. plans should be fully coordinated with the British and the
Dutch.
It closed with a strong recommendation: Tat no ultimatum be
delivered to Japan.
15

Note that the territories Marshall and Stark named with
whose defenses we were concerned and whose security to the
15
Ibid., part 14, pp. 106162.
United States is of very great importance were all thousands of
miles from our shores.
Japan Sets a Deadline for Signing Agreement
To Save U.S. Relations From Falling into
Chaotic Condition
Marshall had told the Joint Board on November 3 that he had
information to the eect that on November 5 the Japanese would
decide their course of action. And sure enough! On November
5, we intercepted and read the following November 5 Japanese
message to the Washington embassy:
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that
all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be com-
pleted by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a di cult
order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one.
Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of
saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic
condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted
eort, I beg of you.
Tis information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
16

U.S. Cabinet Would Support a Strike
Against Japan if She Attacked the
British or Dutch in Southeast Asia?
It was customary for the president to hold meetings of his
cabinet on Friday mornings, and he held one as usual on Friday,
November 7. Secretary of War Stimson had kept a rather com-
plete diary for many years, and he continued the practice through-
out his tenure, dictating rather copious notes each morning
before going to his o ce in the War Department. Following the
16
Ibid., part 12, p. 100, #736, Tokyo to Washington.
November 7 meeting, Stimson wrote, Te Far Eastern situation
was uppermost in many of our minds. Hull reported that U.S.
relations with Japan had become extremely critical and that we
should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. But,
as Marshall and Stark had stated in no uncertain terms in their
memorandum to FDR just two days before, the military were
anxious to avoid becoming involved in any action with Japan at
that time. Nevertheless, according to Stimsons diary, our mili-
tary advisors . . . had urged military action if Japan attacked . . .
American, British or Dutch territory. In anticipation that we
might be called on to take some such action under the Singapore
agreement with the British and Dutch, the military had been y-
ing heavy B-17 bombers out to the Philippines for some time,
whenever they could be spared from other duties. None of the
cabinet members except Hull and Stimson knew of this ongoing
buildup.
Roosevelt took an informal vote of the cabinet members on
how the American people might react if it became necessary to
strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or
the Dutch in the East Indies. According to Stimsons diary, Te
Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would
support such a move, that is, a strike against Japan if she were to
attack the British or Dutch in southeast Asia.
17

News of Victory Program Leaks;
Marshall Denies Its Existence
Te all-encompassing Victory Program, prepared at the
Roosevelts request had been completed by September 10. It con-
tained estimates of the military needs of the United States and her
potential allies, and of the military stocks available worldwide to
win a war in which this country was not as yet o cially involved.
Te details and the very existence of the Victory Program was
17
Ibid., part 11, p. 5420.
a carefully guarded secret. Te small number of copies made had
been distributed only to a select few military and administration
o cials. However, if it was to be intelligently implemented, the
o cers who would be involved had to know about it. Terefore,
War Plans Division (WPD) prepared a strategic estimate of
the situation, which it circulated in mid-November among War
Department o cials.
18

In spite of the careful security surrounding WPDs estimate,
news of the Victory Program leaked out. A rumor circulated
in November that an American expeditionary force (AEF) was
being planned. If true, this was contrary to Marshalls testimony
before Congress in July when testifying on the extension of
Selective Service. At that time, he had discounted any threat of
militarism and assured Congress that he was not considering an
AEF, but merely task forces of 5,000, 15,000, or 30,000 men.
Marshall issued a categorical denial to scotch the rumor about
an AEF: Tere is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or
rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to
Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere.
19

The Japanese Push for Agreement
Te seriousness of the Japanese deadline became increasingly
apparent to anyone reading the secret Purple dispatches during
this period. Japan was sending Nomura repeated reminders of
the need for urgency. She realized she had to reach some agree-
ment with the United States. And with this in mind, Ambassador
Nomura and representatives of the U.S. State Department con-
tinued their discussions.
18
sion, 1950), pp. 22031, 358.
19
Ibid., p. 359.
In a further attempt to bring about an amicable settlement,
Japan sent to Washington a second ambassador, Admiral Saburu
Kurusu, to assist Nomura. Kurusu, with an American wife, was
pro-American. Kurusus association with the U.S. dated back to
World War I when the two countries were allies. Te U.S. gov-
ernment facilitated priority passage for him and for the Japanese
Foreign O ce secretary who accompanied him to the United
States via a Pan American plane.
20
Kurusu arrived in Washington
on November 15. His instructions were to
cooperate with [Nomura] in an unsparing eort to guide the
negotiations to any early settlement. Tat is my fervent prayer
which I hope may be granted. . . . [T]he crisis is fast approach-
ing. . . . [D]o everything in your power to make the United
States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situa-
tion. I beg of you to make every eort to have them cooperate
with us in assuring peace on the Pacic.
21

On November 15 our Navy decoders deciphered and trans-
lated a Japanese Purple intercept reminding the Japanese ambas-
sador in Washington that the date [November 25] set forth in
my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, there-
fore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible
the signing of the agreement by that date.
22

Nomura immediately cabled Tokyo. He was concerned about
what would happen to the Japanese nationals residing in the
United States:
20
Department of State, Peace and War, p. 137. See also Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 362.
21
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 13031. Tokyo to Wash-
ington, #781, November 15, 1941.
22
Ibid., p. 130. Tokyo to Washington, #775.
Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the
adjustment of relations between the two countries which are
being conducted at present, unfortunately break down. . . . It is
most probable that diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries would be broken o immediately. . . . I presume that the
government has given careful consideration as to the disposi-
tion of the various o ces and our nationals residing here. I
would appreciate being advised in condence of your decision
in these matters.
23
Tokyo answered the following day:
[Y]ou may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the
eorts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by
the slender thread of a few days, so please ght harder than you
ever did before. . . . I set the deadline for the solution of these
negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please
try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore,
do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the
negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis
of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate
solution.
24
We decoded, translated, and read both messages on November
17.
Nomura presented Japans newly arrived second ambassador,
Kurusu, to Secretary of State Hull on November 17. Te three
men then proceeded to the White House so that Kurusu might be
received formally by the president. After the courtesies were over,
Roosevelt brought up the serious misunderstandings between the
two countries and expressed his desire to avoid war. Te ambas-
sadors said they equally wished for a peaceful settlement in the
Pacic. In Kurusus words, [A]ll the way across the Pacic it was
23
Ibid., p. 133. Washington to Tokyo, #1098.
24
Ibid., pp. 13738. Tokyo to Washington, unnumbered dispatch.
like a powder keg. He repeated that some way must be found
to avoid war and assured the president that Prime Minister Tojo
was also very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment
notwithstanding he is an Army man.
25

Meanwhile, that very afternoon Hull received a cable from
Ambassador Grew in Japan. Grew warned that there was need
to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions out-
side the area of the Chinese theater of operations. It was likely, he
said, that the Japanese might take every possible tactical advan-
tage, such as surprise and initiative. Japan maintained extremely
eective control over both primary and secondary military infor-
mation, so the embassys eld of observation was restricted
almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and
this is negligible. Tis meant that the U.S. embassys naval and
military attaches could not be relied on to send substantial warn-
ing. Te Japanese, therefore, were assured of the ability to send
without foreign observation their troop transports in various
directions.
26

The Japanese Ambassadors Continue
Trying for Agreement
Te two Japanese ambassadors were back at the State
Department the following day. Teir deadline (November 25) was
approaching, and their immediate concern was the di cult posi-
tion of the Japanese under the U.S.-imposed trade restrictions and
asset-freeze. Tey pointed out that Japan was much more depen-
dent on foreign trade than the United States; she was hard-
pressed, and thus desirous of reaching some agreement.
25
States: Japan, 19311941, vol. 2, pp. 74043.
26
Ibid., pp. 74344.
Hull responded by raising the China question, which had
long been a sticking point between the two countries. Would
the Japanese be willing to forgo annexation and indemnities, and
to respect Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as
the principle of equality? Nomura replied that they would be.
Hull then asked how many soldiers the Japanese would be will-
ing to withdraw from China. Possibly 90 per cent, the ambas-
sador replied. And how long did the Japanese intend to keep that
remaining 10 percent in China? Te ambassador did not reply
directly but invited attention to the fact that under the exist-
ing Boxer Protocol, Japan was permitted to retain troops in the
Peiping and Tientsin area.
Te next topic was Indochina. When Japan moved troops into
that country in July, U.S.-Japanese conversations were interrupted
and shipments of petroleum products were discontinued. Kurusu
said Japan intended to withdraw her troops from Indochina as
soon as a just Pacic settlement should be reached. He asked
about the possibility of the United Statess ending the sanctions
in the meantime. Hull said he would consult the British and the
Dutch on this suggestion.
27

Te Japanese were tired of ghting China, Kurusu added, and
she would go as far as she could in taking the rst step toward
peace. Nevertheless, the U.S. government refused to make any
concessions about aid to China. Te situation was complicated by
Japans military alliance with Germany. Both England and Russia
wanted Japan thoroughly occupied with her war in China so that
she could not become an active ally of Germany, which would
put at risk Britains possessions in Asia and Russias far eastern
territory. Tus U.S. aid to China was, in eect, aid to England
and Russia.
27
Ibid., pp. 74450. Memorandum of Hulls November 18, 1941 conversation
with Japanese ambassadors.
Judging from the cable tra c we were reading, it was becom-
ing apparent that Japan was preparing for a denite break in rela-
tions with the United States within a very short time. As we have
seen, the Japanese embassy in Washington had cabled Tokyo on
November 15 to ask advice as to the disposition of the various
o ces and our nationals residing here in the event of such a
break. Ten on November 17 Tokyo responded in a cable that we
read on the 19th, asking the Japanese ambassador to advise the
several consuls in the United States secretly to help our citizens
who remain behind to work for the common good and also to
destroy immediately . . . secret documents. Tokyo would soon
wire a plan for reducing the members of stas.
28

A break in relations was close!
28
129
6.
Modus VivendiYes? No!
Intelligence
I
nformation about an enemy is intelligence. Intelligence is
one of the most valuable weapons in the arsenal of a bellig-
erent. Most intelligence comes in bits and piecesone fact
here, another there, often seemingly unrelated. In the hands of
an intelligent and capable agent, these bits and pieces may often
be linked and made intelligible, yielding valuable information,
intelligence. Tus coordination, analysis, and interpretation are
extremely important. Te more intelligence a nation can gain
about its enemiestheir forces, weapons, and plansthe more
prepared it can be to forestall or oppose an attack. And the greater
advantage it will have in any encounter.
To gain information about their enemies, to observe and to
eavesdrop, warring powers employ every available technique
spies, telescopes, balloons, radio intercepts, electronic devices, sat-
ellite photography, cryptography, and so on. Tey seek to intercept
secret communications. Tey work to expose invisible inks, and to
decipher codes and ciphers, often extremely intricate and com-
plex ones that frequently are revised and altered. Espionage and
counterespionage are important to both sides in any conict.
As we have seen, the United States had an advantage over the
Japanese during the 19211922 Washington Naval Conference
on disarmament because it was reading the Japanese governments
secret instructions to its representative. But the U.S. government
closed down its cryptographic agency in 1929, although the Navy
continued to maintain an intelligence o ce, OP-20-G, which
operated after 1916 under Commander Laurence F. Saord.
And in 1930 the Army established its Signal Intelligence Service
(SIS), headed by William Friedman. By 1940, these two agencies
were deeply involved once more in analyzing and deciphering
Japanese codes.
At that time, the Japanese had many codes of varying com-
plexities. Each was intended for a dierent purpose. Te most
intricate were their diplomatic, consular, and naval codes. When
the Japanese were especially anxious to assure the security of a
message, they usually transmitted it in one of these codes. Tey
considered their diplomatic code to be their most complex and
most indecipherable; they thought it was absolutely secure and
used it for their very most secret messages.
Japans Diplomatic Code
Te intelligence experts in the Armys SIS and the Navys
Op-20-G cooperated in the attempt to break the various Japanese
codes. Although the Japanese navy code long deed U.S. cryp-
tographers, they made considerable headway in breaking several
others, including the consular code. Teir most spectacular suc-
cess, however, was with Japans diplomatic cipher.
After some 18 or 20 months of painstaking eort, the Army
and Navy experts nally succeeded in breaking this code. Tey
even constructed a machine that could duplicate the operations
of the Japanese machine, including replicating the daily shuf-
ing and transpositional changes by which the Japanese hoped
Modus VivendiYes? No! 131
to thwart would-be code-breakers. In time, six of these machines
were constructed.
For some time, the U.S. code name for Japan had been
Orange. Te machine used for decoding a previous Japanese
cipher had been known as the Red machine. So in the tradition
of color code names, this new machine was called Purple.
Te rst Purple machine was retained in Washington.
When additional machines became available, they were distrib-
uted to stations where they were expected to be most valuable.
Te Navy retained one, the Army two. Te others were sent to
commanders in the eld where conict with Japan seemed pos-
sible. Two machines were sent to England, one of which was later
forwarded to Singapore. Another machine went to Corregidor in
the Philippines. Because personnel was limited there and because
atmospheric conditions prevented picking up more than about
10 percent of the Tokyo-Washington messages, the Philippines
handled primarily local tra c.
1
No Purple machine was ever
sent to Hawaii. Te Pearl Harbor commanders had to rely for
intelligence about the Japanese on radio directional ndings they
could pick up and on reports relayed to them from Washington.
Intercepting and decoding a Japanese message was only the
rst step on the road to turning it into useful intelligence. Once
deciphered, an intercept had to be translated into English. But
this translation was not intelligence; it was only raw material.
To become useful intelligence, it had to be properly analyzed
and interpreted. Ten it had to reach those who could use it to
advantage. And all this had to be accomplished without the ene-
mys knowledge.
1
Percy L. Greaves, Jr., Te Pearl Harbor Investigations, in Harry Elmer Barnes,
ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953),
p. 410; David Kahn, Te Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret Writing (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p. 23. See also Laurence F. Saord, two-
hour tape, notes in authors possession.
Developing the Purple machine seemed almost miraculous,
so the information derived from it was code-named MAGIC.
Since this information was extremely valuable, the U.S. govern-
ment was anxious not to jeopardize its source. Should the Japanese
discover their code had been broken, they would undoubtedly
stop using it, revise it and/or adopt a dierent code. Te laborious
task of breaking a new code would then have to begin all over
again. So knowledge of Purple was conned to a very few o -
cials and only about a dozen copies of each translated MAGIC
intercept were made.
2
Distribution of the MAGIC intercepts was
by a high-ranking special courier who usually waited to answer
questions while the intercepts were being read. To maintain secu-
rity, the intercepts were then retrieved and returned to a secure
le. Only four copies of each decoded/translated intercept were
kept; all others were destroyed.
3

Once the Japanese diplomatic code was broken, the Army
and Navy intercept stations rarely missed a message. With expe-
rience, the Army and Navy specialists in Washington became
quite skillful at deciphering Japanese messages coded on the
Purple machine. As time went by, specialists were often able
to decode and translate messages so quickly that they were in
the hands of Secretary of State Hull before his meetings with
the Japanese ambassadors. Of the 227 messages pertaining
to Japanese-American negotiations sent between Tokyo and
Washington from March to December 1941, all but four were
picked up.
4
And the messages we intercepted dealt not only with
the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, but also with many other matters.
5

2
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 36, p. 23. McCollum testimony
at Hewitt Inquiry.
3
Saord interview, April 5, 1966, notes in authors possession.
4
Kahn, Te Codebreakers, p. 13.
5
So throughout the months preceding the Japanese attack, U.S.
o cials in Washington received a continual ow of precise and
accurate information directly from the innermost chambers of
the Japanese government.
However, the Japanese o cials did not communicate every-
thing to their representatives abroad, not even to their Washington
ambassadors. So there was still much we did not know about
Japans plans and intentions and there was ample room for con-
jecture, speculation and interpretation.
Japan Proposes a MODUS VIVENDI
On November 19, Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu
renewed their conversations with Hull at his apartment. Te
ambassadors told Hull that Japan was being squeezed economi-
cally by the U.S. embargo and by our freezing measures; she
wanted a quick settlement. Tey told Hull they were momen-
tarily expecting instructions from their government. Hull sug-
gested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the
views of the Japanese war party, it might be possible to work out
something with us.
6

By the following day, the ambassadors had received their
instructions and visited Hull again. Nomura said the Japanese
Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to
show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Tailand.
It was anxious to resume trade, and to accomplish this, it was
oering to restrict military operations. Nomura and Kurusu pro-
posed a modus vivendi. Modus vivendi is Latin meaning a living
or viable method or measure. In other words, the ambassadors
6
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 75152.
were proposing a temporary working arrangement until the dis-
putes could be settled.
7

Te Japanese modus vivendi contained ve points: (1) Te gov-
ernments of Japan and of the United States should agree not to
make any armed advancement in southeastern Asia or the south
Pacic, except in French Indochina, where the Japanese troops
were already stationed; (2) the Japanese government would agree
to withdraw its troops from French Indochina once peace was
established in the Pacic, and in the meantime, it would shift
them from southern to northern French Indochina; (3) the two
governments would cooperate with a view to securing in the
Netherlands East Indies the various goods and commodities they
might need; (4) the governments would undertake to restore pre-
embargo commercial relations, and the United States shall supply
Japan a required quantity of oil; and (5) the U.S. government, in
turn, should refrain from actions prejudicial to the restoration
of general peace between Japan and China.
8

United States Makes a -Month
MODUS VIVENDI Counter-Proposal
President Roosevelt expressed his view on the Japanese modus
vivendi in a handwritten note to Hull:
6 months
1. U.S. to resume economic relationssome oil and rice now
more later.
2. Japan to send no more troops to Indochina or Manchurian
border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
3. Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets
into European war.
7
Ibid., p. 753.
8
Ibid., pp. 75556.
4. U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S.
to take no part in their conversations.
Later on Pacic agreements.
9
Apparently FDR was then willing to enter into an agreement
with Japan to help relieve the economic pressures on her for six
months. He would permit Japan to obtain some oil and rice. He
would not insist that Japan pull out of Indochina completely.
He was concerned about the Japanese-German pact. However,
in item 4 FDR ignored Japans request that the United States
refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to
. . . the restoration of general peace in China. In other words,
he did not acknowledge Japans request that the United States
discontinue helping Chiangs forces. To FDR, aid to China was
important; by helping China we were hurting Japan, prevent-
ing her from attacking the Russian Communists in the far east,
and that helped our allies, England and Russia, in their struggle
against Germany in Europe.
Before responding to the Japanese proposal, Hull met on
November 22 with the British and Australian ambassadors and
the Dutch minister to determine the reactions of their respec-
tive governments. Te Chinese ambassador, also invited, was
late in arriving. Hull suggested, and the others seemed to agree,
that it would be better to submit a substitute proposal than to
make a specic reply to the Japanese proposal, section for sec-
tion. He outlined his alternative modus vivendi, the major pur-
poses of which were to contain Japan and to protect China. Te
ambassadors all seemed to be well pleased . . . except the Chinese
Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed. But then, in Hulls
9
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 110809, undated, prob-
ably shortly after November 20, 1941; Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill,
19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton,
1976), p. 467.
words, he always is when any question concerning China arises
not entirely to his way of thinking.
10

Japanese Deadline Extended to
November , After Which Things Are
Automatically Going to Happen.
Te Japanese ambassadors had been told on November 5, that
they must conclude their deliberations by November 25. Ten
on November 22, Tokyo cabled them, extending the deadline to
November 29, but urged them to continue their eorts: Stick to
your xed policy and do your very best. Spare no eorts and try
to bring about the solution we desire. It is awfully hard for us to
consider changing the date, Tokyo told the two ambassadors.
Tere are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle the Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if
within the next three or four days you can nish your conver-
sations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed
by the 29th (let me write it out for youtwenty ninth); if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understand-
ing with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if
everything can be nished, we have decided to wait until that
date.
But, the Japanese government added, Tis time we mean it, that
the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen. (Italics added.)
11

Te Japanese ambassadors were being giving a little more
time. It was obvious that the failure of the negotiations would
10
1941, vol. 4: Te Far East, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing O ce, 1956), p. 640, Hull memorandum of November 22, 1941.
11
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 165. Tokyo cable #812 to
Japanese Ambassador in Washington.
have serious repercussions, but also that their government was
not taking them into full condence.
On November 22, Japan made another concession, oering
to move her troops from the south of Indochina to the north.
Kurusu told Hull it had taken
a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a
position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had
been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to
their suggestion in regard to oering to withdraw the Japanese
troops from southern Indochina.
Kurusu considered this an encouraging sign.
12

On November 24, two days after U.S. intelligence experts
decoded Tokyo cable #812 extending the Japanese deadline to
November 29, the two ambassadors received a follow-up cable
from Tokyo: Te time limit set in my message #812 is in Tokyo
time.
13
Tat was 14 hours earlier than Washington time. Tus
we were alerted that the timing of the deadline was crucial. Tis
cable was decoded by our cryptoanalysts in Washington the same
day it was sent.
More Discussions Among Friends
of the U.S. on U.S. Response to Japan
Also on November 24, Hull met once more with the
Australian, British, Chinese, and Dutch diplomats. Te Dutch
minister said his government would support the [U.S.] modus
vivendi proposal. However, Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih
objected to several of its provisions that aected China. For one
12
Department of State, Japan, 19311941, p. 758. State Department memo-
randum of Hulls November 22 conversation with the Japanese ambassadors.
13
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 173. Tokyo message #823
to Washington.
thing, he believed that permitting the Japanese to retain soldiers
in Indochina would pose a threat to Chinas supply line, the
recently reopened Burma Road.
Hull realized the urgency of the situation. He pointed out
to the four diplomats the importance of reaching a temporary
agreement with the Japanese to assure a few more months of
peace. He said he was
striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primar-
ily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize
to [him] that time is the all-important question for them, and
that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal eectively
with the situation in the Pacic area in case of an outbreak by
Japan.
Hull also
emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of
such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there
are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur
any day after this weekunless a temporary arrangement is
eected. (italics added)
14

Information then available in the Navy Department clearly
indicated that the Japanese were planning some decisive action
for the very near future. In the afternoon of November 24, Chief
of Naval Operations Stark authorized a circular message to his
eet commanders on the rim of the Pacicin the Philippines
(Hart), at Pearl Harbor (Kimmel), and to the commandants of
the several naval districts, Panama (15th), San Diego (11th), San
Francisco (12th), and Seattle (13th)with copies for information
only to SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer/London) and the
commander of the Atlantic Fleet (King). (All Navy messages
14
Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 64647, Hulls memorandum of
conversation.
were identied by a six-digit number indicating the time and
date led in Greenwich, England. Tis system eliminated confu-
sion that might arise when sending and receiving messages to
and from dierent time zones.)
In his cable Stark advised his eld commanders:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very
doubtful. Tis situation coupled with statements of Japanese
Government and movements their naval and military forces
indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement
in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a
possibility. Guam will be informed separately.
15

Te commanders were asked to inform senior Army o cers
their areas.
Following instructions, Admiral Kimmel consulted with
General Short in Hawaii. Kimmel and his advisers did not dis-
pute Japans capability for delivering a long-range surprise
bombing attack on Pearl Harbor. Nor did they rule out the pos-
sibility that Japan might attack without a declaration of war.
Te Philippines and Guam seemed the only U.S. possessions
imminently threatened by Japan. Te Philippines were on the
ank of the most direct route from Japan to French Indochina,
the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. And Guam,
the site of a U.S. naval station, lay in the midst of the Japanese-
mandated, formerly German-owned, islandsthe Marianas,
Carolines, and Marshalls. (After World War I, Japan, then an
ally of Great Britain and the United States, had been given these
islands to administer under a League of Nations mandate, and
we had known for some time that Japan was constructing naval
and air bases on them.) Tus, Kimmel and his advisers did not
consider it likely that Hawaii would be the target of such a sur-
prise aggressive movement in any direction. Tey
15
reasoned that she [ Japan] would not commit the strategic
blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States terri-
tory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American
people in war against Japan.
16

So the eect of Starks message was to turn the attention of
Kimmel and his advisers toward the Far East.
Objections Raised to U. S.
Proposed MODUS VIVENDI
Another November 24 meeting concerning the U.S. pro-
posed modus vivendi took place in the o ce of Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau. Also present were Harry Dexter White, an assis-
tant secretary, and Russian embassy counselor (later ambassa-
dor) Andrei Gromyko. White protested against a Far Eastern
Munich. He drafted a letter to Roosevelt for Morgenthaus sig-
nature stating that to sell China
to her enemies for thirty blood stained pieces of gold will not
only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far
East, but will dim the luster of American world leadership in
the great democratic ght against fascism.
17

Morgenthau didnt send that letter. He didnt have to; he real-
ized the president needed no prodding to stand for precisely the
policy which the Secretary then and later considered essential. He
had, in a sense, deemed it essential ever since the fall of 1938.
18
It
was in November 1938 that Japan had announced her intention
16
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39 (Report), p. 314, analysis here
as culled from testimony during the JCC hearings and presented in its nal
report.
17
David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward,
McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), p. 125.
18
1941 (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1965), p. 389.
of establishing an anticommunist New Order in Asia. Japan,
Manchukuo, and China were to cooperate to secure interna-
tional justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism,
and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion
throughout east Asia.
19

In the evening of November 24 Chinese ambassador Hu Shih
called on Stanley K. Hornbeck, State Department adviser on
political relations, to register his objections to the modus vivendi
the United States was considering. Te ambassador said he real-
ized that it would be very helpful to keep the Japanese in suspense
for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be
achieved. However, he assured Hornbeck that he would try to
cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which
the American Government sees it.
20
Te Dutch minister had told Hull on November 22 that his
government supported the U.S. proposal. However, the Dutch
government had contacted him again to express reservations, as
the Chinese ambassador had, to the number of Japanese troops
that might be left in Indochina. Te minister also called on
Hornbeck that evening to relay to him his governments second
thoughts.
21

19
rence, 19311944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 169. November 3, 1938 entry
quotes from Prime Minister Prince Konoyes November 3, 1938 radio speech
announcing Japans intention of creating a new order in east Asia. For entire
speech, see Department of State, Japan: 19311941, pp. 47881.
20
Department of State, Te Far East, p. 65051, memorandum of conversations
of State Departments adviser on political relations, Stanley K. Hornbeck.
21
Ibid.
The U. S. Proposes
-Month MODUS VIVENDI

Te U.S. counterproposal to the Japanese modus vivendi went
through several drafts. Te one nally approvedby both the
War and Navy departments and then later, at a White House
meeting, by FDRs so-called War Cabinetprovided for a
three-month respite.
Te United States was still, of course, o cially neutral and
nominally at peace. However, a War Cabinet had been set up
as an informal body to coordinate the activities of the civil and
military branches of the executive department. Tis War Cabinet
consisted of the president; the secretaries of State (Hull), War
(Stimson), and Navy (Knox); the Army chief of sta (Marshall),
chief of naval operations (Stark), and occasionally the command-
ing general of the Air Force (Arnold).
It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering
place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent
actors in the scene would know what was going on and would
have information to guide him in making his own decisions
that were more or less independent, but at the same time also
somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the
group.
22

Te U.S. proposal called on Japan to withdraw her troops
from French Indochina and to make no further advances in Asia
or the Pacic. Tese provisions would accomplish the administra-
tions goals of restraining Japan and protecting China. In return
22
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, p. 135. Quotation from
Army Pearl Harbor Board Report. See also U.S. Congress, Report of the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United
States, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an
Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events
and Circumstances Relating Tereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together
with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.
for these concessions, the United States would agree to relax
her trade restrictions for three months. Te export of petroleum
to Japan would be permitted upon a monthly basis for civil-
ian needs only. Te United States also would try to induce the
Australian, British and Dutch governments to relax their trade
restrictions.
.23

In a November 24 telegram to Churchill, Roosevelt summa-
rized this three-month modus vivendi:
Tis seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its
acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese
politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for
real trouble, possibly soon.
24

Stimson and Knox met in Hulls o ce on November 25, where
they discussed the proposal at some length. Stimson thought it
adequately safeguarded all our interests, but he didnt think the
Japanese would accept it because it was so drastic.
25

British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on Hull later that
same morning and relayed Britains approval of the U.S. decision
to present the Japanese with a counterproposal. Te British, he
said, had complete condence in Mr. Hulls handling of these
negotiations. Tey believed the Japanese will try to force a hur-
ried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay and urged
that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be
made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional
and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate
23
Department of State, Te Far East, p. 644.
24
Ibid., p. 649.
25
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433. Excerpt reprinted
from Stimsons November 25 diary.
agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all par-
ties concerned.
26

China Objects to U.S. Revised
-Month MODUS VIVENDI

Word of the proposed U.S. modus vivendi soon reached
Chiang Kai-shek. On November 25 numerous hysterical cable
messages to dierent Cabinet o cers and high o cials in the
Government began arriving from him and his associates.
27
Tey
bombarded Washington with demands that no further conces-
sions be made to Tokyo.
28
Chiang cabled Knox, Stimson, and
Morgenthau to say the same thing.
29
He also cabled Churchill in
England.
Chiang appeared frantic. He asked his brother-in-law and
personal emissary in Washington, Dr. T.V. Soong of China
Defense Supplies, Inc., to contact Stimson and Knox.
If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing
regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese
people would consider that China has been completely sacri-
ced by the United States. Te morale of the entire people will
collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed
suer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most
tragic epoch in the world will be opened. Te Chinese army
will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through
26
Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 65556. British Embassy to Depart-
ment of State.
27
Ibid., pp. 68587, Hull memorandum concerning November 29 conversa-
tion with the Japanese ambassadors.
28
Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 124.
29
Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386.
their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to
our rescue the situation would be already hopeless.
30

Another cable was sent that same day by one of Chiangs
advisers, Owen Lattimore, to Lauchlin Currie, then an adminis-
trative assistant to President Roosevelt and a friend of Lattimores.
Currie had helped Lattimore obtain the appointment as Chiangs
U.S. political adviser.
31
Lattimore cabled that he had never seen
him [Chiang Kai-shek] really agitated before. Loosening of eco-
nomic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japans
military advantage in China. According to Lattimore, Chiang
believed that
A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces
in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi now
arrived at with China [sic; Japan?] would be disastrous to
Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the
Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige.
. . . It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing
aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this
hour. Te Generalissimo [Chiang] has deep condence in the
Presidents delity to his consistent policy but I must warn you
that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the
situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is
undermined by reports of Japans escaping military defeat by
diplomatic victory.
32

30
Department of State, Te Far East, pp. 66061, telegram from Chiang Kai-
shek to Dr. T.V. Soong, November 25, 1941.
31
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Inves-
tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, Institute of Pacic Relations, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, part
9, pp. 320912.
32
Department of State, Te Far East, p. 652; Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor
Attack, part 14, p. 1160.
Still another cable arrived from China, this one from
Foreign Minister Quo Tai-chi to Ambassador Hu Shih. [T]he
Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction at the news he
was receiving from Washington. Quo Tai-chis wire was some-
what calmer than Lattimores: Chiang got the impression that
the United States Government has put aside the Chinese ques-
tion in its conversation with Japan. Apparently, Chiang believed
that the United States was still inclined to appease Japan at the
expense of China. Quo Tai-chi had explained to Chiang that
the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for
the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no
concession to Japan. But his main point came through loud and
clear.
We are, however, rmly opposed to any measure which may
have the eect of increasing Chinas di culty in her war of
resistance, or of strengthening Japans power in her aggression
against China. Please inform the Secretary of State.
33

When Hu Shih showed Hull this telegram, Hull again
explained that the United States was just trying to give the U.S.
military more time to build up its defenses. [T]he o cial heads
of our Army and Navy for some weeks, Hull said, have been
most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until
they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and
methods and means of defense in the Pacic area. Terefore, at
the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan . . . we have
been carrying on conversations and [have been] making some
progress thus far.
Hull told Hu Shih that the Generalissimo and Madame
Chiang Kai-shek had very recently . . . ooded Washington with
strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the
33
Department of State, Te Far East, p. 654, November 24, 1941 telegram, Quo
Tai-chi to Hu Shih.
Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina
and appealing loudly for aid. Hull pointed out that
practically the rst thing this present proposal of mine and
the president does is to require the Japanese troops to be
taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma
Road. . . . [O]ur proposal would relieve the menace of Japan
in Indochina to the whole South Pacic area.
Hull continued,
Of course, we can cancel this proposal, but it must be with the
understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send
our eet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters,
if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward.
34

It would seem that either Hu Shih had completely misun-
derstood the provisions of the proposed modus vivendi or Chiang
had. Perhaps these provisions had been misrepresented to China.
As Hull explained to Hu Shih, the draft Hull had outlined pre-
viously would have required Japan to withdraw all military and
police forces from China proper and from Indochina. Japan would
also have had to agree to support no other government or regime
in China except Chiangs, then headquartered at Chungking. If
Japan acceded to these provisions, it would constitute a great vic-
tory for Chiangs government.
Japanese Attack Appears Imminent;
Stimson: Can They Be Maneuvered
Into Firing the First Shot?
On November 25, Navy intelligence deciphered and trans-
lated a Japanese J-19 circular message (#2330) sent ten days
before from Tokyo to all Japans representatives abroad. It gave
34
Ibid., pp. 65354.
them detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines
to be carried out in the event of an emergency.
35
Here was clear
evidence that Japan was contemplating more hostile action in the
near future.
At noon on November 25, FDRs War Cabinet met at the
White House. [I]nstead of bringing up the Victory Parade, that
is the plan for the actual winning of a war not yet declared,
as Stimson had expected, Roosevelt raised another subject. He
announced, Stimson recalled, that we were likely to be attacked
perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1]. Te Japanese
were undoubtedly planning an expedition to the South, which
would be likely to interfere with our interests in the Philippines
and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. Hull
laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing [our
response to Japans proposed modus vivendi] should be rested
the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance
with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression.
FDR reminded the group that the Japanese were notorious
for making an attack without warning. Te question before the
War Cabinet was how we should maneuver them into the posi-
tion of ring the rst shot without allowing too much danger to
ourselves. Stimson conded to his diary that this was indeed a
di cult proposition. Te possibility of issuing Japan an ultima-
tum was also raised at this meeting. Stimson pointed out that the
president
had already taken the rst steps towards an ultimatum in notify-
ing Japan way back last summer [August 17]
36
that if she crossed
the border into Tailand, she was violating our safety. . . . [H]e
had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow [sic; allow?] any
such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already
35
36
Department of State, Japan: 1941, p. 558.
given. So Hull was asked to prepare such a statement to be
submitted to Japan.
37

When Stimson returned to his o ce from this meeting, he
learned from Army Intelligence, G-2, that ve Japanese divisions
were headed southward from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai.
Te ships had been sighted south of Formosa. He immediately
phoned Hull and sent him a copy of the G-2 message. He also
sent a copy to the president.
38

U.S. Proposed MODUS VIVENDI Scuttled
At 6:00 a.m. the next day, a Triple Priority cable, addressed to
FDR from the former Naval person, Winston Churchill, was
received in Washington. Churchill acknowledged receipt of the
U.S. proposed modus vivendi. Of course, it is for you to handle
this business, Churchill cabled, and we certainly do not want an
additional war. Tere is only one point that disquiets us. What
about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? . . . If
they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase.
39

Early that morning, T.V. Soong, Chiangs brother-in-law and
emissary in Washington, called on Harry Dexter White. Soong
pleaded with White to use his inuence with Morgenthau to try
to have the proposed U.S. modus vivendi killed. White approached
Morgenthau and persuaded him to call on the president.
Morgenthau walked through the underground passageway link-
ing the Treasury building to the White House to see Roosevelt.
After Morgenthau described the Chinese ambassadors and
37
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, excerpt from Stim-
sons diary, November 25, 1941.
38
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 543334, from Stimson
diary, as quoted in JCC hearings.
39
Soongs agitation, FDR agreed to see them. I will quiet them
down, he said.
40

White also
sent an urgent telegram to Edward C. Carter, the former
secretary-general of the Institute of the Pacic Relations in
New York . . . [asking] Carter to come to Washington to lobby
against making any concessions to the Japanese.
41

Stimson phoned FDR that same morning and told him about
the Japanese expedition southward-bound from China. Tis was
news to him, for he hadnt seen the G-2 message Stimson had
sent him the evening before. According to Stimson, Roosevelt
blew upjumped up into the air, so to speak, and said . . .
that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence
of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were
negotiating for an entire trucean entire withdrawal (from
China)they should be sending this expedition down there
to Indochina.
42

FDR met with the two Chinese and then called Hull to the
White House. Te proposed modus vivendi would be scuttled and
a statement of broad basic proposals would be oered instead.
43

Te Dutch governments shift from support to criticism of our
modus vivendi, the reversal of the British governments position
from complete condence in Hull and support for a U.S. coun-
terproposal to concern with Chiangs very thin diet, buttressed
40
Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386.
41
Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 125. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Institute of
Pacic Relations Hearings, July 26, 1951, part 1, pp. 15354.
42
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5434, from Stimsons diary,
November 26, 1941.
43
Ibid., part 11, p. 5387, Hull reply to interrogatory submitted by the Joint
Congressional Committee.
by Chiangs campaign of cables, had tipped the scales against
Japan.
Without consulting his other advisers, Roosevelt authorized
Hull to give the Japanese a ten-point note based on Whites sug-
gestions. Neither War nor Navy department was notied of this
decision. Both Roosevelt and Hull realized their note would be
unacceptable to the Japanese.
Chiangs anti-Japanese campaign, orchestrated largely by
three communist sympathizersWhite, Lattimore, and Currie,
with Edward C. Carter standing in the wings ready to help if
need behad paid o.
44

U. S. Note Delivered to Japanese Ambassadors
Tat afternoon, November 26, Hull summoned the two
Japanese ambassadors to his o ce and handed them the statement
FDR had approved. Section I set forth a number of diplomatic
platitudes. Te governments of the United States and Japan were
44
Te Communist a liations of these several advisers are on the record. Te
evidence oered by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley that White
engaged in Soviet espionage was considered conclusive by Attorney General
Brownell, uncontradictable by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and incontro-
vertible by President Eisenhower (Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 424). After
Lattimore nished testifying during the investigation of the Institute for
Pacic Relations conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
the Subcommittee reported that Lattimore had been from some time in the
middle 1930s a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy
(Francis X. Gannon, Biographical Dictionary of the Left, Belmont, Mass.:
Western Islands, 1969, consolidated vol. 1., p. 416). On November 8, 1945, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover informed President Truman that Currie was one of
many persons within the federal government who have been furnishing data
and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn
transmitting this information to agents of the Soviet Government (Ibid., p.
299). When testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties on July 1, 1948, former Soviet espionage agent Elizabeth Bentley accused
Currie of having furnished United States government secrets to a Soviet spy
ring (Ibid., p. 299).
both solicitous for the peace of the Pacic. Ten several general
principles were presented on which their mutual relations should
be governedprinciples of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-
interference in the internal aairs of other nations, equality of
commercial opportunity, international cooperation, etc. Section
II listed Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United
States and by the Government of Japan. Ten points followed.
45

45
Department of State, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 76870.
Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose
to take steps as follows:
1. Te Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among
the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union,
Tailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands [sic] and Tai
Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments
would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French
Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the
territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consulta-
tion with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed neces-
sary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement
would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agree-
ment would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or
economic relations with Indochina and would use its inuence to
obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and
commerce with French Indochina.
3. Te Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and
police forces from China and from Indochina.
will not supportmilitarily, politically, economicallyany govern-
ment or regime in China other than the National Government of
the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights and interests in and with regard to international
settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of
After reading the documents, Kurusu asked whether this was
our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi . . . . Mr. Kurusu
oered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed
agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there
was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine. He was referring to
the Doctrine of Non-recognition advocated by Stimson when he
was President Hoovers secretary of state.
46
Kurusu
objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression
pacts and referred to Japans bitter experience of international
1901. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of
the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights
in China, including rights in international settlements and in con-
cessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United
States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-
favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both
countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind
raw silk on the free list.
will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds
in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of
the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this
purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has
concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by
it in such a way as to conict with the fundamental purpose of this
agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout
the Pacic area.
10. Both Governments will use their inuence to cause other govern-
ments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic
political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
46
Ibid., p. 76. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 25758.
organization, citing the case of the award against Japan by the
Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter.
Kurusu did not believe his government could agree to para-
graph (3) calling on Japan to withdraw all military, naval, air,
and police forces from both China and Indochina, or paragraph
(4) asking her to refrain from supportingmilitarily, politically,
economicallyany government or regime in China other than
Chiangs national government. Kurusu did not think the United
States should expect Japan to take o its hat to Chiang Kai-shek
and propose to recognize him. . . . He said that if this was the idea
of the American Government he did not see how any agreement
was possible.
Hull asked if this couldnt be worked out. Kurusu responded
that when they [the Japanese ambassadors] reported our answer
to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands.
However, he said, this was a tentative proposal without com-
mitment. Perhaps they should not refer it to their Government
before discussing its contents further informally here. Hull said
they might want to study the document carefully, but he explained
that our proposal was as far as we could go at this time. With
specic reference to the oil question, Hull said public feeling
[in the United States] was so acute . . . that he might almost be
lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan.
Kurusu felt that our response to their proposal could be
interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. He wanted to
know if we werent interested in a modus vivendi. Te Secretary
replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it
was because the other powers would not agree. Te Japanese
must have been aware of the plans we had been making to coop-
erate with the British and Dutch in the southwest Pacic. Te
secretary [Hull] replied simply that he had done his best in the
way of exploration. With that the two Japanese ambassadors
were dismissed.
47

British Notified of MODUS VIVENDI Rejection
Almost immediately after delivering to the Japanese ambas-
sadors the U.S. note with its unacceptable ten points, Hull cabled
Ambassador Grew in Japan and Ambassador C.E. Gauss in
China.
48
Tat evening Hull telephoned British Ambassador Lord
Halifax to inform him of the nature of the document which he
had handed the Japanese envoys. Neither our War nor Navy
department was advised.
Te following morning, Lord Halifax called on Undersecretary
of State Welles to ask why the proposed modus vivendi had been
overthrown and a virtual ultimatum issued. [O]ne of the rea-
sons for the determination reached, Welles replied, was the
half-hearted support given by the British Government to the
earlier proposal. Halifax could not understand this in as much
as he had communicated to Hull the full support of the British
Government. Welles responded that Churchills expressed con-
cern with Chiangs thin diet could hardly be regarded as full
support. Halifax admitted that he had been surprised by the
vigor of the Chinese objections. He had thought that the course
proposed by Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese gov-
ernment that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the
modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He
believed that the Chinese governments attitude
was based partly on faulty information and partly on the
almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind
47
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, pp. 76466. State Department
memorandum of November 26, 1941 meeting.
48
Department of State, Te Far East, p. 666, Telegram #783 to Grew; and p.
666n. Telegram #274 to Gauss.
of an agreement reached between Japan and the United States
at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese
morale.
Welles told Halifax that in his view the Chinese had real cause
for concern. Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina
were already very active. . . . Japanese forces there were being
quickly increased in number . . . [indicating] that the threat against
Tailand was imminent. Moreover, Welles pointed out, it was
evident from the information received here that the Japanese
were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. Te
gravity of the situation . . . could not be exaggerated.
49

Japan Vows to Destroy British and
American Power in China
Another Purple intercept, sent from Tokyo on November
14, and deciphered in Washington on November 26, reminded us
again, forcibly, of Japans intentions in the Far East. Tis cable had
been addressed to Hongkong and to the Japanese diplomatic
o cers in 11 Chinese cities.
[T]he Imperial Government [still] hopes for great things
from the Japan-American negotiations, it read. However, they
do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations
collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will nd
herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Te Japanese cabinet
had made several momentous foreign policy decisions:
a. We will completely destroy British and American power in
China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy impor-
tant rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in
China.
49
Ibid., pp. 66667, Welless November 27, 1941 memorandum.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy
powers, even though they might have connections with the
new Chinese government, should it become necessary.
Te Japanese were under no illusion as to the problems involved
in ghting an expanded war. Teir forces were widely extended
and their resources severely strained. Tey wanted to avoid,
insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. However, they
were prepared to cope with a world war on a long-time scale. If
their reserves for total war and . . . future military strength wane,
they would reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. Tis
has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire.
To carry out these foreign policy objectives, the Japanese
would
encourage the activities of important Chinese in their eorts in
the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China,
working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Tus,
operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout
the entire Far East.
However, because of the U.S. embargo on exports to Japan,
resources were a primary concern; great importance [was placed]
upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied
areas). Te entire Japanese cabinet concurred.
50

Te military and administration o cials in Washington who
read this intercept could have had little doubt as to the serious-
ness of the consequences if the negotiations with the Japanese
ambassadors failed.
50
FDR Notifies the Philippines That Japanese
Aggression Appears Imminent
While Hull was making plans to present the U.S. ten-point
note to the Japanese ambassadors, FDR prepared a message
to our high commissioner in the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre.
Roosevelt explained that the Far East was a veritable tinderbox.
Te Japanese are strongly reenforcing their garrisons and naval
forces in the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are pre-
paring this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on
them by US forces. However, FDR was not so much concerned
by the Japanese attempts to defend themselves against the United
States as he was by the increasing opposition of Japanese lead-
ers and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai
and Japan to the Formosa area. It was apparent, he continued,
that the Japanese were making preparations in China, Formosa,
and Indochina for an early aggressive movement of some char-
acter. However, it was not yet clear whether this move would
be directed against the Burma Road, Tailand, Malay Peninsula,
Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines. Te most likely tar-
get seemed to be Tailand.
FDR was fearful that this next Japanese aggression might
cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan. He
asked Sayre to discuss the situation with the U.S. military com-
manders in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur. Te
commissioner should then present my views to the president of
the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always
I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and
his people. FDRs cable was transmitted by the Navy to the
Philippines on the afternoon of November 26.
51

51
Japanese Cabinet Expected to Decide
Soon Between Peace and War
Also on November 26, we deciphered a Strictly Secret cable
sent the day before, via Purple, from Hanoi in Indochina, to
Tokyo.
52
Japanese diplomatic o cials in Indochina had heard
from military sources that the United States was expected to
present its reply to the Japanese envoys modus vivendi proposal
that very day, November 25. If this is true, Hanoi cabled, if the
U.S. did answer Japans request for a modus vivendi as expected,
the United States response would bring matters to a head. In that
event, Hanoi assumed that the Japanese Cabinet would be mak-
ing a decision between peace and war within the next day or
two.
[I]f the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a success-
ful termination, Hanoi continued, they had plans for launch-
ing various enterprises. Should, however, the negotiations [in
Washington] not end in a success, as the military sources had
implied would be the case, since practically all preparations for
the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to
move within the day.
Hanoi was disturbed that representatives of Britain, Australia,
the Netherlands, and even China had been meeting with U.S.
o cials in Washington and must be aware of the status of the
U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Japans o cials in Hanoi knew from
Tokyos circular message #2353 (which we had not intercepted
and translated before we read this Hanoi cable to Tokyo) that the
situation was becoming exceedingly critical.
Our o cials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC
learned from this telegram that the Japanese cabinet would soon
make a decision between peace and war. If the Japanese envoys in
Washington succeeded in obtaining an acceptable modus vivendi,
52
Ibid., part 12, pp. 17475.
the decision would be for peace. If not, it would be for war. And by
handing the Japanese ambassadors a note that we knew their gov-
ernment could not accept, we were rejecting a modus vivendi. Te
Japanese negotiations were not ending in success. And this, our
reading of MAGIC told us, meant war! Moreover, the Japanese
forces in Indochina would be able to move within the day.
On the afternoon of November 26, Marshall and several mem-
bers of his sta ew down to North Carolina from Washington
to attend the nal phases of the First Armys maneuvers. For
some 36 hours at this crucial time, he was out of touch with
Washington.
53

53
Robert Payne, Te Marshall Story (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1952), p. 148; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939
1942 (New York: Viking Press 1965), p. 208.
7.
Japanese Action
Appears Imminent
U. S. War PlansTo Raid and
Destroy Japanese Bases in Far East
in Support of Associated Powers
M
ilitary forces regularly make plans for the defense of their
country under various contingencies. However, by 1941
the U.S. military had developed war plans that went far
beyond trying to defend the nation against foreign aggressors.
Our Army, Navy, and Air forces were operating under a war plan
based on a secret agreement reached during the American-British
Conversations (ABC) held in Washington early in 1941. Tis
agreement had been approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries
of War and Navy, and by the president.
1
Chief of Navy War
Plans Richmond Kelly Tuner termed it
1
79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing O ce), part 26, p. 264, testimony of Admiral Turner at
Hart Inquiry.
161
a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air,
of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British
Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly
engaged in action against any enemy.
In line with the so-called ABC-I agreement,
a joint Army-Navy plan was prepared after a great many talks
with the Army . . . [and] was approved by the Secretary of
the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on
June 2, 1941. It bore the short title Rainbow No. 5. On the
basis of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan the Navy
Department promulgated the Navy Basic War Plan on May
26, 1941. Tis plan bore the short title WPL-46. . . . Te War
Plan of the Pacic Fleet was distributed on July 25, 1941.
2
It had been customary to name an operating plan by the color
code name assigned to the potential enemy concerned. Japan had
traditionally been designated orange, other countries blue,
red, and so on. However, as ABC-I contemplated action against
several enemy nations, it wasnt feasible to designate its operat-
ing plan by a single color. Hence the code name Rainbow.
3

Several Rainbow operating plans, each numbered consecutively
and each providing for a dierent contingency, were developed
to implement the ABC-I agreement. Te rst four were eventu-
ally set aside. It was Rainbow No. 5 that the Navy issued in May
1941 and sent out to the eet commanders, including Kimmel in
Hawaii, for distribution in July 1941 to the various task forces.
Te ABC-I agreement called on the United States to employ
its Pacic Fleet oensively in the manner best calculated to
2
Ibid., part 6, p. 2502; also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 17, pp.
2568600, Exhibit No. 114 (Pacic Fleet Operating PlanRainbow Five).
3
sion, 1950), pp. 10304.
Japanese Action Appears Imminent 163
weaken Japanese economic power.
4
To accomplish this, our naval
forces were to
Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East
Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier
through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and
through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.
5
U.S. Pacic Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5 stipu-
lated that In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power
against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war,
the senior commander, then Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor,
was to take such action in the defense of his command and the
national interests as the situation may require, and report the
action taken to superior authority at once.
6
Te Plan called on
the eet to reconnoiter, sweep, patrol, and protect. However, the
primary objective prescribed for the Pacic Fleet under Rainbow
No. 5 was to prepare to raid, capture, and destroy the bases in the
Japanese-controlled Marshall and Caroline islands. Te assign-
ments of each task force were set forth in detail in the plan.
7
Stark and Marshall Again Ask for
Time to Build U.S. Defenses
Before Marshall left for maneuvers on November 26, he and
Chief of Naval Operations Stark prepared a joint memorandum
to the president on the Far Eastern Situation.
8
Dated November
27, their memorandum expressed concern that they might not
have enough time to build up their forces before a Japanese strike.
4
5
Ibid., p. 1511.
6
Ibid., part 17, p. 2585.
7
Ibid., part 17, pp. 2568600.
8
Ibid., part 14, p. 1083.
Tey reminded FDR that if the current negotiations with the
Japanese ambassadors failed, Japan may attack: the Burma Road;
Tailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;
the Russian Maritime Provinces. Navy and Army reinforcements
were being rushed to the Philippines. From the U.S. viewpoint,
Marshall and Stark wrote, the most essential thing now . . . is to
gain time. Tey were especially concerned for the safety of an
Army convoy then near Guam and a Marine Corps convoy just
leaving Shanghai. Tey cautioned, however, that so long as con-
sistent with national policy, we should avoid precipitating any
conict.
Marshall and Stark also wrote it had been agreed, after con-
sultation with the British and Dutch military authorities in the
Far East,
that joint military counteraction against Japan should be
undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the
territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should
the Japanese move forces into Tailand west of 1000 East or
south of 100 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the
Loyalty Islands.
Japan should be warned that advance beyond the lines indi-
cated may lead to war. However, prior to such warning, no joint
military opposition [should] be undertaken. Moreover, Marshall
and Stark said, agreement with the British and Dutch should be
sought on issuing such a warning.
Te rst thing in the morning of November 27, Secretary of
War Stimson phoned Secretary of State Hull to nd out what
his nale had been with the Japanese. Had Hull handed them the
three-month modus vivendi proposal, which had been approved a
couple of days before? Or had he put an end to the negotiations,
as he had said he might. Hull told Stimson he had broken the
whole matter o: I have washed my hands of it and it is now in
the hands of you and Knoxthe Army and Navy. Later FDR
gave Stimson a slightly dierent view. However, he too said the
negotiations had ended up, but they ended up with a magni-
cent statement prepared by Hull.
9
FDR Messages British Intelligence Agent
Stephenson, Japanese Negotiations Off . . .
As soon as the president learned that the negotiations
with the Japanese had been broken o, he sent his oldest son,
James, as his emissary to British intelligence agent Sir William
Stephenson. On November 26, James Roosevelt travelled to New
York and informed Stephenson, of the tenuous Japanese situa-
tion. Stephenson cabled Churchill on November 27:
JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS OFF. SERVICES EX-
PECT ACTION WITHIN TWO WEEKS.
10
Washington Warns Philippines of
Possible Japanese Attack
On November 27, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral
Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, met in the o ce
of High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre to discuss the seriousness
of FDRs November 26 warning cable to Sayre. Pacing back and
forth and smoking a big black cigar, General MacArthur assured
Hart and Sayre that the existing alignment and movement of
9
Ibid., part 11, pp. 543435.
10
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 299; also Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and
Churchill, 19391941: Te Partnership Tat Saved the West (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1976), p. 473.
Japanese troops convinced him that there would be no Japanese
attack before the spring.
11
Admiral Hart disagreed.
Reports were arriving in Washington regularly of the daily
reconnaissance overights conducted from the Philippines to
keep track of the large Japanese convoy heading south from
Shanghai. Tus news of the Japanese expeditionary force came
in on November 27, apparently heading toward the Philippines,
Burma, the Burma Road, or the Dutch East Indies. And it was
expected that a concentration of Japanese troops would move over
into Tailand and take a position there, from which an attack
could be launched on Singapore. Stimson suggested to FDR
that MacArthur in the Philippines be sent a nal alert. We had
already sent MacArthur a quasi alert, but Stimson thought he
should be given a further warning against a possible Japanese
attack. Te president agreed.
12
Arrangements were being made to y B-l7s out to the
Philippines to reinforce our defenses there. Army Air Force
Commanding General Arnold called on Stimson on November
27 to present the orders for two of our biggest planes to move out
of San Francisco en route to Manila and y overwhile pho-
tographingthe Japanese mandated islands, where the Japanese
were known to be building military bases. Tese big planes would
be able to y high enough to be out of reach of the Japanese pur-
suit planes.
13
Secretary of Navy Knox and Stark called on Stimson on
November 27 to talk about the warning to be sent MacArthur
in the Philippines. General Leonard T. Gerow, Army chief of
war plans, was also present. A message to MacArthur calling for
action, such as Stimson was considering, would normally have
11
Francis Bowes Sayers, Glad Adventure (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 221.
12
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons
November 27, 1941, diary.
13
Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons November 27.
been prepared and sent by the Army chief of sta. It was most
unusual to send a message to a eld commander signed Marshall,
which had not actually been dispatched by him.
14
Marshall was
familiar with U.S. military outposts in a way that the secretary
of war was not. Also, the responsibility for strategic command
decisions owed from the commander-in-chief (the president)
to the chief of sta; the chief of sta reported to the president.
Te secretary of wars duties lay outside this line of command;
they related primarily to personnel requirements and matters of
supply. However, Marshall was out of the city. So Stimson, Stark,
and Gerow went ahead on their own.
Stark and Gerow, quite naturally, were pressing for more time
for the military buildup before a Japanese strike. Stimson said
he would be glad to have time but not at the expense of back-
ing down. He didnt want it [time] at any cost of humility on
the part of the United States . . . which would show a weak-
ness on our part. Before they nished drafting their message
to MacArthur, they called Hull to learn the latest on the situa-
tion with the Japanese.
15
Tey sent the message over Marshalls
signature. Although directed primarily to MacArthur in the
Philippines, the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable, with slight changes
and also signed Marshall, went to the Armys commanding
generals in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone.
In Response to Armys Warning, General Short
(Hawaii) Reports Sabotage Alert
Te version of the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable sent to Short
in Hawaii advised that Negotiations with Japan appear to be
terminated to all practical purposes. . . . Japanese future action
14
Ibid., part 23, p. 1012.
15
Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimsons November 27, 1941, diary.
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hos-
tilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires
that Japan commit the rst overt act. However, this should not
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Reconnaissance and other measures
necessary should be carried out with caution so as not, repeat
not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Short was asked
to Report measures taken.
16
Te Army was responsible for protecting the eet when it
was in port. On receipt of this message (No. 472) on November
27, Short called a meeting of his sta. He had been instructed to
undertake such reconnaissance . . . as you deem necessary. At the
same time he was not . . . to alarm civil population.
Adequate reconnaissance to guard Hawaii against surprise
attack would have required 360-degree surveillance, 24 hours
a day. According to Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, commander of
the Hawaiian Naval Base Air Force, and Commander Logan
C. Ramsey, his operations o cer at the time of the attack, such
wide-ranging reconnaissance was not realistic, given the planes
and resources then available there. Most of their B-17s had been
sent to the Philippines. Only eight that could have been used
for long-range reconnaissance were available at the time of the
attack, and not all of those were in ying condition. Planes can-
not y continuously; they wear out and need servicing from time
to time. Crews need rest too; it is estimated that crews ying
long-range reconnaissance shouldnt be asked to operate more
often than one in three days.
17
Tus long-range reconnaissance
could not have been maintained indenitely in Hawaiiits suc-
cess depended on timely warning of any potential threat.
Marshall was familiar with the shortage of planes in Hawaii.
But Stimson, who had drafted the November 27 warning message,
16
Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
17
Ibid., part 8, p. 3454.
was not. Te Hawaiian command had three dierent alerts from
which to choose. Marshall was also familiar with the Armys sys-
tem of alerts; again, Stimson was not.
In view of the Armys responsibility and the instruction
not to alarm the public, a large percentage of whom were eth-
nic Japanese, Short decided to go on a sabotage alert, cluster-
ing the planes and storing the ammunition underground. Tis
was the most eective way to guard against subversive activities
in an area surrounded by potential enemies. On the assumption
that the cable had come from Marshall, Short wired Washington
that afternoon that he had alerted to prevent sabotage and had
established liaison with Navy.
18
Shorts response was received in Washington on November
28, at 5:57 am.
19
Under Army rules and regulations then in force,
if a junior o cer, on receiving an order, reports measures taken
and his superior o cer does not countermand them, the respon-
sibility for any error or mistake in judgment lies with the supe-
rior o cer. Short was the junior o cer; Marshall his superior. As
instructed, Short reported the measures taken. If his action was
not considered appropriate, normal Army procedure would have
called for Marshall to order him to change his alert. No such
order was given. Te planes and ammunition remained as they
were until the Japanese attack ten days later.
Admiral Starks War Warning
to Hart (Philippines) and Kimmel (Hawaii)
Also on November 27, CNO Stark sent his eet command-
ers a war warning, reporting on the status of U.S.-Japan rela-
tions. Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet
in the Philippines, was the rst addressee; Admiral Kimmel,
18
Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
19
Ibid., part 3, pp. 102728.
commander-in-chief of the Pacic Fleet at Pearl Harbor, was
second. Information copies went to Admiral King, commander-
in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet and to the special naval observer in
London.
Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of
conditions in the Pacic have ceased, Stark told his command-
ers in this war warning. An aggressive move on the part of the
Japanese was expected within the next few days . . . an amphibi-
ous expedition against either the Philippines Tai or Kra penin-
sula or possibly Borneo. . . . Continental districts Guam Samoa
directed take appropriate measures against sabotage. Te com-
manders should prepare to put WPL 46 (War Plan 46, Rainbow
No. 5) into operation.
20
Te morning after this dispatch was received, Kimmel dis-
cussed its signicance with the senior Army and Navy o cers
in HawaiiShort; Admiral Bloch, commandant of the 14th
Naval District who was in charge of naval shore establishments
in Hawaii; the ag o cers of the eet then in port, as well as
the members of Kimmels sta. After considerable study they
interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and
that readiness to undertake active operations was expected. To
Kimmel being ready to undertake active operations meant car-
rying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. And that meant pre-
paring for oensive action in line with War Plan 46, then in oper-
ation, against the Japanese in the Marshall and Caroline Islands
in the southwestern Pacic.
Tis November 27 cable did not suggest the possibility of a
surprise aggressive move in any direction as had the dispatch sent
three days earlier.
21
Tus the specic mention of the Philippines,
Tai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo as the intended des-
tination of the Japanese expedition served only to reconrm the
20
Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO message #272337.
21
Ibid., part 14, p. 1405, CNO dispatch #242005.
conclusion they had drawn from the earlier message, namely that
the Japanese were most likely to strike in the southwest Pacic or
southeast Asia. Other Washington directives served to strengthen
this impression. For instance, the Navy had recently been ordered
to send a squadron of submarines . . . to the Philippines, leav-
ing only 5 in Pearl Harbor. And on November 28, Kimmel was
advised that the Marines on the islands of Midway and Wake,
in the middle of the Pacic, were to be replaced by Army troops.
Tis would call for a complicated maneuver, occupying for some
time a substantial portion of the U.S. Naval forces in Hawaii, thus
reducing the Territorys defensive strength.
22
FDRs War Cabinet Discuss
Japanese Troop Movements;
FDR Should Report Danger to Congress
Roosevelt scheduled a War Cabinet meeting for noon,
November 28. Stimson had asked G-2 (Intelligence) to summa-
rize the information available concerning the movements of the
Japanese in the Far East.
Te main point of the paper was a study of what the expedi-
tionary force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed
south, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop
into an attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops
in Indochina, or an attack on Tailand or an attack on the
Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore.
23

G-2s paper was such a formidable statement of dangerous
possibilities that Stimson decided he should discuss it with the
president before the War Cabinet meeting.
22
Ibid., part 39, p. 315, NCI report.
23
Stimsons November 28, 1941 note in ibid., part 11, p. 5435.
He went to the White House early that morning, even before
FDR had gotten up. Analyzing the situation as he sat on his bed,
the president saw only three possible alternatives: rst, to do noth-
ing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would ght; third, to ght
at once. Stimson rejected the rst out of hand; he did not think
anyone would do nothing in this situation. Of the other two, he
would choose to ght at once. Stimson left, but he returned to
the White House again for the scheduled noon meeting with the
president, Hull, Knox, Stark, and Marshall.
FDR began the meeting by reading the possible destinations
of the Japanese convoy. Ten he pointed out one further possibil-
ity: if the Japanese were to attack the Kra Isthmus, that could
lead to an attack on Rangoon, a short distance away, which would
enable the Japanese initially to block the Burma Road. Everyone
thought this was very likely.
Te picture had changed radically since the last time they had
discussed sending an ultimatum to Japan. Te Japanese expedi-
tionary force of some 25,000 troops at sea, destined to land some-
where, had changed the situation. Everyone agreed that
if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point
of Indochina and . . . land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok
or further west, it would be a terric blow at all of the three
Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in
the Philippines. . . . It was agreed that if the Japanese got into
the Isthmus of Kra [on the Malaysian peninsula], the British
would ght. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we
would have to ght. And it now seems clear that if this expe-
dition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina,
this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot.
Te consensus of the War Cabinet was that this should not be
allowed to happen, and the members discussed ways to prevent
it. Tey did not believe the United States should strike at the
Japanese force without warning. But they didnt think we should
sit still either and allow the Japanese to proceed. Tey decided
the only thing to do was to warn the Japanese that if the convoy
reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we
should have to ght.
Te president was inclined to send a personal telegram to the
emperor, as he had done with good results at the time of the
Panay incident, December 1937
24
But Stimson pointed out that
this would not be a suitable response in this case.
In the rst place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One
does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not
indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature
of the danger was.
Stimson then suggested a message from the president to the
people of the United States. He thought the best way to do that
would be to report to Congress on the danger and on what action
we would have to take if the danger materialized. Te president
acceded to this suggestion. At rst he thought of incorporating
the terms of his letter to the emperor in the speech. But again
Stimson pointed out that a letter to an emperor could not be
publicized in that way. Te presidents letter should be entirely
separate and condential. Also, his speech to Congress and to the
people should be expressed in more understandable terms. FDR
agreed and asked Hull, Knox, and Stimson to try to draft such
papers.
25
24
On December 12, 1938, Japanese planes had bombed a U.S. river gunboat,
the Panay near Nanjing, China. Te ship was sunk, killing two and wounding
30. Te U.S. demanded apologies, reparations, and guarantees against further
incidents. On December 14, the Japanese complied.
25
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 543536, account of the
War Cabinet meeting based on Stimsons diary.
War Department Warns Hawaiian
Army and Air Commanders
Late in the evening of November 28, the War Department
adjutant general wired Short in Hawaii:
[C]ritical situation demands that all precautions be taken
immediately against subversive activities. Short was advised to
initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide
for protection of your establishments comma property comma
and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your
personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all
activities against espionage stop.
At the same time, Short was to avoid unnecessary publicity
and alarm.
26
Te cables emphasis on sabotage and subversion,
reassured Short in his choice of alert.
Te next day, Short replied that
full precautions are being taken against subversive activities
within the eld of investigative responsibility of war depart-
ment . . . and military establishments including personnel and
equipment.
27

He also reported on the cooperation in protecting vital instal-
lations, such as bridges and power plants being given by Hawaiis
territorial governor, the FBI, and other federal and territorial
o cers.
Te commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Force received
a similar cable that day from the War Department. It asked that
all precautions be taken at once . . . to provide . . . protection of
your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection
26
Ibid., part 14, p. 1330; idem, part 24, pp. 1778, 1823.
27
Ibid., part 24, pp. 182425.
of all activities against espionage comma and protection against
sabotage of your equipment comma property and establish-
ments period.
28
Again Short felt reassured that the sabotage alert he had ini-
tiated was appropriate.
Navy Ordered to Transport Army Planes to
Midway and Wake; Hawaiian Forces Weakened
Te day before the November 27 war warning, Kimmel was
advised to prepare to send some planes, men, and provisions from
Pearl Harbor to two outlying mid-Pacic islands:
In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft
Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV [Chief of
Naval Operations] has requested and Army has agreed to sta-
tion twenty-ve Army pursuit planes at Midway and a simi-
lar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and
desirable.
29

Te cabled orders that followed called on Kimmel to transport by
aircraft carrier these Army planes, which were to support Navy
operations, and to supply the islands with ground personnel, pro-
visions, water, spare parts, tools, and ammunition.
In light of WPL-46, stationing men and planes on Wake
and Midway made sense. Wake was a couple of thousand miles
west of Hawaii and closer to the Japanese mandated Marshall
Islands. An outpost on Wake would extend the area over which
reconnaissance could be conducted and would permit the United
States to watch more closely what was going on in the Marshalls.
At the same time, however, it meant depriving Hawaii of about
50 percent of the Armys pursuit planes then on Oahu. And the
28
Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
29
Ibid., part 17, p. 2479.
transfer operation itself would occupy for some time the eets
aircraft carriers, its main striking defense against air attack.
30
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., in command of the carrier
Enterprise, left Pearl Harbor for Wake on November 28. With
him went three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers.
31
On December 2 Kimmel responded at length to Starks cable.
He described some of the di culties in having the Navy rein-
force the outlying islands, and he made realistic suggestions for
dealing with them.
32
On December 5 Admiral J.H. Newton left Hawaii aboard
the carrier Lexington with another contingent of Army pursuit
planes bound for Midway. Tree heavy cruisers and ve destroy-
ers accompanied the Lexington. En route, the patrol planes con-
ducted reconnaissance, covering a much more extensive area than
they could have from their Oahu base.
33
Also on December 5 Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl
Harbor with Task Force 3, aboard the Indianapolis with six old
destroyers converted to sweepers, to conduct landing exercises on
Johnston Island in the mid-Pacic.
34
Japanese Negotiations Defacto Ruptured
On November 28, two days after the United States responded
to the Japanese request for a modus vivendi, Tokyo sent her two
Washington ambassadors a cable, which we deciphered and read
that same day, commending them for their superhuman eorts.
However, the U.S. reply had been a humiliating proposal. Te
Imperial Government could by no means use it as a basis for
30
Ibid., part 6, p. 2520; see also Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel s Story
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), pp. 4648.
31
Ibid., part 26, pp. 31732, Halsey testimony at Hart Inquiry.
32
Ibid., part 17, pp. 248084 (Serial 0114W).
33
Ibid., part 26, p. 343, Newton testimony at Hart Inquiry.
34
Ibid., part 26, pp. 14146, Brown testimony at Hart Inquiry.
negotiations. Te Japanese government had, in eect, thrown up
its hands, as Ambassador Kurusu had expected it would.
Tokyo added that a report on the American proposal would
be along in two or three days and then the negotiations will be
defacto ruptured. However, the two ambassadors were not
to give the impression that the negotiations are broken o.
Merely say . . . that you are awaiting instructions and that,
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has
always made just claims and has borne great sacrices for the
sake of peace in the Pacic. Say that we have always demon-
strated a long-suering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on
the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making
it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. . . . From now
on do the best you can.
35
Japanese Emergency to be Announced in
Winds Code, Coded Weather Forecast
In the midst of this diplomatic crisis, one of the most impor-
tant Japanese messages to be intercepted during this period was
read in Washington. It had been sent November 19 from Tokyo
in the J -19 (consular code), wasnt deciphered and translated until
November 28. In case of emergency (danger of cutting o our
diplomatic relations), and the cutting o of international com-
munications, a signal will be included in the middle of the daily
Japanese language short wave news broadcast. Tree phrases fol-
lowed. Each appeared to be a weather forecast, but to each was
assigned a special meaning. In an emergency, Tokyo explained,
the appropriate phrase will be repeated twice. When this is heard
35
Ibid., part 12, p. 195.
please destroy all code papers, etc. Tis is as yet to be a completely
secret arrangement.
36
Tis new intercept became known as the Winds Code
message. Te three phrases and their meaning were: HIGASHI
NO KAZE AME (East wind rain): Japan-U.S. relations in dan-
ger; KITANO KAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy): Japan-
U.S.S.R. relations in danger; and NISHI NO KAZE HARE
(West wind clear): Japan-British relations in danger.
When our people read this message, orders went out immedi-
ately from both the Army and the Navy to their intercept stations
throughout the world, asking them to monitor Japanese short-
wave news broadcasts. Because weather was unpredictable and
atmospheric conditions often interfered with radio transmissions,
reception at our intercept stations was erratic. Terefore, the call
went out to all our monitoring stations from Rear Admiral Leigh
Noyes of Naval Communications
37
and from General Sherman
Miles of the Armys Intelligence Division urging the code clerks
to listen for the phrases.
38
Tree-by-ve cards with the three
phrases were prepared and distributed:
39
HIGASHI NO KAZE AME (East wind rainwar with
the U. S.)
KITANO KAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudywar with
the U.S.S.R.)
NICHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clearwar with
Great Britain.)
36
Ibid., part 12, p. 154.
37
Ibid., part 9, pp. 412628.
38
Ibid., part 10, pp. 452022, testimony of colonel Bratton.
39
Ibid., part 8, pp. 391518, testimony of Lieutenant Commander Kramer.
8.
The Countdown Begins
U.S.-Japanese Negotiations Broken Off
U
.S. naval o cials in London had been informed by the
Navy Department that negotiations between Japan and the
United States had been broken o and that an immediate
movement by Japan was anticipated.
1
When British Ambassador
Lord Halifax heard this, he abruptly returned to Washington
from Philadelphia where he had planned to weekend. Te British
government was greatly excited at the news. Halifax called on
Undersecretary of State Welles that Friday evening, November
28, to see if it was actually true. As far as Welles knew, the situ-
ation was exactly as it had been the night before: the Japanese
ambassadors had submitted the U.S. governments statement
to their government: no reply had as yet been received, so that
1
1941, vol. 2: Te Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
O ce, 1956), pp. 68485, Welles November 28 memorandum of conversation
with Halifax.
179
technically negotiations had not yet been broken o. However,
the U.S. government did not expect the Japanese government to
accept its proposals.
Halifax called on Hull the next day to check on the outcome
of the conversations FDR and Hull had been having with the
Japanese. Hull blamed in part the hysterical cable messages sent
by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides. Hull wished Churchill had sent
a strong cable to Chiang in response to his loud protest about
our negotiations . . . telling him to brace up and ght. Churchills
expression of concern at Chiangs very thin diet had resulted in
virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the
British Government toward these negotiations. Tus Chiangs
November 25 cables to o cials all around the world urging that
the United States reject any form of a modus vivendi with the
Japanese had persuaded the United States to drop the U.S. pro-
posal for a three-month modus vivendi and to submit in its place
a ten point ultimatum. Te Japanese ambassadors had not been
optimistic about their governments willingness to agree to the
United States ten points. Although the Japanese government had
not as yet replied, Hull said the diplomatic part of our relations
with Japan was virtually over [and] the matter will now go to the
o cials of the Army and the Navy. Hull also told Halifax in
great condence that he expected some action on the part of the
Japanese before long.
[I]t would be a serious mistake for our country and other coun-
tries interested in the Pacic situation, to make plans of resis-
tance without including the possibility that Japan may move
suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and . . .
capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful coun-
tries interested in the Pacic would have time to confer and
formulate plans to meet these new conditions.
2

2
Ibid., pp. 68587, Hull November 29 memorandum of conversation.
The Countdown Begins 181
Tokyo Orders the Japanese Ambassadors Not to
Break Off Negotiations But to Try Again
On Sunday, November 30, U.S. Navy decoders and trans-
lators intercepted, deciphered, and translated Cable #857 from
Tokyo, informing the Japanese ambassadors in Washington to
make one more attempt verbally. Tey should point out that
Te United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and
judicial position. Tus,
the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made
cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made
new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and
would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
. . . [W]hat has become of the basic objectives that the U.S.
government has made the basis of our negotiations during
these seven months?
Te two ambassadors were told that in carrying out this
instruction to continue their conversations with the United
States, they should please be careful that this does not lead to
anything like a breaking o of negotiations.
3
In compliance
with these instructions, the Japanese ambassadors requested an
appointment with Secretary of State Hull.
An Inflammatory Speech in Tokyo by
Japans Prime Minister Tojo
Te Washington, D.C., newspaper headlines on Sunday,
November 30, quoted from an inammatory speech in Tokyo
3
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, p. 199. Tokyo to Washington
cable #857.
by Japanese Prime Minister Tojo. President Roosevelt was at his
retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia. When Hull telephoned him
about Tojos belligerent remarks, he took the overnight train back
to Washington.
Tojo had criticized the United States and Britain severely:
Te exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans must be purged
with vengeance. U.S. Ambassador Grew reported by quoting
from Japanese press reports:
[M]any countries . . . are indulging in actions hostile to us.
. . . Te fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of
Britain, America, and communism . . . is only due to the desire
of Britain and the United States to sh in the troubled waters
of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each
other. . . . For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge
this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.
4

Ambassador Nomura in Washington cabled Tokyo that he
was concerned Tojos speech would be used extensively for pro-
paganda purposes by the Americans.
5
Ambassador Kurusu was
fearful that Tojos belligerent remarks would jeopardize their
eorts to maintain the pretense of continuing to negotiate. He cau-
tioned the Japanese foreign o ce in Tokyo by TransPacic Radio
Telephone to watch out about these ill-advised statements.
6
Te
Japanese government belittled the reports; it was abbergasted.
Yamamoto, chief of the American bureau of the Japanese foreign
4
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 14849.
5
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 207. Nomura October 30
Washington to Tokyo cable.
6
Ibid., part 12, pp. 20607, Kurusu Washington to Tokyo dispatch concerning
Tojo.
o ce, was nonplused; he asked, What speech?
7
Te Japanese
government cabled an explanation.
Te Washington embassys rst secretary, Hidenari Terasaki,
called on Joseph W. Ballantine, a State Department o cial, on
December 2, and told Ballantine that he had not come to vin-
dicate themselves or to make any explanation. [He] merely
wished to state the facts.
8
Relying on his governments explana-
tion, Terasaki discounted the importance of the speech and also
its belligerence. Te so-called speech . . . was originally drafted by
members of the o ce sta of the East Asia Restoration League, a
non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be
president. It had been given out to newspaper reporters Saturday
evening, November 29,
before the said draft was examined by either the Premier him-
self or other Government o cials, and this unapproved manu-
script was printed in the metropolitan newspapers. As a matter
of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the
30th. . . . It should further be noted that the reported statement
For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort
of practice from East Asia with a vengeance is a mistransla-
tion. . . . Te correct translation of the statement should be For
the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be
removed.
9

7
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, p. 777, as reported by the
Japanese Embassys First Secretary Terasaki to State Departments Joseph W.
Ballantine.
8
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 223, message #1234.
9
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, p. 77778, memorandum of
Terasakis conversation with Ballantine and statement handed Ballantine by
Terasaki.
Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors
Exchange Strong Words
On December 1 the ambassadors called on Hull as
scheduled.
Upon [their] arrival at the State Department, [they] found
not only newspaper men, but even some members of the
Departmental sta crowding the corridors. Some of these
speculators [spectators?] were of the opinion that the issue of
war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general,
the scene was highly dramatic.
10

Te meeting with Hull was long, and their conversation got
o to a rough start when he brought up Tojos bellicose utter-
ances emanating from Tokyo. Te ambassadors responded with
tact: In the United States, they said, you seem to take a more
serious view of the Japanese Prime Ministers utterances than
was warranted. Te ambassadors told Hull that the document
he had handed them on November 26, the ultimatum with its
ten points, had been communicated to the Japanese govern-
ment, which was now studying the case. Tey expected within
a few days to receive their governments observation thereon.
However, they wished the United States would reconsider its
rejection of the proposed Japanese modus vivendi.
Hull then remarked that we had learned of heavy Japanese
troop movements into Indochina. He criticized Japan for mov-
ing into Indochina so suddenly without any advance notice to
this Government. We cant overlook Japans digging herself into
Indochina, Hull said. It
create[s] an increasing menace to America and her friends.
. . . [W]e will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the
10
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 21011, December 1 cable
#1225 of Japanese ambassadors to Tokyo.
Pacific. . . . [W]hen a large Japanese army is anywhere in
Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention
when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east
Asia.
Hull accused the Japanese of using methods in China similar
to those which are being adopted by Hitler to subjugate Europe.
. . . [W]e cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to seize
one-half of the world. Hull said he believed the Japanese mili-
tarists were moving in a similar direction to seize the other half
of the earth. . . . [T]his Government cannot yield to anything of
that kind.
Ambassador Kurusu replied there was
not much dierence between Japans idea of a co-prosperity
sphere and [the U.S. policy of ] Pan-Americanism, except that
Japanese methods may be more primitive. He denied that it
was Japans purpose to use force. . . . Japan was motivated by
self-defense in the same way as Britain had been motivated by
her acts, for example, in Syria.
He pointed out that
Japan needed rice and other materials at a time when she was
being shut o by the United States and other countries and
she had no alternative but to endeavor to obtain access to these
materials. . . . Te Ambassador commented that today war is
being conducted through the agency of economic weapons,
that Japan was being squeezed, and that Japan must expand to
obtain raw materials.
Hull pointed out that
we were selling Japan oil until Japan suddenly moved into
Indochina; that he could not defend such a situation indef-
initely; and that the United States would give Japan all she
wanted in the way of materials if Japans military leaders would
only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.
Hull said
that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japans mil-
itary leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from
the Japanese military, only bluster and blood-curdling threats.
He also brought up Japans ties to Germany through the
Tripartite [Germany-Japan-Italy] Pact. In view of Japans com-
mitment to her ally, Germany, he said, Japan could not expect
the United States to stop helping her friends, Britain and China.
Kurusu
felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the eorts
which the conversations of several months had represented. He
said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement
except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals
seem to carry the two sides further away than before.
Hull responded
that every time we get started in the direction of progress the
Japanese military does something to overturn us. Te Secretary
expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in
view of all the threats that had been made.
Te Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are
the implications of such terms as controlling inuence, new
order in east Asia, and co-prosperity sphere.. . . Hitler was
using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest.
Kurusu disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between
Japans purposes and Hitlers purposes.
Te Japanese ambassador pointed out that wars never settle
anything and that war in the Pacic would be a tragedy. But he
added that
the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to
keep Japan ghting with China and to keep Japan strangled.
He said that the Japanese people feel that they are faced with
the alternative of surrendering to the United States or of ght-
ing. . . .
Te Ambassadors said that they understood the Secretarys
position in the light of his statements and they would report
the matter to the Japanese Government.
11

Japanese Troop Movements Portend
Early Attack in Far East
By the end of the month, Captain Arthur H. McCollum,
o cer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Navy
Departments Division of Naval Intelligence in Washington, had
become seriously concerned by the massive Japanese military
buildup in Indochina and the preparations being made for their
reinforcement.
12
McCollums
duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received
concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the
Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of
Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East
and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy
11
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, vol. 2, pp. 77277. Tis account of
Hulls December 1 meeting with the Japanese ambassadors is taken from State
Departments Joseph W. Ballantines memorandum.
12
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 13. McCollum testimony
before the Hewitt Inquiry.
and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state
of preparation for war.
13

Because of the mounting evidence of Japanese oensive
action, McCollum assembled and evaluated the available data in
a memorandum, which he took, on the morning of December 1,
to his superior, Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, director of naval
intelligence. Te memorandum reported that Japanese transports
had been moving large numbers of fully equipped veteran troops
from Shanghai to Indochina. Others were going by rail:
From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon
and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there
were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves
and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with
Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is esti-
mated that the following Japanese troops are now in French
Indo-China ready and equipped for action.
(a) South and Central Indo-China 70,000
(b) Northern Indo-China 25,000
Te landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops
and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan
Island and more distant Formosa.
McCollum also reported extensive Japanese naval activities:
ships being equipped and repaired, air and surface patrols being
established and ships and planes being moved to the Mandated
Island area, merchant vessels being tted out as antiaircraft ships,
naval task groups being reorganized, outlying naval air groups
being inspected, and so on. He said the Japanese had under sur-
veillance the U.S. island of Guam, more than 3,000 miles west of
Hawaii. Espionage networks were being established throughout
13
Ibid., part 36, p.13. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Japanese residents,
especially women and children, had been evacuated from British
India, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines,
Hong Kong, and Australia, and many had been withdrawn from
the United States, Canada, and South America.
14

Admiral Wilkinson made an appointment at noon on
December 1 to go with McCollum to see Chief of Naval
Operations Stark. As McCollum later testied, We knew that
the Japanese eet was ready for action. We knew that it had been
called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for
action. Also the Japanese eet had just changed its call signs and
frequency allocations again after only a relatively short interval.
Tis change in radio transmissions, when considered in conjunc-
tion with the various other clues, was one further indication that
something was afoot.
15

Wilkinson, in subsequent testimony, said that On the evi-
dence available we had concludedthat the Japanese were con-
templating an early attack, primarily directed at Tailand, Burma,
and the Malay Peninsula.
16
At the meeting with Stark, both
Wilkinson and McCollum urged that a dispatch of warning be
sent to the eet at that time. Stark assured them that such a dis-
patch had already been senton November 27and that it had
denitely included the phrase, Tis is a war warning.
17

The Armys December View of Atlantic
and Pacific Theaters of War
Under date of December 5, Brigadier General Sherman
Miles, acting assistant chief of sta, G-2 (Intelligence), prepared
14
Ibid., part 15, pp. 183942; part 36 (Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit #10), pp.
65960.
15
Ibid., part 36, p. 17, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
16
Ibid., part 4, p. 1847, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
17
a long memorandum for the benet of Marshall, an Estimate
of the Situation December 1, 1941March 31, 1942.
18
G-2 was
responsible for the collection, interpretation, and distribution of
information about our enemies or potential enemies. G-2s duties
included codes and ciphers and liaison with other intelligence
agencies.
19
Te assistant chief of sta of G-2 was on the list to
see MAGIC, and presumably Miles, as acting assistant chief of
sta also had access to this information derived from reading the
Japanese Purple intercepts.
20

Miles presented a rather complete analysis of the situation
from the Armys viewpoint. His memorandum
21
in brief:
Tis estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its
purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and
of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in
order to present the military possibilities and probabilities dur-
ing the period December 1, 1941, to March 1, 1942.
Miles went on to review the military situation in the Atlantic,
Europe, Middle East, and the Pacic.
Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will
remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic
oensives. She was not in a position [at this time] to attempt an
invasion of the [British] islands, and if she did attempt it, it will
be delayed until mid-summer of 1942.
18
Ibid., part 14, pp. 137383.
19
sion, 1950), p. 73.
20
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 23, McCollum testimony
21
Ibid., part 14, pp. 137384. Miles memorandum and Supporting Esti-
mates.
Te battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea
lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conict is now
trending against Germany. . . . As the weight of the United
States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the
Atlantic should be assured.
In the Middle East, Te United States is committed to pro-
viding great masses of material . . . and is undertaking vast con-
struction projects to facilitate supply.
In the Pacic, the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her
military overextension. After listing her alternatives, Miles
believed her most probable line of action is the occupation of
Tailand. . . . Te forces of all other countries in the Far East are
on the defensive before Japan. He thought the British-Dutch-
U.S. consultative association for the defense of Malaysia had
been eective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the
southwest.
China was containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divi-
sions, an important consideration in view of our objectivethe
defeat of the Nazis. China would remain in the war and will
continue to contain important Japanese forces. However,
Te eective use of Chinas unlimited manpower, as an anti-
Axis potential depends entirely on the extent to which she is
able to equip it [her manpower] particularly in artillery and
aviation. . . . For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United
States. . . . [and] China is receiving an increasing amount of
equipment from this country.
Te United States is concerned with southeast Asia and
Malaysia in two dierent capacities: (1) as a possible belligerent
and (2) as a prime source of war materials for China, the British
Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. Although
we were sending a few military airplanes to Tailand . . . this the-
ater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. . . .
Our inuence in the Far Eastern Teater lies in the threat of
our Naval power and the eort of our economic blockade. Both
are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war
as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we
could launch a serious oensive against her by Naval and Air
Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia.
Japan was torn between two opposing factions. Te govern-
ment leaders were aware of the perils of further military adven-
tures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacic and seek a
peaceful settlement with the United States. On the other hand,
army hotheads and other intransigents oppose any major con-
cessions. From the point of view of the government leaders, the
situation appeared bleak; the conversations between the Japanese
ambassadors and the U.S. government in Washington can now
be said denitely to have ended in failure
Miles said Japan faced a serious problem:
Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo
placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the
Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is
slowly but surely becoming worse. Te Japanese have always
lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and su cient
foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the
deciencies in these categories. . . .
Te rm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and
the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has
put Japan on the spot economically. . . . If she goes to war to
achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the
same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are
vital to her existence. . . .
[I]n short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. Te situ-
ation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she
may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she
can force a decision favorable to herself. Tus her economic
situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders.
Tis is a problem which she must solve within then next few
months.
A basic assumption of Miless memorandum, in spite of
United States o cial neutrality, was that we were committed to
the defeat of Nazi Germany. He wrote matter-of-factly about
the continued progress of America from neutrality towards par-
ticipating in the war. Miles acknowledged that the Kurusu con-
ference, the negotiations between the Japanese ambassadors and
our State Department, can now be said denitely to have ended
in failure. Yet he did not appear to view this rupture with par-
ticular concern. Nor did he reect the sense of urgency that per-
vaded much of Washington at that timeincluding the mem-
bers of FDRs War Council or Cabinet and some of those who
were working with the Japanese intercepts, notably McCollum in
naval intelligence and Saord in naval communications.
Miles realized that the United Statess consultative associa-
tion with the British and the Netherlands East Indies for the
defense of Malaysia made us a possible belligerent in that area.
He knew that the increasing amount of equipment we were
sending China pitted us directly against Japan. Miles also rec-
ognized Japans perilous [economic] plight. After analyzing all
these various factors, he concluded that the intentions of Japan
were not predictable. Our economic blockade of Japan and our
military forces in the Pacic, Miles wrote,
are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war
as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan,
we could launch a serious oensive against her by Naval and
Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia.
But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic oen-
sive because . . . it would be a diversion of forces away from
rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.
Honolulu Press Reports U.S.-Japanese
Conversations Continuing
A report of the Japanese ambassadors December 1 meeting
with Hull appeared in the newspapers, including the Honolulu
papers, where it was seen by Kimmel and Short. Te two Pearl
Harbor commanders had no way of knowing what was going on
behind the scenes, except as they were informed by Washington.
Short had received Stimsons November 27 cable, sent out over
Marshalls signature, telling him that Negotiations with Japan
appear to be terminated . . . with only the barest possibilities that
the Japanese government might come back and oer to continue.
Kimmel was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased
and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the bar-
est possibilities of their resumption. Neither Kimmel nor Short
had received any further o cial report of the situation, and then,
as Kimmel said, they were left to read public accounts of further
conversations between the State Department and the Japanese
emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had
been resumed.
22
Tey could only assume that the report they had
received of a break in negotiations had been superseded.
Japan Alerts Berlin of Impending
Clash of Arms with Anglo-Saxon Nations
On December 1, our Navy cryptographers intercepted,
decoded, and translated two November 30 messages from the
Japanese government to its ambassador in Germany. Tese were
long cables, sent in Purple, asking the ambassador in Berlin to
notify Japans allies under the Tripartite Alliance (Germany and
Italy) of the breakdown in negotiations with the United States.
Tese cables were sent in three parts. Te rst part
23
reported
to the ambassador the status of the conversations between Tokyo
22
Ibid., part 6, p. 2548, Kimmel statement presented to the Joint Committee.
23
Ibid., part 12, p. 204. #985 (Part 1 of 3).
and Washington. [I]n spite of the sincere eorts of the Imperial
Government, the negotiations now stand rupturedbroken. . . .
In the face of this our Empire faces a grave situation and must
act with determination. Te ambassador was asked to imme-
diately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister
RIBBENTROP and condentially communicate to them a sum-
mary of the developments. He should describe the provocative
attitude of England and the United States and the plan of the
British and Americans to move military forces into East Asia. He
should say that this makes it inevitable that Japan
counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that
there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some
clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this
war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
In part 3 of this three-part cable,
24
the ambassador was to
reassure the German o cials, if questioned about Japans atti-
tude toward their common enemy under the Tripartite Pact, the
Soviets with whom the Nazis were then engaged in a erce strug-
gle to reach Moscow, that Japan did
not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if
Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States
and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her
with all our might; however right now, it is to our advantage
to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to
refrain from any direct moves in the north.
After speaking with the Germans, the ambassador was to
have an Italian translation of this cable transmitted to Hitlers
ally, Premier Mussolini, and his Foreign Minister Ciano.
To the Japanese, the breakdown in negotiations with the
United States meant war. And they were telling their German
24
Ibid., pp. 20405. #985 (Part 3 of 3).
and Italian allies that they were planning to move souththat
is, in the direction of the Philippines, Indochina, and the Malay
Peninsula.
Te second November 30 cable from Tokyo to Berlin was in
two parts. Te negotiations had been started in April under the
previous Konoye administration. Te intent of these negotia-
tions, Tokyo reminded the ambassador, had been to restrain the
United States from participating in the war. During the negotia-
tions of the last few days, however, the Japanese had found it
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government
could no longer continue negotiations with the United States.
. . . Teir views and ours on the question of the evacuation of
troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the
evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-
China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Tokyo told the ambassador that
before the United States brought forth this plan [to reject
Japans modus vivendi proposal], they conferred with England,
Australia, the Netherlands and Chinathey did so repeatedly.
Terefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion
with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
25

Japan Orders her Embassies Worldwide to
Destroy Codes and Code Machines
On December 1, Tokyo sent two short circular cables to its
embassies around the world, giving instructions for abandoning
the use of code machines and describing how to destroy them.
26

25
Ibid., part 12, pp. 20506.
26
Ibid., part 12, pp. 20809.
Four o cesLondon, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila
were told to destroy their code machines and codes; the o ce in
the United States was told specically to retain its machines and
machine codes. When a government orders the destruction of the
code machines at its diplomatic o ces in certain countries, that is
a strong indication that a break in relations with those countries
is imminent. Te o cials who were reading MAGIC intercepts
realized the signicance of these cables.
FDR Assures British Ambassador Halifax of
U.S. Support in Southeast Asia
Because of the sense of growing emergency, Roosevelt had
returned suddenly from Warm Springs to Washington. On the
afternoon of December 1, he and his close aide Harry Hopkins
met for a long interview with British Ambassador Lord Halifax
at the White House. Both Halifax and FDR had considered
sending a joint British-American statement to the Japanese, but
rejected the idea as they expected it would only evoke an eva-
sive reply from Japan.
27
Halifax was concerned about whether the
United States would lend support to the British in southeast Asia,
as agreed during the American-Dutch-British conversations at
Singapore in April. As a signatory to the ADB agreement, the
United States was committed to engage in active military coun-
ter-action in the event of a direct act of war by Japanese armed
forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the
Associated Powers.
Te geographical area encompassed by this pact covered large
portions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacic. Te details
as to how active military counteraction was to be undertaken had
not been specically spelled out. However, the ADB agreement
did specify that the U.S. Pacic Fleet headquartered in Hawaii
27
Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1966), pp. 52829.
whenever and wherever they can . . . should assume the oensive
against Japanese naval forces and sea communications. In addi-
tion to defending its base in Manila, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was
to transfer some of its cruisers with aviation units and destroyers
towards Singapore . . . to operate under [the] strategic direction
of the commander-in-chief, Chin.
28

Te situation in southeast Asia was becoming increasingly
precarious. Large contingents of Japanese troops were moving in
that direction. Te government of the Netherlands East Indies
had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces.
29

Halifax had been instructed by his government to tell the U.S.
government that it expected a Japanese attack on Tailand, and
that this attack would include an expedition to seize strategic
points in the Kra Isthmus (the narrow strip of land belong-
ing to Tailand north of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore).
Te British proposed to counter this plan by a rapid move into
the Isthmus, and they wanted to be sure . . . [of ] American
support.
30

Roosevelt told Halifax that [i]n the case of a direct attack on
the British or the Dutch, we should obviously all be together.
However, he wanted to explore some situations which might not
be quite so clear, for instance, if there were not a direct attack
on the British or Dutch, or if the Japanese moved into Tailand
without attacking the Kra Isthmus. When Halifax reported this
conversation to his government, he said he thought the United
States would support whatever action we might take in any of
these cases.
28
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1564, 156869, Amer-
ican-Dutch-British agreement, pp. 13, 17, 18.
29
Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 701.
30
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London:
Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), pp. 18586.
FDR also told Halifax that the British could count on
American support if we [the British] carried out our move to
defend the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese attack, though
this support might not be forthcoming for a few days. FDR then
suggested that the British promise the Tai government that they
would respect and guarantee the full sovereignty and indepen-
dence of Tailand if the Tais resisted Japanese attack or inl-
tration. Roosevelt said that the U.S. Constitution did not allow
him to give such a guarantee, but he told Halifax that the British
could be sure that their guarantee to the Tai government would
have full American support.
31

Te presidents answer was su ciently encouraging to enable
Halifax to report that in his opinion the United States would
support whatever action we might take in any of the contin-
gencies outlined by the president. We could, in any case, count
on American support of any operations in the Kra Isthmus.
32

Hart (Manila) Directed to Charter
Three Small Men-of-War to
Observe Japanese Convoys
At the direction of the president, the Navy sent a cable about
7:00 p.m. on December 1 to Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief
of our Asiatic Fleet, based at Manila. Hart was asked to charter
three small vessels as soon as possible and within two days if pos-
sible to form a defensive information patrol. Tese three small
ships were to have the minimal requirements to be classied as
U.S. men-of-war. Each was to be commanded by a U.S. naval
o cer, although the crew members could be Filipinos. For weap-
ons, they needed only a small gun and one machine gun. Teir
31
Ibid., pp. 18687.
32
Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 529.
mission was to observe and report by radio Japanese movements
in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Te three small ships were
to be stationed o the coast of French Indochina. One vessel to
be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel o the Indo-
China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and
one vessel o Pointe de Camau, all locations in the anticipated
path of the Japanese convoys then known to be sailing toward
southeast Asia. Hart was also asked to report on the reconnais-
sance measuresair, surface, and submarinebeing performed
regularly by both Army and Navy.
33

Ambassador Grew Reports Gloom in Tokyo
During the last few days of November, U.S. Ambassador
Grew in Japan spoke with
a number of prominent Japanese, some of whom have been
in direct touch with the Foreign Minister, and most of them
appeared to be already familiar with the substance of our
Governments recent ten-point draft proposal. While desirous
of continuing the Washington conversations, they all reect a
pessimistic reaction, perceiving the di culties of bridging over
the positions of the two countries and emphasizing what they
seem to regard as the unconciliatory tone of our proposal.
On the evening of December 1, Grew saw one of his old
Japanese friends at the Tokyo Club, looking gray and worn.
[T]he cabinet had decided to break o the conversations with
the United States, he told Grew. [I]n that case, Grew feared that
everything was over and that [he] would soon be leaving Japan.
34

However, the government-controlled Tokyo newspapers that
33
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1407. OPNAV CABLE
#012356.
34
Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944),
pp. 48485.
night reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while real-
izing the di culty of adjusting the respective positions of the two
countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington
conversations.
35
Grew cabled Washington to that eect. In spite
of this apparent good news, Grews friend remained crushed.
36

35
36
Grew, Ten Years in Japan, p. 485.
9.
Tensions Mount
FDR Remonstrates Against
Increased Japanese Troops in Indochina
S
ecretary of State Hull was laid up with a cold,
1
so
Undersecretary of State Welles called the two Japanese ambas-
sadors to the State Department on December 2, and presented
them with a statement by President Roosevelt: [C]ontinuing
Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina, reported
during the past several days, represent a very rapid and material
increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.
As FDR understood the Japanese agreement with the French
Vichy government, the arrival of these forces brought the number
of Japanese troops in Indochina well above the total permitted.
[T]hese increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to
imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of
1
Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of State and Teir Diplomacy,
vols. 12 and 13 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 2 vols., p. 516.
203
further aggression, since no such number of forces could pos-
sibly be required for the policing of that region.
Such aggression could conceivably be directed against the
Philippines, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya, or Tailand. Tis,
FDR maintained, would be new aggression . . . additional to the
acts of aggression already undertaken against China. He wanted
to know the intentions of the Japanese government in continuing
to move troops into Indochina because of the broad problem
of American defense and he asked the Japanese ambassadors
to inquire as to their governments purpose in carrying out this
recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina.
2
Nomura
admitted that he was not informed by the Japanese Government
of its intentions; he would contact them immediately.
Kurusu said, [I]t was obvious no threat against the United
States was intended, especially as the Japanese government had
oered on November 20 to transfer all its forces from southern
Indochina to northern Indochina. Tis shift could not be easily
eected, however, due to the lack of adequate transportation and
of communication facilities in Indochina.
3

Although Welles stated that the United States government
has not had any aggressive intention against Japan, Nomura
reminded him of the U.S. economic measures against Japan,
trade embargoes and the freezing of assets. [E]conomic mea-
sures are a much more eective weapon of war than military mea-
sures. Te Japanese people believe they are being placed under
severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American
position; and that it is preferable to ght rather than to yield to
the American position. Te Ambassador added
2
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 779.
3
Ibid.
Tensions Mount 205
that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was
needed; that wars do not settle anything . . . under the circum-
stances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is
better than no agreement at all.
4

Te Japanese ambassadors reminded Welles that the note
we had handed them on November 26 contained several points
which, in view of the actual situation in the Far East . . . the
Japanese Government would nd it di cult to accept. Te lat-
est U.S. proposal raised important questions so that it seemed
to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start.
As a result, its response might take a few days, although they
expected it shortly.
5

With respect to the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese
government had been hopeful of being able to work out with
us [the United States] some settlement of the three outstanding
points on which our draft of June 21
6
and the Japanese draft of
September 25
7
had not been reconciled. Nomura said the situ-
ation called for wise statesmanship. . . . [W]ars do not settle
anything. Kurusu thought considerable progress had been made
and he expressed an interest in resuming the eorts to reconcile
our dierences. Welles agreed to refer this question to Hull.
8

In their cable to Tokyo, the Japanese ambassadors reported:
Te United States and other countries have pyramided economic
pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. . . . Te
people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want
4
Ibid., p. 780.
5
Ibid., pp. 77981.
6
Ibid., pp. 48692. U.S. draft proposal to Japanese government, June 21,
1941.
7
Ibid., pp. 63741. Japanese proposals submitted to U.S. ambassador in Japan,
September 25, 1941.
8
Department of State, Japan, 19311941, pp. 78081.
you to know that we have but the choice between submission
to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes.
9

Welless manner gave Nomura the impression that he
hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th
would leave . . . room to maneuver. It was clear also, from their
interview with Hull the day before
that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude
the current di cult situation. I [Nomura] am convinced that
they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Terefore,
please bear well in mind this fact in your consideration of our
reply to the new American proposals.
10

Would U.S. Fight if British or Dutch
Fought in Malaya and NEI? FDR Still
Plans to Address Congress
Also on Tuesday, December 2, Roosevelt met with Knox,
Welles, and Stimson. Hull was still sick. Te president went
step by step over the situation and reported, through the State
Department, on his request to the Japanese that they tell him what
they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina. He
had demanded a quick reply. FDR seemed to have made up his
mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly also
the message to the Emperor, as had been discussed at his War
Cabinet meeting on November 28.
11
Tese men were watching the situation in the Far East
very carefully. Stimson, for one, was in frequent conference
9
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, Washington to Tokyo message
#1232, part 1 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 22122.
10
Ibid., part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 2 of 2, December
2, 1941, pp. 22122.
11
Ibid., part 3, p. 1148, Marshall testimony.
Tensions Mount 207
with the top Army o cialsMarshall, General Miles of
G-2 (Intelligence), and also General Gerow of the War Plans
Division of the general sta. Tey were anxious to strengthen the
Philippines defenses and were
particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to
the Philippines and additional big bombers which [they] were
trying to y over there, some of which were scheduled to start
at the end of the week.
12

Hull had once remarked to Marshall, apropos of the discus-
sions he had been having with the Japanese envoys, Tese fel-
lows mean to ght and you will have to watch out.
13
He
was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry;
and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. Te
messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese
force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we
discussed whether we would not have to ght if Malaya or the
Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought.
We all three thought that we must ght if those nations fought.
We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result
in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result
would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic
Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics
enormously di cult if not impossible. All the reasons why it
would be necessary for the United States to ght, in case the
Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the
Pacic, were discusssed at length.
14

12
Ibid., part 11, p. 5427. Excerpt from Stimson diary.
13
Ibid., part 3, p. 1148. Quote from Marshall testimony.
14
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 542829, excerpt from
Stimson diary.
Intercepted Japanese Message
Announces System of Codewords
to be Used in Certain Emergencies
Among the Japanese messages our code people intercepted
during this period was a long cable from Tokyo on November 27
addressed to its embassy in Washington and several of the more
important Japanese embassies and consuls around the world. We
decoded and translated it on December 2. In view of the fact that
international relations [were] becoming more strained, it read,
an emergency system of despatches was to be put into eect.
Te cable contained a long list of codewords, each with a hidden
meaning, which would be substituted for other words in case of
certain emergencies, which were then enumerated. To distinguish
one of these special messages from other messages, it would not
use the usual Japanese close, OWARI. Rather it would end with
the English word, STOP.
15

Tis cable was one more indication that the Japanese govern-
ment anticipated a serious emergency before long. It also gave
our hard-worked cryptographers one more thing to keep in mind.
Tey must watch for Japanese cables ending with STOP and
then not only decode and translate them, but determine the hid-
den meanings in the special code words.
Government Prepares for War
On September 8, 1939, a few days after the start of the war in
Europe, Roosevelt had announced a limited national emergency.
As international tension mounted, especially after FDRs third
term reelection in November 1940, various emergency interven-
tionist measures were enacted aimed at placing this country on a
wartime footing. A throng of government agencies were created;
15
Ibid., part 12, pp. 18688, Tokyo Circular #2409.
Tensions Mount 209
some controls on industrial production were initiated; and a sys-
tem of priorities was established in the attempt to assure that
rms producing military equipment and supplies could obtain
the materials they needed.
16

Te O ce of Production Management, headed by William S.
Knudsen, Sidney Hillman, Stimson, and Knox, was established on
January 7, 1941. On February 20, FDRs personal aide, Harry L.
Hopkins, was appointed to a newly created Production Planning
Board. By executive order of February 24, the production of alu-
minum and machine tools was granted government priority. On
February 25, in the interest of national defense, export licensing
procedures were instituted for a long list of items, and the list was
lengthened substantially in March and April. A National Defense
Mediation Board was formed on March 19, to mediate strikes of
labor-union members in defense industries. Te O ce of Price
Administration and Civilian Supply, headed by Leon Henderson,
was set up on April 11. Te O ce of Civilian Defense was orga-
nized on May 20, with New York Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia
in charge.
Ten on May 27 FDR declared an unlimited national emer-
gency. By this declaration the president gained control over
labor, management, and other elements of the economy. Also, his
authority to eliminate internal strife and to suppress subversive
activities was increased. Te emergency agencies continued to
proliferate. On May 31 Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes was
appointed to the newly created position of petroleum coordina-
tor for national defense. As of June 2 mandatory priorities of
wartime scope were imposed on industry. On June 25 U.S. air
16
rence, 1931-1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 216, September 8 entry. Te
dates in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the 1942 World
Almanac.
space was zoned by the Civil Aeronautics Board to facilitate
the movement of military aircraft. On August 3, to conserve
gasoline, nighttime sales (7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) were banned
to motorists on the eastern seaboard, and on August 15 gasoline
deliveries to 17 eastern states were cut 10 percent. On August 9,
steel was placed under 100 percent priority control by the O ce
of Production Management. On August 11, by executive order,
installment credit for consumers durable goods was curbed. On
August 16 the president signed a bill extending from one to two
and a half years the period of military duty required of draftees
under the Selective Service Act and of members of the Army and
National Guard.
17
Ten on August 28 the Supply Priorities and
Allocations Board (SPAB) was set up, with Donald M. Nelson,
then on leave from Sears, Roebuck & Co., as executive direc-
tor, to handle procurement and to coordinate national-defense
purchases.
18

Top Washington Officials
Consider War Imminent
Early in the rst week in December, Roosevelt called Nelson
to his o ce to talk about a priorities meeting. Teir discussion had
hardly begun when the presidents appointment secretary, Pa
Watson, came into the room and said, Mr. President, Secretary
Hull is outside with the two Japs. FDR then told Nelson, Don,
I think we shall have to postpone this discussion; I am very anx-
ious to conclude the discussions with Nomura and Kurusu. As
Nelson got up to leave, he asked, How does it look? FDR shook
his head gravely and replied, Don, I wouldnt be a bit surprised if
we were at war with Japan by Tursday [December 4].
17
E. Eastman Irving, ed., Te World Almanac (New York: New York World-
Telegram, 1942), p. 71.
18
Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story of American War Produc-
tion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 156.
Tensions Mount 211
Nelson had a second shock later in the week. He was giv-
ing a dinner Wednesday evening for Vice President Henry A.
Wallace and had invited the members of SPAB. Wallace sat at
Nelsons right and his fellow Chicagoan, Navy Secretary Frank
Knox, was on his left. Remembering the presidents presentiment
of war, Nelson made guarded inquiries of Knox concerning the
Japanese situation. Knox was not at all reticent in his reply.
Don, he said, we may be at war with the Japs before the month
is over. Nelson asked, Is it that bad? Knox replied, You bet
your life its that bad. Ten Nelson asked Knox what kind of a
ght would we have out there in the Pacic. Knox replied, well
hunt their navy down and blow it right out of the water.
19

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau Asks if
Anything Might Disturb a U.S. Bond Sale
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for arranging
the governments nancing. On December 1 he was preparing to
make an oering on the market of $1.5 billion in U.S. bonds.
Before settling on a date for the oer, he wanted to know the
likelihood that some crisis might occur to disturb the nancial
markets. As Morgenthau was not privy to MAGIC, he lacked
detailed inside knowledge of the international situation; he asked
Roosevelts advice. FDR told him to go ahead with the bond oer.
But he said, I cannot guarantee anything. It is all in the laps of
the gods, adding, it was apt to be worse in the following week
than in the week just beginning.
Morgenthau also asked Welles if something would be hap-
pening Wednesday, Tursday, or Friday [December 3, 4, or 5]
of real importanceI mean that might upset the people of this
country. Welles was reassuring: I dont anticipate anything
within that brief period.
19
Ibid., pp. 18283.
Morgenthau spoke with Roosevelt again on December 3.
FDR said he had the Japanese running around like a lot of wet
hens and thought the Japanese are doing everything they can to
stall until they are ready. Morgenthau had long been anxious for
the United States to become involved in the war against Hitler, so
from Morgenthaus viewpoint, Te most important thing was
that the president was talking with the English about war plans
as to when and where the USA and Great Britain should strike.
When Morgenthau learned that the New York branch of
the Bank of Japan was going to close down on December 4 or
5, he became still more worried about the market for his bond
oer. He contacted the president again and nally got an all
clear signal. So on Tursday, December 4, he announced the
Treasury oering$1 billion of 2-1/2 per cent bonds maturing
19671972, and $500 million of 2 per cent with a shorter matu-
rity 19511955.
20

Japanese Consul in Hawaii Asked to Report
Weekly on Ships in Pearl Harbor
For some months, U.S. intelligence o cers in Hawaii had
been intercepting Japanese messages to and from the Japanese
consul in Hawaii and Tokyo, messages sent in the J-19 (consular)
code. U.S. intelligence personnel in Hawaii did not have the facil-
ities to decipher these coded intercepts and were under instruc-
tions to airmail them as they were intercepted to Washington.
Airmail from Hawaii to Washington took two or three days.
21

Once in Washington, their decoding and translation was often
delayed still further, for Purple messages, which usually dealt
with urgent and sensitive matters, had priority.
20
21
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 791, General Miles testi-
mony before the Joint Committee.
Tensions Mount 213
On October 9 Washington cryptographers had deciphered a
September 24 berthing plan intercept, instructing the Japanese
consul in Hawaii to plot the location of ships in Pearl Harbor on
a grid system and to notify Tokyo.
22
However, the Pearl Harbor
commanders were not notied. On December 3 Navy cryptana-
lysts in Washington decoded and translated a J-19 message more
than two weeks old (November 15), sent from Tokyo to its consul
in Hawaii. It read: As relations between Japan and the United
States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregu-
lar, but at a rate of twice a week.
23

Again, this information was not passed on to our command-
ers in Hawaiinot to General Short, who was responsible for
the safety of the eet while in port, and not to Admiral Kimmel,
commander-in-chief of the Pacic Fleet based in Pearl Harbor.
Tus the U.S. commanders in Hawaii remained ignorant of the
fact that the Japanese consul in Honolulu was keeping a close
watch on the ships of the U.S. eet in Pearl Harbor.
Japan Orders Its Embassy in Washington
to Destroy Codes; U.S. Naval Intelligence
Warns Outposts
On December 2, Tokyo time, the Japanese government cabled
its embassy in Washington further instructions about destroying
its codes. Tis message was promptly decoded and translated by
our Army cryptographers on December 3.
24
It said that all codes
but those now being used with the machine and all secret les and
documents were to be destroyed. Also, [s]top at once using one
code machine unit and destroy it completely. On the completion
22
Ibid., part 12, p. 261, Tokyo September 24 J-19 message to Honolulu, trans-
lated October 9, 1941.
23
Ibid., part 12, p. 262, Tokyo J-19 message to Honolulu #111, translated
December 3, 1941.
24
Ibid., p. 215.
of these tasks, the embassy should wire back the one code word,
haruna.
Tis code-destruct message and others addressed to Japanese
embassies and consulates indicated to anyone familiar with such
matters that the Japanese were planning to go to war very soon.
Junior o cers in Naval Intelligence, who were working with
these Japanese intercepts, were disturbed. Navy Captain Arthur
H. McCollum, who was in charge of the Far Eastern section of
Naval Intelligences foreign branch, suggested that warning mes-
sages be sent to the U.S. outposts in the Pacic, and he drafted
the following cable:
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric
and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplo-
matic and consular posts at Hongkong x Singapore x Batavia
x Manila x Washington and London to destroy most of their
codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important con-
dential and secret documents x From foregoing infer that
Orange [ Japan] plans early action in Southeast Asia.
25

McCollums superior, Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson, chief
of the intelligence division, sought permission from Admiral
Royal E. Ingersoll, assistant chief of naval operations, to send
this cable. When asked during the Pearl Harbor hearings if the
destruction of codes necessarily mean[s] war, that a country
that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act of war or
declare war, Ingersoll replied, It meant that to us, particularly
the destruction of codes in the consulates.
26
Terefore, Ingersoll
apparently assumed that the last sentence of the proposed cable
was unnecessary. In any event, he okayed the code-destruction
message, with the nal sentence deleted. Te shortened message
25
Ibid., part 15, p. 1866, exhibit No. 83. #031850 to CINCPAC, CINCAF,
Coms. 14, 16 concerning Japanese instruction to destroy codes and ciphers.
26
Ibid., part 9, p. 4269, Ingersoll testimony before the Joint Committee.
Tensions Mount 215
was dispatched priority on December 3 at 6:50 p.m. Greenwich
time (1:50 p.m., Washington time), to Admiral Hart (Manila),
Admiral Kimmel (Pearl Harbor), and to commandants of the
naval districts in Hawaii and the Philippines.
27

Navy Captain L.F. Saord in the O ce of Naval
Communications knew of the latest Japanese intercept regard-
ing the destruction of codes in London, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Manila.
28
Ten he learned that the Japanese embassy in
Washington also had been ordered to destroy everything they
had except one copy of their high-grade [decoding] machine.
And on the 3rd we received a signal from Admiralty London
that [the Japanese embassy in] London had already complied.
29

Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer, who was attached to
the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, told Saord that
McCollum was greatly worried by the lack of information that
was being sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacic Fleet.
Saord phoned McCollum and asked if he had read the mes-
sages which we had been getting in the last three days. McCollum
said he had. Do you appreciate their signicance? Saord asked.
McCollum said he did. Ten Saord asked, Are you people in
Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the
Pacic Fleet? We are doing everything we canMcCollum
emphasized both westo get the news out to the Fleet.
30
Saord didnt learn then that McCollum had nally suc-
ceeded in having a warning sent, even if a watered-down one. So
Saord and Kramer set out to draft their own warning. According
to Saord,
27
Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850, December 3, 1941.
28
Ibid., part 12, p. 209, Tokyo to Washington #2444, December 1, 1941.
29
Ibid., part 29, p. 2396. Saord testimony before the APHB.
30
Ibid.
Te C.I. [Communications Intelligence] Unit in Washington
had no authority to forward to the C.I. Units in Pearl Harbor
or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any
information other than technical information pertaining to
direction nding, interception, and so forth. Te dissemination
of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the
O ce of Naval Intelligence as prescribed in Communication
War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in
March, 1940.
31

Terefore, the dissemination of intelligence was not permit-
ted to Saords unit. He acted because he thought McCollum
had been unable to get his message released.
32

Saords message, OpNav 031855, was released by
Captain [ Joseph R.] Redman, Assistant Director of Naval
Communications. It was addressed to the Philippines (CinCAF
and Com 16) for action and routed to Hawaii (CinCPac and Com
14) for information. It was written in highly technical language
and only one o cer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant
H. M. Coleman, U.S.N., on CinCPacs Sta, could have explained
its signicance.
33
Saords message advised that on December 1
Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila
to destroy their Purple machines; Batavias machine had already
been returned to Tokyo. Ten on December 2 the Japanese
embassy in Washington had been told to destroy its secret docu-
ments, its Purple machine, and all but one copy of other systems.
It also reported that the Japanese embassy in London had com-
plied.
34
When Saords message reached Pearl Harbor, Kimmels
intelligence o cer had to ask Coleman what a Purple machine
was. Te Pearl Harbor command had never heard of the Japanese
31
Ibid., part 26, pp. 39293, Saord testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
32
Ibid., p. 392.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., part 14, p. 1408.
Tensions Mount 217
diplomatic code, a code machine named Purple, or of MAGIC,
the valuable intelligence derived from Purple.
McCollums watered-down dispatch (#031850)
35
had actu-
ally been released by Wilkinson just ve minutes before Saords
(#031855).
36
McCollums message had been sent for action to
Hart in Manila, Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, and to the comman-
dants of the 14th (Hawaii) and 16th (Philippines) naval districts.
Saords message went for action to the Philippines, with an
information copy to Hawaii.
U. S. Orders Destruction of Codes
at Some Overseas Embassies
Te repeated reminders that the Japanese were planning
some aggressive action in the very near future spurred Army o -
cials in Washington to action. General Sherman Miles, head of
G-2, the military intelligence division of the Army general sta,
was responsible for the collection, analysis, estimation, and dis-
semination of information primarily for the chief of sta and the
secretary of war.
37
On December 3, he cabled the U.S. military
attach at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to destroy its codes.
38

Te o ce of the chief of naval operations (OPNAV) also
acted. Late in the evening of December 3, Washington time,
instructions to destroy the Navys codes were sent to U.S. naval
attachs in the Asiatic theaterALUSNA (naval attach) in
Tokyo and Bangkok, and ASTALUSNA (assistant naval atta-
ch for air) in Peiping and Shanghai, China. Information copies
only were sent to CINCAF (commander-in-chief, Asiatic Fleet),
that is Admiral Hart in Manila, COM 16 (commandant, 16th
35
Ibid., part 14, p. 1407.
36
Ibid., p. 1408.
37
Ibid., part 2, p. 777, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee.
38
Ibid., p. 841, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee; part 29, p. 2445,
Bratton testimony before the APHB. See also part 14, p. 1409.
naval district, Philippines), and ALUSNA, Chungking, China.
No copy was sent to Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, 14th naval dis-
trict, Hawaii.
39
A similar message was sent a few minutes later
to the naval attach in Peiping and to the marine commander in
Tientsin, China.
Some 17 hours later a message (042017) was sent to the
naval station on Guam, the mid-Pacic island more than 3,000
miles west of Hawaii, which lay practically in the midst of the
Japanese mandated islands. Guam was told to destroy all secret
and condential publications and other classied matter, except
that necessary for current purposes and special intelligence and
to be prepared to destroy instantly any other classied matter
retained.
40
Information copies were sent to Hart and the 16th
naval district in the Philippines, and to Kimmel and the 14th
naval district in Hawaii.
On December 4, just two minutes after the one to Guam,
a cable (042019) was dispatched from OPNAV in Washington
to the naval attachs at Tokyo and Bangkok and to the assistant
naval attachs in Peiping and Shanghai. Tey were told to destroy
all secret and condential les with the exception of those which
are essential for current purposes. Also all other papers which
in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the United
States were to be destroyed.
41

Tese code-destruct messages meant Japanese action was
imminentin the west Pacic and southeast Asia, probably in
Indochina and Tailand. Hawaii was an ACTION addressee in
only one of these urgent cablesMcCollums #031850. (Manila
was a second addressee). However, the information reported in
that message, gleaned from a Japanese intercept, had concerned
primarily southeast Asia, ordering the destruction of codes and
39
Ibid., part 14, p. 1408. OPNAV #040339.
40
Ibid., OPNAV #042017.
41
Ibid., part 29, p. 2397, Saord before the APHB.
Tensions Mount 219
ciphers at Japanese diplomatic and consular posts in Hong Kong,
Singapore, Batavia, and Manila, as well as Washington and
London.
No one in Washington seemed concerned about Hawaii.
10.
Significant Information
Known in Washington
U.S. War
1

Plans Published
O
n December 4, 1941, a front-page story in the Washington
Times Herald and its parent newspaper, the Chicago Tribune,
sent shockwaves throughout the nation:
F.D.Rs WAR PLANS
GOAL IS 10 MILLION ARMED MEN:
HALF TO FIGHT IN AEF
PROPOSED LAND DRIVE BY JULY 1, 1943, TO SMASH NAZIS
Te nation was still o cially neutral. Yet here was evidence
that plans had been made to build an army to ght abroad, that
is, to create an American Expeditionary Force (AEF), to smash
the Nazis. Te people were stunned.
1
sion, 1950), p. 337.
221
Te war plans announced here were those prepared under
Marshalls orders by Lt. Col. Albert C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer
had been assigned the task in May 1941 of compiling a com-
plete statement of Army needsnot for 1941 and 1942 but for
the actual winning of a war not yet declared. Ten in July 1941,
almost immediately after Hitler attacked Russia, Roosevelt had
expanded the scope of Wedemeyers assignment to include not
only the needs of the Army, but also those of the Navy and Air.
2

On August 30, FDR had enlarged it still further to encompass
also the distribution of expected United States production of
munitions of war as between the United States, Great Britain,
Russia and the other countries to be aided.
3
Te project had been carried out in utmost secrecy, and
Wedemeyer had completed his Herculean task by September 10.
Te result of his eorts was known as the Victory Program.
To preserve the security of the project, the number of copies and
their distribution were strictly limited.
4
Nevertheless, rumors had
circulated in October that the Army was currently preparing an
expeditionary force for duty in Africa. To protect the secrecy
of the plans, Marshall had categorically denied their existence.
Tere is no foundation whatsoever, he stated, for the allegation
or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition
to Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere.
5
And
now, to the chagrin of all involved, the security surrounding the
program had been breached.
Te militarys war plans had been leaked and published for all
the world to see in the anti-administration Chicago Tribune. Tere
was consternation and embarrassment in the administration. An
2
Ibid., pp. 33839.
3
Ibid., pp. 34749.
4
Albert C. Wedemeyer, Reports! (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 2021.
5
Signicant Information Known in Washington 223
investigation was launched to discover who had been responsible
for the leak.
Japanese Winds Code Executed: War with
England; War with the U.S.; Peace with Russia
On November 28, we had intercepted the November 15
Japanese Winds Code setup (Tokyo Circular #2353), a message
announcing special weather code words to be used by the Japanese
[i]n case of emergency (danger of cutting o our diplomatic
relations), and the cutting o of international communications.
6

By introducing these weather words, each with a hidden mean-
ing, into daily Japanese language news broadcasts, the Japanese
would be able to communicate secretly to their diplomatic o -
cers throughout the world, even if they could no longer transmit
via their cryptographic channels. Also on November 28, we had
intercepted a Japanese message with the schedule of Japanese
news broadcasts and the kilocycles on which transmissions were
to be made.
7
Te signicance of the Winds Code message
became apparent when on December 1 we translated a Japanese
intercept ordering the Japanese diplomatic o ces in some coun-
tries to destroy their codes and code machines.
When Captain Saord, director of the Security Section of
Navy Departments Communications, read the cable giving the
times and frequencies of Japanese news broadcasts in conjunction
with the Japanese Winds Code message, he put two and two
together. According to him,
6
79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, p. 154, Tokyo Circular #2353.
7
everyone in authority from the president down believed that
this [a Winds Execute] would be the Japanese Governments
decision as to peace or war announced to their own o cials
overseas.
We looked on it as our chance of a tip-o, [our chance]
to gain the necessary time to prevent a surprise attack on our
eet.
8
Interception of a Winds Execute was given top priority.
Saord immediately alerted U.S. intercept stations to monitor
Japanese-language weather and news broadcasts at the sched-
uled times.
9
It was expected that the message would be trans-
mitted in Japanese Morse code. Tose monitoring the broadcasts
were given cards with the three Japanese phrases listed in the
Winds Code messageHIGASHI NO KAZE AME, KITA
NO KAZE KUMORI, and NISHI NO KAZE HAREand
were instructed to listen closely for an Execute, i.e., for an
actual broadcast of any one of the three crucial Japanese weather
phrases.
10
Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious,
Saord said later.
11
Te Navy even feared that this winds execute
might have been sent out before the 28th, when we began listen-
ing for it
12
and that we might have missed it entirely. After all,
the Japanese message had gone out on November 15, almost two
weeks before we decoded and translated it. All these uncertainties
8
Ibid., part 8, p. 3640, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee.
9
Ibid., p. 3580.
10
Ibid., part 33, p. 853, Kramer testimony, September 13, 1944, at Navy Court
of Inquiry; ibid., part 8, pp. 391518, and ibid., part 9, pp. 412628, Kramer
testimony before the Joint Committee; and ibid., part 10, p. 4624, Bratton
testimony before the Joint Committee.
11
Ibid., part 8, p. 3581, Saord statement before the Joint Committee.
12
Ibid. p. 3640.
made the Navy very jittery.
13
Moreover, radio reception was not
only poor but unpredictable.
[T]he radio frequencies used between Japan and the United
States were quite erratic in performance. . . . It is not at all
surprising that the frequency used [by the Japanese] to reach
Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West
Coast and Hawaii.
14

Even the Japanese themselves in Washington and Rio
objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome com-
plained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts.
15
In view of the urgency of intercepting the Winds Execute
and the uncertain nature of radio reception, Navy communications
took the exceptional precaution of alerting all stations with any
possibility of intercepting this important message. Nevertheless,
the Navy Department was very much worried that, even with
all the stations which were known to be listening for it, by some
freak chance we might fail to catch it.
16
Since reception of Tokyo transmissions was often clearer on
the east coast of the United States than on the west coast, Station
M at Cheltenham, Maryland, was one of the several interception
stations to which the alert was sent. Station chief Daryl Wigle
put a notation in the supervisors instruction le, and Radioman
Ralph T. Briggs, then assistant supervisor on his particular watch,
saw the report. Briggs had been especially trained by the Navy in
the interception of Japanese communications, and he recognized
the three Japanese phrases as weather phrases. Tey were the
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., p. 3615, Saord 1945 memorandum re Winds Execute prepared for
Sonnett.
15
Ibid., p. 3581. See also pp. 358185 for Saord statement to the Joint
Committee (February 1, 1946) concerning radio reception at our various
intercept stations and our preparations for picking up the Winds Execute.
16
Ibid., p. 3640, Saord testimony before the Joint Committee.
kinds of phrases Briggs had often picked up when searching vari-
ous radio spectrums at random to practice interception and to see
what kind of tra c was being transmitted.
Briggs wondered why Navy intelligence was all of a sud-
den targeting weather reports, and, being on good terms with
his station chief, he asked why. Wigle was reluctant to explain,
but he nally showed Briggs the card with the three phrases and
their hidden coded meanings. Wigle couldnt give Briggs all the
details, but [he said] its important that we get those. . . . [I]f you
get any of them, if any of those shows up in any broadcast, be sure
and transmit them immediately to OP-20-G, Captain Saords
o ce in Washington, D.C.
Te only broadcast on which such weather phrases might
appear was the Tokyo scheduled weather and news broadcast,
transmitted at dierent hours of the day and on dierent frequen-
cies to Japanese ships and stations worldwide. Te Cheltenham
communication intelligence trained radiomen began to monitor
that broadcast. To each of the ve watch sections Wigle assigned
at least one operator who was qualied in Katakana, the di cult
written form of squarish Japanese characters based on Chinese
ideographs, as contrasted with the simpler Kanji.
On December 4 Briggs had the mid-watch, from mid-
night to 8:00 a.m. Some time after midnight, probably between
3:00 and 8:00, when he was to be relieved, Briggs intercepted in
Japanese Morse code a message containing the phrase Higashi
no kaze ame. He excitedly rushed down the corridor to the
OP-20-G teletype terminal and sent the message o immedi-
ately to OP-20-G in Washington. He then phoned Wigle, who
lived on the station, got him out of the sack, and told him what
had happened. When Wigle checked the log sheet and the sta-
tion copy of the intercept later, he conrmed to Briggs that he
had gotten the real McCoy.
17
17
Tese three paragraphs based on Bettina B. Greavess interview of Ralph
T. Briggs in Las Vegas, Nevada, August 14, 1988. See also John Tolands
Te Execute, forwarded by teletype (TWX) from
Cheltenham, was received in the Navy Department in Washington
by the watch o cer, who notied Lieutenant Commander
Kramer, who was in charge of the translation section of the Navy
Department communication intelligence unit. As soon as Kramer
saw the TWX from Cheltenham, he rushed into Saords o ce
with the long yellow teletype paper in his hands.
18
Te time was
shortly before 9:00 a.m. on December 4.
19
Tis is it! Kramer said, as he handed the message to Saord.
Tis was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to inter-
cept. Tis was the feather in our cap. . . . Tis was what the Navy
Communication Intelligence Division had been preparing for
since its establishment in 1924War with Japan!
20
As Saord later recalled,
Te Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long, with
the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in
interview of Briggs, April 13, 1980, led with Toland papers at Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Also see John Toland, Infamy:
Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), pp.
19599.
18
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3619. Saord testimony; also
ibid., part 18, p. 3344.
19
Considerable confusion has surrounded the actual time when the Winds
Execute was received. Saord s recollection, based on the timing of messages
he dispatched immediately upon receipt, was that it was picked up on the
morning of December 4 (ibid., part 8, pp. 35 8688). Briggss surmise, when he
was interviewed by Toland (April 13, 1980), was that he may have intercepted
a winds message during his mid-watch at Cheltenham from 0001 [12:01
a.m.] to 0800 [8:00 a.m.], Washington, D.C., time on December 2. He came
to this conclusion on the basis of missing messages as recorded on his Station
M log sheet. However, later Briggss investigations convinced him that the
date was actually December 4, as Saord maintained consistently throughout
his testimony and interrogations.
20
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586. See also Kramer testi-
mony, September 13, 1944, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Joint Committee,
part 33, p. 853.
the middle of the message. . . . Kramer had underscored all three
code phrases on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below
the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in
Kramers handwriting, the following free translations:
War with England (including NEI, etc.)
War with the U.S.
Peace with Russia
21
Saord immediately sent the original teletype of the Winds
Execute with one of his o cers up to the o ce of his superior,
Rear Admiral Noyes, director of naval communications. Saord
did not explain the message or its signicance to the courier; he
only told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person.
If Noyes wasnt there, the o cer was to track him down and
not take no for an answer. If Noyes could not be found within
a reasonable time, the o cer was to let Saord know. In a few
minutes, however, Saord received a report that the message had
been successfully delivered to Noyes.
22
Meanwhile over at the Japanese embassy in Washington,
Japanese Petty O cer Ogimoto, an intelligence o cer posing as
a code clerk, had been on the alert since November 19, when
the government in Tokyo had announced the Winds Code.
We knew, of course, that the Japanese embassies and legations
throughout the world must have been listening for the Winds
Execute just as intently as we had been, although we had no way
of knowing just what arrangements they had made. However, in
the naval attach room, Ogimoto had been straining his ears lis-
tening to shortwave broadcasts on their sophisticated radio. At
about 4:00 p.m. on December 4, Ogimoto heard what he had
been waiting for, East Wind Rain. He shouted out, Te wind
21
22
Ibid. See also p. 3611 and ibid., part 18, p. 3347, the memorandum of May
14, 1945, prepared by Saord for Lieutenant Commander John F. Sonnett,
legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt.
blew. Ogimoto heard the phrase East Wind Rain repeated
several times. In the next room Assistant Naval Attach Yuzuru
Sanematsu heard Ogimotos shout and rushed into the radio room.
Te room was electric with excitement. Te two men looked at
one another and said, What had to come has nally come. Tey
immediately started making preparations for the destruction of
the embassys secret codes, ciphers, and code machines.
23
Safford (Naval Communications, Security)
Alerts U.S. Outposts to Destroy
Classified Documents
Indications were mounting that some form of aggressive
action by the Japanese was imminent. But when? Where?
Saord was concerned for the safety of the cryptographic
equipment and all the classied documents at our mid-Pacic
stations. Te U.S. Naval Station on Guam was only 60 miles
or so from Saipan, one of the islands mandated to Japan after
World War I, and according to War Plans [Guam was] not to be
defended except against sabotage. So Saord thought we should
clean house early there.
24
Terefore, when the Winds Execute
came in on December 4, he prepared four messages to our stations
in the far-western Pacic which were dispatched that afternoon.
Te rst of Saords four messages was released by his supe-
rior, Noyes, and the other three by Admiral Ingersoll. Saords
23
Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980),
pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. Tis paragraph is based on translations by
Kentaro Nakano and Toshio Murata of pertinent passages in the autobiog-
raphy of naval historian Sanematsu. At the time of the attack, Sanematsu was
the ranking assistant naval attach and chief intelligence o cer in the Japa-
nese embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war
crimes tribunal and served time in prison.
24
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Saord testimony
before the APHB.
rst message ordered Guam (more than 3,000 miles west of
Hawaii) and Samoa (2,260 miles south and west of Hawaii) to
destroy certain codes immediately and to substitute a new code,
RIP 66, for RIP 65, then in use. It was sent Priority to Kimmel at
Pearl Harbor, Hart in Manila, the commandants of their respec-
tive naval districts, and the Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa.
Because military intelligence, that is, the analysis, interpreta-
tion, and dissemination of information, was the prerogative of
the O ce of Naval Intelligence, it was outside the jurisdiction of
Saords Security Section of Naval Communications. Terefore,
Saords cable was drafted in technical terms and refrained from
interpretation.
25
Saord then drafted a second message ordering Guam to
destroy all secret and condential publications and other clas-
sied matter except that essential for current purposes. . . . Be
prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classi-
ed matter you retain.
It was directed to the naval station at Guam for action, with
information copies to the commanders of the eets and naval
districts in the Philippines and Hawaii, who might have occasion
to communicate with Guam.
26
It was imperative that Saords
rst message get there rst, as the second message was sent in
the new RIP 66, which had just been made eective by the previ-
ous message. Noyes revised Saords draft somewhat and soft-
ened the degree of warning it contained, and it was dispatched
17 minutes after Saords rst message. However, it was sent
Deferred Priority, thus downgrading its urgency.
[B]y Navy regulations or by communication instructions
deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the
25
Ibid., p. 2397.
26
Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408.
beginning of working hours the next morning. In other words,
any message which comes in in deferred priority automatically
is not going to be considered a war warning, regardless of how
you stated it.
27
Saords third December 4 message was sent to Hart in
Manila, which lay on the ank of the route the Japanese con-
voys were traveling. It ordered that the communications room be
stripped of all secret and condential publications and papers
which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the
United States.
28
Te fourth message was directed for action to the U.S. naval
attaches in Tokyo, Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai, with an infor-
mation copy to Hart. No copy of this message was sent to Kimmel
in Pearl Harbor. Tis message, also prompted by our receipt of
the Winds Execute, ordered our outposts in the western Pacic
to destroy secret and condential materials which in the hands
of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States.
29
Saord was proud of the Navy crew at Cheltenham for hav-
ing intercepted the vital Winds Execute, and he did not forget
them. In the midst of the growing tension, he took time to send
them a message: Well done. Discontinue coverage of the target.
A day or so later, he followed that up with a bouquet of roses, not
exactly the traditional gift for one man to give a group of men.
But cryppies (cryptologists) had the reputation for being odd
balls, and Saord was a cryppy.
30
Saord recognized that our interception of the Winds
Execute had been due partly to good luck, the fact that the
Japanese hadnt transmitted it between November 15, when their
Winds Code setup message had gone out, and November 28,
27
Ibid., part 29, p. 2398, Saord testimony before the APHB.
28
Ibid., p. 2397, Serial No. 042018.
29
Ibid., Serial No. 042019.
30
Briggs interview, August 14, 1988, by Bettina B. Greaves.
when we decoded and translated it. It had been due partly to
foresight, the ability of Intelligence to put several clues together
so as to anticipate it. But our successful interception had also
been due to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving
apparatus at Cheltenham.
31
Tokyo to Honolulu: Investigate Ships in
Harbor; Tokyo to Embassy: Destroy Codes
Also intercepted and translated on December 4, was a signi-
cant J-l9 Tokyo-Honolulu cable. Honolulu was asked to investi-
gate comprehensively the eet bases in the neighborhood of the
Hawaiian military reservation.
32
Te usual procedure for handling Japanese J-19 messages
interception in Hawaii and airmailing to Washington as picked up,
still encrypted and untranslatedhad been followed in this case.
As a result, it was not until two weeks after its transmission from
Tokyo that this cable was decoded and translated in Washington.
However, it was available there on December 4, well before the
attack. And it provided conrmation of the Ships in Harbor
messages.
33
In light of the other intercepts, this new reminder
that the Japanese in Hawaii had our eet at Pearl Harbor under
close surveillance should have set o ashing lights and pierc-
ing alarms among those in military intelligence, arousing them to
alert the commanders in Hawaii. Yet no hint of either the earlier
Ships in Harbor messages, or of this follow-up, was forwarded
to Pearl Harbor.
A Purple December 4 Tokyo cable added to the crisis
atmosphere in Washington. Tis cable instructed the Japanese
31
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586, Saord testimony
before the Joint Committee.
32
Ibid., part 12, p. 263.
33
Ibid., part 12, pp. 26163.
ambassadors in Washington how to dispose of their codes. Te
key, or guide to deciphering the code, however, was to be kept
until the last moment and then sent to the Japanese ministry
in Mexico.
34
Tokyo to Ambassadors: Maintain Pretense
that Negotiations Continue
Also on December 4, the Navy translated the Japanese gov-
ernments instructions to their ambassadors in Washington as to
how to quiet Roosevelts concern, as expressed in his December
2 press conference, over Japanese troop movements in Indochina.
Te ambassadors were told to point out, while maintaining the
pretense that the negotiations were continuing, that the move-
ments in the southern part of the country, as well as in the north,
have been in response to an unusual amount of activity by the
Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo China bor-
der. Te movements, they maintained, have in no way violated
the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense
agreement.
35
Nevertheless, the Japanese ambassadors in Washington
were still concerned. If Japans troop movements into Indochina
continued, they feared the United States might take steps to
close down the Japanese consulates. So they wired Tokyo again:
[C]onsideration should be given to steps to be taken in con-
nection with the evacuation of the Consuls.
36
34
Ibid., p. 231.
35
Ibid., p. 224. Tokyo to Washington, #875.
36
Ibid., p. 227. Washington to Tokyo, #1243.
FDR and British Ambassador Discuss
Warning Japanese Against Attacking
British Malaya and NEI
Roosevelt followed the Japanese situation closely, insofar
as it was revealed by the MAGIC intercepts he saw.
37
Judging
from the clues to Japans intentions revealed in the messages
we were intercepting, it was apparent the Japanese were prepar-
ing to strike. [T]he only question that remained was when and
where.
38
Without revealing his reasons, on December 4 FDR
asked Congressional leaders not to recess for more than three
days at a time.
39
He was keeping the door open so that he could
address Congress should he decide events and public opinion
warranted it.
Late that evening, British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on
the president to express his governments very deep appreciation
for his promise the evening before of armed support. Te two
men discussed whether or not it would be advisable for the British,
Dutch, and the U.S. governments to issue jointly a simultaneous
warning to the Japanese against attacking Tailand, Malaya, the
Dutch East Indies, or the Burma Road through Indochina. FDR
was doubtful about including the Burma Road, but otherwise
agreed to the warning. However, he did not believe the warning
should be a joint one. He
thought that each of the three Governments should give it
independently, and that the American warning should come
rst, since he wanted to assure opinion in the United States
37
Henry M. Adams, Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons,
1977), p. 257.
38
Ibid., p. 256.
39
Ibid., p. 257.
that he was acting in the interest of American defence, and not
just following a British lead.
40
FDR had not given up all hope of a temporary agreement
with the Japanese. He led Halifax to believe that
Mr. Kurusu had let him know indirectly that an approach
to the Emperor might still secure a truce, and even lead to a
settlement between Japan and China. Mr. Kurusus plan was
that the President should try to act as an introducer between
China and Japan with a view to their dealing directly with each
other.
Roosevelt suggested that the lines of settlement in such an
agreement might be the withdrawal of the bulk of Japanese
troops from Indo-China, and a similar withdrawal from North
China on an agreed timetable.
41
FDR also told Halifax that the Japanese would have to have
some economic relief. Actually, he said, he did not put too
much importance on Mr. Kurusus approach, but he could not
miss even the chance of a settlement. Besides FDR believed his
own case [that the U.S. was negotiating in sincerity with Japan]
would be strengthened if he had been in communication with the
Emperor.
42
Tere was some danger, Halifax believed, in postponing
the warning. He even suggested that the communication to
the Emperor might serve as a denite warning. Te president
agreed but said he would decide on December 6, after getting
the Japanese reply to his enquiries [concerning the Japanese
troop movements], whether to approach the Emperor. FDR told
40
Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), pp. 18788.
41
Ibid., p.188.
42
Ibid.
Halifax that he hoped that, if he did contact the Emperor, the
three-Power warning might be postponed until he had had an
answer.
43
British Forces in Southeast Asia Told
of Promised U. S. Armed Support
On December 5 in southeast Asia (December 4 in the United
States)
the Dominions received from the United Kingdom Government
information that it had received assurance of armed support
from the United States (a) if Britain found it necessary either
to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy
part of the isthmus as a counter to Japanese violation of any
other part of Tailand; (b) if Japan attacked the Netherlands
East Indies and Britain at once went to their support; (c) if
Japan attacked British territory.
44
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, British commander-in-chief
in the Far East stationed in Singapore, had nally received the
authority he had been requesting; he was free to launch Matador,
the operation intended to forestall a Japanese landing on the Kra
Isthmus. However, Londons instructions were worded in such
a way as to require that he withhold any action until he was
absolutely sure that a Japanese expedition was making for the
Isthmus of Kra. Such a delay would mean that the chances of
its [a British operation] succeeding were greatly reduced, for it
would be too late to take action.
45
43
Ibid.
44
Lionel Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,
1957), p. 109.
45
S. Woodburn Kirby, Te War Against Japan, vol. 1: Te Loss of Singapore
(London: Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1957), p. 175.
Te volume of Japanese intercepts being decoded and trans-
lated in Washington during this time was almost overwhelming.
Te purpose of such cryptanalysis is, of course, to use the intel-
ligence eectively to gain an advantage over ones adversaries. Te
record reveals that our cryptanalysts and translators were doing
a remarkable job; they were intercepting, decoding, translating,
and disseminating promptly countless Japanese messages. Tus, a
great deal of information was coming into Washington. However,
precious little intelligence was going outto the men in the
eld who might have been able to use it.
11.
Further Indications of
Impending Japanese Action
Tokyo: Utterly Impossible for
Japan to Accept U.S. Terms
P
age One of Te New York Times reported on December 5
that Tokyo was struck as by a bombshell . . . with the rev-
elation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotia-
tions. Japans government-controlled news agency, Domei, had
announced, It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipu-
lations of the American document presented to the two Japanese
ambassadors on November 26 by Secretary of State Hull. Domei
was owned by the Japanese government and carefully controlled
by the Japanese Government. Any Domei report was simply
what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to
the public.
1
Te terms of the U.S. document were not reported.
However, according to the story, a lively debate had taken place
1
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 2, p. 688, Testimony of Joseph
C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

239
the day before at a session of the entire Japanese Privy Council.
Furthermore, Domei asserted, the document
cannot serve as a basis of Japanese-American negotiations
henceforth. Hulls statement means that the United States is
still scheming to impose on Japan the provisions of old and
obsolete principles, which are incompatible with the actual Far
Eastern conditions, even of bygone days.
2

Japanese Expeditionary Force
in the Southwest Pacific
Te Dutch and British, with possessions in the southwest
Pacic, were concerned that huge concentrations of Japanese
forces were assembling and apparently preparing to move in their
direction. Te commander-in-chief of all Dutch naval forces, sta-
tioned in London since the German invasion of the Netherlands
in May 1940, had received information that the Japanese were
concentrating an expeditionary force in the Pelew [Palau] Islands
in the Carolines, only about 600 miles northwest of Dutch New
Guinea.
3
Te Dutch in London conferred with Anthony Eden,
secretary of state for foreign aairs. Tey were seeking some type
of a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United States or
Great Britain to assist their defense against the Japanese.
4
Eden
cabled Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington,
setting forth the British view that the time has now come for
immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual
understanding. . . .Tis of course relates to the matter of defense
2
New York Times, December 5, 1941, pp. 1, 4.

3
O ce, 1956), vol. 4, p. 717.
4
Ibid., pp. 71719.

Further Indications of Impending Japanese Action 241
against Japan.
5
Halifax asked to see Secretary of State Hull and
he called at Hulls apartment on the morning of December 5, to
discuss Edens cable.
Tokyo Replies to FDR Concerning Japanese
Troops in Indochina
On December 5 the two Japanese ambassadors called at the
State Department to present formally the Japanese governments
answer to FDRs question with regard to the reported move-
ments of Japanese troops in French Indo-china. Te two men
handed Hull the Japanese governments reply. It was short. Te
ambassadors waited while the secretary read.
Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of move-
ments along the northern frontier of French Indo-china border-
ing on China. Hence, Japanese troops . . . have been reinforced
to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china,
for the principal purpose of taking precautionary measures. As
a result, some Japanese troop movements have been carried out
in southern Indochina and apparently an exaggerated report has
been made of these movements. However, the Japanese govern-
ment said, no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese
Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol
of Joint Defense between Japan and France.
6

When Hull had nished reading, he asked the ambassadors
whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable
to attack them in Indochina. He said the Chinese contended
they were massing troops in Yunnan [a province of China on the
northern border of Indochina] . . . in answer to Japans massing
troops in Indochina. Ambassador Nomura said that
5
Ibid., p. 719.

6
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 784.
as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road . . . the
possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of pre-
venting Japans attacking the Burma Road from Indochina
could not be excluded.
Hull responded that he had never heard before that Japans
troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose
of defense against Chinese attack. Tis was the rst time that
he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina. Hull
sounded sarcastic.
Te ambassadors said the Japanese were alarmed over
increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD pow-
ers in the southwest Pacic area. Tey said that an airplane of
one of those countries had recently own over Formosa, then
Japanese territory.
Nevertheless, Kurusu said, the Japanese government was very
anxious to reach an agreement with this [U.S.] Government, and
it felt we should be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China
as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initi-
ated. Hull countered by bringing up the aid Japan was giving
Hitler. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. Hull
replied, by keeping large forces of this country and other coun-
tries immobilized in the Pacic area.
7
At this point the Japanese
ambassador said under his breath, [T]his isnt getting us any-
where. Nevertheless, the conversation continued. Te secretary
and the two ambassadors recapitulated their respective positions
more or less as they had done many times beforewith respect to
U.S. aid to China, the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina,
Japans desire for oil, and the attitude of the United States toward
supplying that oil.
Hull criticized Japans bellicose slogans and the malignant
campaign conducted [in Japan] through the o cially controlled
7
Ibid., pp. 78182, Joseph W. Ballantine report of December 5 meeting
between Hull and the Japanese ambassadors.
and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to
peace. Kurusu pointed out that on the American side we were
not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. One press report
had cast aspersions on him personally, saying he had been sent
here to check on Nomura. Hull replied that he had heard only
good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador.
In spite of the formal pleasantry, the Japanese ambassadors
sotte voce remark had been correctthe discussions werent get-
ting anywhere. Te two ambassadors made the usual apologies
for taking so much of the Secretarys time and withdrew.
8

FDR and Stimson Denounce for Lack of
Patriotism Those Who Leaked U.S. War Plans
Te December 4 Chicago Tribune story on F.D.R.s War
Plan had aroused the country. At a White House press confer-
ence the next day, Roosevelt parried questions of reporters and
referred them to Secretary of War Stimson. Almost 200 newspa-
per correspondents immediately ocked to his [Stimsons] press
conference.
9
After reading a short statement, Stimson asked the
reporters,
What would you think of an American general sta which
in the present condition of the world did not investigate and
study every conceivable type of emergency which may con-
front this country, and every possible method of meeting that
emergency?
He questioned the patriotism of the person or newspaper
that would publish condential studies and make them available
to our enemies. Te newspaper report was about an unnished
8
Ibid., pp. 78283.
9
New York Times, December 6, 1941, p. 3.
study that had never constituted an authorized program of the
Government.
10

Stimson continued,
While their publication will doubtless be of gratication to
our potential enemies and a possible source of impairment and
embarrassment to our national defense, the chief evil of their
publication is the revelation that there should be among us any
group of persons so lacking in appreciation of the danger that
confronts the country.
He denounced those who were so wanting in loyalty and
patriotism to their government that they would be willing to take
and publish such papers. Stimson declined to answer questions
or enlarge upon it, but indicated that more would be announced
after he had completed the task . . . of nding out how the leak
occurred.
11

Japan Anticipates a Break with England
and the United States
On December 3 the Japanese ambassadors in Washington
notied Tokyo by cable (which we decoded and translated on
December 5) that the indications were that some joint military
action between Great Britain and the United States, with or
without a declaration of war is a denite certainty in the event of
an occupation [by Japan] of Tailand.
12

Also on December 5 we read a December 1 message from
Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in London: Please discontinue
the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately. To
10
sion, 1950), p. 359.
11
New York Times, December 6, 1941 p. 3.
12
acknowledge receipt of these instructions, the embassy was to
cable Tokyo in plain language . . . the one word SETUJU. When
the code machine had actually been destroyed the embassy was to
wire Tokyo, also in plain language, HASSO.
13
Tus communi-
cations in code between the Embassy in London and Tokyo were
being shut down.
Some in U.S. intelligence realized that this was what Japan
had been preparing for when it set up the Winds Code. Radio
reception in those days was not reliable. Routine Japanese news
and weather broadcasts, into which Japan inserted the special
weather words with their secret meanings, could not usually be
heard in the countries surrounding the Pacic. But due to freak
atmospheric conditions, they could be heard . . . in the North
Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles and Western Europe. Tus
the primary reason for sending the Winds Execute must have
been to notify the Japanese ambassador in London, after his code
machine had been disposed of, that war with England and the
United States was coming. [T]his was the only way that Tokyo
could get news to him secretly.
14

Tat same day we intercepted a December 4 cable from the
Japanese ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo. Berlin was asking Tokyo
to arrange, [i]n case of evacuation from London, for the transfer
to Berlin of certain embassy personnel. Why would the Japanese
ambassador in Berlin anticipate the evacuation of the Japanese
embassy in London, unless he expected Japan and Great Britain
soon to be at war with each other?
15

13
Ibid., part 12, p. 209.
14
Ibid., part 8, p. 3585, Saord statement prepared for Joint Committee.
15
Ibid., part 12, p. 234.
Confirmation from Batavia, NEI, of
Significance of Japans Winds Code
Te naval attach in Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, also
picked up the Japanese Winds Code setup message and noti-
ed Washington deferred priority on December 4, 6:21 a.m.
Greenwich time (December 4, 1:21 a.m. Washington time). Te
attach advised the United States that Japan will notify her con-
suls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at
end (italics added). Ten the cable quoted the special weather
words, each with its hidden meaning.
16

Te Winds Execute picked up in Cheltenham, Maryland,
on December 4 was open to several interpretations. It could have
indicated simply that Japanese relations with the nations men-
tioned would be in danger; that Japanese negotiations would be
discontinued; that diplomatic relations would be broken o; or
that actual war was imminent. Tus Batavias explicit interpreta-
tion, that the transmission of a Winds Execute would forebode
war, lent credence to Saords and Kramers interpretation that
it was actually a portent of war. However, since the cable from
Batavia had not been classied URGENT, it was not decrypted
immediately, but held for the December 45 nightshift of Armys
G-2, Intelligence Division. When we nally read it on the morn-
ing of December 5, it was old hat, for we had already picked up
the Winds Execute.
The Navys December View of
the U.S.-Japanese Situation
When Navy Director of War Plans Turner heard from
Admiral Noyes that a Winds Execute referring to a break in
16
Ibid., part 9, p. 4214, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See
also ibid., part 18, p. 3350. #031030 (5 Dec. 1941) from ALUSNA, Batavia
(Torpe).
U.S.-Japanese relations, had been received, he assumed Kimmel
in Pearl Harbor had it. At a December 5 meeting, three top
Washington Navy o cialsChief of Naval Operations Stark,
Assistant Chief Ingersoll, and Turnerconcluded that all neces-
sary orders had been issued to all echelons of command prepara-
tory to war and that nothing further was necessary.
17
17
Ibid., part 33, p. 886. Turner testimony before the NCI.
12.
December 6, Part 1
Collecting Intelligence
and Determining Policy
W
ith the perspective of hindsight, it is easy to spot the sig-
nicant clues that should have given warning that the
Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Out of fairness to the
participants in the drama that was unfolding in 1941, however,
we should keep in mind the situation as it appeared to them. A
mass of information was coming into Washington in many forms
from all over the world. Bits and pieces of information came from
various sourcesfrom diplomatic contacts, from cable intercepts,
including MAGIC, from our military and naval attachs, from
direct observations, overights, radio direction ndings, and so
on. Much of it was not in English. And much of this foreign-
language material was in code as well. We were able to decode,
translate, and read a great deal of that, although not all, quite
promptly. Te coded cable tra c alone was extremely heavy. Tus
the amount of this material that was available toward the end of
1941 was almost overwhelming.
249
Many persons, each with his or her own expertise, played
a role in the process of collecting the raw data that go to pro-
vide intelligence. Tere were code specialists, communications
specialists, security specialists, decoders, translators, and couriers.
Tere were code clerks who listened to foreign radio broadcasts
and could decipher Morse code, linguists familiar with Japanese,
and radio technicians who could determine the location of naval
vessels and military units by intersecting radio beacons. Tere were
others at our various stations all over the world who picked cable
intercepts out of the air and transmitted them to Washington.
Each was familiar with only a small part of the total picture. No
single person had access to all this information. Few of the many
specialists were su ciently aware of the broad picture to be able
to comprehend the signicance of the data they accumulated.
And no one had any reason to feel a sense of urgency because no
one knew what was going to happen on December 7.
Te responsibility for collecting, analyzing, disseminating,
and employing information was divided among various o ces
and divisions of the military and the administration, each with
its own specialized experts. Roughly speaking, data was collected
by technical personnel in communications. Raw data was then
integrated and analyzed by specialists in intelligence o ces or
divisions, persons who had the training, experience, background,
and knowledge of policy su cient to sift the wheat from the
cha, to recognize what was pertinent and what was not, to
analyze and interpret it, and to decide what information should
be disseminated and to whom. Tese intelligence specialists
needed to understand not only military operations, the defensive
and oensive capabilities of our forces and of our potential allies
and enemies, but also the diplomatic situation and government
policy.
Once the raw data collected was converted into intelligence,
other specialists were responsible for disseminating it and issu-
ing commands to the eld commanders. Tis responsibility was
December 6, Part 1 251
usually in the hands of War Plans or Operations divisions.
Final policy decisions were then made on the basis of the diplo-
matic and political situation by the governments administrative
o cials, the president and his cabinet, after taking into consider-
ation the advice of the Armys chief of sta and the chief of naval
operations.
Te various specialists cooperated. But at the same time they
were protective of the prerogatives of their own o ce or division,
and anxious to prevent outsiders from invading their depart-
ments turf. Tus the jurisdiction of each o ce or division was
carefully prescribed. To avoid conict, each was careful to follow
channels. Communications collected data; Intelligence ana-
lyzed and interpreted it; orders to eld o cers, in line with the
administrations policy decisions, went out from War Plans or
Operations. Although the system usually functioned smoothly,
its operation was sometimes disturbed as changes were made in
procedure and personnel.
In the Army, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) collected
information and transmitted it to Army Intelligence (G-2). Te
War Plans Division (G-5) formulated plans under the direction
of the Army chief of sta (ACS). Te president, the commander-
in-chief, was responsible for overall policy. But orders to the eld
were issued by the chief of sta, the immediate advisor of the
Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Field
Forces.
1

In the Navy, the O ce of Naval Communications collected
data. Traditionally, the O ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had
had the responsibility for collating, analyzing, and disseminat-
ing this information to o cers in the eld. However, when Rear
Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson became director of ONI on
1
sion, 1950), p. 64.
October 15, 1941, he found that it had been reduced to a fact-
gathering agency and the Navys War Plans Division had assumed
the responsibility for analyzing the information that came in.
2

Te Navys top o cer, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
was responsible for keeping the Navys commander-in-chief, the
president, informed. And orders to the Navys eld commanders
were sent out by the CNO.
Step by step, as data journeyed through channels, from the
technical specialists who collected it to the o cers with training
and experience who interpreted it, it became meaningful intel-
ligence. Intelligence formed an extremely important compo-
nent of the total 1941 picture. Te Armys chief of sta, General
Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark,
relied on the available intelligence when advising their eld
commanders on military strategy. Te top administration o -
cials, that is the secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the president
himself, also strove to keep abreast of current intelligence. In
1941, this meant keeping up to date on the Japanese position
through the diplomatic cables and other sources.
In the course of assembling, interpreting, and analyzing the
data available, the most important intelligence was channeled
to the men at the top. Even though each technical specialist
involved in the complicated procedure was familiar with only a
small segment of the total picture, the president and his top civil-
ian and military advisers, who had the nal responsibility for the
common defense of the nation and for resolving diplomatic and
political dierences, had a birds-eye view of the overall situa-
tion. Tey were also provided with the countrys most percep-
tive military advice. By December 6, they were well aware, as a
2
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 36, pp. 22931, testimony of
Admiral Wilkinson, June 5, 1945, before the Hewitt Inquiry.
result of their access to MAGIC and other sources, that a clash
with Japan was at hand. Teir constitutional responsibility for
national defense obligated them to protect this country and its
citizens and to see to it that, insofar as possible, U.S. forces, wher-
ever stationed, were properly provisioned, prepared, and alerted.
Teir constitutional responsibility did not call for inviting foreign
intervention or defending other nations.
Pilot Message Alerts Washington to
Expect Japans Reply to U.S. Ultimatum
Ever since November 26, when Washington o cialdom had
rejected the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi, we had been
anxiously awaiting Tokyos reply. We knew from reading cable
intercepts that the Japanese considered our statement humiliat-
ing and that relations between our two countries were considered
to be de facto ruptured. It was clear to us that U.S.-Japanese
relations were at an impasse. But we had also read their govern-
ments instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors to keep on
talking and not to give the impression that the negotiations are
broken o. So we knew their interest in continuing to meet with
Secretary of State Hull was merely for the sake of appearances; it
did not mean a change in their deadline.
3

On Friday, December 5, Rear Admiral Teodore S. Wilkinson,
Director of the O ce of Naval Intelligence, had set up a 24-hour
watch in the Far Eastern Section and had established a watch
of the senior o cers of the Department.
4
According to Navy
Captain William A. Heard, then in charge of the foreign branch,
O ce of Naval Intelligence, Tere was an elaborate arrangement
for prompt notication to the Director of Naval Intelligence of
3
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 195, Tokyo to Washington
Purple message #844.
4
Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony.
any matter of interest to him. Captain Heard had personally
arranged for a special week-end telephone line between the
O ce of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, which
included my [Heards] telephone communication with both
Military Intelligence and with the State Department.
5

On Saturday, December 6, at 7:15 a.m., Washington,
D.C., time, the Navys intercept station on Bainbridge Island
(Washington state), across the Puget Sound from Seattle, started
picking up a message in Purple addressed to the Japanese ambas-
sadors in Washington.
6
Tis coded message was relayed almost
immediately, as was customary by TWX (teletype wire exchange)
along with other messages that had been intercepted that morn-
ing, to Washington, D.C.
7
It was received in Washington that
same day, at 12:05 p.m.
Until a message had been decoded and translated, there was
no way, of course, to know if it was important. Army and Navy
had only just, on December 1, worked out an arrangement to share
responsibility for handling the heavy tra c of Japanese inter-
cepts, the Army had the responsibility for decoding and trans-
lating on even-numbered dates, the Navy on uneven-numbered
dates. December 6 was an Army day. So when this message from
Bainbridge came in, the Navy relayed it to the Armys SIS
8
and
an Army cryptographic unit went to work right away. Tat was
fortunate, for this message proved to be Tokyos announcement
to her two Washington ambassadors that Japans formal reply to
the U.S. note of November 26 was on its way. Tis message came
to be known among those familiar with MAGIC as the Pilot
5
Ibid., part 32, p. 356, Testimony of Navy Captain William S. Heard before the
NCI.
6
7
Ibid., part 8, p. 3560, Saord testimony.
8
Ibid., part 14, p. 1413.
Message.
9
By 2:00 it had been decoded, translated, and typed up
in nished form by the SIS men.
10
Presumably the Japanese code
clerks in their embassy were decoding and typing this same mes-
sage at the same time as were our Army decoders.
Tis Pilot Message stated that the Japanese government
had deliberated deeply with respect to the U.S. note and had
drawn up a long 14-part memorandum that would be sent to
the ambassadors separately. Te reply would be transmitted in
English, so it would only have to be decoded before it could be
submitted to Hull. Te situation was extremely delicate, Tokyo
warned. When the ambassadors received the long memorandum,
they should keep it secret for the time being. Tey would be wired
special instructions separately concerning the time of presenting
this memorandum to the United States.
11

About 2:00 Saturday afternoon, as soon as the Pilot Message
was ready, SIS sent it to the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Departments general sta. From Military Intelligence it
was distributed at about 3:00, either by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton,
then chief of Military Divisions Far Eastern Section, or by one
of his assistants, to the Armys list of recipientsHull, Stimson,
Marshall, and Chief of War Plans Division Leonard T. Gerow
(G-2).
12

Te Navy courier, responsible for delivering Japanese inter-
cepts to the White House and the others on the Navys list, was
Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer. Te White House was
usually rst on Kramers list and apparently Admiral Beardall,
naval aide to the president at the White House, received the
9
Ibid., part 12, pp. 23839.
10
Ibid., part 9, p. 4510, testimony of Colonel Rufus Bratton before the Joint
Committee.
11
Ibid., part 12, pp. 23839.
12
Ibid., part 9, pp. 450810, 451213, 4536, 4574, Bratton testimony before
the Joint Committee.
Pilot Message at about 4:00 in the afternoon, shortly before
leaving his o ce for the evening.
13
Admiral Wilkinson, Director
of Naval Intelligence, was planning a party that Saturday evening
for some of his fellow sta o cers and he said he received the
message in his o ce at about 6:00 p.m., just before he left for
home.
14

After reading the Pilot Message, the top o cers in the
administration, Army, and Navy anxiously awaited the 14-part
Japanese reply. Watching for the long Japanese memorandum
was given top priority. Since FDRs naval aide Beardall had plans
for the evening, he arranged for a communication watch o cer,
Lieutenant Schulz, to stand by at the White House to deliver
to the president any message that might come in during the
evening.
15

Te rst part of Japans 14-part English-language message,
heralded by the Pilot Message, began to come into Washington
during the afternoon of December 6. And then the decoding
began.
U.S. Overflights Sight Japanese Convoys in
South China Sea Heading Toward Malaya
Te steady stream of Japanese messages we were intercepting
gave us substantial insight into the deliberations of the Japanese
government. However, these intercepts were not our only source of
information about their activities. Planes from Manila conducted
reconnaissance ights on a regular basis over the South China
Sea and reported on Japanese movements at sea. A December
6 cable from Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic
13
Ibid., part 10, p. 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee; ibid.,
part 11, p. 5271, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
14
Ibid., part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint
Committee.
15
Ibid., part 11, pp. 527781, Beardall testimony.
Fleet in the Philippines was received in the Navy Department in
Washington at about 8:00 a.m. that same morning. It reported
that two Japanese convoys consisting of 35 ships escorted by eight
cruisers and 20 destroyers had been sighted south of Indochina
heading toward Malaya.
16
Tese convoys were dangerously close
to the line drawn by the ADB powers (American/Dutch/British)
and designated in their secret April 1941 Singapore meeting as
the limit beyond which the Japanese could not advance with-
out inviting active military counter-action.
17
Both convoys were
south of the southern tip of French Indochina, so they had already
crossed latitude 10 North. Since they were heading west toward
the Isthmus of Kra, and had arrived at longitudes 106.20 East
and 105 East, they were expected soon to pass the critical north-
south line, 100 East. Harts message also reported 30 ships
and one large cruiser sighted by his scouting force anchored in
Camranh Bay o the southeast coast of Indochina, a couple of
hundred miles north of Saigon (since renamed Ho Chi Minh
City).
Shortly after Harts cable reached the Navy Department, the
State Department received a message from U.S. Ambassador
John G. Winant in London conrming that these convoys were
converging on waters the ADB powers considered inviolable.
18
It
was not clear, however, just where they were headed. Te British
undersecretary of foreign aairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was
uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra [Malaya] or
Bangkok [Tailand].
19
But there could be no doubt that Japanese
ships and troops were moving into position for some operation
in the vicinity of the Malaysian Peninsula and/or the Dutch East
16
Ibid., part 17, p. 2485.
17
Ibid., part 15, p. 1564, ADB (April 1941) Conversations.
18
Ibid., part 14, p. 1246. See also ibid., part 2, p. 493.
19
Ibid., part 14, p. 1247. See also ibid., part 2, p. 494.
Indies. Te Dutch were much alarmed at the proximity of such
large concentrations of Japanese troops.
On December 5, U.S. Military Attach Merle-Smith in
Australia had sent information about these convoys to General
MacArthur in the Philippines and to General Short in Hawaii.
Te fact that Japanese troops were on the move in the southwest
Pacic was taken as conrmation in Hawaii of the word they
had received from Washington: that the immediate threat of a
Japanese strike was to southeast Asia.
20

Intercepted Messages from Italy,
Japanese Embassy (Washington), Tokyo,
Indicate War is Imminent
In Europe the three Axis PowersGermany, Italy, and
Japanwere following the diplomatic events unfolding in
Washington. We learned on December 6, that Premier Benito
Mussolini had told the Japanese ambassador to Italy that he had
been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks.
Mussolini charged the United States with utter bull-headedness
and FDR with being of a meddlesome nature. Mussolini told
the ambassador that he was in complete sympathy with Japans
desire to create a New Order in East Asia. Te ambassador
then asked, [S]hould Japan declare war on the United States and
Great Britain . . . would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini
replied: Of course.
21

A December 5 message addressed to the Japanese ambassa-
dors in Washington from Tokyo, also decoded and translated in
Washington on December 6, provided one more clue to Japans
intentions. Tis cable was short: Will you please have Terasaki,
20
Ibid., part 34, pp. 5961, Lieutenant Robert H. ODell testimony before
Clarke Inquiry, October 6, 1944.
21
Ibid., part 12, pp. 22829.
Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the
next couple of days.
22
When delivered to the Navy recipients of
MAGIC, a penciled footnote identied Terasaki, second secre-
tary in the Japanese embassy, as head of Japanese espionage in
Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants, the note read, are
being sent to South America.
23

Also on December 6, we translated two other Purple mes-
sages dealing with the destruction of codes at the Japanese embassy
in Washington. One message from the embassy in Washington
advised Tokyo that the codes had been destroyed but requested
permission, since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still con-
tinuing[,] to delay the destruction of the one code machine.
24

Te wire from Tokyo explained that the embassy was to burn
one set of code machines but for the time being to continue the
use of the other.
25

Tat same afternoon we intercepted and decrypted another
short Japanese message from Tokyo reminding the embassy
in Washington of the importance of preserving secrecy with
respect to the aide memoire, the 14-part reply to our note of
November 26. [B]e absolutely sure not to use a typist or any
other person in its preparation.
26

Still another signicant Japanese intercept from Honolulu to
Tokyo was read that day. Tis message, transmitted in a code not
yet decrypted, had been picked up in San Francisco on November
18 and airmailed to the SIS in Washington on or about November
21. It could be decoded and translated only after the cipher was
solved on or about December 3, but it was available to our people
22
Ibid., p. 234.
23
Ibid., part 9, p. 4201. Note added by courier Kramer for the benet of Navy
recipients, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
24
Ibid., part 12, pp. 236.
25
Ibid., p. 237.
26
Ibid., part 12, p. 245.
in Washington on December 6.
27
Tis intercept reported move-
ments of U.S. naval ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. No hint of
its contents, or of its existence, was relayed to the commanders
there.
Japanese Offices Worldwide
Acknowledge Code-Destruct Order
Japanese diplomatic o ces all around the world seemed to be
preparing for an emergency. On December 3 we had translated a
Tokyo message to the Japanese embassy in Washington ordering
them to destroy all but one code machine and to burn all codes
but the one used with the surviving machine. When this had been
done the embassy was to cable one word to Tokyo: haruna.
28
On
delivering this intercept to FDR, his naval aide Beardall called it
to FDRs attention. Te president read it and asked, Well, when
do you think it will happen? In other words, when did he expect
war to break out? Beardall replied, Most any time.
29
On receipt of this intercept, a young o cer, at Colonel
Brattons request, went by the Japanese embassy in Washington
during the night. He saw o cials of the Japanese embassy actually
burning their code book and ciphers. On December 6, the O ce
of Naval Intelligence learned about this and reported to military
intelligence that the embassy had complied with the Tokyo order
to destroy its codes.
30

Also on December 3, SIS began picking the word haruna in
messages being transmitted by the Japanese consuls in New York,
New Orleans, and Havana. Its signicance may not have been
27
Ibid., part 5, p. 2082.
28
Ibid., part 12, p. 215. Tokyo to Washington #867.
29
Ibid., part 11, p. 5284, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
30
Ibid., part 8, p. 3780, memorandum on the stationery of the War Depart-
ment General Sta, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, dated
December 6, 1941.
fully appreciated at the time, for the cable directing the Japanese
embassy in Washington to cable haruna to Tokyo after destroy-
ing their codes and code machines had only been intercepted,
decoded, and translated that very day. Te next day we inter-
cepted transmissions of haruna from Portland and Panama.
On December 5 the Japanese consuls in Hollywood, Seattle, and
Vancouver (Canada) also cabled Tokyo haruna. Ottawa did the
same the following day.
31
Security of U.S. Communications
in Pacific in Jeopardy
In compliance with U.S. Pacic Fleet Operating Plan,
Rainbow No. Five, Admiral Kimmel had sent reinforcements to
the mid-Pacic islands under his commandWake (1,994 miles
west of Pearl Harbor)
32
and Guam (located 1,334 miles farther
out in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands, 3,340 miles
west of Pearl Harbor).
33

In Washington, toward the end of the o ce day on December 5,
one of the women employed in the Registered Publication Section
realized that the forces which had gone to Wake had taken with
them a lot of registered publications. Captain Saord, who was
in charge of the security section of the Navys Communications
Division, had warned Guam the day before to destroy all secret
and classied publications and other classied matter. Saord
now became concerned about Wake; he asked the persons in the
Registered Publication Section to make a complete inventory
of the sensitive materials there. One or two o cers and a couple
of civilians in the Section worked on the assignment until about 1
oclock in the morning. [T]he next morning they gave [Saord]
31
Ibid., part 5, p. 2077.
32
Ibid., part 12, p. 339, table of distances.
33
Distances as cited in the Encylopaedia Britannica (1955), Guam entry, vol.
10, p. 929.
an inventory of 150 dierent registered publications on that lit-
tle island where, you see, they had almost nothing in the way
of defense. And at that time, in Saords view, war was right
around the corner.
34

As communications o cer, Saord was responsible for safe-
guarding the security of our lines of communications. Intelligence
was not within his purview; he could not convey to the eld his
judgment that war was right around the corner. However, the
safety of the registered publications on Wake, under the jurisdic-
tion of the Pacic Fleet, was one of his responsibilities. Terefore,
Saord drafted a message for the eets commander-in-chief,
Kimmel, and for the information of the senior o cers on Wake.
In view of imminence of war, it read, they were to destroy all
registered publications except this system and current editions of
aircraft code and direction nder code.
35
Before such a message
could go out, it had to be approved by Saords superior, Admiral
Noyes, director of Naval Communications. So Saord took his
draft to Noyes.
Noyes: What do you mean by using such language as that?
Saord: Admiral, the war is just a matter of days, if not of
hours.
Noyes: You may think there is going to be a war, but I think
they are blu ng.
Saord: Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are
captured we will never be able to explain it.
Noyes then rewrote the message and left out any reference
to Wake Island or the 150 publications exposed to capture, which
34
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 239899, Saord testi-
mony at APHB.
35
Ibid.
included all our reserve publications for the next six months. Te
message as it was actually released, addressed to Kimmel under
date of December 6, for transmission to Wake, read as follows:
In view of the international situation and the exposed position
of the outlying Pacic islands you may authorize the destruc-
tion by them of secret and condential documents now or
under later conditions of greater emergency.
Tis ambiguous message was released by Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations Ingersoll and sent to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor,
who still had to relay it to Wake. Moreover, it was sent deferred
precedence, which meant delivery by 9:00 on Monday morning,
December 8, 1941.
36

British and Dutch on the
QUI VIVE in Southeast Pacific
By November 29, Singapore had begun to go on the alert.
[A]ll troops away from barracks . . . had been ordered back.
British Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had
ordered the second degree of readiness, and the Volunteers were
being mobilized. Soon troops were recalled from leave and other
precautions were taken, including the rounding up of Japanese
civilians.
37

All Singapore was on the qui vive. More ships than usual
were on the move. Troops were being recalled to duty. Our naval
observer in Singapore, Captain John M. Creighton, was busy
shuttling back and forth between his two o ces, 18 miles apart.
He wanted to be physically acquainted with the dockyard so that
if contingents of our eet came there [he] could guide them to
36
Ibid. For text of message #061743, see Joint Committee, part 14, p. 1408.
37
1957), pp. 12122.
all the shops and arrange for them to get repairs on guns, bat-
teries, or anything else. He was also busy routing American mer-
chant ships in that area. And he frequently had to arrange special
passes for the many American visitors arriving at the airports with
dispatches, money, and sometimes pistols, which were not always
allowed into the country.
38

A report reached Singapore during the night of December
4 or 5 that a pilot of a British reconnaissance airplane, ying
from a certain point northeast of Malaya on a regular patrol up
toward Siam . . . in the late afternoon . . . had encountered a large
[ Japanese] convoy of what looked to him like transports, sev-
eral old battleships, an aircraft carrier, and attendant destroyers.
Tey were already south and west of Indochina and were headed
west and almost south of the south point of Siam. . . . [W]hen
he went closer in his plane to observe them . . . Japanese ghter
planes came up o the deck of the carrier and went straight at
him, making it perfectly evident that they would keep him from
approaching the convoy. It was presumed that after nightfall
they would [either] continue west to the Kra Peninsula, north of
Malaya, or shift northwest toward Bangkok, toward which many
threats had been made recently.
39

Two big British ships, Repulse, a battle cruiser, and Prince
of Wales, a battleship that was undergoing repairs so as to be
ready for sea duty once more, had been sent out to Singapore.
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, recently appointed commander-in-
chief of the Eastern Fleet, had arrived there ahead of the ships
and had own on December 4 to Manila for a conference with
Admiral Hart. Teir talks ended abruptly with the news of the
large Japanese convoy on its way from Camranh Bay towards the
Gulf of Siam. As Philllips was leaving for Singapore . . . Hart
38
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 5081, Creighton testi-
39
Ibid., p. 508384.
told him that he had just ordered four of his destroyers, then at
Balikpapan (Borneo), to join Phillipss force.
40
Phillips arrived
back in Singapore on the morning of December 7 (December 6,
Washington time).
Te entire region was on the alert. [B]ecause of the movement
of Japanese task forces southward and possibly into the China
Sea, a conference was called in Australia early in December by
Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, chief of sta, of the
Royal Australian Air Force. In attendance were representatives of
the British, Dutch, and American governmentsColonel Van S.
Merle-Smith, U.S. military attach at the legation in Melbourne;
Commander Salm, the Dutch Indies naval liaison o cer to the
Australian government; Lieutenant Robert H. ODell, then assis-
tant military attach in Australia; and Air Commodore Hewitt,
the Royal Australian Air Force intelligence o cer, who came and
went during the conference.
41

[U]pon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau,
one of the Caroline Islands less than 600 miles north of the Dutch
East Indies, the Netherlands Far East Command had ordered
on December 6 the execution of mobilization Plan A-2.
42
War
Plan A-2 was a mutual agreement among Britain, Holland (the
Indies), America and Australia in line with the ADB conversa-
tions at Singapore in the spring of 1941.
43

Te Australians had oered to furnish some aircraft to the
Dutch. But then planes reached Koepang on the island of Dutch
Timor and the Netherlands command did not consider Australian
40
Wigmore, Te Japanese Trust, p. 122.
41
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2300, testimony before
APHB of ODell.
42
Ibid., part 30, p. 3223 (APHB Exhibit No. 70, Exhibit A, Summary of
Far Eastern Documents paragraph FE 366). See also ibid., part 9, p. 4565,
Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
43
Ibid., part 29, p. 2303, ODell testimony before the APHB.
air assistance necessary. However, the Australian Air Corps chief
decided to go ahead just the same and furnish the Dutch with
aircraft as planned.
44

With respect to Tailand, or Siam, the situation was compli-
cated. Te Tai prime minister, who expected an attack within
the next few daysasked on December 5 for an immediate dec-
laration from the British that they should go to war with Japan
if the latter attacked Tailand. . . . Churchill proposed to send the
Tai Prime Minister a message telling the Tais to defend them-
selves, if attacked, and promising to come to their aid.
45

Sometime during the day, December 6, Britains ambassador
in Washington, Lord Halifax, got in touch with Roosevelt to tell
him of Churchills intentions to contact the Tais. Te presi-
dent agreed with the [Churchill] proposal (subject to a change
in wording) and said that he [FDR] intended to send a similar
message. Mr. Churchill accepted the presidents formula and sent
his [Churchills] message on the night of December 67.
46

Admiral Hart (Manila) Learns of
U.S. Commitment of Armed Support to
British and Dutch in S.E. Asia
In Singapore, Captain Creighton learned that the United
States was committed to lend armed support to the British or
Dutch in the event that the Japanese attacked in that part of the
world. He so wired Hart at 10:26 a.m. on December 6. Creighton
reported to Hart that Brooke-Popham, commander of the Royal
Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces, had been
advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that they
44
Ibid., p. 2301.
45
Her Majestys Stationery O ce, 1962), p. 188n.
46
Ibid.
had now received assurance of American armed support in three
eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a Japanese
landing on the Isthmus of Kra (Malayan Peninsula), or on any
other part of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and
the British went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked
the British. Moreover, Brooke-Popham could put plan in action
[without reference to London] if you [Brooke-Popham] have
good info Jap expedition advancing with apparent intention of
landing in Kra second if the Nips violate any part of Tailand.
Also if the Netherlands East Indies were attacked he should put
into operation the British-Dutch plans agreed upon.
47

Hart was dumbfounded at the news that the British had been
assured of American armed support. He had just agreed to send
four of his destroyers to join Phillipss force. However, this news
from Singapore was apparently Harts rst intimation that the
United States had a denite commitment to support the British
or Dutch militarily if the Japanese should attack either of them
at Tailand, the Isthmus of Kra, or the Netherlands East Indies.
Any such commitment would necessarily involve the Asiatic Fleet
under his command. Hart wired Washington for instructions.
48

47
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 508283; Creighton
testimony before the Joint Committee, quoting War Department London
telegram, relayed from Singapore to Manila December 7, Manila time.
48
Ibid., part 14, p. 1412, Exhibit No. 40.
13.
December 6, Part 2
First Parts of Japans Reply
to U.S. Note of November
U
.S. o cials assumed the Japanese government had not been
blu ng when it wired its ambassadors in Washington set-
ting a deadline after which things [were] automatically
going to happen if they could not reach agreement in their nego-
tiations with the United States by November 29. Tus special
arrangements had been made to assure that our top o cials in
Washington would receive promptly whatever reply the Japanese
might make to our November 26 note, the so-called ultimatum.
Te director of Naval Intelligence was to be notied immedi-
ately; a special weekend phone line connected Naval Intelligence
and the State Department, and a special deputy communication
watch o cer was assigned duty at the White House on the eve-
ning of December 6.
Te Pilot Message, advising the Japanese ambassadors in
Washington to expect their governments reply to the U.S. note
shortly, had been intercepted, decoded, translated, and delivered
269
Saturday afternoon, December 6.
1
After Commander Kramer
delivered it to the Navy personnel on his listby then it was
mid-afternoonhe stopped by the Navy Department to make
a nal check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was
anything apparently hot coming in. . . . In view of other devel-
opments that we [the United States] had seen taking place in
the diplomatic tra c and otherwise it was apparent things
were shaping up to some sort of a crisis.
2

Japans 14-part English-language reply to the U.S. ultimatum
began to come in at Bainbridge intercept station on the west coast
very early Saturday morning, December 6. Te rst part reached
there at 5:03 a.m. (8:03 a.m. Washington, D.C. time). From then
until 8:52 a.m. (11:52 a.m. Washington, D.C. time), when the
13th part came in, Bainbridge was busy intercepting and relaying
the messages, by teletype, still in code, to Washington, D.C.
3
Te
rst 13 parts had all been received in Washington, D.C., by 2:51
p.m. on December 6. Part 14 did not come in until more than 12
hours later.
In 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor, most government
o ces closed down at noon on Saturdays. Te War Department
[cryptographic] unit at that time was observing normal o ce
hours and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6,
1941, with the intention of doing no work until 8:00 on Monday,
December 8, 1941.
4
Terefore, just past noon, after decoding the
Pilot Message, the Army closed up shop for the weekend.
1
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 23839, Tokyo Purple
message #901.
2
Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,
1944.
3
Ibid., part 14, pp. 141315, exhibit No. 41.
4
Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Saord testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945.
Te Navy Department was operating on a dierent schedule.
To keep in touch with developments, Admiral Wilkinson, chief
of the O ce of Naval Intelligence, had set up a 24-hour watch
in the Far Eastern Section alone. [W]hen it appeared that
the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and
more critical, he had established a watch of the senior o cers
of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant
Director so that responsible o cers were on duty in rotation
to cover the 24 hours each day. Admiral Beardall, himself, the
Presidents naval aide, was on call. So was Captain Kramer.
5

Terefore the Navy decoders and translators were on duty that
Saturday afternoon, even though this work was an Army respon-
sibility on even-numbered dates.
When Kramer stopped in at the department at 3:00 on the
6th, the message was coming in . . . [which] turned out to be
a part of the [14-part Japanese] reply. Te Japanese govern-
ment was transmitting it in English so that their ambassadors in
Washington would not have to translate it before submitting it
to Secretary of State Hull. Tis made the task of the Navy cryp-
tographers somewhat easier. But the message was in Purple; it
still had to be decoded. Kramer waited and held [his] team of
translators.
6

Te Navy cryptographers turned to
7
and began decod-
ing and translating. However, they were soon swamped by the
heavy work load. At about 3:00 p.m., they sent an urgent call to
the Army for help and got some of the Army people back and
they assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in
5
Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee,
December 17, 1946.
6
Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
7
Ibid.
translating [sic] the very long and very important fourteen-part
message.
8

[B]y 9:00 p.m. Saturday, the evening of the 6th of December,
[we] had received, broken down, translated [sic], and had typed
ready for delivery thirteen of those parts, several of them some-
what garbled.
9

FDR Tells Australian Minister
He Plans to Address Hirohito
Late in the afternoon of December 6, Australias minister to
the United States, Richard G. Casey, spoke with FDR. Roosevelt
conded to Casey that he was planning to send a special message
to Hirohito. If no answer was forthcoming by Monday evening,
December 8, he intended to issue Japan another warning the fol-
lowing afternoon or evening, asking that it be followed by warn-
ings from the British and others.
10

Stimson Requests Inventory of
U.S. Ships Around the World
While the cryptographers were busy decoding the 14-part
Japanese message, War Department people, at Stimsons request,
were trying to determine the location of U.S. ships around
the world. At about 8:00 p.m. December 6, Major George L.
Harrison, an aide to Stimson, phoned the o ce of the Chief of
Naval Operations asking for the following information by 9:00
a.m. the next morning:
8
Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Saord testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945.
9
Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
10
Ibid., part 11, pp. 516667.
Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British, American,
Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-
of-war in Pacic Fleet, with locations, and a list of American
men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations.
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were
consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be
compiled and delivered to him [Stimson] prior to 1000 Sunday,
7 Dec.
11

First Parts of Japanese Reply
Delivered to FDR
Between October 1 and December 7, 1941, Kramer, attached
to the O ce of Naval Intelligence in Washington, was on loan to
OP-20-G, O ce of Naval Communications. He was a Japanese
language student and headed the translation section of the com-
munications security group, then made up of a sta of three
civilian translators. Kramer reviewed their translations and did
an occasional translation himself. He was also responsible for
seeing that the decoded and translated intercepts were delivered
to the authorized Navy personnel. As the volume of intercepts
increased in the weeks before December 7, Kramer necessarily
assumed more responsibility for organizing the intercepts with
background material and assembling them for delivery.
12

Before Beardall left for home at about 5:30 p.m. that Saturday
afternoon, he turned over his post to the special deputy commu-
nication watch o cer, Lieutenant Lester Robert Schulz, on tem-
porary assignment with the O ce of Naval Communications.
He told Schulz to remain there that night to receive [a] special
11
Ibid., part 19, pp. 353637. See also memorandum read into the record, Joint
Committee, part 11, pp. 524754.
12
Ibid., part 33, pp. 84852, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,
1944.
message for the president. Schulz was to take it to Roosevelt
immediately.
13

When the rst 13 parts of the 14-part answer were in clear
form, typed up, and ready for distribution, Kramer
proceeded at once to the White House, left a folder [with
Beardalls aide, Schulz] with that 13-part message and one
or two others with rather emphatic instructions to get to the
president as quickly as possible. Schulz immediately left with
the locked pouch for the presidents study. Te president was
entertaining at the moment,
14

but when he learned the courier had arrived he left his guests for
his White House study. Schulz opened the pouch and personally
handed the president the papers, perhaps 15 typewritten pages
clipped together, which included the rst 13 parts of Japans
14-part reply to our November 26 note. Schulz waitedperhaps
10 minuteswhile [t]he president read the papers. Ten he
[FDR] handed them to [his friend and close associate] Mr.
[Harry] Hopkins, who read them and returned them to the
president.
15

Te president then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in
substance . . . Tis means war. Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they
discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the
Japanese forces, that is, their deployment.
Te Japanese had already landed in Indochina. Indochina
was the only geographical location they mentioned. FDR and
Hopkins speculated as to where the Japanese would move next.
13
Ibid., part 10, pp. 4661, 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint
Committee.
14
Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,
1944.
15
Ibid., part 10, pp. 465971. Schulz testimony before Joint Committee.
Neither mentioned Pearl Harbor. Nor did they give any indica-
tion that tomorrow was necessarily the day. And [t]here was no
mention made of sending any further warning or alert.
16

[S]ince war was imminent, Hopkins ventured, . . . since
war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the
Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the rst blow
and prevent any sort of surprise.
Te president nodded. No, we cant do that. We are a democ-
racy and a peaceful people. Ten he raised his voice: But we
have a good record. FDR implied we would have to stand on
that record, that we could not make the rst overt move. We
would have to wait until it came.
17

Roosevelt went on to tell Hopkins that he had prepared a
message for Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, concerning the
presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in eect requesting
their withdrawal.
18
FDR had not followed the usual procedure
in sending this cable, he said. Rather than addressing it to Tojo as
prime minister, FDR made a point of the fact that he had sent it
to the Emperor as Chief of State. Te president must have been
thinking also about how he would describe the situation in the
speech that had been prepared in the State Department for him
to present to Congress if he did not receive a satisfactory reply
from Hirohito.
FDR tried, unsuccessfully, to phone Chief of Naval Operations
Stark. When told Stark was at the theater, Roosevelt said he could
reach Stark later and hung up. FDR then returned the papers to
Schulz, who left.
19

16
Ibid. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
17
Ibid., part 10, pp. 465971, especially pp. 466263, Schulz testimony before
18
Ibid., p. 4663. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
19
Ibid., pp. 466364, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
First Parts of Japans Long-Awaited Reply
Delivered to Navy and Army
After leaving the locked pouch with Schulz at the White
House a little after 9:00 p.m., Kramer delivered the papers to
Navy Secretary Knox
20
at his Wardman Park apartment. After
some discussion, Knox told Kramer there would be a meeting at
the State Department at 10:00 the following morning, Sunday.
Knox wanted Kramer there with that material and anything else
that had come in. Kramer then drove to Admiral Wilkinsons
home in Arlington, Virginia, where Admiral Beardall and General
Miles were having dinner. Beardall and Miles saw the papers
then at Wilkinsons dinner party.
21
Wilkinson asked Kramer to
have that material plus anything new at the Navy Department
the next morning.
At about 11:30 p.m., Admiral Turner was rousted out of bed
at his home to receive the 13-part message.
22
A courier with the
message called at Admiral Ingersolls home at about midnight.
23

After making his deliveries, Kramer checked in at the Navy
Departmentabout 12:30 a.m.to see if anything of impor-
tance had come in from Tokyo or Berlin. As nothing had, he
went home. In any event, he was on tap any hour of the day and
night by GY Watch O cers.
24

Meanwhile, the Army courier, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, dis-
tributed the locked pouch with the intercepts to Chief of Sta
Marshalls secretary, Colonel Bedell Smith,
25
announcing that
20
Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. Also ibid., part 9,
p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
21
Ibid., p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
22
Ibid., part 4, p. 1970, Turner testimony before the Joint Committee.
23
Ibid., part 33, p. 809, Ingersoll testimony before the NCI.
24
Ibid., p. 858, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
25
Ibid., part 29, pp. 2421, 2423, Bratton testimony before the APHB.
it was an important document. . . . And that the Chief of Sta
should know about it. Also to General Gerows executive o -
cer, Colonel Gailey,
26
and to the night duty o cer in the State
Department for delivery to Hull.
27

FDR Addresses Emperor Hirohito Directly
According to Hull, On December 6, our Government
received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a
Japanese eet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers from
Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. . . . Te critical character of
this development, which placed the United States and its friends
in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds,
and was an important subject of my conference with representa-
tives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.
28

Sometime during the day, December 6, Hull drafted and
forwarded to the White House a message for FDR to send the
Japanese emperor.
29
Roosevelt had written a draft of his own
and preferred it.
30
After a few editorial changes by the State
Department, to which FDR agreed, he sent the revised version to
Hull with his handwritten OK.
31

In his note to the emperor the president said that recent
developments in the Pacic area contain tragic possibilities.
32

Te president desired peace, he wrote, but
26
Ibid., p. 2421.
27
Ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
28
Ibid., part 2, p. 441, Hulls 1945 deposition to the Joint Committee.
29
O ce, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 72223.
30
Ibid., pp. 72325.
31
Ibid., p. 762n. Transmitted in Telegram No. 818, December 6, 9 p.m.
32
O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 78486.
During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world
that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to
Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a rea-
sonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continu-
ing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its char-
acter. . . . It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is
unthinkable.
In his message, the president sought to assure Japan that
Tere is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States
of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to
be withdrawn therefrom.
He continued:
I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the
Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya
and the Government of Tailand. I would even undertake to
ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of
China. Tus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-
China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the
whole of the South Pacic area.
33

Roosevelt did not address Japans economic problems, which
had been aggravated by the U.S. embargoes barring her from
world markets. Nor did FDR refer to the decades-long Russian-
inspired conict in Manchuria and China, the source of Japans
di culties on the Asian mainland. And he oered no assurance
that he could, or would try to, keep the Chinese from stirring up
still more trouble. (By this time, the American taxpayers were
actually furnishing aid to the communist troublemakers in China
and the communist forces ghting against Germany in Europe.)
Te message for Emperor Hirohito was transmitted in our
noncondential code at that time, the gray code, which was
33
Ibid.
perfectly open to anybody.
34
It left Washington at 9:00 in the
evening of December 6. Our ambassador in Japan, Joseph C.
Grew, was instructed to communicate the presidents message to
the Japanese Emperor in such manner as deemed most appropri-
ate by the Ambassador and at the earliest possible moment.
35
A
copy went also to Chiang Kai-Shek in China.
36
Roosevelt announced to the press and the world that he had
sent a message of peace to the Emperor.
37
However, the text of his
message was not released at the time.
Saturday Night, December -,
at the White House
A meeting of FDRs inner circle was held late Saturday
night, a meeting which must have lasted from about midnight
into the wee, small hours of December 7. With the president on
this occasion were Stark, Marshall, Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins.
Tese ve men spent most of the night . . . at the White House
with FDR, all waiting for what they knew was coming after those
intercepts.
38
As far as we know, no record was made of their conversation.
In view of the intelligence they had been receiving of a massive
buildup of Japanese forces in the southwest Pacic, apparently
headed for Tailand, Malaya, or British or Dutch territory, we
can only imagine what they discussed. Te six men in the White
34
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 692, Grew testimony before
35
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, p. 784n. See also Department of
State, Far East: 1941, p. 726n.
36
37
Department of State, Japan: 19311941, p. 784n. See also Department of
State, Te Far East, p. 726n.
38
Letter from James G. Stahlman to Admiral Kemp Tolley, USN (Ret.),
November 26, 1973. Copy in authors les.
House that night must surely have speculated on how to respond
if the Japanese attacked the Isthmus of Kra in Malaya, Tailand,
the Dutch East Indies, or British Singapore. What action should
the United States then take? What should FDR say to Congress?
Should we go to the aid of the British and Dutch militarily, as
FDR had promised British Ambassador Halifax? If we did, how
would FDR and his associates justify to the American people this
military intervention so far from the shores of continental United
States? On the other hand, if the U.S. did not give the British and
Dutch the armed support they had been promised, how would
the administration explain to them, and to the world, the failure
of our president to honor an agreement he had made?
With the crisis developing in southeast Asia, it looked as if
the United States was losing the opportunity to take the initiative
as Stimson had suggested a week earliernamely to maneuver
them [the Japanese] into the position of ring the rst shot with-
out allowing too much danger to ourselves. Of course, it was
still possible that the three small vessels outtted, as FDR had
directed, as minimal U.S. men-of-war might get to sea before a
Japanese strike. If they did sail in time and arrive at the paths of
the Japanese convoys, they could still provoke an incident with-
out too much danger to ourselves. But events were crowding in
around us thick and fast.
281
14.
The Morning of the
Fateful Day
NEW YORK TIMES December ,
Reports: Navy Secretary Knox Says:
U.S. Navy Superior to Any
W
hile the authorities in Washington had been deeply con-
cerned for months behind the scenes with the signicance
of the Japanese intercepts being decoded daily by U.S.
Army and Navy cryptographers, they were also sensitive to public
opinion. Especially so, since the leak on December 4 of the gov-
ernments secret war plans.
On December 6, Secretary of Navy Knox released the July 1,
1940, to June 10, 1941, annual report of the Navy Department,
which included a statement on the current state of the Navy and
its enlargement on a basis indicated by operations in the last scal
year. Te New York Times headlined its page one announcement
of this Navy report on Sunday, December 7, 1941: NAVY IS
SUPERIOR TO ANY, SAYS KNOX. According to the news
report,
Te United States Navy, now in the midst of a record expan-
sion program and recently placed on a war footing with full
personnel manning the ships of three eets, has at this time no
superior in the world. . . . On any comparable basis, the United
States Navy is second to none.
Knox was proud to report that the American people may feel
fully condent in their Navy. In view of the uncertain interna-
tional situation,
Our aim must always be to have forces su cient to enable us to
have complete freedom of action in either ocean while retain-
ing forces in the other ocean for eective defense of our vital
security. Anything less than this strength is hazardous to the
security of the nation and must be considered as unacceptable
as long as it is within our power to produce and man the forces
necessary to meet these requirements.
In substance, the departments report announced that the U.S.
Navy was second to none and that it was capable of operating
in both the Atlantic and Pacic. Moreover, it was being further
strengthened and expanded. Tus the public was assured on the
morning of December 7, 1941, that the U.S. Navy constituted an
eective and reliable arm of our national defense.
Part of Japans Reply to U.S. Note
Te 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our November 26 note,
received in Washington late on Saturday, December 6, were a
fairly sober review of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date and
the various points of agreement and disagreementnotably, the
economic restrictions imposed on Japan, the embargo, the freez-
ing of assets, the fact that the United States was assisting China,
and the United Statess determined insistence (a) that Japan
withdraw from China and (b) that she refuse to honor her mutual
The Morning of the Fateful Day 283
assistance pact with Germany and Italy. Part 9 of Japans reply
was more inammatory; it asserted that the United States
may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war . . .
aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack . . . Germany and
Italy . . . and exercising . . . pressure [on Japan] by economic
power.
1

After seeing these 13 parts, the top administration, Army, and
Navy o cials were anxious to learn the content of the 14th part.
Part 14 was picked up by Station S at Bainbridge Island on
the west coast on Sunday, December 7, at 3:05 a.m. Washington,
D.C. time and was in the hands of our decoders, still in code, in
Washington, D.C. by about 4:00.
2
Like the earlier 13 parts, it was
in English. It was decoded completed and ready for delivery to
Commander Kramer at 7 a.m., December 7.
3

In part 14, Japan charged that it was the
intention of the American Government to conspire with Great
Britain and other countries to obstruct Japans eorts toward
the establishment of peace . . . by keeping Japan and China at
war.
Terefore, Japans attempt to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacic through cooperation with the American
Government has nally been lost. Te Japanese government
regretted
to have to notify hereby the American Government that in
view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
1
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 23945, Tokyo to Wash-
ington 14-part #902.
2
Ibid., part 14, p. 1415.
3
Ibid., part 33, pp. 80304.
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations.
4
Tis strong language left little room for doubt as to Japans
intentions. According to Wilkinson, these were ghting words.
He was more impressed by that language than by the break-
ing o of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary.
Tose would be hard words to eat.
5

Another message from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassadors
was also intercepted and teletyped from Bainbridge at the same
time as part 14. It was received in Washington during the watch
that ended at 7:00 a.m. Sunday morning, passed to the Army
for translation by the Navy and then received back in the Navy
at about 7:15 a.m. Tere it was held for Commander Kramer,
the only person authorized to distribute translations to higher
authorities.
6
Tis message, in Japanese, specied the precise
time1:00 p.m. Washington time, December 7at which the
ambassadors were to deliver their governments 14-part reply to
the U.S. government. Te ambassadors were to hand the Japanese
reply, if possible, directly to the secretary of state. Because of
the time specied, this cable came to be known as the One p.m.
Message.
7

Admiral Hart (Manila) Inquires About
U.S. Commitments in Southeast Pacific
Two other important messages also arrived in Washington
during the night of December 67 from Admiral Hart in the
Philippines. However, as a result of the heavy intercept tra c, they
were not decoded immediately and did not become available to our
4
Ibid., part 12, p. 245.
5
Ibid., part 4, p. 1766, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
6
Ibid., part 33, pp. 80304. Testimony of Lt. Cmdr. Alfred V. Pering at NCI.
7
Ibid., part 12, p. 248.
o cials in Washington until the following morning. One of these
messages consisted of ve parts and was signed jointly by Hart
and by the British commander-in-chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral
Tom S.V. Phillips. Te other was a frantic plea from Hart for
advice from Washington; Hart had just learned of U.S. promises
to support the British militarily in the event of a Japanese strike
in southeast Asia.
Phillips had own from Singapore to Manila to meet Hart
and discuss with him the problems with which we are faced in the
Far Eastern area. Teir joint cable was dispatched from Manila
at 3:27 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), December 7 (10:27
p.m. December 6, Washington time) and received in Washington
about 11:00 p.m. on December 6.
8

Hart and Phillips had conferred about preparations for the
war with Japan they both anticipated. Tey assumed that the
initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese. Te two com-
manders considered it important to coordinate British and U.S.
operations, but they agreed that each would retain strategic con-
trol of his own forces. Hart expected that his eets operations
would be in accordance with plan Rainbow V, the plan prepared
as the basis for U.S. oensive operations, the same plan under
which Kimmel in Hawaii had been directed to operate. Teir joint
message discussed the disposition to be made of British ships in
the Far East and recommended that Manila be made available as
a base for the British battle eet.
As soon as Phillips heard of the Japanese convoy setting out
for the Gulf of Siam from Camranh Bay, on the eastern coast of
French Indochina, he left Manila to return to Singapore. As he
was leaving, Hart told him that four of Harts destroyers then at
Borneo would soon be joining Phillipss forces.
9

8
Ibid., part 4, pp. 193335.
9
1957), p. 122.
In spite of Harts willingness to cooperate with the British,
he was startled by the news he received just after Phillipss depar-
ture from U.S. Naval Observer John M. Creighton in Singapore.
Creighton reported that Brooke-Popham, commander of the
Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces, had
been advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that
they had now received assurance of American armed support in
three eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a
Japanese landing on the Isthmus of Kra, or on any other part
of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and the British
went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked the British.
Moreover London had advised Brooke-Popham that if he had
reliable information that the Japanese were advancing with the
apparent intention of landing on Kra or in Siam, he need not
consult London to put his operation plan into action. London
also advised him that the British-Dutch plan was to be put into
operation if the Netherlands East Indies was attacked.
10

If the United States was committed to helping the British
militarily in the event of a Japanese attack in southeast Asia, it
could not be long before we would be asked to fulll that prom-
ise. Te immediacy of a possible call for U.S. armed support
led Hart to wire Washington about Creightons report, saying he
had received no corresponding instructions.
11
Harts message
left Manila three-and-a-half hours after the one sent by Hart
and Phillips jointly6:45 a.m. GMT (2:45 p.m., December 7,
Manila time, or 1:45 a.m. December 7 in Washington). It reached
Washington during the night of December 67 but wasnt
decoded immediately. An information copy went to Kimmel
10
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 508283. See Creighton
(ALUSNA), Singapore telegram, December 6, 1941, to Admiral Hart in
Manila, included in Creighton testimony before Joint Committee hearings.
11
Ibid., part 14, p. 1412.
in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmels impression that it was
southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack.
Under our Constitution the only justication for having U.S.
military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests
within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told
by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had
agreed to go to the aidnot of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens
but of British military forces should they decide to take action
against Japanese soldiers landing in Tailand, the Dutch East
Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had
apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thou-
sands of miles from any U.S. territory. Tis was news to our top
naval commander in the Far East.
Part of Japans Reply
Delivered to Navy Personnel
Tis particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have
to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer
went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30.
12
According to
o cial records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the One
p.m. Message were available before Kramer reached the depart-
ment.
13
However, when Kramer set out on his rst delivery trip of
the day, the One p.m. Message, which required translation, was
apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of
part 14, the text of the Japanese governments reply to our note of
November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds.
Kramers rst delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to
the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far
Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollums
o ce, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part
12
Ibid., part 33, pp. 85859, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944.
13
Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony.
message for McCollums boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director
of Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for
McCollum and for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the
Far East situation. Ten they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief of
Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Departmentit was
quite unusual for Stark to come in to the o ce that early on a
Sunday morning
14
and they went down to talk with him.
When Kramer arrived at Starks o ce with the 14 parts
together with the other new material, it was about 9:00 Sunday
morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30. Wilkinson and
McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark.
15

McCollum stepped out of the o ce for a moment and was
handed the nal note to be delivered on the United States by
the Japanese ambassadors.
16

Other Navy o cers of the Division of Operations began to
appear in Starks o ceAdmirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, and
Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others.
All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself was in and out
of Starks o ce at about 0900 or 0930 and on one of his entries
into Admiral Starks o ce [he] met General Marshall coming
out of the o ce . . . accompanied by his aide, Colonel Bratton.
17

Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to
arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary of Navy Knoxs meeting
14
Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also
part 33, p. 869.
15
Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
16
Ibid., p. 26.
17
Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this
authors interviews of McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel and
Kimmels attorneys, Charles Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender; and
May 3, 1961, at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals
Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, and
Mrs. Wohlstetter present).
with Secretaries Hull and Stimson was scheduled to begin.
18
He
did not take a car to cover the eight to ten blocks but walked
almost on the double . . . at least trotted part of the way. Kramer
arrived in time almost exactly 10 minutes to 10.
19
He had a brief
discussion with the Army courierhe thought it was Bratton
and Mr. Hulls private secretary.
20

Kramer returned to the Navy Department and then went to
the White House with part 14. Roosevelts aide Beardall imme-
diately took the MAGIC pouch to the president, who was still in
his bedroom. As FDR read the intercept, he commented, it looks
like the Japanese are going to break o negotiations.
21
Beardall
returned the pouch to the Navy Department, about 1111:30
a.m.
22
As far as he knew, no other deliveries were made to FDR
that morning.
23

Delivery of One p.m. Message
to Navy Department
After delivering part 14, Kramer returned to the Navy
Department to assemble several other intercepts that had been
received in the interim. It was about 10:20. Undoubtedly the most
important intercept he found there was the separate One p.m.
Message advising the Japanese ambassadors in rather emphatic
language that delivery [of the 14-part Japanese reply] be made
to the Secretary of State at 1300, that is 1:00 p.m. Washington
time. Among the other newly received intercepts was one that
18
Ibid., part 9, p. 4043, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
19
Ibid., part 8, p. 3907. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
20
Ibid., part 33, p. 868.
21
Ibid., part 11, p. 5283, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
22
Ibid., part 11, p. 5287. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
23
Ibid., part 11, p. 5283. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
directed nal destruction of Japanese codes still on hand. . . .
Tere was another message thanking the ambassador for his
services, another addressed to the embassy sta, and one or two
others of like nature.
24

A fourth intercept was a circular telegram addressed to
Japanese diplomatic o ces around the world concerning rela-
tions between Japan and England.
25
Tese new messages made it
obvious that the Japanese government was giving up all thought
of negotiating further with the U.S. government, breaking rela-
tions with England, winding down its operations in Washington,
and abandoning the embassy sta to their own devices.
Because the circular telegram closed with the telltale English
word STOP instead of the usual Japanese OWARI, Kramer
realized it was an emergency dispatch containing code words. Te
Tokyo-Washington Circular #2409, containing the setup for this
message and dening the hidden meanings of the code words,
had been translated by the Navy on December 2.
26
Presumably
it was distributed to the usual recipients of MAGIC, but it was
not a subject on which witnesses were questioned during the
hearings. Despite the urgency to deliver the One p.m. Message
promptly, Kramer thought
that delay to get this one [the circular intercept] into that folder
was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldnt have been
made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at
the State Department and in CNOs o ce would probably
have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to
lunch or one thing and another.
27

24
Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI. For intercepts referred to,
see ibid., part 12, pp. 24849.
25
Ibid., part 12, p. 251.
26
Ibid., pp. 18687, part 37, pp. 66566, and part 36, p. 77.
27
Ibid., part 36, pp. 344, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
Terefore, Kramer dictated on [his] feet while the book con-
cerning the 1:00 delivery and other late urgent messages was being
made up.
28
His translation of the crucial sentence in this cable
read: Relations between Japan and England are not in accor-
dance with expectation.
29
Kramer delivered this new material,
including the One p.m. Message, within ten to fteen minutes
to Admiral Starks o ce in the Navy Department building.
30

Starks meeting was still going on, so Kramer sent word in that
he had something more of importance. According to McCollum,
he
held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer
as to the signicance at [sic] the [1 p.m. delivery] time, and he
it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in
the Far East as dawn, and so on.
31

McCollum took the One p.m. Message in to Stark. Te sig-
nicance of the 1:00 p.m. delivery time was discussed. McCollum
pointed out that
1:00 p.m. Washington time would mean about 8:00 in the
morning Honolulu time . . . 7:30 . . . very early in the morning
out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those
places . . . we didnt know what this signied, but that if an
attack were coming, it looked like . . . it was timed for opera-
tions out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii.
Tere was no way of knowing just where the Japanese might
strike, but, McCollum reasoned, because of the fact that the
exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the
28
Ibid., part 36, p. 343, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
29
Ibid., part 36, pp. 8283, 343, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. See also
part 9, pp. 4071, 4073, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
30
Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI.
31
ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which
would move at that time.
32

Stark immediately called the White House on the telephone.
33

McCollum thought Stark also phoned Marshall.
34
Tere was
considerable coming and going; not everyone was there all the
time.
35
Tere is no record of what these top naval o cers talked
about in Starks o ce that morning in the light of the crucial
intercepts they had just received. In any event, no special notice
or advice of impending conict was sent out by CNO Stark to
the eld commanders.
to State Department
Kramer was anxious to get to the State Department before
the Hull-Knox-Stimson meeting broke up.
36
When he, Kramer,
arrived at Hulls o ce with the One pm. Message, he talked,
not with Hull, but with a State Department Foreign Service
O cer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull. He
explained the importance of the material he was delivering and
pointed out that the directive for delivery of the Japanese note
at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a
few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu [British Malaya]. In
talking with the foreign service o cer, Kramer made a point of
. . . inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved. He
thought that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary
of Navy, might not have seen at rst glance the implications of
the times. So he simply pointed out the coincidence of those
32
Ibid., pp. 2526.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., p. 27.
35
Ibid., p. 26.
36
Ibid., part 9, p. 4052. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
times to the Secretary. Te o cer then took the folder into Mr.
Knox, together with [Kramers] remarks.
37

Kramer proceeded across the street to the White House
for his second delivery that morning. Kramer handed the new
intercepts to a senior assistant to Beardall, possibly Lieutenant
Commander Leahy.
38

When Kramer returned to the Navy Department this time
at about 12:30he discovered that, in his haste to translate the
circular message containing code words, so as to be able to deliver
it along with the One p.m. Message and the other Japanese inter-
cepts, he had failed to note an important code word, minami,
meaning United States. Tus the sentence he had translated as
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with
expectations was wrong; it should have read, Relations between
Japan, and England and the United States are not in accordance
with expectations. Kramer made a few phone calls, but it was
lunchtime and he found his recipients scattered. No re-transla-
tion was made and delivered, as was usual when messages were
garbled or misinterpreted. Tat afternoon, after the attack had
occurred, Kramer realized it would be pointless to send out a cor-
rected translation.
39

to Army Personnel
Te Army courier, Colonel Bratton, drove into Washington at
about 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 7, with Colonel
John R. Deane.
40
Bratton was in charge of the Far Eastern section
37
Ibid., part 33, pp. 85960, Kramer testimony at NCI.
38
Ibid., part, 33, p. 865, Kramer testimony at NCI.
39
Ibid., part 36, pp. 8283, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. Also ibid., part
9, pp. 407173, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See Friedman
testimony at Hewitt Inquiry (ibid., part 36, p. 308).
40
John R. Deane interview, January 2, 1964, by the author.
of Military Intelligence. He went at once to his o ce in G-2.
Deane proceeded to his o ce in the Munitions Building, right
across the hall from the o ce of Army Chief of Sta Marshall.
Because of the furor created nationwide by the Chicago
Tribunes publication on December 4 of the secret U.S. war plans,
Congress had called on our top military o cials to answer some
questions. Marshall was scheduled to testify on December 8,
41
and
he had asked Deane to compile a one-page summary statement
on the number of planes, antiaircraft guns, etc., in the United
States, together with basic information on the war plans. FDR
had also asked Marshall to have this information available, all on
a single sheet, when he came to the meeting the president had
called for 3:00 p.m. Sunday.
42
Tat was why Deane went into his
o ce early.
43
Prior to December 7 there was no o cer on duty around the
clock in the o ce of the Armys chief of sta, no 24-hour per day
duty o cer (D.O.), so his o ce was not o cially open. However,
Deane opened his o ce in the Munitions Building.
44

As soon as Bratton reached his o ce in G-2, he received the
One p.m. Message from the Navy Department. It was imme-
diately apparent to Bratton that this message
was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to
the Chief of Sta [Marshall], the A.C. of S. [assistant chief
of sta military intelligence, Miles], and Chief of WPD [war
plans chief, Gerow] with the least practicable delay.
45

41
Ibid.
42
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 19391942 (New
York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 221.
43
Deane interview.
44
Ibid.
45
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at
APHB.
It was then about 9:00 or shortly before. Bratton was
immediately stunned . . . into frenzied activity because of its
implications and from that time on [he] was busily engaged
trying to locate various o cers of the General Sta and con-
ferring with them on the exclusive subject of this message and
its meaning.
46

He washed [his] hands of all other matters, turning them
over to [his] assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take
steps with the 1:00 p.m. delivery message.
47

Bratton could not locate in their o ces any of the gener-
als for whom he was looking. He phoned Marshalls quarters at
Fort Myer. Marshall had three orderlies, one of whom was always
on duty when Marshall was outto answer the telephone, to
be there until [Marshall] got back.
48
When Bratton phoned
that morning, [o]ne of his orderlies answered the telephone
and informed [Bratton] that the General had gone horseback
riding.
49

Well, Bratton said, you know generally where he has gone.
You know where you can get ahold of him?
Yes, I think I can nd him.
Please go out at once, Bratton continued,
get assistance if necessary, and nd General Marshall, ask him
totell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest tele-
phone, that it is vitally important that I communicate with him
at the earliest practicable moment.
Te orderly said he would do so.
50

46
47
Ibid., p. 4524.
48
Ibid., part 3, p. 1430, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
49
50
Ibid.
Bratton then called his boss, General Miles. Bratton told him
what he had done and also recommended that he [Miles] come
down to the o ce at once. One of them telephoned Gerow to
summon him to the o ce.
51

Miles arrived at his o ce about 10:00 a.m., and Bratton joined
him there. Tey discussed this whole business. Tus General
Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter before
the two men met with Marshall later that morning.
52

Bratton held on to Marshalls copy of the One p.m. Message,
waiting anxiously for the general to call back. Marshall did
phone, nally, sometime between ten and eleven. Bratton told
Marshall that he had a message of extreme importance which he
[Marshall] should see at once. Bratton oered to take it out to
his quarters and could be there in ten minutes. But Marshall told
him not to do that, to report to him in his o ce, as he was on
his way there.
53

Tere were two doors into Marshalls o ce. One opened
directly into the hall, the other from the anteroom, the secre-
tarys o ce. Te anxious Bratton waited in the anteroom while
watching the hall door. Marshall nally arrived through the hall
door.
54
According to Bratton, it was 11:25.
55
Bratton immediately
reported to him. Miles arrived shortly thereafter.
56

51
Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB.
52
53
Ibid., part 34, pp. 1920, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation,
September 14, 1944.
54
Ibid., part 9, p. 4517. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
55
Ibid., part 29, p. 2420, Bratton testimony at APHB. Marshall believed he
arrived earlier, more nearly 11; see his testimony before the Joint Committee
(ibid., part 3, p. 1431).
56
Ibid., part 34, pp. 19, 2930. Also ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton at Clarke
and APHB, testifying both times from notes made by him and General Miles
on or about December 8, 1941.
One p.m. Message Spurs ActionFinally!
When Bratton and Miles walked into Marshalls o ce,
Marshall had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front
of him and was reading the 14 parts. Since Bratton and Miles
were both concerned about the deadline implied in the One P.m.
Message, they attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get
him to read this One p.m. message.
57
But Marshall continued
reading the fairly lengthy 14-part message, re-reading parts of it,
and reecting on it, which took a while, even though Marshall
said he read much more rapidly than the average man.
58

When Marshall had nally nished, Bratton handed him
the short One p.m. Message, which Bratton had been trying to
deliver to Marshall since about 9:00 a.m. Only then did Marshall
read it. He then asked General Miles and [Bratton] what [they]
thought it meant. Both men were
convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some
American installation in the Pacic at or shortly after 1:00 that
afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General
Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of
the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ulti-
matum, and of the One p.m. delivery message.
59

Marshall asked each of the men in turn, starting with Miles,
for an evaluation of the situation. Tey thought it
probable that the Japanese line of action would be into
Tailand but that it might be into any one or more of a num-
ber of other areas. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii,
Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that
57
58
Ibid., part 33, p. 827, Marshall testimony at NCI.
59
Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. See also ibid., part 34,
pp. 1920, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.
the Japanese reply would be delivered at one oclock that after-
noon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the
areas indicated, should be on the alert.
60

After the men had all
concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an
additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, Marshall
drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a
pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our
overseas commanders. When he reached the bottom of the
page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Stark. . . . General Marshall, in a guarded
way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and . . .
that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, and
the Philippines and so on.
61

After some conversation with Stark, Marshall put down the
phone and said: Admiral Stark doesnt think that any additional
warning is necessary.
62
Stark said that all the forces had already
been several times alerted,
63
they had sent so much
64
that
he feared that that [another warning] would tend to confuse
them.
65
More discussion. Marshall again phoned Stark.
66
He
read Stark the message he had just written. Tis time apparently
60
Ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton testimony before the APHB. Also ibid., part
34, pp. 1920. Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.
61
Ibid., part 9, p. 4518. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
64
Ibid., part 32, p. 136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
65
Ibid., part 3, p. 1111. Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
66
Ibid. Te record of phone calls through the White House switchboard on
the morning of December 7, 1941, lists two a.m. calls by Marshall to Stark 10
minutes apart, 11:30 and 11.40.
Stark concurred and asked Marshall to add a phrase to the eect
that the naval forces be also informed.
67

[T]o safeguard the codes, messages to Army o cers in the
eld frequently included a request that the Navy be notied, and
vice versa. Since two similar coded cables containing essentially
the same message made the task deciphering a code that much
easier, Marshall and Stark tried to avoid . . . both sending a mes-
sage about the same things, to the various commanders concerned
at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines.
So Marshall penciled a short sentence at the bottom of his mes-
sage, Notify naval opposite.
68

During their second conversation, Stark asked Marshall if
he wouldnt like to use the Navys more powerful transmitting
facilities, its 25,000-kilowatt versus the Armys 10,000-kilowatt
radio station.
69
Te Navys station had little di culty transmit-
ting messages, while the Armys was normally out of service with
Honolulu between 11 and 1:00.
70
Atmospheric conditions over
the Pacic at that time of the year were poor. Marshall declined
Starks oer.
Marshalls handwritten message read,
Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time
today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders
to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what signi-
cance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert
accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.
71
67
Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
68
Ibid., part 33, p. 822. Marshall testimony before the NCI. See also Bratton
testimony, ibid., part 9, p. 4541. Bratton said sending the same message in
dierent codes jeopardized code security.
69
Ibid., part 32, p.136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
70
Ibid., part 27, p. 114, Colonel French testimony before the APHB.
71
Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Washington to Fort Shafter #529. See also ibid., part
15, p. 1640, Exhibit 61. Also ibid., part 3, p. 1112, Marshall testimony before
Marshall gave his handwritten message to Bratton and told him
to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched
at once by the fastest safe means.
72

When Bratton was about to leave, the question was raised as
to whether Marshalls message shouldnt be typed. Because time
was an important factor, however, Bratton was asked to take
it in its draft form to the Message Center. As he was leaving,
Gerow called out, If there is any question of priority, give the
Philippines rst priority.

Bratton took the message down the
hall to the Army Message Center. As he handed it to Colonel
Edward F. French, the signal o cer in charge, Bratton said: Te
Chief of Sta wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.
73

French found the penciled message rather di cult to read;
74

neither he nor his clerk could interpret Marshalls handwriting.
So French asked Bratton to help [him] get this into readable
script. Bratton dictated it to a code-room typist, which took per-
haps a minute, then veried and authenticated the message
75

and put it into code. According to Bratton, it was then about
11:58 a.m.
76

French started processing the message immediately, giving
the Philippines rst priority.
77
He went to the Signal Center
himself and had the operator check the channel to Honolulu.
Due to atmospheric conditions, Honolulu had been out of con-
tact since about 10:20 that morning.
78
Transmitting the message
to Honolulu via Army facilities would not only have slowed it
down, but would have run a risk of garbling when it was copied
72
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid., part 34, p. 32, French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
75
Ibid., p. 33.
76
77
Ibid., part 34, p. 20, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
78
Ibid., part 27, p. 108, French testimony before the APHB.
and retransmitted in San Francisco. Te Armys normal method
when atmospheric conditions prevented sending messages via
its own radio station was to use commercial facilities that were
available in the Armys Signal CenterWestern Union to San
Francisco, tube relay across the city, and then RCA to Honolulu.
79

So French decided the quickest method of dispatch would be
via commercial service, especially as RCA had just installed a
teletype circuit to Fort Shafter, Army headquarters in Hawaii, on
the western outskirts of Honolulu.
80

When Bratton returned to Marshalls o ce, Marshall asked
him to go back to the Message Center and nd out how long it
would take for his message to reach its several addressees. Bratton
returned, talked with French, who told him that the messages
would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about
eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30
minutes.
81
With respect to the message to Honolulu, French
estimated that it would reach there within a half hour to 45
minutes.
82
Bratton looked at [his] watch at that time and, as
[he] remember[ed] it, it was about 11:58 a.m.
83
Bratton reported
back to Marshall.
Marshalls message was in code by 11:52 a.m. (Washington
D.C. time) and was dispatched to Panama at noon, to the
Philippines at 12:05, to the Presidio in San Francisco at 12:11,
and to Hawaii at 12:17.
84
It was Marshalls understanding that
his message went right through to the Philippines, Panama, and
San Francisco. Te only problem came in raising Hawaii.
85

79
Ibid., part 34, p. 33, French testimony during Clarke Investigation.
80
Ibid. See also part 27, pp. 10810, French testimony before the APHB.
81
Ibid., part 34, p. 21, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
82
Ibid., p. 33. French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
83
Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. See also
part 34, p. 21.
84
Ibid., part 33, p. 1282.
85
Ibid., p. 823. Marshall testimony before the NCI.
By noon Deane had nished the one-page statement he had
been preparing for Marshall to use that afternoon at his meeting
with FDR and/or for testifying the next day before Congress.
Marshall called him into his o ce, and he handed Marshall his
memorandum. As Marshall read it, he said to Deane, it looks as
though the Japs were going to issue an ultimatum about 1:30.
Deane had not known of the information that administration
and top military o cials had been learning during recent months
from MAGIC, so was not aware of the signicance of Marshalls
announcement.
86

Sunday Morning at the State Department
Hull went to his o ce that Sunday morning as [he] had done
almost every Sunday since [he] entered the State Department in
1933. Because of the Japanese situation, however, this one was a
little out of the ordinary. Hull talked rst with the departments
Far Eastern expertsStanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political
Relations; Maxwell M. Hamilton, chief of the division of Far
Eastern aairs; and Joseph W. Ballantine, an expert on Japan.
87

Hull had asked Stimson and Knox to meet with him at the
department at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the situation created by the
movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward
of the southernmost point of Indochina.
88
Te administration
o cials were striving to ascertain the full signicance of those
military movements, their probable destination, etcetera.
89

86
Deane interview.
87
Cordell Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948),
vol. 2, p. 1095. See also Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: Te American Secretaries of
State and Teir Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), vols.
12 and 13, p. 517.
88
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5393, Hulls reply to Joint
Committee interrogatory.
89
Ibid., p. 5394.
Stimson, Knox, and Hull were all well aware that that day
was
the day that the Japanese [were] going to bring their answer
to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had
been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish
something hanging in the air. . . . Hull [was] very certain that
the Japs [were] planning some deviltry.
90

Te three secretaries were all wondering where the blow will
strike. Te messages [they] were receiving now indicated that the
Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam.
91

Hull, Stimson, and Knox
discussed whether we would not have to ght if Malaya or the
Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought.
We all three thought [recalled Stimson] that we must ght if
those nations fought. . . . [I]f Britain were eliminated it might
well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet.
Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power
in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the
American Republics enormously di cult if not impossible. All
the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to
ght, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch
neighbors in the Pacic were discussed at length.
92

Te main thing, Stimson wrote in his diary, is to hold
the main people who are interested in the Far East together
the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese.
According to Stimson, both Hull and Knox held that the Japanese
military advances in the southwest Pacic represented a threat to
the United States that should be countered by us on grounds of
90
Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hear-
ings.
91
Ibid., p. 5427, Stimson statement to Joint Committee.
92
Ibid., pp. 542728, Stimson statement to Joint Committee.
self-defense. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture
of it. . . . Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing
immediately how these dierent nations must stand together.
Stimson had both men dictate their views to a stenographer.
93

Hull stated in his Proposed Statement for the president that
the Japanese government,
dominated by the military reeaters, [was] deliberately pro-
ceeding . . . to acquire military control over one-half of the
world with nearly one-half its population. . . . [D]efense of life
and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the
Pacic area must be commenced with the South Sea area.
94

According to Knoxs typed-up Suggestion, we were
tied up inextricably with the British [and Dutch] in the present
world situation. . . . [A]ny serious threat to the British or the
Dutch is a serious threat to the United States. . . . We should
therefore be ready jointly to act together.
95

Hull, Knox, and Stimson stayed together in conference
until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or
done.
96

Japanese Ambassadors Request One P.m.
Appointment with State Secretary Hull
Ambassador Nomura telephoned Hull about noon to ask
for an appointment for himself and Kurusu at 1:00. Hull agreed.
93
ings.
94
Ibid., pp. 543940. Proposed Hull statement.
95
Ibid., p. 5440. Knox suggestions.
96
ings.
Nomura phoned again shortly after 1:00 to ask for a postpone-
ment until 1:45. Hull agreed to the time change.
97

Sunday Morning at the White House
Te morning of December 7 was a busy one for FDR. He
had been up late the night before with Marshall, Stark, Stimson,
Knox, and Hopkins, discussing until the early hours of the morn-
ing the crescendo toward which the situation in the Far East was
building. At about 10:00 a.m., FDRs naval aide, Beardall, deliv-
ered to him in his bedroom the nal 14th part of the Japanese
reply. It is possible that FDRs busy day began even earlier when
Stark phoned giving him advance notice of that mornings two
crucial Japanese interceptspart 14 of Japans nal reply and the
extremely important One p.m. Message. In any event, when the
MAGIC pouch containing the One p.m. Message was delivered
to FDR later that morning, he learned rsthand about that as
well as the other urgent Japanese intercepts.
FDRs personal physician, Dr. Ross T. McIntire, was one of
the presidents closest associates. He admired FDR greatly and
faithfully kept his secrets, both medical and non-medical. From
the day of FDRs rst inauguration until the day of FDRs pass-
ing in 1945, McIntire saw the president each morning and again
in the evening.
98
December 7, 1941, was no exception. McIntire
was with him [FDR] on that Sunday morning from ten to twelve
oclock, while Mr. Hull was waiting over in the State Department
for the Japanese envoys to bring their governments reply to the
American note. According to McIntire, FDR thought that even
given the madness of Japans military masters [they] would not
risk a war with the United States. Tey might well . . . take
97
Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1095. See also Pratt, Cordell Hull, vol. 2,
pp. 51718.
98
Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons,
1946), p. 3.
advantage of Great Britains extremity and strike at Singapore or
some other point in the Far East, but an attack on any American
possession did not enter his [FDRs] thought. In McIntires
view, the president clearly counted only on the usual evasions
from the two ambassadors.
99

FDR was also in touch that Sunday morning with the British
ambassador, Lord Halifax. Halifax had sent to the White House
for Roosevelts comments a copy of the British governments pro-
posed message to Japan. He was waiting at the British embassy
for a phone call from Roosevelt.
100

China was also very much in FDRs thoughts. Te Chinese
government had appreciated his eorts to strangle Japan eco-
nomically. As a result, Chinese ambassador Hu Shih and FDR
had developed a close and condential relationship. Roosevelt
had tried to get in touch with Hu the day before, but he had been
in New York. On his return Sunday morning, he returned FDRs
call, and the president summoned him to the White House for a
condential chat. Hu arrived about 12:30. FDR showed him the
statement he had sent the Japanese emperor, his very last gesture
toward peace, Roosevelt said. [I]f Hirohito didnt respond
well, it would be war!
FDR told Hu about the Japanese envoyss insistence on a
1:00 p.m. appointment with Hull. Roosevelt expected either an
answer [from Hirohito] or a nasty move from the Japs before
Tuesday morning.
101
He fully expected foul play; he had a feel-
ing that within forty-eight hours something nasty might hap-
99
Ibid., pp. 13637.
100
Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Houghton Mi in, 1966), p. 530.
101
Helen Lombard, While Tey Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 1941
1946 (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1947), p. 10.
pen in Tailand, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and possibly the
Philippines.
102

In between these several interruptions, FDR was working
on the draft of a speech, which had been prepared in the State
Department that he contemplated delivering to Congress the
following Tuesday or Wednesday if he received no response to his
message to Emperor Hirohito. Phrasing what he wanted to say
was a di cult proposition, in view of his pledge to the American
people that he would not send our boys to ght on foreign soil
except in case of attack and in view of the Constitutional provi-
sion that only Congress could declare war. Eight months of U.S.
negotiations with Japan in the attempt to reach a peaceful solu-
tion had ended in failure. FDR had decided he would present
the issue as one of national defense. He would compare Japanese
aggressions with those of the Nazis in Europe. He would describe
Japans conquest and exploitation in China and point out that she
was now threatening the Philippines and British and Dutch terri-
tories in Southeast Asia, as well as trade routes of vital importance
to them and to us. Japans practice of aggression and conquest
sets up a continuing and growing military threat to the United
States. . . .Within the past few days large additional contin-
gents of troops have been moved into Indo-China and prepa-
rations have been made for further conquest. . . .We cannot
permit, and still less can we support, the fullment by Japan
of the aims of a militant leadership which has disregarded law,
violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives
of our nationals, inicted horrible suerings upon peoples who
are our friends.
How to respond to the current crisis in the light of FDRs
pledges to the American people and his assurances of armed
102
Herbert Feis, Te Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1950), p. 340.
support to the British and Dutch was di cult. FDR relied on
the advice of his three secretaries, Knox, Hull, and Stimson. And
that was, as Stimson put it, what we were at work on our papers
about that morning.
103
Roosevelt would not ask for a declaration
of war, but he would conclude by announcing his intention to
embark on a de facto war: As Commander in Chief, I have given
appropriate orders to our Forces in the Far East.
104

In addition to working on his proposed speech, Roosevelt
must also have been thinking about the White House meeting
of his War Cabinet he had called for 3:00 p.m. that afternoon.
He apparently wanted to discuss his intended address with his
advisers and to talk with them about the possible showdown
that might follow in the Far East.
105

Lunch Break
At about 12:30, after being reassured that his warning mes-
sage to his eld commanders was on its way, Marshall left for
lunch at his quarters.
106
Hulls meeting with Knox and Stimson
wound up in time for lunch. Knox and Stimson left the State
Department, Knox for his o ce and Stimson for lunch at his
spacious estate, Woodley.
107
When Knox returned to his o ce in
the Navy Department, he found a message from Admiral Stark
who wanted him to phone. Knox immediately called Stark and
103
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438. Excerpt from Stim-
sons December 7, 1941 diary reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.
104
National Archives, Civilian Records Branch, Record Group 59, Entry 398,
Box 3, Location 250/46/04/01, 30pp. Hornbeck draft. FDRs intended speech
printed in full in Appendix.
105
Pogue, George C. Marshall: 19391942, p. 221.
106
Deane interview.
107
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, excerpt from Stimson
diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
the Admiral went over to Knoxs o ce. Captain (later Admiral)
Turner came too and the three men met for about an hour.
108

After Dr. Hus departure at 1:10 p.m., FDR retired for lunch
and to prepare for the 3:00 p.m. meeting with his advisers.
* * * *
To the outside observer, peace and normality appeared to reign.
Yet beneath the outer calm, o cial Washington was uneasy. It
was obvious that a blow was coming, but they didnt know where.
If it fell on British, Dutch, or Tai territory, as seemed likely, what
should the United States do? Should it implement the admin-
istrations secret and unconstitutional agreement to furnish the
British and Dutch with armed support, as it seemed FDR was
planning to do? Would the people of this country be willing to
support such a venture? Or would they reject the idea of U.S.
involvement in a Japanese conict with the British, Dutch, or
Tai in southeast Asia, thousands of miles from our shores?
108
Ibid., part 8, p. 3828. Testimony of Maj. John H. Dillon, aide to Knox.
15.
Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!
This is No Drill!
Intelligence Supplied Hawaiian
Commanders was Limited
U
nlike the top administration and military o cials in
Washington, the armed forces in Hawaii did not have a
Purple machine or access to MAGIC. Te Hawaiian
commanders did not even know of their existence. Tey knew
Washington had information not available to them and had to
rely on Washington to be kept informed. When they asked for
information so as to be able to make informed decisions in the
eld, they were usually assured that they were being sent what
they needed to know. As a matter of fact, it was Washington
policy not to forward diplomatic intercepts to the forces in the
eld so as to safeguard MAGIC. Te large department stas in
Washington were considered better qualied to evaluate the bits
and pieces of data in relation to the political situation than were
the smaller stas in the eld, and the eld commanders were
311
assured that they would get what [they] needed at the time
[they] needed it.
1

Te commanders in Hawaii received some advice by way of
telegraphic reports from Washington and the Philippines. But
otherwise, the information available to them was what they
gleaned from intercepting all Japanese naval tra c, and of
attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that tra c
with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in
Washington, and in Cavite. Tey had a radio intelligence unit
whose duties were to obtain all information available from the
Japanese naval tra c by means other than cryptanalysis, and they
had a mid-Pacic direction-nding unit.
2
Tey also received
reports from observers, analyzed directional radio beams, and
decoded and translated Japanese messages transmitted in PA-K2
and certain lower classied, nondiplomatic codes.
3
It was obvious to the Hawaiian commanders from the cables
they received from Washington, as well as from accounts appear-
ing in the Hawaiian press concerning the Japanese-U.S. conver-
sations, that relations between the two countries were tense. On
November 27, General Short was advised that Negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Short
was asked to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as . . . necessary but . . . not . . . to alarm civil population.
4
To
minimize the damage that might be done by local Japanese who
were antagonistic to the United States, Short alerted for sabotage
and so advised Washington.
5

1
U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1946), part 10, pp. 484546.
2
Ibid., part 10, pp. 4673, 4687, testimony of Commander Joseph John Roche-
fort.
3
Ibid., pp. 4674, 4676, 4677.
4
Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
5
Ibid., p. 1330.
Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 313
Hawaiian Commanders Warned
of Japanese Threat to Philippines,
Thai, Kra Peninsula, Borneo
On November 27, eet Commander-in-Chief Kimmel in
Hawaii was sent a war warning advising that Japanese troops
were apparently preparing an amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines Tai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo.
Te same cable also went to eet Commander-in-Chief Hart in
Manila. Both commanders were told to implement WPL-46, the
U.S. war plan then in eect, which provided for preparing to take
oensive action.
6
Ten on November 28, Short was advised that
all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activi-
ties . . . to provide for protection of your establishments, property,
and equipment against sabotage. He took this as Washington
approval of his earlier sabotage alert.
7

With all clues pointing to a war with Japan erupting in
southeast Asia, Short and Kimmel expected their primary con-
cerns would be to defend the mid-Pacic U.S. outpostsGuam,
Wake, and Midwayand to carry out WPL-46 by attacking the
Japanese-held Marshall Islands. Tey continued drilling their men
and preparing for war. Kimmel was directed from Washington
to reinforce Wake and Midway with men and planes. So on
November 28 and December 5, he sent out from Hawaii two task
forces, under heavy security and in a state of combat readiness,
8

with reinforcements for Wake and Midway.
9

6
Ibid., p. 1406, Chief of Naval Operations TOP SECRET cable #272337.
7
Ibid., p. 1330, War Department SECRET cable 482 to Short.
8
Ibid., part 26, pp. 32124, Admiral William F. Halsey testimony before the
Hart Inquiry.
9
Ibid., p. 43, Admiral John Henry Newton testimony before the Hart
Inquiry.
War in the west Pacic appeared imminent indeed to readers
of page one of the Sunday, November 30, Honolulu Advertiser.
A banner headline read, KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED
NATION READY FOR BATTLE. Te story that followed
quoted a former State Department adviser warning the Japanese
ambassador that the United States was ready to ght if Japan
did not mend her aggressive ways in Asia. Another story on the
papers front page suggested that it might be the Japanese encir-
clement of the Philippines that would spark the war. Still another
story, datelined Singapore, reported that a Japanese strike was
expected there and that in the interest of preparedness all troops
had been called back to barracks.
But then the situation seemed to ease. Nomura and Kurusu
in Washington asked the U.S. government to continue their
conversations. U.S. o cials in Washington who were reading
MAGIC knew this was merely a ruse to permit Japan to stall
for time; they had read Tokyos November 29 instructions to the
two Japanese ambassadors to please be careful that this does not
lead to anything like a breaking o of negotiations.
10
But the
Hawaiian commanders did not know this. Te lengthy meet-
ing of Secretary of State Hull with the two Japanese envoys on
Monday, December 1, was reported in the Hawaiian press, giving
the impression that the crisis was over, at least for the time being.
An Associated Press story in Te Honolulu Star-Bulletin datelined
Tokyo, December 5, reinforced this impression:
A Japanese government spokesman expressed the belief today
that the United States and Japan will continue with sincer-
ity to nd a common formula for a peaceful solution in the
Pacic.
11

10
Ibid., part 12, p. 199.
11
Walter Karig, Battle Report: Te Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart,
1943), p. 8.
A December 6 story was headlined NEW PEACE EFFORT
URGED IN TOKYOJOINT COMMISSION TO IRON
OUT DEADLOCK WITH U.S. PROPOSED. In Hawaii it
looked as if the immediate crisis had passed, even though another
December 6 story struck a more ominous note: JAP PRESS
ASKS FOR WAR.
12

On the basis of radio intelligence, Commander Joseph John
Rochefort, o cer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor, noted two signicant factors. Te Japanese, who
usually changed their radio call signs no more often than once
every six months, introduced new call signs on December 1, just
one month after their last previous change.
13
Rochefort consid-
ered it ominous also when he realized he had lost track of the
Japanese aircraft carriers.
14
It was considered possible that they
were still located in home waters
15
communicating with radio
waves too weak to be picked up in Hawaii. However, Rochefort
thought that they might be moving eastward.
16
As a matter
of fact, he had located practically the entire Japanese eet that
attacked Pearl Harbor in a negative sense. He had lost them; he
didnt know where they were.
17

Rochefort called the loss of contact with the Japanese car-
riers to the attention of Commander Edwin Tomas Layton,
eet intelligence o cer and combat intelligence o cer. Layton
showed the location, to the best of [his] knowledge, of the
major portion of the Japanese Fleet
18
on his Communication
12
Ibid., p. 11.
13
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 4680, Rochefort testimony
before the Joint Committee. Ibid., pp. 483637, Edwin Tomas Layton testi-
14
Ibid., p. 4682, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
15
Ibid., pp. 483738, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
16
Ibid., p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
17
Ibid., p. 4681.
18
Ibid., p. 4838, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
Intelligence Summary. He shared this report with Kimmel on
December 2, at his usual 8:15 a.m. brieng.
19

Layton: Almost a complete blank of information on the car-
riers today. . . . We havent seen the carriers except Cardiv 3
[Carrier Division 3] and sometimes Cardiv 4. . . . I felt appre-
hensive. . . . I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division
2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traf-
c for fully 15 and possibly 25 days.
Kimmel: What, you do not know where the carriers are? . . . Do
you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and
you wouldnt know it?
Layton: [If they were,] I hoped they would be sighted before
now.
20

Dawn on Sunday at Pearl Harbor
It was clearly recognized in Hawaii that the way to assure
against a surprise air attack was to conduct long-range air-patrol
reconnaissance. But Hawaii had nowhere nearly enough planes,
trained pilots, fuel, or spare parts. As Admiral Patrick Bellinger,
commander, Patrol Wing Two at Pearl Harbor, later testied:
[T]o be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier could reach a
spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detec-
tion, would have required an eective daily search through 360
to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius
of visibility, this would have required a daily 16 hour ight of
50 PBY-5 planes. Tis, in turn, would have necessitated a force
19
Ibid., pp. 4831, 4833. See also Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John
Costello, And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets
(New York: W. Morrow, 1985), pp. 22830.
20
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 483739, Layton testi-
of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and
ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the
whole Hawaiian area, including Midway.
21

Because of the shortage, the Hawaiian patrols were operat-
ing on a shoestring.
22

Te Fleet operating areas were searched daily, and as planes
were available rotational sweeps were conducted of those sectors
thought to be most dangerous. Te planes accompanying the
task forces sent out from Hawaii to Wake and Midway were also
scouting morning and afternoon over 60 sectors to 300 miles on
either bow.
23
On the morning of December 7 three patrol planes
were in the air over the eet operating areas at Pearl Harbor and
four other planes were aloft, carrying out exercises with subma-
rines. Tis was in addition to the three task forces at sea that were
conducting a regular wartime search by aircraft and destroyers, as
required by eet orders.
24

During the early morning hours of December 7, the USS
Ward, captained by Lieutenant William Woodward Outerbridge,
was steaming back and forth at low speed patrolling the sea lanes
converging on Pearl Harbor.
25
Outerbridges orders were that any
submarine operating in the restricted areanot operating in the
submarine areas and not escortedshould be attacked.
26

21
Ibid., part 8, p. 3454, Testimony of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander,
Patrol Wing Two, Pearl Harbor. See also Homer N. Wallin, Pearl Harbor: Why,
How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History
Division, 1968), p. 45.
22
Ibid., p. 45, quoting Bellinger letter, January 16, 1941.
23
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 329, Halsey testimony
before the Hart Inquiry.
24
Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 46.
25
Karig, Battle Report, pp. 68.
26
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, pp. 5657, Outerbridge testi-
mony at Hewitt Inquiry.
Two minutes before 4:00 a.m. a blinker signal from the
minesweeper Condor informed the Ward that it had sighted a
suspicious object believed to be a submarine apparently head-
ing for the entrance of the harbor. Outerbridge immediately
ordered the ship to general quarters. . . . Te ship sprang to life.
For nearly an hour she combed a wide area in the dark, conduct-
ing a sonar search. Nothing was located. So the men aboard the
Ward relaxed.
27

But then at 6:37 a.m. Outerbridge was again aroused from
his bunk. Tis time he saw the U.S. target ship Antares towing
a raft to Pearl Harbor. Between ship and raft the lieutenant saw
a smaller object which had no right to be there . . . a submarine
conning tower . . . unlike any submarines silhouette with which
he was familiar. In view of his orders to attack any unauthor-
ized submarine in the area, Outerbridge did not hesitate: Load
all guns and stand by to commence ring. Te rst shot was a
near miss. Number 3 gun opened up . . . on the pointer re, like
a squirrel rie, with a point-blank range of 75 yards. . . . [T]he
projectile was seen to strike the conning tower. And the sub-
marine disappeared from view. Te Ward then reported its next
move: We have dropped depth charges on sub operating in
defensive area. Ten a few minutes later a follow-up message:
WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED
DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING
IN DEFENSIVE AREA.
28
It was 6:53 a.m. Hawaii time.
29

In 1941, the Army was in the process of installing three large
xed radars on high ground in Hawaii, and six mobile radar units.
Tis new radar service was operative daily from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m.
only, the hours Short considered the most dangerous time for
27
Karig, Battle Report, pp. 13-14.
28
Ibid., pp. 1416.
29
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 57, Outerbridge testimony
an air attack.
30
But on Saturday, December 6, the Signal Corps
obtained permission of the control o cer to have all stations
operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7.
31

However, on that morning Opana radar station actually hap-
pened to stay open a little longer. Private Joseph L. Lockard, out
of personal interest and a desire for experience, and Sergeant
George E. Elliott, who wanted to learn plotting, had volunteered
to experiment overtime.
Shortly after 7 a.m., Lockard detected on the radar screen a
large ight of aircraft bearing north at a distance of about 136
miles. He was confused by what he saw. A few minutes after 7,
when it got down to about 132 miles, he called the information
center, but no one was around.
[I]t was the largest group [he] had ever seen on the oscillo-
scope. . . . Ten we continued to follow the ight and to plot it,
till it got within about 22 miles20 to 22 miles of the Island,
at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area.
32

At that time radar was still rather primitive, basically experi-
mental; there was no proper identication system to determine
friend from foe, so these planes could not be identied.
33

At 7:20 Lockard reached Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler on duty
at Aircraft Warning Center and reported his sightings. Tyler dis-
counted the report for several reasons. Te planes sighted could be
from our own two task forces at sea; they could be from Armys
30
Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 49.
31
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, p. 2951, Short statement
prepared for the Joint Committee.
32
Ibid., part 27, pp. 53133, Lockard testimony before the APHB.
33
Ibid., part 7, pp. 295152, Short statement prepared for the Joint Committee.
Tere is a good description of the radar installations and December 7 sight-
ings in George Raynor Tompson, et al., Te Signal Corps: Te Test (December
1941 to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: O ce of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, 1957), pp. 35.
Hickam Field; or they could be B-17s en route from the west
coast to the Philippines and due to arrive about then in Hawaii.
34

Reassured that his sighting was not anything of importance,
Lockard and Elliott closed down the radar installation and left
for breakfast.
35
Air Raid Pearl Harbor STOP This is No Drill
At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, the sun rose at 6:27
a.m.
36

At 7:33, Marshalls last-minute message, announcing the
instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their govern-
ments reply at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time (7:30 a.m.
Honolulu time), had arrived, in code, at Western Union in down-
town Honolulu.
37
It had to be sent for decoding to the Armys
cryptographic center at Fort Shafter, four miles away, before it
could be read.
At 7:55 (1:25 p.m. in Washington, D.C.) the rst Japanese
planes swooped down simultaneously at Hawaiis Army air base
at Hickam Field and at Hawaiis Navy air base on Ford Island
in the middle of Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately the rst
Japanese torpedoes struck their targets in the harbor.
38

At 7:58 Vice Admiral Patrick Nelson Lynch Bellinger, com-
mander of Patrol Wing Two at the naval air station on Ford
Island, broadcast to all ships in the area, Air raid Pearl Harbor X
Tis is no drill. With the emergency, the Naval Base Defense Air
34
Wallin, Pearl Harbor, pp. 4850.
35
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, p. 533, Lockard testimony
before the APHB.
36
Ibid., part 5, p. 2439, as reported by the Naval Observatory.
37
Ibid., part 14, p. 1410; also ibid., part 34, p. 7.
38
Ibid., part 6, p. 2675.
Force immediately became functional, and orders to planes in the
air were sent and received by 8:05.
39

Within minutes of the attack, Kimmel cabled the Navy
Department. O cial notication of the attack was received
in Washington at 1:50 p.m., Washington time, by dispatch as
follows:
40

AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT [sic]
DRILL.
The Attack News Reaches the
Navy Department
At about 1:30 p.m., as Navy Secretary Knox, Chief of Naval
Operations Stark, and possibly Admiral Turner were coming out
of a meeting at the Navy Department, the rst news of the attack
on Pearl Harbor arrived. Te Air Raid message, delivered by
Commander Fernald from Navy Communications, was handed
to Knox.
Knoxs immediate response was, My God, this cant be true,
this must mean the Philippines.
41

No, sir, Stark said, this is Pearl.
42
Stark knew Tis is no
drill were agreed-upon code words to indicate an actual outbreak
of hostilities.
The Attack News Reaches the White House
On hearing the news, Knox immediately called on the White
House phone and spoke to the president. It was 1:40 p.m. Knox
39
Ibid., part 8, p. 3452, Bellinger testimony before the Joint Committee.
40
Ibid., part 11, p. 5351.
41
Ibid., part 8, pp. 382829, 383437, Testimony of Knoxs Marine aide, Major
John H. Dillon.
42
Ibid., p. 3829, Dillon testimony before the Joint Committee.
simply stated what was in the message . . . [Knox] had no further
details and . . . [FDR] would be kept advised.
43

Roosevelt was nishing a late lunch with Harry Hopkins. Te
president couldnt believe what he had heard. Nor could Hopkins;
he didnt think Japan would dare to attack Honolulu. Tere must
be some mistake, he said.
44
But there was no mistake.
FDR immediately began telephoning. He called Hull. He
called Marshall. He called Stimson. And FDR began receiving
phone calls too, from persons all around the world. Winston
Churchill was among the callers.
It was Sunday evening in England when Churchill heard the
news on a small wireless radio in his dining room at Chequers, the
Prime Ministers residence just outside London. With him at the
time were U.S. Ambassador John Winant and Averell Harriman,
then a special representative of the president with ambassadorial
rank. Churchill immediately placed a call to Roosevelt:
Mr. President, he began, whats this about Japan?
Tey have attacked us at Pearl Harbour, FDR replied. We
are all in the same boat now.
Winant spoke briey with FDR, and then Churchill got
back on the line. Tis certainly simplies things, he said. God
be with you, or words to that eect. According to Churchill,
Winant and Harriman
took the shock with admirable fortitude. . . . Tey did not wail
or lament that their country was at war. Tey wasted no words
43
Ibid., p. 3837.
44
Robert Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins. 2 vols. (London:
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), vol. 1, p. 435, and Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Inti-
mate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 43031; and Henry H.
Adams, Harry Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1977),
p. 258.
in reproach or sorrow. In fact, one might almost have thought
they had been delivered from a long pain.
45

The Attack News Reaches
the War Department
A very few minutes after the news was picked up out of the
air on the west coast, the news reached the War Department in
Washington via the Navy. At about 1:30 p.m. a Navy enlisted
man, all out of breath, rushed into Marshalls o ce. Colonel
Deane was there trying to round up men, so as to have the o ce
open on a skeleton basis by 3:00 p.m. that afternoon as Marshall
had directed. Te Navy messenger was carrying a penciled note,
supposedly a message from the Navy radio operator at Honolulu:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACKED. THIS IS NO DRILL.
Deane immediately telephoned Marshall at his quarters at Fort
Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message.
Marshall directed Deane to contact Hawaii if possible to verify
the report. Deane tried to phone, but the operator questioned his
authority and refused to put the call through to Pearl Harbor,
even though Deane was calling from Marshalls o ce. By this
time a more o cial report came in conrming the attack.
46

the State Department
In line with the instructions from his government, Ambassador
Nomura phoned the State Department at about noon to ask for a
1:00 p.m. appointment with Secretary of State Hull. Hull had read
45
Winston Churchill, Te Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mi in, 1950),
pp. 60405.
46
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1411, Deanes June 8, 1942
memorandum to Brigadier General W.B. Smith.
the decoded Japanese intercepts that morningthe 14-part reply
to our note of November 26, and the One p.m. Messageso
he knew what to expect. However, the two ambassadors didnt
appear at 1:00. Rather they phoned again a few minutes after
1:00 asking to have their appointment postponed until 1:45. Hull
agreed.
47

He was still waiting for the ambassadors when the president
telephoned from the White House shortly after 1:30. Teres
a report that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. FDRs
voice was steady but clipped. In view of his impending appoint-
ment with the ambassadors, Hull was especially interested. Has
the report been conrmed? Not yet, the president said, but it
would be checked.
48

Te ambassadors arrived at the State Department and were
in the diplomatic waiting room even as Hull and the president
spoke. Hull kept them waiting while he consulted his advisers
Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser, and Joseph W. Ballantine, a
foreign service o cer, who had participated with Hull in most
of his conversations with the Japanese. Te president has an
unconrmed report, Hull told them, that the Japanese have
attacked Pearl Harbor. Te Japanese Ambassadors are waiting
to see me. . . . Tey are going to turn us down on our note of
November 26, he said. Perhaps they want to tell us that war has
been declared. I am rather inclined not to see them.
49

Hull thought over the situation and nally decided that since
the presidents report had not been conrmed and there was one
chance out of a hundred that it was not true, [he] would receive
the envoys. Hull summoned the ambassadors to his o ce.
50

47
Cordell Hull, Te Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol.
2, p. 1095.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid., p. 1096.
50
Ibid.
When Nomura and Kurusu entered, Hull received them
coldly and did not ask them to sit down. Nomura handed Hull
his governments note. Hull naturally could give no indication
that he already knew its contents, so he made a pretense of
glancing through it. When he had nished skimming the pages,
he eyed Nomura. I must say, Hull said,
that in all my conversations with you during the last nine
months I have never uttered one word of untruth. Tis is borne
out absolutely by the record. In all my fty years of public
service I have never seen a document that was more crowded
with infamous falsehoods and distortionsinfamous false-
hoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined
until today that any Government on this planet was capable of
uttering them.
51

Nomuras face was impassive. He seemed to be under great
emotional strain. Hull thought Nomura was about to speak, but
Hull stopped him with a motion of his hand and nodded toward
the door. Te Ambassadors turned without a word and walked
out, their heads down.
52

Secretary of War Stimson
Te president telephoned Stimson at his home at just about
2:00 p.m. Stimson was still at lunch. [I]n a rather excited voice,
the President asked, Have you heard the news?
51
Ibid. Also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing O ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 78687, and Department of State, Peace and
War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing O ce, 1943), pp. 83132.
52
Hull, Memoirs, pp. 109697.
Well, Stimson replied, I have heard the telegrams which
have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of
Siam.
Oh, no, the president responded. I dont mean that. Tey
have attacked Hawaii. Tey are now bombing Hawaii.
Well, Stimson thought, that was an excitement indeed!
His reference to the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam
was to the British patrols sightings of large Japanese forces south
of Indochina and moving up into the Gulf. It had appeared that
these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern
side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina,
or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula,
or probably Malay. Te British were very much excited about
it and our eorts this morning in drawing our papers was
to see whether or not we should all act together. Te British
will have to ght if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three
[Stimson, Hull, Knox] all thought that we must ght if the
British fought.
Tat was the reason for their Sunday morning meeting at the
State Department and for the position papers they had drafted
to see whether or not we should all act together. . . . But now,
Stimson conded to his diary, the Japs have solved the whole thing
by attacking us directly in Hawaii.
53
(Italics added)
The Afternoon in Marshalls Office
Deane had phoned Marshall immediately after receiv-
ing the news of the attack. It was about a ten-minute drive
from Marshalls quarters at Fort Myer to his o ce in the War
Department. Although it had taken Marshall a couple of hours
to respond to Brattons frantic phone call that morning, this time
53
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, Stimson diary excerpt,
as reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.
Marshall reached his o ce within ten
54
or fteen
55
minutes of
receiving Deanes telephone call.
Marshall had many phones in his o ce, all hung on the side
of his desk. He had no sooner arrived than they all began to ring
at once. A regular stream of phone calls started coming in. Deane
gave Marshall one instrument and then another phone would
ring. Roosevelt called on the direct line from the White House,
asked Marshall what he knew, but Marshall had to admit that
he didnt know much. At that point another phone on the side
of Marshalls desk rang. Deane answered and when he nished
talking, he inadvertently hung the phone on the Roosevelt con-
nection on the side of Marshalls desk, temporarily closing o the
Roosevelt-Marshall conversation. Deane quickly shifted it, but
he later recalled that his rst act of the war had been to cut o a
telephone conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and
the Army Chief of Sta.
56

Marshall sent word of the attack out to all the corps area
commanders and all our people throughout the world, particu-
larly in the Philippines.
57

Roosevelt asked Marshall to come over to the White House
right away and Marshall immediately dashed over.
Te rst call that came in after Marshall left was from a drunk
in St. Louis, who had just heard what those bastards had done
and oered to come to Washington to help Marshall out. Deane
thanked the caller and said he would relay his oer to Marshall.
To Deane, this incident illustrated how ill-prepared the Chief of
Stas o ce was for the emergency; a call from a plain citizen
54
Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Deane June 8, 1942, memorandum for General W.B.
Smith.
55
Authors interview of Deane, January 2, 1964.
56
Ibid.
57
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary
except.
had gotten through to Marshalls o ce without any trouble. Yet
Deane had had di culty trying to call Pearl Harbor on behalf
of the Chief of Sta. According to Deane, the War Department
personnel that next week were all at sixes and sevens . . . totally
unprepared for what had happened.
58

Stimsons Afternoon
After hearing the news and nishing his lunch, Stimson
returned to his o ce. He started matters going in all directions
to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move.
Armed guards were stationed at the War Department building
and also at Stimsons estate. He oered to provide guards for the
White House, but it was decided the FBI should stand guard
there.
59

Stimson attended FDRs meeting at the White House. Ten
at 4:00, he joined McCoy and the chiefs of the armed services,
giving them a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in
the emergency. He spent most of the afternoon in conference
with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCoy, and
their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the provost mar-
shal general. Te main topic of their conversation was the form
the declaration of war should take. Grenville Clark had drawn
up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. Tey all
thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany
at the same time with Japan. But that was an open question.
However, Stimson thought there was now no doubt about
declaring war on Japan.
60

When Stimson had rst heard the news of Japans attack, his
rst feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a
58
Deane interview.
59
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary
excerpt.
60
Ibid., p. 5438.
crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. Yet
the news that came in from Hawaii during the afternoon was
very bad. Te Japanese seemed
to have sprung a complete surprise upon our eet and [to] have
caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them
severely with losses . . . hit our airelds there and . . . destroyed
a great many of our planes, evidently before they got o the
ground.
It was staggering, Stimson wrote, to see our people there,
who [had] been warned long ago and were standing on the alert
. . . so caught by surprise. Nevertheless, his dominant feeling
continued to be one of relief in spite of the news of catastrophes
which quickly developed. He felt that this country united has
practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred
up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.
61

Sunday Afternoon at the White House
Soon after receiving the news of the attack, the White House
became a beehive of activity. At 2:28 p.m. FDR had a phone call
from Stark telling of the heavy losses suered by the eet during
the rst phase of the attack and reporting some loss of life. Stark
discussed the next step with FDR, and the president wanted him
to execute the agreed orders to the Army and Navy in event of an
outbreak of hostilities in the Pacic.
62
At 2:30 Knox ordered all
ships and stations to Execute WPL-46 against Japan.
63

Knox reached the White House almost immediately after
Stark nished talking with the president. As Knox later conded,
61
Ibid.
62
Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 43536, and
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431.
63
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5351, John Ford Baecher
April 8, 1946, memorandum to Joint Committee Counsel Seth Richardson.
he found the president in the Oval O ce, seated, and as white
as a sheet . . . visibly shaken. Te extent of the disaster, news
of which was beginning to trickle in, really shook FDR. Knox
thought Roosevelt expected to get hit by the Japanese, but that
he did not expect to get hurt. It was not the attack itself, but the
amount of the damage that shocked him.
64

FDR called in his secretary, Steve Early, and dictated a news
release that Early was to give to the press immediately. A half
hour later FDR dictated to Early a second press release.
65

Roosevelts oldest son, James, a captain in the Marine Corps
Reserve, was on assignment in Washington at the time, as liaison
between Marine Headquarters and the O ce of the Coordinator
of Information. He was o duty that Sunday afternoon when
the White House phoned him at his home in the suburbs; his
father wanted him at the White House right away. He got there
as fast as [he] could. As he entered his fathers o ce, the rst
thing FDR said was Hello, Jimmy. Its happened.
66
As Elliott
Roosevelt, James next younger brother wrote later, it was the
target, not the attack, that amazed him.
67

Mrs. Roosevelt heard of the attack from an usher as her 30
luncheon guests of the day were leaving. FDR was occupied all
that afternoon and evening with meetings, and Eleanor didnt
have a chance to talk with him until later. When she and the
president did speak together briey, it was her opinion that in
spite of his anxiety Franklin was in a way more serene than he
had appeared in a long time. She thought
64
Admiral Ben Moreell letter to Harry Elmer Barnes, December 17, 1961.
65
Sherwood, Te White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, and Roosevelt
and Hopkins, p. 431.
66
James Roosevelt, Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story of a Lonely Man (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), pp. 32728. Also James Roosevelt with Bill
Libby, My Parents: A Diering View (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976), p. 266.
67
Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, A Rendezvous with Destiny: Te
Roosevelts of the White House (London: W.H. Allen, 1977), p. 304.
it was steadying to know nally that the die was cast. One
could no longer do anything but face the fact that this coun-
try was in a war; from here on, di cult and dangerous as the
future looked, it presented a clearer challenge than the long
uncertainty of the past.
68

FDR had a previously scheduled meeting of his princi-
pal advisers for 3:00 p.m., and they soon began arriving: Hull,
Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark. In anticipation of this meet-
ing, Marshall and Stimson had prepared papers on the status of
U.S. military preparedness.
Te atmosphere at the conference was not too tense. Te
participants all looked on Hitler as the real enemy. Tey thought
that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that
sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan
had given us an opportunity. FDR
discussed at length with Marshall the disposition of the troops
and particularly the air force. . . . [Marshall] said he had ordered
General MacArthur to execute all the necessary movement
required in event of an outbreak of hostilities with Japan.
Many matters were dealt with at the meeting. Tose present
agreed that some type of censorship had to be set up at once.
And the president ordered the Japanese Embassy and all the
consulates in the United States to be protected and ordered all
Japanese citizens to be picked up and placed under careful sur-
veillance. When a move required the president to sign an execu-
tive order, he instructed the person to whom he talked to go
ahead and execute the order and he would sign it later.
69

68
Eleanor Roosevelt, Tis I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949),
pp. 23334.
69
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 43132.
In view of the crisis, the president, at Hopkinss suggestion,
decided to call a special meeting of his entire cabinet for 8:30 that
evening. He then asked also to have the congressional leaders
come to the White House to confer with the president after the
cabinet meeting was over.
CNO Stark Replies to Admiral Hart in Manila
For weeks, especially during the last few days, Washingtons
attention had been riveted on the western Pacic and the like-
lihood of a Japanese landing in Tailand, the Kra peninsula,
Singapore, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies. If the Japanese
struck any of those areas, the British and Dutch were expected
to ght. And if the British and Dutch fought, the United States
was committed to helping them militarily. In view of the fact that
our commitment was not only secret but also unconstitutional,
the administration had been faced with a dilemma. Te question
had been, as Stimson stated on November 25, how we should
maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of ring the rst
shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.
70
But if the
Japanese attacked us, we would be justied in responding. Tus,
the attack at Pearl Harbor had let us o the hook.
Te Hart-Phillips cable, asking how Hart should respond
to Creightons news from Singapore, was a reminder of the U.S.
commitment to the British.
71
Te cable had reached Washington
during the night of December 67, but because of the rash of
Japanese intercepts it had not been decoded promptly. It became
available only on the morning of December 7, and it was not
until after the attack that Stark had a chance to reply. His answer
referred to the incoming cable paragraph by paragraph. It was
70
Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, Stimsons diary report
on the White House meeting of November 25.
71
Ibid., part 4, pp. 193335, Hart-Phillips December 7, 1941, report from
Manila.
encoded and transmitted December 7, at 11:00 p.m. Washington
time.
72
Stark agreed with Hart that the Japanese would be able to
take the initiative in a war starting at that time, and he agreed
also that the most important thing was to prevent any Japanese
movement through the Malay barrier. Stark approved of the
defensive strategy suggested by Hart and Phillips, but reminded
them of the possibility that the major Japanese attack against
Philippines may come from the eastward, that the Japanese
might strike from the bases they had been constructing on their
mid-Pacic mandated islands, the Marianas and the Carolines.
As a matter of fact, Stark said,
a Japanese concentration may be established in Halmahera
[an island of the Dutch East Indies between the Philippines
and New Guinea] or Mindanao [the southernmost island
of the Philippines itself ] approximately in accord with ideas
expressed in WPL44.
Stark approved of the Hart-Phillips proposals for coordinat-
ing U.S. army and navy operations and for U.S.-British coopera-
tion. He said Marshall approved as well. Washington also okayed
the idea of permitting the British Battle Fleet to use the naval
base in Manila and asked what additional personnel material
and minor forces were required for the projected eet base in
Manila or alternatively in Mindanao.
Tis reply was sent for action to Hart, for information to
the secretary of navy, and to Kimmel. Copies went also to the
British Admiralty Delegation and to the U.S. Armys War
Plans Division. Hart was to inform the British and Dutch. Te
U.S.-British plans for cooperation, conceived months before in
London, Washington, and Singapore, when the United States
was still o cially neutral, were now being put into operation.
72
Ibid., pp. 193536.
A message from the U.S. naval attach in Australia, Merle-
Smith, the transmission of which had been held up 17 hours
at the request of the Australian authorities, was also received
in Washington on December 7. It reported on the threatening
movement of the Japanese in the southeast Pacic. A strike from
the Japanese island of Pelau, aimed at Menado, on the northern
coast of Celebes, Dutch East Indies, and/or at Ambon, appeared
imminent. Te Dutch had ordered execution of plan A2, calling
for joint operations by the Australians and the Dutch. And the
Dutch Indies forces were mobilizing.
73

FDRs Evening Meetings with Cabinet
and Congressional Leaders
As the cabinet o cers entered the Oval O ce for the 8:30
p.m. meeting, the president was seated at his desk. He nodded to
everyone as they came in, but there was
none of the usual cordial, personal greeting. Tis was one of
the few occasions he couldnt muster a smile. However, he was
calm, not agitated. He was concentrated; all of his mind and all
of his faculties were on the one task of trying to nd out what
had really happened.
74
Te members of the cabinet faced him in a semi-circle. FDRs
secretary, Steve Early, sat at his side.
Knoxs face was drawn and white. Before the meeting started
he conded to Stimson that we had lost seven of the eight battle-
ships in Hawaii. (As Stimson wrote in his diary, Tis, however,
proved later to be exaggerated.)
75

73
Ibid., part 9, p. 4566.
74
Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 379.
75
diary entry, December 7, 1941.
FDR opened by saying that this was the most serious meet-
ing of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861.
76
He began
in a low voice, looking down at the dispatches before him as he
talked. You all know whats happened. Te attack began at 1:00
[actually 1:25 p.m. Washington time]. We dont know very much
yet.
77

Someone, probably Attorney General Francis Biddle, spoke
up. Mr. President, several of us have just arrived by plane. We
dont know anything except a scare headline, Japs Attack Pearl
Harbor. Could you tell us? Te president asked Knox to tell the
story, which he did, with interpolations by Stimson, Hull, and
Roosevelt.
78

Dispatches were being brought in every few minutes during
the meeting, and FDR enumerated the blows that had befallen
us at Hawaii. He had hastily drawn a draft of a message he
was planning to present to Congress, and he then read [it] to us
slowly. It was very brief.
79

Te Cabinet meeting lasted for at least three-quarters of
an hour. Ten the congressional leaders, who had been wait-
ing below, were called in. Among those who appeared were:
Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Tom Connally, Senator Warren R. Austin,
Senator Hiram W. Johnson, Senator Alben Barkley, and Senator
Charles L. McNary. And Representatives: Speaker Sam Rayburn,
Foreign Aairs Chairman Sol Bloom, Charles A. Eaton of New
76
Ibid.
77
Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew, p. 379.
78
Ibid.
79
Jersey, Majority Floor Leader John W. McCormack, Minority
Floor Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
80

Te president began by giving them
a very frank story of what had happened, including our losses.
Te eect on the Congressmen was tremendous. Tey sat in
dead silence and even after the recital was over they had very
few words [to say]. Te president asked if they would invite
him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow and they
said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what
he was going to say to them because events were changing so
rapidly.
81

Te White House meeting didnt wind up until after 11:00.
As the cabinet o cers and congressional leaders were ling out,
Postmaster General Frank Walker said to Secretary of Labor
Frances Perkins, I think the Boss really feels more relief than he
has had for weeks.
82
She agreed.
Mrs. Perkins wrote later,
A great change had come over the president since we had seen
him on Friday. Ten, he had been tense, worried, trying to be
optimistic as usual, but it was evident that he was carrying an
awful burden of decision. Te Navy on Friday had thought
it likely it would be Singapore and the English ports if the
Japanese eet meant business. What should the United States
do in that case? I dont know whether he had decided in his
own mind; he never told us; he didnt need to. But one was
conscious that night of December 7, 1941, that in spite of the
terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the Navy and its ships,
80
and Hopkins, p. 433. See also excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7
( Joint Committee, part 11, p. 5439).
81
82
Perkins, Te Roosevelt I Knew, p. 380.
and to his condence in the American Intelligence Service,
and in spite of the horror that war had actually been brought to
us, he had, nevertheless, a much calmer air. His terrible moral
problem had been resolved by the event.
83

Looking Back
A few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR and his
condential adviser Hopkins dined alone together. On that occa-
sion, the president told Hopkins
about several talks with Hull relative to the loopholes in our
foreign policy in the Far East in so far as that concerned the
circumstances on which the United States would go to war with
Japan in event of certain eventualities. All of Hulls negotia-
tions, while in general terms indicating that we wished to pro-
tect our rights in the Far East, would never envisage the tough
answer to the problem that would have to be faced if Japan
attacked, for instance, either Singapore or the Netherlands
East Indies. Te president felt it was a weakness in our policy
that we could not be specic on that point. Te president told
[Hopkins] that he felt that an attack on the Netherlands East
Indies should result in war with Japan and he told [Hopkins]
that Hull always ducked that question.
84

Hopkins had talked with the president many times over the
previous year, and
it always disturbed him [FDR] because he really thought that
the tactics of the Japanese would be to avoid a conict with us;
that they would not attack either the Philippines or Hawaii but
would move on Tailand, French Indo-China, make further
83
Ibid., pp. 38081.
84
and Hopkins, p. 428.
inroads on China itself and possibly attack the Malay Straits.
He also thought they would attack Russia at an opportune
moment. Tis would have left the president with the very dif-
cult problem of protecting our interests [in the Far East].
He always realized that Japan would jump on us at an oppor-
tune moment and they would merely use the one by one tech-
nique of Germany. Hence, his great relief at the method that
Japan used. In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the
blitz-warfare with the Japanese during the rst few weeks, it
completely solidied the American people and made the war
upon Japan inevitable.
85
* * * * *
Judging from reports of a number of the presidents intimate
associates who saw him on December 7, after he had learned of
the Japanese attack, he was unquestionably more soothed than
surprised by the news. He was truly abbergasted at the actual
site of the attack, and he was shaken by the large unexpected
losses to his beloved Navy. However, it came as a relief to him that
Japan had not bypassed American territory to attack the British
or Dutch.
FDR had faced a domestic dilemma. Te New Deal had
failed to end the depression. Unemployment in 1939 was as high
as when he took o ce in 1933. Only Selective Service and the
war orders of France and England had succeeded in eliminating
unemployment. Increased employment in the United States had
been nanced rst by French and British gold and then, under
lend-lease, by ination and increased public debt. Without such
continued war production, the New Deal, on which FDRs great
popularity rested, would have been revealed as an illusion and the
85
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428.
economic catastrophe it really was. Roosevelt continued to impro-
vise new policies and new programs to prevent such a revelation.
To put o the day of reckoning and divert public attention
from his domestic failures, he had become more and more involved
in foreign aairs. As Japan struggled to protect her Asian markets
and sources of supply from ever-increasing communist disrup-
tions, FDR had taken step-by-step actions to support China and
to strangle the Japanese economy. He had also joined in parallel
actions with the British and Dutch to blockade Japan and to
prevent her attempts to extend her trade and inuence on the
Asian mainland.
Because of her straitened economic circumstances, Japan was
under pressure to obtain from southeast Asia, by fair means or
foul, the oil and other products she needed but which we refused
to let her buy. Time and time again, Joseph Grew, our ambassador
in Japan, had warned FDR that our embargo was starving Japan
economically and that he feared it would eventually lead to war.
Yet his warnings went unheeded. Moreover, FDR had given secret
assent to naval and military agreements to provide American
armed support to the British and Dutch if Japan should strike
their southeast Asian territories, which seemed likely as Japan
drove south for the resources she needed.
Several clues were available in Washington from the read-
ing of MAGIC, which indicated that the Japanese were plan-
ning aggressive action against the United States itself. Yet these
indications were largely ignored, or at least not recognized by the
authorities as serious enough to warrant taking decisive measures,
except to plead for more time to prepare for war. As a result, the
military commanders in the eld remained inadequately alerted
to the impending threat.
As the extent of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe trickled in, the
enormity of Washingtons negligence began to become apparent.
Te authorities then tried to conceal their responsibility and to
cover their tracks. Te tale of the subsequent investigations and
the attempted Washington cover-up is dealt with in Part II of
this book, Te Fruits of Infamy.

341
Front row (lrom lclt): Vinston Churchill,
Franklin . Rooscvclt, and ]oscl Stalin
at thc Yalta Conlcrcncc, cccmbcr 1945
Prcsidcnt Franklin . Rooscvclt
signing cclaration ol Var,
cccmbcr 8, 1941
Sccrctary ol Statc Cordcll Hull with
8ritish Forcign Ministcr Anthony dcn
Harry Hopkins, advisor to
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt
Sccrctary ol Var Hcnry L. Stimson
(Abovc) Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, Army Chicl
ol Sta, (Abovc right) Gcncral Valtcr C. Short,
Army Commandcr in Hawaii, (Right) Gcncral
Lconard T. Gcrow, Assistant Army Chicl ol Sta,
Var Plans ivision (courtcsy ol \irginia Military
!nstitutc Archivcs).
U.S. Army Gcncrals, 1945, including Gcncral Valtcr 8cdcll Smith (back row, ccntcr),
and Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow (lront row, lar right).
Editors Preface 343
Admiral Husband . Kimmcl,
Commandcr in Chicl, Pacic Flcct
Kichisaburo Nomura, ]apancsc Ambassador
to thc Unitcd Statcs (standing, at lclt)
Admiral Harold R. Stark and
Sccrctary ol thc Navy Frank Knox, 1943
Captain Laurancc F. Saord, Sccurity
Scction, Naval Communications
]apancsc Purplc Ciphcr lrom thc
]apancsc cmbassy in 8crlin, Gcrmany,
now in thc National Cryptologic
Muscum in Laurcl, Maryland.
From lclt: Pcrcy L. Grcavcs, ]r.,
Scnators Fcrguson (RM!),
Lucas (!L), and Gcorgc (GA),
cccmbcr 11, 1945, during thc Pcarl
Harbor hcarings. Photo lrom thc
Vashington, .C. Times-Herald,
cccmbcr 12, 1945.
From lclt: Scnator Homcr
Fcrguson, Pcrcy L. Grcavcs,
]r., and Rcar Admiral T.8.
!nglis, at thc Pcarl Harbor
hcarings, Novcmbcr 17, 1945.
(Associatcd Prcss photo)
cccmbcr 1943, standing outsidc thc Russian mbassy, lclt to right: unidcnticd
8ritish o ccr, Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chicl ol Sta, shaking hands
with Sir Archibald Clark Kccr, 8ritish Ambassador to thc USSR, Harry Hopkins,
Marshal Stalins intcrprctcr, Marshal ]oscl Stalin, Forcign ministcr Molotov, and
Gcncral \oroshilov. Photograph was takcn during thc Tchcran conlcrcncc.
Part 2
The Fruits of Infamy
16.
The First Response
Tnv Rv~c)iox )o )nv A))~cx ix V~snixc)ox
A
s ncws ol thc attack on Pcarl Harbor sprcad around thc world,
rcports soon lollowcd ol othcr ]apancsc actionsall ovcr
thc Pacic. Tcy struck Singaporc in southcast Asia, whcrc
thc 8ritish had a big naval basc. Tcy struck Khota 8aru on thc
8ritish Malayan pcninsula and thc 8ritish basc in Hong Kong.
Tcy attackcd U.S.opcratcd Clark Ficld in thc Philippincs. And
thcy struck thc U.S. islands ol Guam and Vakc. All this within
scvcn hours and thrcc minutcs ol thc attack on Pcarl Harbor.
And thcn a lcw hours latcr, thcy hit U.S. air and naval bascs in
Manila and thc midPacic U.S. island ol Midway.
1

8clorc thc attack, onc ol Rooscvclts major conccrns had bccn
that thc Amcrican pcoplc would not support a war to dclcnd thc
8ritish or utch in southcast Asia il thc ]apancsc attackcd thcm
thcrc. Howcvcr, thc attack on thc U.S. cct at Pcarl Harbor had
radically altcrcd thc situation. Now thcrc was no doubt that thc
pcoplc would support a dcclaration ol war.
1
79th Cong., 1st scss. ]oint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation
ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.:
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 6, p. 2675.
347
As FRs mccting with congrcssional lcadcrs on thc cvcning
ol thc attack brokc up, cmocrat Housc Spcakcr Sam Rayburn
was askcd, Vill thc prcsidcnt ask lor a dcclaration ol war: FR
hadnt committcd himscll. 8ut Rayburn voluntccrcd that il hc
did, that is onc thing on which thcrc would bc unity.
Minority Housc Lcadcr ]oscph V. Martin agrccd: Tcrc is
only onc party whcn it comcs to thc intcgrity and honor ol thc
country.
2

Scnator avid !. Valsh, chairman ol thc Naval Aairs
Committcc, a lrcqucnt critic ol FRs lorcign policy:
Tc uncxpcctcd and unprovokcd attacks upon Unitcd Statcs
tcrritory and ships and thc lormal dcclaration ol war by ]apan
lcavc Congrcss no choicc but to takc spccdy and dccisivc mca
surcs to dclcnd our country. Vc must promptly mcct thc chal
lcngc with all our rcsourccs and all our couragc.
3

Vithin hours ol thc attack, many ]apancsc nationals in this
country wcrc pickcd up and dctaincd.
Congrcssional lcadcrs madc plans to qucstion top military
o cials.
Tnv Movxixc Av)vv )nv A))~cx
At noon thc prcsidcnt was drivcn up to Capitol Hill to
addrcss a joint scssion ol Congrcss. Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Housc
and Scnatc, and thcir gucsts, wcrc asscmblcd in thc Housc cham
bcr whcn thc prcsidcnt cntcrcd. !t was a sombcr occasion. Tc
prcsidcnt was an cloqucnt spcakcr, and cvcryonc was anxious to
hcar what hc had to say.
Rooscvclt bcgan clcarly and rmly: Ycstcrday, cccmbcr 7,
1941a datc which will livc in inlamythc Unitcd Statcs ol
2
New York Times, cccmbcr 8, 1941, p. 1.
3
!bid., p. 2.
The First Response 349
Amcrica was suddcnly and dclibcratcly attackcd by naval and air
lorccs ol thc mpirc ol ]apan. Tc Unitcd Statcs had bccn at
pcacc with that Nation, hc said, and its cnvoys had still bccn in
convcrsation with this govcrnmcnt. Tc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt has
dclibcratcly sought to dcccivc thc Unitcd Statcs by lalsc statcmcnts
and cxprcssions ol hopc lor continucd pcacc. FR wcnt on to
statc that thc Unitcd Statcs was not ]apans only targct.
Ycstcrday thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt also launchcd an attack
against Malaya.
Last night ]apancsc lorccs attackcd Hong Kong.
Last night ]apancsc lorccs attackcd Guam.
Last night ]apancsc lorccs attackcd thc Philippinc !slands.
Last night thc ]apancsc attackcd Vakc !sland.
Tis morning thc ]apancsc attackcd Midway !sland.
Tc prcsidcnt callcd on thc Amcrican pcoplc to comc to thc
dclcnsc ol thc country.
No mattcr how long it may takc us to ovcrcomc this prcmcdi
tatcd invasion, thc Amcrican pcoplc in thcir rightcous might
will win through to absolutc victory.
! bclicvc ! intcrprct thc will ol thc Congrcss and ol thc pcoplc
whcn ! asscrt that wc will not only dclcnd oursclvcs to thc
uttcrmost but will makc vcry ccrtain that this lorm ol trcachcry
shall ncvcr cndangcr us again.
Hostilitics cxist. Tcrc is no blinking at thc lact that our pcoplc,
our tcrritory, and our intcrcsts arc in gravc dangcr.
Tc prcsidcnts short talk was a ringing call lor thc support ol
thc Amcrican pcoplc.
Vith condcncc in our armcd lorccswith thc unboundcd
dctcrmination ol our pcoplcwc will gain thc incvitablc tri
umphso hclp us God.
Tc prcsidcnt thcn askcd thc Congrcss to dcclarc that sincc thc
unprovokcd and dastardly attack by ]apan on Sunday, cccmbcr
7, a statc ol war has cxistcd bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and thc
]apancsc mpirc.
4
Vith Congrcsss cccmbcr 8 rcsolution, thc
Unitcd Statcs was at war with ]apan. Not with Gcrmany which,
throughout most ol 1941, FR had considcrcd thc primc targct.
V~v:
]apans mpcror Hirohito promptly dcclarcd war on thc
Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain. ngland, Australia, Canada,
thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, and Costa Rica all rcspondcd by
announcing that a statc ol war cxistcd bctwccn thcm and ]apan.
5

n thc morning ol cccmbcr 11 Gcrmany and !taly both
dcclarcd war on thc Unitcd Statcs. FR noticd Congrcss, which
promptly issucd two joint rcsolutions rcsolving that thc statc ol
war bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and thc Govcrnmcnt ol Gcrmany
|and thc govcrnmcnt ol !taly| which has thus bccn thrust upon
thc Unitcd Statcs is hcrcby lormally dcclarcd.
6

4
cpartmcnt ol Statc 8ullctin, vol. 5, p. 474, cpartmcnt ol Statc, Peace and
War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrn
mcnt Printing cc, 1943), pp. 83940.
5
New York Times, cccmbcr 8, 1941, p. 1.
6
cpartmcnt ol Statc, Peace and War, pp. 84950.
17.
The Public Had Questions
How Mucn ~:~cv H~b )nv
]~v~xvsv !xviic)vb ox Pv~vi H~vnov-
T
hc pcoplc in this country wcrc panicstrickcn. Why had ]apan
attackcd thc U.S. Flcct whilc ncgotiations with thc U.S. wcrc
still ongoing: How much damagc had bccn inictcd: Vould
thc ]apancsc land in Hawaii: Vould thcy attack thc wcst coast ol
thc Unitcd Statcs: Vould thcy attack Panama:
Sccrctary ol Navy Knox dctcrmincd to invcstigatc thc sit
uation in Hawaii himscll. Hc callcd on Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt
Monday morning to ask pcrmission to y to Pcarl Harbor to
inspcct thc carnagc rsthand, to nd out lor himscll how much
damagc had bccn donc, and to dctcrminc thc rcsponsibility lor
our lorccs apparcnt lack ol prcparcdncss. Rooscvclt agrccd to
his trip. Knox spcnt thc day gathcring background matcrial to
study on thc ight. Hawaii was still a tcrritory, not yct a statc.
Sccrctary ol Navy would bc travcling outsidc thc country, so
Undcr Sccrctary ol Navy ]amcs V. Forrcstal would takc ovcr as
Acting Sccrctary. Forrcstal had not prcviously bccn on thc list ol
thosc lcw top military and political o cials privy to thc closcly
guardcd MAG!C intcrccpts. Howcvcr, as Acting Sccrctary hc
351
was cntitlcd to scc thcm, and hc askcd to bc briclcd. Navy couricr
Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr asscmblcd lor Forrcstal a sizc
ablc loldcr ol thc intcrccpts bcaring on Pcarl Harbor, took thcm
to Forrcstals o cc on cccmbcr 10, and spcnt somc timc going
through |thc loldcr| . . . giving |Forrcstal| thc gcncral tcnor ol thc
way thc things shapcd up lrom this tra c.
1

!t was a long trip to Hawaii in 1941, morc than two days
cach way. Tc ight bcgan on cccmbcr 9. Accompanying Knox
wcrc his aidc, Captain Frank . 8catty, Licutcnant Commandcr
dward A. Haycs, USNR, ]oscph V. Powcll, vicc prcsidcnt ol
8cthlchcm Shipbuilding Company and two Knox assistants, onc
a spccialist in shipbuilding mattcrs. Tc Knox party cw rst to
Mcmphis whcrc thc planc was gasscd up, and thcn to l Paso
whcrc thcy ovcrnightcd bccausc ol bad wcathcr. Tc ncxt day
was rough, thc planc iccd up hcavily going ovcr thc mountains,
but arrivcd salcly at San icgo whcrc a lourcngincd ying boat,
hcavily loadcd with mcdical supplics badly nccdcd in Hawaii, was
waiting to takc thcm on thc 2,000 milc ovcrscas ight. Tcy had
troublc taking o but nally madc it. Tcy cncountcrcd such tur
bulcncc and icing conditions at 7,000 lcct that cvcryonc donncd
lull coldwcathcr ying gcar and wrappcd thcmsclvcs in blankcts.
Tc pilot brought thc planc down to 1,0001,200 lcct whcrc it
was smooth but still intcnscly cold.
Not knowing what to cxpcct in Hawaii, Knox and his party
prcparcd lor thc worst. As thcy approachcd thc islands, thc
plancs machinc guns wcrc manncd. vcryonc donncd lilc prc
scrvcrs and parachutcs. To avoid bcing mistakcn by somc triggcr
happy lookout lor an cncmy planc, thc pilot lollowcd his landing
1
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 36, pp. 8384. Kramcr tcsti
mony at Hcwitt !nquiry.
The Public Had Questions 353
instructions prcciscly. Tcy landcd on ahu on thc morning ol
cccmbcr 11.
ncc on thc ground, Knox and his companions saw wrcck
agc cvcrywhcrc. Tc air station at Kancoho sccmcd to havc bccn
complctcly dcvastatcd. So lar as thcy could scc, no plancs
rcmaincd in ying condition. Tc wrcckagc ol Navy P8Y sca
plancs which had bccn shot to picccs or burncd wcrc visiblc on
thc ramps and in thc watcr. Tc largc hangars wcrc burnt out.
Pcarl Harbor prcscntcd a
tragic picturc. . . . |A|ll ol our modcrn battlcships, savc thc
Colorado, wcrc thcrc, damagcd in various dcgrccs. Tc Arizona,
a shattcrcd mass ol wrcckagc with smokc still pouring lrom
hcr dcbris. Tc Oklahoma capsizcd. Tc Maryland, Tennessee,
and Pennsylvania bombcd or torpcdocd. Tc Nevada groundcd
ncar thc hospital, bombcd in hcr valiant cort to clcar thc
harbor.
2
Admiral Kimmcl mct Knox and his companions at thc Royal
Hawaiian Hotcl, grim and unlikc thc gay tourist hotcl ol pcacc
timc days.
3
Tcy mct somc ol Kimmcls sta at his quartcrs.
Latcr Gcncral Short joincd thcm.
Ncithcr Kimmcl nor Short attcmptcd to justily thcir lack ol
rcadincss to opposc thc attack. Tcy rcadily acknowlcdgcd that
Tc ]apancsc air attack on thc !sland ol ahu on cccmbcr
7th was a complctc surprisc to both thc Army and thc Navy. !ts
initial succcss . . . was duc to a lack ol a statc ol rcadincss against
such an air attack. . . . Vhilc thc likclihood ol an attack without
warning by ]apan was in thc minds ol both Gcncral Short and
Admiral Kimmcl, both lclt ccrtain that such an attack would
2
Harry lmcr 8arncs 1953 intcrvicw ol \icc Admiral Frank . 8catty, on lc
at Naval Acadcmy Library, Annapolis, p. 8.
3
!bid., p. 7.
takc placc ncarcr ]apans basc ol opcrations, that is, in thc Far
ast.
4

An air attack had appcarcd
cxtrcmcly unlikcly bccausc ol thc grcat distancc which thc ]aps
would havc to travcl to makc thc attack and thc conscqucnt
cxposurc ol such a task lorcc to thc supcrior gun powcr ol thc
Amcrican cct.
5

Morcovcr, thcy had not cxpcctcd an attack by thc ]apancsc
whilc ncgotiations wcrc still going on in Vashington, as thc
Hawaiian prcss had rcportcd.
Kimmcl had rcccivcd a gcncral warning lrom thc Navy
cpartmcnt on Novcmbcr 27. His chicl lcar had bccn ol a
submarinc attack, and hc had madc all ncccssary provisions to
copc with such an attack.
6
As a mattcr ol lact, thc air attack
was accompanicd by a submarinc attack. Two ]apancsc subma
rincs wcrc sunk, onc ran ashorc, and onc small twoman subma
rinc pcnctratcd thc harbor. According to Knox at thc timc ol thc
attack
Ncithcr Short nor Kimmcl had any knowlcdgc ol thc plain
intimations ol somc surprisc movc, madc clcar in Vashington
through thc intcrccption ol ]apancsc instructions to Nomura,
in which a surprisc movc ol somc kind was clcarly indicatcd by
thc insistcncc upon thc prccisc timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull,
at 1:00 on Sunday.
7

!n contrast to Kimmcl, Short had considcrcd sabotagc thc
most immincnt dangcr to thc Army . . . bccausc ol thc known
4
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport on
his trip.
5
!bid.
6
!bid., part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport.
7
!bid., part 5, p. 2342. From Knoxs rcport.
prcscncc ol largc numbcrs ol alicn ]apancsc in Honolulu. Tc
Armys sabotagc alcrt unlortunatcly callcd lor
bunching thc plancs on thc various clds on thc !sland, closc
togcthcr, so that thcy might bc carclully guardcd against pos
siblc subvcrsivc action by ]apancsc agcnts. . . . Tis bunching ol
plancs, ol coursc, madc thc ]apancsc air attack morc ccctivc.
8
Shorts lcar ol a ]apancsc lth column was by no mcans
unjusticd. ]apancsc agcnts had providcd thc ]apancsc Navy
with cxact knowlcdgc ol all ncccssary dctails to plan thc attack,
including
cxact charts showing customary position ol ships whcn in Pcarl
Harbor, cxact location ol all dclcnscs, gun powcr and numcr
ous othcr dctails. Papcrs capturcd lrom thc ]apancsc submarinc
that ran ashorc indicatcd that thc cxact position ol ncarly cvcry
ship in thc harbor was known and chartcd.
9

!t is acknowlcdgcd that thc bcst mcans ol dclcnsc against air
attack consists ol ghtcr plancs. Howcvcr, thc numbcr ol such
plancs availablc to thc Army lor thc dclcnsc ol thc !sland was
lar lrom adcquatc. Tis, Knox rcmarkcd in his rcport, was duc
to thc divcrsion ol this typc |ol planc| bclorc thc outbrcak ol thc
war, to thc 8ritish, thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians.
10

Tc ncxt bcst wcapon against air attack is adcquatc and wcll
disposcd antiaircralt artillcry. Tc dangcrous shortagc ol this
typc ol gun, Knox rcportcd, is through no lault ol thc Army
Commandcr who has prcsscd consistcntly lor thcsc guns.
11

Tc Army carricd out no morning patrol on cccmbcr 7. Tc
Navy scnt out at dawn a tcnbombcr air patrol, which scarchcd
8
!bid.
9
!bid., pp. 234243.
10
!bid., p. 2342.
11
!bid.
thc southcrn approach to thc islands, considcrcd thc most likcly
dircction lrom which an attack might bc cxpcctcd, thcy madc no
contacts with cncmy cralt. Tc Navys condition ol rcadincss was
dcscribcd as Condition Trcc, which mcant that about onc
hall ol thc broadsidc and antiaircralt guns wcrc manncd, and
all ol thc antiaircralt guns wcrc supplicd with ammunition
and wcrc in rcadincss.
12

Tc ]apancsc air lorcc plancs had swcpt ovcr Pcarl Harbor in
thrcc wavcs. Tc torpcdo plancs, ying low, appcarcd rst ovcr
thc hills surrounding thc harbor, and in probably not morc than
sixty scconds wcrc in a position to dischargc thcir torpcdocs. Tc
rst wavc was substantially, but not complctcly, unopposcd. Tc
rst rcturn rc lrom thc guns ol thc cct bcgan, it is cstimatcd,
about lour minutcs altcr thc rst torpcdo was rcd, and this rc
grcw rapidly in intcnsity. Tc sccond wavc ovcr thc harbor was
rcsistcd with lar grcatcr rc powcr and a numbcr ol cncmy plancs
wcrc shot down. Tc third attack ovcr thc harbor, about an hour
and 20 minutcs altcr thc rst, was mct by so intcnsivc a bar
ragc lrom thc ships that it was drivcn o without gctting thc
attack homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor by this
last assault.
13

Knox and his companions visitcd thc Naval Hospital, whcrc
thcy saw hundrcds ol woundcd, many sucring horribly lrom
burns and shock. Hc was distrcsscd by thc hugc numbcrs ol dcad
and woundcd: Tc sight ol thosc mcn madc mc as angry as !
havc cvcr bccn in my lilc. !t madc mc rcalizc what a big job lay
ahcad ol us.
14
Hc was trcmcndously imprcsscd also by thc cour
agc, daring, and hcroism dcmonstratcd by many scrviccmcn and
12
!bid., p. 2339.
13
!bid., p. 2340.
14
8arncs intcrvicw with 8catty, citcd abovc, p. 9.
civilians in ghting back at thc attackcrs and in rcscuing mcn
lrom burning ships and thc harbors oilcovcrcd aming watcrs.
Friday, cccmbcr 12, was takcn up with intcrvicws with
Hawaiis lcading industrialists and scnior Army o ccrs. Knox,
a vctcran ncwspapcrman, asscmblcd thc raw matcrials hc would
nccd lor his rcportinlormation about damagc to ships, possiblc
sabotagc, casualty lists, copics ol ]apancsc charts, damagc rcpairs,
ship rcpair yards and many photographs.
Kxox Vvi)vs His Rvvov)
~xb viivvvs i) )o FR
Knox and his party took o Friday cvcning. Knox spcnt most
ol that night on thc ight back to thc mainland dralting his
rcport. 8y morning it was prctty wcll nishcd in rough, handwrit
tcn lorm. Tc planc landcd in San icgo at 10:30 ~.:., and whcn
it took o on thc ncxt lcg ol thc journcy, Knox had a borrowcd
portablc typcwritcr, papcr and carbon. 8y thc timc thcy landcd
in l Paso at 4:00 v.:., Licutcnant Commandcr Haycs, a lormcr
court stcnographcr, had it nishcd in typcd lorm. Tcy gasscd up,
but thc wcathcr closcd in and thcy had to spcnd anothcr night in
Midland, Tcxas.
n Sunday cvcning thcy arrivcd in Vashington, and Knox
wcnt dircctly to thc Vhitc Housc to dclivcr his rcport to
Rooscvclt. Tc original copy bcars a notation in FRs hand
writing: 1941givcn mc by F.K. 10:00 v.:., cc. 14, whcn hc
landcd hcrc lrom Hawaii. FR.
15
Tc ncxt morning Knox rcturncd to thc Vhitc Housc. FR
had gonc ovcr Knoxs rcport and writtcn out in pcncil a scrics ol
points conccrning thc Pcarl Harbor attack which hc told Sccrctary
Knox to usc at his prcss conlcrcncc on thc subjcct. FRs notcs,
altcr dclcting mattcrs that an cncmy should not bc allowcd to
15
8catty 1953 intcrvicw citcd abovc, p. 13.
lcarn, containcd all thc inlormation that could thcn, with thc
sccurity ol thc nation at stakc, bc rclcascd to thc public.
16
Tc
Army and Navy wcrc to assumc cqual rcsponsibility and blamc
lor thc damagc causcd by thc ]apancsc attackand lor thc lailurc
to bc prcparcd lor such an attack.
17

Kxoxs Pvvss Coxvvvvxcv
Tat altcrnoon 200 ncwspapcr rcportcrs lcd into Knoxs
o cc. Vith FRs pcncillcd notcs as a guidc, Knox issucd a
lormal rclcasc and cldcd thc rcportcrs qucstions.
18
xccpt lor his
praisc ol thc pcrlormanccs ol U.S. scrviccmcn during thc attack,
his rclcasc borc littlc rcscmblancc to thc rcport hc had madc to
thc prcsidcnt. !t bcgan:
My inspcction trip to thc island cnablcs mc to prcscnt thc
gcncral lacts covcring thc attack which hithcrto havc bccn
unavailablc:
1. Tc csscntial lact is that thc ]apancsc purposc was to knock
out thc Unitcd Statcs bclorc thc war bcgan. Tis was madc
apparcnt by thc dcccption practiccd, by thc prcparations which
had gonc on lor many wccks bclorc thc attack, and thc attacks
thcmsclvcs, which wcrc madc simultancously throughout thc
Pacic. !n this purposc thc ]apancsc lailcd.
2. Tc Unitcd Statcs scrviccs wcrc not on thc alcrt against thc
surprisc air attack on Hawaii. Tis lact calls lor a lormal invcs
tigation, which will bc initiatcd immcdiatcly by thc prcsidcnt.
. . . Vc arc all cntitlcd to know it il (a) thcrc was any crror ol
judgmcnt which contributcd to thc surprisc, (b) il thcrc was
any dcrcliction ol duty prior to thc attack.
19

16
!bid.
17
!bid., p.14.
18
Te New York Times, cccmbcr 16, 1941, pp. 1, 7.
19
Knoxs lormal statcmcnt, as publishcd in ibid.
Knox wcnt on to namc somc ol thc ships that wcrc damagcd.
Hc admittcd that Army losscs wcrc scvcrc, and hc citcd thc lat
cst gurcs on Navy killcd and woundcd: o ccrs 91 dcad and 20
woundcd, cnlistcd mcn, 2,638 dcad and 636 woundcd. Hc thcn
dcscribcd in dctail somc ol thc acts ol hcroism and valor on thc
part ol Navy mcn in ghting thc ]apancsc and told ol rcmarkably
hcroic rcscucs ol mcn lrom thc watcr altcr thcir ships had gonc
down.

Tc lollowing important points in thc rcport Knox turncd
in to thc prcsidcnt wcrc spccically omittcd in his lormal prcss
rclcasc:
1. In spite of the information available in Washington, Kimmel
and Short had received no warning from Washington since November
27. Tc army had thcn considcrcd thc most immincnt thrcat to
bc lrom sabotagc. And thc navy, warncd that southcast Asia was
]apans likcly targct, was conccrncd with thc possibility ol a sub
marinc attack on thc cct at Pcarl Harbor. Most importantly,
ncithcr Kimmcl nor Short had any intimation ol somc surprisc
movc, madc clcar in Vashington, through thc intcrccption ol
]apancsc instructions to Nomura . . . by thc insistcncc upon thc
prccisc timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull, at 1:00 on Sunday, i.c.,
7:30 ~.:. in Hawaii.
20
For sccurity rcasons, ol coursc, thc prcss
couldnt bc told that thc ]apancsc instructions had bccn intcr
ccptcd and dccodcd in Vashington. 8ut Knox could havc admit
tcd, without rcvcaling anything ol signicancc to thc ]apancsc,
that it was not astonishing that thc Hawaiian commandcrs had
bccn caught by surprisc.
20
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knoxs rcport.
2. Te Army in Hawaii didnt have enough ghter planes for the
necessary reconnaissance because of the diversion of this type [of plane]
. . . to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.
21

3. U.S. soldiers and sailors responded to the Japanese attack
within four minutes of the launching of the rst Japanese torpedo
and the intensity of their ring increased to such an extent that the
third and last wave of Japanese planes was driven o without get-
ting the attack home. Although Knox praiscd thc valor ol U.S.
pcrsonncl in ghting back whcn attackcd, hc didnt mcntion thc
promptncss with which thcy got into action, nor thc lact that thc
intcnsity ol thcir ring incrcascd to such an cxtcnt that thc third
and last wavc ol ]apancsc plancs, only an hour and 20 minutcs
altcr thc rst onc,
22
was drivcn o without gctting thc attack
homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor.
4. Tc unsuitability ol Pcarl Harbor as a sitc lor a largc conccn
tration ol naval vcsscls. !n his rcport, Knox raiscd thc qucstion.
!n vicw ol thc attack and thc scrious damagc inictcd by it,
thc usclulncss and availability ol this Naval station must bc
studicd. . . . Pcnding thcsc studics and thc addition ol satislac
tory salcguards, no largc conccntration ol Naval vcsscls can bc
pcrmittcd at Pcarl Harbor.
Knox rccognizcd that Admiral Richardson had had rcason
ablc grounds lor thc doubts hc had raiscd with FR conccrning
thc advisability ol holding thc cct at Pcarl Harbor.
23

Vhilc lor sccurity rcasons somc ol thcsc points could not bc
rcvcalcd, it would havc bccn possiblc to admit (1) surprisc, (2)
inadcquatc cquipmcnt, (3) prompt rctaliation, and (4) prcvious
21
!bid., part 5, p. 2342, lrom Knoxs rcport on his trip to Hawaii.
22
!bid., p. 2340. Scc also Homcr N. Vallin, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet
Salvage and Final Appraisal (Vashington, .C.: Naval History ivision,
1968) pp. 88, 150, 166.
23
!bid., part 5, p. 2345, lrom Knoxs rcport on his trip to Hawaii.
crrors in judgmcnt, without giving aid or comlort to thc cncmy.
Howcvcr, such admissions might havc lcd our own pcoplc to ask
cmbarrassing qucstions. For instancc, who was rcsponsiblc lor
providing thc commandcrs in thc cld with intclligcncc: Vho
had thc rcsponsibility lor sccing that thcy wcrc propcrly warncd
and adcquatcly cquippcd and supplicd: And why was thc cct
hcadquartcrcd at Pcarl Harbor anyway:
Knox said thc prcsidcnt would launch a lormal invcstigation
into thc attack. !n rcsponsc, thc two houscs ol Congrcss agrccd to
drop thcir proposals to conduct thcir own invcstigations.
24

24
Te New York Times, cccmbcr 16, 1941, p. 7.
18.
The Cover-up Begins
Tnv Fivs) Vvvx Av)vv )nv A))~cx
ix V~snixc)ox
A
ltcr thc attack, thc corts ol U.S. citizcns immcdiatcly turncd
in thrcc dircctions: (1) to avcngc thc dastardly act, (2) to
invcstigatc thc damagc donc by thc ]apancsc, and (3) to
undcrstand thc rcasons lor thc attack. Among top Vashington
o cials, civil and military, thcrc was a lourth conccrn, namcly to
prcvcnt public knowlcdgc ol any acts ol commission or omission
on thcir part that might havc contributcd to thc tragcdy and to
conccal any implication ol thcir possiblc complicity or rcsponsi
bility lor having provokcd thc attack.
Tc mcmbcrs ol Congrcss wcrc anxious to lcarn as much as
possiblc about thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr, and thcy promptly sct
thc whccls in motion to conduct various invcstigations. Scnator
avid L. Valsh ol Massachusctts and Rcprcscntativc Carl \inson
ol Gcorgia, chairmcn rcspcctivcly ol thc Scnatc and Housc naval
aairs committccs, mct with Admiral Stark on cccmbcr 8. Tcy
askcd him just how much damagc had actually bccn donc to thc
363
ships at Pcarl Harbor.
1
Stark answcrcd by giving cxact dctails:
Four ships sunkthc Arizona, California, West Virginia, and
Olgalatwo ships capsizcdthc Oklahoma and thc Utahand
12 othcr ships damagcd, somc hcavily.
2

Valsh immcdiatcly callcd a mccting ol thc Scnatc Naval
Aairs Committcc. Scnator Harry Flood 8yrd ol \irginia and
scvcral othcrs adviscd Valsh to go dircctly to thc prcsidcnt.
|A|sk him to tcll thc truth to thc Amcrican pcoplc. Valsh
agrccd that thc truth should bc told, but, as a lormcr mcmbcr
ol thc Amcrica First Committcc who had opposcd Rooscvclts
lorcign policy, hc was hcsitant at rst to bc thc onc to go to thc
prcsidcnt with such a rcqucst. Altcr lurthcr urging, howcvcr, hc
agrccd to do so.
3
Vhcn Valsh askcd FR to tcll thc Amcrican
pcoplc thc truth about Pcarl Harbor, thc prcsidcnt cw into a
ragc. Hc dcmandcd Valsh divulgc thc sourcc ol his inlormation.
Valsh acknowlcdgcd that it camc dircctly lrom thc Navy and
Admiral Stark. Rooscvclt rcspondcd, Stark should ncvcr havc
givcn out thc lacts about Pcarl Harbor, not cvcn to thc chairman
ol thc Scnatc Committcc on Naval Aairs. Tcn rclcrring to thc
battlcships sunk, Rooscvclt said, Vhy in hcll should wc admit
that thcyrc sunk: Tcyrc rcsting in only a couplc ol lcct ol watcr,
wcll raisc cm!
4

n cccmbcr 10, Valsh publicly acknowlcdgcd that Prcsidcnt
Rooscvclt must bc thc judgc ol inlormation about war opcrations
to bc givcn to thc Amcrican public. For that rcason, thc commit
tcc will makc no cort to qucstion naval o cials on thc cxtcnt
ol ship losscs at Pcarl Harbor. Hc was satiscd, hc said, that thc
1
2
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2210, part 6, p. 2674.
3
Charlcs A. Lindbcrgh, Te Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (Ncw
York: Harcourt, 8racc, ]ovanovich, 1970), p. 595.
4
!bid., pp. 59596.
The Cover-up Begins 365
prcsidcnt had told all hc could. Tc prcsidcnt, as Commandcr in
Chicl, Valsh continucd, is in thc position ol having to dctcr
minc thc linc ol dcmarcation bctwccn giving as much inlorma
tion as possiblc to thc Amcrican public and ol rclraining lrom
giving inlormation that will bc comlorting to thc cncmy.
5

n cccmbcr 10, Harry S. Truman, thcn chairman ol thc
Scnatc clcnsc !nvcstigating Committcc, announccd that his
committcc bclicvcs that it should not invcstigatc military and
naval stratcgy or tactics and that thcrclorc no attcmpt will bc
madc to inquirc into thc circumstanccs ol thc ]apancsc surprisc
attack at Pcarl Harbor Sunday.
6

Souvicnixc Ru:ovs ~xb
Kvvvixc V~v)i:v Svcvv)s
MAG!C had always bccn a closcly guardcd sccrct, ol coursc,
and now it was most impcrativc, lor thc sakc ol thc war cort,
to kccp thc ]apancsc lrom knowing that thcir Purplc codc had
bccn brokcn. As thc cnormity ol thc Pcarl Harbor catastrophc
bccamc apparcnt, thc top Vashington o cials rcalizcd morc
strongly than cvcr that thcy would havc to kccp thc public lrom
lcarning how much had bccn known about ]apancsc aairs in
Vashington bclorc thc attack. thcrwisc, thcy would bc askcd to
cxplain why, whcn thcy had had so much inlormation, thc Army
and Navy in Hawaii had had so littlc, and why our military lorccs
in Hawaii had bccn so poorly prcparcd. To prcscrvc thcir own
rcputations, thcrclorc, Vashington o cials who had bccn privy
to MAG!C had to maintain its sccrccy.
A mccting to discuss Pcarl Harbor was hcld shortly altcr thc
attack in thc o cc ol thc dircctor ol Naval Communications, prc
sidcd ovcr cithcr by Admiral Noycs, dircctor ol N!, or Captain
5
6
!bid.
Rcdman, assistant dircctor ol Naval Communications. A whis
pcring campaign against Admiral Kimmcl and Admiral 8loch,
commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict, Hawaii, was thcn gct
ting in lull swing.
7
Noycs told his subordinatcs
thcrc wcrc altogcthcr too many rumors running around thc
Navy cpartmcnt and pcoplc running to thc ncwspapcrs . . .
gctting in thc ncwspapcrs and on thc radio . . . saying all man
ncr ol things against Admiral Kimmcl and Admiral 8loch
which wcrc not truc, that wc had to put a stop to . . . thcsc
rumors oursclvcs, il wc kncw anything lct it dic with us . . . and
not originatc any rumors oursclvcs.
8

Tc scction hcads wcrc givcn standing ordcrs not to talk, not
to sprcad thc gossip against Kimmcl and 8loch, to kccp anything
wc had to oursclvcs until wc wcrc callcd to a witncss stand to
tcstily o cially. Tcy wcrc told to pass that word on to |thcir|
subordinatcs.
9
Tcy should
tcll all |thcir| pcoplc not to talk, thcrc was too much loosc talk
going around, that thcrc would undoubtcdly bc an invcstiga
tion latcr and that anybody who had anything to say would bc
callcd bclorc that invcstigation and pcrmittcd to say all thcy
had to say, il thcy had anything to say, and il wc had writtcn out
anything to dcstroy it immcdiatcly.
10

Anyonc who had kcpt any notcs or anything in writ
ing should dcstroy thcm immcdiatcly. !l thcsc papcrs wcrcnt
dcstroycd, thcrc was a chancc somcbody might scc thcm and
start somcthing thc notctakcr hadnt intcndcd.
11

7
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3565.
8
!bid., p. 3571.
9
!bid., p. 3566.
10
!bid., p. 3565.
11
!bid., p. 3571.
Vc wcrc in an cmcrgcncy situation and thcrc was panic
running through thc Navy cpartmcnt at that particular timc.
12

Tc ordcr to dcstroy thc papcrs camc down lrom thc o cc ol
Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark. According to Captain Saord,
in chargc ol thc Sccurity Scction ol Naval Communications, it
sccmcd a pcrlcctly logical and rcasonablc ordcr
13
and hc carricd
it out, passing that word on to |his| immcdiatc subordinatcs.
14

Tc ordcr applicd only to uno cial notcs or pcrsonal rccords, thc
scction hcads wcrc not givcn any instructions to dcstroy lcs or
any o cial rccords.
15

Conccrning sccurity in thc Army, Gcncral Marshall warncd
his sta o ccrs shortly altcr thc attack that it was mandatory
that knowlcdgc ol thc MAG!C intcrccpts ncvcr bc madc public.
Marshall told thcm that thcy would havc to go to thcir gravcs
with this sccrct.
16

Vith rcspcct to Navy sccurity, Stark tcsticd that anybody
who was lct in on that |MAG!C| had to sign a papcr ncvcr to
disclosc it, practically so long as hc livcd. Hc said, lor instancc,
that his aidc during thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations, Licutcnant
Commandcr Richmond . . . prctty ncar signcd his dcath warrant,
. . . il hc wcrc to givc anything out about it.
17

12
!bid., part 8, p. 3570. Saord tcstimony.
13
!bid., p. 3570.
14
!bid., p. 3566.
15
!bid., p. 3571.
16
An Army o ccr, who was in a position to know, told this author on two
occasionsoncc in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral 8onncr Fcllcrs and a sccond timc
in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral Albcrt C. Vcdcmcycrabout thc vow ol sccrccy
cxactcd by Marshall lrom his o ccrs. Tc Army o ccr rcluscd to lct his namc
bc uscd lcst it jcopardizc his sons Army carccr.
17
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2468, Stark tcstimony bclorc
thc ]oint Committcc.
Snov) ~xb Ki::vi Rviivvvb ov Tnviv Co::~xbs
Action on thc rclicl ol Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short
was prompt. Upon Knoxs rcturn lrom Hawaii, hc conlcrrcd with
Stimson. Stimson talkcd with Marshall. |A|s a rcsult a dccision
was rcachcd lor thc rclicl ol both Kimmcl and Short.
18

Tcrc was no hint in Knoxs rcport ol any misconduct on
Kimmcls part, no chargcs wcrc madc, no trial was hcld. Stark
was not consultcd bclorchand. |A|ltcr coming lrom thc Vhitc
Housc, Knox dircctcd that Kimmcl bc rclicvcd. Knox had no
discussion with Stark as to thc rcasons. 8ut Stark said,
A commandcr in chicl would not bc rcmovcd without thc prcs
idcnts pcrmission. . . . ! imaginc that had bccn discusscd with
thc prcsidcnt bccausc thc luturc ol thosc two o ccrs |Kimmcl
and Short| at that timc was on a high lcvcl.
19

Kimmcls dismissal lcttcr, datcd cccmbcr 16, was lrom thc
Sccrctary ol thc Navy and borc thc initials ol Stark and Admiral
Nimitz, thcn Chicl ol Pcrsonncl.
20

Sccrctary ol Var Stimson discusscd Shorts situation with
Marshall. Short was thcn promptly rclicvcd ol his command on
thc dircction ol thc Sccrctary ol Var. His dismissal lcttcr, also
datcd cccmbcr 16, was signcd by Gcncral Marshall.
21

Although rclicvcd ol thcir dutics in midcccmbcr, both
Kimmcl and Short wcrc still in thc scrvicc awaiting lurthcr
assignmcnts. Tcy rcmaincd in Hawaii.
Kimmcl and Short had dcvotcd thcir livcs to prcparing
thcmsclvcs to dclcnd thc Unitcd Statcs. Tcir corts and thcir
18
!bid., part 3, p. 1530. Mashall tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
19
!bid., part 5, pp. 2430, 2432. Stark tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
20
!bid., dispatch to Kimmcl, #162105. Admiral Pyc was to bc Kimmcls tcmpo
rary rclicl.
21
!bid., part 3, p. 1529.
accomplishmcnts ovcr thc ycars had carncd thcm rcspcct and
advanccmcnt to positions in thc military hicrarchy. Kimmcl and
Short had bccn givcn no indication that thcir actions had not
bccn complctcly honcst and honorablc. Yct at thc vcry momcnt
whcn traincd and cxpcricnccd mcn wcrc in grcatcst dcmand
thcy wcrc abruptly rclicvcd ol thcir commandswithout any
chargcs having bccn madc, without a hcaring, without having
had a chancc to lacc thcir accuscrs, and without an opportunity
to dclcnd thcmsclvcs.
Pvvssuvv vov ~x !xvvs)ic~)iox
Scnator Tom Connally ol Tcxas, chairman ol thc Scnatc
Forcign Rclations Committcc, callcd lor a thorough invcstiga
tion ol thc lcadcrship at Hawaii. Hc said,
thc statcmcnt ol thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy that ncithcr thc
Army nor thc Navy wcrc on thc alcrt at Hawaii . . . is astound
ing. !t is almost unbclicvablc. . . . Tc naval commandcr and
Army gcncral should bc vigorously invcstigatcd.
Tcirs is a rcsponsibility and it ought to bc dctcrmincd whcthcr
cithcr or both arc inc cicnt or criminally ncgligcnt. Tcy must
bc onc or thc othcr. ! havc always bccn a big Navy man. . . . ! am
paincd and gricvcd at its sccming lailurc ol its high duty.
22

At his prcss conlcrcncc lollowing his own invcstigation, Knox
had avoidcd potcntially damaging statcmcnts. Still qucstions
would undoubtcdly bc askcd as to why thc military lorccs at Pcarl
Harbor had not bccn bcttcr providcd with plancs and antiaircralt
artillcry. Vhy had thcy not bccn morc adcquatcly supplicd with
intclligcncc: And why had thc Navy bccn bascd in such a vulncr
ablc position lar lrom our shorcs: !t was bccoming obvious that il
22
thc administration was to rctain its good namc, an o cial invcsti
gation would havc to bc arrangcd to answcr such qucstions.
Lcss than 24 hours bclorc thc ]apancsc attack, thc Navy
cpartmcnt had announccd that thc U.S. cct was sccond to
nonc. Yct now many ol its ships had bccn sunk or sct ablazc and
wcrc rcsting in thc mud at thc bottom ol Pcarl Harbor. Morc
than 2,500 o ccrs and cnlistcd mcn wcrc dcad and 650 morc
wcrc woundcd.
23
Vhy had scasoncd Army and Navy o ccrs, who
had spcnt lilctimcs prcparing to dclcnd thc nation, bccn takcn so
complctcly by surprisc: Vhy had thcy bccn caught with thcir
dclcnscs down: Vhy had thcy bccn so illprcparcd: Tc pcoplc
wcrc cntitlcd to answcrs.
Any tragcdy, cspccially onc ol this magnitudc, lcads to rccrim
inations and doubts. Many ol thc individuals involvcd, dircctly or
indircctly, with thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr must havc had sccond
thoughts about whcthcr things might havc turncd out dicrcntly
il only thcy had lollowcd anothcr path. Ccrtainly thc Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs thcmsclvcs must havc wishcd thcy could turn back
thc clock and havc a sccond chancc. Admiral Kimmcl, lor onc,
conlcsscd altcr thc attack that hc wishcd hc had takcn thc othcr
coursc whcn ocrcd thc promotion to commandcrinchicl.
24

Undoubtcdly somc Vashington o cials must havc also had
doubts about whcthcr thcy had lollowcd thc corrcct path. Supposc
thcy had tricd to amclioratc ]apancscU.S. rclations instcad ol
aggravating thcm: Also, givcn what thcy kncw in Vashington
about thc likclihood ol ]apancsc aggrcssion, could thcy havc donc
a bcttcr job ol alcrting and provisioning thc cld commands lor
dclcnding thcmsclvcs:
At Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts dircction, with thc sccurity ol thc
nation at stakc, most ol Sccrctary Knoxs ndings on his trip
to Hawaii had bccn withhcld lrom thc public. l coursc, wc
23
!bid., p. 1.
24
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.359, Kimmcl tcstimony.
cannot know whom Knox rcally considcrcd rcsponsiblc, but onc
admiral, Villiam H. Standlcy, commcntcd that hc thought Knox
was vcry scnsitivc ol thc lailurc ol thc Navy cpartmcnt and
ol himscll propcrly to alcrt thc CommandcrinChicl in Pcarl
Harbor. Knox appcarcd conscious ol his sharc in thc blamc lor
thc surprisc at Pcarl Harbor.
25

Tc ]apancsc nc v.:. Mcssagc, which had sparkcd
Marshalls last minutc cccmbcr 7 dispatch, had bccn intcr
ccptcd carly in thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. 8ut apparcntly it
wasnt dccodcd and rcady lor dclivcry until about 9:00 ~.:. Army
couricr Coloncl 8ratton said hc had it about 9:00 or shortly
bclorc. Hc had thcn tricd dcspcratcly to rcach Army Chicl ol
Sta Marshall. Captain McCollum tcsticd that Navy couricr
Kramcr had brought it to him just bclorc 9:30 ~.:. and that hc,
McCollum, had thcn handcd it to Chicl ol Naval pcrations
Stark. Stark had apparcntly phoncd FR, but takcn no lurthcr
action. According to somc rcports, Marshall was with Stark in his
o cc somctimc that morning. Still nothing was donc. Apparcntly
no spccial action was takcn on thc nc v.:. Mcssagc until altcr
11:25 ~.:., whcn Marshall arrivcd in his o cc and 8ratton was
nally ablc to dclivcr it to him pcrsonally. Marshall did not rcad
it until altcr rcading thc othcr ]apancsc mcssagcs that awaitcd
him. nly thcn did Marshall dralt his mcssagc advising thc cld
commandcrs ol thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry timc lor thc ]apancsc rcply
to thc U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26. 8y thc timc thcsc warning mcs
sagcs had bccn cncodcd and scnt to Manila, Pcarl Harbor, ctc., it
was 11:58 ~.:.
Altcr thc attack Marshall must havc lclt uncasy. Hc bcgan
that vcry altcrnoon to chcck on thc disposition ol his lastmin
utc mcssagc to his cld commandcrs, hc askcd lor an immcdi
atc rcport on thc dclivcry ol that mcssagc. Licutcnant Coloncl
dward F. Frcnch ol thc U.S. Armys Signal Corps wircd a
25
Villiam H. Standlcy and Arthur A. Agcton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia
(Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), pp.82, 83.
lollowup scrvicc mcssagc trying to track down whcn that mcs
sagc to Pcarl Harbor had bccn dclivcrcd and to whom. !t had
gonc to San Francisco by Vcstcrn Union, which had a tubc run
ning across thc strcct to thc R.C.A. From thcrc it had gonc via
RCAs powcrlul transmittcr to Hawaii. According to Frcnch, that
was thc quickcst mcans at his disposal at thc timc. Frcnch told
Vcstcrn Union that hc wantcd to know whosc hands that mcs
sagc got into. Tis inquiry wcnt on latc until thc night, and 2:00
in thc morning wc hadnt as yct rcccivcd thc rcply. Frcnch also
talkcd to thc signal o ccr ovcr thcrc |in Hawaii| . . . on thc wirc
and told him it was impcrativc that |Frcnch| inlorm Gcncral
Marshall as to who rcccivcd that mcssagc.
26

To track Marshalls mcssagc, Vashington wircd o cials in
Hawaii on cccmbcr 9 asking thcm to
advisc immcdiatcly cxact timc ol rcccipt ol our numbcr vc two
ninc |Marshalls mcssagc|. . . . cccmbcr scvcn at Honolulu
cxact timc dcciphcrcd mcssagc transmittcd by Signal Corps to
sta and by what sta o ccr rcccivcd.
Hawaiis rcply on cccmbcr 9, signcd by Gcncral Short,
statcd that thc mcssagc was dclivcrcd to Honolulu, downtown,
via RCA at 7:33 ~.:. ol thc 7th, rcccivcd, still in codc, at thc
Signal cc, Fort Shaltcr, at about 11:45 ~.:. !t had thcn still to
bc dcciphcrcd, and it didnt rcach thc adjutant gcncral until 2:58
v.:. in thc altcrnoon.
27
Many othcr principals conccrncd with thc nations dclcnscs
may also havc had doubts and qucstions conccrning thc rcspon
sibility lor thc disastcr. Somc ol thcm undoubtcdly lookcd on thc
prospccts ol a lormal invcstigation with mixcd cmotions.
26
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 1104, Frcnch tcstimony.
27
!bid., part 24, p. 1828.
19.
The Administration
Initiates an Investigation
Ronvv)s Co::issiox Avvoix)vb
O
n cccmbcr 16 thc prcsidcnt namcd a vcman board, with
Suprcmc Court ]usticc wcn ]. Robcrts as chairman, to
invcstigatc thc attack. !n addition to Robcrts, it includcd
two rctircd Navy o ccrs, onc rctircd and onc activc Army o
ccr.
1
According to Admiral Villiam H. Standlcy, lormcr chicl ol
naval opcrations and a mcmbcr ol thc Commission, FR hand
pickcd thc othcr lour mcmbcrs in consultation with Stimson,
Marshall, and possibly Knox, so that a majority could bc trustcd
to concludc that Short and Kimmcl wcrc primarily rcsponsiblc
lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr.
2

Tc Commissions assignmcnt was to dccidc whcthcr any
dcrclictions ol duty or crrors ol judgmcnt on thc part ol Unitcd
Statcs Army or Navy pcrsonncl contributcd to such succcsscs as
wcrc achicvcd by thc cncmy. !l any such dcrclictions or crrors
1
2
Villiam H. Standlcy, Admiral (USN, Rct.) ]unc 1, 1962, intcrvicw by Harry
lmcr 8arncs, p. 7, notcs in authors posscssion.
373
wcrc lound, it was to dctcrminc who wcrc rcsponsiblc thcrclor.
3

Tc Commissions authority was limited to investigating Army and
Navy personnel only; no civilian pcrsonncl.
Tnv Co::issiox 8vcixs Hv~vixcs
Tc Commission convcncd in Vashington cccmbcr 17, with
only lour ol its vc mcmbcrs prcscnt. Vhcn Admiral Standlcy
arrivcd thc ncxt day, hc lound thc Commission to bc a mixcd
and a vcry mixcd upPrcsidcntial commission with civilian,
naval and military mcmbcrs, lor which thcrc was no prcccdcnt in
law, custom or jurisprudcncc. Hc was shockcd at thc irrcgularity
ol thc proccdurc ol thc Commission and ol thc rcliancc placcd
upon unsworn tcstimony.
4
!t was cmpowcrcd to prcscribc its
own proccdurc but as originally sct up, it did not havc thc lcgal
powcr to do anything which would bc usual and csscntial to carry
out thc purposcs lor which it had bccn lormcd
5
to summon
witncsscs, cnlorcc thcir attcndancc, administcr oaths, or takc tcs
timony. Standlcy protcstcd at this lack ol lormal authority.
6

V~snixc)ox Tvs)i:oxyUxswovx
Tc Commission mcmbcrs kncw nothing ol prcattack cvcnts
cxccpt what thcy had rcad in thc ncwspapcrs. Tcy bcgan by qucs
tioning top military o cials on thc Vashington situation. Nonc
3
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2210, part 23, p. 1247, part
24, p. 1306.
4
Villiam H. Standlcy and Arthur A. Agcton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia
(Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry, 1955), pp. 8182. Scc also Standlcy intcrvicw in
US. News & World Report, April 16, 1954, pp. 4046.
5
Standlcy, 8arncs ]unc 1, 1962 intcrvicw, p. 8.
6
Standlcy, U.S. News & World Report, April 16, 1954.
The Administration Initiates an Investigation 375
ol thc o ccrs was sworn. Nor wcrc thcy crosscxamincd. No tran
scripts, only bricl summarics, ol thcir rcmarks wcrc publishcd.
7

Sccrctary ol Statc Hull had agrccd to advisc thc Commission
by lcttcr as to warnings ol probablc ]apancsc attack hc had
rcccivcd lrom Stimson and Knox.
8
Tc sccrctarics ol war and
navy, intcrvicwcd jointly by thc Commission mcmbcrs, ocrcd
thc lullcst coopcration ol thcir cpartmcnts. Gcncral Marshall
and Admiral Stark
appcarcd togcthcr . . . and lurnishcd inlormation . . . showing
that |Kimmcl and Short| . . . had bccn spccically warncd ol
thc likclihood ol a probablc outbrcak ol war . . . on ctobcr 16,
Novcmbcr 24, and Novcmbcr 27, 1941.
9

Gcncral Marshall rclatcd inlormativc or warning mcssagcs
scnt to thc Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt,
including his cccmbcr 7 mcssagc to Gcncral Short which had
bccn dispatchcd on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 but which had
not rcachcd Short in Hawaii until altcr thc attack.
10

Tc tcnor ol this unsworn tcstimony was that Vashington
had bccn lully alcrt to thc possibility ol a surprisc ]apancsc attack
and ol suddcn raids on Pcarl Harbor. Stark was obligcd to admit,
howcvcr, that all thc warnings scnt out lrom Vashington to thc
cct commandcrs in thc months bclorc thc attack conccrning
thc possibility ol attacks and cxpcditions against positions in thc
Far ast convcycd thc idca that both hc and Marshall bclicvcd
thc Far ast would bc thc locality whcrc thc major sustaincd
7
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 24, pp. 135561. Prccis ol Tcsti
mony.
8
!bid., part 23, p. 1245.
9
!bid., p. 1246.
10
!bid., pp. 1, 2. Scc also ibid., part 14, pp. 140910 (xhibit No. 39), mcmo
randa prcparcd lor thc rccord by L.T. Gcrow and V.8. Smith rcgarding
Marshalls cccmbcr 7, 1941 warning.
]apancsc cort would bc initiatcd. Hawaii was not spccically
mcntioncd as a point ol attack.
11

Tc dircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc ivision acknowlcdgcd that
sccrct inlormation had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington lcading thc
Navy to concludc in Novcmbcr that thc ]apancsc wcrc contcm
plating an carly attack. According to him, |c|arc was takcn . . . to
scc that thcsc two o ccrs |Kimmcl in Hawaii and Admiral Hart
in thc Philippincs| wcrc kcpt lully adviscd as to dcvclopmcnts.
12

So hc assumcd that thcy had bccn scnt this inlormation.
Pv~vi H~vnov Tvs)i:oxy Uxbvv ~)n
n complction ol thc Vashington tcstimony, thc mcmbcrs
ol thc Commission cw to Pcarl Harbor. 8y thcn, Congrcss had
approvcd a joint rcsolution granting thc Commission powcr to
conduct a propcr invcstigation and authorizing it to administcr
oaths and a rmations, cxaminc witncsscs, and rcccivc cvidcncc.
13

Tus, thc military o ccrs in Hawaii tcsticd under oath. 8oth
Short and Kimmcl wcrc still in thc scrvicc, although thcy had
bccn rclicvcd ol thcir rcspcctivc commands on cccmbcr 16,
shortly altcr thc attack. Shorts sta was availablc to hclp him,
Kimmcls sta had put to sca with thc cct, so hc had littlc hclp
in prcparing his tcstimony.
14

H~w~ii Swovx Tvs)i:oxy: Rvsvoxsiniii)y
According to thc plan thcn in ccct, Army and Navy coordi
natcd thcir opcrations lor thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc thrcc
principalsKimmcl, 8loch, and Shorthad bccn vcry lrank
with cach othcr, talkcd things ovcr, and Short bclicvcd thcy
11
!bid., part 23, p. 1357. 8ricl ol Admiral Starks Tcstimony.
12
!bid., part 23, p. 1361. Statcmcnt by Captain T. S. Vilkinson.
13
!bid., part 24, pp. 130708.
14
Standlcy and Agcrton, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 8384.
had cnjoycd closcr coopcration in thc last cight or tcn months
than . . . cvcr . . . bclorc.
15

Tcstimony rcvcalcd clcarly that rcsponsibility lor thc protcc
tion ol Pcarl Harbors shorcbascd cstablishmcnts rcstcd on thc
Army and Navy jointly.
16
Tc Armys rolc was basically to dclcnd
onshorc cstablishmcnts, thc naval basc, and thc cct whcn it was
in harbor. Tc Navys rcsponsibility was ocnsivc, to support thc
Army by opcrations at sca. Tc Navy was not rcsponsiblc lor thc
dclcnsc ol thc basc in casc ol an air raid, but, it was rcsponsiblc lor
thc naval clcmcnts that could bc madc availablc |to thc Army and
thc Army Air Forcc| lor thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor.
17
Kimmcl
was not includcd in thc joint ArmyNavy plan lor dclcnding thc
bascs onshorc cstablishmcnts, hc lully cxpcctcd whcn thc ght
camc on that hc wouldnt bc down hcrc in thc harbor, that hc
would bc on thc high scas ghting.
18
According to him, thc cct
was to havc lrccdom ol action, to go and comc without bcing
conccrncd about thc salcty . . . |cxccpt lor| thc broadcr stratcgy
ol opcrations.
19
As Kimmcl put it, a Flcct basc is a havcn lor
rct, supply, and lor rcst and rccrcation ol pcrsonncl altcr arduous
dutics and strcnuous opcrations at sca.
20
Pcarl Harbors dclcnsc
was in thc hands ol thc Army.
Tc Navys aircralt carricrs wcrc ol spccial conccrn. Plancs
could not takc o lrom a dockcd carricr, so whcn in port, both
carricr and any plancs would bc vulncrablc . . . to attack and . . .
dcstruction.
21
For salctys sakc, whcn in harbor, carricr aircralt
15
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.55.
16
!bid., part 22, p. 11, tcstimony ol Major Villiam S. Lawton, gcncral sta
corps liaison o ccr with thc Navy, in chargc ol joint ArmyNavy activitics.
17
!bid., part 23, p. 1149. Kimmcl tcstimony, part 22, pp. 1011. Kimmcl mcmo
randum ol cccmbcr 21, 1941, part 23, 1211 Kimmcl tcstimony.
18
!bid., part 22, p. 55. Short tcstimony.
19
!bid., part 23, pp. 112934.
20
!bid., part 23, p. 1129.
21
!bid., part 23, pp. 121718.
wcrc own o thcir mothcr ships. Tus, thc Navy rcquirc|d|
shorc air bascs lor thc usc ol carricr aircralt in ordcr to maintain
thcm in a propcr statc ol training lor war rcadincss
22
and so that
in cvcnt ol bcing caught in port thosc plancs could bc usclul.
Tosc shorc air bascs, also nccdcd to outt thc carricr plancs with
bombs and ammunition, wcrc an Army rcsponsibility. Vhcn thc
plancs assigncd to carricrs or to thc Marincs wcrc shorc bascd,
thcy camc undcr thc commandcr Flcct Air ctachmcnt.
23
Air
combat, Army pursuit airplancs, antiaircralt artillcry, and thc
Aircralt Varning Scrvicc (radar) wcrc undcr thc command ol
thc Armys intcrccptor commandcr.
24
Radar, still in its inlancy in
1941, was not lully opcrational on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, it
was thcn opcrating lor drill purposcs only.
25

H~w~ii Swovx Tvs)i:oxy: Tnv Suvvvisv iv:vx)
Knox, rccalling clcvcnmonth old corrcspondcncc bctwccn
him and Stimson, considcrcd an air bombing attack or an air tor
pcdo planc attack thc grcatcst potcntial dangcrs and urgcd Stimson
to havc thc Army improvc Pcarl Harbors rcadincss to mcct such
attacks.
26
Stimson assurcd Knox that thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt
is thc bcst cquippcd ol all our ovcrscas dcpartmcnts, and hc was
working to lurthcr improvc its dclcnsivc capabilitics: ncw pursuit
plancs had bccn promiscd, Aircralt Varning Scrvicc cquipmcnt
and barragc balloons wcrc on ordcr.
27

22
!bid., part 23, p. 1218, part 24, p. 1564. From Rcport ol ArmyNavy 8oard,
ctobcr 31, 1941.
23
!bid., part 23, pp. 55455. 8cllingcr tcstimony.
24
25
!bid., part 23, p.1209.
26
!bid., 109294. Corrcspondcncc ol ]anuary 24, 1941.
27
Stimson mcmorandum, Fcbruary 7, 1941. ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor
Attack, part 23, pp. 109495.
8loch, who had oncc hcld Kimmcls position as commandcr
inchicl ol thc cct, said that thc possibility ol a ]apancsc air
raid on Pcarl Harbor had always bccn a considcration, but in all
cstimatcs ol thc situation that |hc was| lamiliar with . . . it was
considcrcd rcmotc.
28
Ncvcrthclcss, in March Major Gcncral F.
L. Martin, commandcr ol thc Armys Hawaiian Air Forcc, and
Rcar Admiral P. N. L. 8cllingcr, commandcr ol thc Navys Naval
8asc clcnsc Air Forcc, had cxamincd thc prospccts ol an attack
on thc cct in Hawaii:
29

|T|hc most likcly and dangcrous lorm ol attack on ahu
would bc an air attack . . . launchcd lrom onc or morc carri
crs. . . . !n a dawn air attack thcrc is a high probability that it
could bc dclivcrcd as a complctc surprisc in spitc ol any patrols
wc might bc using and that it might nd us in a condition ol
rcadincss undcr which pursuit would bc slow to start.
Tc two commandcrs rccommcndcd daily patrols as lar as
possiblc to scaward through 360 dcgrccs to rcducc thc probabili
tics ol surlacc or air surprisc. Howcvcr, thcy rcalizcd that this
can only bc ccctivcly maintaincd with prcscnt pcrsonncl and
matcrial lor a vcry short pcriod and as a practicablc mcasurc
cannot, thcrclorc, bc undcrtakcn unless other intelligence indi-
cates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time
limits.
30

istant rcconnaissancc, a Navy rcsponsibility, was gcncr
ally acknowlcdgcd to bc thc bcst assurancc against an approach
ing surprisc attack. Howcvcr, 8loch rcportcd that

rcconnaissancc
plancs wcrc in scrious short supply on thc islands. !t was cstimatcd
28
!bid., part 22, pp. 46061, 8loch tcstimony.
29
!bid., part 23, pp. 114448. Martin8cllingcr mcmo, March 31, 1941.
30
!bid., p. 1145 (cmphasis addcd).
that to patrol 360 dcgrccs continually would havc rcquircd 200
300 plancs.
31
n papcr, 8loch tcsticd,
|hc| had bccn givcn 108 patrol plancs lor that spccic purposc
|distant rcconnaissancc|, nonc ol which had cvcr arrivcd, not
onc ol thcm.
32
. . . Vc had a plancbuilding program, and on
that plancbuilding program thc assignmcnt ol thc 14th Naval
istrict was ninc squadrons ol patrol plancs and two squadrons
ol obscrvation plancs, and thcy wcrc thc istrict lorccs that
wcrc supposcd to do this rcconnaissancc, but thcrc wcrc nonc
ol thcm cvcr dclivcrcd hcrc bccausc thcy hadnt bccn built.
33

Twcntylour ol ahus 72 patrol bombcrs wcrc thcn out with
thc task lorccs Kimmcl had scnt to rcinlorcc thc bascs on Vakc
and Midway. nly 36 plancs wcrc still at ahu, 12 ol which wcrc
undcr ovcrhaul. Tcrc wcrc nowhcrc ncarly cnough plancs in
Hawaii to carry out any distant rcconnaissancc.
34
8loch rclatcd
his cxpcricncc in 1938, whcn hc had bccn commandcrinchicl ol
thc U.S. Flcct. Tcy cndcavorcd to makc thc 360dcgrcc scarch
with thc plancs thcy had, and wc had a trcmcndous numbcr ol
casualtics. !n a lcw days thcy lost somcthing likc lour or vc
plancs, and two ol thcm lost all thc crcws. Tcy lost thc othcr
plancs that wcnt down, but rccovcrcd thc pcrsonncl. Tc lcsson
lrom this mancuvcr was that
to conduct a scarch c cicntly and to maintain it rcquircd a
largc numbcr ol plancs, and thcy had to bc opcratcd morc or
lcss day on and day o, so that onc day thcy |thc crcws| would
go out, thc ncxt day thcy could rcst. !n othcr words thc strain
on thc pcrsonncl was grcatcr than it was on thc matricl.
35

31
!bid., part 23, pp. 1134, 1183. Kimmcl tcstimony.
32
!bid., part 22, p. 460. 8loch tcstimony.
33
!bid., pp. 46970. 8loch tcstimony.
34
!bid., p. 487. Kimmcl tcstimony.
35
!bid., p. 466. 8loch tcstimony.
Tc Navy undcr Kimmcl had bccn diligcnt in conducting
rcconnaissancc, mainly antisubmarinc patrols, covcring thc 25
to 50 milc bclt around thc island that thc availablc plancs could
covcr.
36
Howcvcr, Kimmcl admittcd that hc had considcrcd an
air attack highly improbablc and patrols to thc northward
not justicd. Had hc had warning that an air attack was any
whcrc ncar probablc, hc said, ! would havc uscd cvcrything wc
had, cvcrything.
37
8ut givcn thc statc ol thc plancs, it sccmcd
morc prudcnt to conscrvc thcm lor action in thc war that was
anticipatcd.
!n addition to considcring thc likclihood ol submarinc and
air attacks, thc Navy had also considcrcd thc possibility ol a tor
pcdo attack. Howcvcr, this thrcat had gcncrally bccn discountcd
bccausc ol thc shallowncss ol thc approach to Pcarl Harbor.
38
So
thc usc ol |antitorpcdo| ba cs lor Pcarl Harbor or othcr har
bors in thc Fourtccnth Naval istrict was not rccommcndcd.
39
!n
]unc, thc Navy cpartmcnt again concludcd that a torpcdo planc
attack in Pcarl Harbors rclativcly shallow watcr was unlikcly. !n
any cvcnt, no antitorpcdo ba cs wcrc installcd.
Tcrc had bccn gossip in thc ncwspapcrs in thc Statcs to
thc ccct that thcrc had bccn a lot ol drinking and that somc
in thc high command wcrc not t lor duty on Sunday morn
ing, cccmbcr 7.
40
8oth Kimmcl and his aidc, Admiral Tcobald,
dcnicd that drunkcnncss was a contributing lactor, no liquor is
allowcd on board ship.
41
According to Kimmcl, thcrc had bccn
vcry littlc drunkcnncss among thc o ccrs and mcn ol this cct.
Vc havc dcalt vcry scriously with thc incidcnts which wcrc
36
37
!bid., part 23, p. 1183. Kimmcl tcstimony.
38
!bid., p. 1137.
39
!bid., p. 1139.
40
!bid., p. 1236.
41
!bid., p. 1235.
rcportcd by thc patrol, and thcy havc bccn isolatcd instanccs.
42

Nor was Kimmcl conscious . . . ol thc spccial dangcrs ol a
Sunday,
43
whcn morc passcs and lcavcs wcrc issucd on Saturdays
and lcwcr mcn and o ccrs wcrc apt to bc aboard ship, alcrt, and
rcady lor action. Tcrc wcrc not apprcciably morc abscnccs ol
o ccrs and mcn on Sunday than on any othcr day. Truc, somc
commanding o ccrs wcrc ashorc, but that dcpcndcd on whcthcr
or not thcir lamilics wcrc in Hawaii. Tcrc wcrc a grcat many
o ccrs hcrc who had no lamilics, and thcy slcpt on board, so
il thcrc wcrc lcwcr o ccrs aboard it was not cntircly duc to its
bcing a wcckcnd.
44

H~w~ii Swovx Tvs)i:oxy: Pvvv~vvbxvss
As Admiral Richardson prcparcd to rclinquish command ol
thc U.S. Pacic Flcct in ]anuary 1941, hc and Kimmcl, who was
prcparing to takc ovcr command, collaboratcd in a lcttcr to Chicl
ol Naval pcrations Stark, conccrning thc sccurity mcasurcs
rcquircd lor thc protcction ol Flcct units, at sca and in port.
Surprisc raids on Pcarl Harbor, or attcmpts to block thc chan
ncl, thcy wrotc, wcrc possiblc. Tc cct was scvcrcly handi
cappcd in prcparing lor such contingcncics by ccrtain markcd
dccicncics in thc cxisting local dclcnsc lorccs and cquipmcnt
both Army and Navy. Morcovcr, many ol thc ccts lacilitics
wcrc obsolcsccnt. Richardson and Kimmcl urgcd that corrccting
thcsc critical dccicncics bc givcn priority ovcr thc nccds ol
contincntal districts, thc training program, and matcrial aid to
Grcat 8ritain.
45

Short, who was rcsponsiblc lor thc protcction ol thc cct whcn
in Pcarl Harbor, said it was practically impossiblc to protcct thc
42
!bid., part 23, p. 1236.
43
!bid., p. 1184.
44
45
!bid., part 22, pp. 32931.
ships in such a rcstrictcd arca against a scrious attack, no mat
tcr how much you tricd. Vith so many ships dockcd so closc
togcthcr, hc could not havc guarantccd that no cncmy planc could
gct in and makc a hit, somc would bc bound to sucr losscs.
46

Troughout 1941, thc Hawaiian commandcrsKimmcl,
Short, and 8lochhad prcsscd rcpcatcdly lor additional mcn
and cquipmcnt. Tcy rcccivcd some rcinlorccmcnts but thcsc
lailcd to build up thc Hawaiian lorccs as hopcd, as othcr lac
tors wcrc stcadily croding thcm. Rcgular and cxpcricnccd o
ccrs wcrc bcing dctachcd at an alarming ratc, and many traincd
cnlistcd mcn wcrc not planning to rccnlist whcn thcir duty was
up.
47
!n May 1941, about a quartcr ol thc Pacic Flccts ships
had bccn translcrrcd to thc Atlantic on ordcrs lrom Vashington.
Morcovcr, rclativcly lcw ol thc ncw plancs, mcn, and guns that
rcachcd Hawaii rcmaincd thcrc, most continucd on to thc wcst.
Tc Army was cngagcd in lcrrying . . . plancs to thc Asiatics.
48

Longrangc patrol bombcrs wcrc bcing own to thc Philippincs
via Hawaii, Midway, Vakc, and Australia.
vcr and abovc thc Armys dclcnsivc rolc at Pcarl Harbor,
thc Army air corps had a vcry spccic mission . . . ol prcparing
. . . combat tcams to lcrry plancs |817s| to thc Philippincs. No
onc can just stcp into thc cockpit ol a 817, a Flying Fortrcss,
lrom his training ship and immcdiatcly y it across thc Pacic.
A pilot must rst train on 818s and A20s, and thcn scrvc as a
817 copilot, bclorc taking ovcr as a lullcdgcd 817 pilot. !t
would havc bccn risky to scnd a planc across thc Pacic with a
halltraincd crcw, and Short had only six bombcrs at his disposal
to do all this training. Short couldnt (1) usc thcsc six bombcrs
lor training pilots lor lcrrying missions, and at thc samc timc
(2) turn thcm ovcr to thc Navy lor longrangc rcconnaissancc,
46
47
!bid., part 23, p. 1155. Kimmcl mcmo to CN, May 26, 1941.
48
and also (3) kccp thcm scattcrcd about, warmcd up 24 hours a
day, and rcady to takc to thc air. Hc didnt havc cnough plancs to
accomplish both (1) and (2), and hc hadnt considcrcd thc thrcat
scrious cnough to justily (3).
49

n ctobcr 17 Stark had wircd Kimmcl:
8ccausc ol thc grcat importancc ol continuing to rccnlorcc thc
Philippincs with long rangc Army bombcrs you arc rcqucstcd
to takc all practical prccautions lor thc salcty ol thc airclds at
Vakc and Midway.
50
Tc plan was to lcrry somc 60 longrangc bombcrs out to
thc Philippincs via Hawaii and Vakc. As Kimmcl was rcspon
siblc lor thc dclcnsc ol Vakc and lor thc dclcnsc ol Midway and
lor putting Marincs and guns and all othcr dclcnsivc wcapons
out thcrc,
51
hc procccdcd to strcngthcn thcir dclcnscs as bcst hc
could.
Tc war warning mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 27 had instructcd
Kimmcl to carry out thc tasks assigncd in VPL 46, that is, to gct
rcady to attack thc ]apancsc bascs in thc Marshall !sland.
52
Two
othcr dispatchcs on that samc day ordcrcd him to prcparc troops
lor our advancc bascs and to transport 25 Army pursuit plancs
with ground crcws to Vakc and Midway. Stationing thcsc plancs
|on Vakc and Midway| must not bc allowcd to intcrlcrc with
planncd movcmcnts ol Army bombcrs to Philippincs.
53
Kimmcl
rcalizcd thc Army was short ol plancs. Shortly bclorc rcinlorcing
Vakc and Midway hc had wantcd thc Army to participatc in
Navy mancuvcrs, but thc Army could not do it bccausc thcy
wcrc cngagcd in lcrrying thcsc plancs to thc Asiatics, and in
49
50
!bid., part 14, p. 1403. From CN to C!NCPAC, #171458.
51
52
!bid., part 6, p. 2518.
53
!bid.
gctting thcir plancs in a lcrrying condition hcrc. . . . Tcy had thcir
problcms too, Kimmcl said.
54
Short and Kimmcl mct with sta
mcmbcrs on Novcmbcr 27 to discuss thc translcr lrom ahu ol
25 pursuit plancs cach to Vakc and Midway, as Vashington had
ordcrcd.
55
Kimmcl qucstioncd his war plans o ccr: |V|hat is
your idca ol thc chanccs ol a surprisc raid on ahu: McMorris:
! should say nonc, Admiral. At thc timc, Short said,
|T|hcrc was no cxccption takcn to that statcmcnt by cithcr
Admiral Kimmcl or Admiral 8loch, and apparcntly thc Navy
lclt that thcy had dcnitc inlormation ol thc location ol carri
crs and major ships ol thc ]apancsc and that thcrc was no qucs
tion in thcir minds ol thc possibility or probability ol a surprisc
attack upon ahu.
56

Tc construction ol thc airclds on Vakc and Midway had to
bc carricd out undcr thc most advcrsc conditions. Vc wcrc laccd
with thc ncccssity ol building bascs and ol protccting thcm at
thc samc timc. Tc dispatch ol rcinlorccmcnts thcrc would scri
ously wcakcn Hawaiis dclcnsivc lorccs. !t was nally dccidcd to
scnd only hall thc numbcr ol plancs Vashington had suggcstcd.
Rightly or wrongly, Kimmcl tcsticd, wc cvcntually had thcrc
about 350 marincs and 6 5inch guns and 12 3inch guns and a
numbcr ol machinc guns, and wc had 12 ghting plancs thcrc.
57

n Novcmbcr 28 Kimmcl dispatchcd a convoy, undcr Admiral
Villiam F. Halscy, with mcn and plancs to Vakc. 8ccausc thcrc
had bccn a warning lrom thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations that
thc convcrsations with thc ]apancsc rcprcscntativcs wcrc about
to brcak down, and to bc prcparcd lor cvcntualitics, all thc ships
54
!bid., part 23, p. 1151.
55
!bid., part 22, p. 43.
56
57
in Halscys convoy wcrc to assumc a condition ol rcadincss lor
instant combat and to maintain strict radio silcncc.
58

n cccmbcr 5 Kimmcl scnt out a sccond convoy undcr
Admiral ].H. Ncwton, with a squadron ol plancs bound lor
Midway.
59

8loch, who had takcn ovcr thc rcsponsibility lor thc sccu
rity ol thc basc, had writtcn thc Navy cpartmcnt about thc
wcakncss in thc pursuit plancs, bombing plancs, and antiaircralt
guns. Tc Army had dispatchcd to Hawaii a largc numbcr ol
pursuit plancs and somc hcavy bombcrs, but no antiaircralt guns
|wcrc| lorthcoming.
60
Vhcn 8loch prcsscd his nccd lor plancs
and vcsscls, hc was told thcy wcrc doing cvcrything within thcir
powcr to gct thcm and would scnd thcm as soon as thcy could.
61

As a rcsult ol 8lochs corts, Pcarl Harbor nally obtaincd onc
division ol dcstroycrs, lour dcstroycrs, only onc ol which has any
listcning gcar, and onc division ol lour minc swccpcrs. !n accor
dancc with Kimmcls ordcr, thc dcstroycrs wcrc stationcd at thc
harbor cntrancc, thc minc swccpcrs swcpt thc channcl, thc ncts
wcrc opcrating, and boom and harbor patrols wcrc cxccutcd.
Howcvcr, antiaircralt protcction ol Pcarl Harbor was wcak.
8loch was also chargcd on papcr with thc rcsponsibility lor dis
tant rcconnaissancc, 108 patrol plancs had bccn promiscd lor that
purposc, nonc ol which had cvcr arrivcd, not onc ol thcm.
62

8clorc cccmbcr 7 Short rcccivcd thrcc scrious warning
mcssagcs lrom Vashingtonctobcr 16, Novcmbcr 27, and
Novcmbcr 28.
63
All thrcc mcssagcs
58
!bid., part 23, p. 608. Halscy tcstimony.
59
!bid., p. 1166. Kimmcl.
60
!bid., part 22, p. 471. 8loch tcstimony.
61
!bid., pp. 461, 469. 8loch tcstimony.
62
63
!bid., p. 39. Short tcstimony.
cmphasizcd right straight through that wc must not disclosc
our stand and that wc must not alarm thc population and that
wc must takc mcasurcs to protcct against sabotagc, against
cspionagc, and against subvcrsivc action. Nowhcrc did thcy
indicatc in any way thc ncccssity lor protccting against attack.
Tcy also did indicatc dcnitcly that wc must avoid publicity
and avoid alarming thc public.
64

Short institutcd what was known as Alcrt #1, lor sabotagc.
!l thc Army had gonc to thc ncxt highcr alcrt, Alcrt #2, all anti
aircralt guns would havc bccn sct out with livc ammunition right
alongsidc, pcoplc would thcn havc noticcd. And that, Short
maintaincd, would havc violatcd thc Var cpartmcnts intcn
tions to not alarm thc population.
65
n Novcmbcr 29 hc dctailcd
thc prccautions bcing takcn against subvcrsivc activitics.
66

Vashington madc no objcction whatcvcr to Shorts rcport that
hc was alcrtcd lor sabotagc. Short told thc Commission,
!l thcy had any idca that that was not a corrcct ordcr, thcy had
all thc opportunity lrom Novcmbcr 27 to cccmbcr 7 to comc
back and say, Vc do not considcr thc action takcn by you as
su cicnt and that you should instcad takc action to dclcnd
yourscll against air attack.
Hc took Vashingtons lailurc to objcct to his action as tacit
agrccmcnt with thc coursc |hc| had takcn. Hc did not scc how
|hc| could draw any othcr conclusion.
67

Short bclicvcd that il Vashington rcally wantcd him to know
somcthing urgcntly, it would havc contactcd him by its spccch
scramblcr tclcphonc. Short had a sccrct phonc . . . with con
ncctions to thc sccrct phonc right in thc Chicl ol Stas o cc.
64
!bid., p. 39, p. 58. Short tcstimony.
65
!bid., part 24, pp. 177476.
66
!bid., part 22, p. 39.
67
!bid., pp. 4548.
Short had talkcd with Marshall rcpcatcdly on this tclcphonc,
which was thc lastcst thing that could possibly comc through,
taking only about 15 minutcs to cstablish contact. Vhilc not
considcrcd as salc as codc, thcy |scramblcr phoncs| arc rcasonably
salc.
68
Vashington didnt phonc Short with a spccial warning
bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and cccmbcr 7.
Tc cc ol Navy !ntclligcnccs (N!) cccmbcr 5 sum
mary ol thc ]apancsc naval situation rcportcd that cxtcnsivc
prcparations arc undcr way lor hostilitics. Troop transports and
lrcightcrs wcrc pouring continually down lrom ]apan and north
crn China coast ports hcadcd south, apparcntly lor Frcnch !ndo
China and Formosan ports.
69
And thc intclligcncc Kimmcl and
Short rcccivcd lrom Vashington during this pcriod indicatcd
that thc ]apancsc lorccs wcrc hcading lor southcast Asia and wcrc
cxpcctcd to strikc in thc vcry lar wcst at thc Philippincs, Tailand,
thc Kra pcninsula, or possibly 8ornco,
70
about 3,000 milcs lrom
Hawaii.
8oth Kimmcl and Short had prcparcd contingcncy plans,
dctailing what to do in casc thcy wcrc attackcd. Kimmcl was by
no mcans convinccd that wc wcrc going to gct into thc war at this
timc and that wc would bccomc involvcd immcdiatcly. Tat was,
ol coursc, hc said, |his| mistakc.
71
Ncvcrthclcss, hc had madc
plans lor going to war. From Novcmbcr 30 on, hc had prcparcd
daily mcmoranda to show what thc initial stcps would bc whcn
war would comc. n thc morning ol cccmbcr 6 Kimmcl had
gonc ovcr his cccmbcr 5 mcmorandum, which had sct lorth thc
stcps to bc takcn in casc ol Amcrican]apancsc war. Hc said
68
!bid., p. 48.
69
!bid., part 23, pp. 115253. N! cccmbcr 1, 1941 rcport ol ]apancsc Naval
Situation.
70
!bid.
71
!bid., p. 1167.
thcy wcrc alivc to thc possibility ol war.
72
|!|n accordancc with
thc sccurity mcasurcs wc had in ccct, hc pointcd out, Patrol
Ving 2 did not havc to wait lor spccic instructions, it sct out
immcdiatcly altcr thc attack bcgan to scarch lor thc cncmy.
73

H~w~ii Swovx Tvs)i:oxy: !x)viiicvxcv
Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Robcrts Commission lcarncd lrom wit
ncss altcr witncss about thc intclligcncc availablc to thc Hawaiian
commandcrs. !t camc principally lrom lour sourccs: (1) obscrva
tion, (2) dcciphcring ol somc minor ]apancsc codcs, PAK2,
(3) dircctionnding (.F.) stations that analyzcd radio bcams
broadcast lrom ]apancsc ships, and (4) advicc lorwardcd lrom thc
N! and chicl ol naval opcrations (CN) in Vashington.
Rcsponsibility lor intclligcncc in Hawaii was dividcd bctwccn
two authoritics: thc Combat !ntclligcncc Unit, conccrncd pri
marily with thc lunctions ol thc cncmy . . . and . . . cncmy movc
mcnts, and thc istrict !ntclligcncc ccr, who has morc to do
with dclcnsc. . . . Subvcrsivc activitics, alicns, sabotagc, and that
sort ol thing.
74
Commandcr ]oscph ]ohn Rochclort ol Combat
!ntclligcncc tricd to covcr cvcry possiblc transmission . . . by thc
Gcrmans, !talians, ]apancsc through his .F. stations and his
intcrccptor watch, which intcrccpts cncmy transmissions in thc
lorm ol radio mcssagcs and copics thc radio mcssagcs intact.
His opcrators wcrc ablc to pick up transmissions lrom Tokyo and
thc ]apancsc cct. Tcn thcrc was also thc scarch watch, which
scarchcd lrom thc bottom ol thc |radio| band to thc top.
75
To
discovcr what thc ]apancsc cct was doing, thc intclligcncc o
ccrs in Hawaii did thcir bcst to piccc togcthcr what thcy could
lcarn lrom thc intcrccptcd radio transmissions, radio bcams, and
72
!bid., p. 1167.
73
!bid., p. 1129.
74
!bid., part 22, pp. 673, 67677. Rochclort tcstimony.
75
!bid., pp. 67778.
thcir scarch watch. thcrwisc, all thcy kncw ol thc impcnding
crisis, cxccpt lor thc Vashington dispatchcs rcporting ]apancsc
ship movcmcnts in thc vicinity ol thc South China Sca, was
glcancd lrom thc Honolulu ncwspapcrs. And according to prcss
rcports, thc thrcat appcarcd to havc abatcd tcmporarily, ]apancsc
U.S. convcrsations in Vashington wcrc continuing.
From about Novcmbcr 1 on, Hawaiian !ntclligcncc pcrsonncl
rcalizcd somcthing was aloot. Tcy couldnt put thcir ngcrs on it
cxactly, but it was apparcnt that somcthing was building up, just
as it had bccn scvcral ycars carlicr, whcn thc ]apancsc wcrc prc
paring to movc against thc Chincsc island ol Hainan, and again
in thc spring ol 1941, whcn thcy wcrc gctting rcady to go into
!ndochina.
About Novcmbcr 25 or 26, it bccamc apparcnt that ]apancsc
submarincs and aircralt carricrs, and probably a battlcship division,
wcrc conccntratcd in thc Marshall !sland arca, south ol Vakc. 8y
thc cnd ol thc month it lookcd as il cvcrything, cxccpt lor somc
ships still in thc Marshalls, was wcst ol that, down around Palao,
not lar lrom thc Philippincs. Tis lormation just didnt sccm logi
cal, but Hawaiian !ntclligcncc was positivc, lrom thcir study ol
thc tra c, that thc carricrs wcrc in thc Marshalls. So thcy scnt a
dispatch to this ccct to thc Navy cpartmcnt in Vashington.
About a day altcr that thc carricrs just complctcly droppcd
lrom sight, ncvcr hcard anothcr word lrom thcm. . . . |T|hcy
just complctcly droppcd out ol thc picturc approximatcly thc
rst ol cccmbcr, battlcships likcwisc.
76

Flcct !ntclligcncc ccr Licutcnant Commandcr dwin
Tomas Layton cstimatcd thcy wcrc in port, having complctcd
76
!bid., pp. 67778.
two wccks opcrations, and thcy arc having an ovcrhaul lor ncw
opcrations.
77

!n addition to thc tra c buildup, Hawaiian !ntclligcncc had
anothcr hint ol impcnding ]apancsc actionthc ccts lrcqucnt
codc changcs in latc 1941. Tc ]apancsc normally changcd thcir
sca and shorc calls twicc a ycar, on thc rst ol Novcmbcr and
thc rst ol March or April. 8ut in 1941 thcy didnt wait lor
Novcmbcr. Tcy changcd thcir codcs a month carly, on ctobcr
1. Tcn thcy changcd thcm again on Novcmbcr 1, and still again
on cccmbcr 1.
78
Tc ]apancsc wcrc apparcntly planning somc
thing. 8ut what: Vhcrc: Vhcn: Tc Armys Hawaiian dcpart
mcnt rclicd on inlormation supplicd by thc Fourtccnth Naval
istrict, thc Var cpartmcnts G2 in Vashington, which got
its inlormation through N!.
79

Mcmbcrs ol thc Robcrts Commission askcd again and again
why thc Hawaiian lorccs wcrc surpriscd so complctcly. Tc intcl
ligcncc that rcachcd Hawaii lrom Vashington in thc wccks and
months prcccding cccmbcr 7, 1941, warncd rcpcatcdly that a
strikc was cxpcctcd in southcast Asia, thousands ol milcs lrom
Pcarl Harbor. Kimmcl summarizcd: And thc cpartmcnt by
thcir dispatchcs cvidcnccd considcrablc conccrn about thc sccu
rity ol thcir outlying bascs. vcn Commission chairman Robcrts
admittcd that anyonc who rcads thosc tclcgrams will scc that
thc Naval !ntclligcncc indicatcd aggrcssivc movcmcnts many
thousand milcs lrom Pcarl Harbor.
80
Tc buildup ol Hawaiis
dclcnscs had bccn ncglcctcd at thc cxpcnsc ol othcr thcatcrs ol
77
!bid., part 23, p. 679. Rochclort tcstimony. Scc also part 22, p. 664. Layton
tcstimony. And dwin T. Layton, Rogcr Pincau, and ]ohn Costcllo, And I Was
Tere: Pearl Harbor and MidwayBreaking the Secrets (Ncw York: V. Morrow,
1985), pp. 22830.
78
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 679. Rochclort tcstimony.
79
!bid., part 23, p. 1238.
80
!bid., p. 1238. Chairman Robcrts.
war, as Kimmcl had notcd. Rcpcatcd rcqucsts by thc Hawaiian
commandcrs lor morc mcn and matcricl had bccn ignorcd.
Pos)A))~cx Rvvvi~)ioxs ix H~w~ii
!mmcdiatcly altcr thc attack, o cials ol thc F.8.!. cntcrcd thc
]apancsc consulatc in Honolulu. Tcy intcrruptcd thc burning ol
papcrs, arrcstcd thc consul, and scizcd ]apancsc codcs and papcrs.
Short said, Tcy got almost a complctc lc.
81
Vith thc hclp ol
thcsc codcs, thc Navy was soon ablc to dcciphcr communications
which had passcd bctwccn Tokyo and thc ]apancsc consul in
thc wccks prcccding thc attack. Tcsc capturcd communications
undoubtcdly includcd thc ships in harbor mcssagcs that had
bccn intcrccptcd in Hawaii bclorc thc attack, lorwardcd still in
codc by airmail on Vashingtons ordcrs, thcn dccodcd, translatcd,
and madc availablc bclorc cccmbcr 7 to Vashington o cials,
though not to thc Hawaiian commandcrs.
n cccmbcr 9, Kimmcl saw translations ol thcsc mcssagcs.
Tcy madc it vcry clcar that Tokyo had attachcd spccial impor
tancc to inlormation conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl
Harbor. Apparcntly, ]apan had no intcntion ol attacking Pcarl
Harbor in thc abscncc ol a largc numbcr ol our battlcships and
aircralt carricrs.
82
nc mcssagc, scnt to Tokyo by thc ]apancsc
consul on cccmbcr 3
83
itcmizcd
laboratc arrangcmcnts . . . to rcport to ]apancsc submarincs
and ]apancsc vcsscls at sca thc dcparturc ol aircralt carricrs and
battlcships lrom Pcarl Harbor by: (1) 8roadcast advcrtiscmcnts
ovcr KGM8 at 0945 daily, (2) A systcm ol lights lrom a housc
on Lanakai and Kalama during thc night and visual day signals
at Lanakai lrom a starboat during daylight, (3) Furthcr visual
81
82
83
!bid.
warning ol thc abscncc ol aircralt carricrs and battlcships was a
bonrc to bc shown on thc !sland ol Mauri |sic| ncar thc Kula
Sanatarium.
84

Had Kimmcl known on cccmbcr 3, whcn thc ]apancsc con
sul scnt this mcssagc to Tokyo, that a scrics ol signals was bcing
sct up to indicatc which ships wcrc in thc harbor and which wcrc
out, hc would havc immcdiatcly rcportcd it to Vashington and
|would havc| considcrcd it almost cquivalcnt to a dcclaration ol
war.
85
!l hc had had this inlormation on cccmbcr 6, hc would
havc ordcrcd all units to sca, bccausc thc bcst dispositions against
surprisc air attack can bc ccctcd with thc cct at sca.
86
8ut hc
and Short kncw nothing ol any such mcssagcs. Tcy undoubtcdly
had suspcctcd that ]apancsc spics on ahu had bccn watching
thc ships in thc harbor, although thcy certainly didnt know that
mcssagcs about ship locations had bccn dccodcd, translatcd, and
rcad by many top U.S. o cials, days, cvcn wccks, bclorc thc attack.
Likcwisc, thc Robcrts commissioncrs probably did not know that
somc ol thcsc mcssagcs had bccn availablc in Vashington prior
to thc attackat lcast nonc ol thc Vashington o cials thcy
qucstioncd had mcntioncd thcm.
8~cx ix V~snixc)ox:
So:v Ab:issioxs ny M~vsn~ii
Tc Commission complctcd its Hawaiian hcarings and
dcpartcd on ]anuary 10, 1942. n ]anuary 15 thc mcmbcrs arrivcd
back in Vashington and rcsumcd qucstioning Vashington o
cials lor onc day.
87
Tcy again qucstioncd Marshall, Stark, Turncr,
84
!bid.
85
86
!bid., p. 1153. Kimmcl. tcstimony.
87
!bid., pp. 1075.
and Gcrow. Tc most signicant tcstimony was that givcn by
Marshall, this timc undcr oath.
88

Marshall admittcd that cvcn with thc supcrior intclligcncc
availablc to him, hc had bccn surpriscd by thc attack. ]apancsc
movcmcnts wcrc going on around thc Philippincs, Marshall
rccallcd. And il anything happcncd thcy wcrc going to gct it. . . .
So, in point ol priority, il wc had turncd to thc tclcphonc to scnd
a warning, hc ccrtainly would havc turncd to thc Philippincs
rst. Vashington had had cvidcncc also ol
gathcring strcngth in thc Mandatc !slands, air and naval vcs
scls. . . . |V|c assumcd that Guam would bc wipcd out ol thc
picturc right at thc start. Tat thcy |thc ]apancsc| would carry
thc mattcr right up to Hawaii ! didnt anticipatc.
89
Marshall admittcd also that hc had lully anticipatcd a tcr
ric cort to cripplc cvcrything out thcrc by sabotagc.
90
Hc had
considcrcd thc local ]apancsc population to bc thc grcatcst thrcat
to Hawaii. n top ol that, hc admittcd his lailurc to rcalizc that
Shorts alcrt lor sabotagc callcd lor bunching thc plancs.
91
Yct
thc spccic purposc ol Alcrt #1, as statcd in thc Hawaiian
cpartmcnts Standard pcrating Proccdurc, was to dclcnd
thc airclds and vital installations against acts ol sabotagc and
uprisings.
92
!t was lor this rcason that Short ordcrcd thc plancs
88
!bid., part 23, pp. 107582.
89
!bid., p. 1081.
90
!bid., p. 1081. Marshall tcstimony.
91
!bid., p. 1079.
92
!bid., part 24, pp. 177176. Shorts Standing pcration Proccdurc, Hcad
quartcrs Hawaiian cpartmcnt, 5 Novcmbcr 1941. Tc stcps to bc takcn
undcr Alcrts #1, 2, and 3 arc itcmizcd: thc phrasc against acts ol sabotagc
and uprisings appcar on pagc 1771 in SCT!N !!ALRTS, paragraph
14, ALERT NO. 1.
kcpt in thc vicinity ol thc landing mat or thc apron in groups, so
thcy could bc guardcd vcry closcly.
93

As lor naval rcconnaissancc, Marshall had assumcd that, as a
rcsult ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, thc Navy would havc
dispatchcd ovcrwatcr patrols to scarch lor cncmy ships.
94
Hc
appcarcd unawarc ol thc shortagc ol plancs in Hawaii.
Vhcn Stark and Turncr wcrc qucstioncd again, this timc
undcr oath, thcy appcarcd to havc a morc rcalistic vicw ol thc
Hawaiian supply situation than Marshall.
95
Turncr had assumcd
that thcy had a longrangc rcconnaissancc, although hc kncw
that thcrc wcrc an insu cicnt numbcr ol plancs thcrc to conduct
a longrangc rcconnaissancc scarch 360 dcgrccs cxtcnding ovcr a
considcrablc pcriod ol timc.
96

At thc timc ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, whcn Stark
had ordcrcd Kimmcl to undcrtakc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt . . . in
accordancc with his |war| plan, hc had cxpcctcd Kimmcl to takc
dispositions to avoid surprisc, so far as he could with what he had
(italics addcd). Howcvcr, Stark had thought that Kimmcl would
havc bccn ablc to includc air patrols.
97
Stark had also cxpcctcd
Kimmcl to gct morc plancs and pcrsonncl, and so on, out to
Vakc and Midway, il possiblc, and to scnd his task lorccssomc
task lorccs to sca in rcadincss to catch any raidcrs. And this,
Stark admittcd, Kimmcl had donc.
98

According to Gcrow, thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning had
callcd lor carrying out rcconnaissancc and othcr mcans ol guard
ing against a surprisc attack.
99
Shorts lailurc to do so, Gcrow
93
94
!bid., part 23, p. 1077.
95
!bid., pp. 108292.
96
!bid., pp. 108586.
97
!bid., p. 1086.
98
!bid., p. 1087.
99
!bid., p. 1108.
said, did not constitutc a dircct disobcdicncc ol that dircctivc,
although hc considcrcd it a lailurc to obcy ordcrs.
100
Gcrow was
quitc critical ol Short lor not having conductcd morc cxtcnsivc
rcconnaissancc.
101
Tc Commission nishcd qucstioning Vashington witncsscs
within thc day and thcn bcgan prcparing its rcport.
Co::issiox Fixbixcs
!n thc month thc Commission cxistcd, it took tcstimony
lrom 127 witncsscs in Vashington and Hawaii. !ts ndings
camc to 2,173 pagcs ol cvidcncc and cxhibits.
102
!t spcnt ]anuary
2023 dralting its rcport. Tc rcport was nishcd on ]anuary 23
and dclivcrcd to thc prcsidcnt on thc morning ol ]anuary 24. Tc
Commission thcn adjourncd. Tc rcport was publishcd in lull in
thc New York Times on ]anuary 25, 1942.
To Commissioncr Standlcy, it appcarcd that thc majority ol
thc mcmbcrs wcrc prcjudiccd against Kimmcl lrom thc start. Tis
prcjudicc cvcn carricd ovcr to thc way Kimmcls rcmarks wcrc
rccordcd. Tcy wcrc carclcssly transcribcd, containcd crrors, and
whcn hc suggcstcd ccrtain rcvisions,
103
thc Commission inscrtcd
his corrcctions by intcrlcaving thc tcxt ol cach suggcstcd rcvision
on a pagc immcdiatcly lollowing cach pagc rclcrrcd to,
104
mak
ing his tcstimony di cult to rcad. To mollily him, thc corrcctcd
transcript was printcd in lull at thc cnd ol thc Commissions pub
lishcd hcarings, just prcccding thc cxhibits.
105

100
!bid., part 23, p. 1109.
101
!bid., p. 1112.
102
!bid., part 39, p. 1.
103
!bid., part 22, p. 315.
104
!bid., pp. 317. For corrcctcd tcstimony, scc part 23, pp.123, part 22, pp.
317411 (corrcctcd pagcs intcrlcalcd), 41559, 9311051.
105
!bid., part 23, pp. 112344.
Vhat had thc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission lcarncd in thcir
month ol hcarings: Tcy had lcarncd that thc intclligcncc avail
ablc in Hawaii was mcagcr indccd, and cvcn mislcading. All
availablc clucs had pointcd to a ]apancsc strikc in southcast Asia,
thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc Commission mcm
bcrs had lcarncd that Pcarl Harbor was lacking in plancs, antiair
cralt guns, and othcr matcrial nccdcd lor thc dclcnsc ol thc basc,
duc to thc dcmands ol othcr thcatcrs ol war. Tcy had discovcrcd
what thcy had known bclorc thcy startcd thcir invcstigation, that
thc Hawaiian commandcrs had bccn surpriscd by thc ]apancsc air
attack. 8ut thcy had also discovcrcd that Chicl ol Sta Marshall
had bccn just as surpriscd. Ncvcrthclcss, thc Commission placcd
thc rcsponsibility lor thc cxtcnt ol ]apans succcss in surprising
thc cct on thc two Hawaiian commandcrs.
Tc Commission appcarcd to placc considcrablc crcdcncc
on thc ]anuary 24, 1941, lcttcr lrom Sccrctary ol Navy Knox to
Sccrctary ol Var Stimson, writtcn clcvcn months bclorc thc attack,
suggcsting that, !l war cvcntuatcs with ]apan, it is bclicvcd casily
possiblc, that hostilitics would bc initiatcd by a surprisc attack
upon thc Flcct or thc Naval 8asc at Pcarl Harbor by air bomb
ing attack, air torpcdo planc attack, sabotagc, submarinc attack,
mining, or bombardmcnt by gun rc.
106
isrcgarding latcr lcttcrs,
intclligcncc, and communications to thc commandcrs in thc cld
about thc movcmcnts ol thc ]apancsc in thc South China Sca,
thc Commission implicd that this should havc su ccd to alcrt
thc Hawaiian commandcrs against a surprisc attack.
Tc Commission lound that thc commandcrs opcratcd undcr
somc disadvantagc: Tc pcrsonncl, matricl, and cquipmcnt
wcrc insu cicnt to placc thc lorccs on a war looting and main
tain thcm on that looting lor an cxtcndcd pcriod. Yct thc rcport
continucd: Tcsc dccicncics did not prccludc mcasurcs which
would havc to a grcat cxtcnt lrustratcd thc attack or mitigatcd
106
!bid., pp. 109295.
its scvcrity.
107
Morcovcr, in spitc ol thc rccognizcd shortagc ol
rcconnaissancc plancs, thc Commission hcld that Mcans wcrc
availablc lor distant rcconnaissancc which would havc aordcd a
mcasurc ol sccurity against a surprisc attack.
108

Tc Commission admittcd that thc Hawaiian commandcrs
wcrc handicappcd by lack ol inlormation as to ]apancsc disposi
tions and intcnt, which would havc bccn vital to thc dclcnsc ol
Pcarl Harbor. Ncvcrthclcss, in thc Commissions vicw, Tc lack
ol such knowlcdgc rcndcrcd morc urgcnt thc initiation ol a statc
ol rcadincss lor dclcnsc.
109
According to thc Commission rcports
conclusions, thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs in thc Hawaiian arca
|had| prcparcd plans which, il adaptcd and uscd lor thc cxisting
cmcrgcncy would havc bccn adcquatc.
110

Tc Commission mcmbcrs had hcard tcstimony to thc ccct
that thc Army and Navy o cials in Hawaii had coopcratcd
with onc anothcr and had cnjoycd lairly good working rclations.
Yct thcy chargcd that thc Hawaiian commandcrs had lailcd to
conlcr . . . and to adapt and usc thc cxisting plans to mcct thc
cmcrgcncy.
111
Tc Commission maintaincd that if thc Hawaiian
commandcrs had complicd with . . . ordcrs issucd by thc Chicl
ol Sta and thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations Novcmbcr 27, 1941,
thc Armys aircralt warning systcm and inshorc air patrols, and
thc Navys distant rcconnaissancc should havc bccn opcrating,
thc Army and Navy antiaircralt artillcry
should havc bccn manncd and supplicd with ammunition, and
a high statc ol rcadincss ol aircralt should havc bccn in ccct.
Nonc ol thcsc conditions was in lact inauguratcd or maintaincd
107
!bid., part 39, pp. 1819.
108
!bid., p. 12.
109
!bid., p. 18.
110
!bid., p. 19.
111
!bid., p. 20.
lor thc rcason that thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs lailcd to con
sult and coopcratc.
112

Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission had hcard tcstimony to thc
ccct that thc only surc way to bc lorcwarncd ol an approaching
air attack was through continual 360dcgrcc longrangc rccon
naissancc. 8ut thcy had also lcarncd that thc plancs and pcrson
ncl availablc in Hawaii wcrc complctcly inadcquatc lor carrying
out such rcconnaissancc. Morcovcr, thcy had lcarncd that antiair
cralt artillcry is inccctivc against lowying plancs. vcn with
roundthcclock, larranging rcconnaissancc and an allout alcrt,
somc ol thc carly torpcdo plancs that madc thc rst strikc on
cccmbcr 7 would undoubtcdly havc bccn ablc to pcnctratc thc
dclcnscs and surprisc thc dclcndcrs. Tcy rccognizcd that, Tcrc
wcrc dccicncics in pcrsonncl, wcapons, cquipmcnt, and lacilitics
to maintain all thc dclcnscs on a war looting lor cxtcndcd pcri
ods ol timc, but, thcy hcld, thcsc dccicncics should not havc
acctcd thc dccision ol thc rcsponsiblc commandcrs as to thc
statc ol rcadincss to bc prcscribcd.
113

Tc mcmbcrs ol thc Commission wcrc much intcrcstcd in
Marshalls last minutc (cccmbcr 7) mcssagc to thc cld com
mandcrs, sparkcd by thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tcy qucstioncd
him about it, but madc no criticism ol his dilatory tactics in scnd
ing it out. Nor did thcy commcnt on his lailurc to usc his scram
blcr phonc. And thcy did not criticizc Starks lailurc to act whcn
hc rst saw thc nc v.:. Mcssagc at about 9:30 that Sunday
morning. Tcy kncw that Marshalls last minutc warning did not
rcach Short and Kimmcl until wcll altcr thc ]apancsc plancs had
dcpartcd Hawaii, but thcy discountcd thc dicrcncc its timcly
arrival prior to thc attack would havc madc bccausc ol thc gcncral
lack ol prcparcdncss.
112
!bid., p. 20.
113
!bid.
!n thc light ol thc warnings and dircctions to takc appropriatc
action, transmittcd to both commandcrs . . . it was a dereliction
of duty on thc part ol cach ol thcm not to consult and conlcr
with thc othcr rcspccting thc mcaning and intcnt ol thc warn
ings, and thc appropriatc mcasurcs ol dclcnsc rcquircd by thc
immincncc ol hostilitics.
114

Tc Commission lound Kimmcl and Short at lault lor having
lailcd propcrly to cvaluatc thc scriousncss ol thc situation. Tcsc
errors of judgment wcrc thc ccctivc causc lor thc succcss ol thc
attack.
115

Tc Robcrts Commissions purposc, as statcd in thc cxccutivc
ordcr sctting it up, was to invcstigatc thc contributory ncgligcncc
ol thc military only. Howcvcr, thc Commission wcnt bcyond its
o cial authorization. !t gratuitously absolvcd thc top Vashington
o cials, civilian and military, ol any blamc in a way that was not
supportcd in thc Commissions publishcd rccord. !t statcd spc
cically in its rcport that thc sccrctarics ol statc, war, and navy
had all lulllcd thcir rcspcctivc obligations satislactorily. !t also
statcd that thc top Army and Navy o ccrs in Vashington, that
is Marshall and Stark, had both lulllcd thcir command rcspon
sibilitics propcrly and had issucd suitablc and timcly warnings to
thc Hawaiian commandcrs.
116

n thc othcr hand, thc commandcrs in Hawaii, Short and
Kimmcl, wcrc pronounccd guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty. Tcy
had
dcmonstratcd . . . a lack ol apprcciation ol thc rcsponsibilitics
vcstcd in thcm and inhcrcnt in thcir positions as commandcrs
114
!bid., part 39, p. 21.
115
!bid.
116
!bid., p. 19.
in chicl, Pacic Flcct, and commanding gcncral, Hawaiian
cpartmcnt.
117
Rv)ivv:vx) ov Gvxvv~i Snov)
Vi)nou) Coxbox~)iox . . . )o Fu)uvv
isciviix~vy Ac)iox.
Vhcn thc Robcrts rcport camc out, Short was in klahoma
City awaiting lurthcr assignmcnt. Hc was complctcly dumb
loundcd. To bc accuscd ol dcrcliction ol duty altcr almost lorty
ycars ol loyal and compctcnt scrvicc was bcyond |his| comprchcn
sion. n ]anuary 26 hc tclcphoncd Marshall, an old and trustcd
lricnd ol thirtyninc ycars standing. Short askcd Marshall il hc
should rctirc. Stand pat, Marshall said. |8|ut il it bccomcs ncc
cssary ! will usc this convcrsation as authority.
118
Short had laith in |Marshalls| judgmcnt and loyalty. Hc
told Marshall that hc would placc |himscll | cntircly in his hand.
Howcvcr, Short was a gcntlcman. As hc hung up thc phonc, hc
dccidcd it wasnt quitc lair to |Marshall| to havc to usc thc
convcrsation as authority. Hc lclt Marshall should not havc to
assumc thc rcsponsibility ol dcciding Shorts latc on thc basis ol
oral instructions alonc, so hc wrotc out a lormal application lor
rctircmcnt and scnt it along with a pcrsonal covcring lcttcr to
Marshall. |U|ndcr cxisting conditions, hc wrotc, hc would vcry
much prclcr to rcmain on thc activc list. Howcvcr, hc cncloscd
his application lor rctircmcnt so that you may usc it should you
considcr it dcsirablc.
119

!n hopc ol soltcning any judgmcnt against him, Short thcn
rcmindcd Marshall that 12 817s arrivcd lrom thc mainland in
thc midst ol thc attack without ammunition, with guns cosmolincd
117
!bid., part 39, p. 21.
118
!bid., part 7, pp. 313334.
119
!bid., pp. 313435. Shorts ]anuary 25, 1942 lcttcr to Marshall.
and with skclcton crcws, rcsulting in thc dcstruction ol lour ol
thcsc plancs. Tc Var cpartmcnt, which had dispatchcd thcsc
plancs lrom thc mainland during thc night ol cccmbcr 67,
apparcntly had not anticipatcd thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Short
considcrcd that a strong argumcnt that thc Var cpartmcnt
had agrccd with |Short| that sabotagc was thc most dangcrous
thing to thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt.
120

8y thc altcrnoon ol Shorts call, Marshall was ol thc opin
ion that wc should acccpt Gcncral Shorts application lor rctirc
mcnt today and to do this quictly without any publicity at thc
momcnt. Tc ]udgc Advocatc Gcncral saw no objcction to this
proccdurc and statcd |q|uitc inlormally that hc considcrcd a
Court ol !nquiry unncccssary . . . and that a courtmartial would
not bc in thc public intcrcst at this timc.
121
Vhcn Marshall
rcccivcd Shorts writtcn application a couplc ol days latcr, hc lor
wardcd it to thc adjutant gcncral to hold pcnding instructions
lrom Stimson.
122

Tc prcsidcnt askcd lor assurancc that acccpting Shorts
rctircmcnt would not prccludc his latcr court martial and sug
gcstcd including a phrasc in thc lcttcr rcading roughly as lollows:
Providcd it is agrccd by you that this is no bar to bc uscd lcgally
or othcrwisc to subscqucnt court martial procccdings.
123
]udgc
Advocatc Major Gcncral Myron C. Cramcr qucstioncd thc
advisability ol bringing a rctircd o ccr to court martial. Cramcr
was doubtlul that a conviction could bc obtaincd in Shorts casc:
|T|hc ocnscs chargcd against Gcncral Short arc ocnscs ol
omission or nonlcasancc which rcquirc a much strongcr showing
120
!bid., part 7, pp. 313435. Short lcttcr to Marshall, ]anuary 25, 1942.
121
!bid., p. 3139.
122
!bid.
123
!bid., pp. 314041. Assistant Chicl ol Sta 8rigadicr Gcncral ].H.
Hildrings lcttcr ol Fcbruary 14, 1942, to thc Attorncy Gcncral.
to justily a trial than thosc involving mislcasancc or mallcasancc.
Morcovcr,
For thc prcsidcnt to dischargc Gcncral Short summarily undcr
thc provisions ol Articlc ol Var
124
would tcnd cvcn morc
strongly than a dismissal by a scntcncc ol a gcncral courtmar
tial to cnablc him altcrward to claim pcrsccution.
125
To avoid thc possibility that thc prcsidcnts cxcrcisc ol discrc
tion in tcrminating thc o ccrs activc scrvicc on his own applica
tion might constitutc a bargain that Short would not lurthcr
bc prosccutcd lor known ocnscs occurring prior to rctircmcnt,
Cramcr suggcstcd that Shorts rcqucst lor rctircmcnt bc acccptcd
with thc undcrstanding that it
will not constitutc a condonation ol his ocnscs, il any, on thc
part ol thc Var cpartmcnt, or bc considcrcd a bar to any
luturc trial by gcncral courtmartial in casc such trial should bc
dccmcd advisablc.
126

Acting on Cramcrs advicc, Stimson on Fcbruary 14, 1942,
instructcd that a saving clausc bc includcd in thc lcttcr acccpt
ing Shorts rctircmcnt without condonation ol any ocnsc or
prcjudicc to any action on bchall ol thc govcrnmcnt.
127
Tc Var
cpartmcnts Fcbruary 17, 1942, lcttcr to Short acccpting his
application lor rctircmcnt rcad as lollows:
8y dircction ol thc prcsidcnt, Major Gcncral Valtcr C. Short
. . . upon his own application, is rctircd lrom activc scrvicc to
124
!bid., pp. 314546. ]udgc Advocatc Gcncral Myro C. Cramcr mcmorandum
ol ]anuary 27, 1942.
125
!bid.
126
!bid.
127
!bid.
takc ccct Fcbruary 28, 1942 . . . without condonation ol any
ocnsc or prcjudicc to luturc disciplinary action.
128

Gcncral Short was out ol thc Army by March 1, 1942.
Rv)ivv:vx) ov Ab:iv~i Ki::vi Vi)nou)
Coxbox~)iox )o Fu)uvv isciviix~vy Ac)iox.
n ]anuary 25, Stark talkcd about Kimmcl with Knox.
Kimmcl was thcn noticd, on ordcrs lrom Vashingtonlrom
Knox himscll, Kimmcl lcarncd latcrthat Short had submittcd a
rcqucst lor his rctircmcnt.
129
Until thcn, Kimmcl had not thought
ol rctiring. Howcvcr, hc took that as a suggcstion that ! submit a
similar rcqucst.
130
Tcrclorc, on ]anuary 26, hc too submittcd his
rcqucst lor rctircmcnt. Two days latcr Kimmcl was inlormcd by
phonc that his notication ol Shorts rcqucst lor rctircmcnt was
not mcant to inucncc him. Howcvcr, Kimmcl wrotc back that
samc day that hc wishcd his rcqucst lor rctircmcnt to stand, sub
jcct only to dctcrmination by thc cpartmcnt as to what coursc
ol action will bcst scrvc thc intcrcsts ol thc country and thc good
ol thc scrvicc.
131

Kimmcl gathcrcd that Stark did not rcally cxpcct Kimmcl
would bc rctircd at that timc. Ncvcrthclcss, thc qucstion ol
Kimmcls rctircmcnt movcd ahcad. Tc wording to bc uscd in
thc Navy cpartmcnts lcttcr ol acccptancc was raiscd with thc
Navys assistant judgc advocatc gcncral.
132
At FRs rcqucst,
128
!bid., part 7, p. 3142.
129
!bid., part 33, p. 691. Kimmcl statcmcnt to NC! Scptcmbcr 27, 1944.
130
!bid.
131
!bid.
132
!bid., part 19, p. 3965, Lcttcr to Captain Gatch, Fcbruary 14, 1942, signcd
by dwin ickinson, Spccial Assistant to thc Attorncy Gcncral, part 19, pp.
396667, part 7, pp. 314142, Assistant Chicl ol Sta 8rigadicr Gcncral ].H.
Hildrings Fcbruary 14, 1942 mcmorandum lor Attorncy Gcncral Francis
8iddlc.
Attorncy Gcncral Francis 8iddlc and Acting Assistant Solicitor
Gcncral dward ickinson wcrc consultcd. Scvcral suggcstions
with rcspcct to thc wording wcrc madc by FR and othcrs. FR
was anxious to havc thc mattcr scttlcd. Finally, a phrasc vcry simi
lar to that suggcstcd lor thc Var cpartmcnts lcttcr to Short
was agrccd on.
n Fcbruary 19 Kimmcl rcccivcd lormal notication lrom
Knox that hc would bc placcd on thc rctircd list on March 1.
Knoxs lcttcr rcad in part: Tis approval ol your rcqucst lor rctirc
mcnt is without condonation ol any ocnsc or prcjudicc to luturc
disciplinary action.
133

vcr sincc thc attack, blamc and opprobrium had bccn hcapcd
on both Kimmcl and Short. Tcy had rcccivcd abusivc lcttcrs and
cvcn thrcats on thcir livcs.
Vhcn Kimmcl rcad thc sccond paragraph ol Knoxs lct
tcr, with its conditional approval ol his rcqucst lor rctircmcnt,
hc promptly wrotc Stark: Vas thc lcttcr to bc publishcd to thc
country as a promisc that ! will bc disciplincd at somc luturc
timc: Kimmcl stood rcady at any timc to acccpt thc consc
qucnccs ol |his| acts. Hc did not wish to cmbarrass thc govcrn
mcnt in thc conduct ol thc war, but hc lclt that his crucixion
bclorc thc public has about rcachcd thc limit. Hc lclt that pub
lication ol thc sccrctarys lcttcr with its conditional approval ol
Kimmcls rctircmcnt would lurthcr inamc thc public and do
|him| a grcat injusticc.
134
Kimmcl rcgrct|tcd| thc losscs at Pcarl
Harbor just as kccnly, or pcrhaps morc kccnly than any othcr
Amcrican citizcn. Hc wishcd hc had bccn smartcr than hc was
and ablc to lorcscc thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 7. Hc had dcvotcd all
133
!bid., part 19, p. 3963, part 33, p.692, Kimmcls statcmcnt to Naval Court ol
!nquiry. And Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry
Rcgncry Co., 1955), p. 182.
134
Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, pp. 18182. Scc also ]oint Committcc,
Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2562.
his cncrgy to his job and had madc thc dispositions hc consid
crcd callcd lor. Hc could not rcproach |himscll | lor any lack ol
cort. Hc had bccn willing to acccpt |all this| lor thc good ol
thc country out ol |his| loyalty to thc Nation. 8ut hc did think
that in all justicc thc dcpartmcnt should do nothing lurthcr to
inamc thc public against him. Hc thought hc was cntitlcd to
somc considcration cvcn though somc may havc bclicvcd hc had
crrcd gricvously.
135
Kimmcl was rctircd ccctivc March 1 altcr morc than 40
ycars ol scrvicc in thc Navy.
136
n or about that datc Kimmcl was
noticd
through thc public prcss . . . that thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy
had dircctcd that chargcs and spccications bc prcparcd to
bring |him| to trial by Gcncral Court Martial at somc luturc
timc.
137

Ki::vi ~xb Snov) Fixb Pos)A))~cx Posi)ioxs
Cox)vinu)ixc )o )nv V~v vvov)
8oth mcn soon lound civilian positions in which thcy could
contributc to thc war cort. Short bccamc hcad ol thc tra c
dcpartmcnt at thc Ford Motor Company plant in allas, Tcxas,
which was dcvotcd cntircly to making war cquipmcnt.
138
Kimmcl
took a position with a Ncw York rm ol consulting marinc cngi
nccrs, Frcdcrick R. Harris, !nc., whcrc hc hclpcd dcsign thc rst
135
!bid.
136
!bid., part 33, pp. 69192. Kimmcls statcmcnt to thc NC!.
137
Te NewYork Times, August 11, 1942, p. 4.
138
!bid., Scptcmbcr 4, 1949, p. 49. Shorts obituary.
largc scctional oating drydock capablc ol holding a battlcship.
139

Tcsc drydocks saw much scrvicc in thc war in thc Pacic.
140
Rcscntmcnt ol thc Hawaiian commandcrs did not ccasc. !n
August 1942, public curiosity was arouscd by thc ncws that
Kimmcl was holding a civilian job in Ncw York. Vas hc rccciving
rctircmcnt pay in addition to his pay as a civilian cmploycc: Ycs,
hc was, thc Navy cpartmcnt rcplicd, as a rctircd Navy o ccr,
hc was
clcarly cntitlcd to thrccquartcrs rctircd pay, or 86,000 a ycar,
and it is absolutcly lcgal lor him or any othcr rctircd naval
o ccr to takc a civilian job and draw his rctircmcnt lrom thc
Navy at thc samc timc.
Kimmcl was cxpcctcd to gct thc routinc rctircd salary lrom thc
Navy until thc prospcctivc courtmartial is cstablishcd to try
him.
141

139
!bid., May 15, 1968, pp. 1, 24. Kimmcls obituary.
140
!bid.
141
!bid., August 11, 1942, p. 4.
409
20.
19421944
Tov Svcvvcy ox )nv V~snixc)ox Ho:v Fvox)
O
ncc wc had dcclarcd war, a wavc ol patriotism swcpt ovcr
thc country. All opcn criticism ol thc govcrnmcnts lor
cign policy ccascd. Yct a dcsirc to know thc truth simmcrcd
undcr thc surlacc. Many pcoplc bclicvcd that Admiral Kimmcl
and Gcncral Short, who had bccn pilloricd in thc cycs ol thc
public, should havc a chancc to prcscnt thcir sidc ol thc story in
opcn court, but attcmpts wcrc bcing madc to lorcstall thcir courts
martial.
Tcrc wcrc, ol coursc, lcgitimatc rcasons why thcir casc should
not bc invcstigatcd whilc thc war was going on. !nlormation
would undoubtcdly bc rcvcalcd in a courts martial trial that would
bc damaging to thc war cort. !t would undoubtcdly bc brought
out (1) that thc ]apancsc wcrc still using thcir diplomatic codc,
Purplc, lor sccrct mcssagcs. As our armcd lorccs wcrc gaining
inlormation lrom rcading Purplc intcrccpts, which was valuablc
lor ghting thc war, this was a lcgitimatc argumcnt lor postpon
ing a trial. A trial would probably rcvcal also (2) that U.S. intcl
ligcncc pcrsonncl had dcciphcrcd Purplc bclorc thc attack on
Pcarl Harbor and had bccn rcading ]apancsc intcrccpts cvcr sincc.
Also (3) that Vashington had, thcrclorc, had considcrablc prc
attack intclligcncc about ]apancsc intcntions. And (4) that littlc
ol this prcattack intclligcncc had bccn scnt to Pcarl Harbor.
Tc administration and top military o cials wcrc dctcrmincd
that thcrc bc no sccurity lcaks about Purplc and MAG!C, thc
intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom it. Somc ol thcm may also havc har
borcd guilt about thc inlormation thcy had scnt, or had lailcd to
scnd, our military commandcrs bclorc thc attack. !l that was thc
casc, thcy would not havc wantcd it known that our dccryption
ol ]apancsc intcrccpts had startcd before thc attack. Tus thosc
who wcrc anxious to dclay or postponc indcnitcly a hcaring lor
Kimmcl and Short bccausc thcy did not want it to bc rcvcalcd
that wc wcrc dccoding postattack ]apancsc mcssagcs had thc
support ol thosc who wantcd to conccal thc lact that wc had bccn
rcading preattack ]apancsc mcssagcs.
To salcguard this major sourcc ol intclligcncc, Army and
Navy pcrsonncl lamiliar with Purplc had bccn sworn to sccrccy.
Gcncral Marshall himscll, in his o cc a wcck altcr thc attack,
had warncd his sta o ccrs to go to thcir gravcs with thc sccrct
ol MAG!C. Tcn in 1944, witncsscs to appcar bclorc thc Army
Pcarl Harbor 8oard wcrc again sworn not to rcvcal thc lacts,
i.c., thc Purplc codc dccrypts.
1

Similar prccautions had also bccn takcn in thc Navy. Admiral
Stark tcsticd, Anybody who was lct in on that |MAG!C| had
1
An admission by a rctircd Army gcncral as to thc Armys rulc ol sccrccy was
madc to thc author twicc, oncc in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral 8onncr Fcllcrs and
thcn again in thc prcscncc ol Gcncral Albcrt C. Vcdcmcycr. Scc also rcport ol
Harry lmcr 8arncs intcrvicw ol Major Hcnry C. Clauscn, ]anuary 3, 1964,
pp. 23 (typcscript in authors posscssion): ||aths had bccn takcn not to
rcvcal thc lacts |thc Purplc codc dccrypts|. . . . Tc witncsscs Milcs, Marshall,
MacArthur, ct al., all rcvcalcd to Clauscn that thcy wcrc sworn not to rcvcal
Purplc whcn thcy wcrc bclorc APH8. N.8., by March 1945, Clauscn had
bccn promotcd to licutcnant coloncl.
19421944 411
to sign a papcr ncvcr to disclosc it, practically so long as hc livcd,
or cvcr to talk about itnot cvcr!
2

Navy intclligcncc o ccrs too wcrc warncd to maintain sccu
rity. Somctimc within thc wcck lollowing Pcarl Harbor, thcn
Commandcr Saord and othcr o ccrs wcrc callcd into con
lcrcncc in thc o cc ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications
|Admiral Noycs|. . . . |A|ll scction hcads wcrc askcd to tcll all
|thcir| pcoplc not to talk. Any writtcn mcmoranda, pcrsonal
notcsnot o cial lcswcrc to bc dcstroycd immcdiatcly and
thc o ccrs wcrc to pass that word on to |thcir| subordinatcs.
3

8ut qucstions about Pcarl Harbor did not lct up.
Pos)A))~cx Pvvsoxxvi Sn~xvuv
As wc havc sccn, both Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short
wcrc pcrcmptorily rcmovcd lrom thcir commands altcr thc
attack on Pcarl Harbor. Rcplaccmcnt o ccrs wcrc namcd, thcn
promptly rctircd lrom thc military.
4
Somc suspicion rcstcd on
Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark lor not having kcpt Kimmcl
and Admiral Hart in thc Philippincs bcttcr inlormcd. n March
26, Admiral .]. King took ovcr Starks position as CN.
5
Stark
was in ccct kickcd upstairs, translcrrcd out ol Vashington,
2
79th Cong., 1st scss. ]oint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol
thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S.
Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 5, p. 2468, Stark tcstimony bclorc thc
]oint Committcc.
3
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 356566, Saord tcstimony
bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
4
Shorts command was turncd ovcr to Licutcnant Gcncral clos C. mmons.
Kimmcl was rcplaccd tcmporarily as Chicl ol thc Pacic Flcct by Admiral
Villiam S. Pyc and thcn, oncc thc arrangcmcnts lor thc translcr could bc
workcd out, by Admiral Chcstcr V. Nimitz.
5
U.S. cpartmcnt ol Navy, Naval History ivision, cc ol thc Chicl ol
Naval pcrations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Vashington,
.C.: Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1955), p. 22.
scnt to London and on April 30, 1942, givcn command ol thc
rcccntly cstablishcd (March 17, 1942) Unitcd Statcs Naval Forccs
uropc.
6

Chicl ol Sta Marshall appcarcd to bc abovc rcproach. !n spitc
ol qucstions about his whcrcabouts on thc morning ol cccmbcr
6, hc rcmaincd in his position and wcnt on latcr to still morc
important and prcstigious positionsspccial rcprcscntativc ol thc
prcsidcnt to China with ambassadorial rank (19451946), sccrc
tary ol statc (19471949), and sccrctary ol dclcnsc
7
(19501951).
Hc cvcn rcccivcd thc Nobcl Pcacc Prizc in 1953 lor his proposal,
which bccamc known as thc Marshall Plan, lor U.S. govcrnmcnt
grants to hclp postwar uropcs cconomic rccovcry.
Naval intclligcncc and naval communications wcrc cspccially
hard hit by pcrsonncl changcs. Tc Navys traditional pridc in
scrvicc at sca mcant that thc path to promotion clcarly lay in
sca duty, thosc who scrvcd in intclligcncc wcrc much lcss likcly
to advancc. As a rcsult, lcw naval o ccrs wcrc willing to makc a
carccr in cryptography. nc notablc cxccption was Commandcr
L.F. Saord, who had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol
naval communications and had madc brilliant contributions to
dcciphcring and intcrprcting ]apancsc intcrccpts. Shortly altcr
thc Unitcd Statcs cntcrcd thc war, hc was promotcd to captain
( ]anuary 1, 1942), but at thc samc timc his dutics and rcsponsi
bilitics wcrc sharply curtailcd.
8

Commandcr A.H. McCollum, hcad ol thc Far astcrn
Scction ol Naval !ntclligcncc in cccmbcr 1941, was anothcr
victim ol thc postattack rcorganization ol naval opcrations. Hc
6
!bid, p. 24.
7
n Scptcmbcr 18, 1947, thc cpartmcnts ol Var and Navy wcrc incorpo
ratcd into a ncw cpartmcnt ol clcnsc.
8
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3556, Saord tcstimony bclorc
thc ]oint Committcc. Scc also L.F. Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc,
April 8, 1968, p. 46, unpublishcd manuscript (typcscript in authors lcs).
19421944 413
had rccognizcd thc scriousncss ol thc ]apancsc thrcat prior to
thc attack and had draltcd mcssagcs to thc Pacic commandcrs
warning ol impcnding ]apancsc action. His supcriors had watcrcd
down his mcssagcs so much, howcvcr, that thcy lailcd to dclivcr thc
scnsc ol urgcncy McCollum had intcndcd to convcy.
9
McCollum
got disgustcd with naval intclligcncc and applicd lor sca duty. n
routc to his ncw post in thc southwcst Pacic hc passcd through
Hawaii. Tcrc hc was gucst ol honor at a party givcn by scvcral
o ccrs who had scrvcd on Kimmcls sta. McCollum told thcm
somc ol thc things hc had known through his work with intcl
ligcncc in Vashington.
10

Cv~cxs ix )nv Ab:ixis)v~)ioxs V~ii ov Svcvvcy
nc ol thc o ccrs in Hawaii who hcard McCollum spcak
was Commandcr ]oscph ]ohn Rochclort, chicl intclligcncc o
ccr, district sta ol thc commandant in Hawaii. Rochclort spokc
]apancsc, his work in radio intclligcncc, cryptography, and cryp
tanalysis had madc him onc ol thc mainstays ol thc intclligcncc
unit at Pcarl Harbor. !t had bccn his rcsponsibility to prcparc
daily intclligcncc summarics lor Kimmcls cct intclligcncc o
ccr, Licutcnant Commandcr dwin Tomas Layton.
11
!n spitc ol
9
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 338890, McCollum tcsti
mony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc, part 26, p. 392, Saord tcstimony bclorc
thc Hart !nquiry, part 29, p. 2396, Saord tcstimony at APH8. Scc also
McCollum lcttcr, May 21, 1944, to Kimmcl and Kimmcl intcrvicw, May 18,
1945, ol McCollum (typcscripts ol both papcrs in authors lcs).
10
Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, pp. 4950. Scc also ]oint Committcc,
Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3382. McCollum was rcassigncd lrom Vash
ington to thc Southwcst Pacic Forcc in ctobcr 1942. Scc Kimmcls intcr
vicw ol McCollum.
11
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 467980, Rochclort
tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc. Rochclort was awardcd thc istin
guishcd Scrvicc Mcdal posthumously, in 1985, lor his succcss in cracking thc
]apancsc codcs rcvcaling thc timc, datc, and placc ol ]apans plan to invadc
his knowlcdgc and cxpcrtisc, Rochclort bccamc a victim ol thc
postattack pcrsonncl changcs in intclligcncc, hc was translcrrcd
out ol cryptography in ctobcr 1942,
12
ordcrcd to Vashington,
and assigncd to command a oating drydock in San Francisco.
13

!n prcparation lor his ncw assignmcnt, hc was scnt to Ncw York
to consult with thc marinc cnginccring rm ol Frcdcrick R.
Harris, !nc.
!n Ncw York, Rochclort cncountcrcd his old boss, Kimmcl,
who was thcn himscll working on oating drydocks lor thc Harris
rm. Rochclort told him what McCollum had rcportcd about
prcattack knowlcdgc in Vashington.
14
Tus by a scrics ol coin
cidcnccs, Kimmcl lcarncd in latc 1942 that crucial inlormation
about ]apancsc intcntions had bccn availablc in Vashington prior
to thc attack, which had not bccn rclaycd to him in Pcarl Harbor.
Anothcr rcsponsiblc Navy o ccr who lclt intclligcncc was
Licutcnant Commandcr Alwin alton Kramcr, a ]apancsc
languagc scholar. !n latc 1941, hc had bccn in chargc ol thc transla
tion group ol thc communications sccurity group in Vashington.
As Navy couricr hc had dclivcrcd many condcntial intcrccpts,
including MAG!C, to top Navy o ccrs during thc crucial wccks
prcccding thc attack. !n ]unc 1943 Kramcr was translcrrcd to
Pcarl Harbor. And in ]anuary 1944, hc was ordcrcd to sca duty in
thc South Pacic.
15

Midway (New York Times, Novcmbcr 17, 1985, 88G). Scc dwin T. Layton,
Rogcr Pincau, and ]ohn Costcllo, And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and Midway
Breaking the Secrets (Ncw York: V. Morrow, 1985), p. 464.
12
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679, Rochclort
tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc. Rochclort lclt Pcarl Harbor in ctobcr
1942.
13
Layton, And I Was Tere, p. 468 (88G).
14
Saord, \ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, pp. 50, 54.
15
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 389495. According to
Kramcrs tcstimony, hc was on duty with Saords o cc lrom ]unc 1940 to
]unc 1943.
19421944 415
Ki::vi ~xb Snov) V~ivv
S)~)u)v ov Li:i)~)ioxs
vcr and ovcr again Kimmcl rcvicwcd in his mind thc ordcrs
hc had rcccivcd as cct commandcr and his rcsponscs to thcm.
Hc kcpt asking himscll what sins ol commission or omission hc
could havc committcd. Hc cvcn bcgan to think that pcrhaps hc
had bccn somcwhat rcsponsiblc lor thc disastcr. Yct hc could ncvcr
gurc out just how. Until hc spokc with Rochclort in latc 1942,
hc had assumcd, as Stark had assurcd him, that hc was bcing sup
plicd with all availablc intclligcncc ncccssary lor him to lulll his
rcsponsibilitics as commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct. Not
until hc lcarncd lrom Rochclort ol McCollums rcvclations did
Kimmcl havc any hint that Vashington o cials had bccn privy
to crucial inlormation that had bccn dcnicd him in Hawaii.
Tc only hopc Kimmcl and Short had lor vindication was
to obtain a hcaring at which thcy could rcvcal thc ordcrs undcr
which thcy had bccn opcrating prior to thc attack and to cxplain
why thcy had takcn thc actions thcy had. Tcy wcrc both anx
ious lor a spccdy and opcn courtmartial.
16
According to thc
rcgulations thcn in ccct, thc opportunity lor thc govcrnmcnt to
courtmartial Kimmcl and Short lor any allcgcd ocnscs thcy
might havc committcd and with which thcy might bc chargcd
would cxpirc in two ycars, on cccmbcr 7, 1943. Tc Navy, in no
hurry to scc thc two commandcrs courtmartialcd, was willing
to cxtcnd thc dcadlinc. r cvcn to lct thc statutc ol limitations
cxpirc. Kimmcl, lor his part, was anxious not to lct that happcn,
lcst thc chancc lor a hcaring bc lost lorcvcr. Hc rcmindcd Knox
(Scptcmbcr 17, 1943) ol his dcsirc lor a spccdy trial in opcn court.
Howcvcr, Kimmcl wrotc, hc did not wish to put his own intcrcsts
16
Kimmcl Sccks pcn Trial at arlicst atc, Washington Star, March 29,
1944, pp. A1, 4. Scc also Kimmcl lcttcr ol March 16, 1944 (typcd copy in
authors posscssion).
abovc thosc ol thc national wcllarc, which hc rccognizcd appcars
to rcquirc that my trial bc dclaycd.
17
Knox sympathizcd with
Kimmcl and commcndcd him lor his patriotic spirit, which
was, hc said, in kccping with thc bcst naval traditions.
18

Kimmcl was cagcr to do battlc and undcrtook an activc cam
paign to lcarn thc truth. Hc would not lct thc mattcr rcst. Hc
bcgan to prcparc lor thc hcaring hc hopcd to havc. !n Novcmbcr
1943, hc askcd Knox lor copics ol Navy cpartmcnt dispatchcs,
lcttcrs, intclligcncc rcports, ctc., scnt bctwccn ]anuary 1 and
cccmbcr 17, 1941, plus copics ol thc war plans and opcrating
plans that wcrc in ccct on cccmbcr 7, 1941.
19

!n ]anuary 1944, on thc advicc ol |his| trustcd longtimc
lricnd, Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr, U.S. Navy, Kimmcl hircd
Charlcs 8. Rugg ol thc 8oston law rm ol Ropcs, Gray, 8cst,
Coolidgc and Rugg, to hclp in his crusadc.
20
n ]anuary 27,
Kimmcl, Rugg, and Lavcndcr mct to discuss thc situation.
Kimmcl askcd Rugg to go to Vashington and try to arrangc
to havc thc dcadlinc lor his courtmartial cxtcndcd. Rugg warncd
him:
Admiral, this is thc crossroads. !l ! go down thcrc and havc this
Statutc |thc cxtcnsion ol thc court martial statutc ol limita
tions| passcd, wcrc going to bc in lor a tcmpcstuous timc.
17
Kimmcls Scptcmbcr 17, 1943 lcttcr to Knox quotcd in Washington Star,
March 29, 1944.
18
Knox mcmo to Kimmcl, Scptcmbcr 10, 1943.
19
Kimmcl mcmo to Knox, Novcmbcr 26, 1943.
20
Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry,
1955), p. ix. Rugg was hircd ]anuary 19, 1944, according to ]ohn Tolands
intcrvicw ol dward 8. Hanily, August 29,1979, on lc with Tolands papcrs
in FR Library, Hydc Park, N.Y. Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr (Annapolis,
class ol 1912, #03895) was Kimmcls counscl (Kimmcl ]anuary 24, 1944
mcmorandum).
19421944 417
!t could mcan cmbarrassmcnt and unlavorablc publicity. !l
wc dont pursuc this mattcr, Rugg wcnt on, thcy may drop this
busincss and you will bc lrcc lrom any morc public discussion.
Kimmcl was dctcrmincd that thc Amcrican pcoplc . . . know this
story and hc authorizcd |Rugg| to go all out to scc that it is
donc. |Hc was| prcparcd to lacc thc conscqucnccs, cmbarrass
mcnt, misundcrstanding, timc, anything. Hc told Rugg, Go to
it!
21

Tus it was largcly as a rcsult ol Kimmcls corts that thc
statutc ol limitations on courtmartialing Kimmcl and Short was
cxtcndcdsix months lrom cccmbcr 7, 1943, to ]unc 7, 1944.
And cxtcndcd yct again to cccmbcr 7, 1944.
22

Short also wantcd a chancc to prcscnt his casc, but hc was a
vcry dicrcnt pcrsonality and lcss aggrcssivc than Kimmcl in his
pursuit ol a hcaring.
23

21
]ohn Toland intcrvicw ol Hanily.
22
!n March 1944 somc mcmbcrs ol Congrcss urgcd a still lurthcr cxtcnsion
ol thc statutc ol limitations. Tcy argucd that thc courts martial ol Kimmcl
and Short should not continuc to bc postponcd indcnitcly. Tc Housc
Rulcs Committcc approvcd a mcasurc cxtcnding to ]unc 7, 1945, thc possiblc
starting datc lor thcir courts martial. Morcovcr, rathcr than mcrcly lcngth
cning thc timc during that Kimmcl and Short might bc court martialcd, thc
Housc committccs mcasurc proposcd that thc Army and Navy bc ordcrcd to
schcdulc thcir courts martial. Tc Scnatc Committcc thcn votcd to considcr
thc Housc committccs rcsolution in closcd scssion (Washington Star, March
29, 1944). Tus thc chanccs that Kimmcl and Short would gct thcir opcn
hcaring wcrc improving. Howcvcr, thc Housc committccs proposal was not
acccptcd as wordcd. Rathcr thc courtmartial dcadlinc was cxtcndcd again
lor anothcr six months only, i.c., until cccmbcr 7, 1944. n that datc it was
cxtcndcd oncc morc, into 1945. ( ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part
3, pp. 151718).
23
Washington Star, March 29, 1944, p. 24.
C~v)~ix S~vvovb T~ixs wi)n Ki::vi
Captain Saord playcd a kcy rolc in thc wholc Pcarl Harbor
picturc, both bclorc thc attack and also altcrwards during thc
invcstigations. Hc scrvcd with thc Navy cpartmcnt communi
cations intclligcncc unit lrom May 1936 until altcr thc attack. Hc
had workcd in radio intclligcncc and cryptology, thc dcciphcring
ol codcs. As chicl ol thc communications sccurity scction ol naval
communications during thc months prcccding thc Pcarl Harbor
attack, hc was rcsponsiblc lor thc sccurity ol thc sccrct ]apancsc
intcrccpts and lor kccping thcm lrom rcaching unauthorizcd
hands.
!n thc lall ol 1943 Saord, by thc dircction and instruction
ol thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc, was undcr ordcrs to work
on a history ol radio intclligcncc lrom 1924 to 1941.
24
Likc
most pcoplc in thc country, Saord had bclicvcd that Kimmcl
had lailcd to lulll adcquatcly his rcsponsibilitics as cct com
mandcr, that hc had bccn rcmiss in intcrprcting thc intclligcncc
and ordcrs scnt him and thus was partially culpablc lor thc scvcrc
damagc donc to thc cct during thc ]apancsc attack.
8ccausc ol his prcPcarl Harbor rcsponsibilitics, Saord
cxpcctcd that hc would bc callcd to tcstily in any Kimmcl court
martial procccdings that might bc hcld. So, as hc lookcd through
thc lcs lor thc historical rcscarch to which hc was assigncd,
hc startcd to rcvicw thc prcPcarl Harbor situation also and to
asscmblc matcrial hc would nccd as a witncss.
25
To his amazcmcnt
hc discovcrcd that thc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom thc ]apancsc
intcrccpts, which Saords scction had dccodcd in thc months
bclorc thc attack, had not bccn lorwardcd to thc Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs as hc had assumcd. Vhcn hc rcalizcd this, hc was
24
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3601, Saord tcstimony
bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
25
!bid., part 36, p. 69, Saord tcstimony bclorc Hcwitt !nquiry, rcprintcd in
ibid., part 8, p. 3602.
19421944 419
arouscd by thc injusticc ol thc situation. !n ccct, Kimmcl had
bccn dismisscd lrom his position and pilloricd bccausc hc had not
bccn scnt thc prcattack inlormation availablc in Vashington.
!n Fcbruary 1944 Saord callcd on Kimmcl in Ncw York.
Hc told Kimmcl that many ]apancsc mcssagcs had bccn intcr
ccptcd and dcciphcrcd prior to thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc
gavc Kimmcl a vcrbal summary ol thcir contcnts.
26
From thc
lcw notcs hc had madc and lrom his mcmory, Saord rclatcd
much ol thc inlormation that had bccn known in Vashington
lrom rcading thosc intcrccpts, inlormation which would havc
bccn invaluablc to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs.
Vhcn hc rcturncd to Vashington hc sought to documcnt his
statcmcnts. 8ut hc scarchcd in vain. Tc crucial intcrccpts wcrc
missing lrom thc lcs!
n March 23, 1944, Kimmcl askcd dward 8. Hanily, a law
ycr in thc samc lcgal rm as Rugg to comc on board also to assist
in his casc.
27
Hanily promptly startcd work on thc Kimmcl casc.
28

Kimmcl would not lct it dic.

1944 bccamc a ycar ol inquirics and invcstigations. Lcst somc
individuals in thc military who might havc knowlcdgc conccrning
thc attack bccamc casualtics ol thc war, thc Hart !nquiry was sct
up. 8oth thc Army and Navy hcld scparatc, but concurrcnt, hcar
ings. Tcsc hcarings wcrc supplcmcntcd by thc lollowup Clarkc,
Clauscn, and Hcwitt inquirics that cxtcndcd into 1945. n thc
grounds ol military sccurity, all thcsc inquirics wcrc conductcd in
grcatcst sccrccy bchind closcd doors, and thcir rcports wcrc not
rclcascd to thc public.
26
Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story, p. 129.
27
!bid., p. ix.
28
Toland intcrvicw.
Many lacts that cxoncratcd Kimmcl and Short wcrc rcvcalcd
in thcsc closcddoor hcarings. Yct thcsc lacts wcrc not madc pub
lic. At thc cnd ol 1944 Kimmcl and Short wcrc still thc princi
pal culprits in thc cycs ol thc public, thcir ncgligcncc considcrcd
rcsponsiblc lor thc cxtcnsivc loss ol ships, plancs and mcn at Pcarl
Harbor.
1944 was also a prcsidcntial clcction ycar. FR was running
lor an unprcccdcntcd lourth tcrm. Tus political considcrations,
as wcll as military, playcd a rolc in thcsc invcstigations. How
should thcsc sccrct rcports bc handlcd: Vhat would thc public
think il it kncw thc truth was bcing conccalcd: How would thc
votcrs rcspond il thcy kncw thc lacts that had bccn uncovcrcd by
thcsc invcstigations: Vhat would thcy think ol thc top civilian
and military authoritics, who wcrc still dirccting thc war cort,
il thcy lcarncd lrom thcsc rcports about thcir prcwar dccisions:
How much inlormation could, or should, bc madc public: Tc
top brass in Vashington laccd a dilcmma.
421
21.
1944: A Year of
Investigations
T
hc public was no closcr in 1944 to unravcling thc mystcry
surrounding thc ]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor than it had
bccn in ]anuary 1942. vcn though a spccdy and public
trial, at which Kimmcl would havc an opportunity to prcscnt
his sidc ol thc story, was impossiblc bccausc ol thc nccd lor
wartimc sccurity, Kimmcl bcgan to prcparc.
1
Any such hcaring
or trial would havc to dcpcnd on thc tcstimony ol witncsscs with
knowlcdgc ol thc prccccmbcr 7 situation, many ol whom,
stationcd in combat positions lrom thc northcrn Atlantic to thc
southwcst Pacic, could bccomc war casualtics. n Kimmcls rcc
ommcndation, thcrclorc, or as a rcsult ol his prodding, Sccrctary
Knox issucd a Prcccpt, or ordcr, instructing rctircd Admiral
Tomas C. Hart, commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Asiatic Flcct in
thc Philippincs bclorc thc attack, to conduct an inquiry lor thc
purposc ol rccording and prcscrving tcstimony pcrtincnt to thc
1
Knox mcmorandum to Kimmcl, March 4, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in
authors lcs.
]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor, T.H., on 7 cccmbcr 1941.
2

Tus Hart was to cxaminc such mcmbcrs ol thc naval lorccs as
wcrc thought to havc knowlcdgc ol lacts pcrtincnt to thc said
surprisc attack. !t was to bc a sort ol oncman board to takc
tcstimony. Hart would soon bc contacting Kimmcl o cially.
3

Kimmcl had rcscrvations about Harts inquiry. Not only
could it not bc lrcc and opcn, but it was too narrowly locuscd.
!t was to bc limitcd to cxamining mcmbcrs ol thc naval lorccs
conccrning cvcnts pcrtincnt to thc said surprisc attack. Kimmcl
pointcd out that many nonNavy pcrsonncl, Army pcrsonncl and
civilians, should also bc cxamincd. And thcy should bc qucstioncd
not only about cvcnts pcrtincnt to thc said surprisc attack, but
also about cvcnts that took placc somc timc prior to said attack
and ol cvcnts at placcs not in thc Hawaiian !slands that havc an
important bcaring on thc actual attack. Tc tcstimony ol such
pcrsons should also bc takcn and prcscrvcd.
4
Morcovcr, Kimmcl
maintaincd that hc had a right to bc inlormcd ol thc naturc and
causc ol any accusation against him.
5

Although Knox assurcd Kimmcl that this cxamination
would bc in no scnsc a trial, and Kimmcl would bc pcrmittcd
to introducc mattcr pcrtincnt to thc cxamination, to crosscxam
inc witncsscs, ctc., Kimmcl still had qualms.
6
Tc lcgal charactcr
ol thc inquiry was unclcar. !t would havc somc charactcristics
2
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 26, pp. 34.
3
Hart lcttcr to Kimmcl, Fcbruary 15, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors
lcs.
4
Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in
authors lcs.
5
Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, Fcbruary 29, 1944. Tcrmolax copy ol orig
inal in authors lcs.
6
Knox mcmorandum to Kimmcl, March 4, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in
authors lcs.
1944: A Year of Investigations 423
ol dcpositions, othcrs ol courts ol inquiry, and still othcrs
which wcrc ncithcr thosc ol dcpositions or courts ol inquiry.
Kimmcls counscl, Robcrt A. Lavcndcr, pointcd out that it was
important that any tcstimony takcn should bc scalcd and dcliv
crcd to thc ]udgc Advocatc ol thc court as custodian and prc
scntcd to thc accuscd in a rcasonablc timc lor cxamination and
to makc objcctions as to thc introduction ol cvidcncc. As thcrc
was no assurancc that thc Hart !nquiry tcstimony takcn would
bc scalcd and . . . hcld inviolatc until a court martial, or that a
witncsss tcstimony would not bc uscd in a court martial unlcss
hc was dcad, insanc, or could not appcar lor somc othcr rcason,
7

Kimmcl dcclinc|d| to attcnd or participatc in thc procccdings
bclorc Admiral Hart.
8

Tnv H~v) !xouivy (M~vcn , +o]uxv +, +o)
!n thc coursc ol intcrvicwing naval o ccrs, Hart travclcd lrom
Vashington, .C., to Ncw York, San Francisco, Pcarl Harbor,
thc USS Iowa, and thc island ol Guadalcanal in thc southwcst
Pacic.
9
Most ol thc mcn hc qucstioncd had scrvcd with Kimmcl
in Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941, but scvcral had hcld
positions in Vashington at thc timc ol thc attack and tcsticd
lrom a Vashington vicwpoint.
8y cccmbcr 1941 thcrc sccmcd littlc doubt among thosc
who wcrc lollowing cvcnts closcly that war with ]apan was incvi
tablc. As a mattcr ol lact, in Hawaii on Sunday, Novcmbcr 30,
1941, prcciscly onc wcck bclorc thc attack, banncr hcadlincs on
7
Kimmcl/Rugg/Lavcndcr mcmorandum, undatcd, copy lorwardcd to Kimmcl
by Lavcndcr undcr datc ol March 18, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in authors
lcs.
8
Kimmcl mcmorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typcd copy ol original in
authors lcs.
9
Harts itincrary, ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 9, 217, 241,
291, 299, 349, 367, 397, 403, 453, 465.
pagc 1 ol thc Honolulu Advertiser rcad KURUSU 8LUNTLY
VARN NAT!N RAY FR 8ATTL. 8ritish
hcld Singaporc was rcportcd on thc alcrt, all troops thcrc had
bccn callcd to activc duty. Tc Philippincs wcrc thrcatcncd by
]apancsc cncirclcmcnt.
10
Var sccmcd likcly. 8ut all signs pointcd
to its brcaking out thousands ol milcs lrom Hawaii, possibly in
Singaporc or thc Philippincs.
Hart qucstioncd naval o ccrs who had bccn at Pcarl Harbor
during thc attack. Vitncss altcr witncss conlcsscd that hc had
bccn no lcss surpriscd than Kimmcl by thc suddcn air attack.
Practically all thc inlormation availablc to thcm had dircctcd
thcir attcntion clscwhcrc. Gcncrally spcaking, thcy wcrc support
ivc ol Kimmcls prcattack dccisions and actions.
Rcar Admiral V.V. Smith, Kimmcls chicl ol sta in
cccmbcr 1941, tcsticd that whcn hc saw thc cccmbcr 3
dispatch conccrning thc burning ol documcnts by thc ]apancsc
at Hong Kong, Singaporc, 8atavia, Manila, Vashington, and
London, hc had littlc doubt that thcy wcrc about to makc a hos
tilc movc.
11
Vc had bccn told that hcavy ]apancsc movcmcnts
wcrc on thc way to thc southard |sic|. !t did not occur to us,
Smith tcsticd, that thc attack was coming in our dircction.
12

Vc did cxpcct a submarinc attack . . . |but not| an air raid on
Pcarl Harbor, although plans wcrc madc to mcct onc, as ! havc
said, by thc stationing ol ships and conditions ol rcadincss.
13

Rcar Admiral Arthur C. avis, who at thc timc ol thc
attack was scrving as cct aviation o ccr ol thc Pacic Flcct,
had thought a surprisc air attack was possiblc. 8ut hc had con
sidcrcd it prcvcntablc only by thc most cxtcnsivc scarchcs and
corts lor which ncithcr thc plancs nor thc mcn ncccssary wcrc
10
Honolulu Advertiser, Novcmbcr 30, 1941, p. 1.
11
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 489, ispatch #031850.
12
!bid., p. 62.
13
!bid., p. 73.
availablc in Hawaii. vcn undcr thc bcst ol circumstanccs, avis
said tcstilying in 1944, whcn an attack might bc cxpcctcd, it isnt
casy to sight an incoming cncmy lorcc.
Vc havc, oursclvcs, quitc oltcn madc an attack whcrcin
]apancsc scarch plancs lailcd to sight our lorccs, cvcn though
in many ol thcsc cascs wc know that thcy wcrc making intcn
sivc scarch ights. !n thc Guadalcanal landing, as an cxamplc, a
]apancsc scarch planc, undcr scattcrcd cloud conditions, camc
closc cnough to our lorcc actually to bc sightcd by longrangc
tclcscopc lrom thc ENTERPRISE, but lailcd to scc and rcport
thc lorcc.
14

uc to thcir dcpcndcncc on Vashington, thc mcn in intcl
ligcncc in Hawaii had no morc rcason to cxpcct a surprisc air
attack on Pcarl Harbor than had thc mcn on thc Navys ships and
plancs. Tcrc wcrc scrious gaps in thcir intclligcncc.
Captain dwin T. Layton, cct intclligcncc o ccr at thc timc
ol thc attack, said intclligcncc was cvaluatcd inlormation and a
commodity ol which you can ncvcr havc quitc cnough. . . . |!|t is
likc a jigsaw puzzlc with parts missing, thc wholc picturc is rarcly
availablc as important picccs arc missing. Hc was convinccd thc
Statc cpartmcnt must havc had inlormation during thc prc
attack pcriod that would havc bccn ol valuc to thc Commandcr
inChicl.
15
n thc morning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn Layton dcliv
crcd to Kimmcl a rcport on thc sightings ol ]apancsc ships in thc
Gull ol Siam and Camranh 8ay, thc thought ol attack on Pcarl
Harbor at that timc was vcry lar lrom most pcoplcs minds.
16

Naval o ccrs qucstioncd by Hart rcjcctcd thc Robcrts
Commissions chargc that Kimmcl and Short had lailcd to conlcr
14
!bid., pp. 105, 109.
15
!bid., p. 226.
16
!bid., p. 237.
and coopcratc. Admiral V.V. Smith,
17
Rcar Admiral Valtcr S.
Andcrson, commandcr, 8attlcships 8attlc Forcc, Pacic Flcct,
18

and Admiral Villiam F. Halscy, commandcr Aircralt 8attlc
Forcc and Task Forcc Two at thc timc ol thc attack, all said that
thcir rclations wcrc cxccllcnt. Admiral Kimmcl . . . pcrsonally,
spcnt a grcat dcal ol timc socially with Gcncral Short. !n goll, and
othcr lorms ol cxcrcisc. . . . Tis cnablcd thcm to discuss things in
an inlormal way. 8ut ArmyNavy coopcration was common in
Hawaii. At this timc, thcrc wcrc many Army o ccrs that wcnt to
sca with thc task lorccs to obtain a rsthand knowlcdgc ol what
thc Navy was doing. At thc samc timc, many naval o ccrs wcnt
on mancuvcrs with thc Army.
19

Vitncss altcr witncss supportcd Kimmcls claim that hc had
bccn handicappcd in opposing thc ]apancsc air attack bccausc
ol too lcw plancs and antiaircralt guns and insu cicnt pcrson
ncl. According to Admiral Smith, Kimmcl had askcd lor mcn so
many timcs that somc mcmbcrs ol thc Sta adviscd him that hc
was only boring thc cpartmcnt. . . . Hc would ask lor 20,000
mcn, 10,000 to ll vacancics in thc Flcct, and 10,000 morc lor
training . . . and thc answcr hc invariably got was that, Tc mcn
arc not availablc. Tcy arc nccdcd in thc Atlantic.
20

\icc Admiral Villiam Sattcrlcc Pyc, commandcr at thc
timc ol thc attack ol 8attlc Forcc, Unitcd Statcs Pacic Flcct,
and commandcr ol Task Forcc nc, tcsticd about thc ]unc
1941 dctachmcnt ol ships lrom thc Pacic to thc Atlantic: thrcc
battlcships, lour light cruiscrs, onc squadron ol dcstroycrs, and
othcr ships had bccn translcrrcd carlicr, so that thc powcr ol thc
17
!bid., p. 44.
18
!bid., pp. 43435.
19
!bid., p. 331.
20
!bid., p. 47.
Pacic Flcct had bccn matcrially rcduccd in ordcr to strcngthcn
thc lorccs in thc Atlantic.
21

Vitncss altcr witncss pointcd out that thc plancs and ight
crcws availablc in Hawaii wcrc clcarly insu cicnt lor longrangc
survcillancc. Commandcr Patrick C. 8cllingcr ol Patrol Ving
Two cstimatcd an ovcrall lorcc ol approximatcly 200 plancs (84
plancs ying daily) and 252 crcws would bc rcquircd to conduct
a scarch through 360 dcgrccs, to a distancc ol at lcast 800 milcs,
assuming a 15 milc radius ol visibility.
22
Givcn 25milc visibility,
150 plancs and 225 ight crcws, ying 16 hours pcr day, would
bc nccdcd to scarch a radius ol 800 milcs. Tc total ol 24,750
planchours would consumc 1,980,000 gallons ol gasolinc pcr
month and rcquirc an avcragc ol 82 cnginc changcs plus 182
sparc cngincs pcr month. And still thc ccctivcncss ol thc scarch
would bc only about 50 pcr ccnt.
23
Tc Hawaiian Command thcn
had only 81 plancs, ninc wcrc undcrgoing rcpair, 58 wcrc in com
mission, and 14 wcrc in thc air. Howcvcr, bccausc ol physical
latiguc, about two crcws arc nccdcd lor cvcry planc in opcration,
and thc numbcr ol ight crcws in Hawaii on cccmbcr 7 lcll lar
short ol thc numbcr rcquircd.
24

Rcar Admiral (commandcr at thc timc ol thc attack) Villard
A. Kitts, cct gunncry and training o ccr, U.S. Pacic Flcct, did
not think Kimmcl was unduly occupicd with training mattcrs to
thc cxtcnt that hc lost sight ol thc othcr aspccts ol rcadincss and
sccurity. Hc bclicvcd thc succcss ol thc training in gunncry had
bccn
bornc out by thc splcndid pcrlormancc that thc antiaircralt
battcrics ol thc Flcct put lorth on thc 7th ol cccmbcr. . . .
|A|t lcast twcntycight plancs wcrc shot down by vcsscls ol thc
21
!bid., p. 158.
22
!bid., p. 124.
23
!bid., p. 125.
24
!bid., p. 123.
Flcct. Not a bad pcrlormancc lor mcn who had ncvcr rcd a
shot in action and considcring thc numbcr ol guns cngagcd.
25

8cllingcr, who had bccn commandcr ol thc Naval 8asc
clcnsc Air Forcc, thought it was loolish to think that such a
skclctonizcd organization, as thc Pacic Flcct was thcn,
lunctioning on thc basis ol coopcration by thc Navy and Army
Air Forccs and sct up to bc put in motion by spccial ordcrs or
by an cmcrgcncy occurring, rcmaining practically noncxistcnt
cxccpt during pcriodic drills, could go into action and lunction
ccctivcly at thc occurrcncc ol an actual cmcrgcncy. An orga
nization ol this naturc to bc ccctivc must lunction twcnty
lour hours cvcry day, and prior to an air raid not subscqucnt
thcrcto.
8cllingcr tcsticd that hc kncw ol no man who, undcr thc cir
cumstanccs, could havc donc morc than Kimmcl did.
26

Admiral Halscy pointcd out that thc problcm was onc ol
balancing sccurity against training and how lar hc could aord
to lct his traincd mcn go and still havc his Flcct rcady lor instant
action. Hc was constantly going ovcr in his mind how lar this
should go. . . . |Kimmcl| was vcry much against thc translcr ol
so many traincd mcn and thc inux ol so many rccruits undcr
thc conditions that laccd us.
27

Kimmcls task as commandcrinchicl was a juggling act. !n thc
light ol his ordcrs and availablc intclligcncc, hc had to wcigh thc
rclativc importancc ol training against that ol prcparations lor
war, hc did not darc ovcrcmphasizc onc to thc ncglcct ol thc
othcr.
25
!bid., pp. 193, 201. Scc also ibid., pp. 47, 65.
26
!bid., p. 140.
27
!bid., pp. 31819.
Rcar Admiral Vilson 8rown, commandcr ol thc ccts
Scouting Forcc, Task Forcc 3, spokc wcll ol thc ccts prcwar
training:
|T|hc high statc ol c cicncy maintaincd whilc doubling thc
sizc ol our Flcct in two ycars, thc scamanship, gunncry, and
ghting ability ol our Navy during two ycars ol war rcccts
|sic| thc quality ol our naval lcadcrship and ol our training
proccsscs during thc prcwar pcriod as wcll as during thc war
pcriod.
Tc succcss ol thc ]apancsc, 8rown hcld, was not duc to laxity on
thc part ol U.S. pcrsonncl, but rathcr to thc dctailcd inlormation
thc ]apancsc had about our Flcct.
28

Admiral Hart cxamincd ninc witncsscs who had not bccn in
Pcarl Harbor during thc wccks bclorc thc attack, including scv
cral who had thcn hcld important positions in Vashington and
had bccn privy to cspccially important prcattack intclligcncc
Rcar Admiral !ngcrsoll, assistant chicl ol naval opcrations,
Rcar Admiral Turncr, chicl ol thc Navys war plans division, Rcar
Admiral Vilkinson, dircctor ol naval intclligcncc. Tcy wcrc
all just as surpriscd as thc Hawaiian o ccrs had bccn that thc
]apancsc had targctcd Pcarl Harbor.
Hart caught up with Vilkinson on Guadalcanal in thc south
Pacic. Vilkinson had takcn ovcr as dircctor ol naval intclligcncc
in thc midst ol thc ctobcr 1941 radical pcrsonncl shilts. From
Vilkinsons tcstimony, ]apans immcdiatc objcctivc appcarcd to
bc thc occupation ol |thc| southwcstcrn coast ol !ndoChina,
Kampot, and possibly 8angkok, or lowcr Siam on thc Malay
Pcninsula. ]apancsc troop transports and lrcightcrs wcrc pour
ing continually down lrom ]apan and Northcrn China coast
ports hcadcd South, apparcntly lor Frcnch !ndoChina and
Formosan ports. Much activity was going on in thc Mandatcs,
28
!bid., p. 153.
thc midPacic islands undcr ]apancsc control consisting ol largc
rccnlorccmcnts ol pcrsonncl, aircralt, munitions, and also con
struction matcrial with yard workmcn and cnginccrs. Howcvcr,
naval intclligcncc assumcd that thc major capital ship strcngth
rcmains in homc watcrs, as wcll as thc grcatcst portion ol thc
carricrs.
29

Tc Unitcd Statcs was kccping a closc cyc on thc ]apancsc
ship movcmcnts, according to Vilkinson, bccausc ol thc tcnta
tivc Amcrican8ritish agrccmcnt that any movcmcnt bcyond
ccrtain gcographical limits |100 dcgrccs longitudc, 10 dcgrccs
north latitudc| in Southcast Asia would bc considcrcd as a
casus bclli lor ngland and as a mattcr ol gravc conccrn lor thc
Unitcd Statcs.
30
Vilkinson said Turncr bclicvcd, without spc
cic cvidcncc, that thc ]apancsc would launch an attack on thc
Philippincs,
31
whcrc thc U.S. Asiatic Flcct was bascd. thcrwisc,
according to Vilkinson, U.S. tcrritory did not appcar dircctly
thrcatcncd.
!ngcrsoll told thc inquiry that Vhilc thc Govcrnmcnt could
not guarantcc that wc would cntcr thc war il ]apan attackcd Grcat
8ritain, in linc with thc A8C Agrccmcnt, thcy lully bclicvcd
that wc would do so. !n our convcrsations with thc 8ritish,
howcvcr,
wc ncvcr could makc a rm commitmcnt that at any particular
timc thc Unitcd Statcs would cntcr thc war, lor thc rcason that
unlcss wc wcrc attackcd rst thc xccutivc cpartmcnt did
not havc thc powcr to put thc Country into war.
32

29
!bid., p. 303, quoting lrom N!s cccmbcr 1, 1941 lortnightly summary ol
intcrnational ncws, airmailcd to all ag o ccrs aoat.
30
!bid., p. 303.
31
!bid.
32
!bid., p. 267.
!ngcrsoll tcsticd that thc Unitcd Statcs was virtually at war
with Gcrmany in thc Atlantic, although without bcnct ol a war
dcclaration.
33
!t was lclt that Gcrmany was thc principal cncmy
to bc disposcd ol rst.
34
Ncvcrthclcss, !ngcrsoll said Vc lclt that
thc war would bc prccipitatcd in thc Pacic and that wc would
only bccomc involvcd in thc war in thc Atlantic as a rcsult ol war
in thc Pacic. As a mattcr ol lact, corts had bccn madc
to gct our mcrchant vcsscls out ol thc Far ast and out ol thc
othcr arcas in thc Pacic whcrc thcy could bc capturcd by thc
]apancsc. . . . |T|hc Atlantic situation did not prcoccupy our
attcntion to thc cxclusion ol thc Pacic.
35

!ngcrsoll had anticipatcd ]apan would strikc without a dcc
laration ol war. 8ut that hcr surprisc attacks
would bc madc against thc Philippincs and Guam with pos
sibly raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to thc wcst
ward ol Hawaii, and submarinc attacks against our shipping
around Hawaii. . . . |Hc did| not rccall anyonc in pcrations
rcprcscnting to Admiral Stark that thc war would bc prccipi
tatcd by an air attack on Pcarl Harbor.
36

C~v)~ix S~vvovbs Tvs)i:oxy
Captain Laurcncc F. Saord ol thc sccurity (intclligcncc) scc
tion ol thc Navys communications division, mct inlormally with
Hart and rclatcd to him lrom mcmory somc ol thc inlormation
Vashington had dcrivcd lrom dccryptcd ]apancsc intcrccpts bclorc
thc attack. Hart cautioncd him against making statcmcnts hc
33
!bid., p. 469.
34
!bid., p. 461.
35
!bid., p. 470.
36
!bid.
couldnt provc and askcd him to chcck thc rccord bclorc rcturn
ing to givc lormal tcstimony.
Saord rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt and lookcd lor
thc pcrtincnt intcrccpts. But they were missing! Tcrclorc, whcn
Saord tcsticd lormally bclorc thc Hart !nquiry on April 29,
1944,
37
hc again spokc lrom mcmory and a lcw notcs. Howcvcr,
hc was ablc to rccall in considcrablc dctail many ol thc impor
tant ]apancsc dispatchcs that had bccn intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd,
translatcd, and rcad by top military and administration o cials
in Vashington bclorc thc attack.
As carly as thc spring ol 1941 (May 22), thcy had rcccivcd
positivc prool ol ]apancsc plans lor thc conqucst ol Southcastcrn
Asia and thc Southwcst Pacic. Furthcr indications ol ]apans
plans lor aggrcssion in thc southwcst Pacic and against southcast
Asia wcrc pickcd up in Scptcmbcr and ctobcr. n Novcmbcr
4, wc rcccivcd inlormation that ]apans intcrnal situation, both
political and cconomic, was so dcspcratc as a rcsult ol thc U.S.
cmbargo that thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt had to distract popular
attcntion by a lorcign war or by somc bloodlcss diplomatic vic
tory. Vc lcarncd on Novcmbcr 12 that thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt
rcgardcd Novcmbcr 25 as thc dcadlinc lor ncgotiations thcn
bcing conductcd in Vashington. !t was obvious that ]apan was
prcparing lor ocnsivc military opcrations ol somc naturc.
Tc pacc ol thc urgcnt intcrccpts pickcd up toward thc cnd ol
Novcmbcr. n Novcmbcr 24, 1941, wc lcarncd that Novcmbcr
29 was
dcnitcly thc govcrning datc lor ocnsivc military opcra
tions ol somc naturc. Vc intcrprctcd this to mcan that largc
scalc movcmcnts lor thc conqucst ol Southcast Asia and thc
37
!bid., p. 387.
Southwcst Pacic would bcgin on that datc, bccausc, at that
timc Hawaii was out ol our minds.
38
n cccmbcr 1 U.S. o cials lcarncd that ]apan was going
to attack 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs. Tcn on cccmbcr 4
wc rcccivcd dcnitc inlormation . . . that ]apan would attack
thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain, but would maintain pcacc with
Russia.
39

At 9:00 v.:. (Vashington timc), cccmbcr 6, 1941, wc rcccivcd
positivc inlormation that ]apan would dcclarc war against thc
Unitcd Statcs, at a timc to bc spccicd thcrcaltcr. Tis inlor
mation was positivc and unmistakablc and was madc availablc
to Military !ntclligcncc at this samc timc.
40

8ccausc this inlormation was so important, it was distributcd as
a rush job by Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr.
Much ol thc cccmbcr 6 inlormation was distributcd ovcr
thc tclcphonc by Admiral Vilkinson and by Sccrctary Hull.
Tc lollowing o cials wcrc givcn this inlormation that night:
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt (via thc Vhitc Housc Aidc), Sccrctary
Hull, Sccrctary Stimson, Sccrctary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rcar
Admiral Turncr, Rcar Admiral Vilkinson, Rcar Admiral
8cardall. Licutcnant Coloncl R.S. 8ratton, U.S. Army, was
givcn thc samc inlormation at 9:00 v.:. |cccmbcr 6| lor dis
scmination to Var cpartmcnt o cials, and wc did not know
any morc, cxccpt that hc got a copy ovcr to Sccrctary Hull by
10:00.
41

Finally, at 10:15 ~.:. (Vashington timc), cccmbcr 7, 1941,
wc rcccivcd positivc inlormation lrom thc Signal !ntclligcncc
38
!bid., p. 390.
39
!bid.
40
!bid.
41
!bid., pp. 39092.
Scrvicc (Var cpartmcnt) that thc ]apancsc dcclaration ol
war would bc prcscntcd to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1:00 v.:.
(Vashington timc) that datc.

8clorc that mcssagc was prcscntcd to thc sccrctary ol thc Navy,
Kramcr appcndcd a notc to thc ccct that 1:00 v.:. Vashington
timc was sunrisc in Hawaii and approximatcly midnight in thc
Philippincs, and this indicatcd a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor
in about three hours.
42

According to Saord, two spccic mcssagcs rcccivcd in
Vashington bclorc thc attack gavc prctty clcar indications that
]apan intcndcd to dcclarc war on thc Unitcd Statcs. Tc Vinds
Mcssagc, intcrccptcd cccmbcr 4, was rcgardcd . . . as dcnitcly
committing thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt to war with thc Unitcd
Statcs and 8ritain.
43
And thc mcssagc rcccivcd in thc cvcning ol
cccmbcr 6 constitutcd positivc inlormation that ]apan would
dcclarc war against thc Unitcd Statcs, at a timc to bc spccicd
thcrcaltcr.
44

Hart: !s thcrc any documcntary rcport which shows thc datc
and hour ol dclivcry ol thc lorcgoing inlormation to various
o cials:
Saord: Tcrc is no documcntary cvidcncc.
Saord was tcstilying, hc said, on thc basis ol his rccollcction
ol Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcrs vcrbal rcports.
45
Rccords ol
all thc ]apancsc intcrccpts had bccn madc and lcd at thc timc,
but in 1944 Saord could nd no copics whatsocvcr.
42
!bid., p. 390, italics addcd.
43
!bid., p. 394.
44
!bid., p. 390.
45
!bid., p. 391.
Hart: Vas any ol thc lorcgoing inlormation, undcr datcs ol
Novcmbcr and cccmbcr, 1941, disscminatcd by thc main
Vashington unit dircct to thc corrcsponding unit in Fourtccnth
Naval istrict |Hawaii|:
Saord: No, sir. Tat was not pcrmittcd by a writtcn ordcr thcn
in lorcc, but thcrc was onc cxccption. n thc 3rd ol cccmbcr,
! prcparcd pNav Sccrct ispatch 031855. . . . !n scnding
this inlormation, ! was ovcrstcpping thc bounds as cstablishcd
by approvcd war plans and joint agrccmcnt bctwccn Naval
Communications and Naval !ntclligcncc.
Tis inlormation was scnt to Manila lor action and it was
routcd to Pcarl Harbor lor inlormation.
46
!t rcportcd thc ]apancsc
govcrnmcnts ordcrs to its cmissarics throughout thc world to
dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs.
47
Hawaii could not pos
sibly havc gaincd this inlormation through thcir own corts. Tc
disscmination ol such intclligcncc was thc duty, rcsponsibility,
and privilcgc ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, not ol Saords
Communications !ntclligcncc Unit.
48

Tis was Saords rst tcstimony bclorc a Pcarl Harbor
invcstigation, hc had not bccn askcd to tcstily bclorc thc Robcrts
Commission. His rcvclations wcrc startling. No onc appcaring
bclorc Robcrts had hintcd at thc availability ol such intclligcncc as
Saord dcscribcd. And ol thc Vashington witncsscs qucstioncd
by Hart, only Turncr and !ngcrsoll had said anything that might
havc bccn intcrprctcd as rclcrring to thc ]apancsc intcrccpts.
Saord appcarcd to know what hc was talking about, but hc
was unablc to producc copics ol any ol thc ]apancsc mcssagcs to
support his tcstimony. Almost thrcc ycars had passcd sincc hc
had actually sccn any ol thc intcrccpts hc was dcscribing. How
46
!bid., p. 392.
47
!bid., part 14, p. 1408, Saords Top Sccrct dispatch ol cccmbcr 3.
48
!bid., part 26, pp. 39293.
much, il any, ol Saords dctailcd tcstimony could bc bclicvcd:
Saords mcmory could bc playing tricks on him.

Sccrctary ol Navy Knox dicd suddcnly ol a hcart attack on
April 28, 1944, whilc thc Hart !nquiry was in progrcss. ]amcs \.
Forrcstal, thcn undcrsccrctary ol Navy, was sworn in as his suc
ccssor on May 19.
49

Hart concludcd his inquiry on ]unc 15 and adjourncd to
await thc action ol thc convcning authority.
50
Tc tcstimony ol
witncsscs was rccordcd and submittcd with thc scvcral documcnts
and cxhibits introduccd to Forrcstal.
S~vvovb Fixbs )nv Missixc !x)vvcvv)s
Altcr tcstilying at thc Hart !nquiry, Saord continucd his
scarch lor thc intcrccpts. 8ut hc was unsucccsslul, all copics
sccmcd to havc disappcarcd. Saord was mysticd. Finally somc
onc told him about a packct ol papcrs in a Navy salc labclcd
P.H. Pcrhaps that containcd thc documcnts hc was looking
lor. !t did! !t containcd an almost complctc sct ol thc missing
]apancsc intcrccpts. Saord thcn had copics madc and rcstorcd
to thc lcs.
51

No onc has cvcr bccn ablc to cxplain how thc lour original
copics ol cach intcrccpt produccd lor thc govcrnmcnts Army
and Navy pcrmancnt lcs and hcld undcr tight sccurity had bccn
lost or dcstroycd. Apparcntly this onc sct ol intcrccpts survivcd
bccausc ol a scrics ol coincidcnccs. n cccmbcr 9, almost immc
diatcly altcr thc attack, Navy Sccrctary Knox cw to Hawaii to
invcstigatc thc damagc donc by thc ]apancsc. Hc didnt rcturn
49
Valtcr Millis, cd., Te Forrestal Diaries (Ncw York: \iking Prcss, 1951), p.
xxiii. ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26.
50
!bid., pp. 47172.
51
Saords convcrsations with author, notcs in authors lcs.
until cccmbcr 14. Hawaii was thcn a tcrritory, not yct a statc.
Vith thc sccrctary out ol thc country, Undcrsccrctary ]amcs \.
Forrcstal bccamc acting sccrctary. Forrcstal had known nothing
ol Purplc and had not bccn privy to MAG!C. n assuming
thc rcsponsibilitics ol sccrctary, hc askcd to bc briclcd. Tcrclorc,
apparcntly on ordcrs ol Admiral Noycs, dircctor ol naval com
munications, Licutcnant Commandcr Kramcr, ]apancsc transla
tor and Navy couricr, asscmblcd lor Forrcstal a spccial loldcr ol
intcrccpts and othcr papcrs rclativc to thc brcak in diplomatic
rclations with ]apan.
52
8ccausc ol Saords lamiliarity with thc
tra c, Kramcr had gonc ovcr thc loldcr with Saord to chcck lor
complctcncss.
53
Tcn both Commandcr McCollum ol Far ast
intclligcncc and Kramcr briclcd Forrcstal, cxplaining thc signi
cancc ol thc various mcssagcs
54
and thc way things shapcd up
lrom this tra c.
55

Vhcn Knox rcturncd and Forrcstal was rclicvcd ol his posi
tion as Acting Sccrctary, his bundlc ol intcrccpts must havc bccn
tosscd in a salc and lorgottcn.
Couv) M~v)i~i v~biixv x)vxbvb
Tc tidcs ol war had shiltcd by this timc. Tc Allics wcrc
prcparing to launch a sccond lront in uropc. Tc Axis powcrs
wcrc on thc dclcnsivc both in uropc and in Asia. Many pcoplc,
Rcpublicans and somc antiNcw cal cmocrats, wcrc bcgin
ning to ask why, altcr all this timc, it was still ncccssary to main
tain sccrccy about thc Pcarl Harbor attack. Vhy couldnt thc
truth bc told: Vas thc administration trying to hidc somcthing:
52
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3689, Saord tcstimony
bclorc thc ]oint Committcc. At thc timc, Saord was undcr thc imprcssion thc
loldcr ol intcrccpts was bcing asscmblcd lor thc usc ol thc Robcrts Commis
sion.
53
!bid., part 36, p. 71, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc Hcwitt !nquiry.
54
!bid., part 36, p. 71, Saord tcstimony.
55
!bid., pp. 8384, Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc Hcwitt !nquiry.
Saord had told Kimmcl about thc important ]apancsc
intcrccpts. 8ut cxccpt lor what hc had lcarncd about thcm lrom
Rochclort in 1942,
56
Kimmcl had only Saords word that thcy
had cvcr cxistcd. vcn so, Kimmcl didnt want to losc thc chancc
ol having his day in court. Vhcncvcr anyonc askcd him about his
possiblc court martial, hc always rcplicd that hc was rcady, hc had
always wantcd a lrcc, opcn and public hcaring.
!n thc critical ycars lollowing Pcarl Harbor, Kimmcl had
undcrstood why hc had to bcar, in silcncc, thc burdcn ol shamc
hcapcd upon |him| by thc rcport ol thc Robcrts Commission
and by publishcd intcrprctations ol that rcport. Howcvcr, hc lclt
that now, with our armcd lorccs on thc ocnsivc on all lronts, hc
owcd it to his lamily, lricnds, and thc public to makc it clcar that
hc wantcd
a trial by CourtMartial at thc carlicst practicablc datc. . . . To
bc hcld undcr a shadow ol blamc lor an additional prolongcd
and indcnitc pcriod is intolcrablc. Tc public has a right to
know what happcncd.
And hc, Kimmcl, had an Amcricans right to |his| day in
court.
57

Kimmcl scnt his attorncy, Charlcs 8. Rugg, and his assistant,
dward 8. Hanily, to Vashington in thc spring ol 1944, to try
to havc Congrcss cxtcnd thc dcadlinc lor his court martial. Altcr
a rathcr hcatcd dcbatc, Congrcss approvcd anothcr sixmonth
dcadlinc cxtcnsion and, at thc samc timc, passcd a joint rcsolution
calling lor invcstigations ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack by both thc
Army and Navy.
58

56
Saord, Tc Kita Mcssagc: No Longcr a Mystcry, manuscript (copy in
authors lcs).
57
Kimmcl, May 25, 1944, lcttcr to Scnator Sinclair Vccks (R., Mass.). Copy in
Tomas Kimmcl Collcction. uotcd in Toland, Infamy, 1982, pp. 7879.
58
Te New York Times, ]unc 8, 1944, p. 14.
FR signcd thc joint rcsolution against thc advicc ol Sccrctary
ol Var Stimson and Knox. !n signing, hc statcd that hc was surc
thc Congrcss did not intcnd that thc invcstigation . . . should
bc conductcd in a manncr which would intcrrupt or intcrlcrc
with thc war cort. n thc strcngth ol this condcncc ! havc
approvcd thc rcsolution.
59

Tus, by appcaring to approvc lurthcr invcstigations ol Pcarl
Harbor, thc politically astutc prcsidcnt succccdcd in shilting thc
rcsponsibility lor any dclay to his sccrctarics.
59
!bid., ]unc 15, 1944, p. 10.
441
22.
Army Pearl Harbor Board
T
hc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8) was authorizcd by
Congrcss to Asccrtain and Rcport thc Facts Rclating to thc
Attack Madc by ]apancsc Armcd Forccs upon thc Tcrritory ol
Hawaii on 7 cccmbcr 1941, and to Makc such Rccommcndations
as !t May ccm Propcr.
1
Licutcnant Gcncral Gcorgc Gruncrt
was appointcd prcsidcnt ol this Gruncrt 8oard. Two othcr
Army gcncrals also scrvcdMajor Gcncral Hcnry . Russcll
and Major Gcncral Valtcr H. Frank. Coloncls Charlcs V. Vcst
and Harry A. Toulmin had nonvoting positions as rccordcr and
cxccutivc o ccr rcspcctivcly, and Major Hcnry C. Clauscn was
assistant rccordcr.
Tc Gruncrt 8oard convcncd in Vashington, .C. on ]uly 20,
1944. 8cing an Army board, it was primarily intcrcstcd in Armys
rolc, cspccially that ol Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall and Hawaiian
Commandcr Gcncral Valtcr Short. Tc 8oards mcmbcrs rst
rcvicwcd thc rcports ol carlicr invcstigations and studicd matcri
als supplicd by various govcrnmcnt agcncics and Congrcssional
1
Public Law 339, 78th Cong., 2nd scss. ( ]unc 13, 1944), scc also 79th Cong.,
1st scss. ]oint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl
Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrn
mcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 27, p. 12, part 31, p. 3173, part 39, p. 24.
committccs. !t also wrotc Sccrctary ol Var Stimson and Army
Chicl ol Sta Gcorgc C. Marshall, listing thc subjccts thc 8oard
hopcd to covcr whcn thcy tcsticd.
2
Tc APH8 did not havc
thc powcr ol subpocna, but in no instancc |was| its invitation
to appcar and tcstily . . . ignorcd.
3
Tc qucstioning altcrnatcd
among thc mcmbcrs. Tc board intcrvicwcd 151 witncsscs and
was in continuous scssion until ctobcr 20, 1944.
4
8ccausc ol
thc naturc ol thc rcvclations, much ol thc tcstimony takcn during
thc nal scgmcnt ol thc procccdings was kcpt o thc rccord and
prcscrvcd in a scparatc TP SCRT rcport.
Av:y Cnivv ov S)~vv Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii:
US.]~v~x Rvi~)ioxs ix +o+, !xcvv~sixciy Tvxsv
Marshall, thc 8oards rst witncss, statcd:
|V|c wcrc vcry lcarlul ol somc warlikc act by thc ]apancsc,
which immcdiatcly would havc brought about a statc ol war
in thc Pacic, lor which, at thc timc, wc wcrc not prcparcd.
. . . |T|hcrc wcrc numcrous indications . . . all ol which indi
catcd a vcry scrious crisis dcvcloping in thc Pacic in rclation
to ]apan.
5

Marshall said hc and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Stark
madc it vcry clcar . . . to thc Sccrctary ol Statc, that it was ol
thc utmost importancc . . . to dclay so long as possiblc any
outbrcak in thc Pacic. . . . Vc anticipatcd, bcyond a doubt, a
]apancsc movcmcnt in !ndoChina and thc Gull ol Siam, and
against thc Malay Pcninsula. Vc anticipatcd also an assault on
thc Philippincs. Vc did not, so lar as ! can rccall, anticipatc an
2
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 208789.
3
!bid., part 39, p. 24.
4
!bid.
5
!bid., part 27, p. 14.
Army Pearl Harbor Board 443
attack on Hawaii. . . . |V|c thought, with thc addition ol morc
modcrn plancs, that thc dclcnscs thcrc would bc su cicnt to
makc it cxtrcmcly hazardous lor thc ]apancsc to attcmpt such
an attack.
6

!n a joint Novcmbcr 27 mcmorandum Marshall and Stark told
thc prcsidcnt cmphatically:
Tc most csscntial thing now, lrom thc Unitcd Statcs vicw
point, is to gain timc. . . . Altcr consultation with cach othcr,
Unitcd Statcs, 8ritish, and utch military authoritics in thc
Far ast agrccd that joint military countcr action against ]apan
should bc undcrtakcn only in casc ]apan attacks or dircctly
thrcatcns thc tcrritory or mandatcd tcrritory ol thc Unitcd
Statcs, thc 8ritish Commonwcalth, or thc Ncthcrlands ast
!ndics, or should thc ]apancsc movc lorccs into Tailand wcst
ol 100
ast or south ol 10
NorthPortugucsc Timor, Ncw

Calcdonia, or thc Loyalty !slands.
7

\cry soon altcr Short assumcd command ol thc Hawaiian
cpartmcnt, Marshall adviscd him (Fcbruary 7, 1941) ol his
rcsponsibility lor protccting thc cct:
Tc lullcst protcction lor thc Flcct is the rathcr than a major
considcration lor us, thcrc can bc littlc qucstion about that.
. . . Plcasc kccp clcarly in mind in all ol your ncgotiations that
our mission is to protcct thc basc and thc Naval conccntration,
and that purposc should bc madc clcarly apparcnt to Admiral
Kimmcl.
8

6
!bid.
7
!bid., p. 15.
8
!bid., pp. 1618.
Vhcn askcd il thc mission ol thc Army out thcrc was thc pro
tcction ol thc Navy, Marshall answcrcd, Ycs. Tat is thc rcason
lor thc Armys bcing thcrc.
9

Coovvv~)iox 8v)wvvx Pv~vi H~vnov
Co::~xbvvs Ab:iv~i Ki::vi ~xb
Gvxvv~i Snov)
Tc Robcrts Commission had blamcd thc Pcarl Harbor disas
tcr to somc cxtcnt on thc lailurc ol thc two Pcarl Harbor com
mandcrs, Kimmcl and Short, to coopcratc. Short acknowlcdgcd
that thcrc had bccn somc instanccs whcn thc channcls ol com
munication bctwccn thc Army and Navy sccmcd to brcak down.
For instancc, hc did not lcarn until cccmbcr 8 about thc subma
rinc sunk ncar Pcarl Harbor at about 6:45 ~.:. on cccmbcr 7.
10

Howcvcr, gcncrally spcaking hc thought thc Armys rclation with
thc Navy in Hawaii and his pcrsonal rclationship with Kimmcl
had bccn good. Kimmcls associatcs and Hawaiian locals who
wcrc qucstioncd agrccd.
11

Gvxvv~i Snov) vvvxbs His S~no)~cv Aivv)
Short had bccn chargcd by thc Robcrts Commission with an
crror in judgmcnt lor having institutcd Alcrt #1 to guard against
sabotagc and lor not having alcrtcd lor such an attack as that
ol cccmbcr 7. Tc Armys ]uly 14, 1941, Standard pcrating
Proccdurc,
12
ccctivc Novcmbcr 5, 1941, had dcscribcd thrcc
alcrts. So Marshall was lamiliar with thcm. Howcvcr, hc had
somc dcnitc idcas about implcmcnting thcm. Hc did not want
9
!bid., part 27, p. 18.
10
!bid., p. 285.
11
!bid., p. 798 (Admiral 8loch), part 28, p. 1447 (8usincssman Valtcr Francis
illingham).
12
!bid., part 39, p. 77. APH8 Rcport, part 7, pp. 294144.
thc Hawaiian air lorcc uscd to dclcnd against sabotagc and
ground attacks, or to providc military policc duty. Hc wrotc Short
on ctobcr 10 that using thc air lorcc lor antisabotagc sccms
inconsistcnt with thc cmphasis wc arc placing on air strcngth in
Hawaii.
13
Marshall told Short to usc his Air Forcc lor its normal
purposcs and not upon antisabotagc guard duty.
14

Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc
#472 had rcad:
Ncgotiations with ]apan appcar to bc tcrminatcd. . . . !l hostili
tics cannot rcpcat cannot bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs
that ]apan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Tis policy should not
comma rcpcat not comma bc construcd as rcstricting you to
a coursc ol action that might jcopardizc your dclcnsc. Prior
to hostilc ]apancsc action you arc dircctcd to undcrtakc such
rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary but
thcsc mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not comma rcpcat
not comma to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt.
15

Short lound this conlusing, hc should undcrtakc such rccon
naissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary, but thcsc
mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not comma rcpcat not
comma to alarm civil population or disclosc intcnt. 8ccausc ol
this stricturc, Short had dccidcd upon Alcrt #1, dcsigncd spcci
cally to guard against sabotagc, cspionagc, and subvcrsivc activi
tics, rathcr than onc ol thc morc aggrcssivc Alcrts.
16
Short had
thcn radiocd Vashington, as rcqucstcd, that hc had alcrtcd to
prcvcnt sabotagc.
17

13
!bid., part 27, p. 22, Marshall tcstimony.
14
!bid., pp. 2223. Marshall tcstimony.
15
Mcssagc #472 quotcd in APH8 hcarings, part 27, p. 155.
16
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, pp. 156, 158. Short tcsti
mony.
17
!bid., part 14, p. 1330, part 27, p. 158: Rc your radiogram 472, cpartmcnt
alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc.
Short cxplaincd still lurthcr thc rcasons lor his sabotagc alcrt.
18

Hawaiian !ntclligcncc (G2) had rcccivcd a mcssagc#473
lrom Gcncral Shcrman Milcs, ircctor ol Military !ntclligcncc,
G2advising that Subvcrsivc activitics may bc cxpcctcd.
19

Milcs cxplaincd that Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had dclcgatcd to thc
F8!, N!, and to his military intclligcncc division rcsponsibility
lor countcrsubvcrsivc activitics. Vhcn Milcs lound that nothing
had bccn said about subvcrsion in Gcncral Marshalls Novcmbcr
27 war warning, hc lclt it ncccssary to warn all G2 dcpartmcnts.
Tc policy had alrcady bccn laid down, Milcs said, by Gcncral
Marshalls tclcgram, hc was simply backing up Marshalls pol
icy and cmphasizing thc lorm ol attack lor which hc, Milcs, was
rcsponsiblc.
20
Upon rccciving thc Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr
27 war warning,
21
Short thought, lrom thc caution about not
taking any provocativc mcasurcs against ]apan and not alarming
thc public, thcrc was still somc possibility ol avoiding war with
]apan.
To takc thc mcssagc ol thc 16th ol ctobcr |rc ]apans changc
in Primc Ministcrs lrom Konoyc to Tojo| and thc 27th ol
Novcmbcr togcthcr, thcy indicatcd to mc |Short| that thcy
wcrc still hopclul ol avoiding hostilitics.
Stark didnt hcar anything lurthcr lrom thc Var cpartmcnt
cxccpt thc short Novcmbcr 28 mcssagc (#482), which wcnt into
dctail about sabotagc,
22
tclling Short to protcct his cstablish
mcnts against subvcrsivc propaganda and . . . cspionagc.
23
Short
18
!bid., part 27, pp. 156, 158.
19
!bid., part 14, p. 1329.
20
!bid., part 27, p. 66, 9899, tcstimony ol Gcncral H.H. Arnold, chicl ol thc
Army Air Forccs.
21
!bid., part 27, p. 25.
22
!bid., p. 239.
23
!bid., part 14, p. 1330.
intcrprctcd thc scvcral mcssagcs lrom thc Var cpartmcnt in
Vashington as approving his sabotagc alcrt. thcr witncsscs
qucstioncd by thc Gruncrt board also bclicvcd Short had bccn
justicd in his dccision to alcrt lor sabotagc. Short had bccn givcn
no indication that thc ncgotiations in Vashington wcrc rcaching
a brcaking point, hc had not bccn told that wc wcrc ncgotiating
with thc 8ritish and utch about coordinatcd military action in
thc Pacic arca. !l hc had known morc about what was going on
in Vashington and about thc attitudc ol Vashington o cials, it
would undoubtcdly havc madc him morc conscious that war was
practically unavoidablc.
24

V~snixc)ox vvici~is Svv V~v ~s !::ixvx)
!n thcir tcstimony, various Vashington o cials traccd thc
dctcrioration ol U.S.]apancsc rclations back to various points in
timc. Gcncral H.H. Arnold, chicl ol thc Army Air Forccs, said
it had bccn apparcnt as carly as ]anuary 1941 that rclations wcrc
quitc straincd.
25
Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, acting, or assistant,
chicl ol war plans, said thc gcncral buildup . . . bctwccn ]uly and
Novcmbcr . . . lcd to thc conclusion in Novcmbcr that war with
]apan might occur.
26
Marshall said it had bccn a gradual pro
ccss, hc had comc to thc conclusion somc timc in thc lall ol 41
that war with ]apan was incvitablc.
27
Gcncral Milcs ol Military
!ntclligcncc also saw thc situation as prccarious lrom Novcmbcr
27,
whcn wc lcarncd that wc had practically givcn what . . . prob
ably would bc considcrcd by thcm |thc ]apancsc| an ultimatum
. . . ! considcrcd war as vcry probablc il not incvitablc. . . . !
24
!bid., part 27, p. 240.
25
!bid., p. 89, Arnold tcstimony.
26
!bid., part 29, p. 2158.
27
!bid., p. 2326.
thought that vcry dcnitcly an action by ]apan, a prctty radi
cal action, would bc takcn almost at oncc, that that ncccssarily
would bc an ovcrt and opcn attack on thc Unitcd Statcs.
Howcvcr, Milcs pointcd out, war was not thc only possibility,
thcrc wcrc a good many things ]apan could havc donc, il shc
did brcak thosc ncgotiations, short ol opcn war with thc Unitcd
Statcs, and wc wcrc considcring all ol thosc mattcrs.
28

Vn~) ib Snov) Kxow ov )nv Gvowixc
U.S.]~v~xvsv Cvisis 8uiibuv-
Not much! Short bclicvcd hc kncw in an indcnitc way that
U.S. policy lrom somctimc in August or Scptcmbcr ol 1941 was
largcly onc ol dclaying, playing lor timc, with thc rcalization that
war with ]apan was incvitablc.
29
8ut hc had not bccn told about thc
Scptcmbcr 1941 conlcrcncc whcn Gcncral Marshall and othcrs
who wcrc in conlcrcncc with thc Sccrctary ol Statc had dccidcd
that war with ]apan was incvitablc. Nor had hc known that wc
wcrc ncgotiating with thc 8ritish and utch about coordinatcd
military action in thc Pacic arca. And no onc had told him
an agrccmcnt had bccn rcachcd with all nations, thc ccct ol
which was that il thc ]apancsc movcd lorccs into Tailand wcst
ol 100 dcgrccs cast or south ol 20 dcgrccs north wc would
rcgard that as an act ol war.
30

8asically, hc kncw only what was in thc papcrs.
Short lcarncd lrom an ctobcr 16 StarkKimmcl mcssagc, ol
thc rcsignation ol ]apans Primc Ministcr Konoyc and thc risc to
powcr ol thc morc militant Gcncral Hidcki Tojo crcating
28
!bid., part 27, pp. 6465.
29
!bid., p. 240.
30
!bid.
a gravc situation. . . . |H|ostilitics bctwccn ]apan and Russia arc
a strong possibility. Sincc thc US and 8ritain arc hcld rcspon
siblc lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a possibil
ity that ]apan may attack thcsc two powcrs.
31

All conccrncd with thc cxisting gravc situation wcrc to takc
duc prccautions. Short bclicvcd hc had donc that with his Alcrt
#1: Vc had had all thc utilitics guardcd, all thc bridgcs, and . . . !
just simply cautioncd pcoplc that wcrc rcsponsiblc lor that guard
ing to bc unusually carclul. Shorts intcrprctation was that thc
Navy cpartmcnt lclt surc ]apan was going to attack Russia, an
attack on thc U.S. and G.8. was only a possibility.
32

Altcr discussion with thc Armys G2, Army Chicl ol Var
Plans Gcrow rcachcd thc conclusion at that timc that thc
Navy cstimatc was morc pcssimistic than wc bclicvcd it should
bc.
33
Accordingly thc Var cpartmcnt scnt Short an ctobcr 20
lollowup radiogram in ccct toning down thc Navys warning:
Following Var cpt. cstimatc ol ]apancsc situation lor your
inlormation STP Tcnsion bctwccn Unitcd Statcs and ]apan
rcmains straincd but no rcpcat no abrupt changc in ]apancsc
lorcign policy appcars immincnt.
34

n Novcmbcr 24 thc Navy scnt anothcr pcssimistic mcssagc
to its cld commandcrs, including Kimmcl:
Chanccs ol lavorablc outcomc ol ncgotiations with ]apan vcry
doubtlul x Tis situation couplcd with statcmcnts ol ]apancsc
Govcrnmcnt and movcmcnts thcir naval and military lorccs
indicatc to our opinion that a surprisc aggrcssivc movcmcnt
31
!bid., part 14, pp. 1327, 1402.
32
!bid., part 27, pp. 21819.
33
!bid., part 29, p. 2159.
34
!bid., part 14, p. 1327.
in any dircction including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a
possibility.
Tc commandcrs wcrc adviscd: Chicl ol Sta has sccn this dis
patch concurs and rcqucsts action adccs |addrcssccs| to inlorm
scnior Army thcir arcas.
35
Short did not rccall sccing this pcs
simistic Navy mcssagc.
36

Marshall dclcndcd Vashingtons warnings as adcquatc to
havc alcrtcd Short to bc prcparcd lor thc crisis that was coming.
!n our own vicw, Marshall tcsticd,
an alcrt ol thc charactcr, particularly thc charactcr ol thc two
that occurrcd at that timc, thc Naval alcrt and thcn thc latcr
Army alcrt, wcrc su cicnt lor any commandcr with a grcat
rcsponsibility.
37

Short thought that, il Vashington cvcr rcally bclicvcd that an
attack on thc Unitcd Statcs was immincnt, it would havc lound
somc mcans to inlorm him, as commandcr in thc cld, il ncccs
sary by scramblcr phonc. ||rdinarily, you could gct through in
tcn or ltccn minutcs. !t was rcasonablc to bclicvc, Short tcsti
cd, that il thcrc was going to bc a hostilc attack, thcy would havc
tricd to gct it to us by morc than onc mcans ol communication.
Tus hc had bccn lorccd to concludc that thcrc was a lccling
still at that timc that sccrccy was morc important than thc timc
clcmcnt.
38
8ut thcrc had bccn no word lrom Vashington. Undcr
Gruncrts qucstioning, Marshall admittcd that it would havc
bccn both possiblc and lcasiblc to havc scnt thc substancc ol this
sccrct inlormation to thc Commanding Gcncrals ol thc vcrscas
cpartmcnts by couricr or othcrwisc. Howcvcr, Marshall had
35
!bid., pp. 1328, 1405, CN ispatch #242005, Novcmbcr 24, 1941.
36
!bid., part 27, p. 220.
37
!bid., part 29, p. 2329.
38
!bid., p.169.
bccn so scnsitivc to thc thrcat ol cndangcring Vashingtons sourcc
ol intclligcnccthc MAG!C intcrccptsthat hc had considcrcd
it unwisc to do so.
39

Pi~xvs ~xb Snivs vov H~w~ii
No) ~ Hicn Pviovi)y
Tc board qucstioncd Admiral 8loch about thc Navys cort
to obtain plancs. !n 1940 thc Navy had gottcn moncy lor a
15,000planc programa numbcr ol P8Ys, ol which about 108
wcrc allocatcd to thc Fourtccnth Naval istrict (Hawaii) and
150 or so to thc U.S. Pacic Flcct. At that timc thc cct only had
81. 8loch said hc was quitc pcrsistcnt in . . . trying to gct thc
plancs.
CommandcrinChicl |Kimmcl| kncw . . . and hc supportcd
mc. Tc corrcspondcncc wcnt to thc Navy cpartmcnt ask
ing lor thcsc plancs, and ! was told rcpcatcdly thcy would bc
givcn to mc but thcy would not bc givcn to mc until somc
timc that was indcnitc in thc luturc.
40
. . . |!|t wasnt a qucstion
ol appropriation. !t was qucstion ol prioritics: Tc war was in
|thc| Atlantic, Pacic wasnt in thc war. . . . Tcy say it in thc
war plan: Tc war is in thc Atlantic, thc Pacic is a morc or lcss
quasidclcnsivc |thcatcr| until thcy gct around to it.
41

According to Admiral Villiam S. Pyc, commandcr battlc
lorcc, Pacic Flcct, and commandcr Task Forcc 1, thc situation
was said to bc scrious as carly rcally as April 1941. Howcvcr, hc
rcmindcd thc board, thc Navy cpartmcnt had dctachcd lrom
thc Pacic Flcct in ]unc
39
!bid., part 29, p. 2328.
40
!bid., p. 800.
41
!bid., pp. 80001.
onc battlcship division, onc light cruiscr division, and two
dcstroycr divisions, to scnd into thc Atlantic. !t hardly sccmcd
to thc Commandcrs in thc Pacic that il thc situation was as
bad as it was said to bc, that was thc timc to bc moving a largc
portion ol our Flcct into thc Atlantic,
cspccially as thc 8ritish Flcct, itscll, was many timcs supcrior to
thc availablc Gcrman ships.
42

Not only had thc Pacic Flcct bccn guttcd, Pyc said, but thc
commandcrs cncountcrcd rcsistancc lrom Vashington whcncvcr
thcy askcd lor mcn and matcricl.
uring this samc pcriod, it bccamc most di cult lor thc
CommandcrinChicl ol thc Pacic Flcct to obtain patrol
plancs or cvcn to obtain carricr plancs, and, up to cccmbcr
7, not cvcn all ol thc carricrs wcrc cquippcd with thcir normal
numbcr ol plancs. . . . |8|y acts rathcr than |by| words . . .
Vashington lailcd to indicatc urgcncy. Tis lcd to thc almost
unilorm opinion that whilc war probably was in thc o ng, it
was not cxpcctcd to comc without warning. At lcast thc ncccs
sary stcps to prcparc lor a surprisc attack wcrc not bcing takcn.
Tc imprcssion givcn was that il war camc, it would bc upon thc
initiativc ol thc Unitcd Statcs.
43

N~vy Aivv) )o Sun:~vixv A))~cx Tnvv~)
Gruncrt qucstioncd Pyc about rcconnaissancc in Hawaii, thc
arcas in which thc cct opcratcd and patrollcd with thc availablc
aircralt.
42
!bid., p. 548.
43
!bid.
Grunert: Vould it havc bccn rcasonablc to assumc . . . that thc
cncmy could not wcll approach with aircralt carricrs to makc
an attack on thc mainland:
Pye: . . . |!|t should bc rccallcd that wc wcrc not in a statc ol
war . . . . |T|hc patrol was primarily to dctcrminc thc possiblc
prcscncc ol submarincs. . . . !l attacks had bccn madc by subma
rincs, and thc submarinc not sightcd or sunk or capturcd, thcrc
would havc bccn no way lor us to provc dcnitcly that it was
not an intcrnal cxplosion in thc ship rathcr than a torpcdo. !n
addition to that thcrc was always thc possibility that Gcrman
crcws might man ]apancsc submarincs or might, in thc last
analysis, cvcn bring thcir submarincs to thc Hawaiian !slands
in ordcr to try to lorcc us into war. . . . |T|hc implication |ol thc
Novcmbcr 27 war warning| was that thcrc was grcat dangcr
ol a submarinc attack.
Grunert: Tcn it would appcar lrom what tcstimony wc havc
had to datc that thc Army was sabotagcmindcd and thc Navy
may havc bccn submarincmindcd.
Pye: ! think thcrc is no qucstion but what thc Navy was
submarincmindcd.
44

Pv~vi H~vnov A))~cx Suvvvisvb V~snixc)ox
vvici~is ~s wvii ~s H~w~ii~x Co::~xbvvs
Tc principal task ol thc U.S. cmbassy in ]apan, particularly ol
its military and naval o ccrs, was to obtain inlormation conccrn
ing probablc action on thc part ol thc ]apancsc Army and Navy.
45

Yct in thc months bclorc thc attack thc cmbassy o cials in ]apan
had lound this to bc incrcasingly di cult. Ambassador Grcw
cablcd lrom Tokyo on Novcmbcr 17, 1941: Tc mbassys cld
44
!bid., pp. 53940.
45
!bid., p. 62.
ol naval or military obscrvation is rcstrictcd almost litcrally to
what could bc sccn with thc nakcd cyc, and this is ncgligiblc.
46

According to Gcncral Milcs, Chicl ol Armys G2, Military
!ntclligcncc, many ol our sourccs ol intclligcncc had dricd up.
To havc avoidcd bcing surpriscd on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7,
would havc callcd lor knowing about ]apans naval bascs, staging
arcas, and within rathcr lairly narrow limits, thc cxpcctcd timc ol
thc attack and thc dircction ol approach. Hc tcsticd:
! did not think any !ntclligcncc o ccr cvcr thought that hc
could bc surc ol picking up a convoy or attack lorcc or task
lorcc in ]apan bclorc it sailcd and know whcrc it was going. . . .
!t would havc bccn almost a military intclligcncc miraclc.
47

Pyc did not bclicvc thc pcoplc in Vashington cxpcctcd thc
attack any morc than thc pcoplc in Honolulu.
48
Hc thought thc
attitudc ol thc o ccrs ol thc Flcct was just about thc samc as
thc attitudc ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts. Pyc, who mct
Sccrctary Knox right upon his arrival in thc Hawaiian !slands
about cccmbcr 10, said
thc rst thing Knox said to mc was, No onc in Vashington
cxpcctcd such an attack|not| cvcn Kclly Turncr. Admiral
Kclly Turncr was in thc Var Plans ivision, was thc most
aggrcssivcmindcd ol all.
49

Marshall tcsticd that hc had scnt Major Gcncral Arnold,
commanding gcncral, Army Air Forcc, and dcputy chicl ol sta,
to Calilornia spccically to cxpcditc thc dcparturc ol thc 817
bombcrs to thc Philippincs.
50
Arnold in turn tcsticd that in
46
!bid., p. 58. Scc also U.S. Statc, Peace and War: 19311941, pp. 78899.
47
!bid., part 27, p. 62.
48
!bid., part 27, p. 550.
49
!bid., p. 554.
50
!bid., part 29, p. 2316.
vicw ol thc straincd rclations with ]apan, wc wcrc doing what
wc could to prcparc lor any cvcntuality that might occur, without
causing an ovcrt act against thc ]apancsc.
51
Vc had not bccn
so much worricd about thc immcdiatc attack on Hawaii. !t was
always a possibility, but wc all thought thcrc ccrtainly would bc
an attack against Midway and Vakc.
52
Tc 817s lclt thc Vcst
Coast lor Hawaii without ammunition
bccausc at that timc it was a qucstion ol gasolinc or ammu
nition lor that long 2400milc hop. . . . So thcy did not takc
thc ammunition, and thcy got thcrc right in thc middlc ol thc
Pcarl Harbor attack.
53

bviously, Arnold said, wc madc an crror, an crror in judg
mcnt. Somcbody had to wcigh thc lact against thcir ccrtainty ol
arriving thcrc by providing su cicnt gasolinc against thc prob
ability ol thcir using thcir machinc guns and not gctting thcrc
bccausc thcy wcrc carrying ammunition.
Tc lact that bombcrs had bccn dispatchcd to Honolulu,
unarmcd, cn routc to thc Philippincs on thc night ol cccmbcr
67, told Short that thc Var cpartmcnt lclt that thcrc was no
dangcr ol an air attack on Honolulu, or bctwccn Honolulu and
San Francisco. Tc cxtra wcight in ammunition was considcrcd
a grcatcr hazard . . . than it was to takc a chancc ol mccting thc
]aps without any ability to rcturn thcir rc.
54
|\|cry dcnitcly,
Short said, thcir cstimatc was cxactly thc samc as |his|, thcy wcrc
not cxpccting an air attack on Honolulu.
55

51
!bid., part 27, p. 89.
52
!bid., p. 92.
53
!bid., p. 96.
54
!bid., p. 166.
55
!bid., p. 168.
Pniiivvixvs Coxsibvvvb )nv Mos) Lixviy T~vcv)
Rclations bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apan wcrc dctc
riorating in ctobcr and Novcmbcr 1941. Vashington was
cxpccting a ]apancsc strikc somcwhcrc in thc wcstcrn Pacic
or southcast Asia. !t sccmcd logical that shc would attack
thc Philippincs to kccp thc Unitcd Statcs lrom intcrccpting
]apancsc ships and plancs bound lor southcast Asia. Tus, thc
Var cpartmcnt had bccn trying dcspcratcly to build up U.S.
dclcnscs thcrc. According to Marshall, wc wcrc pouring through
Hawaii, on thc way to thc Philippincs, convoys |with mcn and
matcricl lor thc Philippincs|, rushing cvcrybody. vcrything was
bcing pushcd to thc last cxtrcmc.
56
|F|rom thc inlormation that
wc wcrc rccciving, Marshall lclt that thcy |thc ]apancsc| wcrc
now gctting in a highly ncrvous statc bccausc ol thc arrival ol
supplics in thc Philippincs. nc MAG!C mcssagc had askcd
thc ]apancsc Consul Gcncral in Manila to chcck up immcdi
atcly on thc prcscncc ol Flying Fortrcsscs in thc Philippincs. Tc
]apancsc consul in Manila was also rcporting thc trcmcndous
unloading proccdurcs bcing carricd out at night and thc movc
mcnt ol things at night lrom thc docks, and cvcrybody barrcd
lrom thc vicinity. Marshall concludcd that thc ]apancsc wcrc in
a critical posturc as to what thcy must do to prcvcnt us lrom
building up lurthcr in thc Philippincs.
57

ur own bclicl, Marshall said,
was that, oncc wc got thc plancs out thcrc, and particularly
thcsc convoys that wcrc thcn on thc Pacic, which had, com
parcd to what thc Philippincs alrcady had, a wcalth ol matcrial
. . . thc ]apancsc would bc in an cxtrcmcly dclicatc stratcgical
56
!bid., part 29, p. 2329.
57
!bid., p. 2326.
position in trying to carry out any cntcrprisc to thc south ol
thc Philippincs.
58

Marshall rcalizcd that thc shipmcnts bcing rushcd out to thc
Philippincs must bc alarming ]apan. Nobody could look at that
|buildup|, hc told thc board,
without rcalizing that somcthing vcry critical was in thc wind.
ur grcat problcm was how to do thcsc things . . . thc shipmcnts,
and collccting thc mcans and gctting thcm out, particularly
to thc Philippincs, which passcd cntircly through Hawaii
without giving such noticc to thc ]apancsc that it would havc
an unlortunatc ccct in our stalling o this aair.
59

Tc ]oint 8oard ol thc Army and Navy conlcrcncc on Novcmbcr
3 had urgcd postponing hostilitics as long as possiblc. Tc
Novcmbcr 5 MarshallStark mcmorandum to FR had rccom
mcndcd that wc not issuc an ultimatum that might provokc ]apan
to attack.
60
Yct, on Novcmbcr 26, Hull had handcd thc ]apancsc
ambassadors thc U.S. ultimatum hc kncw thc ]apancsc govcrn
mcnt would not acccpt.
Vashingtons cycs appcarcd to bc glucd on thc Philippincs.
Troughout this timc, rclativcly littlc thought was givcn to Hawaii.
Furthcr conrmation ol Vashingtons ncglcct ol Pcarl Harbor
and its conccntration on thc Philippincs camc whcn Marshall
appcarcd bclorc thc board on Scptcmbcr 29, 1944. Hc was askcd
spccically about thc nc v.:. Mcssagc ol cccmbcr 7 and
his radiogram to Hawaii which had lclt Vashington shortly
altcr noon that day but was dclaycd in transit and lailcd to rcach
Pcarl Harbor until altcr thc attack. Gruncrt askcd Marshalls
|r|casons lor not using thc tclcphonc to inlorm Gcncral Short
58
!bid., p. 2327.
59
!bid., part 29, p. 2329.
60
!bid., part 14, pp. 106162, xhibit No. 16.
ol thc inlormation containcd in thc Chicl ol Stas radiogram
ol 7 cccmbcr 1941.
61
Marshall said that il hc had uscd thc
scramblcr phonc to rclay that mcssagc hc would ccrtainly havc
callcd MacArthur |in thc Philippincs| rst, and thcn ! would
havc callcd Panama Canal sccond. Hc had thought wc wcrc
opcn in a morc vulncrablc way in thc Panama Canal, than wc
wcrc in Hawaii.
62

Tc mcssagcs scnt Short in Hawaii had bccn tcrsc and rathcr
cryptic, advising him that
hostilitics bctwccn ]apan and Russia arc a strong possibility.
Sincc thc U.S. and 8ritain arc hcld rcsponsiblc by ]apan lor hcr
prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a possibility that ]apan
may attack thcsc two powcrs.
63

Short had bccn lcd to bclicvc, by thc urgcncy ol thc shipmcnts
passing through Hawaii to thc Philippincs, that Vashington
must havc had dcnitc rcasons lor bclicving that thc Philippinc
!slands wcrc thc U.S. tcrritory most scriously thrcatcncd by
]apancsc attack.
Ki::vi Tviis )nv APH8 Anou)
!:vov)~x) !x)viiicvxcv No) Svx)
Pv~vi H~vnov Co::~xbvvs
n Friday, August 25, scvcral days altcr Kimmcl tcsticd
bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry, hc was callcd to thc witncss
stand by thc APH8 which was going on concurrcntly. Hc was
askcd thc usual qucstions about his rclationship with Short and
othcr mattcrs pcrtaining to conditions bclorc thc attack.
64
Kimmcl
61
!bid., pp. 233031, Gruncrt lcttcr ol August 31, 1944.
62
!bid., p. 2313, part 27, p. 169.
63
!bid., part 14, p. 1327, Navy mcssagc #162203 ol ctobcr 16.
64
!bid., part 28, pp. 90948.
thcn discusscd intclligcncc. Hc said hc got inlormation lrom thc
Navy cpartmcnt . . . so lar as thc c cicncy ol thc ]apancsc Air
Forcc |was| conccrncd. 8ut his sourccs had thcn bccn limitcd lor
hc could not scnd pcoplc to thc Mandatcd !slands to discovcr
what thc ]apancsc wcrc doing thcrc. His
ordcrs wcrc not to go anywhcrc ncar thcm. . . . Vc wantcd to go
into thc Gilbcrts to makc somc survcys down thcrc . . . and thc
answcr was that wc should not cvincc any intcrcst in thc Gilbcrts,

bccausc thc ]aps might nd out that wc wcrc intcrcstcd.
65

!n any cvcnt, Kimmcl said, A movcmcnt such as that would
havc had to bc approvcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt. Kimmcl was
convinccd that no rcconnaissancc ol thc Mandatcs would havc
bccn pcrmittcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt at that timc.
66
Hc had
a statcmcnt to makc about thc inlormation which was supplicd
to thc two rcsponsiblc commandcrs in Hawaii. Hc and Short
had thoroughly considcrcd all such inlormation and had takcn
thc action which wc dccmcd appropriatc. Tcrc was no disagrcc
mcnt bctwccn thc Army and Navy and nonc bctwccn mc and my
pcrsonal adviscrs.
67

Howcvcr, Kimmcl said,
Sincc Pcarl Harbor inlormation has comc to my knowlcdgc
that vital inlormation in thc hands ol thc Var and Navy
cpartmcnts was not supplicd to rcsponsiblc o ccrs in Hawaii,
in particular, that thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts kncw that
]apan had sct a dcadlinc ol 25 Novcmbcr, latcr cxtcndcd to 29
Novcmbcr lor thc signing ol an agrccmcnt, altcr which thcy
would takc hostilc stcps against thc Unitcd Statcs, that on 26
Novcmbcr an ultimatum was dclivcrcd to ]apan by thc Unitcd
Statcs. Tis was donc notwithstanding a joint rccommcndation
65
!bid., p. 944, part 29, pp. 227981.
66
!bid., part 28, p. 945.
67
!bid., p. 946.
to thc prcsidcnt by Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark that
no ultimatum ol any kind should bc madc to ]apan.
Kimmcl said hc had bccn adviscd ol this rccommcndation and
had rcccivcd no qualication ol that inlormation. Morcovcr, hc
said hc had had no knowlcdgc ol thc dclivcry ol thc ultimatum
to ]apan on 26 Novcmbcr, 1941.
68

Furthcr, Kimmcl said, hc was
ccrtain that scvcral days prior to 7 cccmbcr, 1941, thcrc was
inlormation in thc Var cpartmcnt and thc Navy cpartmcnt
that ]apan would attack thc Unitcd Statcs and, vcry probably,
that thc attack would bc dircctcd against thc cct at Pcarl
Harbor, among othcr placcs, that thcrc was inlormation in thc
Var and Navy cpartmcnts on 6 cccmbcr, 1941, that thc
hour ol attack was momcntarily immincnt, and that carly on
7 cccmbcr, 1941, thc prccisc timc ol thc attack was known.
!t was known at lcast thrcc or probably lour hours bclorc thc
attack.
69

All this inlormation, Kimmcl said, was dcnicd to him and
to Short, yct hc lclt thcy wcrc cntitlcd to it. Hc had bclicvcd that
il thc Var and Navy dcpartmcnts had had such inlormation, thcy
would surcly havc lurnishcd it to thcm.
Had wc not bccn dcnicd this, many things would havc bccn
dicrcnt. Had wc bccn lurnishcd this inlormation as littlc as
two or thrcc hours bclorc thc attack, which was casily lcasiblc
and possiblc,
Kimmcl said, much could havc bccn donc.
70

Vhcn Kimmcl nishcd his statcmcnt, Gruncrt said, Somc
ol thc things to which you havc rclcrrcd may bccomc thc subjcct
68
!bid.
69
!bid., p. 947.
70
!bid.
ol lurthcr invcstigation bclorc thc 8oard is through and hc askcd
il Kimmcl would providc his sourcc. Kimmcl agrccd to coopcratc
to thc bcst ol my ability, in conlormity with thc rcstrictions which
|had| bccn imposcd upon mc.
71

Tc APH8 mcmbcrs could not thcn pursuc Kimmcls lcads
as thcy wcrc ying to San Francisco and Pcarl Harbor to qucs
tion othcr witncsscs. Kimmcls tcstimony raiscd ncw qucstions.
Gruncrt wrotc Marshall anothcr lcttcr saying hc wantcd to ask
Marshall about inlormation brought to thc attcntion ol thc
8oard, which it did not havc whcn you tcsticd bclorc.
72

APH8 Fiivs )o S~x Fv~xcisco ~xb H~w~ii
n routc to and lrom Hawaii,
73
thc 8oard stoppcd in San
Francisco to invcstigatc chargcs ol shoddy construction carricd
out lor thc Army by thc Hawaiian Constructors.
74
!n Hawaii, thc
board askcd Army o ccrs and local busincssmcn about Shorts
prcparations lor thc islands dclcnsc. Gcncrally spcaking, thcy
approvcd ol Shorts dclcnsc prcparations. And cxccpt lor a lcw
]apancsc conncctcd with thc consulatc, Amcrican busincssmcn
did not qucstion thc loyalty ol most cthnic ]apancsc.
75

Tc APH8 mcmbcrs lclt Hawaii lor Vashington on
Scptcmbcr 13
76
and rcsumcd thcir hcarings on Scptcmbcr 26.
nly whcn thcy wcrc back in Vashington wcrc thc Gruncrt
8oard mcmbcrs ablc to lollow up on Kimmcls rcvclations. And
thc board did not actually obtain copics ol thc documcnts on
which thcy wcrc bascd until ctobcr 6, whcn thc board was
71
!bid.
72
!bid., part 29, pp. 233031.
73
!bid., part 28, pp. 9511352.
74
!bid., part 29, pp. 200760.
75
Scc lor cxamplc, ibid., part 27, p. 414, and part 28, pp. 136465, 1369, 1382
83, 142023, and 1441.
76
!bid., part 28, pp. 13552003.
winding up its hcarings. !n vicw ol thc scnsitivity ol this matcrial,
and to salcguard thc condcntiality ol witncsscs, thcir rcmarks
wcrc not includcd in thc rcgular printcd hcarings but placcd in a
scparatc TP SCRT supplcmcnt.
77

A:n~ss~bov Gvvw vscvinvs
)nv Toxyo Si)u~)iox
]oscph C. Grcw had bccn U.S. ambassador to ]apan lrom ]unc
14, 1932, until cccmbcr 7. ncc thc two nations wcrc at war,
hc was placcd undcr housc arrcst and hcld until an cxchangc ol
diplomats could bc arrangcd. Grcw was qucstioncd about U.S.
]apancsc rclations in gcncral. |T|hc trcnd ol our rclations during
. . . thc ycars 1940 and 1941 was almost stcadily downhill. Grcw
thought that in thc cmbassy thcy had donc cvcrything possiblc
to arrcst that trcnd. . . . 8ut wc wcrc up against what ! would
call a tidal wavc ol military cxtrcmism in ]apan. . . . |N|ot
bcing a dclcatist by naturc, ! was unwilling to admit that war
was incvitablc, up to thc last minutc.
78

Grcw had warncd Vashington that cconomic cmbargocs
should not bc imposcd
until wc wcrc prcparcd to go all thc way through with whatcvcr
might rcsult lrom thosc cmbargocs. . . . ||ur rclations with
that country wcrc bound to go stcadily downhill and it might,
and probably would, cnd in war.
79

77
!bid., part 29, pp. 233357.
78
!bid., pp. 214344.
79
!bid., p. 2144.
And hc rcmindcd thc board, thcrc wcrc not only thc cmbargocs,
but also thc lrcczing ordcr and thc dcnunciation ol our trcaty and
commcrcc with ]apan.
80

Grcw thought thc attack must havc bccn a surprisc also to thc
civil authoritics in ]apan. !t was pcrlcctly possiblc, hc said, that
thc Cabinct was not inlormcd ol thc plans lor attacking Pcarl
Harbor.
81
Hc had had a convcrsation with Forcign Ministcr
Togo at hall past midnight on cccmbcr 7about thrcc hours
bclorc thc attackand was convinccd lrom thc naturc ol that
convcrsation that Mr. Togo did not at that momcnt know that
Pcarl Harbor was about to brcak. Grcw addcd:
Tat docs not lor a momcnt mcan that thcy wcrc not inlormcd
ol thc likclihood that undcr ccrtain circumstanccs war might
occur. l coursc, thcy kncw that, without any shadow ol doubt,
and Nomura and Kurusu kncw that, too. ! was rclcrring purcly
to thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, itscll.
82

Gvxvv~i Snov) R~isvs Movv uvs)ioxs
Altcr Short appcarcd bclorc thc APH8, hc askcd to bc
lurnishcd thc tcstimony ol othcr witncsscs and thc board had
agrccd.
83
Vhcn hc appcarcd again on Scptcmbcr 29,
84
hc said hc
was conccrncd about thc criticism lcvicd against thc Hawaiian
commandcrs bccausc thc attack had takcn thcm by surprisc. Tcy
wcrc not thc only oncs surpriscd, hc was convinccd thc attack had
bccn a surprisc to Vashington o cials also. n thc thcory that
80
!bid., p. 2152.
81
!bid., p. 2151.
82
!bid., p. 2154.
83
!bid., p. 2270, Major Gcncral Ulio, adjutant gcncral, August 24, 1944,
rcsponsc to Short.
84
!bid., p. 2251, Gruncrt statcmcnt.
actions spcak loudcr than words, hc pointcd to Vashingtons
prcattack actions. Hc rcmindcd thc board ol Vashingtons
constant dcnials ol rcqucsts lor incrcascs in pcrsonncl, lor
moncy lor thc improvcmcnt ol dclcnscs, and things likc scnd
ing out plancs |lrom Calilornia| thc night bclorc thc attack
without ammunitionall kinds ol things, that rcally wcrc
strongcr in thcir ccct than mcrc words.
Assuming that thcy wcrc acting in good laith, Short contin
ucd, you havc to arrivc at thc conclusion that thcy undoubtcdly
wcrc not contcmplating an air attack on Honolulu.
85

Tc Army had also bccn considcrcd ncgligcnt bccausc its radar
was not opcrational and had not warncd ol thc impcnding attack
that morning. Tat was not duc to thc commands ncgligcncc.
Rathcr, Short said, it was duc to a shortagc ol supplics lor thc
radar, such as vacuum tubcs, and so lorth. !n an ctobcr 1941
mcmorandum radar cquipmcnt had bccn rcqucstcd adcquatc to
opcratc 24 hours daily, but it had bccn radically cut back to allow
only two hours ol opcration pcr day. Vhy: 8ccausc, according to
thc Var cpartmcnt, thc Unitcd Statcs was not thrcatcncd with
attack.
86

Short raiscd thrcc important qucstions:
(1) Had thc APH8 lcarncd anything about thc codcd mcs
sagcs scvcral witncsscs had mcntioncd: For instancc, what was
thc basis lor ]usticc Robcrtss qucstion conccrning
A ]apancsc codc mcssagc . . . intcrccptcd and . . . brokcn down
by thc cpartmcnt in Vashington . . . which gavc ccrtain kcy
words which would bc ashcd ovcr thc radio dirccting thc
attack on Pcarl Harbor:
87

85
!bid., p. 2254.
86
!bid., part 29, p. 2261 (Powcll ctobcr 1941 mcmo to Short).
87
!bid., p. 2255. !n part 10, Short rcad lrom thc tcstimony bclorc thc Robcrts
Commission ol Licutcnant Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, assistant to thc
dcpartmcnt G2 in Honolulu, part 22, p. 192.
(2) Vhat ncw intclligcncc had promptcd Marshall to scnd
thc mcssagc conccrning thc ]apancsc dclivcry timc to thc cld
commandcrs at noon on cccmbcr 7:
88

(3) Vhat wcrc thc grounds lor Kimmcls statcmcnt to thc
board about inlormation availablc in Vashington during thc
crucial days bclorc thc attack, inlormation not lurnishcd Short
and Kimmcl:
89

Short was anxious to lcarn about thc codcd mcssagcs. Hc
had writtcn Stimson that vcry day asking that a scarch bc madc
. . . and that, il it |thc inlormation| is not to bc lound in thc
Var cpartmcnt lcs, that a dcmand bc madc on thc Navy lor
thc inlormation. . . .
90
Short lclt that all pcrtincnt cvidcncc
should bc madc availablc to thc board and to him, bccausc thc
Var cpartmcnt had not pcrmittcd him to havc a rcprcscntativc
attcnd thc APH8 hcarings and cxaminc witncsscs.
91
Howcvcr,
Shorts path to sccuring this inlormation wasnt casy. Vhcn hc
wrotc Sccrctary ol Var Stimson latcr (Scptcmbcr 29, 1944) ask
ing lor pcrmission to scc thc SCRT documcnts,
92
Stimson
agrccd that Shorts military counscl, 8rigadicr Gcncral Tomas
H. Grccn, should havc acccss to this matcrial (ctobcr 2, 1944).
93

Gruncrt tricd to countcrmand that pcrmission,
94
but thc Var
cpartmcnt rcluscd. Gruncrt was told to comply with thc
instructions ol thc Sccrctary ol Var as issucd
95
and to allow
Grccn to scc thc TP SCRT matcrial. 8ut Short was not
allowcd acccss. Grccn was cvcn askcd to sign a lcttcr swcar|ing|
88
!bid., part 29, p. 2257.
89
!bid., p. 2258.
90
!bid., p. 2259.
91
!bid., pp. 243435.
92
!bid.
93
!bid., p. 2435.
94
!bid., p. 2436.
95
!bid., pp. 243637.
that you havc bccn appropriatcly warncd rclating to thc military
sccurity conccrning thcsc mattcrs.
96
M~vsn~ii Rv:v:nvvs So:v vvx)s,
ovs No) Rvc~ii )nvvs
Vhcn Marshall appcarcd bclorc thc board again, hc was
askcd about thc qucstions in Gruncrts lcttcr ol August 31, 1944.
97

Marshall was askcd about thc ]apancscimposcd dcadlincs
Novcmbcr 25 at rst, thcn Novcmbcr 29. |T|hc rst datc ol thc
25th ol Novcmbcr . . . puzzlcd us grcatly, Marshall said.
|T|hc only thing that wc could think ol at thc momcnt was . . .
that on that day thc antiComintcrn pact cxpircd. . . . uring
all this pcriod thc ]apancsc had bccn involvcd in actions in thc
China thcatcr and towards !ndoChina, which indicatcd . . .
that thcy wcrc cithcr about to cmbark on a war in thc Malaysia
arca, at lcast, or wcrc in thc proccss ol carrying out vcry dirc
inltration opcrations. . . . Howcvcr, wc latcr rcccivcd inlorma
tion lrom our sccrct sourccs . . . that thc datc had bccn cxtcndcd
to thc 29th ol Novcmbcr. Tat, in our vicw, wipcd out any
thought that thc original datc ol thc 25th ol Novcmbcr pcr
taincd to thc antiComintcrn pact. . . . Novcmbcr 29th arrivcd
and passcd, and wc cntcrcd into cccmbcr without anything
happcning othcr than thc continuation ol thcsc movcmcnts,
which wc could lollow lairly wcll, down thc China coast and
!ndoChina and hcadcd quitc plainly towards Tailand and
thc Gull ol Siam.
|!|n all thc past proccdurcs ol thc ]apancsc, thcy had takcn vcry
bold mcasurcs . . . on thc assumption, ! prcsumcthat thcy
could gct away with thcm without thc Unitcd Statcs cntcring
into war. Tcir lccling, so ncarly as wc could dctcrminc, was
onc that thc Unitcd Statcs would not participatc in a war and
96
!bid., pp. 243738.
97
!bid., pp. 233031, Gruncrt August 31, 1944, lcttcr to Marshall.
thcy could takc advantagc ol that by doing things that othcr
wisc would immcdiatcly provokc a statc ol war.
98

Troughout Novcmbcr, Marshall and Stark wcrc urging thc
administration to postponc any conlrontation with thc ]apancsc
until thcy could build up thcir Philippinc dclcnscs. Tc 8ritish,
prcoccupicd at homc with thcir strugglc against Gcrmany, wcrc
ovcrcxtcndcd and wantcd to avoid opcn conict with thc ]apancsc.
Yct thc cmbargo on oil to ]apan, with thc coopcration ol thc
8ritish and utch, impcrilcd thc ]apancsc. Also thc rcopcning
ol thc 8urma Road by thc 8ritish madc it casicr lor China to
bc provisioncd, and this was a thorn in thc sidc ol thc ]apancsc.
Marshall said hc bclicvcd that thc ]apancsc
wcrc going ahcad to gct in as strong a position as possiblc, on
thc assumption that thc rcluctancc ol thc Unitcd Statcs and
thc rcluctancc ol thc 8ritish Govcrnmcnt in its dilcmma ol thc
momcnt would pcrmit thcm to cstablish thcmsclvcs.
99
Hc thought
thc ]apancsc wcrc capitalizing on thc bclicl that it would bc
vcry di cult to bring our pcoplc into a willingncss to cntcr thc
war. Tat, incidcntally, was somcwhat conrmcd by thc govcrn
mcntal policy on our part ol making ccrtain that thc ovcrt act
should not bc attributcd to thc Unitcd Statcs, bccausc ol thc
statc ol public mind at that timc. l coursc, no onc anticipatcd
that that ovcrt act would bc thc crippling ol thc Pacic Flcct.
Marshall bclicvcd Tat thc ]apancsc wcrc going to takc cvcry
conccivablc advantagc and nally would rcach thc point whcrc
98
!bid., pp. 230809.
99
!bid., p. 2309.
thcy could salcly dcclarc war, involvc us in war, and gct all thc
othcr things thcy wcrc altcr.
100

8y thc lall ol 1941, Marshall said, hc had comc to thc con
clusion that war with ]apan was incvitablc. Prudcncc dictatcd
that warnings bc scnt by thc Var cpartmcnt to thosc o ccrs
rcsponsiblc lor thc dclcnsc ol all our arcas within rcach ol ]apancsc
action. Howcvcr, inlormation availablc in thc Var cpartmcnt
lcd him to bclicvc that any ]apancsc attack would takc placc in
thc vicinity ol thc Malay Pcninsula and thc Philippincs.
101
Hc
wasnt particularly conccrncd about Hawaii, cspccially as hc con
sidcrcd it bcttcr supplicd and bcttcr prcparcd to dclcnd itscll than
othcr U.S. outposts.
102

APH8 board mcmbcr Gcncral Russcll qucstioncd Marshall
on various points Kimmcl had raiscd. Marshall admittcd to hav
ing no rccollcction ol thc scvcral advanccd warnings rcccivcd in
Vashington. Hc did not rccall having lcarncd that Novcmbcr 29,
Tokyo timc, was dcnitcly thc govcrning datc lor ocnsivc mili
tary opcrations ol somc naturc. Hc had no rccollcction ol any
mcssagcs on Novcmbcr 26, cccmbcr 1, and cccmbcr 4 giving
spccic cvidcncc ol ]apans intcntion to wagc an ocnsivc war
against both 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs.
103

Marshall rccallcd somcthing about a Vinds Codc sctup
and thc alcrting ol our codc clcrks to listcn lor thc crucial words.
8ut, hc said,
Coloncl 8ratton was unablc to nd that aour rccords do
not show that a ]apancsc mcssagc using thc Vinds codc was
intcrccptcd by thc F.C.C. or thc Army Signal Corps until altcr
Pcarl Harbor.
100
!bid., p. 2326.
101
!bid., p. 2328.
102
!bid., pp. 2317, 2318.
103
!bid., p. 2321.
Howcvcr, hc admittcd that it did appcar lrom thc rccord,
that a ]apancsc mcssagc using thc Vinds codc had bccn intcr
ccptcd. Tis indicatcd, Marshall said, that ]apancscGrcat
8ritain rclations wcrc to bc brokcn. Marshall didnt mcntion a
possiblc brcak in ]apancscU.S. rclations.
104
Russcll notcd this was
thc Army intcrprctation. Hc said,
Tc Navy pcoplc say that thc cxccutivc ordcr |thc Vinds
xccutc| whcncvcr it camc inand thcy allcgcd it camc in on
thc 3rd |sic| ol cccmbcr . . . mcant that war was coming with
thc Unitcd Statcs and with 8ritain, but not with Russia.
105

Marshall had undcrstood lrom 8ratton that thc intclligcncc o
ccrs in Hawaii wcrc privy to thc inlormation about thc Vinds
Codc mcssagc.
106

Anothcr important mattcr which Marshall did not rcmcmbcr
rclatcd to thc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply to our ulti
matum. According to Kimmcls statcmcnt, thcy wcrc rcccivcd
during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall said was hc was
unawarc ol this.
107

Rcsponding to Gruncrts qucstion as to whcn on cccmbcr 7
Marshall had lcarncd thc prccisc timc ol thc attack, hc rcvicwcd
his cccmbcr 7 morning movcmcntshis carly horscback ridc,
his arrival at his Var cpartmcnt o cc about 11 ~.:., his mcct
ing with Milcs, Gcrow, and 8ratton, his discovcry ol thc long
14part ]apancsc mcssagc, and, nally, thc nc v.:. Mcssagc.
Somcthing was going to happcn at 1:00, it was quitc cvidcnt to
us. Altcr digcsting all this matcrial, Marshall draltcd thc mcs
sagc that wcnt out to thc cld commandcrs at noon.
108
104
!bid., p. 2324.
105
!bid., pp. 2323, 2325.
106
!bid., pp. 232425.
107
!bid., p. 2320.
108
!bid., pp. 2310, 2311.
According to Marshall, hc had comc to thc conclusion about
Novcmbcr 1 that war with ]apan was incvitablc. Conccrning thc
TP SCRT inlormation known to top Vashington o cials,
hc admittcd that to havc scnt this intclligcncc to thc command
ing gcncrals ol thc ovcrscas dcpartmcnts by couricr or othcrwisc,
thcrcby avoiding thc dangcr ol cxposing thc codcs that ! was
striving so diligcntly to protcct, would havc bccn both practical
and lcasiblc. n thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, whcn conlrontcd
with incontcstablc cvidcncc that ]apan was planning somc dc
nitc action that vcry day at 1:00 v.:. Vashington timc, Marshall
said it would havc bccn possiblc to notily thc commandcrs by a
morc rapid mcthod than thc codcd radio mcssagc actually dis
patchcd at noon that day. 8ut hc lclt thcn that that would havc
bccn unwisc.
109
Morcovcr, Marshall was convinccd that Short
had bccn scnt su cicnt inlormation and that hc had adcquatc
wcapons, ammunition, and othcr mcans lor thc dischargc ol his
dclcnsivc mission in thc protcction ol thc !sland ol ahu.
110

Marshall apologizcd lor not bcing bcttcr prcparcd to answcr
thc boards qucstions, but as chicl ol sta hc had bccn busy with
thc war with ]apan and Gcrmany and had not bccn ablc to kccp
up on thc Pcarl Harbor situation.
111

Tcrc wcrc still morc qucstions thc board wantcd to pur
suc with Marshall, who plcadcd prcssurc ol othcr busincss
appointmcnts with a Chincsc o cial, thc combincd Chicls ol
Sta, thc U.S. Chicls ol Sta, thc ambassador going to Francc.
And condcntially hc was lcaving lor Francc himscll thc ncxt
Tucsday.
112
Gruncrt said il it appcars ncccssary, thc 8oard might
ask Marshall lor anothcr hour carly ncxt wcck.
113
Tc ncxt day,
109
!bid., p. 2328.
110
!bid., pp. 2313, 2319.
111
!bid., p. 2329.
112
!bid., pp. 232930.
113
!bid.
Saturday, Scptcmbcr 30, thc board scnt Marshall still morc qucs
tions.
114
!n thc mcantimc, two important witncsscs tcsticd
Army couricr Coloncl Rulus 8ratton and Navy Captain L.F.
Saord.
Coioxvi 8v~))ox Tvs)ivivs Anou)
]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s
At thc timc ol thc attack, Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton had bccn
Chicl, Far astcrn Scction G2 and Army Couricr. Vhcn tcsti
lying bclorc thc APH8,
115
hc rclcrrcd to a mcmorandum writ
tcn cccmbcr 10 dctailing thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 7,
116
and to
a Summary ol Far astcrn ocumcnts, bascd on documcnts
lrom 19371941 and compilcd August 1943 by thc Far astcrn
scction, intclligcncc group, and by Var cpartmcnts G2.

!t had
bccn compilcd lor submission to thc Army chicl ol sta and thc
prcsidcnt. 8ratton was convcrsant with thc ]apancsc languagc.
117

Although hc had not bccn involvcd with thc actual intcrccption
and dccoding ol thc ]apancsc mcssagcs on which that Summary
had bccn bascdthat had bccn thc rcsponsibility ol thc Armys
Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc (S.!.S.) and thc Navys cc ol Naval
!ntclligcncc (.N.!.)hc had sccn all sccrct mcssagcs rclating
to thc ]apancsc situation rcccivcd by thc Var cpartmcnt.
118
!n
August 1940, U.S, cryptographcrs had succccdcd in dcciphcring
thc ]apancsc diplomatic codc, which bccamc known as purplc,
and cvcr sincc thcn wc had bccn rcading many, il not most, ol
thc ]apancsc intcrccpts transmittcd in this codc. Tc intclligcncc
dcrivcd lrom this sourcc was considcrcd so valuablc that it had
bccn codcnamcd MAG!C. Much ol thc inlormation Kimmcl
114
!bid., pp. 241315.
115
!bid., pp. 233555.
116
!bid., pp. 234647.
117
!bid., p. 2338.
118
!bid., p. 2335.
rclcrrcd to, that had not bccn lurnishcd thc Pcarl Harbor com
mandcrs, had comc lrom MAG!C.
According to 8ratton, tight sccurity maintaincd in thc distri
bution ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts.
As to thc intcrccpts, and translations ol ]apancsc intcrccpts,
thcy wcrc handlcd in a spccial way. . . . !n 1941, ccrtainly in
thc lattcr part ol it, ! was thc custodian and thc disscminator
ol this typc ol intclligcncc. . . . Tc translations, madc cithcr in
thc Signal Corps S!S scction or in thc corrcsponding scction ol
Naval Communications wcrc scnt to mc in scxtuplct, six copics
ol cach onc. ut ol thc mass ol matcrial . . . say 10 to 20 pcrccnt
was ol intclligcncc valuc, thc rcmaindcr dcalt with administra
tivc or pcrsonal mattcrs . . . and that matcrial ! dcstroycd by
burning. Tc rcmaining imsics containing military intclli
gcncc ol valuc to our Govcrnmcnt o cials was arrangcd in
cardboard loldcrs which in turn wcrc placcd in lockcd dispatch
cascs, onc lor thc Sccrctary ol Statc. onc lor thc Sccrctary ol
Var, onc lor thc Chicl ol Sta, onc lor thc AC ol S, G2, and
onc lor thc AC ol S, VP.
! dclivcrcd thcsc pouchcs in pcrson to thc o ccrs conccrncd,
who had kcys to thc pouchcs. . . . ! collcctcd all ol thcsc pouchcs
on my ncxt visit, or on my ncxt round thc lollowing day, and
dcstroycd thc contcnts ol thcm by burning and rctaining in my
lc a complctc copy ol cvcrything that had bccn sccn by all ol
thcsc o cials.
119

Tc critical mcssagcs scnt by G2, in Novcmbcr and carly
cccmbcr, 1941: Tc translatcd intcrccpts, you rclcr to, arc on
lc in G2, Var cpartmcnt.
120

uring this pcriod, 8ratton said,
119
!bid., pp. 245051.
120
!bid., p. 2417.
thc prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var,
thc Chicl, thc AC ol S G2, and thc Chicl ol thc Var Plans
ivision all saw thc samc matcrial, thcy all rcad thc samc trans
lations, as last as ! could gct thcm to thcm.
121

Tcsc matcrials
did not go out to thc cld. . . . Vc lclt considcrably hampcrcd
in G2 by two rcstrictions that wcrc placcd upon us. Tc rst !
havc mcntioncd as thc policy which prcvcntcd us lrom giving
out intclligcncc to G2s in tactical units or in ovcrscas dcpart
mcnt, which might havc thc ccct ol bringing about opcra
tional rcsults. Tc othcr rcstriction was imposcd on us by thc
Navy, who rcluscd to allow us to scnd any ol this intcrccpt
intclligcncc out to any ol our pcoplc in thc cld ovcr Army nct,
using any Army codc ciphcr . . . lcar ol thc ]apancsc brcaking
our Army codc, and nding out that wc wcrc rcading thcir
own. !t was a sccurity mcasurc.
122

8ratton tcsticd that on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, bctwccn
8:30 and 9:00 ~.:., hc had rcccivcd thc short ]apancsc nglish
languagc intcrccpt rclating to thc dcstruction ol thc codc
machincs and thc dclivcry ol thc ultimatum. Hc rcalizcd this was
about thc most important mcssagc hc had rcccivcd during this
pcriod and immcdiatcly phoncd Marshalls quartcrs.
123
8ratton
was told Marshall had gonc horscback riding. Hc rcqucstcd his
|Marshalls| ordcrly to go out and nd him at oncc and ask him
to call . . . as soon as practicablc, as |hc| had an important mcs
sagc to dclivcr to him. !n spitc ol thc urgcncy ol thc mcssagc, it
was not until somctimc bctwccn tcn and clcvcn that Marshall
rcturncd 8rattons call. 8ratton thcn told Marshall that hc had a
mcssagc ol cxtrcmc importancc which hc should scc at oncc and
121
!bid., p. 2451.
122
!bid., p. 2453
123
!bid., pp. 234445.
ocrcd to bring it out to Marshalls quartcrs. Marshall told him
to rcport to him in his o cc.
124

Marshall arrivcd in his o cc at about 11:25. Tcn nally,
almost thrcc hours altcr this mcssagc ol cxtrcmc importancc
had bccn rcccivcd, 8ratton was ablc to show it to Marshall.
Marshall discusscd it with 8ratton, Milcs, and Gcrow, who wcrc
prcscnt. Tcy thought it probablc that thc ]apancsc linc ol action
would bc into Tailand but that it might bc into any onc or morc
ol a numbcr ol othcr arcas.
125
Marshall thcn radiocd thc Army
cld commandcrs by thc lastcst possiblc salc mcans, giving thc
Philippincs rst priority,
126
advising thcm ol thc 1 v.:. dcadlinc,
and tclling thcm to bc on thc alcrt accordingly.
127
Tis was thc
mcssagc that rcachcd Pcarl Harbor in thc altcrnoon, hours altcr
thc attack had cndcd.
Tc APH8 wantcd to know whcthcr or not thc Vinds Codc
sctup had cvcr bccn cxccutcd, i.c., implcmcntcd. 8ratton had
known that thc FCC had bccn looking lor such a mcssagc and hc
rcmcmbcrcd talking about wcathcr mcssagcs with Coloncl Sadtlcr,
Navy Licutcnant Kramcr and Navy Commandcr McCollum. 8ut
his mcmory was vaguc. Hc did rcmcmbcr talking with Sadtlcr on
thc morning ol cccmbcr 5, who said somcthing about a mcs
sagc that had comc through indicating a brcak bctwccn ]apan and
Grcat 8ritain. 8ratton did not rcmcmbcr sccing bclorc thc attack
an implcmcntation, a Vinds Codc xccutc, with rclcrcncc to
a ]apancscUnitcd Statcs brcak.
128
Howcvcr, hc did rcmcmbcr,
vagucly, sccing a Vinds xccutc rclcrring to a ]apancscU.S.
brcak in rclations after thc attack.
129
124
!bid., p. 2346.
125
!bid.
126
!bid., p. 2344.
127
!bid., part 14, p. 1334, Marshall radio mcssagc #529 to Hawaii.
128
!bid., part 29, pp. 2338, 2341.
129
!bid., p. 2341.
APH8 mcmbcrs Russcll and Gruncrt thcn askcd 8ratton
how it would acct thc ]apancsc il thcy lcarncd thcn1944
that wc had intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc mcssagc in 1941. Hc
did not bclicvc thosc codc words wcrc bcing uscd by thc ]apancsc
today. Hc was thcn askcd il thc ]apancsc kncw wc had intcr
ccptcd thcsc mcssagcs and had brokcn that codc bclorc thc war,
would it givc thcm any inlormation as to whcthcr or not wc had
brokcn thc codc thcy arc using today.
Bratton: h, ycs, sir, it would, bccausc thcsc codc phrascs arc a
codc within a ciphcr. . . . Tc wholc mcssagc about this Vinds
signal was in a vcry sccrct ciphcr. . . .
Grunert: And thcy arc continung to usc that ciphcr: . . .
Tcrclorc, thc dangcr that any lcak ol this thing might acct
thc war cort cxists now as it has in thc past:
Bratton: Ycs, sir.
130

n this point, Navy Captain Saord atly disagrccd, as thc
APH8 soon lcarncd.
C~v)~ix L.F. S~vvovb vscvinvs )nv
]~v~xvsv Vixbs Cobv !x)vvcvv)s
As hcad ol thc communications sccurity division, naval
opcrations, in 1941, Saord had bccn much involvcd with naval
intclligcncc inlormation.
131
Hc rcmcmbcrcd many dctails lrom
1941. Howcvcr, whcn tcstilying bclorc thc APH8 on ctobcr
2, hc consultcd a rccord ol thc intcrccpts prcparcd morc rcccntly
(Novcmbcrcccmbcr 1943 and ]anuaryMarch 1944) lrom
original sourccs borrowcd lrom P20G, i.c., thc communica
tion intclligcncc scction, or communication division, ol Naval
130
!bid., pp. 234041.
131
!bid., pp. 2361400.
pcrations.
132
Russcll askcd Saord about his statcmcnt bclorc
Harts invcstigation that wc had rcccivcd on Novcmbcr 26 spc
cic cvidcncc ol ]apans intcntions to wagc an ocnsivc war
against both 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs. Saord rcplicd that
this mcssagc, S.!.S. No. 25392,
said that ]apan would announcc hcr intcntions in rcgard to
war or possibly brcaking o diplomatic rclations with Russia,
ngland including thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, and thc Unitcd
Statcs by mcans ol a word scnt vc timcs in thc middlc and at
thc cnd ol thcir inlormation broadcast.
Saord continucd, n Novcmbcr 28th, 1941, wc rcad anothcr
mcssagc . . . giving a Vinds codc to bc uscd in thcir voicc
broadcasts.
133
Vc had vcrication ol this Vinds Codc sctup
lrom othcr sourccsHart (Manila), Singaporc, 8atavia (N!),
and our intcrccpt station in thc statc ol Vashington.
134

Russell: |T|cll us about thc lollowup on this codc . . . whcthcr
or not on or about cccmbcr 4th you did rcccivc inlorma
tion which indicatcd that thc ]apancsc mpirc had cmploycd
this codc and thc intcrccptcd mcssagcs indicatcd nal dcci
sions accting thc Unitcd Statcs, Russia, 8ritain, onc or morc
ol thcsc powcrs.
Saord: Ycs, sir, wc did. Tat was rcccivcd in thc morning ol
Tursday, cccmbcr 4, 1941. !t was rcccivcd about 8:00. . . by
tclctypc. ! saw it whcn ! rst camc to thc o cc . . . thc writing
at thc bottom in lcad pcncil in Kramcrs handwriting, Var
with ngland, war with Amcrica, pcacc with Russia. Tc
mcssagc as rcccivcd was not thc way wc cxpcctcd it, bccausc
132
!bid., pp. 2362, 2367.
133
!bid., pp. 236768.
134
!bid., pp. 236871.
thcy had mixcd up thcir voicc proccdurc with thc Morsc codc
mcssagc.
135

istribution ol this Vinds xccutc was madc, not only
in accordancc with thc spccial arrangcmcnts sct up by Noycs ol
naval communications, but also in thc usual lashion, through thc
war and navy dcpartmcnts.
And also ! know that in thc Navy cpartmcnt that copy
was distributcd around noon, in conncction with thc daily
routinc distribution ol translations, and that wcnt to thc
Chicl ol Naval pcrations |Stark|, Assistant Chicl ol Naval
pcrations |!ngcrsoll|, ircctor ol Naval Communications
|Noycs|, ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc |Vilkinson|, and thc
ircctor ol Var Plans ivision |Turncr|, also wcnt to thc Statc
cpartmcnt and to thc Vhitc Housc.
136

Saord was positivc as to thc datc whcn thc Vinds xccutc
camc in bccausc its rcccipt had promptcd him to scnd lour mcs
sagcs that vcry day, bctwccn 3:00 v.:. and 3:19 v.:., to thc naval
attachs at Tokyo, Pciping, 8angkok, and Shanghai, dirccting
thcm to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial lcs cxccpt thosc csscn
tial lor currcnt purposcs and all othcr papcrs which in thc hands
ol an cncmy would bc a disadvantagc to thc Unitcd Statcs.
137

Saord bclicvcd that all thc Army S.!.S. mcssagcs hc had bccn
dcscribing wcrc in thc custody ol thc Armys G2, gcncral sta,
and that thc samc mcssagcs, lcd by thcir Navy numbcrs, wcrc
at 20G, thc Navys communication anncxexcept for the imple-
mentation of the Winds Code. Unlortunatcly, wc cannot nd
any writtcn rccord ol thc |Vinds xccutc| mcssagc, in spitc ol
135
!bid., p. 2371.
136
!bid., p. 2372.
137
!bid., p. 2397, PNA\ dispatch #042019. Scc also part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc
#040330, supplcmcnting #042019, which is not includcd with othcr Navy
cpartmcnt dispatchcs to cld o ccrs in xhibit No. 37, ibid., part 14.
having lookcd now lor morc than six months.
138
And thcrc was
no way to tracc it bccausc all thc station logs unlortunatcly had
bccn dcstroycd somctimc during 43, which was |m|orc or lcss
Standard pcrating Proccdurc whcn a govcrnmcnt o cc movcd
or cxpandcd.
139

Morc important in Gruncrts vicw than thc Vinds xccutc
itscll was whcthcr thc war cort in 1944 would sucr il thc
]apancsc lcarncd that wc had intcrccptcd and dcciphcrcd this
mcssagc in 1941. Russcll dcscribcd thc dilcmma:
|T|hc 8oard is dcbating thc ccct on thc war cort ol a public
disclosurc ol thc contcnts ol thc Vinds mcssagc. Assuming
that thc ]apancsc mpirc kncw that thc Amcrican Govcrnmcnt
was in posscssion ol thosc lacts which arc containcd in that
Vinds mcssagc, would it . . . causc thcm to makc changcs
which would makc it morc di cult lor us to obtain ]apancsc
inlormation now:
Vhcn qucstioncd, 8ratton had said it would. Saord
disagrccd.
No, sir, not thc Vinds mcssagc or this othcr socallcd hiddcn
word or stopcodc mcssagc. Tc sctup lor thosc two was scnt
in what thcy call a lowgradc ciphcr hcld by all thcir Consuls.
vcrybody was solving that. Tc utch solvcd it, thc 8ritish
solvcd it in Singaporc, and wc solvcd it oursclvcsboth ol
thcmand thcy must know that wc havc bccn rcading thosc
mcssagcs, and ! bclicvc that that particular systcm is not in usc
any morc, anyhow. !t is not thc highclass machinc which is a
litcral gold minc at thc prcscnt timc. Tc othcr stu it would
bc vcry bad to lct public.
140

138
!bid., part 29, pp. 237172.
139
!bid., pp. 236873.
140
!bid., pp. 239293.
8y this othcr stu, Saord mcant thc dcclaration ol war,
i.c., thc 14part rcply to our ultimatum that thc ]apancsc scnt
cccmbcr 67, and thcir cccmbcr 7 nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tat,
Saord said, is in thcir |highclass, purplc| machinc which
thcy think no onc can rcad, and thcy arc still talking thcir lool
hcads o in it, particularly lrom Gcrmany.
141

vcn though thc Vinds xccutc had bccn scnt in thc
lowgradc ciphcr, Saord said it was cxtrcmcly signicant.
8y announcing thc immincncc ol a brcak in rclations, or ol
an outbrcak ol war, with thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain, ]apan
was cxplaining thc rcason lor hcr Novcmbcr 25 dcadlinc, latcr
changcd to Novcmbcr 29. And thc dcadlinc showcd that thc
brcak in rclations it portcndcd was not just talk. Tus thc Vinds
xccutc madc thc dcadlinc mcssagc mcan a lot morc, and thc
dcadlinc mcssagc madc that |thc Vinds Codc xccutc| mcan a
lot morc.
142

Saord told thc APH8 that wc kncw lrom ]apancsc intcr
ccpts pickcd up cccmbcr 1 and 3, 1941 that ]apancsc cmbas
sics and consulatcs in London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, Manila,
8atavia, and Vashington had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs,
ciphcrs, and codc machincs. |T|his dcstruction ol codcs immcdi
atcly thrcw thc Vinds mcssagc into promincncc, Saord said.
8clorc, wc couldnt undcrstand why thcy had this |Vinds
Codc| sctup arrangcd. !t sccmcd a loolish thing to do . . .
but thcy had this in mind, ! think: Vcll, all right, onc stcp
short ol war. Tcy arc dcstroying thcir codcs to play salc, but
thcy arc still rcscrving thc dccision as to pcacc or war to comc
in thc Vinds mcssagc, which was thc rcason that, lrom
thc rst on, wc thought thc Vinds mcssagc was so highly
important, and yct that inlormation did not gct out to cithcr
141
!bid.
142
!bid., p. 2370.
CommandcrinChicl Pacic Flcct or CommandcrinChicl
Asiatic Flcct until 48 hours altcr wc had thc ncws.
143

Saord had rccognizcd thc signicancc ol thc Vinds Codc
xccutc at thc timc. Howcvcr, his rcsponsibilitics wcrc limitcd
to communications security. Tc cvaluation |ol a mcssagc| was
out ol my hands, and that is a lunction ol Naval !ntclligcncc.
144

Tus, Saord had locuscd his cccmbcr 4 mcssagcs to thc naval
attachs ncccssarily on thc issuc ol security.
Gruncrt thcn turncd to anothcr subjcct. Saord had indi
catcd . . . that at somctimc in thc not too distant past it was not
intcndcd to givc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry and thc Army 8oard
ccrtain sccrct inlormation. Had spccial instructions bccn issucd
to that ccct:
Tat was rathcr a long story, Saord said. Hc cxplaincd
that Kimmcl had askcd to scc thc Hart rcport. n thc basis ol
inlormation rcvcalcd thcrc, Kimmcl had rcqucstcd pcrmission
lor his counscl, Captain Lavcndcr, to inspcct all thc lcs out at
20G, communications intclligcncc lcs, to scc what inlormation
had bccn in cxistcncc in thc Navy cpartmcnt. Lavcndcr had
bccn pcrmittcd to scc thc lcs and had thcn askcd lor copics
ol about 60 mcssagcs. Tc dcpartmcnt had asscmblcd thc intcr
ccpts, turncd thcm ovcr to thc dircctor ol naval communications,
and noticd S.!.S. S.!.S. had protcstcd. Tc assistant sccrctary ol
thc Navy, Ralph A. 8ard, had also disapprovcd ol thcir rclcasc.
8ut whcn Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, thcn in London, rcturncd
to Vashington, hc rcvcrscd that dccision and dircctcd that thc
intcrccpts bc madc availablc to thc NC!. 8ut thc APH8 had not
obtaincd copics. Saord suggcstcd thcy put in a rcqucst to thc
sccrctary ol thc Navy.
145
143
!bid., pp. 239697.
144
!bid., p. 2379.
145
!bid., p. 2375.
M~vsn~ii vvvxbs Govvvx:vx)s Poiicy ov
Svcvvcy, ovsx) Rvc~ii !:vov)~x) ocu:vx)s
n Monday, ctobcr 2, 1944, Marshall rcturncd oncc morc
to thc APH8 to answcr qucstions poscd in thc boards Scptcmbcr
30 lcttcr. Hc cxplaincd that it was considcrcd csscntial at all cost
to prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom lcarning that ]apancsc intcrccpts wcrc
our sourcc ol sccrct inlormation. Var and Navy dcpartmcnt pol
icy conccrning sccrct, ultrasccrct inlormation dircctcd that No
action is to bc takcn on inlormation hcrcin rcportcd, rcgardlcss
ol tcmporary advantagc, il such action might havc thc ccct ol
rcvcaling thc cxistcncc ol thc sourcc to thc cncmy. According to
Marshall,
thcrc havc bccn cascs whcrc convoys havc bccn pcrmittcd to
go into thc most scrious situations rathcr than divcrting thcm
lrom thc asscmblagc ol thc socallcd woll packs bccausc ol thc
lcar that that would convcy to thc Gcrmans that wc had somc
mcans ol knowing just how this was managcd.
Apparcntly, Marshall continucd, thc ]apancsc thought wc
wcrc obtaining knowlcdgc ol thcsc convoy movcmcnts lrom
spics and obscrvation posts. So long as thcy did, wc lclt lrcc to
go ahcad.
|8|ut il thcrc is any dangcr ol our giving away our sourccs,
thcn wc would havc to hold o somcwhat on scizing cach
opportunity, lor lcar wc would losc trcmcndous longtcrm
advantagcs.
146

Marshall bclicvcd hc had bccn kcpt lully inlormcd by thc
Statc cpartmcnt on thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc rclations bctwccn
thc ]apancsc mpirc and thc Amcrican Govcrnmcnt. vcn so,
hc couldnt rcmcmbcr somc important cvcnts. Hc didnt rccall
146
!bid., p. 2403.
thc dcpartmcnts Novcmbcr 26, 1941, mcmorandum, or ultima
tum, rcjccting ]apans proposal lor a modus vivendi. Nor did hc
rcmcmbcr Sccrctary ol Statc Hulls rcmark to Sccrctary ol Var
Stimson thc ncxt morning to thc ccct that Hull had brokcn o
discussions with thc ]apancsc: ! havc washcd my hands ol it and
it is now in thc hands ol you |Stimson| and Knox, thc Army and
Navy.
147
Marshall admittcd, howcvcr, that hc
must havc known on thc 26th ol Novcmbcr that thc ncgo
tiations wcrc ncaring an impassc, bccausc Admiral Stark and
! cvidcntly dircctcd thc prcparation ol a dralt ol thc 27th ol
Novcmbcr warning on that day, thc 26th.
148
Marshall didnt rcmcmbcr thc Var cpartmcnts Novcmbcr
27 warning to Short (#472) advising that Ncgotiations with
]apan appcar to bc tcrminatcd and asking Short to rcport
mcasurcs takcn.
149
Nor did hc rcmcmbcr Shorts sabotagc
alcrt rcply (#959). And hc had not rcalizcd that his lailurc to
rcspond to Shorts sabotagc alcrt, admittcdly inappropriatc lor
dclcnsc against attack, mcant that it had obtaincd during thc
cntirc pcriod 27 Novcmbcr6 cccmbcr inclusivc. Marshall was
lorccd to admit that Vashingtons Novcmbcr 27 warning did
not accomplish thc dcsircd rcsults
150
ol dclcnding Pcarl Harbor
against attack.
Pcrhaps most astonishing ol all, howcvcr, was that Marshall
still maintaincd that hc had hcard nothing at all prior to thc
morning ol cccmbcr 7 about thc ]apancsc rcply to thc U.S.
Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum. Tis in spitc ol thc lact that thc rst
13 parts ol that rcply had bccn dclivcrcd to thc Vhitc Housc and
thc Statc cpartmcnt and wcrc in thc hands ol somc agcncy
147
!bid., p. 2402.
148
!bid., p. 2405.
149
!bid., p. 2402.
150
!bid., pp. 240405.
ol thc Var cpartmcnt during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6.
Marshall bclicvcd that it was
not . . . until ! was bclorc thc Navy Court hcrc rcccntly that
! kncw this had comc in, had bccn madc availablc to thc
Sccrctary ol Statc, thc largcr portion ol that mcssagc, thc night
bclorc.
151

Russcll pointcd out to Marshall:
Tc cvidcncc which is bclorc thc 8oard at this timc is to thc
ccct that as carly as 8:30, possibly not latcr than 9:00 ~.:.,
on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7th, thc mcssagc which indi
catcd that thc ultimatum would bc dclivcrcd by thc ]apancsc
Ambassadors at 1:00 on that day, and that thc codc machincs
wcrc bcing dcstroycd, was in thc hands ol a Coloncl. . . . 8ratton
ol G2.
8rattons cncrgics lrom thc timc hc rcccivcd that mcssagc wcrc
dcvotcd cxclusivcly to trying to locatc Marshall and Milcs.
152
Yct
Marshall couldnt bc rcachcd lor a couplc ol hours, not until hc
nally arrivcd in his o cc at about 11:30 ~.:. Tc situation was
lurthcr complicatcd by thc lact that thc Army apparcntly had
no clcar plan lor handling cmcrgcncics whcn Marshall was not
availablc.
153
Morcovcr, this was a mcssagc, APH8 mcmbcr Frank
commcntcd, whcrc thc timc ol its dclivcry by two hours would
havc madc an awlul lot ol dicrcncc.
154

Marshall ocrcd no cxplanation lor his inacccssibility that
Sunday morning, cxccpt to dcscribc his activitics:
151
!bid., p. 2409. Scc also 8ratton tcstimony, ibid., p. 2349.
152
!bid. Scc also 8ratton tcstimony on dclivcry, ibid., pp. 234950.
153
!bid., p. 2409.
154
!bid., p. 2410.
! rcmcmbcr vcry distinctly thc mcssagc lrom Coloncl 8ratton
bccausc it camc to mc as ! was coming out ol a showcr, as my
habit was to ridc at 8:30 on Sunday morning, and it takcs mc
about lty minutcs to go around thc only availablc loop to ridc
in. !t takcs mc about cight or tcn minutcs to gct a showcr and
drcss. And whcn thc mcssagc camc lrom Coloncl 8ratton hc
wantcd to comc out thcrc, and ! said, No. ! am on my way
down to thc Var cpartmcnt. And it couldnt havc bccn morc
than vc or tcn minutcs at thc outsidc bclorc ! had lclt to comc
down hcrc. ! havc a vcry clcar rccollcction ol that bccausc natu
rally ! thought about it at thc timc. . . . ! was not awarc ol thc
lact that this mcssagc had bccn availablc thc night bclorc.
155

Marshall concludcd his tcstimony with a lurthcr commcnt
on thc importancc ol sccrccy. ||vcrybody that is conccrncd
with this top sccrct thing is vcry cagcy about saying anything
about it.
156
Tis, hc implicd, cxplaincd thc rcluctancc ol thc Var
cpartmcnt to rclcasc TP SCRT intcrccpts to thosc invcs
tigating thc Pcarl Harbor attack.
Av:y Couvivv 8v~))ox Rvvov)s
His viivvvivs ov ]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s
Now that morc inlormation about thc ]apancsc intcr
ccpts had comc out, 8ratton rcturncd twicc morc to tcstily
ctobcr 2 and 6. Hc said thc sccrct Summary ol Far astcrn
ocumcnts,
157
copics ol thc translatcd ]apancsc intcrccpts docu
mcnting thc Summary, togcthcr with an Appcndix containing
many ol thc crucial ]apancsc intcrccpts, wcrc on lc in G2, Var
155
!bid., pp. 240911.
156
!bid., p. 2413.
157
!bid., part 31, pp. 320135, xhibit A to Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Top
Sccrct Transcript: Summary ol Far astcrn ocumcnts, and pp. 323558,
xhibit 8 to Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Top Sccrct Transcript. xhibit consists
ol copics ol thc 4550 most important documcnts thcmsclvcs.
cpartmcnt,
158
bcing hcld in tight sccurity and will bc madc
availablc to you latcr.
159

8ratton had bccn convinccd on cccmbcr 3 that war with
]apan was immincnt. n that day a cccmbcr 2 mcssagc lrom
Tokyo dirccting thc ]apancsc cmbassy in Vashington to burn its
codcs, to stop using thcir codc machinc, and to dcstroy it com
plctcly, had bccn translatcd.
160
Altcr thc rcccipt ol this transla
tion, 8ratton said, any lurthcr intcrccpts that wcrc brought to
mc would simply contributc toward thc climax that ! saw coming.
Tis was it.
161
Hc had a lccling that lurthcr warnings or alcrts
should bc scnt out to our ovcrscas commands. Gcrow lclt that
su cicnt warning had bccn scnt. Milcs thought hc couldnt go
ovcr Gcrows dccision bccausc ol thc Var cpartmcnt policy
thcn in ccct that Var cpartmcnt G2 (!ntclligcncc) should
not scnd out any intclligcncc to thc G2s ol tactical commands
or ovcrscas dcpartmcnts which might producc an opcrational
rcaction, without thc complctc concurrcncc ol thc Var Plans
ivision.
162

8ratton still lclt uncasy and thought lurthcr warnings
should bc scnt out. Hc wcnt to thc Navy cpartmcnt to scc
Commandcr McCollum, hcad ol thc Far astcrn Scction in
N!. McCollum lclt as 8ratton did and was going to writc up
a warning and try to gct thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations to dis
patch it. McCollum told 8ratton also that thc Navys S.!.S. man
in Honolulu, a Commandcr Rochclort . . . had all thc inlormation
that wc had, and was listcning lor this ]apancsc windswcathcr
broadcast. McCollum suggcstcd that 8ratton instruct Armys
G2 in Hawaii to talk with Rochclort at oncc, as in a short
158
!bid., part 29, p. 2417.
159
!bid., p. 2416.
160
!bid., part 12, p. 215, part 31, p. 3250.
161
!bid., part 29, p. 2442.
162
!bid., pp. 2444, 2453.
pcriod ol timc Rochclort could tcll Coloncl Ficldcr, our G2,
cxactly what was going on and what wc kncw. Tus 8ratton
tricd by this indircct routc to communicatc his lcars to Armys
G2 in Hawaii.
163

Vhcn dclivcring thc ]apancsc intcrccpts, 8rattons usual
practicc was to go rst to Marshall, Milcs, and Gcrow, and thcn
to thc Statc cpartmcnt. Hc had lollowcd this proccdurc thc
cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn dclivcring thc rst 13 parts ol thc
]apancsc rcply. 8ratton said hc vcry scldom dclivcrcd thc lockcd
pouch ol intcrccpts to Marshall in pcrson. Tat cvcning hc had
lclt thc lockcd bag containing Marshalls copy with his sccrc
tary, Coloncl 8cdcll Smith, advising him that it was an impor
tant documcnt. . . and that thc Chicl ol Sta . . . |s|hould scc it
right away.
164

8ratton had thcn madc dclivcry in pcrson to G2s Milcs,
with whom hc had discusscd thc mcssagc at somc lcngth.
165
Hc
had lclt thc copy ol thc mcssagc lor Gcrow with his cxccutivc
o ccr, Coloncl Gailcy.
166
Tcn, at about 10 or 10:30 8ratton
had gonc with thc 13part mcssagc to thc cpartmcnt ol Statc,
whcrc hc had dclivcrcd thc lockcd pouch to thc watch o ccr in
thc Statc cpartmcnt, with thc rcqucst that it bc gottcn to Mr.
Hull immcdiatcly.
167

Tc ncxt morning, altcr rccciving thc last installmcnt ol thc
]apancsc rcply and thc 1:00 v.:. dcadlinc mcssagc at about 8:30
9:00 ~.:., 8ratton spcnt a couplc ol lrantic hours trying to locatc
Marshall. Vhcn hc nally rcachcd him by phonc, Marshall askcd
8ratton to wait lor him at his o cc. Marshall arrivcd at 11:25
~.:., 8ratton was surc ol thc timc bccausc hc kcpt looking at thc
163
!bid., p. 2444.
164
!bid., part 29, pp. 242123.
165
!bid., p. 2422.
166
!bid., p. 2421.
167
!bid., pp. 2422, 2419.
clock on thc wall and at my watch. Tc long ]apancsc rcply was
on Marshalls dcsk whcn hc camc in. Marshall rcad it and thcn a
discussion ol thc cntirc communication cnsucd.
168

8ratton urgcd thc APH8 to obtain, not only thc ]apancsc
rcply to thc U.S. Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum, but also
thc 30 or 40 othcr mcssagcs which prcccdcd it, that is, thc
cxchangcs bctwccn thc Ambassador in Vashington and thc
lorcign ministcr in Tokyo. . . . And considcr thc picturc that lay
bclorc all ol our policymaking and planning o cials, lrom thc
Sccrctary ol Statc down through thc Sccrctary ol Var, to thc
Chicl ol thc Var Plans ivision. Tcy all had thc samc picturc,
and it was a picturc that was bcing paintcd ovcr a pcriod ol
wccks, il not months.
169

APH8 n)~ixs ]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s Fix~iiy:
n ctobcr 6, 1944, thc board gaincd acccss to thc 45 to 50
intcrccpts rcqucstcd.
170

Altcr it actually had thc intcrccpts in hand, it qucstioncd a
lcw nal witncsscs and thcn its procccdings wcrc concludcd.
Tnv Av:y Pv~vi H~vnov 8o~vb Rvvov)
Tc APH8s hcarings and thosc ol thc NC! had run concur
rcntly, thc NC! lrom ]uly 24 through Scptcmbcr 27, 1944, thc
APH8 lrom August 7 through ctobcr 6. Tc NC! rcport was
datcd ctobcr 19, that ol thc APH8, ctobcr 20, 1944.
171

168
!bid., pp. 2419, 2420, 2422.
169
!bid., p. 2424.
170
!bid., p. 2449. For list ol documcnts, scc ibid., pp. 245657, lor documcnts
thcmsclvcs, scc part 31, pp. 323558.
171
!bid., part 39, pp. 23178, APH8 Rcport, ctobcr 20, 1944, ibid., pp.
179230, Appcndix to Rcport, ibid., pp. 23169, ]udgc Advocatc Gcncral
(Major Gcncral) Myron C. Cramcrs analyscs.
Tc APH8 issucd a dctailcd rcport dcscribing thc back
ground ol thc attack, thc situation in Vashington and in Hawaii,
and thc rcsponsibilitics ol thc scvcral o cials. !t had brought out
in thc coursc ol its hcarings scvcral signicant points not prcvi
ously covcrcd in dcpth:
a. Tc Army was clcarly rcsponsiblc lor thc dclcnsc ol thc
cct whcn it was at its homc basc in Pcarl Harbor,
b. Givcn thc instructions hc had rcccivcd, Short appcarcd jus
ticd in ordcring Alcrt #1 lor sabotagc,
c. Shorts Vashington supcrior commandcr, Marshall, was
obviously lamiliar with Shorts systcm ol alcrts and should
havc noticd Short il his ordcr lor a sabotagc alcrt, issucd
in rcsponsc to Vashingtons Novcmbcr 27 warning, was not
considcrcd adcquatc,
d. Short had bccn told vcry littlc about thc crisis that
Vashington o cialdom kncw was looming,
c. Tc attack on Pcarl Harbor apparcntly took cvcryonc by sur
prisc, not only in Hawaii but also in Vashington. cials
both in Vashington and Hawaii had cxpcctcd thc rst
]apancsc strikc would bc in thc wcstcrn Pacic or southcast
Asia and, quitc likcly, thc Phillippincs.
l. Two witncsscsKimmcl and Saordrcvcalcd that, as
a rcsult ol dccodcd ]apancsc intcrccpts, Vashington o
cials had had acccss to considcrablc intclligcncc conccrning
]apancsc intcntions, which was not lurnishcd thc Hawaiian
commandcrs.
Tc APH8 was imprcsscd by thc quantity and quality ol thc
intclligcncc availablc in Vashington. Tc rccord shows that lrom
inlormcrs and othcr sourccs thc Var cpartmcnt had complctc
and dctailcd inlormation ol ]apancsc intcntions. !nlormation ol
thc cvidcnt ]apancsc intcntion to go to war in thc vcry ncar luturc
was wcll known to thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var,
thc Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army, thc Sccrctary ol Navy, and thc
Chicl ol Naval pcrations. !t was not a qucstion ol lact, it was
only a qucstion ol timc. Tc ncxt lcw days would scc thc cnd ol
pcacc and thc bcginning ol war.
!l it bc assumcd that lor any rcason thc inlormation could
not havc bccn givcn to thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, thcn it was
a rcsponsibility ol thc Var cpartmcnt to givc ordcrs to Short
what to do, and to tcll him to go on an allout alcrt instcad ol a
sabotagc alcrt.
172
Tc board was cspccially conccrncd about thc
warnings scnt Short, his sabotagc alcrt rcsponsc to thc Novcmbcr
27 warning, and thc lailurc ol Vashington to rcspond.
Having askcd lor a rcport ol what hc was doing, thc Var
cpartmcnt placcd itscll in thc position ol sharing thc rcspon
sibility il it did not dircct Short to takc such mcasurcs as thcy
considcrcd adcquatc to mcct this scrious thrcat.
173

Howcvcr, thc APH8 pointcd out, Short had two thrcats.
Yct hc only took mcasurcs as to onc. Tc mcssagc on which hc
particularly rclicd as to sabotagc camc lrom G2 on Novcmbcr
28, thc rcport said,
after hc had madc his dccision to go to Alcrt Numbcr 1. Tis
last mcssagc . . . docs not in any way changc prcvious mcssagcs.
Short should havc known, as a traincd soldicr, that a G2 mcs
sagc is inlormativc and is ol lcsscr authority than a command
ing mcssagc lrom thc Chicl ol Sta.
174

172
!bid., part 39, p. 139.
173
!bid., p. 90.
174
!bid., p. 91.
Altcr thc conicting Navy and Army dispatchcs ol Novcmbcr 27,
and thc additional Novcmbcr 28 sabotagc mcssagcs lrom Army
G2 and lrom thc adjutant gcncral,
175

Short had only silcncc lrom Vashington. Hc was givcn no lur
thcr clarication ol this conict amongst thc mcssagcs. Tcrc
is no cxplanation why Short was not told ol thc socallcd
|Novcmbcr 26| ultimatum. !t was known to thc ]apancsc
bccausc it was handcd to thcm.
176

!n its rcport, thc APH8 discusscd thc intclligcncc availablc
in Vashington and Hawaii, thc amiablc rclationship bctwccn
Short and Kimmcl,
177
thc warnings that had bccn scnt to Hawaii,
thc Hawaiian commandcrs dclcnsc plans, thc Armys radar lacil
itics, Shorts sabotagc alcrt, thc shortagc ol plancs in Hawaii lor
longrangc rcconnaissancc, and so on.
As has bccn rcpcatcd so many timcs, thcrc was positivc cvi
dcncc in thc Var cpartmcnt that it was only a mattcr ol
days bclorc war would cnsuc and thc Var cpartmcnt had
noticc that Hawaii was on only a sabotagc alcrt, inadcquatc
lor lull warlarc. Had a lull war mcssagc, unadultcratcd, bccn
dispatchcd or had dircct ordcrs lor a lull, allout alcrt bccn
scnt, Hawaii could havc bccn rcady to havc mct thc attack with
what it had. Vhat rcsultcd was lailurc at both cnds ol thc linc.
Rcsponsibility laid both in Vashington and in Hawaii.
178
Among othcr things, thc APH8 rcport criticizcd Marshall
lor not providing an arrangcmcnt by which anothcr could act in
175
!bid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy #272337, p. 1328, Army #472, p. 1329, Milcs,
G2, #473, and p. 1330, Army Adjutant Gcncral, #482.
176
!bid., part 39, p. 141.
177
!bid., p. 61.
178
!bid., p. 145.
so critical a situation whcn hc could not rcadily bc rcachcd.
179
No
accounting lor this was madc cvcn though
|t|hc cvidcncc indicatcs that thc manncr in which author
ity to act was dclcgatcd or not dclcgatcd had its inucncc on
this situation. Tc Chicl ol Sta had thrcc dcputics, Gcncrals
8rydcn, Arnold, and Moorc. Nonc ol thcsc thrcc was givcn
thc sccrct inlormation conccrning thc known ]ap intcntions.
. . . Complctc authority to act in Gcncral Marshalls abscncc
docs not sccm to havc bccn givcn to any onc subordinatc. Had
thcrc bccn an o ccr cithcr with authority or with couragc to
act on thc inlormation that was in thc Var cpartmcnt on thc
cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, and had hc scnt a mcssagc to Short,
Hawaii should havc bccn lully alcrtcd.
180

Tc board rcport attributcd thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor
disastcr
primarily to two causcs: (1) Tc lailurc ol thc Commanding
Gcncral |Short| ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt adcquatcly to
alcrt his command lor war, and (2) Tc lailurc ol thc Var
cpartmcnt, with knowlcdgc ol thc typc ol alcrt takcn by thc
Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt, to dircct him to
takc an adcquatc alcrt, and thc lailurc to kccp him adcquatcly
inlormcd as to thc dcvclopmcnts ol thc Unitcd Statcs]apancsc
ncgotiations, which in turn might havc causcd him to changc
lrom thc inadcquatc alcrt to an adcquatc onc.
181

Tc board citcd scvcral lactors that contributcd to thc disastcr:
Tc lailurcs ol (1) Tc Sccrctary ol Statc, Cordcll Hull, (2) Tc
Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army, Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall, (3) Chicl
ol Var Plans ivision, Var cpartmcnt Gcncral Sta, Major
Gcncral Lconard T. Gcrow, and (4) Commanding Gcncral ol thc
179
!bid., p. 140.
180
!bid., pp. 14445. APH8 rcport, part 39.
181
!bid., p. 175.
Hawaiian cpartmcnt, Licutcnant Gcncral Valtcr C. Short.
182

Tc APH8 rcport thcn dctailcd thc cxtcnt to which cach sharcd
in thc rcsponsibility.
Tc rcport was submittcd to Stimson only a couplc ol wccks
bclorc thc Novcmbcr 7 prcsidcntial clcction. Tc APH8 had bccn
critical ol Short, who was no longcr on activc duty. 8ut it had also
criticizcd Sccrctary ol Statc Hull, Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall,
and Gcncral Gcrow, all ol whom wcrc still activcly involvcd in
thc administration and thc war. Tc rcports rclcasc could provc
an cmbarrassmcnt to thc administration, thc prcsidcnt, and thc
war cort.
Vhcn Stimson rcccivcd thc rcport, it was announccd in thc
prcss that it would not bc rclcascd until it had bccn rcvicwcd
lor sccurity by appropriatc military authoritics.
183
Tcn, on
cccmbcr 1, altcr Rooscvclt had won his clcction to a third tcrm,
Stimson announccd that
it would bc highly prcjudicial to thc succcsslul prosccution ol
thc war and thc salcty ol Amcrican livcs to makc public dur
ing thc war thc rcport ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard or thc
rccord on which it is bascd.
Tus both sccrctarics, war and navy, rcluscd |o|n thc ground ol
national sccurity . . . to makc thc rcal story ol Pcarl Harbor, as
rcvcalcd in thc NC! and APH8 rcports public until thc war had
cndcd.
184

182
!bid., pp. 17576.
183
New York Times, ctobcr 24, 1944, p. 12, col. 2.
184
New York Times, cccmbcr 2, 1944, pp. 1, 5.
493
23.
The Navy Court of Inquiry
(July 24October 19, 1944)
O
n ]uly 13, 1944,
1
thc ncw Navy Sccrctary, ]amcs \. Forrcstal,
ordcrcd thc convcning ol a Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!)
lor thc purposc ol inquiring into all circumstanccs con
ncctcd with thc attack madc by ]apancsc armcd lorccs on Pcarl
Harbor, Tcrritory ol Hawaii, on 7 cccmbcr 1941.
2
Trcc rctircd
admirals wcrc appointcd to thc court: rin G. Murn, prcsi
dcnt, dward C. Kalblus, and Adolphus Andrcws. Commandcr
Harold 8icscmcicr was namcd judgc advocatc.
3
Tc court opcncd
its doors on ]uly 24, and took tcstimony ovcr 32 days. Admirals
Harold R. Stark, chicl ol naval opcrations at thc timc ol thc
attack, Claudc C. 8loch commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict
(Hawaii), and Husband . Kimmcl, who had bccn commandcr
inchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct,
4
wcrc namcd intcrcstcd partics,
cntitlcd to attcnd thc hcarings, havc counscl, and crosscxaminc
1
New York Times, ]unc 15, 1944, p. 10.
2
3
!bid., p. 9.
4
!bid., p. 12.
witncsscs. Tc court bcgan by cxploring thc situation at thc timc
ol thc attack and thus covcrcd much ol thc samc tcrritory as had
thc Robcrts and Hart invcstigations.
Tc jurisdiction ol thc NC! was not limitcd to invcstigat
ing Navy pcrsonncl only, it was to inquirc into all circumstanccs
conncctcd with thc attack madc by ]apancsc armcd lorccs on
Pcarl Harbor (italics addcd). Morcovcr, as Captain L.F. Saord
had locatcd thc ]apancsc intcrccpts and had had copics rcplaccd
in thc lcs by thc summcr ol 1944, thcsc intcrccpts wcrc availablc
to bc introduccd to thc NC!. Kimmcl was dctcrmincd that thcy
bc madc a part ol thc rccord. 8ut obtaining NC! acccss to thcm
would not bc casy.
]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s Loc~)vb
Kimmcl brought thc subjcct ol thc intcrccpts up at his rst
opportunity. Hc said hc had bccn brandcd throughout this coun
try as thc onc rcsponsiblc lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Hc was
anxious that this invcstigation should go lar cnough to disclosc
all thc lacts in conncction with thc mattcr, it should call wit
ncsscs lrom thc Army, lrom thc Statc cpartmcnt, or lrom any
othcr lcdcral dcpartmcnt in ordcr to cstablish thc lacts that arc
ncccssary . . . to rclutc thc uttcrly lalsc and mislcading statcmcnts
madc throughout thc Robcrts Commission.
5
Unlcss thc intcr
ccpts wcrc introduccd, Kimmcl maintaincd, it would bc impos
siblc to propcrly assign rcsponsibility lor thc disastcr.
]udgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr askcd Forrcstal on August 1
lor acccss to thc ]apancsc intcrccpts. No answcr. n August 4
8icscmcicr was told that thc lcttcr had bccn misplaccd. Tcn
apparcntly it was lound and rcturncd to 8icscmcicr with a
rcqucst lor a changc in its classicationlrom SCRT to
5
!bid., p. 19.
The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24October 19, 1944) 495
TP SCRT.
6
Finally on thc morning ol August 8, duc to
thc purcly lortuitous circumstancc that Admiral rncst ]. King
was acting sccrctary ol thc Navy that day,
7
8icscmcicr rcccivcd
Forrcstals pcrmission lor onc ol Kimmcls attorncys to cxam
inc thc sccrct lcs.
8
Mr. Knox promiscd you acccss to all thc
lcs, King said, so ! can scc no rcason to rclusc.
9
Tus Navy
Captain Robcrt A. Lavcndcr ol Kimmcls lcgal sta was givcn
thc chancc to inspcct thc sccrct lcs. Hc madc his inspcction that
vcry altcrnoon.
10

Vhcn Lavcndcr was ushcrcd into thc room whcrc hc was to
cxaminc thc intcrccpts, hc was astoundcd to scc a stack two
and a hall lcct high ol intcrccptcd mcssagcs. Hc had only a lim
itcd timc to look through thcm. 8ut Saord had givcn him thc
numbcrs ol thc most important intcrccpts, so hc was ablc to makc
his cxamination rathcr quickly. Lavcndcr bccamc physically nau
scatcd, hc said, whcn |hc| rcalizcd what thc inlormation in |his|
hands would havc mcant to Kimmcl and thc mcn ol thc Flcct
who dicd. Hc sclcctcd somc 43 mcssagcs that hc thought should
havc bccn scnt to Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor and had thcm copicd
and authcnticatcd.
11
Tat cvcning, attorncys Rugg and Hanily
dincd with Lavcndcr. Lavcndcr was still so sickcncd by what hc
had uncovcrcd that hc could not cat.
12

Tc ncxt day, Gcncral ]oscph McNarncy, thcn dcputy chicl
ol sta ol thc Army and an FR appointcc to thc Robcrts
Commission which had hcapcd opprobrium on Kimmcl and
6
!bid., p. 54.
7
Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry Co.,
1955), p. 130.
8
!bid., pp. 5354. ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 5354.
9
]ohn Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Gardcn City, N.Y.:
oublcday, 1982), p. 81.
10
11
!bid. Scc also Toland, Infamy, p. 82.
12
Toland, Infamy, p. 82.
Short, protcstcd to Naval Communications that Lavcndcrs acccss
to thc sccrct lcs violatcd ordcrs. Vhcn thc dircctor ol naval
communications said hc had rcccivcd no such ordcrs, McNarncy
backcd down. Howcvcr, Admiral King, who had agrccd to
Lavcndcrs cxamination, told Kimmcl latcr that hc would not
rccommcnd making thc inlormation availablc. And thcn Naval
Communications rcluscd to turn ovcr to Lavcndcr thc copics ol
thc intcrccpts hc had sclcctcd.
13
8ut Kimmcl did not lct thc mat
tcr rcst. Hc askcd thc judgc advocatc to pursuc thc mattcr with
Navy sccrctary Forrcstal,
14
who rcplicd on August 10 that it was
not in thc public intcrcst to introducc this typc ol matcrial in
cvidcncc. . . .
15
Howcvcr, Kimmcls man had sccn thc intcrccpts.
So Kimmcl pcrsistcd.
uring thc courts rst 19 days, Kimmcl madc rcqucsts almost
daily to havc thc sccrct ]apancsc intcrccpts introduccd in cvi
dcncc. Finally on thc 20th day, August 28, Kimmcls corts borc
lruit. Tc lc copics ol thc sclcctcd documcnts, duly authcnti
catcd undcr o cial scal, wcrc placcd in thc NC!s rccord at thc
rcqucst ol thc judgc advocatc ol this court.
16
Tc rcmaining days
ol thc !nquiry, thcrclorc, dcalt with this ncw matcrial. . Howcvcr,
bclorc gctting to that, wc should rst rcvicw bricy thc situation
bclorc thc intcrccpts wcrc introduccd.
CN H~voib R. S)~vx ovsx) Rvc~ii
Pvv~))~cx v)~iis
Tc courts rst witncss, Chicl ol Naval pcrations Stark
17

ocrcd no startling rcvclations. Stark hcld that hc had sought
13
!bid.
14
15
!bid., pp. 12021.
16
!bid., part 33, p. 735.
17
!bid., part 32, pp. 11152, 24750, 52738, 72731.
to kccp Kimmcl inlormcd so lar as wc thought hc could havc
a vital intcrcst.
18
id hc know ol any important dcvclopmcnt
prcccding thc attack ol which Kimmcl had not bccn adviscd, as
Kimmcl had rcqucstcd, by thc quickcst sccurc mcans thcn avail
ablc: Stark rcplicd:
! havc scarchcd my brain, my conscicncc, my hcart, and cvcry
thing ! havc got, sincc Pcarl Harbor startcd, to scc whcrcin
! was dcrclict or whcrcin ! might havc omittcd somcthing.
Tcrc is only onc thought . . . that ! rcgrcttcd . . . . |T|hat was
thc dispatch which was scnt by thc Army on thc morning ol
cccmbcr 7, that ! had not parallclcd it with my own systcm,
or that ! had not tclcphoncd it. . . . |T|hat is thc onc conscious
rcalization ! rcmcmbcr and rcgrct.
19
Tc ]apancsc intcrccpts had not bccn actually introduccd
into thc rccord, but Kimmcl uscd what hc had lcarncd about
thcm lrom Captain Lavcndcr in qucstioning Stark. Kimmcl
askcd Stark il hc had rcccivcd inlormation that thc ]apancsc
Govcrnmcnt rcgardcd Novcmbcr 25 as an absolutc immovablc
dcadlinc lor thc ncgotiations thcn bcing conductcd bctwccn
]apan and Amcrica.
Stark: No, ! dont rcmcmbcr that.
Vhcn Kimmcl tricd to rclrcsh Starks mcmory by rclcrring to
Saords tcstimony bclorc Admiral Hart, 8icscmcicr objcctcd: !t
was an attcmpt to show in thc lorm ol a qucstion that thcrc was
ccrtain cvidcncc bclorc thc Hart cxamination, what thc cvidcncc
was, and thc lact that thc cvidcncc was givcn undcr oath.
20

Kimmcl tricd anothcr tack. 8ctwccn cccmbcr 1 and
cccmbcr 4 |had Stark rcccivcd| inlormation that ]apan was
18
!bid., p. 82.
19
!bid., p. 99.
20
!bid., part 33, pp. 72728.
going to attack 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs and maintain pcacc
with Russia:
Stark: Not that ! rccall.
Kimmel: o you rccall thc phrasc Vinds Mcssagc:
Stark: ! dont rccall such a mcssagc. . . . Not thc slightcst rccol
lcction ol a discussion ol thc socallcd Vinds Mcssagc.
And morc in thc samc vcin.
21

8icscmcicr objcctcd.
22
Kimmcl thcn askcd Stark il hc rccallcd rccciving any impor
tant intclligcncc on cccmbcr 6, thc cvcning bclorc thc attack.
Stark: ! couldnt say what ! was doing that cvcning. My
rcmcmbrancc is! think ! was homc but ! couldnt say. ! dont
rccall clcarly. . . . ! havcnt thc slightcst rccollcction ol any mcs
sagc bcaring on this, or any othcr subjcct, bcing givcn to mc
bctwccn thc timc ! lclt thc o cc and thc . . . ncxt morning.
23
Stark did rcmcmbcr a discussion with Marshall Sunday
morning, cccmbcr 7 about thc mcssagc asking thc ]apancsc
ambassador to call on Hull that day at 1:00 v.:. 8ut othcrwisc hc
rccallcd nothing ol signicancc about that mcssagc.
24
Ab:iv~i Scnuiv:~xx, N~vy Li~isox wi)n
S)~)v vv~v):vx), v~sivv
Rcar Admiral R.. Schuirmann, who had bccn dircctor ol
Ccntral ivision, cc ol Chicl ol Naval pcrations, and liai
son with thc Statc cpartmcnt, was not much morc rcsponsivc.
21
!bid., p. 729.
22
!bid., p. 730.
23
!bid., part 32, pp. 13233.
24
!bid., pp. 13436.
!n answcr to Kimmcls rcpcatcd qucstioning, Schuirmann hcsi
tatcd and rcplicd only that it would involvc thc disclosurc ol
inlormation dctrimcntal to thc public intcrcst. . . . |H|c claimcd
his privilcgc against rcvcaling statc sccrcts.
25
Finally altcr
bcing rccallcd to tcstily altcr thc court rcscindcd its carlicr rul
ing rcstricting qucstions on subjccts not prcviously in cvidcncc
bclorc thc court,
26
Schuirmann admittcd having known about thc
]apancsc dcadlincsNovcmbcr 25 and 29.
27
Hc also said thc dis
patch dirccting thc ]apancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir rcply to
Hull on Sunday, cccmbcr 7, at prcciscly 1:00 v.:. Vashington
timc, had bccn availablc by 9:30 ~.:. whcn Stark rcachcd his
o cc. And Schuirmann also rccallcd thc MarshallStark tclc
phonc convcrsation conccrning thc last minutc mcssagc to thc
cld commandcrs.
28
V~snixc)oxs Abvicv )o Pv~vi H~vnov
Co::~xbvvs Coxvusixc, Coxviic)ixc
Gcncral Short, thc Armys commandcr at Pcarl Harbor at
thc timc ol thc attack, was NC!s ncxt witncss. Likc Kimmcl,
Short had bccn undcr a cloud ol suspicion cvcr sincc thc publi
cation ol thc Robcrts Commission rcport. nc ol Shorts most
tclling points was that thc plancs which had bccn cn routc to thc
Philippincs via Hawaii, thc plancs that had arrivcd ovcr Hawaii
during thc attack, had bccn scnt out lrom Calilornia unarmed.
As latc as 1:30 ~.:. in thc Var cpartmcnt on cccmbcr 7,
whcn thc plancs wcrc dispatchcd lrom Calilornia, Short said,
thcy did not bclicvc thcrc was any dangcr ol air attack at
Honolulu, or thcy ncvcr would havc bccn so rash as to scnd
25
!bid., p. 159.
26
!bid., part 33, pp. 73233.
27
!bid., p. 733.
28
!bid., p. 759.
plancs out in thosc conditions. . . . Vhocvcr scnt thcm out
lclt that thc hazard ol carrying thc ammunition was grcatcr
than thc hazard ol a ]apancsc attack. !n othcr words, hc |thc
dispatchcr| considcrcd that thcrc was no probability ol an air
attack at Pcarl Harbor on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 or thc
plancs would not havc bccn startcd lrom Hamilton Ficld in
that condition, as latc as thcy wcrc.
29
Tcn Kimmcl himscll spcnt thrcc days on thc witncss stand,
August 1517. Hc spokc about thc Armys rcsponsibility lor thc
dclcnsc ol thc cct whcn in port, his training proccdurcs, thc pos
sibility ol a submarinc attack, and so on. 8clorc thc attack, hc had
madc lrcqucnt rcqucsts to Vashington lor inlormation and had
rcccivcd rcpcatcd assuranccs that |hc| would bc kcpt inlormcd.
Howcvcr, Kimmcl lclt surc that thcrc must bc dctails |known in
Vashington| about which |hc| was not inlormcd, dctails about
which hc could only gucss.
30

Kimmcl had known that both Marshall and Stark had rcc
ommcndcd against our issuing an ultimatum to thc ]apancsc.
Howcvcr, hc did not know that whcn hc rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr
27 war warning, thc Statc cpartmcnt had issucd ]apan an ulti
matum thc day bclorc. Hc had simply assumcd that onc ol thc
primary causcs lor thc |war warning| dispatch was, as statcd, that
ncgotiations had ccascd and that U.S.]apancsc rclations wcrc
rcaching a brcaking point. Kimmcl rcccivcd no latcr mcssagc
lrom thc CN canccling or modilying thc Novcmbcr 27 war
warning. As a rcsult, whcn latcr prcss rcports indicatcd that lur
thcr convcrsations wcrc continuing bctwccn thc ]apancsc ambas
sadors and thc Statc cpartmcnt, thc warning lost much ol its
lorcc.
31
29
!bid., part 32, p. 186.
30
!bid., p. 291.
31
!bid., p. 233.
Kimmcl was askcd about thc lastminutc cccmbcr 7
MarshallStark dispatch stating that thc ]apancsc ambassadors
wcrc prcscnting at 1:00 v.:. astcrn Standard timc today what
amounts to an ultimatum. Marshall had closcd this dispatch by
saying, ]ust what signicancc thc hour sct may havc wc do not
know but bc on alcrt accordingly.
32
Tis mcssagc did not rcach
Short and Kimmcl until wcll altcr thc attack. cvastatcd by thc
disastcr, Kimmcl had told thc couricr thcn that it wasnt ol thc
slightcst intcrcst to mc at that timc, and ! thrcw thc thing in thc
wastc baskct.
33

Askcd what dicrcncc it would havc madc had hc rcccivcd
thc warning bclorc thc attack, Kimmcl said two othcr lactors wcrc
morc signicant. nc was that an ultimatum was bcing dclivcrcd.
Tc othcr was that . . . thc ]apancsc Ambassador had instructions
lrom his govcrnmcnt to dclivcr it at a spccic timc.
34
Kimmcl had bccn undcr ordcrs to pcrmit ]apan to commit
thc rst ovcrt act. Tcchnically, Kimmcl said,
! could not rc a shot at a ]apancsc Flcct until altcr thcy had
rst shot at us, and also, tcchnically, had ! scnt out patrol plancs
armcd, ! would havc had to wait until thc cncmy rcd at thcsc
patrol plancs or committcd somc othcr ovcrt act bclorc ! could
do anything morc than protcst.
35

Tc warwarning dispatch had givcn Kimmcl an cxcusc to do
somcthing that ! had wantcd to do lor scvcral months . . . to
bomb submarinc contacts.
36
Kimmcl considcrcd his ordcrs conlusing. ]ust thc day bclorc
thc war warning, Stark had adviscd him that thc Army had
32
!bid., part 33, p. 1282.
33
!bid., part 32, p. 253.
34
!bid., p. 264.
35
!bid., p. 254.
36
!bid., p. 259.
agrccd to station 25 Army pursuit plancs at Midway and a simi
lar numbcr at Vakc.
37
Short had rcccivcd a Var cpartmcnt
mcssagc along thc samc linc, asking him to rclicvc thc marinc
inlantry units on thc outlying islands with Army pcrsonncl.
38

Tc proximity ol thcsc two mcssagcs in point ol timc to thc
war warning mcssagc . . . lcsscncd thc lorcc ol thc war warning
mcssagc. Apparcntly, Kimmcl said, CN Stark was willing to
tcmporarily upsct, to a considcrablc dcgrcc, thc dclcnscs ol Pcarl
Harbor as wcll as ol thc outlying bascs to rcinlorcc Vakc and
Midway, cspccially as thc Navy was bcing askcd to transport thc
plancs, ground crcws, csscntial sparc parts, tools, and ammuni
tion. Now, Kimmcl said, thc di cultics ol rcinlorcing thc outly
ing stations wcrc undoubtcdly wcllknown to thc Chicl ol Naval
pcrations, so that thc Var cpartmcnts mcssagc indicatcd a
conict bctwixt thc idcas ol thc Var cpartmcnt and thc Navy
cpartmcnt at that timc.
Pv~vi H~vnov, U.S. Fivv)s 8~sv,
\uixvv~niv )o A))~cx
Tc NC! qucstioncd Admiral ]amcs . Richardson, Kimmcls
prcdcccssor as commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl
Harbor. Richardsons tcstimony rcvcalcd that hc had also cncoun
tcrcd di cultics in obtaining mcn and matcricl, in conducting
rcconnaissancc, and in acquiring rcliablc inlormation to guidc
him in planning, training, and prcparing lor dclcnsc.
39
Richardson
had also objcctcd to basing thc cct at Pcarl Harbor and had rcc
ommcndcd that it bc hcadquartcrcd on thc Vcst Coast, cxccpt a
37
!bid., part 33, p. 1177.
38
!bid., part 32, p. 238.
39
!bid., pp. 624, 629.
dctachmcnt to rcmain in Pcarl Harbor that could bc adcquatcly
carcd lor by thc lacilitics thcrc.
40
Hc said
thc opcrating arcas wcrc not adcquatc, cithcr lor surlacc ships
or air, thcrc wcrc no air clds adcquatc to carc lor thc plancs
that wcrc on carricrs, and could not bc traincd lrom thc carricrs
bccausc ol thc shortagc ol lucl. Tc only salc anchoragc was
Pcarl Harbor, and it was cntircly inadcquatc to handlc thc Flcct,
thc distancc lrom thc Vcst Coast incrcascd thc cost and thc
dclay and thc di culty ol maintaining and supplying thc Flcct,
that thcrc wcrc no rccrcational lacilitics, that in timc ol pcacc
thc mcn and o ccrs could not scc any rcason lor rcmaining lor
such a long timc away lrom homc, that thcy wcrc two thou
sand milcs ncarcr a possiblc cncmy, that wc wcrc unprcparcd to
undcrtakc ocnsivc opcrations lrom Pcarl Harbor, and that il
wc wcrc involvcd in war, it would bc ncccssary lor us to rcturn
to thc Vcst Coast lor stripping and mobilization and prcpara
tion lor war, and that our prcscncc in thc Hawaiian arca, whcn
wc wcrc absolutcly not traincd, couldnt makc any military pco
plc bclicvc that wc wcrc planning ocnsivc opcrations.
41
!n spitc ol Richardsons objcctions, Stark had dircctcd him
in May 1940 to announcc to thc prcss that thc Flcct would
rcmain in Hawaiian watcrs at Richardsons rcqucst to carry out
cxcrciscs that |hc| had in mind.
42
Askcd il hc kncw why Stark
had ordcrcd thc Flcct hcld in Hawaii, Richardson rcplicd For
thc rcstraining inucncc it might cxcrcisc on thc action ol thc
]apancsc nation.
43
Vhcn Richardson was still commandcr ol thc U.S. Flcct, hc
had bccn warncd scvcral timcs that war was possiblc. Hc had
rcccivcd
40
!bid., p. 628.
41
!bid., pp. 62728.
42
!bid., p. 624.
43
!bid., p. 628.
an incrcasing numbcr ol warnings. . . . Tcy wcrc not clcarcut.
. . . Tcy wcrc in pcrsonal lcttcrs, thc gcncral tcnor bcing!
hopc you will kccp cvcr prcscnt in your mind thc possibility
that wc may bc at war tomorrow.
Tc rst warning had not comc lrom thc Navy cpartmcnt, but
rathcr lrom thc Var cpartmcnt to thc Commanding Gcncral
ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt, probably on ]unc 19, 1940. Vhcn
Richardson askcd thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations lor inlorma
tion rcgarding it |this warning| hc rcccivcd no rcply.
44
Kimmcl agrccd . . . in gcncral with Richardson as to thc
inadvisability ol basing thc cct at Pcarl Harbor and hc had dis
cusscd Richardsons objcctions with Stark. Howcvcr, whcn hc
took command, hc had not madc any lormal protcst, hc had
acccptcd thc situation. Latcr hc had pointcd out thc dangcrs
that cxistcd so long as thc cct was in Pcarl Harbor. Tc singlc
cntrancc might bc blockcd, it took a long timc lor thc Flcct to
sortic, and thc oil stocks wcrc vulncrablc. !n vicw ol thcsc dan
gcrs, Kimmcl had rcqucstcd rcpcatcdly, in corrcspondcncc that
hc bc kcpt inlormcd ol dcvclopmcnts.
45
!n ordcr to rcach thcir own conclusions, thc NC! wcnt ovcr
much ol thc samc matcrial covcrcd by thc Robcrts and Hart
invcstigations. And it inquircd about thc radar lacilitics in Hawaii
at thc timc ol thc attack. Commandcr Villiam .G. Taylor, U.S.
Navy Rcscrvc, radar cxpcrt on tcmporary duty with thc Pacic
Flcct, tcsticd that thc Army radar opcrators thcmsclvcs wcrc
wclltraincd, although givcn thc tcchnology availablc at thc
timc, it was
impossiblc to dccidc whcthcr thc plots pickcd up by thc radar
station wcrc a ]apancsc raid, an air group lrom onc ol our
44
!bid., p. 626.
45
!bid., p. 282.
own carricrs, or somc plancs bcing lcrricd in lrom thc Unitcd
Statcs.
46

Tc two mcn who had actually manncd thc radar station on ahu
on cccmbcr 7, ]oscph L. Lockard, radar opcrator, and Gcorgc .
lliott, told ol having pickcd up a clustcr ol blips on thc radar
scrccn indicating an unusually largc ight . . . coming in lrom
almost duc north at 130 somc milcs. Vhcn thcy rcportcd this
to thc inlormation ccntcr, it was assumcd thcsc blips wcrc lrom
817 bombcrs bcing lcrricd to Hawaii lrom Calilornia. So thcir
radar rcport was not passcd along to highcr authority.
47
Admiral P.N.L. 8cllingcr, who on cccmbcr 7 had bccn
commandcr ol Hawaiian 8ascd Patrol Ving Two and liaison
with thc commandant ol thc 14th Naval istrict, tcsticd:
! was surpriscd to nd that thcrc in thc Hawaiian !slands,
an important naval advancc outpost, wc wcrc opcrating on a
shocstring, and thc morc ! lookcd thc thinncr thc shocstring
appcarcd to bc.
Morcovcr, according to a lcttcr lrom NC Stark, it appcarcd
that
thcrc was no intcntion to rcplacc thc prcscnt obsolcsccnt typc
ol patrol plancs in Patrol Ving Two prior to onc ycar, and that
Patrol Ving Two would practically bc thc last wing to bc lur
nishcd ncw plancs.
Tis, togcthcr with thc many cxisting dccicncics, lcd 8cllingcr
to concludc that thc Navy cpartmcnt as a wholc did not vicw
thc situation in thc Pacic with alarm, or clsc is not taking stcps
in kccping with thcir vicws.
48
Tcrc wcrc by no mcans cnough
46
!bid., pp. 461, 47374.
47
!bid., Lockard and lliott tcstimony, pp. 47596.
48
!bid., p. 501, 8cllingcr tcstimony rclcrring to Stark scrial lcttcr 95323.
mcn and cquipmcnt to carry out thc kind ol continual longrangc
survcillancc that would havc bccn rcquircd to guard against a sur
prisc attack.
N~v~i Couv) ov !xouivy G~ixs Accvss
)o ]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s
Finally on August 28, thc 20th day ol thc inquiry, Kimmcls
corts to havc thc ]apancsc intcrccpts introduccd borc lruit.
8icscmcicr introduccd 40 or 50 itcms sclcctcd lrom among thc
sccrct ]apancsc Purplc intcrccpts known as MAG!C rcccivcd
lrom Novcmbcr 26 to cccmbcr 7, 1941.
49
Tc intcrccpts wcrc
not actually cntcrcd into thc tcxt ol thc hcarings, but would bc
availablc to thc court lor rclcrcncc. Tcy wcrc cxtractcd lrom thc
rccord and dcpositcd with thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy . . . in thc
intcrcst ol national sccurity and thc succcsslul prosccution ol thc
war.
50

Stark objcctcd strcnuously:
Should thc sccrct classication ol thc procccdings ol this court
bc rcmovcd, or should a copy ol thosc procccdings or inlor
mation gaincd thcrclrom comc into thc posscssion ol pcrsons
unlricndly to this country whilc thc prcscnt war with ]apan
is still in progrcss, thcsc ccrtain qucstions . . . might suggcst
cnough to thc cncmy to bc dcnitcly injurious to our prcscnt
and continuing war cort. . . . |!|n duc timc,
hc said, procccdings ol this court and all ol thc cvidcncc it might
havc sccurcd will bc a mattcr ol opcn rccord availablc to thc
public. Tcrclorc, as a rcsponsiblc naval o ccr and as a lormcr
Chicl ol Naval pcrations with knowlcdgc ol many ol thc intcl
ligcncc activitics ol my subordinatcs, Stark urgcd that
49
!bid., part 33, pp. 735, 76769.
50
!bid., part 32, p. 521.
that part ol thc rccord which would in any way idcntily matc
rial now hcld so sccrct that it has bccn dcnicd this court bc
takcn out ol thc rccord and placcd in a top sccrct status which
will absolutcly prccludc any lcak and rclcrcncc thcrcto.
]udgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr concurrcd. As a rcsult, substantial
blocks ol NC! tcstimony rclcrring to sccrct intclligcncc wcrc
dclctcd lrom thc rccord and lcd in a sccurc placc with duc
rclcrcncc to thcm so that thcy may bc sccn by propcr authoritics
on dcmand.
51
Schuirmann was callcd back again to tcstily. Now that thc
MAG!C intcrccpts had bccn introduccd, hc was somcwhat morc,
although not much morc, rcsponsivc.
52
Hc did not rcmcmbcr somc
documcnts. His rccollcction ol thc mcssagc sctting up thc Vinds
Codc was quitc hazy or cxtrcmcly hazy.
53
Vhcn askcd about
thc cccmbcr 6 13part ]apancsc rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 pro
posal, hc asscrtcd without hcsitation that hc was not acquaintcd
with thc contcnts on thc 6th ol cccmbcr, 1941.
54
Schuirmann did admit discussing somc ol thc Novcmbcr 26
to cccmbcr 7 mcssagcs with Admiral Stark.
Schuirmann: Ycs, sir. ! did discuss thc situation but whcn it
camc down to pointing out ccrtain mcssagcs, you ask il ! madc
a particular point ol discussing that particular mcssagc with thc
Admiral and ! just dont rcmcmbcr.
55

Tcrc was a gcncral lccling, Schuirmann said,
51
!bid., pp. 24950. Vhcn thc hcarings wcrc publishcd altcr thc war, thcsc
spccial scctions wcrc printcd out ol contcxt in a latcr part ol thc hcarings,
lorcing thc rcadcr to shu c pagcs continually back and lorth to lollow a
witncsss tcstimony.
52
!bid., p. 159.
53
!bid., part 33, pp. 738, 755.
54
!bid., p. 749.
55
!bid., p. 758.
that cvcrybody rccognizcd that thcrc was a vcry tcnsc situa
tion, that diplomatic rclations wcrc in dangcr ol bcing scvcrcd,
but that a scvcrancc ol diplomatic rclations did not ncccssarily
mcan that war was going to rcsult.
Hc could not spcak lor othcrs, but my own opinion . . . was that
]apan would go hcr own way in ast Asia and would put up to
thc Unitcd Statcs thc onus ol using lorcc to opposc hcr.
56
C~v)~ix S~vvovb Rvi~)vs M~xy V~vxixcs
Cox)~ixvb ix ]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s
At thc timc ol thc attack, Captain L.F. Saord had bccn in
chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications, which
was conccrncd with sccurity propcr, that is, codcs and ciphcrs,
and survcillancc ovcr thcir usc . . . also . . . Communications
!ntclligcncc |C.!.|. Tc namc was uscd in pcacctimc, Saord
cxplaincd, purcly to mask thc major mission ol thc scction . . . col-
lecting information from enemy or prospective enemy nations through
their communications (italics addcd). Most ol thc scctions cort
at that timc had bccn conccntratcd on ]apan. Saord had bccn
in chargc ol thc intcrccpt stations, dircction ndcr cxchangcs,
and dccrypting units.
57

Saords tcstimony was lorthright and lactual. Hc idcnticd
thc sclcctcd ]apancsc intcrccpts that had bccn madc availablc to
thc NC!. Askcd what inlormation, il any, had bccn rcccivcd in
thc C.!. Unit in Vashington prior to thc cvcning ol cccmbcr
6th that indicatcd a brcak in rclations bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs
and ]apan,
58
Saord discusscd scvcral intcrccpts othcr than thosc
availablc to thc NC!, with which hc was lamiliar bccausc ol his
dutics in communications intclligcncc. Hc pointcd out that on
56
!bid., pp. 75970.
57
!bid., p. 769.
58
!bid., p. 775.
Novcmbcr 5 thc ]apancsc sct a Novcmbcr 25 dcadlinc lor thc
signing ol thc agrccmcnt thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apancsc ambas
sadors wcrc working on.
59
n Novcmbcr 14 thc ]apancsc adviscd
thcir Vashington ambassador, Should ncgotiations collapsc
. . . wc will complctcly dcstroy 8ritish and Amcrican powcr in
China.
60

n Novcmbcr 16, Tokyo wircd that Tc latc ol our cmpirc
hangs by thc slcndcr thrcad ol a lcw days.
61
n Novcmbcr
22 Tokyo postponcd thc dcadlinc to Novcmbcr 29, advising
Nomura,
Tcrc arc rcasons bcyond your ability to gucss why wc wantcd
to scttlc ]apancscAmcrican rclations by thc 25th, but il within
thc ncxt thrcc or lour days you can nish your convcrsations
with thc Amcricans, il thc signing can bc complctcd by thc
29th . . . and in short il cvcrything can bc nishcd, wc havc
dccidcd to wait until that datc.
62
Saord tcsticd about othcr ]apancsc intcrccpts that gavc
still lurthcr indications ol impcnding war. n cccmbcr 1 wc
translatcd and rcad a Novcmbcr 30 dispatch lrom Tokyo to thc
]apancsc ambassador in 8crlin advising him:
Tc convcrsations . . . bctwccn Tokyo and Vashington . . . now
stand rupturcd. . . . |T|hcrc is cxtrcmc dangcr that war may
suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc AngloSaxon nations and
]apan through somc clash ol arms, and . . . this war may comc
quickcr than anyonc drcams.
63

59
!bid, part 12, p. 100 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #736, Novcmbcr 5), also part 33, p.
1365.
60
!bid., part 33, p. 776 ( ]apancsc Circular 2319), also part 12, pp. 12627.
61
!bid., part 33, p. 775, 1366, also part 12, pp. 13738.
62
!bid., part 33, p. 1366 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #812), also part 12, p. 165.
63
Also on cccmbcr 1, wc rcad a long intcrccptcd mcssagc
lrom thc ]apancsc ambassador in 8crlin to Tokyo rcporting that
Gcrman Forcign Ministcr Ribbcntrop had said, Should ]apan
bccomc cngagcd in a war against thc Unitcd Statcs, Gcrmany, ol
coursc, would join thc war immcdiatcly.
64
Tokyo also adviscd its Vashington ambassadors on cccmbcr
1 that London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, and Manila had bccn
instructcd to abandon thc usc ol codc machincs and to disposc
ol thcm.
65
Tokyo adviscd Hsinking (Changchun, Manchuria) on
cccmbcr 1,
in vicw ol various circumstanccs it is our policy to causc
Manchuria to participatc in thc war in which cvcnt Manchuria
will takc thc samc stcps toward ngland and Amcrica that this
country will takc in casc war brcaks out.
66
n cccmbcr 2, wc translatcd and rcad a Novcmbcr 28 dis
patch to Tokyo lrom Hsinking:
|!|n thc cvcnt that war brcaks out with ngland and thc Unitcd
Statcs . . . |p|crsons to bc intcrncd: a. 8ritish nationals339. b
Amcrican citizcns81 . . . d. Nationals ol thc Sovict or othcr
third powcrs obscrvcd to bc obnoxious charactcrs with pro
8ritish and Amcrican lcanings arc to bc suitably takcn carc
ol.
67
Vc had intcrccptcd scvcral mcssagcs to and lrom Tokyo and
thc ]apancsc consul in Honolulu conccrning survcillancc ol thc
ships at Pcarl Harbor. n cccmbcr 3 wc rcad a Tokyo mcssagc
64
!bid., part 33, p. 776 (8crlin to Tokyo #1393, Novcmbcr 29, 1941), also part
12, pp. 20002.
65
!bid., part 33, p. 77677 ( ]apancsc circular #2444, cccmbcr 1, 1941), also
part 12, p. 209.
66
!bid., part 33, pp. 75556 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #893), also part 12, pp.
0910).
67
to Honolulu datcd Novcmbcr 15, asking thcm to makc your ships
in harbor rcport irrcgular, but at a ratc ol twicc a wcck.
68
n
cccmbcr 4, wc lcarncd that on Novcmbcr 20, Tokyo had told thc
consul gcncral in Honolulu to invcstigatc comprchcnsivcly thc
cct _______|sic| bascs in thc ncighborhood ol thc Hawaiian
military rcscrvation.
69
Saord tcsticd: n cccmbcr 5 wc
lcarncd that Tokyo had instructcd |thc consul| in Honolulu on
Novcmbcr 29: !n thc luturc, rcport cvcn whcn thcrc arc no ship
movcmcnts.
70

uring thc Hart inquiry, Saord had tcsticd about thc
Vinds Codc, but thc ]apancsc intcrccpts had not thcn bccn
availablc. Saord brought thc subjcct up again. Tc ]apancsc
mcssagc sctting up thc Vinds Codc had bccn scnt lrom Tokyo,
Saord said, on Novcmbcr 19.
71
!t providcd lor inscrting lalsc
wcathcr rcports, cach containing a sccrct mcaning, in thc mid
dlc and at thc cnd ol daily ]apancsc languagc shortwavc ncws
broadcasts, pcrmitting thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt to rcach hcr
rcprcscntativcs around thc world in thc cvcnt it could no longcr
communicatc in normal codc.
72
Saord tcsticd that his rst indi
cation thc codc sctup had bccn implcmcntcd and that a Vinds
Codcs xccutc had actually bccn pickcd up camc on cccmbcr
4, around 8:00 ~.:. Hc had not sccn a copy ol thc translation sincc
about thc 15th ol cccmbcr, 1941, but to thc bcst ol his rccol
lcction, thc translation had said, Var with Amcrica, war with
ngland, and pcacc with Russia.
73
Tis Vinds Codc xccutc,
thc Navy cpartmcnt communications intclligcncc unit had thcn
68
69
!bid., part 12, p. 263 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #111).
70
!bid., part 33, pp. 777, 1379 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #122), also part 12, p. 263.
71
!bid., part 33, pp. 738, 1368 ( ]apancsc circular #2353), also part 12, p. 154.
72
!bid., part 33, pp. 77075, Saord tcstimony.
73
!bid.
rcgardcd . . . as dcnitcly committing thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt
to war with thc Unitcd Statcs and 8ritain.
74

Saord was askcd:
Captain, in a prcvious answcr you statcd that thc copy ol thc
intcrccpt using thc winds codc which you saw on thc morning
ol 4 cccmbcr 1941 indicatcd a brcak in diplomatic rclations
bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apan and ]apan and Grcat
8ritain, and war bctwccn thcsc nations. Vas thcrc anything
in thc cstablishmcnt ol thc codc originally which would indi
catc . . . war as contrastcd with a mcrc brcak in diplomatic
rclations:
Saord said,
Tc utch translation said war. Tc ]apancsc languagc is vcry
vaguc and you can put a numbcr ol constructions or intcrprcta
tions or translations on thc samc mcssagc. !n vcry important
documcnts it was customary lor thc Army and Navy to makc
indcpcndcnt translations. . . . Tc gcncral lacts would bc alikc.
Howcvcr, thc pcoplc in Communications !ntclligcncc and thc
pcoplc in Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc and thc pcoplc in thc Far
astcrn Scction ol Naval !ntclligcncc, as wcll as thc ircctor
ol Naval !ntclligcncc, considcrcd that mcant war, that it was a
signal ol cxccutc lor thc ]apancsc war plans.
75

Saord continucd, |!|mmcdiatc distribution |ol thc Vinds
Codc xccutc| was madc to thc rcgular pcoplc bclorc 9:00
~.:., that morning. !t wcnt to thc dircctor ol naval intclligcncc
(Vilkinson), thc dircctor ol war plans (Turncr), thc dircctor ol
naval communications (Noycs), thc assistant chicl ol naval opcra
tions (!ngcrsoll), and thc chicl ol naval opcrations (Stark). Copics
wcrc also scnt to thc Statc cpartmcnt, thc Vhitc Housc, and thc
74
!bid., part 26, pp. 39094, cspccially p. 394, Saord tcstimony bclorc thc
Hart !nquiry.
75
!bid., part 33, pp. 77273.
Var cpartmcnt. And, Saord said, this mcssagc was includcd
in thc routinc distribution, which was madc around noon cach
day.
76
Saords doggcd scarch lor thc prcattack intcrccpts locatcd
most ol thcm, including thc Novcmbcr 19 Vinds Codc sctup
mcssagc.
77
Howcvcr, in spitc ol rcpcatcd scarchcs sincc mid
Novcmbcr 1943, hc said hc could nd no tracc ol its implc
mcntation.
78
Tus doubt was cast on whcthcr thc ]apancsc had
cvcr actually uscd a Vinds Codc xccutc to communicatc
with thcir ovcrscas o cials. A grcat many mcssagcs and othcr
matcrial wcrc misplaccd during lrcqucnt movcs conscqucnt to
thc growth ol thc Naval !ntclligcncc organization, Saord said,
although hc thought all thc ]apancsc mcssagcs intcrccptcd had
bccn locatcd or accountcd lor except this Winds Code Execute.
vcn thc Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc had lailcd to locatc
a singlc copy. |T|his Vinds Mcssagc, Saord said, is vcry con
spicuous by its abscncc.
79
Hc continucd with his tcstimony about intcrccpts not givcn
to thc court. n Novcmbcr 26, 1941, thc Unitcd Statcs had
rcjcctcd thc ]apancsc proposal lor a modus vivendi. Tcnsion and
unccrtainty prcvailcd among top Vashington o cials, thc Statc
cpartmcnt was on thc qui vive. n Novcmbcr 28, whcn our
Statc cpartmcnt o cials rcad thc intcrccpt saying that Tokyo
would rcply in two or thrcc days to what thcy callcd our humil
iating proposal, thc cpartmcnt rcalizcd thc ]apancsc govcrn
mcnt was not going to agrcc to our tcrms. ]apans ambassadors
wcrc told by thcir govcrnmcnt that ncgotiations will bc dc lacto
rupturcd but not to givc thc imprcssion that thc ncgotiations
76
!bid., p. 773.
77
!bid., pp. 738, 1368 ( ]apancsc circular #2353), pp. 755, 1367 ( ]apancsc
circular #2354), also part 12, pp. 15455.
78
!bid., part 33, p. 772.
79
!bid., p. 782.
|wcrc| brokcn o. Mcrcly say to thcm |thc U.S. o cials| that
you arc awaiting instructions.
80
Tus thosc privy to thc intcrccpts
kncw that, in thc words Stanlcy K. Hornbcck, spccial assistant to
Sccrctary ol Statc Hull, |T|hcrc would bc no lurthcr ncgotia
tions bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd Statcs.
81
Saord tcsticd that Tokyo scrial No. 901 |thc Pilot
Mcssagc announcing thc impcnding arrival ol Tokyos #902, thc
14part rcply| in nglish to thc Amcrican notc ol Novcmbcr 26,
1941.
82
Saord continucd:
n this wcckcnd |cccmbcr 67| wc handlcd about thrcc
timcs thc normal mcssagcs lor a busy day. Tc most important
was a vcry long, 14part mcssagc which containcd thc ]apancsc
dcclaration ol war. . . . Up to this timc, thc languagc implicd had
bccn vcry courtcous. 8ccausc ol thc harsh and abusivc languagc
uscd throughout this |thc ]apancsc rcply|, thcrc was no doubt
in thc minds ol thc mcn who wcrc on watch at thc timc that
thc ]apancsc mcant war and that this was thcir dcclaration.
83

Saord was askcd il hc kncw whcthcr any inlormation con
ccrning thc mcssagcs which you havc outlincd was scnt to Kimmcl
or 8loch in Hawaii.
Saord: Tc only inlormation scnt him |sic|, was with rclcr
cncc to thc ]apancsc dcstroying thcir codc machincs.
84

Saord was thcn askcd spccically about thc mcssagc trans
latcd and rcad in Vashington on cccmbcr 1, in which Tokyo
noticd 8crlin that war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn thc
80
!bid., part 12, p. 195, ]apancsc intcrccpt #844.
81
!bid., part 33, p. 784.
82
!bid., p. 783.
83
!bid., p. 783.
84
!bid., p. 782.
AngloSaxon nations and ]apan. . . . |T|hc timc ol thc brcaking
out ol this war may comc quickcr than anyonc drcams.
Saord: Tat was not scnt . . . ncithcr to |Kimmcl| nor |Hart
in Manila|.
85
Saord kncw ol onc attcmpt to disscminatc intcrccpt inlor
mation to Kimmcl and 8loch. Commandcr McCollum, chicl ol
thc Far astcrn scction ol naval intclligcncc, wrotc up a long
mcssagc about 4 or 5 or 6 pagcs long, approximatcly 500 words,
giving a complctc and bricl and vcry lorcclul summary ol dcvcl
opmcnts up to that timc, up to 4 cccmbcr, 1941. n thc altcr
noon ol cccmbcr 4, Saord had bccn in thc o cc ol Admiral
Lcigh Noycs, dircctor ol naval communications, whcn Captain
Tcodorc S. Vilkinson, dircctor ol thc o cc ol naval intclligcncc,
camc in with McCollums mcssagc lor Kimmcl and gavc it to
Noycs to rcad. As Noycs nishcd a pagc, hc handcd it to Saord
to rcad. According to his tcstimony,
!t was a vcry complctc summary ol what had happcncd. !t
bcgan with thc withdrawal ol ]apancsc mcrchant ships lrom thc
Atlantic and !ndian ccans in ]uly. !t mcntioncd thc cvacuation
ol ]apancsc Nationals lrom Malaya and thc Ncthcrlands ast
!ndics. !t includcd thc lact that diplomatic rclations wcrc at
an impassc, that ncithcr party would yicld, and it had a dircct
rclcrcncc to thc winds mcssagc . . . and said that wc considcrcd
that this was . . . thc signal ol cxccutc ol thc ]apancsc war plans,
that wc cxpcctcd that war was immincnt.
According to Saord, McCollum had donc a vcry thorough job.
Vhcn Noycs nishcd rcading, Vilkinson askcd what hc thought
ol it. Noycs rcspondcd, ! think its an insult to thc intclligcncc ol
thc CommandcrinChicl.
85
!bid., p. 782. For Tokyo8crlin mcssagc, scc part 12, pp. 20405.
According to Saords tcstimony, Vilkinson disagrccd,
saying
Admiral Kimmcl is a vcry busy man and may not scc thc
picturc as clcarly as you and ! do. ! think it only lair to thc
CommandcrinChicl that hc bc givcn this inlormation and !
am going to scnd it il ! can gct it rclcascd by thc lront o cc.
Vilkinson thcn lclt, Saord prcsumcd, to scc Admiral Royal .
!ngcrsoll, assistant CN, and to havc thc mcssagc rclcascd. Until
Novcmbcr 1943, Saord had assumcd that it had bccn scnt. 8ut
it hadnt!
86
CN Ab:iv~i S)~vxs Mv:ovy is Poov
Admiral Stark was thcn callcd back to thc witncss stand
and askcd about spccic mcssagcs. His Novcmbcr 24 mcssagc
to thc cld commandcrs may wcll havc bccn bascd upon or ccr
tainly had takcn into considcration thc ]apancsc intcrccpts. !t
had warncd that a lavorablc outcomc ol ncgotiations with ]apan
vcry doubtlul. . . . |A| surprisc aggrcssivc movcmcnt in any dircc
tion including attack on Philippincs or Guam is a possibility.
87

Morcovcr, thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc announccd,
Ncgotiations with ]apan . . . havc ccascd and an aggrcssivc movc
by ]apan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days . . . against cithcr
thc Philippincs Tai or Kra pcninsula or possibly 8ornco.
88

!n his mcssagcs to thc cld commandcrs Stark had not mcn
tioncd any ol thc ]apancscannounccd dcadlincs in his dispatchcs,
hc had bccomc lccry ol datcs. !l ! had sct a datc ol thc 25th, lor
cxamplc, hc said,
86
!bid., part 33, pp. 77475.
87
!bid., p. 788, scc CN ispatch 242005, part 14, p. 1405.
88
!bid., part 33, p. 789, scc CN ispatch 272337, part 14, p. 1406.
and nothing happcncd on thc 25th, it would havc, in my opin
ion, bccn bad ball. Again, il ! had scnt a datc ol thc 29th . . . and
nothing had happcncd, again it would probably havc wcakcncd
thc dispatch which wc did scnd, and which, in my opinion,
covcrcd thc situation. ]udging by what is now pcrhaps hind
sight, ! am glad that ! did not includc thc datcs.
89

Starks mcmory appcarcd poor. Hc did not rccall sccing thc
documcnt mcntioning thc Vinds Codc. According to him, thc
sctup intcrccpt, translatcd Novcmbcr 28, addcd nothing to what
! had alrcady scnt in thc |war warning| dispatch ol thc 27th.
90

Hc did not rccall thc ]apancsc ambassadors twopart dispatch ol
Novcmbcr 26, summarizing lor thcir govcrnmcnts bcnct thc
U.S. proposal ol that day.
91
Nor did Stark rcmcmbcr sccingin
thc lorm in which it was prcscntcd to thc NC!thc Tokyo mcs
sagc ol cccmbcr 1 rcporting that thc situation continucs to
bc incrcasingly critical but that to prcvcnt thc Unitcd Statcs
lrom bccoming unduly suspicious wc |thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt|
havc bccn advising thc prcss . . . thc ncgotiations arc continu
ing. !t may vcry wcll havc bccn discusscd at that timc. 8ut in
any cvcnt, hc said, it addcd nothing . . . to what had bccn scnt
out lormcrly.
92
Stark did not rcmcmbcr spccically thc Tokyo
rcqucsts lor rcports rclativc to ships in Pcarl Harbor. Nor did hc
rccall Tokyos rcqucst about ships by spccic arcas thcrc. Vhcn
askcd il hc rcmcmbcrcd thc mcssagc translatcd cccmbcr 6, rcl
ativc to thc movcmcnts ol Amcrican warships in Pcarl Harbor,
thc courscs takcn and spccds maintaincd, hc answcrcd, No, !
do not.
89
!bid., part 33, pp. 78889.
90
!bid., p. 789.
91
!bid.
92
!bid., p. 791.
Vas any inlormation conccrning |thc shipsinharbor mcs
sagcs| scnt by you to thc CommandcrinChicl, Pacic Flcct:
Stark: No ! think not.
93
And Stark did not rccall sccing thc Pilot Mcssagc intcrccpt.
94

Askcd il hc had sccn or bccn madc acquaintcd with thc contcnts
ol ]apans 14part rcply bclorc thc attack, Stark said hc had not
sccn it and didnt havc thc slightcst rccollcction ol having sccn its
contcnts.
95
Vhcn askcd latcr il hc kncw on cccmbcr 6 that 13
parts wcrc at thc Navy cpartmcnt, hc rcplicd, ! did not know
it.
96
Many mcssagcs wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington during thc
wccks bclorc thc attack on Pcarl Harbor. !t was physically impos
siblc, Stark said, lor him to havc rcad, or cvcn to havc sccn, all
thc intcrccpts. Hc cxplaincd thc Navy cpartmcnt proccdurc lor
dclivcring classicd inlormation to him as CN:
Somc ! saw dircctly. Somc camc to mc with cvaluations.
Somctimcs somc camc to mc with a gcncral picturcsomc
timcs orally, somctimcs on a writtcn mcmorandum. To takc
a singlc dispatch with a spccic qucstion, wc may rcad into it
now, in thc light ol hindsight, what wc couldnt scc thcn.
Stark said, howcvcr, that hc was in complctc touchat lcast
that ! assumcd ! was in complctc touchwith thc broad gcn
cral trcnd. Vc wcrc unqucstionably continually talking things
ovcr. And, hc said, hc always aimcd to kccp thc commandcrs
in thc cld adviscd ol thcir conclusions, wc did not scnd thcm
cvcry spccic documcnt.
97
Tc gcncral tcnor ol Starks rcmarks
93
!bid., pp. 79394.
94
!bid., p. 792.
95
!bid.
96
!bid., p. 801.
97
!bid., p. 791.
throughout his tcstimony was that hc bclicvcd hc had convcycd
to Kimmcl all thc inlormation hc nccdcd.
Av:y Cnivv ov S)~vv Gvxvv~i M~vsn~iis
Mv:ovy is Poov
Gcncral Marshall appcarcd bclorc thc NC!. Sincc that trag
cdy occurrcd, hc said, his wholc attcntion had bccn turncd to
othcr things lrom that instant, and ! didnt scc a rccord or look
at a thing until, as a mattcr ol lact, thc last day or two, trying to
gct somcthing lor this board. Hc had considcrcd thc prcattack
cvcnts simply watcr ovcr thc dam.
98
Marshall tcsticd at lcngth about thc problcms ol supply
ing mcn and matcricl to thc outlying military postsHawaii,
thc Philippincs, Panama, and thc Pacic !slandswhilc at thc
samc timc supporting Grcat 8ritain in thc Atlantic and Alrica,
and continuing thc training ol mcn hcrc at homc.
99
||ur rcla
tions with thc ]apancsc appcarcd to dcgcncratc progrcssivcly
throughout 1941, hc said. !n Fcbruary thc Army and Navy
dcpartmcnts dccidcd to takc all thc womcn and childrcn out ol
thc Philippincs. According to Marshall, in ]uly and August thc
situation bccamc conspicuously critical. Tat was thc timc ol thc
cnlorccmcnt ol thc cconomic sanctions against ]apan. Hc had
thought lor somc timc that war was immincnt. Hc and Stark
wcrc trying
to do all in our powcr hcrc at homc, with thc Statc cpartmcnt
or othcrwisc, to try to dclay this brcak to thc last momcnt,
bccausc ol our statc ol unprcparcdncss and bccausc ol our
involvcmcnt in othcr parts ol thc world.
100
98
!bid., part 32, p. 557.
99
!bid., pp. 55459.
100
!bid., p. 560.
Marshall continucd:
Tc inlormation that wc obtaincd lrom thc ]apancsc actions
in China, and particularly as thcy approachcd !ndoChina, as
wcll as lrom our most sccrct sourccs, pointcd to an cvidcnt
intcntion to movc into Tailand. . . . !t sccmcd to us that thcy
wcrc dcnitcly going to takc somc action to cut thc 8urma
Road, possibly closing thc port ol Rangoon. !t sccmcd cvidcnt
to us that Malaysiathc MalayKra Pcninsulawas vcry dcl
initcly thrcatcncd. !t was plainly cvidcnt to us that thcy wcrc
accumulating supplics to go into !ndoChina, and apparcntly
wcrc going into Tailand. Vc had no spccic indications . . .
ol thcir intcntions rcgarding thc Philippincs othcr than thosc
which automatically suggcstcd thcmsclvcs to us gcographically.
. . . |V|c had rcports ol movcmcnts ol convoys down thc coast
ol !ndoChina.
Marshall rccallcd no indication ol any ]apancsc plans in prcpara
tion lor an assault on Hawaii.
101
Vith rcspcct to thc intcrccpts, Marshall did not rccall thc
Tokyo mcssagc sctting Novcmbcr 29, 1941, as thc dcadlinc by
which thc ]apancsc ambassadors should complctc thcir ncgotia
tions with thc Unitcd Statcs, although hc was rcasonably ccrtain
that hc had sccn or bccn inlormcd about it.
102
Hc had a vcry
dim rccollcction ol thc Vinds Codc sctup intcrccpt, but didnt
rccall any inlormation about any part ol thc Vinds Codc hav
ing bccn put into ccct.
103

Marshall had no dcnitc rccollcction ol bcing on thc alcrt,
cxpccting a ]apancsc rcply to Hulls Novcmbcr 26 notc to thc
]apancsc.
104
Askcd whcthcr, on Saturday, cccmbcr 6, hc had bccn
acquaintcd with thc lact that ]apan had scnt to hcr ambassadors
101
!bid., p. 561.
102
!bid., part 33, p. 820.
103
!bid., pp. 82122.
104
!bid., p. 821.
13 ol 14 parts ol a mcssagc or notc to bc dclivcrcd or transmittcd
at somc latcr datc to our Sccrctary ol Statc: hc rcplicd: ! do not
rccall that ! was awarc ol such inlormation.
Vas his lailurc to rcccivc this inlormation Saturday duc to
somc lailurc in thc cchclons ol command in transmitting thc
inlormation to |him|:
Marshall: ! couldnt say ohand. !t would dcpcnd on whcrc !
was which ! do not rccall on that particular Saturday. ! might
havc bccn quitc a numbcr ol placcs. ! dont know now whcrc !
actually was. . . .
Q: And you havc no rccollcction ol whcrc you wcrc on Saturday
night:
Marshall: No, ! havcnt.
105

Marshall statcd atly that until Sunday morning, cccmbcr
7, hc had rcccivcd nonc ol thc 14part ]apancsc rcply.
106
Marshall was willing to talk about Sunday morning,
cccmbcr 7. Hc had bccn horscback riding and had comc in to
thc Var cpartmcnt immcdiatcly altcr thc ridc. Tcrc hc had
lound thc long rcply lrom thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt. Tis was
a most unusual mcssagc, hc said.
107
Hc rcad it through, natu
rally carclully, and somc parts ol it scvcral timcs to gct thc lull
signicancc ol it. As ! nishcd it ! lound anothcr pagc which
was thc mcssagc rclcrring to 1:00 v.:. as thc spccicd dclivcry
timc.
108
Marshall thcn told about thc lastminutc mcssagc hc had
draltcd, which hc and Stark scnt to thc cld commandcrs, advis
ing thcm that thc ]apancsc had bccn instructcd to dclivcr thcir
105
!bid., pp. 82526.
106
!bid., p. 823.
107
!bid., pp. 82627.
108
!bid., p. 822.
rcply to Hull that day at prcciscly 1:00 v.:., Vashington timc.
109

Tis mcssagc, codcd and scnt as a radiogram, lclt Vashington
about noon on cccmbcr 7. !t apparcntly wcnt through without
dclay to thc Philippincs, Panama, San Francisco. 8ut lor somc
rcason, possibly unusual air turbulcncc, Hawaii couldnt bc raiscd
by radio. So thc dispatch to Hawaii was dclaycd. !t was scnt lrom
San Francisco via Vcstcrn Union.
110

Altcr 24 days ol hcarings, thc NC! translcrrcd its opcrations
to Hawaii. Kimmcls prcattack dccisions and actions wcrc gcn
crally dclcndcd by his lcllow o ccrs. !t was rccognizcd, how
cvcr, that bccausc ol thc shortagcs ol mcn and matcricl thcrc was
incvitably a nccd lor compromiscs bctwccn prcparing lor war and
conducting survcillancc.
N~vy Couvivv Co::~xbvv Kv~:vvs
Mv:ovy Sn~vv ~xb Civ~v
8y lar thc most signicant tcstimony takcn by thc NC! at
Pcarl Harbor was that ol Commandcr A.. Kramcr. Kramcr, a
]apancsclanguagc scholar, had bccn stationcd in Vashington at
thc timc ol thc attack. Hc had bccn attachcd to thc cc ol
Naval !ntclligcncc, Navy cpartmcnt, Vashington, on loan to
P20G, cc ol Naval Communications. Hc bccamc hcad
ol thc translation scction ol thc communications sccurity group
and was rcsponsiblc lor translating all dccryptcd tra c obtaincd
lrom intcrccpts. Kramcrs translation scction had a sta ol civil
ian civilscrvicc translators. Hc normally lookcd ovcr thc impor
tant mcssagcs and cditcd thc translations bclorc thcy wcrc typcd
up, hc translatcd only an occasional mcssagc himscll. As a Navy
couricr also, Kramcr had dclivcrcd many ol thc crucial dccryptcd
109
!bid. For tcxt ol Marshall/Stark mcssagc, scc ibid., p. 1282.
110
!bid., p. 823.
and translatcd intcrccpts to Navy o cials and othcrs authorizcd
to scc thcm.
111

Soon altcr Kimmcls counscls, Lavcndcr and Hanily, arrivcd
in Pcarl Harbor, thcy cncountcrcd Kramcr in thc corridor as hc
was gctting o an clcvator. Kramcr had only just arrivcd lrom
duty in thc southwcst Pacic. Tc two lawycrs introduccd thcm
sclvcs and said: Tcrc is probably onc qucstion, Commandcr
Kramcr, that you will bc askcd. o you rccall thc Vinds Codc:
Hc said hc did.
Tcn, o you rccall whcthcr or not thcrc was cvcr an xccutc
ol thc Vinds Mcssagc:
Kramcrs answcr was immcdiatc: Ycs. Higashi No Kazeame.
ast Vind Rain.
Right likc that, Hanily rcportcd latcr. Vithout any hcsita
tion. Hcrc was a man, just in lrom thc Pacic, and hc was that
dcnitivc about that lormulation.
112
Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC!, hc was just as opcn
and lorthright in his tcstimony bclorc thc court as hc had bccn
in rcsponding to Hanily and Lavcndcrs inlormal qucstions. Hc
dcscribcd thc proccdurc lor proccssing and dclivcring thc largc
volumc ol ]apancsc intcrccpts pickcd up in thc wccks prcccd
ing thc attack. Hc discusscd spccic dispatchcsthc ]apancsc
instructions to thcir ovcrscas diplomatic o ccs to dcstroy thcir
codcs, thc shipsinharbor mcssagcs, thc Vinds Codc xccutc,
and thc cccmbcr 67 dclivcry ol thc ]apancsc rcply to thc
Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum.
113
Tc grcatcst pcrccntagc ol thc tra c in thc lall ol 41,
Kramcr said, had to do with two main typcs ol matcrial: nc
was thc ]apancscU.S. ncgotiations, and thc othcr was thc circuit
111
!bid., pp. 848, 849.
112
]ohn Toland intcrvicw ol Hanily, August 29, 1979, on lc with Toland
papcrs, Franklin clano Rooscvclt Library, Hydc Park, N.Y.
113
lrom 8crlin to Tokyo. Tcsc two catcgorics ol tra c wcrc bcing
lollowcd with considcrablc intcrcst and dctail by all thc scnior
addrcssccs. . . . Tcy thcrclorc wantcd to scc thosc things as
promptly as possiblc. Tc skill ol thc U.S. cryptographcrs was
such that, in spitc ol thc daily adjustmcnts madc by thc ]apancsc
to thcir Purplc codc machinc, thc U.S. cryptographcrs wcrc
oltcn ablc to dccrypt a ]apancsc intcrccpt and havc it translatcd
an hour or two bclorc thc ]apancsc ambassador was to mcct
Sccrctary ol Statc Hull to discuss it.
114
To spccd up thc dclivcry ol
this matcrial to Hull and our othcr top o cials, Kramcr said hc
didnt takc timc to writc summarics during thc nal wccks, as hc
had donc carlicr, but would only indicatc subjcct mattcr by
attaching clips to thc mcssagcs in thc loldcrs . . . ol most immcdi
atc intcrcst.
115
Although thc intclligcncc glcancd lrom thc intcrccpts was
ncccssarily incomplctc, Kramcr notcd many clucs to ]apans
intcntions. Tc ]apancsc wcrc ncgotiating lor Tailand to cntcr
thc conict on thcir sidc, on Novcmbcr 30, thcy rcportcd to
thcir Gcrman allics on thc status ol thcir ncgotiations with thc
Unitcd Statcs, thcy askcd thcir spccially traincd cspionagc man
in thc Unitcd Statcs, Tcrasaki, mistakcnly callcd Takahashi by
Kramcr, to lcavc thc country. n cccmbcr 6 ]apancsc ships had
bccn sightcd moving down thc coast ol Frcnch !ndochina and
rounding its southcrn tip approximatcly a days run lrom Kota
8haru,
116
north ol Singaporc on thc Malayan pcninsula ncar thc
bordcr ol Tailand, and thc ]apancsc wcrc vcry conccrncd about
what action wc wcrc taking, whcrc our Flcct might bc, what
action wc might takc in casc thc ]aps did makc a movc against
thc 8ritish.
117
Kramcr tcsticd that thc ]apancsc had wircd thcir
ambassador in 8crlin
114
!bid., pp. 85152.
115
!bid., p. 852.
116
!bid., pp. 85960.
117
!bid., p. 867.
thcrc is cxtrcmc dangcr that war may suddcnly brcak out
bctwccn thc AngloSaxon nations and ]apan through somc
clash ol arms and . . . thc timc ol thc brcaking out ol this war
may comc quickcr than anyonc drcams.
118
Kramcr said hc
prcparcd a spccial paraphrascd vcrsion ol that lor Mr. Rooscvclt
which hc rctaincd, othcrwisc, ncithcr thc Statc cpartmcnt
nor thc Vhitc Housc wcrc cvcr pcrmittcd . . . to rctain any ol
thcsc dispatchcs.
119
Kramcr rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds Codc sctup clcarly. n
rcccipt ol this particular mcssagc, on thc instructions ol thc
ircctor ol Naval Communications, Admiral Noycs, Kramcr
prcparcd somc cards with thc cxprcssions containcd in this
cxhibit, and thc mcaning:
120
H!GASH! N KAZAM
(ast wind rain, ]apanUnitcd Statcs rclations in dangcr),
K!TANKAZ KUMR! ( ]apanU.S.S.R. rclations in dan
gcr), N!SH! N KAZ HAR (Vcst wind clcar, ]apan8ritish
rclations in dangcr).
121
Noycs indicatcd that hc intcndcd to lcavc
thcsc cards with ccrtain scnior o ccrs ol thc Navy cpartmcnt.
According to Kramcr, Noycs arrangcd with Captain Saord, thc
hcad ol p20G, thc scction ol Communications that handlcd
this matcrial, to havc any mcssagc in this phrascology handlcd
promptly by watch o ccrs, not only in P20G but through
thc rcgular watch o ccrs ol thc Communications scction ol thc
Navy cpartmcnt.
122
|A|ll that p20G organization wcrc
vcry much on thc qui vive looking lor that . . . warning, Kramcr
118
!bid., p. 869. Scc also part 12, p. 204 ( ]apancsc intcrccpt #985).
119
!bid., part 33, p. 873.
120
!bid., p. 853.
121
!bid., p. 738, (TokyoVashington Circular #2353). Scc also part 12, p. 154.
122
!bid., part 33, p. 853.
tcsticd.
123
Kramcr also rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds Codc xccutc.
Hc said hc was shown such a mcssagc by thc GY watch o ccr,
rccognizcd it as bcing ol this naturc, walkcd with him to Captain
Saords o cc.
124

Vhcn this Vinds Codc xccutc camc through on
cccmbcr 3 or 4, Captain Saord took thc ball. Kramcr did
not handlc its distribution himscll bccausc ol thc lact that this
was a plain languagc mcssagc, and bccausc ol thc lact that spccial
arrangcmcnts had bccn madc to handlc it.
125
Kramcr bclicvcd
Saord took thc mcssagc dircctly to Admiral Noycs o cc, hc
kncw that Admiral Noycs was highly intcrcstcd in that par
ticular plain languagc codc bccausc ol his prcvious instructions
to mc |Kramcr| to makc out thcsc cards so that hc could lcavc
it with ccrtain high o ccrs and thc Sccrctary, all with thc vicw
ol gctting thc word to thosc pcoplc promptly, whcthcr it was
any timc ol thc day or night.
126

Kramcr rccallcd thc ]apancsc languagc words, H!GASH!
N KAZAM. Tcir litcral mcaning, hc said, is ast Vind,
Rain. Tat is plain ]apancsc languagc. Tc scnsc ol that, howcvcr,
mcant straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possibly cvcn
implying war with a nation to thc castward, thc Unitcd Statcs.
127

!t could bc inlcrrcd to imply as including an actual rupturc ol
rclations, or possibly cvcn war.
128
Kramcr continucd:
|V|c kncw thcy wcrc planning somcthing against 8ritain. . . .
Vc kncw, too, that thc ]aps wcrc vcry much awarc ol thc lact wc
123
!bid., p. 871.
124
!bid., p. 853.
125
!bid., p. 853.
126
!bid., p. 871.
127
!bid., p. 853.
128
!bid., p. 867.
wcrc doing a grcat dcal lor thc 8ritish in thcir war and working
closcly with thcm. !n lact, it was almost a joint lront as rcgards
ncgotiations with thc ]aps. Tat notc that wc had handcd thc
]apancsc on 26 Novcmbcr had only bccn givcn to thcm altcr
consultation, with ]apancsc knowlcdgc, with thc utch and
Chincsc as wcll as thc 8ritish. Conscqucntly . . . thc ]aps wcrc
vcry conccrncd about what action wc wcrc taking, whcrc our
Flcct might bc, what action wc might takc in casc thc ]aps did
makc a movc against thc 8ritish.
129
Kramcr tcsticd about rclaying inlormation to Stark and
occasionally cvcn discussing it with him. Tc majority ol timcs,
Kramcr said, thc loldcr |ol ]apancsc intcrccpts| was lclt with his
aidc. ]ust how much Stark rcad, Kramcr didnt know, but Kramcr
said hc
madc a point ol pointing out to his aidc, his ag sccrctary, which
wcrc thc things ol most immcdiatc importancc or intcrcst to
thc Admiral. ccasionally ! would indicatc that thc Admiral
should scc thcm at oncc, or as soon as possiblc. At othcr timcs
whcn a particular hot itcm . . . camc in, ! would rcqucst pcr
mission to scc thc Admiral dircctly and would takc it in. Tat
happcncd quitc lrcqucntly during thc lall ol 41.
8y lrcqucntly, Kramcr mcant, two or thrcc or lour timcs a
wcck.
130

Vhcn askcd whcthcr Stark had sccn onc ol thc intcrccptcd
TokyoHonolulu shipsinharbor mcssagcs, Kramcr couldnt bc
positivc whcthcr thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations actually saw
it, but . . . it would havc bccn in a loldcr that was lclt in his
o cc.
131

129
!bid., p. 867.
130
!bid., p. 852.
131
!bid., p. 856.
Had Stark rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr 28 intcrccpt stating that,
with thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnts rcply in two or thrcc days to
thc Statc cpartmcnts notc ol Novcmbcr 26,
132
thc ncgotiations
will bc dc lacto rupturcd: Tis mcssagc was dclivcrcd, Kramcr
said, as all thc ncgotiation mcssagcs wcrc dclivcrcd, to thc Chicl
ol Naval pcrations. Kramcr was as ccrtain as hc could bc that
all thcsc important mcssagcs wcrc dclivcrcd to thc cc ol thc
Chicl ol Naval pcrations.
133

Among thc most important mcssagcs Kramcr handlcd was
this ]apancsc rcply to our Novcmbcr 26
134
humiliating, accord
ing to thc ]apancsc, proposal. n cccmbcr 6 wc intcrccptcd
thc Pilot Mcssagc
135
announcing to thc ]apancsc ambassadors
that Tokyo would soon bc scnding thcir govcrnmcnts rcply to
thc Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26 proposal. Tis rcply would bc in
nglish and would bc vcry long, lourtccn parts.
136
!n thc middlc
ol thc altcrnoon, Kramcr bccamc awarc that this mcssagc was
coming in.
137
|!|n guardcd languagc hc cxplaincd to Admiral
Vilkinson thc naturc ol thc mcssagc. Tcn hc procccdcd to thc
Vhitc Housc. From thcrc hc wcnt to Knoxs apartmcnt and
Vilkinsons homc. Kramcr was unablc to rcach Stark that cvc
ning, although hc bclicvcd Vilkinson was in touch with him or
his aidcs.
138

132
!bid., part 33, pp. 870, 1370, also part 12, p. 195. ]apancsc intcrccpt #844,
Novcmbcr 28, 1941.
133
!bid., part 33, p. 870.
134
!bid., part 12, p. 195. Tokyo to Vashington, #844, Novcmbcr 29, 1941.
135
!bid., part 33, p. 1380. Also part 12, pp. 23839. Tokyo to Vashington #901
(Pilot Mcssagc).
136
!bid., part 14, pp. 23945. Tokyo to Vashington #902, 14 part mcssagc,
cccmbcr 6/7, 1941.
137
!bid., part 33, p. 857. !t was in thc ]apancsc codc so it had to bc dccryptcd,
but |a|ll parts ol thc |14part| mcssagc wcrc in nglish, so that translation
was not rcquircd (ibid., part 14, p. 1413).
138
!bid., part 33, p. 857.
Tc ncxt morning at thc Navy cpartmcnt, Kramcr said hc
lound thc nal part ol ]apans rcply as wcll as onc or two othcr
mcssagcs.
139
Hc put part 14 plus thc othcr 13 parts and othcr ncw
mcssagcs in a loldcr that hc lclt in Starks o cc at about 9:00
~.:.
140
Vhcn Kramcr rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt at approxi
matcly 1020, a mcssagc dirccting |thc ]apancsc ambassadors| in
rathcr cmphatic languagc that dclivcry |ol thc ]apancsc 14part
rcply| bc madc to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1300 (1:00 v.:.) had
bccn rcccivcd. Also rcccivcd was a scrics ol othcr mcssagcs,
addrcsscd to thc ]apancsc ambassadors. nc dircctcd
nal dcstruction ol ]apancsc codcs still on hand. . . . Tcrc was
anothcr mcssagc thanking thc ambassador lor his scrviccs,
anothcr addrcsscd to thc cmbassy sta, and onc or two othcrs
ol likc naturc. Tat matcrial was dclivcrcd within tcn to ltccn
minutcs to Admiral Starks o cc.
141
Kramcr dclivcrcd thc ncw intcrccpts to thc Statc cpartmcnt,
whcrc Hull, Stimson, and Knox wcrc mccting. !n giving thcm to
Hulls sccrctary, Kramcr cmphasizcd thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry timc
(7:30 ~.:. in Hawaii), lcaring that Knox, a civilian would miss its
signicancc.
142

Ab:iv~i Tuvxvv (V~v Pi~xs) H~b
Ax)iciv~)vb )nv A))~cx, Ab:iv~i Noyvs
(Co::uxic~)ioxs) ouivoc~)vs
Tc NC! stoppcd in San Francisco on thcir rcturn trip lrom
Hawaii to Vashington, to qucstion ircctor ol Var Plans Admiral
Richmond K. Turncr and ircctor ol Naval Communications
139
!bid.
140
!bid., pp. 85859.
141
!bid., p. 859.
142
!bid.
Lcigh Noycs, both ol whom had bccn stationcd in Vashington
bclorc thc attack.
Turncr was askcd what hc kncw about Starks knowlcdgc ol
thc ]apancsc intcrccpts. Hc said hc had discusscd thc supcr
sccrct dccryptcd mcssagcs with Stark lrcqucntly, although thcy
hadnt talkcd about thc importancc ol transmitting thcir contcnts
to Kimmcl.
143
As a mattcr ol lact, Turncr got thc imprcssion lrom
what Stark said that Hawaii had lacilitics lor dccoding thcsc mcs
sagcs and that thcy wcrc actually doing morc ol thc dccrypting
in Pcarl Harbor than wc wcrc in Vashington.
144

According to Turncr, a Var Plan (Rainbow Trcc) was issucd
in ]anuary 1941 that
cnvisagcd a major attack, a major linc ol cort ol ]apan against
thc Philippincs and cithcr 8ornco or Malaya, ultimatcly both,
dcpcnding on thc dircction ol thc strcngth that thcy had avail
ablc. . . . |V|c considcrcd that any attack ol that naturc would
almost surcly bc accompanicd by an attack on thc Hawaiian
!slands and thc Flcct ol onc or morc lorms ol attackair, sub
marinc, Flcct, or a combination ol any ol thosc.
145

Turncr tcsticd that hc had anticipatcd a ]apancscUnitcd
Statcs war cvcn bclorc thc ]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc
rcalizcd that 8ritish and Unitcd Statcs rclationships had bccomc
vcry closc. Although hc kncw
nothing about what assuranccs wcrc givcn by thc prcsidcnt to
Grcat 8ritain . . . |hc| was convinccd thcn that il ]apan attackcd
8ritain in thc Far ast that thc Unitcd Statcs would immcdi
atcly cntcr thc war against ]apan.
Turncr bclicvcd
143
!bid., p. 886.
144
!bid., pp. 88182.
145
!bid., part 32, p. 605.
a ccrtain scction ol thc ]apancsc hicrarchy wcrc vcry anxious to
kccp thc Unitcd Statcs out ol thc war, that is, kccp thc Unitcd
Statcs lrom assisting Grcat 8ritain, but many ol thc movcs
that had bccn madc against ]apan during 1940 and 41 wcrc
madc by thc Unitcd Statcs.
146

Vhcn thc ]apancsc asscts in thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc lrozcn by
cxccutivc ordcr in ]uly 1941, Turncr said hc
had cxprcsscd thc opinion prcviously, and ! again cxprcsscd it,
that that would vcry dcnitcly bring on war with ]apan. Tcrc
was no possibility ol composing mattcrs altcr that unlcss ]apan
madc a complctc backdown, which it was vcry apparcnt shc
was not going to do.
147
Turncr had hclpcd dralt thc Navys Novcmbcr 24 mcssagc
warning thc cld commandcrs that a surprisc aggrcssivc movc
mcnt |by thc ]apancsc| in any dircction including attack on
Philippincs or Guam is a possibility.
148
8y that timc, hc was
pcrsonally convinccd that thcy wcrc going to go into Siam and
also into thc Malay Pcninsula as thc initial movc and also attack
thc Philippincs.
149

Turncr rccallcd discussing with Stark thc substancc ol thc
U.S. notc, thc socallcd ultimatum ol Novcmbcr 26. According
to Turncr, Stark said at thc timc that thcrc wasnt any possi
bility that ]apan would acccpt it.
150
Turncr said, Mr. Hull kcpt
Admiral Stark vcry wcll inlormcd at all timcs. . . . Tcir rcla
tions, Turncr tcsticd, wcrc vcry closc and cordial. So Starks
Novcmbcr 27 war warning mcssagc to Kimmcl had bccn bascd,
146
!bid., p. 604.
147
!bid.
148
!bid., part 33, pp. 117374, CN Stark Novcmbcr 24, 1941 dispatch to cld
commandcrs, #242005, also part 14, p. 1405.
149
!bid., part 33, p. 878.
150
!bid., pp. 87778.
on Hulls advicc ovcr thc intcro cc phonc . . . that to all intcnts
and purposcs thc thing was all ovcr as lar as ncgotiations wcrc
conccrncd.
151

Turncr wrotc thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning, discusscd
it with Stark, and it wcnt out with Turncrs rccommcndation.
Turncr was askcd: Vhy was it |that| thc Hawaiian !slands wcrc
not includcd |in that mcssagc| as a possiblc objcctivc lor ]apan:
Turner: Tc objcctivcs which wcrc put in thcrc wcrc thc stra
tcgic objcctivcs. Vc did not bclicvc that ]apan would launch an
amphibious attack against thc Hawaiian !slands.
152

Howcvcr, Turncr had lclt
an attack was coming, and ! was not at all surpriscd at thc air
attack. ! kncw our carricrs wcrc out, and with thc warnings
which had bccn givcn, ! lclt wc would givc thcm a prctty bad
bcating bclorc thcy got homc. . . . Vc had donc what wc could to
takc prccautions against thc attack carrying through. Tc ordcr
was issucd to dcploy thc Flcct in a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt.
153

According to Turncr, that ordcr mcant
To scnd scouting lorccs out ol dicrcnt kinds, to dcploy sub
marincs in thrcatcncd dircctions, to put thc Flcct to sca and in
a covcring position lor thc Hawaiian !slands and a supporting
position lor Midway.
154
151
!bid., p. 878.
152
!bid., part 32, p. 616.
153
!bid. !ncludcd in thc Novcmbcr 27, 1941 war warning mcssagc (#272337):
ibid., part 33, p. 1176, also part 14, p. 1406, was thc dircctivc xccutc an appro
priatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt prcparatory to carrying out thc tasks assigncd in
VPL46.
154
!bid., part 33, p. 879.
Turncr said hc bclicvcd that thc cccmbcr 7, 1:00 v.:., dcliv
cry timc indicatcd an attack by thc ]apancsc against thc Unitcd
Statcs or Grcat 8ritain. ||n ccrtainly thc Kra Pcninsula, Turncr
said, a landing in Siam and attacks ol onc naturc or anothcr, air
probably, on thc Philippincs, bccausc wc had scouting plancs out
thcrc, and somc lorm ol attack in Hawaii. Turncr considcrcd
that an air attack against thc Hawaiian !slands was onc ol thc
possibilitics, cvcn a probability.
Q. Vcrc you surpriscd on thc morning ol thc 7th whcn ]apan
madc an air attack on thc Hawaiian !slands:
Turner: Not in thc lcast.
155
At thc timc ol thc attack, Admiral Noycs had bccn scrving
in Vashington as dircctor ol naval communications. According
to him, Tc handling ol communication intclligcncc was a
joint aair bctwccn cc ol Naval Communications and thc
cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, thcn hcadcd by Vilkinson. Naval
Communications was rcsponsiblc lor thc mcchanics ol crypto
analysis, including intcrccption which could bc donc by naval
mcans. As intclligcncc was dcvclopcd it was turncd ovcr to thc
cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc to handlc according to thcir usual
proccdurc. Howcvcr, Noycs pointcd out, thc intcrccpts wcrc not
handlcd by thc usual proccdurc as thcy wcrc considcrcd
most sccrcta much highcr dcgrcc ol sccrccy than thc ordi
nary dcsignation, Sccrct, duc to thc lact that it is usclcss il any
inkling rcachcs thc cncmy ol thc lact that wc arc ablc in any
way to rcad his communications.
156
Noycs provcd a rcluctant witncss. Hc avoidcd issucs, or lim
itcd his rcsponscs to thc obvious or irrclcvant. Vhcn askcd,
155
!bid., part 32, p. 616.
156
!bid., part 33, p. 889.
Vcrc you acquaintcd with thc contcnts ol this |war warning|
dispatch on or bclorc 7 cccmbcr 1941: hc rcplicd, Tcsc arc
my initials on this dralt, thosc arc my initials.
157
Q. Vcrc you prcscnt at any conlcrcncc or discussion rcgarding
this dispatch prior to its having bccn rclcascd:
Noyes: Admiral Turncr showcd mc that dispatch bclorc hc
took it in lor rclcasc. Tcsc arc his initials. (!ndicating.) Tcsc
arc minc. (!ndicating.) !t was prcparcd by p12, which was
Var Plans.
158
Noycs couldnt rcmcmbcr what had sparkcd thc Novcmbcr 27
war warning that Ncgotiations with ]apan . . . havc ccascd.
|!|t wasnt bascd on any inlormation that camc through mc.
Vhatcvcr thc statcmcnt was, ! assumcd at thc timc it was cor
rcct. ! hadnt any doubt it was corrcct. ! will bc glad to cxprcss
an opinion. !t is purcly my rccollcctiona gcncral rccollcc
tion, it may not bc corrcct. ! think that at that timc Nomura
and Kurusu statcd that thcy wcrc through. Tc Unitcd Statcs
hadnt acccptcd what thcy had proposcd, and ncgotiations wcrc
supposcd to bc ovcr. Altcrwards, thcy wcrc rcopcncd, likc all
diplomatic situations, it was a casc ol blu at thc timca dip
lomatic blu in rcgard to thc ccasing ol ncgotiations, but that
is purcly my mcmory, and that wasnt anything that ! had any
o cial knowlcdgc ol.
159
Tc judgc advocatc tricd to dctcrminc il thcrc was somc spc
cial rcason lor scnding, on cccmbcr 4, thc dispatch dirccting
thc Naval Station, Guam, to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial
157
!bid., p. 892.
158
!bid.
159
!bid.
publications.
160
Tat was whcn Saord said thc Vinds Codc
xccutc had bccn rcccivcd,
Noyes: Tis was onc ol a scrics ol dispatchcs scnt, dirccting
thc dcstruction ol all sccrct publications in thc Pacic that
could bc sparcd in vicw ol thc immincncc ol war. ! prcparcd
it. !t was scnt on thc 4th ol cccmbcr. Tis is my handwriting
(indicating), and ! prcparcd this dispatch, which is onc ol somc
othcrs.
161
]udgc Advocatc 8icscmcicr pursucd thc mattcr: !mmincncc
ol war with what country, Admiral:
Noyes: ]apan.
8icscmcicr prcsscd on. Vhy did Noycs bclicvc a war with
]apan was immincnt:
Noyes: Tc scriousncss ol thc situation in thc Pacic. ! couldnt
givc you thc cxact itcms as thcy camc up bctwccn thc 27th
|thc datc ol thc war warning| and thc 4th. Tings had gottcn
progrcssivcly worsc. . . .
162
Judge Advocate: 8ut you havc not yct told us thc dcvclopmcnts
|bctwccn 27 Novcmbcr and 4 cccmbcr 1941| . . . which madc
you think this dispatch was ncccssary:
Noyes: No, ! dont think ! could givc you thc cxact scqucncc
ol cvcnts bctwccn thosc two datcs. Ambassador Nomura, and
! cxpcct, Ambassador Kurusu, wcrc in Vashington, and thc
ncgotiations wcrc apparcntly not procccding wcll. Tcrc was
160
!bid., pp. 117879, PNA\ mcssagc #042017, scc also part 14, p. 1408.
161
!bid., part 33, p. 893.
162
!bid., pp. 89394.
no spccic cvcnt that occurrcd on thc morning ol thc 4th that
causcd mc to scnd this dispatch.
163
Vhcn 8icscmcicr askcd Noycs whcthcr hc had sccn thc
Vinds Codc sctup intcrccpt on or altcr Novcmbcr 28, Noycs
said hc had and that hc took stcps to gct immcdiatc noticc lrom
our intcrccpt stations to covcr this point.
164
Tis rcsponsc was
consistcnt with Kramcrs tcstimony that Noycs had had cards
madc up with thc Vinds codc words on thcm.
165
Howcvcr, whcn
askcd latcr about thc cards, Noycs couldnt say.
166

Had Noycs known bclorc thc attack ol thc sccrctary ol statcs
Novcmbcr 26 proposal to thc ]apancsc:
Noyes: ! couldnt say whcthcr ! was lamiliar with this particular
papcr or not. . . . Tat is thrcc ycars ago. ! cant say on what day.
Tis tra c which has my initials, and things that ! prcparcd, !
am glad to tcstily to, but ! cannot say cxactly whcn ! saw or il !
did scc many ol thcsc hundrcds ol dispatchcs.
167

Q. Vc havc tcstimony bclorc this court, Admiral, lrom sub
ordinatcs who wcrc in your o cc as ol this pcriod immcdi
atcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941, that all pcrsonncl wcrc on
thc alcrt lor thc rcccipt ol somc vcry importantor a vcry
important answcr lrom thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt. o you havc
any knowlcdgc ol this situation:
Noyes: From thc timc ol thc 27 ol Novcmbcr, gradually gct
ting morc acutc, wc wcrc making cvcry cort to obtain any
inlormation possiblc. ! couldnt say that wc cxpcctcd any par
ticular mcssagc. . . .
163
!bid., p. 894.
164
!bid.
165
!bid., p. 853, Kramcr tcstimony.
166
!bid., p. 899.
167
!bid., p. 895.
Q. 8ut wcrc you cxpccting any inlormation ol importancc
immcdiatcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941, lrom thc ]apancsc
govcrnmcnt:
Noyes: ! might say wc wcrc hoping. ! couldnt say wc wcrc
cxpccting.
168
Had Noycs sccn or bccn inlormcd about parts 1 to 13 ol
thc ]apancsc rcply, intcrccptcd, dccodcd, and dclivcrcd to top
Vashington o cials during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6: Hc said
hc had not sccn or bccn inlormcd ol thc subjcct mattcr bclorc
cccmbcr 7. Hc did not know whcrc hc was altcr working hours
on thc night ol cccmbcr 6. Nor did hc know whcthcr hc wcnt
back to thc o cc or staycd homc.
Q. 8ut your prcscnt rccollcction is that you havc no knowlcdgc
ol having sccn that documcnt, Parts 1 to 13, on thc night ol 6
cccmbcr 1941:
Noyes: Tat is my rccollcction.
Askcd about part 14, hc rcplicd, Tis mcssagc wasnt translatcd
until thc 7th ol cccmbcr.
Q. Had you cvcr bccn inlormcd ol it at any timc, and il so,
whcn:
Noyes: ! will havc to say ! dont rcmcmbcr.
Noycs said hc did not scc thc nc v.:. Mcssagc instructing
thc ]apancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir govcrnmcnts rcply to
thc sccrctary ol statc at that timc until altcr 7 cccmbcr.
169
Askcd il thc Navy had lacilitics in Pcarl Harbor lor intcrccpt
ing inlormation in thc Purplc codc, which was usually scnt by
168
!bid., pp. 89596.
169
!bid., p. 896.
cablc, Noycs rcplicd, At thc timc thcrc wcrc no lcgal lacilitics |in
Pcarl Harbor| lor intcrccpting cablc. . . .
Q. o ! undcrstand your answcr to mcan that thcy wcrc not
rccciving thcsc cablc dispatchcs transmittcd in thc purplc
codc:
Noyes: ! should say thcy probably wcrc not.
170
Q. id you cvcr inlorm thc Chicl ol thc Var Plans ivision,
Captain Turncr, that thc CommandcrinChicl ol thc Pacic
Flcct was dccrypting intclligcncc inlormation ol a char
actcr similar to that which you wcrc rccciving in thc Navy
cpartmcnt:
Noyes: No.
171

Vhcn Noycs was askcd whcthcr any ol thc codc words as
sct out in documcnt 15 |thc Vinds Codc sctup mcssagc|
wcrc rcccivcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt, cithcr in ]apancsc or in
plain nglish: that is whcthcr thcrc had bccn a Vinds Codc
xccutc, hc rcplicd, Tcy wcrc not.
172
Tcstimony had bccn prcscntcd bclorc this court to thc ccct
that thc cxccution ol thc winds codc systcm was rcccivcd and
that a thorough scarch in thc Navy cpartmcnt lcs had lailcd
to rcvcal a copy ol thc cxccution signal. Noycs was askcd about
that: Vould thc ircctor ol Naval Communications lcs bc thc
normal placcd in which that rccord would bc kcpt:
Noyes: !l it was rcccivcd by naval mcans, ycs. . . . thcrwisc, thc
cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc.
170
!bid., p. 898.
171
!bid., p. 897.
172
!bid., p. 894.
Q. Tc tcstimony bclorc this court was that it had bccn rcccivcd
by naval intcrccpting mcans and thcrclorc thc rccord ol this
mcssagc would naturally bc kcpt in thc lcs ol thc ircctor ol
Naval Communications, would it not:
Noyes: Ycs.
Q. Can you cxplain why this documcnt is missing lrom thc
lcs ol thc ircctor ol Naval Communications:
Noyes: ! dont think . . . that any such mcssagc was rcccivcd by
naval mcans.
Q. Tcn at no timc did you lcarn lrom anyonc ol thc cxccution
ol thc winds mcssagc in any lorm, and at no timc did you tcll
anyonc ol thc cxccution in any lorm ol thc winds mcssagc: !s
that thc way you want to lcavc your tcstimony on that subjcct:
Noyes: Tat is right, ycs.
173
. . . |T|o thc bcst ol my rcmcm
brancc no cxccution ol thc socallcd Vinds Mcssagc was
nally rcccivcd.
174
At thc conclusion ol Noycss qucstioning, hc apologizcd lor
not hav|ing| bccn ablc to answcr thc qucstions morc spcci
cally. 8ut, hc rcmindcd thc Court, it had bccn thrcc ycars sincc
hc had handlcd any ol thcsc mcssagcs, and thcrc had bccn thou
sands ol thcm.
Scptcmbcr 21, 1944, lound thc NC! back in Vashington,
with only a lcw morc witncsscs to bc hcard.
!xvov:~)iox ox Sniv Movv:vx)s
At thc rcqucst ol Stark, 16 mcssagcs bctwccn Tokyo and
Manila, Tokyo and Scattlc, Tokyo and Singaporc, and Tokyo and
173
!bid., p. 900.
174
!bid., pp. 90506.
San Francisco conccrning thc movcmcnts ol U.S. ships into and
out ol thosc harbors wcrc introduccd into thc rccord.
175
Admiral
]oscph R. Rcdman, Assistant ircctor ol Communications, was
askcd il thcrc wcrc othcr similar rcports to Tokyo.
Redman: Vhy, thc gcncral tcnor ol thc ]apancsc tra c was in
a scarching cxpcdition all ovcr thc world as to thc movcmcnts
not only in Unitcd Statcs ports but also in thosc ol lorcign coun
trics. |!t had bccn going on lor somc timc.| uring thc scvcral
months prcccding cccmbcr, 1941, it was intcnsicd.
176
Rcdman admittcd that thc Novcmbcr 16 Honolulu to Tokyo
mcssagc conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl Harbor had
bccn morc spccic than thc othcr ]apancsc mcssagcs hc had
sccn rcporting on ship movcmcnts,
177
cvcn morc spccic than any
answcr lrom Manila, bccausc this apparcntly rclcrrcd to somc
particular chart upon which hc was rcporting.
178
Rcdman was askcd, Can you givc thc court any rcasons why
that |diplomatic tra c| should not havc bccn transmittcd to all
commandcrs in thc Pacic, including thc coastal lronticr com
mandcrs on thc Pacic Coast:
179
Altcr somc discussion ol thc
di culty ol rctaining sccurity il mcssagcs wcrc rccordcd word
lorword, or il thcy wcrc scnt by airmail, Rcdman nally admit
tcd that thc inlormation could havc bccn scnt by couricr. 8ut a
couricr wasnt uscd.
180
r it could havc bccn briclcd, cncodcd,
175
!bid., pp. 908 and xhibit #68, pp. 139196. For morc complctc compilation
ol such mcssagcs including thosc not madc availablc to NC!, scc part 12, pp.
270310.
176
!bid., part 33, pp. 91415.
177
!bid., ]apancsc !ntcrccpt #222, translatcd cccmbcr 6, 1941, pp. 138485.
178
!bid., p. 917.
179
!bid., p. 915.
180
!bid., p. 917.
and thcn scnt, with littlc thrcat to sccurity.
181
8ut that hadnt bccn
donc cithcr.
Ki::vi Rvvivws Pvv~))~cx
Pv~vi H~vnov Si)u~)iox
Admiral Kimmcl said hc had rcccivcd nonc ol thc sccrct
]apancsc intcrccpts introduccd to thc NC! that had bccn rcccivcd
in Vashington bctwccn Novcmbcr 1 and cccmbcr 7, 1941.
182

Hc had, ol coursc, rcccivcd thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning
dispatch. !n rcsponsc to that, on Novcmbcr 30 hc sct lorth in a
mcmorandum thc action which wc would takc in casc hostilitics
should suddcnly brcak out. Hc thought that it was wcll to bc
prcparcd and rcady to takc action immcdiatcly. Tcsc plans wcrc
rcviscd as ncccssary lrom timc to timc and on cccmbcr 5, a ncw
mcmorandum was prcparcd and approvcd and put in thc hands
ol thc Sta uty ccr . . . so that hc would know cxactly what
to do . . . in casc ol an cmcrgcncy.
183

Kimmcl rcvicwcd again thc situation at Pcarl Harbor in thc
months prcccding thc attack.
184
uring thc months prcccding thc
attack, Stark scnt Kimmcl a numbcr ol rathcr gcncral warnings
conccrning thc ]apancsc thrcat in thc Pacic. !n Vashington, tcn
sion was building toward thc cnd ol Novcmbcr, many ]apancsc
mcssagcs wcrc bcing intcrccptcd, dccryptcd, and translatcd cvcry
day ocrcd clucs to thc thinking ol thc Tokyo govcrnmcnt.
Tosc privy to this ultra sccrct MAG!C wcrc wcll awarc that
thc ]apancsc wcrc planning somc kind ol aggrcssivc action. Yct
in spitc ol Kimmcls lrcqucnt rcqucsts to Stark lor inlormation,
181
!bid., pp. 915, 918.
182
!bid., part 32, p. 654.
183
!bid., p. 653.
184
!bid., pp. 65859.
thc actual warnings scnt to Kimmcl rcvcalcd littlc ol this growing
scnsc ol cmcrgcncy.
185

!n Hawaii, Kimmcl put into ccct all thc sccurity mcasurcs
that ! thought wc could put into ccct, and still continuc thc
training at anywhcrc ncar a satislactory condition. Tc war
warning ol Novcmbcr 27 as wcll as thc warnings hc had rcccivcd
carlicr, Kimmcl said, lollowcd a pattcrn that had continucd lor
somc timc. Hc lclt that bclorc hostilitics camc that thcrc would
bc additional inlormation, that wc would gct somcthing morc
dcnitc. Vhcn thc attack actually camc without his having hcard
anything morc spccic, hc
was inclincd to blamc myscll lor not having bccn much smartcr
than ! was. 8ut whcn ! lound, somc timc latcr, that thc inlor
mation was, in lact, availablc in thc Navy cpartmcnt, that
thc inlormation which, il it had bccn givcn mc, would havc
changcd my attitudc and would havc changcd thc dispositions,
! ccascd to blamc myscll so much.
186

Hindsight is always bcttcr than lorcsight. Yct Kimmcl
bclicvcd that, il hc had known what was in thc Novcmbcr 26
Statc cpartmcnt notc to thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt and that thc
Navy cpartmcnt thought this notc would provc cntircly unac
ccptablc to thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt, his outlook would havc
bccn acctcd vcry considcrably.
187
Morcovcr, thc shipsinhar
bor mcssagcs inquiring as to thc disposition ol ships insidc Pcarl
Harbor itscll, wanting to know which oncs wcrc in arcas, thc
rcport ol thc ]apancsc Consul giving in dctail thc courscs takcn
by thosc in thc harbor, would havc indicatcd to mc that thcy |thc
]apancsc| wcrc not only intcrcstcd in thc ships that wcrc in thc
185
!bid., pp. 65557.
186
!bid., p. 659.
187
!bid., p. 660.
Pcarl Harbor arca but that thcy wcrc intcrcstcd in cxactly whcrc
thcy wcrc in Pcarl Harbor propcr.
188

Tcrc wcrc only two ccctivc lorms ol attack against ships
in Pcarl Harbor itscll. nc would bc lor submarincs actually to
cntcr thc harbor. At that timc Kimmcl would havc discountcd
largcly that possibility bccausc hc didnt know thcy had midgct
submarincs. Hc would also havc discountcd thc possibility ol an
aircralt torpcdo attack. Hc would havc considcrcd that about
thc only thing that could gct in would bc a bombing attack.
Tcrclorc, il hc had known about thc ]apancsc mcssagcs asking
about thc spccic locations ol ships in thc harbor, hc would havc
concludcd, Vcll, thcy probably arc going to makc an air bomb
ing raid hcrc. Kimmcl could not scc any othcr conclusion you
can draw lrom it, unlcss you put it down to ]apancsc stupidity in
wanting all this inlormation. And Kimmcl did not think thcy
wcrc so stupid.
189
Vith rcspcct to thc Vinds Codc Mcssagc, Kimmcl said
hc did not want to appcar to bc so wisc now that cvcrything has
happcncd. 8ut still, hc said, hc had
a right to an opinion. . . . Tc dcnitc lact that ]apan, at lcast, was
going to brcak o diplomatic rclations and, at most, was going
to war with us would havc had a vcry grcat ccct on mc and all
my advisors. Tat would havc bccn somcthing dcnitc.
190
Vhat would Kimmcl havc donc il hc had bccn privy to thc
intclligcncc availablc in thc sccrct intcrccpts that had bccn intro
duccd to thc NC!: Hc said that was a vcry di cult qucstion to
answcr . . . altcr thc lact. Howcvcr, hc was surc hc would at lcast
havc alcrtcd all shorcgoing activitics in thc Hawaiian !slands,
including thc Army. Hc would havc
188
!bid., part 33, p. 920.
189
!bid., pp. 92021.
190
!bid., p. 921.
in all probability, had thc Flcct put to sca . . . probably 300
milcs wcst ol ahu in an intcrccpting position lor any attack
ing lorcc that would havc comc cithcr to thc northward or to
thc southward.
Hc couldnt put thcm too lar away, lor hc had to considcr
thcir lucling. 8ut hc would havc put thcm just lar cnough so
thcy couldnt bc rcadily locatcd. Hc was torn bctwixt a dcsirc lor
thc sccurity ol thc Flcct and lor prcparations to makc thc initial
movcs in casc ol war with ]apan. . . . Any Flcct which sits and
waits to bc attackcd, Kimmcl addcd, labors undcr an cnormous
handicap. Howcvcr, hc thought it lair to say that hc would
havc alcrtcd cvcrything on shorc to its maximum that could bc
maintaincd ovcr a long pcriod. Hc would havc institutcd thc
rcconnaissancc to thc bcst ol our ability and ! would havc had thc
Flcct put to sca.
191
Kimmcl addcd, howcvcr, that it was wcll within thc rcalm
ol possibility that had ! takcn thc Flcct to sca, thc losscs could
havc bccn grcatcr than thcy actually wcrc lrom submarinc and air
attack |in thc harbor|. Howcvcr, you must also rcalizc, hc said,
that you prcsupposc thcn that thcy would havc lound our Flcct
and that thcy would havc bccn ablc to dclivcr an attack. !t is
not impossiblc that, had thc Flcct gonc to sca, thc ]apancsc
would not havc attackcd at that timc at all. Tcy might havc
dclcrrcd thc attack. Vc all know how di cult it is to locatc a
Flcct at sca, particularly il thcy do not want to bc locatcd. All
this is in thc rcalm ol conjccturc, but ! think it is lair to say that
thcrc arc somc things to bc said lor kccping thc Flcct in port,
and thc only changc wc would makc would bc to go to a littlc
highcr statc ol alcrt than wc had at thc timc.
192
191
!bid., part 32, p. 659.
192
!bid., p. 661.
|T|hc c cicncy ol thc ]apancsc Air Forcc was, Kimmcl
thought, a surprisc to thc Navy cpartmcnt as wcll as to thc
pcoplc in Hawaii. Vc had on thc ships no adcquatc antiaircralt
dclcnsc.
193
Nor did wc havc su cicnt patrol plancs to maintain
an adcquatc patrol ovcr a long pcriod ol timc. . . . |A| patrol out to
300 milcs or lcss is ol vcry doubtlul valuc, Kimmcl said, particu
larly against air raid. !t was almost usclcss, hc addcd. Kimmcl
wantcd it clcarly undcrstood that giving thc ordcrs to thc plancs
was his rcsponsibility, hc had uscd thcm to protcct opcrating arcas
and in training in prcparation lor war. Hc bclicvcd that
by my doing so wc wcrc cmploying thcm to thc vcry bcst
advantagc. . . . l coursc, had thc patrol plancs, plus all thc
Army bombcrs, bccn out on scarch, wc would not havc had any
striking lorcc lclt.
194

To dctcct a carricr lorcc, it was ncccssary to know that it was
on thc way and also its approximatc timc ol arrival at a ccrtain
placc. To conrm thc di culty ol locating an incoming lorcc,
Kimmcl mcntioncd scvcral attacks, just within thc prcvious thrcc
or lour wccks, whcn our own Navy has gonc in and madc attacks
on ]apancschcld positions at Saipan, Palau, and Manila. !n cach
casc our plancs ccctcd what amounts to a tactical surprisc. And
this in spitc ol thc lact that thc ]apancsc should havc bccn on thc
alcrt lor wc had bccn at war lor ncarly thrcc ycars.
|V|hat is so oltcn ovcrlookcd in conncction with this Pcarl
Harbor aair is that wc wcrc still at pcacc and still conducting
convcrsations. . . . Vc wcrc still in thc pcacc psychology, and !
myscll, was acctcd by it just likc cvcrybody clsc.
195

193
!bid.
194
!bid., p. 662.
195
!bid., p. 663.
N~vy Couv) ov !xouivy Rvvov)
Tc court complctcd taking tcstimony on Scptcmbcr 27
and issucd its rcport on ctobcr 19, 1944. !n thc coursc ol 19
Findings ol Facts, it rcvicwcd thc inlormation rcvcalcd in thc
NC!s ninc and a hall wccks ol hcarings ( ]uly 24 to Scptcmbcr
27).
196

Tc NC! concludcd that
Admiral Kimmcls dccision, madc altcr rccciving thc dispatch
ol 24 Novcmbcr, to continuc prcparations ol thc Pacic Flcct
lor war, was sound in thc light ol thc inlormation thcn avail
ablc to him. . . . |A|lthough thc attack ol 7 cccmbcr camc as
a surprisc, thcrc wcrc good grounds lor thc bclicl on thc part ol
high o cials in thc Statc, Var, and Navy cpartmcnts, and on
thc part ol thc Army and Navy in thc Hawaiian arca, that hos
tilitics would bcgin in thc Far ast rathcr than clscwhcrc, and
that thc samc considcrations which inucnccd thc scntimcnt
ol thc authoritics in Vashington in this rcspcct, support thc
intcrprctation which Admiral Kimmcl placcd upon thc war
warning mcssagc ol 27 Novcmbcr, to thc ccct that this mcs
sagc dircctcd attcntion away lrom Pcarl Harbor rathcr than
toward it. . . .
|T|hc Court is ol thc opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark. . . .
lailcd to display thc sound judgmcnt cxpcctcd ol him in that hc
did not transmit to Admiral Kimmcl, CommandcrinChicl,
Pacic Flcct, during thc vcry critical pcriod 26 Novcmbcr to 7
cccmbcr, important inlormation which hc had rcgarding thc
]apancsc situation and, cspccially, in that, on thc morning ol 7
cccmbcr, 1941, hc did not transmit immcdiatcly thc lact that
a mcssagc had bccn rcccivcd which appcarcd to indicatc that a
brcak in diplomatic rclations was immincnt, and that an attack
in thc Hawaiian arca might bc cxpcctcd soon. . . .
196
!bid., part 39, pp. 297322, Addcndum, pp. 32330.
Finally, bascd upon thc lacts cstablishcd, thc Court is ol thc
opinion that no ocnscs havc bccn committcd nor scrious
blamc incurrcd on thc part ol any pcrson or pcrsons in thc
naval scrvicc.
197

Tc rcport was promptly prcscntcd to Sccrctary ol thc Navy
Forrcstal.
198
Tc prcsidcntial clcction was lcss than thrcc wccks
o. Rooscvclt was running against Rcpublican candidatc Tomas
. cwcy lor an unprcccdcntcd lourth tcrm. Tc war was still
going on. Tc rcport dcalt with an cxtrcmcly scnsitivc topic, thc
rcading ol thc ]apancsc codcs that wcrc still hclping thc Unitcd
Statcs in its strugglc against ]apan. Morcovcr, it had cxoncratcd
Kimmcl, who had bccn blamcd lor thc cxtcnt ol thc catastrophc
and hastcncd into rctircmcnt on thc basis ol thc ndings ol thc
prcsidcntially blcsscd Robcrts Commission. Tcn, too, thc NC!s
criticism ol Stark, a closc lricnd and adviscr ol FRs, could
provc dangcrous in thc political campaign. Forrcstal laccd a dil
cult qucstion: Vhat should hc do:
197
!bid., p. 321.
198
Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9.
549
24.
1944: A Political Year
I
n politics, as in war, crisis is thc normal statc ol aairs. !n 1944,
with thc nation at war, thc Gcrmans and thc ]apancsc wcrc
doing thcir utmost to crcatc criscs lor thc Unitcd Statcs lorccs
ovcrscas. Tc pcoplc ol this country, unitcd in thc war cort, wcrc
working hard. ur lactorics wcrc booming, wcapons, ships, and
plancs wcrc coming o asscmbly lincs at unprcccdcntcd ratcs.
Yct politics docsnt takc timc o lor war. Although thc pcoplc
wcrc patriotic and unitcd in thc national war cort, thcy wcrc
dividcd politicallybctwccn proadministration cmocrats and
antiadministration Rcpublicans. And in politics onc can bc surc
ol onc thing, both partics will try to crcatc criscs lor thc othcr.
Tnv Pvvsibvx)i~i No:ix~)ioxs
n ]unc 26, thc Rcpublican National Convcntion, mccting
in Chicago, nominatcd as its prcsidcntial candidatc thc vigor
ous 42ycarold Tomas . cwcy, a lawycr and lormcr district
attorncy lor Ncw York County, who had won acclaim as a crimc
bustcr, had put mob lcadcrs Lcgs iamond and Lucky Luciano
bchind bars,
1
and had bccn clcctcd, and was thcn scrving, as gov
crnor ol thc Statc ol Ncw York.
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had alrcady brokcn thc traditional two
tcrm limit by running lor a third tcrm in 1940. Although many
pcoplc suspcctcd hc would run in 1944, cvcn his closcst associatcs
did not know lor surc. Finally, on ]uly 11, with thc cmocratic
convcntion littlc morc than a wcck away ( ]uly 1921), hc answcrcd
thc qucstion rcportcrs had bccn asking. Hc rcad to thcm lrom a
lcttcr hc had writtcn thc national chairman ol thc cmocratic
Committcc, Robcrt . Hanncgan:
2
! do not want to run. . . . All
that is within mc crics out to go back to my homc on thc Hudson
Rivcr, to avoid public rcsponsibilitics. . . . |8|ut, hc continucd,
as a good soldicr, . . . ! will acccpt and scrvc in this o cc, il ! am
so ordcrcd by thc CommandcrinChicl ol us allthc sovcrcign
pcoplc ol thc Unitcd Statcs.
3
!t was no surprisc, thcrclorc, that
Rooscvclt was nominatcd on ]uly 20 to run on thc cmocratic
tickct lor a lourth tcrm.
FR was 62 ycars old. Although hc had lost thc usc ol his
lcgs in 1921 through inlantilc paralysis,
4
hc had always bccn vig
orous, hcalthy, and rcsilicnt. 8y 1944, howcvcr, hc was showing
thc strain ol almost 12 ycars ol hcavy rcsponsibility as thc war
timc commandcrinchicl. Hc lookcd thin and gaunt. His doc
tors insistcd that hc rcducc his hours ol work and gct plcnty ol
rcst. 8ut FR and his political adviscrs did cvcrything thcy could
to makc him appcar wcll and vigorous. Rooscvclt took scvcral
1
]amcs MacGrcgor 8urns, Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom, 19401945 (Ncw
York: Harcourt 8racc ]ovanovich, 1970), p. 501.
2
]onathan anicls, White House Witness, 1942-1945 (Gardcn City, N.Y.:
oublcday, 1975), p. 234, Villiam . Hassctt, O the Record with F.D.R.,
19421945 (Ncw 8runswick, N.].: Rutgcrs Univcrsity Prcss, 1958), pp.
26061.
3
Lcttcr to Robcrt . Hanncgan, Vhitc Housc rclcasc, ]uly 10, 1944.
4
]amcs Rooscvclt and Sidncy Shalctt, Aectionately, F.D.R.: A Sons Story of a
Lonely Man (Ncw York: Harcourt, 8racc, 1959), pp. 14145.
1944: A Political Year 551
long trips during thc campaign. Travcl lor Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt
was not strcnuous, as it was lor common lolks, rathcr it was a
timc ol rcst and rclaxation, on trains in comlortablc privatc cars
or aboard luxurious ships in lrcsh occan air and sunshinc.
Tnv v:ocv~)s iiv::~
!n political campaigns, both partics cxpcct criscs. Howcvcr,
FR and his administration laccd two potcntial criscs ol which
thc Amcrican pcoplc wcrc complctcly unawarc. 8oth conccrncd
thc supcrsccrct ]apancsc MAG!C intcrccpts. !n thc rst placc,
thc administration lcarcd thc rcaction ol thc votcrs il thcy lcarncd
at this juncturc, in thc middlc ol thc war, that Vashington o cials
had bccn intcrccpting, dcciphcring, and rcading sccrct ]apancsc
mcssagcs as carly as 1940 and that, thcrclorc, thcy had known a
grcat dcal about ]apancsc intcntions before thc attack on Pcarl
Harbor. Vhy, thcn, thc pcoplc would ask, hadnt Vashington
o cials adcquatcly alcrtcd thc Hawaiian commandcrs: Vhy
hadnt thcy sccn to it that thc cct at Pcarl Harbor was bcttcr
providcd with thc inlormation, mcn, wcapons, and plancs nccdcd
to rcsist attack: Altcr having lost thousands ol lovcd oncs at Pcarl
Harbor and altcr having livcd through almost thrcc ycars ol war,
how would thc votcrs lccl toward thc prcsidcnt and his lcllow
cmocrats: Vould thcy lccl rcvulsion at having bccn dcccivcd
and bctraycd: And would thcy cxprcss that rcvulsion at thc ballot
box in thc coming clcction: Vould thcy votc lor thc Rcpublican
candidatc and against FR:
!n thc sccond placc, thc administration lcarcd thc consc
qucnccs lor thc war cort. Vhat il thc ]apancsc lcarncd that thc
Unitcd Statcs was ablc to dcciphcr somc ol ]apans supcrsccrct
codcs, codcs shc was still using to scnd mcssagcs to hcr diplo
matic and military pcrsonncl throughout thc world: !l ]apan
rcalizcd that thc Unitcd Statcs was continuing to rcad many ol
hcr most privatc communications, shc would changc hcr codcs
immcdiatcly, our armcd lorccs would losc a valuablc sourcc ol
intclligcncc, and thc ghting and killing would bc prolongcd.
Rvvuniic~x Pvvsibvx)i~i C~xbib~)v
vwvy Siivxcvb
Tc Rcpublican Party had lcarncd that U.S. cryptographcrs
had dcciphcrcd somc ]apancsc codcs and had bccn rcading
somc ]apancsc intcrccpts sincc bclorc Pcarl Harbor. As Rcscarch
ircctor lor thc National Rcpublican Party in 1944, ! lcarncd
that cwcy wantcd to makc a spccch on Pcarl Harbor and
Vashingtons knowlcdgc ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts. Vhcn Army
Chicl ol Sta Marshall got wind ol this, hc considcrcd this mat
tcr ol such a highly sccrct naturc that hc lclt compcllcd to prc
vcnt cwcy lrom spcaking on thc subjcct. n Scptcmbcr 25 hc
wrotc a Top Sccrct lcttcr FR MR. VYS YS NLY
and had his cmissary, Coloncl Cartcr Clarkc, handdclivcr it to
cwcy, thcn on thc campaign trail in klahoma.
5

Marshall wrotc cwcy that hc was contacting him without
thc knowlcdgc ol any othcr pcrson cxccpt Admiral King (who
concurs) bccausc wc arc approaching a gravc dilcmma in thc
political rcactions ol Congrcss rcgarding Pcarl Harbor.
Vhat ! havc to tcll you bclow is ol such a highly sccrct naturc
that ! lccl compcllcd to ask you cithcr to acccpt it on thc basis
ol your not communicating its contcnts to any othcr pcrson
and rcturning this lcttcr or not rcading any lurthcr and rcturn
ing thc lcttcr to thc bcarcr.
6

5
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 3, pp. 1130, 1133.
6
!bid., p. 1130.
cwcy rcad no lurthcr bclorc handing thc lcttcr back to
Clarkc. Hc lclt hc could not acccpt thc proviso that hc not com
municatc its contcnts to any othcr pcrson.
7

Marshall discusscd thc situation with Clarkc and Gcncral
8isscll, hcad ol army intclligcncc. Tcy concludcd that thc mat
tcr was so important that wc must makc it a mattcr ol rccord.
So Marshall again scnt Clarkc, travcling in civvics, to scc cwcy,
by thcn in Albany. Clarkc phoncd Marshall lrom cwcys o cc,
saying cwcy was unwilling to rcad thc lcttcr unlcss hc could
sharc thc inlormation with at lcast onc adviscr and bc pcrmittcd
to rctain thc lcttcr in his lcs. Marshall agrccd.
8
cwcy thcn rcad
thc lcttcr.
Marshall wrotc that hc would havc
prclcrrcd to talk to you in pcrson but ! could not dcvisc a
mcthod that would not bc subjcct to prcss and radio rcactions
as to why thc Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army would bc sccking an
intcrvicw with you at this particular momcnt. . . . Tc most vital
cvidcncc in thc Pcarl Harbor mattcr consists ol our intcrccpts
ol thc ]apancsc diplomatic communications.
vcr a pcriod ol scvcral ycars, Marshall wrotc, our crypto
graph pcoplc had succccdcd in rcproducing a copy ol thc ]apancsc
cncoding machinc so that wc could dcciphcr thc ]apancsc diplo
matic codc. Tc ]apancsc wcrc still using thc samc codc, and this
sourcc was providing us with a grcat dcal ol valuablc inlormation.
!t had hclpcd us to win victorics at Midway, in thc Alcutians,
it told us ol thc movcmcnts ol ]apancsc convoys and hclpcd us
in raiding ]apancsc shipping. Marshall told also ol thc scrious
conscqucnccs whcn thc SS had sccrctly scarchcd thc ]apancsc
mbassy in Portugal. As a rcsult ol that incidcnt, thc ]apancsc
7
!bid., p. 1133.
8
!bid., p. 1135.
had changcd thcir military codc all ovcr thc world, thus dcpriving
us ol an invaluablc sourcc ol inlormation.
You will undcrstand lrom thc lorcgoing, thc uttcrly tragic
conscqucnccs il thc prcscnt political dcbatcs rcgarding Pcarl
Harbor disclosc to thc cncmy, Gcrman or ]ap, any suspicion ol
thc vital sourccs ol inlormation wc posscss.
9

As a patriotic Amcrican, cwcy honorcd this rcqucst.
Shortly altcr this, Rcpublican Scnator Homcr Fcrguson ol
Michigan, unawarc ol thc rcason lor cwcys silcncc, also schcd
ulcd a spccch on thc prcwar rcading ol thc ]apancsc codcs.
cwcy callcd Fcrguson to Albany and askcd him not to say any
thing about it. Tcrc was no lurthcr rclcrcncc to thc mattcr dur
ing thc political campaign.
nc crisis lor thc administration was salcly ovcr. 8ut anothcr
loomcd.
APH8 ~xb NC! Rvvov)s Co:viv)vb
Two Vvvxs 8vvovv Novv:nvv ivc)iox
Vhilc thc NC! and APH8 invcstigations wcrc going on,
FR bccamc worricd lor lcar thcrc would bc an advcrsc rcport
by thc Gruncrt |APH8| Committcc just bclorc lcction.
10

Stimson was worricd too. Tc lorccs in Congrcss which had lcd
to thc inquiry wcrc largcly political, hc said, and wcrc trying
to cmbarrass thc prcsidcnt. So Stimson had spcnt considcr
ablc timc prcparing lor his appcarancc bclorc thc board in thc
hopc ol showing how basclcss thc chargcs arc that wc pcoplc in
Vashington wcrc ncgligcnt in any way.
11

9
!bid., pp. 112835.
10
Stimson, Hcnry L. iary. Yalc Univcrsity Library. \olumc 48, p. 101,
Scptcmbcr 21, 1944.
11
!bid., p. 102.
FR wondcrcd whcthcr it |thc APH8| could not bc askcd
to adjourn |its hcarings| until altcr lcction.
12
n ctobcr 13,
Stimson conlcrrcd with thc Navy as to what wc should do in
rcgard to thc two Pcarl Harbor 8oards.
13
Vhcthcr or not thcy
tricd to pcrsuadc thc Gruncrt board to discontinuc its hcarings
tcmporarily is immatcrial, it didnt. Tc NC! and thc APH8
rcports wcrc submittcd to Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal and Sccrctary
ol Var Stimson on ctobcr 19 and 20, rcspcctivcly, only a couplc
ol wccks bclorc thc Novcmbcr 7 clcction. As FR and Stimson
had lcarcd, thc two rcports shiltcd thc burdcn ol blamc lrom
Pcarl Harbor to Vashington.
Tc NC! ccctivcly absolvcd Kimmcl ol rcsponsibility by
concluding that thc stcps hc took had bccn adcquatc and ccc
tivc, that his action in ordcring that no routinc, longrangc
rcconnaissancc bc undcrtakcn was sound, and that his dccision
to continuc prcparations ol thc Pacic Flcct lor war, was sound
in thc light ol thc inlormation thcn availablc to him. Tcn, altcr
lctting Kimmcl o thc hook, thc NC! had chargcd Chicl ol
Naval pcrations Stark with having lailcd to display thc sound
judgmcnt cxpcctcd ol him in that hc did not transmit to Admiral
Kimmcl . . . important inlormation which hc had rcgarding thc
]apancsc situation.
14

Tc APH8s allcgations against Gcncral Marshall, who was
in Stimsons words invaluablc in thc war
15
disturbcd Stimson
cspccially. To bc surc, thc APH8 had placcd a sharc ol thc blamc
on Shorts lailurc adcquatcly to alcrt his command lor war.
16

Howcvcr, it criticizcd Vashington o cials scvcrcly: Sccrctary
ol Statc Hull lor having issucd thc ultimatum to thc ]apancsc
12
!bid., Scptcmbcr 26, 1944, p. 107.
13
!bid., ctobcr 13, 1944, p. 142.
14
15
Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 51, Scptcmbcr 27, 1944.
16
on Novcmbcr 26, in spitc ol thc corts ol thc Var and Navy
cpartmcnts to gain timc lor prcparations lor war,
17
also
Marshall
18
and Gcrow
19
lor not having kcpt Short adcquatcly
inlormcd.
n rcccipt ol thcsc rcports, thc two sccrctarics laccd a
dilcmma. To makc thc rcports public would rcvcal to thc ]apancsc
that wc had brokcn thcir codcs. To rclusc to makc thcm public
would lcad pcoplc to think thc administration had somcthing to
hidc, cspccially in vicw ol thc rumors circulating that thc rcports
would absolvc thc two Pcarl Harbor commandcrs ol blamc and
shilt thc rcsponsibility to Vashington. Tc immcdiatc rcsponsc
ol thc sccrctarics was to rclusc to rclcasc thc rcports at that timc.
Parts ol both rcports wcrc classicd Sccrct and Top Sccrct, so
thcy plcadcd rcasons ol sccurity.
20

Forrcstal acknowlcdgcd rcccipt ol thc NC! rcport to Admiral
rin G. Murn, prcsidcnt ol thc Naval Court. Hc would pcr
sonally cxaminc thc rcport and rccord ol thc Naval Court altcr
thcy had bccn cxamincd and approvcd by thc ]udgc Advocatc ol
thc Navy as to lcgal lorm. Hc would consult also with Admiral
rncst ]. King, commandcrinchicl ol thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct
and chicl ol naval opcrations, to asccrtain how much ol this
matcrial su cicntly acctcd prcscnt military opcrations as to
mcrit a sccurity classication. !n thc mcantimc, pcnding inspcc
tion, thc rcport would not bc madc availablc to thc public.
21

Tc Var cpartmcnt proposcd a commission to rulc on thc
Top Sccrct issuc.
22

17
!bid., pp. 135., 175.
18
!bid., pp. 144., 175.
19
!bid., pp. 142., 176.
20
Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, p. 9.
21
!bid., ctobcr 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9.
22
Stimson iary, vol. 48, p. 186, ctobcr 26, 1944.
Fovvvs)~i ~xb S)i:sox Coxsui)
Av:y ~xb N~vy Lvc~i xvvv)s
vcn as Forrcstal was announcing that thc NC! rcport would
not bc madc public, inlormation about it was bcing lcakcd. Tc
samc New York Times story that rcportcd Forrcstals intcntions to
kccp thc rcport condcntial told ol rcports that had comc lrom
somc quartcrs in rcccnt months, and somctimcs with a political
background, that rcvclation ol all dctails ol thc Pcarl Harbor
attack would clcar Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl and Licut.
Gcn. Valtcr C. Short ol suspicion and, on thc othcr hand, cast
discrcdit on thc administration
23
this in dircct contradiction
to thc ndings ol thc proadministration Robcrts Commission.
Tus, thc rclcasc ol sccrct or topsccrct inlormation might not
only cndangcr thc military but, il thc rcports rcally did clcar
Kimmcl and Short and cast discrcdit on thc administration,
could provc a scrious cmbarrassmcnt to thc administration in thc
coming prcsidcntial clcction.
Forrcstal askcd thc opinion ol thc Navys scnior lcgal o ccr,
]udgc Advocatc Gcncral T.L. Gatch,
24
and ol |Commandcr in
Chicl, Atlantic Flcct| King.
25
Tc Army consultcd its top lcgal
adviscr, ]udgc Advocatc Major Gcncral Myron C. Cramcr, who
wrotc a long mcmorandum lor thc sccrctary ol war.
26
Tcsc mcn
concludcd that ccrtain portions ol thc rcports should not bc
rclcascd in any casc.
Cramcr, Gatch, and King all wcnt ovcr thc APH8 and NC!
hcarings and rcports. !n rcporting to Forrcstal and Stimson,
thcy hcld that thc two boards had bccn in crror in maintaining
that insu cicnt inlormation had bccn supplicd thc Hawaiian
23
Te New York Times, ctobcr 21, 1944, p. 9.
24
25
!bid., pp. 33235.
26
!bid., pp. 23169.
commandcrs. !n commcnting on thc APH8 rcport, Cramcr
rclcrrcd to Marshalls tcstimony to thc ccct that |t|hc |scram
blcr| tclcphonc was not considcrcd . . . bccausc . . . it would havc
bccn too timc consuming to scrvc as a rapid and rcliablc mcans
lor transmitting an urgcnt warning.
27
As to Gcncral Marshall,
Cramcr wrotc thc conclusions ol thc 8oard arc unjusticd and
crroncous.
28
And Short, Cramcr hcld, had bccn
adcquatcly adviscd ol thc immincnt rupturc in diplomatic rcla
tions bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apan, ol thc immincncc
ol war, ol thc probablc momcntary outbrcak ol hostilitics by
]apan against thc Unitcd Statcs, and ol thc possibility ol sabo
tagc and cspionagc.
Shorts
lailurc stcmmcd lrom a mistakc ol judgmcnt on his part. . . .
|Hc| had adoptcd wholchcartcdly what was apparcntly thc
vicwpoint ol thc Navy, namcly, that thcrc was litcrally no
chancc ol a surprisc air attack on Pcarl Harbor.
29

According to King, Kimmcl could and should havc judgcd
morc accuratcly thc gravity ol thc dangcr to which thc Hawaiian
!slands wcrc cxposcd.
30
Conccrning thc NC! rcport, King warncd
that, il thc ncccssary dclctions wcrc madc, a disjointcd picturc
would bc prcscntcd,
lull ol uncxplaincd gaps . . . |which| would lcad to a dcmand ol
Congrcss and by thc prcss lor morc inlormation, on thc ground
27
!bid., p. 260.
28
!bid., p. 267.
29
!bid., pp. 239, 268.
30
!bid., p. 344. Yct King admittcd to Kimmcl a month latcr, in an intcrvicw
cccmbcr 7, 1944, that hc had ncvcr rcad thc procccdings upon which thc
Court had bascd thcir ndings (Admiral Kimmel s Story, Hcnry Rcgncry,
1955, p. 161).
that thc part madc public was incomplctc, and that withhold
ing ol any inlormation is indicativc ol a dcsirc on thc part ol
thc Navy to whitcwash high naval o ccrs. A situation such as
this might wcll lcad to discussions that would inadvcrtcntly dis
closc just thc inlormation that wc lccl is vital to kccp sccrct.
King pointcd out that thc law calling lor thc NC! docs not
obligatc thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy to makc any public statcmcnt
ol what thc Court ol !nquiry has asccrtaincd. Tcrclorc, hc con
cludcd, there is no necessity for making anything public.
31
(!talics
addcd. )
Stimson worricd a grcat dcal about how to handlc thc APH8
rcport. Hc rcscntcd Congrcss lor having quitc unncccssarily
thrown on him this wrctchcd piccc ol labor . . . thc most wcar
ing and rasping thing that ! havc had in thc lour ycars that ! havc
bccn hcrc.
32
Hc rclcrrcd to this task in his diary variously as his
cross,
33
and as |t|hc miscrablc Pcarl Harbor busincss.
34
Hc had
had to spcnd his timc stopping ratholcs bccausc ol |t|hc con
loundcd Pcarl Harbor casc.
35
Tc analyscs ol thc APH8 by Cramcr and ol thc NC! by
Gatch and King providcd Stimson and Forrcstal with thc ratio
nalc thcy nccdcd to rcvcrsc thc APH8 and NC! ndings, to
oncc morc placc thc blamc lor thc cxtcnt ol thc disastcr on thc
Hawaiian commandcrs, and to vindicatc thc acts ol Vashington
o cials. Stimson considcrcd Cramcrs analysis a vcry nc job
rcally a humdingcr . . . a vcry good hclp. . . . |H|c handlcd thc
Pcarl Harbor 8oard without glovcs and had analyzcd vcry carc
lully and yct lairly all thcir mistakcs.
36

31
32
Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 22, Novcmbcr 11, 1944.
33
!bid., p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944.
34
!bid., p. 47, Novcmbcr 24, 1944.
35
!bid., p. 51, Novcmbcr 27, 1944.
36
!bid., p. 49, Novcmbcr 24, 1944.
Sooncr or latcr, ol coursc, o cial statcmcnts about thc Army
and Navy rcports would havc to bc issucd. 8ut lrom thc point
ol vicw ol thc sccrctarics, latcr was bcttcr than sooncr. Tcy ago
nizcd lor wccks ovcr how to word thcir rclcascs. Tcy consultcd.
Tcy composcd scvcral dralt statcmcnts. And thcy agrccd that
thcir announccmcnts should bc coordinatcd and issucd simulta
ncously. 8ut thcy disagrccd as to how lrank thcy should bc.
Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, apparcntly undcr thc inucncc ol
King, lcancd toward making no mcntion at all ol any NC! criti
cism ol Vashington o cials. Sccrctary ol Var Stimson lclt that
hc should at lcast acknowlcdgc that thc APH8 had criticizcd
Vashington o cials, including Marshall. 8ut Stimson cxpcctcd
to cxplain, at thc timc ol making such an acknowlcdgmcnt, that
thc chargcs had not bccn justicd. Howcvcr, his rccommcndation
lor acknowlcdging thc APH8 criticism ol Marshall mct opposi
tion in thc Var cpartmcnt.
37
Stimson rcasoncd that
il wc do not takc thc initiativc oursclvcs and publish thc lact
that Marshall has bccn criticizcd at thc samc timc with thc
vindication ol it, why it will lcak out in a much morc disadvan
tagcous way lrom thc cncmics who arc alrcady in posscssion ol
thc sccrct.
38

According to Stimson, Marshall, who has most to losc by thc
publicity which would comc out ol it, lavorcd Stimsons vcrsion
as altogcthcr thc wiscst thing.
39

Uxvixisnvb Av:y ~xb N~vy 8usixvss
Ncithcr thc Army nor thc Navy was willing to lct thc nd
ings ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol !nquiry
37
!bid., p. 27, Novcmbcr 15, 1944, and p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944.
38
!bid., p. 36, Novcmbcr 20, 1944.
39
!bid., p. 42, Novcmbcr 22, 1944.
stand as thc nal word. Tcy both authorizcd lollowup inscr
vicc invcstigations. n thc oral instructions ol Marshall, Cartcr
Clarkc was askcd to cxplorc thc manncr in which Top Sccrct
communications wcrc handlcd.
40
Stimson dircctcd Major Hcnry
C. Clauscn to invcstigatc Uncxplorcd Lcads in Pcarl Harbor
!nvcstigation.
41
And Admiral Kcnt H. Hcwitt was askcd to
conduct Furthcr invcstigation ol lacts pcrtincnt to thc ]apancsc
attack on Pcarl Harbor.
42

Stimsons and Forrcstals stalling tactics succccdcd. No rclcascs
about thc rcports wcrc issucd bclorc thc clcction.
n Novcmbcr 7 FR won rcclcction lor a lourth tcrm.
FRs vcibvs How ~xb Vnvx )o
Rviv~sv NC! ~xb APH8 Rvvov)s
Tc prcsidcnt was to cast thc dccisivc votc on how thc NC!
and APH8 rcports wcrc to bc prcscntcd to thc prcss. Finally on
Novcmbcr 21, Stimson had a chancc to talk with FR and to
show him his dralt announccmcnt about thc Armys Pcarl Harbor
rcport. Tc prcsidcnt had cvidcntly alrcady sccn and approvcd
ol Forrcstals proposcd noncommittal rclcasc. FR thought thc
lcss said thc bcttcr. Stimson said thc Var cpartmcnt could
not aord to go ahcad and bc lrank whcn thc Navy was not
bcing lrank. And hc thought thc bcst hopc lor kccping o a
Congrcssional invcstigation was to makc such a disclosurc as !
proposcd to do.
43

Stimson showcd Rooscvclt thc conclusions ol thc Gruncrt
board, and FR rcad thcm carclully. Vhcn hc saw thc namcs ol
thc pcrsons thc Army 8oard had criticizcd, hc said, Vhy, this
40
41
!bid., part 35, p. 6.
42
!bid., part 36, p. 359.
43
!bid. pp. 3940, Novcmbcr 21, 1944.
is wickcd, this is wickcd. FR thcn rcad Stimsons papcr and
praiscd it. 8ut hc still adhcrcd to his vicw that thc salcr plan was
to lollow as ncarly as possiblc thc Forrcstal mcthod. Vc must
takc cvcry stcp against Congrcss gctting hold ol thc papcrs and
thc lacts. Vc must rclusc to makc thc rcports public, hc said.
|T|hcy should bc scalcd up and our opinions put in with thcm
and thcn a noticc madc that thcy should only bc opcncd on a
]oint Rcsolution ol both Houscs ol Congrcss approvcd by thc
prcsidcnt altcr thc war.
Tis rcsolution, FR said, should say that that was in thc public
intcrcst.
44

!n spitc ol thc lact that no ncws rclcasc conccrning thc Navy
courts conclusions had as yct bccn issucd, thc New York Times
ol Novcmbcr 26, 1944, rcportcd that thc Army and Navy Journal
had
suggcstcd |that| as a rcsult ol thc rcccnt |Naval| Court ol
!nquiry, Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl might ncvcr bc
courtmartiallcd lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr and that his Army
associatc at Hawaii, Maj. Gcn. Short, would bc vindicatcd.
Tc Times quotcd thc Journal as saying:
Tcrc will bc no courtmartial lor Admiral Kimmcl. . . . undcr
thc ndings ol thc Court ol !nquiry hcadcd by Admiral
Murn, according to gossip in wcllinlormcd Vashington
circlcs. . . . As to thc Army 8oard, which simultancously invcs
tigatcd thc disastcr, it also is said to support thc ndings ol
thc Robcrts 8oard in thc mattcr ol thc lailurc ol o ccrs ol
thc Var cpartmcnt to commcnt to Gcncral Short upon thc
mcasurcs hc had rcportcd hc took to guard thc basc in accor
dancc with thc instructions givcn him. . . . !n thc unlikcly casc
44
!bid., p. 40.
that Gcncral Short should bc courtmartiallcd, his lricnds arc
convinccd that hc would bc vindicatcd.
45

Finally on Novcmbcr 30, altcr Stimson and Forrcstal had
madc somc lurthcr rcvisions, thc prcsidcnt approvcd thcir
rcspcctivc statcmcnts and authorizcd thcir rclcasc. Stimson and
Forrcstal planncd to issuc thcm simultancously within thc ncxt
two or thrcc days.
46

n cccmbcr 1, thc Army and Navy rclcascd to thc public
thcir statcmcnts on thc ndings ol thc APH8 and NC! invcsti
gations.
47
According to thc New York Times (cccmbcr 2, 1944),
Stimson and Forrcstal rcvcalcd that thcy had
lound no cvidcncc to justily a courtmartial ol Maj. Gcn.
Valtcr C. Short and Rcar Admiral Husband . Kimmcl. . . .
8oth Sccrctarics wcrc carclul to spcak ol thc cvidcncc now
availablc, and promiscd lurthcr invcstigation to obtain cvcry
bit ol tcstimony. . . . n thc ground ol national sccurity, both
Sccrctarics rcluscd to makc thc rcal story ol Pcarl Harbor pub
lic until thc war had cndcd. Mr. Stimson considcrcd it highly
prcjudicial to war prosccution and thc salcty ol Amcrican livcs
to disclosc it bclorchand. Tc Navy cpartmcnt said tcrscly
that thc rccord ol thc Court ol !nquiry will not bc madc pub
lic whilc thc war continucd.
!n thcir individual statcmcnts, Sccrctarics Stimson and
Forrcstal conccdcd crrors on thc part ol unnamcd o ccrs at
Pcarl Harbor and in Vashington. Tcsc o ccrs, Mr. Stimson
statcd, did not pcrlorm thcir dutics with thc ncccssary skill
or cxcrcisc thc judgmcnt nccdcd. Mr. Forrcstal sponsorcd a
statcmcnt that thcrc wcrc crrors ol judgcmcnt by o ccrs ol
his scrvicc.
45
Te New York Times, Novcmbcr 26, 1944, p. 44.
46
Stimson iary, vol. 49, p. 62, Novcmbcr 30, 1944.
47
Howcvcr, Mcssrs. Stimson and Forrcstal madc it plain that no
prosccution ol any o ccr was contcmplatcd now.
48

Pvvss Rvvov)s No)v Cox)v~bic)ioxs
8v)wvvx NC!/APH8 Rvvov)s ~xb
~viivv Ronvv)s Coxciusioxs
Tc rcspcctcd journalist Arthur Krock ol thc New York Times
commcntcd on thc Forrcstal and Stimson rclcascs. Hc pointcd
to
a lundamcntal conict ol nding bctwccn thc rcports on Pcarl
Harbor ol thc commission hcadcd by ]usticc Robcrts and ol
thosc composcd ol admirals and gcncrals as rcvicwcd by thcir
dcpartmcntal supcriors. !l Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short
. . . wcrc guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty, as thc Robcrts commis
sion concludcd, thcn it cannot cqually bc truc, as thc Sccrctarics
ol Navy and Var appraiscd thcir o ccrs inquirics, that on thc
basis ol availablc cvidcncc no grounds cxist lor thc courtsmar
tial ol thc arca commandcrs or any othcrs in thc scrvicc.
crcliction ol duty is basis lor a courtmartial, and thc
Robcrts commission imputcd this to both Kimmcl and Short.
Tis lact, Krock said, whcn
contrastcd with thc ncgativc rcsults ol thc o cial inquirics
by thc Army and Navy, makcs an unsatislactory situation lor
cvcryonc conccrncd, including thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs,
who wcrc rcmovcd, rcduccd in rank and rcluscd thc courts
martial lor which thcy rcpcatcdly applicd.
49

48
!bid. pp. 1, 5.
49
!bid., cccmbcr 5, 1944, p. 22.
Vcrc Kimmcl and Short guilty ol dcrcliction ol duty and lia
blc lor courtsmartial: r wcrcnt thcy: Krock bclicvcd Congrcss
would want to scc thcsc contradictions rcsolvcd.
Many mcmbcrs ol Congrcss havc cxprcsscd this dissatislac
tion, and thcir statcmcnts indicatc rcvival ol thc suspicion that
thc lault lor thc surprisc clcmcnt in thc air attack on Pcarl
Harbor by thc ]apancsc rcsts morc hcavily on Vashington
than any publishcd rcport has indicatcd. Congrcss lorccd
thc o ccrs boards ol inquiry on thc Administration, which
clcarly wantcd to lct thc cntirc controvcrsy await thc cnd ol
thc war. . . . Now Congrcss, unlcss thc continucd invcstigation
promiscd by Sccrctarics Forrcstal and Stimson disposcs ol thc
conict bctwccn thc two rcports and xcs rcsponsibility on thc
basis ol pcrsuasivc cvidcncc, can bc cxpcctcd to try to nd out
thc lacts lor thc public and lor itscll.
Krock rccognizcd, howcvcr, that such an invcstigation would
havc to await wars cnd. To rcvcal thc cvidcncc rcquircd to rcsolvc
thc conict, as cwcy had lcarncd during thc prcsidcntial cam
paign, would havc bccn to invitc a chargc ol impcriling sccurity
and thc prospccts ol thc Pacic war.
50

Tc cditorial board ol thc vcncrablc New York Times camc to
csscntially thc samc conclusion:
Tc Sccrctarics ol thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts, and thcir
adviscrs . . . havc dccidcd that on thc cvidcncc now avail
ablc courtsmartial ol any o ccrs arc not indicatcd. . . . !l thc
Sccrctary ol Var and thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, both honor
ablc mcn, both loyal and dcvotcd Amcricans, both vitally and
succcsslully cngagcd in thc prosccution ol thc war, givc it as
thcir considcrcd judgmcnt that lull publicity and a public dis
cussion now ol thc many ramications ol thc Pcarl Harbor
50
!bid.
attack would bc inimical to thc succcsslul prosccution ol thc
war, thcn that opinion must bc hcard with rcspcct.
Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral Short arc cntitlcd to a lull and
opcn inquiry into all thc circumstanccs ol thcir prcparation,
or lack ol it, to mcct a ]apancsc attack. Tcy arc cntitlcd to an
opportunity to givc a public cxplanation. . . . 8ut rst things
comc rst. Vinning thc war is thc paramount duty now bclorc
cvcry o cial and cvcry citizcn. Tc bcst intcrcsts ol thc country
will bc scrvcd il thc qucstion ol rcsponsibility lor thc disastcr ol
Pcarl Harbor is put asidc lor thc duration.
51

Tc ncxt day, cccmbcr 6, an unplcasant account about thc
Pcarl Harbor invcstigation by muckrakcr ncwspapcrman rcw
Pcarson appcarcd on thc lront pagc ol thc Miami Herald. Stimson
considcrcd it unlortunatc that thc prcsidcnt had thwartcd his
original plan lor giving a lull and lrank statcmcnt, and hc con
dcd to his diary that hc
had warncd thc prcsidcnt that thc thing was surc to lcak and
hcrc rcw Pcarson had gottcn hold ol so many lacts that it
lookcd as il all ol thc rcst would probably comc out. Fortunatcly
Marshalls namc was not mcntioncd and somc ol thc things
that Pcarson said wcrc cntircly inaccuratc and wrong and can
bc dcnicd.
52

51
!bid., cditorial, p. 22.
52
Stimson iary, vol. 49, pp. 6869, cccmbcr 110, 1944.
567
25.
Administration Directed
Supplementary Investigations:
Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt
E
ach ol thc thrcc supplcmcntary invcstigations was uniquc.
Tc rst ol thcsc thrcc supplcmcntary invcstigations, thc
Clarkc !nvcstigation, was launchcd at thc rcqucst ol Army
Chicl ol Sta Marshall, whilc thc APH8 was still undcr way, to
hclp him prcparc lor his ncxt appcarancc bclorc that board.
1
Tc
sccond invcstigation, thc Clauscn !nvcstigation, was instigatcd by
Sccrctary ol Var Stimson to look into uncxplorcd lcads in thc
Pcarl Harbor situation lrom thc Armys point ol vicw.
2
Tc third
invcstigation, thc Hcwitt !nquiry, dcalt primarily with thc Navys
situation and was ordcrcd by Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal who had
lound thc NC! invcstigation had not cxhaustcd all possiblc cvi
dcncc.
3
!mplicit, il not cxplicit, in thc dircctivcs sctting up thc
1
2
!bid., part 35, p. 5.
3
!bid., part 36, p. 359, Forrcstals May 2,1945, mcmorandum to Admiral H.
Kcnt Hcwitt.
Clauscn and Hcwitt invcstigations was a dcsirc to uncovcr inlor
mation that might contradict, discrcdit, or at lcast cast doubts on
thc ndings ol thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol
!nquiry, which thc administration had lound unacccptablc.
Tnv Ci~vxv !xouivy (Svv)v:nvv +:o, +o)
Altcr thc APH8 lcarncd ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts, Marshall
was again callcd to answcr qucstions. !n prcparation lor that
appcarancc, Marshall askcd Coloncl Cartcr V. Clarkc to cxplorc
thc manncr in which ccrtain Top Sccrct communications wcrc
handlcd.
4
Marshall hadnt bccn ablc to rccall thc cxtrcmcly
important ]apancsc rcply to thc U.S. Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum
prior to thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Yct scvcral witncsscs had
rcportcd that thc rst 13 parts (ol that 14part rcply) had bccn
rcccivcd and dclivcrcd to top Vashington o cials thc cvcning ol
cccmbcr 6. Marshall was also intcrcstcd in rcvicwing thc cvcnts
ol thc morning ol cccmbcr 7 and his rcsponsc to thc radio
gram advising thc ]apancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir govcrn
mcnts rcply to Sccrctary ol Statc Hull on cccmbcr 7 at prcciscly
1:00 v.:., Vashington timc. Clarkc intcrvicwcd clcvcn witncsscs
who had bccn involvcd with thc rcccipt and distribution ol thc
intcrccpts.
Marshall had Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton, Army intclligcncc
(G2), rccallcd lrom thc uropcan thcatcr whcrc hc was thcn
scrving. 8ratton had bccn rcsponsiblc lor thc prcPcarl Harbor
distribution ol intcrccpts to Army pcrsonncl. 8ratton dcscribcd
thc proccdurc lor distributing various ]apancsc intcrccpts to
thc top military and civilian o cials in Vashington, including
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt, Marshall, and thc sccrctarics ol statc, war,
and navy.
4
!bid., part 34, p. 1.
Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 569
8ratton was also askcd about thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning
to Short and about what intclligcncc had bccn scnt to Hawaii.
8ratton bclicvcd that ]apans 14part rcply startcd coming into
thc Navy on thc 6th, and his rccollcction was that hc transmit
tcd a copy to thc Sccrctary ol Statc that night.
5
Vhcn tcstily
ing, 8ratton rclcrrcd to a mcmorandum hc had prcparcd shortly
altcr cccmbcr 7.
6
Hc dcscribcd his corts to locatc Marshall
that morning, Marshalls arrival in his o cc at 11:25 ~.:., thc
discussion thcn ol thc signicancc ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc,
Marshalls dccision to notily Short, his consultation with CN
Stark, and thc transmission ol thc lastminutc warning.
7

Clarkc thcn qucstioncd Coloncl dward F. Frcnch, Army
Communications Scrvicc, who had actually transmittcd Marshalls
last minutc cccmbcr 7 mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs. !ts
transmission was dclaycd, Frcnch said, as Marshalls pcncilcd
dralt was rathcr di cult to rcad and it had to bc typcd, vcri
cd and authcnticatcd bclorc bcing cncodcd. ||ur channcl at
Honolulu was out, duc to atmosphcric conditions. To avoid thc
risk ol any garbling or crror in rclaying thc mcssagc via Army
lacilitics through San Francisco, Frcnch dccidcd thc quickcst
mcthod ol dispatch would bc via commcrcial scrvicc. So thc
mcssagc to Hawaii was handlcd dircctly to San Francisco via thc
Vcstcrn Union and on a tubc rclay ol this mcssagc to thc RCA
o cc in San Francisco.
8

Major Gcncral Gcrow, assistant chicl ol sta, war plans divi
sion, prcscntcd Clarkc with a mcmorandum hc had prcparcd
cccmbcr 15, 1941 conccrning thc nc v.:. Mcssagc: n
Sunday, cccmbcr 7, 1941, about 11:30 ~.:., .S.T., Gcncral
Marshall callcd mc to his o cc. 8ratton was thcrc and was
5
!bid., p. 21.
6
!bid., p. 19.
7
!bid., pp. 10, 1920, 2021.
8
!bid., pp. 3233.
dircctcd to takc Marshalls pcncilcd dralt to thc mcssagc ccntcr
and havc it scnt immcdiatcly by thc most cxpcditious mcans
to thc Philippincs, Panama Canal, Hawaii and thc Vcst Coast
command.
9
Gcrow told Clarkc that G2 (Army !ntclligcncc), not his war
plans division, was to advisc Hawaiian G2 with rcspcct to sabo
tagc. Tcrclorc, any rclcrcncc to subvcrsivc activitics and sabo
tagc had bccn strickcn out ol thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning.
Gcrow had considcrcd that mcssagc a dcnitc warning to bc on
thc alcrt, not only against sabotagc, but also against a possiblc
cncmy ocnsivc. Gcrow admittcd Shorts rcsponsc lclt no room
lor misundcrstanding, hc had dcnitcly takcn all thc ncccssary
prccautions against sabotagc
10
and sabotagc only.
Gcncral Milcs, acting assistant chicl ol sta, G2, also tcsticd
lor Clarkc. Milcs was thoroughly lamiliar with thc MAG!C intcr
ccpts, but his mcmory was vcry hazy about whcthcr thc Vinds
Mcssagc had bccn implcmcntcd, hc did not rcmcmbcr sccing
any documcnt on it, any writtcn statcmcnt on it.
11
According
to Milcs, 8ratton, chicl ol thc Far astcrn scction during this
pcriod, sclcctcd thc important Ultra inlormation lor Marshall.
12

Milcs had known wc wcrc watching lor thc ]apancsc rcply to
thc Novcmbcr 26 U.S. ultimatum vcry cagcrly.
13
Hc lcarncd
during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 that it was in, and hc had thc
wholc 14part rcply whcn hc got to thc o cc thc ncxt morning.
Signs that war was coming had bccn apparcnt cvcrywhcrc and
thc Var cpartmcnt, Milcs said, had cvcn madc plans lor put
ting ccnsorship into opcration and was training ccnsors.
14

9
!bid., p. 41.
10
!bid., p. 40.
11
!bid., p. 50.
12
!bid., p. 49.
13
!bid., p. 58.
14
!bid., p. 58.
!n addition to qucstioning thc witncsscs scparatcly, Clarkc
hcld a roundtablc discussion with Milcs, 8rigadicr Gcncral Haycs
A. Kroncr (chicl, intclligcncc branch, military intclligcncc divi
sion), Coloncl ]ohn T. 8isscll (chicl ol thc countcr intclligcncc
group ol military intclligcncc), and 8rattonto iron out any
littlc dicrcnccs that may havc appcarcd in thcir tcstimony.
15
For
instancc, 8isscll and Kroncr had said that thc Ultra sccrct intcl
ligcncc dcrivcd lrom MAG!C had not bccn madc availablc to
thcm prior to Pcarl Harbor but 8ratton said it had bccnthrough
mcmoranda conccrning subvcrsivc activitics. 8ratton rcportcd
that MAG!C was rcgularly distributcd to thc top administration
and military o cials.
16

Tcsc lour mcn, all conccrncd with somc aspcct ol prc
war military intclligcncc, discusscd thcir prcattack vicw ol thc
]apancsc thrcat. Although Kroncr hadnt sccn MAG!C himscll,
hc kncw 8ratton and Milcs wcrc handling it and insisting it bc
kcpt sccrct.
17
Vhcn ncws ol thc attack camc on cccmbcr 7,
Kroncr had actually bccn rcading Milcss Novcmbcr 29 cstimatc
ol thc Far astcrn situation, so hc rcmcmbcrcd distinctly that
that cstimatc did not includc in thc lincs ol action opcn to ]apan,
an attack on Pcarl Harbor.
18

According to Milcs,
thc bulk ol our inlormation, all ol it including Magic, indicatcd
thc major probability ol a ]apancsc movc to thc south, !ndo
China, Siam, Tailand, pcrhaps thc utch Vcst |sic| (ast:)
!ndics, pcrhaps Malaya. . . . Vc did not cxcludc war with thc
Unitcd Statcs sincc wc spccically mcntioncd thc Philippincs
as bcing part ol thc ]apancsc southcrn push and in a war with
thc Unitcd Statcs ol coursc thcrc was a possibility, particularly
15
!bid., p.72.
16
!bid., pp. 70, 72.
17
!bid., pp. 4248.
18
!bid., p. 48.
with thc ]apancsc that a surprisc attack might bc madc any
whcrc, ccrtainly including Hawaii which had bccn armcd and
prcparcd lor such an attack lor twcnty ycars.
19

8ratton bclicvcd
that initially . . . any attack against an Amcrican installation in
thc middlc or castcrn Pacic would bc in thc naturc ol a divcr
sion and having as its objcctivc thc immobilizing ol any lorcc
that wc might call in to hclp thc utch and 8ritish in wcst and
southwcst Pacic, but . . . thcir primary initial objcctivc was thc
dcstruction ol Grcat 8ritains powcr in southcast Asia.
20

Clarkc qucstioncd witncsscs about thc clusivc Vinds
xccutc. Cryptanalyst Fricdman had had no dircct knowlcdgc
ol a Vinds xccutc himscll, hc had only lcarncd ol it com
parativcly rcccntly in talking with Col. Sadtlcr and Capt. Saord
ol thc Navy.
21
8ut hc had known monitoring stations had bccn
alcrtcd to watch lor a Vinds Codc implcmcntation. Furthcr, hc
said, a diligcnt scarch, il not a complctcly cxhaustivc scarch,
had lailcd to nd a singlc bit ol cvidcncc to indicatc that an
Army station actually intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc mcssagc.
22

Coloncl tis K. Sadtlcr, chicl ol thc Army Communications
Scrvicc at thc timc ol thc attack, told thc inquiry hc hcard lrom
Admiral Noycs that thc mcssagc is in, mcaning that thc Vinds
xccutc had bccn rcccivcd, and it said war would bc dcclarcd
bctwccn ]apan and Grcat 8ritain. Hc didnt say with thc Unitcd
Statcs also, but hc couldnt vcrily that lor hc didnt know thc word
in thc ]apancsc tcxt.
23
Var was cxpcctcd in thc Ncthcrlands ast
!ndics too, by cccmbcr 5 thc utch had ordcrcd thc cxccution
19
!bid., p. 71.
20
!bid.
21
!bid., part 34, p. 34.
22
!bid., p. 36.
23
!bid., p. 68.
ol thc Rainbow Plan, A2 |lor U.S. naval participation| . . . . a
part ol thc joint Abducan plan only to bc takcn in thc cvcnt ol
war.
24

Clarkc prcscntcd his ndings to Marshall on Scptcmbcr 20,
1944. Vhcn Marshall rcturncd to thc APH8 (Scptcmbcr 29 and
ctobcr 2), his mcmory was rclrcshcd.

Tnv Ci~usvx !xvvs)ic~)iox
(Novv:nvv ::, +oSvv)v:nvv +:, +o)
Tc APH8 rcport concludcd that Marshall, Gcrow, and
Short had lailcd in thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics. 8oth FR
and Stimson had bccn shockcd, thcy much prclcrrcd thc Robcrts
Commission ndings that Kimmcl and Short wcrc rcsponsiblc
lor thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Tus, Stimson dircctcd
Major Clauscn, an attorncy who had scrvcd as assistant rccordcr
lor thc APH8 to look into uncxplorcd lcads in thc Pcarl Harbor
situation.
25
Tc invcstigation was to bc limitcd strictly to mattcrs
which havc a bcaring on thc part that Army pcrsonncl, organiza
tion, or action may havc had in thc disastcr.
26
Clauscns assignmcnt
was classicd an cmcrgcncy war mission,
27
hc had an unlimitcd
cxpcnsc account, pcrmission to travcl in and out ol thc war thc
atcrs, pcrsons intcrrogatcd by Clauscn wcrc to answcr his inqui
rics lully, all papcrs, sccrct or top sccrct, wcrc to bc lurnishcd
him, any prcscnt dircctivcs to thc contrary notwithstanding.
28
His
invcstigation appcars to havc bccn aimcd primarily at cxploring
24
!bid., part 34, pp. 60, 63. Tcstimony ol Lt. Robcrt H. cll.
25
!bid., part 35, p. 5.
26
!bid., p. 7, Stimson Fcbruary 6, 1944, lcttcr to Navy Sccrctary.
27
!bid., p. 9.
28
!bid., p. 5. Stimsons dircctions to assistant chicl ol sta, G2, rc Clauscns
assignmcnt.
thc proccdurc lor distributing MAG!C, in ordcr to discovcr who
was rcsponsiblc lor dclivcring to Marshall thc crucial cccmbcr
67 intcrccpts, and il thcy had not bccn promptly dclivcrcd, why
not. Clauscns qucstions also indicatcd conccrn with thc inlorma
tion providcd, or not providcd, to Short.
For almost tcn months, Novcmbcr 23, 1944, to Scptcmbcr 12,
1945, Clauscn travclcd ovcr 55,000 milcs by air and intcrvicwcd
92 Army, Navy and civilian pcrsonncl, 52 ol whom prcscntcd
thcir rccollcctions ol prcPcarl Harbor cvcnts in sworn a da
vits.
29
From timc to timc, Clauscn rcportcd to Stimsons spccial
assistant. Major Clauscn was promotcd to Licutcnant Coloncl by
March 24, 1945.
30

nc ol Clauscns rst intcrvicwccs was Coloncl Carlislc C.
uscnbury, 8rattons assistant. uscnbury said hc and 8ratton
altcrnatcd in asscmbling and dclivcring thcsc intcrccpts . . . daily
about lty to scvcntyvc ol thcsc intcrccpts . . . sortcd to about
twcntyvc lor distribution. uscnbury rccallcd that thc 13
parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply startcd coming in on thc night ol 6
cccmbcr 1941. Hc and 8ratton wcrc both on duty. uscnbury
said 8ratton rcmaincd until about hall ol it had bccn rcccivcd.
Tcrcupon, hc lclt and wcnt homc at about 9 v.:. uscnbury
staycd and waitcd lor thc rcmaindcr.
Tc lourtccnth part, bcing thc nal part ol thc mcssagc, was
rcccivcd about 12 that night. Tcrcupon ! lclt and wcnt homc.
. . . Nonc ol thcsc parts comprising this intcrccpt was dclivcrcd
bclorc thc morning ol 7 cccmbcr 1941 bccausc thc rst hall
had bccn rcccivcd whilc Coloncl 8ratton was on duty and hc
had sccn this and had not had it dclivcrcd that night. . . . ! did
not wish to disturb thc usual rccipicnts who wcrc probably at
29
!bid., p. 1, 2021.
30
!bid., p. 10, Stimson March 24, 1944, mcmorandum.
homc aslccp, as ! did not scc thc implications ol immcdiatc
hostilitics.
31

uscnburys a davit contradictcd 8rattons prcvious tcs
timony bclorc both thc APH8 and thc Clarkc invcstigation.
8ratton had told Clarkc that hc had transmittcd to thc sccrctary
ol statc a copy ol thc rst 13 parts thc night thcy wcrc rcccivcd.
32

Two wccks latcr, hc had told thc APH8 that hc had also dclivcrcd
thc 13 parts to thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall|, |and|
thc A.C. ol S., G2 |Milcs|.
33
Tcn a lcw days latcr, hc had told
thc APH8 that hc rccallcd that Marshall, Milcs, and Gcrow got
thcir copics thc cvcning ol thc 6th. !t was his practicc, 8ratton
said to dclivcr to thcm thcir copics |ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts|
bclorc ! wcnt to thc Statc cpartmcnt.
34

!n March, Clauscn sccurcd thc a davit ol 8rigadicr Gcncral
Charlcs K. Gailcy, a major and Gcrows cxccutivc o ccr on
cccmbcr 6. Tc a davit signcd by Gailcy, but unqucstion
ably draltcd by Clauscn, statcd that it was Gailcys customary
practicc to dclivcr to Gcrow as soon as practicablc thc dcci
phcrcd and translatcd ]apancsc intcrccpts rcccivcd lrom 8ratton
or uscnbury. Gailcy did not rccall having rcccivcd any pouch or
intcrccpts lrom Coloncl 8ratton or Coloncl uscnbury or lrom
any othcr sourcc on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Gailcy was ccr
tain that il Gcrow hadnt rcccivcd any intcrccpts that cvcning,
thcy hadnt bccn dclivcrcd to him, as, il thcy had bccn, ! would
havc givcn thcm to him |Gcrow|.
35

Clauscn thcn cw to thc Pacic thcatcr, Guam and Honolulu.
Hc was in thc Philippincs on \ ay, and lrom thcrc hc cw to
Gcrmany, Francc, !taly, and ngland.
31
!bid., pp. 2526.
32
!bid., part 34, p. 21.
33
!bid., part 29, p. 2349.
34
!bid., p. 2421.
35
!bid., part 35, pp. 3940.
!n ]unc, at Mainz, Gcrmany, Clauscn tacklcd Valtcr 8cdcll
Smith, who had bccn Marshalls sta sccrctary in cccmbcr 1941
and had riscn rapidly in thc ranks. 8y thcn, hc was a licutcn
ant gcncral and iscnhowcrs chicl ol sta. n cccmbcr 67,
1941, 8cdcll Smith and his assistants wcrc supposcd to maintain
a 24hour watch outsidc Marshalls o cc, know whcrc Marshall
was at all timcs and scc that important mcssagcs rcachcd him
promptly. Clauscn summarizcd, lor 8cdcll Smith, 8rattons tcs
timony bclorc thc APH8. 8cdcll Smith thcn gavc Clauscn an
a davit sctting lorth, not his rccollcctions ol thc prcattack situ
ation, but rathcr his usual practicc lor handling thc pouchcs ol
scnsitivc matcrial intcndcd lor Marshall. Vhcn
instructcd that thc contcnts should rcach him at oncc . . . thc
uty ccr ol thc Gcncral Sta Sccrctariat would takc thc
pouchcs to Gcncral Marshall at his quartcrs or whcrcvcr hc
happcncd to bc. . . . 8oth ! myscll and thc Assistant Sccrctarics
undcrstood that thcsc pouchcs containcd inlormation ol such
valuc and importancc that thcy should bc shown to thc Chicl
ol Sta without dclay.
36
8cdcll Smith had no rccollcction ol having rcccivcd, or known
ol, an urgcnt dclivcry on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. To thc bcst
ol my rccollcction, hc sworc, ! lclt thc o cc at thc usual timc
on thc cvcning ol 6 cc. 41, that is about 7:00 v.:., turning ovcr
to thc Night uty ccr. 8cdcll Smith was
quitc ccrtain that ! was not at thc o cc altcr 10:00 v.:. !l thc
intcrccptcd radio mcssagc rclcrrcd to by Coloncl 8ratton was
dclivcrcd cithcr to mc or to thc Night uty ccr, it would
havc bccn dclivcrcd in thc lockcd cnvclopc . . . to thc Chicl
ol Sta in accordancc with our usual proccdurc, cithcr by thc
o ccr on duty or by Coloncl 8ratton himscll.
37

36
!bid., p. 91. Smiths ]unc 15, 1945, a davit.
37
!bid.
!n his rolc as sccrctary to thc chicl ol sta, 8cdcll Smith had
scvcral assistant sccrctarics. nc ol thcm must havc bccn on duty
that night. 8ut Clauscn intcrvicwcd only onc, ]ohn R. canc,
who had not bccn on duty that night.
38

Gcrow had bccn chicl ol army war plans in 1941. Vhcn
Clauscn sccurcd Gcrows a davit, at Canncs, Francc, Gcrow was
both positivc and dircct. uring Novcmbcr and cccmbcr 1941
hc had rcccivcd and rcvicwcd thc MAG!C intcrccpts in thcir
raw, uncvaluatcd lorm, and had always rcturncd thcm promptly
to G2. Hc rccallcd sccing thc rcqucsts lrom Tokyo lor rcports
on ship movcmcnts at Pcarl Harbor, but as thcsc rclatcd cspc
cially to Navy, ! assumcd that thc Navy was lully cognizant, and
would intcrprct this inlormation. Howcvcr, Gcrow did not con
sidcr Pcarl Harbor to bc ]apans only intcrcst, hc rccallcd similar
inquirics madc ol ]apancsc consuls at Manila and Scattlc.
Gcrow did not rcmcmbcr convcrsations with cithcr 8ratton
on cccmbcr 4 or Sadtlcr on cccmbcr 5 conccrning alarming
]apancsc intcrccpts, at which timc Gcrow had rcplicd that su
cicnt warnings had alrcady bccn scnt to thc ovcrscas command
crs. !n his opinion, howcvcr,
thc Var cpartmcnt had scnt amplc warnings to thc ovcrscas
commandcrs, including Gcncral Short. . . . Gcncral Short at
no timc inlormcd thc Var cpartmcnt that hc was not in lull
agrccmcnt with Var cpartmcnt cstimatcs and plans lor thc
dclcnsc ol ahu.
Conccrning thc MAG!C mcssagcs, Gcrow again warncd that it
was ncccssary to guard most carclully against compromising thc
sourcc ol this cxtrcmcly valuablc intclligcncc.
39
Hc did not rccall
sccing thc 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply to our ultimatum bclorc
thc morning ol cccmbcr 7.
38
!bid., p. 96, cancs ]uly 24, 1945, a davit.
39
!bid., p. 93.
!n ]uly in Paris, Clauscn intcrvicwcd 8ratton. Hc showcd
8ratton tcn a davits hc had collcctcd bcaring on thc Vinds
Codc mcssagc and dclivcry ol thc 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply to
our ultimatumthc vc alrcady mcntioncd (uscnbury, Gailcy,
8cdcll Smith, Gcrow, and canc) and vc othcrs by Army o ccrs
who said thcy couldnt rccall dctails ol prcattack cvcnts. Tcsc
a davits did not rcally dicr lrom 8rattons APH8 tcstimony,
lor most ol thc o ccrs didnt answcr Clauscns qucstions dircctly.
nly uscnburys a davit actually conictcd with 8rattons prc
vious statcmcnts, and whcn uscnbury crrcd, 8ratton pointcd
that out.
Clauscn usually typcd thc a davits, somctimcs rctyp
ing thcm whcn an intcrvicwcc rcqucstcd changcs. At thc ]oint
Congrcssional Committcc 8ratton rccallcd: |!| dictatcd what !
thought ! should say, making corrcctions as wc wcnt along.
Finally wc got it all in shapc in pcncil. Tcn hc |Clauscn| put
a piccc ol papcr into thc typcwritcr and typcd thc a davit.
8ratton madc somc lurthcr suggcstions and corrcctions, only
altcr 8ratton was satiscd that thc a davit rcprcscntcd his
bcst rccollcction did hc sign it.
40

Tc ]apancsc rcply to our ultimatum, 8ratton said in his a
davit, startcd coming in lrom thc Navy thc cvcning ol cccmbcr
6. Hc and uscnbury wcrc on duty togcthcr. 8rattons account
dicrcd lrom uscnburys. Altcr rcccipt ol thc 13th part, 8ratton
dctcrmincd lrom S!S that thc 14th part was not likcly to comc in
that night. 8ratton and uscnbury thcn asscmblcd thc 13 parts
in prcparation lor dclivcry to thc authorizcd rccipicnts. 8ratton
dircctcd Coloncl uscnbury to dclivcr thc sct lor thc Chicl
ol Sta |Marshall| to his homc at Fort Mycr that night as
Coloncl uscnbury wcnt to his homc in Arlington. Tis was
about 10:00 v.:.
40
!bid., part 10, p. 4616. 8ratton bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
8ratton said in his a davit that thc only sct hc dclivcrcd that
cvcning was to thc sccrctary ol statc, bctwccn 10:00 and 11:00
v.:. to thc Statc cpartmcnt night duty o ccr. Tc scts lor
Milcs, Gcrow, and Stimson, 8ratton said, wcrc not dclivcrcd thc
night ol 6 cccmbcr 1941, but wcrc dclivcrcd thc ncxt morning,
7 cccmbcr 1941, with thc lourtccnth part. 8ratton concludcd
his a davit:
Any prior statcmcnts or tcstimony ol minc which may bc con
trary to my statcmcnts hcrc . . . should bc modicd and con
sidcrcd changcd in accordancc with my statcmcnts hcrcin. Tis
a davit now rcprcscnts my bcst rccollcctions ol thc mattcrs
and cvcnts sct lorth . . . altcr having my mcmory rclrcshcd in
scvcral ways and rcspccts.
41

~viy Aucus) vouxb Ci~usvx
n~cx ix )nv Uxi)vb S)~)vs
!n thc a davit Coloncl Sadtlcr, a signal corps o ccr at thc
timc ol thc attack, signcd lor Clauscn in August in Vashington,
.C., hc discusscd a possiblc Vinds Codc cxccutc mcssagc
that Noycs had givcn him on cccmbcr 5, 1941. Sadtlcr was
alrcady alarmcd by thc scrics ol ]apancsc diplomatic and consular
intcrccpts which ! had bccn rcading ovcr a considcrablc pcriod
ol timc, and thc mounting tcnsion, and thc inlormation which
Admiral Noycs had just givcn mc. Altcr conlcrring with Milcs
and 8ratton, hc had gonc to his o cc and pcrsonally typcd a
proposcd warning which ! intcndcd to rccommcnd bc scnt to
thc ovcrscas commandcrs.
42
According to Sadtlcrs rccollcction,
it rcad substantially as lollows:
41
!bid., part 35, pp. 9798.
42
!bid., pp. 9899, August 13, 1945, a davit.
C.G.P.!., HawaiiPanama. Rcliablc inlormation indicatcs
war with ]apan in thc vcry ncar luturc stop takc cvcry prccau
tion to prcvcnt a rcpctition ol Port Arthur stop notily thc Navy.
Marshall.
Sadtlcr hadnt shown his dralt warning to anyonc in 1941, and
hc had madc no copy at thc timc. Howcvcr, hc tcsticd hc had
talkcd with Gcrow and 8cdcll Smith altcr dralting it. Howcvcr,
in ]unc 1945, ncithcr Gcrow nor 8cdcll Smith rcmcmbcrcd such
a convcrsation with Sadtlcr
43
and altcr rcading thc Gcrow and
8cdcll Smith a davits Sadtlcr bclicvcd thcy wcrc corrcct in say
ing that hc had not talkcd with thcm about it in cccmbcr 1941.
Morcovcr, Gcrow didnt bclicvc that Sadtlcr, purcly a Signal
Corps o ccr, should bc conccrncd with thc disscmination or
intcrprctation ol Magic.
44

Sadtlcr also dcnicd hc had cvcr urgcd Gcncral Shcrman
Milcs, G2, or any othcr rcprcscntativc ol G2, to scnd any warn
ing mcssagc to thc ovcrscas commandcrs. Hc dcnicd that hc had
madc lurthcr corts to obtain thc |Vinds| cxccutc mcssagc
mcntioncd by Admiral Noycs. And hc dcnicd Fricdmans statc
mcnt to Clarkc that hc, Sadtlcr, had matcrial in a salc dcposit
box conccrning thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr.
45

Clauscn was in Vashington on \] day, his invcstigation
almost ovcr. 8ut hc wcnt to 8oston to intcrvicw Major Gcncral
Milcs, brigadicr gcncral and chicl ol army intclligcncc in 1941.
Milcs said that on thc instructions ol Marshall, transmittcd
through Gcncral smun and Coloncl Clarkc ol G2, hc had said
nothing to thc APH8 about thc topsccrct MAG!C sourccs.
Hc had known about thc 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply on thc
cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 bccausc hc had bccn dining that cvc
ning at Admiral Vilkinsons homc. Admiral 8cardall, FRs
43
!bid., p. 91, ]unc 15, 1945 a davit.
44
!bid., p. 92, ]unc 20, 1945 a davit.
45
!bid., pp. 99100.
aidc, who was thcrc also, had brought it to Vilkinsons attcntion,
and Vilkinson had shown it to Milcs. Milcs had bccn undcr thc
imprcssion that bclorc cccmbcr 7 thc Navy in Hawaii had bccn
intcrccpting, dccrypting, dccoding, and translating ]apancsc dip
lomatic and consular mcssagcs.
46

8ack in Vashington, Clauscn mct with Marshall. !n his a
davit Marshall said that whcn hc rst appcarcd bclorc thc APH8
on August 7, 1944, hc had inlormcd thc voting mcmbcrs in a
onchour closcd scssion ol thc charactcr ol inlormation which
had bccn dcrivcd bclorc 7 cccmbcr 1941 lrom Top Sccrct
sourccs thcn callcd Magic. !n that bricl mccting, Marshall said,
hc did not cxplain thc naturc ol thc inlormation glcancd lrom
thcsc sourccs cxccpt to say that ncithcr this inlormation nor thc
sourcc thcrcol should bc madc public bccausc it would rcsult in at
lcast tcmporarily, il not pcrmancntly, cxtinguishing that sourcc.
According to Marshall, it was not until it dcvclopcd that thc
Magic papcrs wcrc bcing discloscd bclorc thc Navy Court ol
!nquiry that Army o ccrs conccrncd with MAG!C had bccn
authorizcd to go into all thc dctails rcgarding Magic.
47

Marshall statcd that it had bccn his undcrstanding that
in thc pcriod prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941 . . . thc Commanding
Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt |Short| was awarc ol and
was rccciving somc ol this inlormation lrom lacilitics availablc
in his command.
!n this Marshall was mistakcn.
48
Marshall told Clauscn that hc
had adviscd Short by corrcspondcncc (Fcbruary 7 and March 5,
1941) ol thc
46
!bid., pp. 10102.
47
!bid., pp. 10405.
48
!bid.
risk ol sabotagc and thc risk involvcd in a surprisc raid by air
and by submarinc. . . . At no timc did Gcncral Short inlorm
mc or, to my knowlcdgc, anyonc clsc in thc Var cpartmcnt
that hc was not in lull agrccmcnt with thcsc Var cpartmcnt
cstimatcs and plans lor thc dclcnsc ol ahu, which in ccct
warncd him to cxpcct air and submarinc attacks as primary
thrcats in thc cvcnt ol war with ]apan.
49

Marshall did not say whcthcr hc had scnt Short any advicc
or warning latcr than Fcbruary or March 1941 conccrning thc
impcnding crisis. Howcvcr, Marshall did say that Shorts assis
tant G2 o ccr, Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, had sccn a Navy
wirc scnt to Pcarl Harbor on or about cccmbcr 3, 1941, con
ccrning instructions to thc ]apancsc diplomatic rcprcscntativcs
in thc southwcst Pacic, Vashington, and London to burn thcir
codcs and ciphcrs.
50

Clauscns invcstigation had sct out to look into uncxplorcd
lcads, primarily lor Marshalls bcnct, about MAG!C and cspc
cially about thc ]apancsc rcsponsc to thc U.S. ultimatum. Hc
tricd to discovcr to whom it had bccn dclivcrcd on cccmbcr
67. Clauscn had also inquircd altcr thc Vinds Codc and its
implcmcntation, thc Vinds Codc xccutc. And hc had askcd
what inlormation had bccn lurnishcd Gcncral Short in Hawaii
conccrning thc impcnding crisis. Although many qucstions
rcmaincd unanswcrcd, thc Clauscn a davits did ocr two pos
siblc cxcuscs lor Marshalls lailurc to notily Short ol thc dcvclop
ing cccmbcr 67 crisis:
1. 8ratton and uscnbury had bccn rcmiss in not dclivcring
thc important 13part ]apancsc dispatch to Marshall on
thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6.
49
!bid.
50
!bid. Scc also p. 30, 8icknclls Fcbruary 25, 1945, a davit lor Clauscn.
2. Vashington o cials, including Marshall and Milcs,
bclicvcd that thc ]apancsc mcssagcs wcrc bcing intcrccptcd
and dccryptcd in Hawaii.

Tnv Hvwi)) !xouivy (M~y + )o ]uiy ++, +o)
Upon thc complction ol thc Navy Court ol !nquirys rcport,
Sccrctary ol thc Navy Forrcstal lound
crrors ol judgmcnt on thc part ol ccrtain o ccrs in thc Naval
Scrvicc, both at Pcarl Harbor and at Vashington. Tc Sccrctary
has lurthcr lound that thc prcvious invcstigations havc not
cxhaustcd all possiblc cvidcncc. . . . |and| has dccidcd that thc
|NC!| invcstigation . . . should bc lurthcr continucd until thc
tcstimony ol cvcry witncss in posscssion ol matcrial lacts can
bc obtaincd and all possiblc cvidcncc cxhaustcd.
51

Tcrclorc, Forrcstal on May 2, 1945,
appointcd Admiral H. Kcnt Hcwitt, U.S. Navy, as invcstigating
o ccr, with ]ohn F. Sonnctt as counscl, and Licutcnant ]ohn
Ford 8acchcr, USNR, as assistant counscl, to cxaminc such
witncsscs and to obtain such othcr cvidcncc as might bc ncccs
sary in ordcr to lully dcvclop thc lacts in conncction with thc
]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor.
52

Altcr rcvicwing thc ndings ol thc prcvious invcstigations,
Hcwitt dccidcd his task was to cxplorc lurthcr what inlorma
tion was availablc in Vashington and at Pcarl Harbor bclorc thc
attack, to ask spccically about intcrccptcd ]apancsc tclcphonc
and cablc mcssagcs, cspccially thc Vinds Codc, to nd out
51
!bid., part 36, p. 359, Forrcstals May 2,1945, mcmorandum to Admiral H.
Kcnt Hcwitt.
52
!bid., p. 364.
whcthcr or not ]apancsc submarincs had bccn opcrating in and
around Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, and also to dctcrminc
Kimmcls undcrstanding ol various plans lor thc dclcnsc ol thc
cct.
53
Vith thcsc goals in mind, Hcwitt took tcstimony lrom 39
witncsscs ovcr 26 days, lrom May 14 to ]uly 11.
54

As thc Hcwitt !nquiry opcncd, Captain Arthur H. McCollum,
who in cccmbcr 1941 had bccn thc ccrinChargc ol thc
Far astcrn Scction ol thc ivision ol Naval !ntclligcncc, Navy
cpartmcnt, rcvicwcd thc intclligcncc thcn availablc conccrn
ing thc Far ast. Hawaii was dcpcndcnt on data dcrivcd lrom
dircction ndcrs, radio intclligcncc ol cct activitics conrmcd
latcr by ncwspapcr accounts, and inlormation lrom Vashington.
8clorc thc war startcd on cccmbcr 7, thcy wcrc not pcrmittcd
by U.S. law to tap tclcphoncs or intcrccpt mcssagcs to or lrom
thc ]apancsc consul in Honolulu. Hawaii did not havc a Purplc
machinc, which would havc givcn thcm acccss to ]apancsc dip
lomatic mcssagcs. Mcssagcs in othcr codcs that could not bc
dccodcd in Hawaii wcrc mailcd to Vashington lor dccrypting.
Altcr thc imposition ol thc U.S. cmbargocs on ]apancsc tradc
and thc outbrcak ol war in uropc, lcw ]apancsc mcrchant vcs
scls ploughcd thc scas, lcw ]apancsc ships crosscd thc Pacic to
ports in thc Amcricas, and U.S. ships no longcr travcrscd thc
north Pacic. Tus wc had lost thc mcans ol kccping track ol thc
lcw ]apancsc ships that wcrc still sailing, as wcll as thc cycs ol
obscrvcr agcnts at various ports in Asia.
55

Givcn his position at thc timc ol thc attack, Captain McCollum
was ablc to kccp abrcast ol dcvclopmcnts in U.S.]apancsc rcla
tions. Vhcn McCollum appcarcd bclorc thc Hcwitt inquiry on
May 15 hc brought with him an analysis ol thc situation as it
lookcd to mc at that timc which hc had submittcd on cccmbcr
53
!bid., pp. 79.
54
!bid., pp. 7355, 361, 57374.
55
!bid., pp. 1315.
1, 1941, to Admiral Vilkinson, dircctor ol naval intclligcncc. Hc
and Vilkinson had thcn mct with Stark and urgcd that a dis
patch ol warning bc scnt to thc cct. Stark assurcd thcm that
such a dispatch had bccn scnt on thc 27th ol Novcmbcr which
dcnitcly includcd thc tcrm, Tis is a war warning. Subscqucnt
to this, McCollum said, thc situation lurthcr dctcrioratcd. Hc
and Vilkinson did scnd dispatchcs out to our naval attachcs and
various naval agcncics throughout thc Far ast dirccting that
thcy dcstroy all thcir codcs and ciphcrs. Tis was |s|omc timc
altcr thc 1st |ol cccmbcr|, possibly around thc 4th.
56

Rcgarding thc Vinds Codc, thcrc was no doubt that thc
]apancsc govcrnmcnt sct up a schcmc ol wcathcr words with hid
dcn mcanings. Yct, mystcry and conlusion surroundcd practically
cvcry othcr aspcct ol thc mattcr. According to McCollum,
|!|n onc instancc it |thc wcathcr codc| mcant war with Russia,
in thc ncxt instancc it mcant war with ngland, and anothcr
onc . . . it mcant war with thc Unitcd Statcs. Tosc wcrc thc
thrcc possibilitics.
8ut a litcral translation ol thc ]apancsc did not actually say war.
McCollum wcnt on. !nstcad ol war, thc tcrm uscd was, !n casc
rclations arc in dangcr,. . . . Tcrc is thc vcrbatim translation, in
]apancsc this says, !n casc thcrc is dangcr ol cutting o our dip
lomatic rclations.
57

Vhcn Hcwitt qucstioncd Captain Saord about thc Vinds
Codc mcssagc, Saord insistcd, as hc had in carlicr hcarings,
that a Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd bclorc thc attack, that
it mcntioncd thc Unitcd Statcs, that it mcant war, that hc and
Kramcr had lookcd at it togcthcr, that it had bccn dclivcrcd to
ircctor ol Naval Communications Admiral Noycs, that latcr hc,
Saord, could nd no rclcrcncc to thc Vinds Codc xccutc in
56
!bid., pp. 1819.
57
!bid., p. 23.
thc lcs, and that hc had bccn unablc to locatc any copics ol it
at all.
58
Saord couldnt undcrstand what could havc happcncd
to thcm. Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC! in Hawaii dur
ing thc summcr ol 1944, hc had not hcsitatcd to say that thc
Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd and that it rclcrrcd to thc
Unitcd Statcs as wcll as to Grcat 8ritain. 8ut a ycar latcr, bclorc
thc Hcwitt inquiry, hc was lcss positivc ol that now. Kramcr did
rccall dcnitcly bcing shown such a mcssagc by thc GY watch
o ccr and walking down with him to Saords o cc and bcing
prcscnt whilc thc GY watch o ccr turncd it ovcr to him. A
bricl convcrsation cnsucd and thcn Saord had takcn thc mcs
sagc, Kramcr assumcd, to Noycs. And that was thc last Kramcr
saw ol it. Hc did not rccall thc prccisc wording ol that mcssagc.
Hc had a rathcr sharp rccollcction in thc lattcr part ol that wcck
|cccmbcr 17, 1941| ol lccling thcrc was still no ovcrt mcntion
or spccic mcntion ol thc Unitcd Statcs in any ol this tra c. His
rccollcction was no longcr clcar, hc was undcr thc imprcssion
that thc mcssagc rclcrrcd to ngland and possibly thc utch
rathcr than thc Unitcd Statcs, although it may havc rclcrrcd to
thc Unitcd Statcs, too.
59

!l a Vinds xccutc was rcccivcd, as Saord claimcd, hc was
undcr thc imprcssion that it had bccn turncd ovcr to thc Robcrts
Commission.
60
8ut within thc past month Kramcr had told
Saord
that a copy ol thc winds mcssagc and othcr papcrs rclativc to
thc brcak in diplomatic rclations with ]apan wcrc not turncd
ovcr to thc Robcrts Commission but wcrc givcn to Assistant
Sccrctary ol thc Navy Forrcstal about 9 cccmbcr 1941 whilc
58
!bid., pp. 6877.
59
!bid., p. 81.
60
!bid., p.71.
hc was Acting Sccrctary in thc abscncc ol Mr. Knox who had
own to Hawaii.
61

Tis is likcly bccausc, according to Forrcstals schcdulc ol
appointmcnts, hc saw both Kramcr and McCollum on cccmbcr
10, 1941.
62

Many arguc that thc rcason no copics ol a Vinds xccutc
havc bccn lound in thc lcs is bccausc Tokyo did not scnd onc.
!t may also bc, as Kramcr inlormcd Saord on anothcr occasion,
that
no writtcn copy was lurnishcd thc Army and no writtcn copy
was distributcd in thc Navy cpartmcnt in thc customary
manncr bccausc Admiral Noycs had givcn spccic ordcrs not
to do so and that hc would handlc disscmination ol this mcs
sagc himscll.
63

Saord told Hcwitt that hc had hcard through Fricdman,
cryptanalyst, that writtcn copics ol thc winds mcssagc had bccn
dcstroycd in thc Var cpartmcnt by thcn Coloncl 8isscll on thc
dircct ordcrs ol Gcncral Marshall.
64

Villiam F. Fricdman, Chicl Cryptanalyst, had bccn rcsponsi
blc, with his tcam in thc Army cryptoanalytic burcau,
65
lor having
dcciphcrcd altcr 1820 months ol hard conccntration, thc pur
plc (diplomatic) codc in August 1940. Fricdman tcsticd bclorc
Hcwitt on ]unc 22, 1945:
Captain Saord indicatcd that . . . thcrc had bccn a winds
cxccutc mcssagc, that no copics ol it wcrc to bc lound in thc
Navy lcs, and that ncvcrthclcss thcrc had bccn tcstimony to
61
!bid.
62
Forrcstals appointmcnt rccords (Princcton Univcrsity Library).
63
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 72, Saord tcstimony.
64
!bid., p. 70.
65
!bid., part 34, pp. 8485.
thc ccct that it had bccn intcrccptcd. His story was that it was
intcrccptcd by onc ol thcir ast Coast stations, hc bclicvcd, and
was promptly lorwardcd into Vashington. . . .|H|c |Saord|
indicatcd that it not only had thc a rmativc lor brcak in rcla
tions bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd Statcs, but it also had a
ncgativc lor a brcak in rclations bctwccn ]apan and Russia.
66

Fricdman thcn said hc had had a convcrsation about a ycar
and a hall ago with Coloncl Sadtlcr who had
indicatcd that thc winds codc cxccutc mcssagc had comc in
somc timc on thc 4th or 5th ol cccmbcr . . . that hc hadnt
himscll sccn a copy, but that hc had bccn told by somcbody
that thc copics had bccn ordcrcd or directed to be destroyed by
General Marshall. (!talics addcd)
Fricdman said hc had rcgardcd this as mcrcly hcarsay cvi
dcncc and nothing morc than that, highly inconccivablc. . . . !
probably just passcd that |story| out |to Saord| as onc ol thosc
crazy things that gct startcd. Fricdman said hc shouldnt havc
donc it, hc ccrtainly had no idca that hc |Saord| would rcpcat
it.
67

As a rcsult ol this ]unc 22, 1945, tcstimony by Fricdman,
thc Clarkc invcstigation was latcr rcopcncd to invcstigatc thc
chargcs.
Hcwitt was intcrcstcd also in thc dclivcry ol thc nc v.:.
Mcssagc. Tc 14th part ol thc ]apancsc rcply was coming in
whcn McCollum arrivcd at his o cc carly Sunday morning,
cccmbcr 7. Vhilc hc and Vilkinson wcrc discussing thc situ
ation with Stark, about 8:30 to 9:00, thc dispatch dirccting thc
]apancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thcir rcply to Hull at prcciscly 1
v.:. was brought in. Stark immcdiatcly callcd thc Vhitc Housc.
66
!bid., part 36, pp. 30506 (Hcwitt).
67
!bid.
At thc timc, thc possiblc signicancc ol thc timc ol dclivcry
was pointcd out to all hands. . . . |V|c didnt know what this
signicd, but that il an attack wcrc coming, it lookcd likc thc
timing was such that it was timcd lor opcrations in thc Far
ast and possibly on Hawaii.
68
Kramcr told Hcwitt a similar story. Vhilc thc loldcrs lor thc
rccipicnts ol MAG!C intcrccpts wcrc bcing madc up that morn
ing, hc rccallcd drawing a navigators timc circlc to scc il this
1:00 v.:. Vashington timc ticd up at all with thc dcvclopmcnts
in thc Malay arca, which wc had bccn lollowing in considcrablc
dctail thc prcvious wcck. Hc was
imprcsscd with thc lact that 1:00 v.:. hcrc was scvcral hours
bclorc sunrisc in thc Kra Pcninsula arca, whcrc wc kncw thc
]apancsc had bccn contcmplating an attack on Kota 8haru
with thc connivancc ol thc Taiian Chicl ol Sta. Tat lurthcr
ticd up with thc movcmcnt ol a largc ]apancsc convoy down
thc coast ol China thc prcvious thrcc or lour days.
Vhcn dclivcring thc loldcr lor Knox, who was thcn at a
mccting in thc Statc cpartmcnt, Kramcr also pointcd out thc
timc at various points in thc Pacic whcn it was 1:00 v.:. in
Vashington. Hc may havc mcntioncd thc timc dicrcncc to cight
or tcn othcrs, including McCollum, 8ratton, scvcral pcoplc in thc
Statc cpartmcnt, possibly Vilkinson, Stark, and, hc thought,
Saord.
69

All thosc qucstioncd by Hcwitt who had bccn stationcd in
Hawaii at thc timc ol thc attack wcrc wcll awarc that ]apan was
on thc vcrgc ol going to war with somconc somcwhcrc. Captain
Rochclort, who had bccn in chargc ol communication intclli
gcncc in Hawaii, notcd that |o|n cccmbcr 1 all scrvicc radio
calls wcrc changcd, and that this indicatcd an additional progrcs
68
!bid., pp. 2526.
69
!bid., p. 84.
sivc stcp in prcparing lor activc opcrations on a largc scalc.
70

According to Rochclort, it was gcncrally agrccd that thcrc was a
dcnitc ocnsivc movcmcnt in thc works. Tc only crror madc
was in thc dircction.
71
All attcntion had bccn turncd toward thc
lar wcst, thc Philippincs, Malaysia, and Tailand.
Captain Layton, who had bccn cct intclligcncc o ccr lor
Pacic Flcct, at thc timc ol thc attack, also tcsticd bclorc Hcwitt
that thc ]apancsc Navy had changcd all calls only onc month
altcr thc prcvious changcsix months had bccn thc usual pcriod.
To Layton, scrvicc calls lasting only onc month indicatcd pro
grcssivc stcps in prcparing lor activc opcrations on a largc scalc.
72

Vhcn hc lcarncd during thc rst wcck ol cccmbcr that thc
]apancsc consul in Hawaii was burning papcrs, hc said, Tat ts
thc picturc that thc ]apancsc arc prcparing lor somcthing, dcstroy
ing thcir codcs.
73
Layton said thcrc had bccn scvcral rcports ol
unidcnticd submarinc soundings in Hawaiian watcrs.
74

McCollum tcsticd that wc had suspcctcd lor somc timc that
]apancsc submarincs wcrc kccping our cct bascd in Pcarl Harbor
undcr obscrvation.
75
\icc Admiral Charlcs H. McMorris, who
had bccn war plans o ccr lor CincPac at thc timc ol thc attack,
told Hcwitt hc considcrcd it highly important to maintain anti
submarinc patrols in thc opcrating arcas.
76
Hc thought an air
attack on Pcarl Harbor possiblc but not probablc and that thc
cct should not takc as its solc objcct ol cxistcncc thc dclcnsc
ol itscll against a surprisc attack, but that it should also carry
70
!bid., p. 35.
71
!bid., p. 37.
72
!bid., p. 128.
73
!bid., p. 137.
74
!bid., pp. 16465.
75
!bid., p. 20.
76
!bid., p. 182.
on othcr lundamcntal dutics.
77
Admiral Patrick N.L. 8cllingcr,
commandcr ol thc Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc, acknowlcdgcd
that thcrc had bccn sound contacts, indicating thc possiblc
prcscncc ol submarincs, but most such rcports wcrc unconrmcd:
|N|o submarinc was cvcr sccn.
78
Ncvcrthclcss, thc thrcat ol a
submarinc raid was widcly acknowlcdgcd as rcal, much morc rcal
than thc likclihood ol an attack by air.
Many othcr witncsscs conccdcd that an air attack on Pcarl
Harbor was possiblc but not probablc. Kimmcls chicl ol sta,
Admiral Villiam V. Smith, tcsticd: Vc wcrc particularly
guarding against thcir submarinc raids in thc arca. . . . Vc bclicvcd
that that was ]apans rst attack to bc madc upon us and wc madc
cvcry cort to guard against it.
79
Smith kncw ol no onc in this
arca who rcally bclicvcd thcrc would bc a hostilc air attack on thc
Hawaiian !slands.
80

Hcwitts inquiry rcvcalcd that thc Naval 8asc clcnsc Air
Forcc pcration Plan, submittcd April 9, 1941, by a group hcadcd
by 8cllingcr, anticipatcd a possiblc air attack by plancs
launchcd lrom onc or morc carricrs which would probably
approach insidc ol thrcc hundrcd milcs. . . . A singlc submarinc
attack might indicatc thc prcscncc ol a considcrablc undiscov
crcd surlacc lorcc probably composcd ol last ships accompa
nicd by a carricr.
Tis plan ol opcrations pointcd out that such an attack at
dawn ocrcd a high probability that it could bc dclivcrcd as
a complctc surprisc . . . and that it might nd us in a condi
tion ol rcadincss undcr which pursuit would bc slow to start.
81

77
!bid., p. 193.
78
!bid., p. 293.
79
!bid., p. 201.
80
!bid., pp. 205, 212, 220.
81
!bid., part 37, p. 949.
Tis sccnario was lollowcd almost prcciscly on cccmbcr 7. Tc
sighting and sinking, shortly before dawn, ol a ]apancsc subma
rinc by thc dcstroycr Ward, was lollowcd vcry shortly after dawn
by thc surprisc attack on Pcarl Harbor by plancs launchcd lrom
carricrs about 200 milcs away.
!t was acknowlcdgcd that Tc mission ol thc Army on ahu
is to dclcnd thc Pcarl Harbor naval basc against all attacks by
an cncmy.
82
Tc Navy was assigncd thc rcsponsibility lor long
rangc rcconnaissancc. Howcvcr, thcrc wcrc nowhcrc ncar cnough
plancs or crcws on ahu to conduct longrangc rcconnaissancc
lor any lcngth ol timc whilc training and prcparing lor ocnsivc
action in accordancc with thc war plan, Rainbow Fivc. !n his tcs
timony, 8cllingcr cstimatcd that hc could havc conductcd
360 dcgrcc rcconnaissancc with thc availablc Navy plancs . . .
pcrhaps lour or vc days . . . 128 dcgrccs approximatcly on
a daily basis . . . until thc lailurc ol plancs and lack ol sparc
parts rcduccd thc plancs to an cxtcnt that it would havc madc
it impossiblc. Pcrhaps it could havc bccn carricd on lor two
wccks, pcrhaps, but this cstimatc is . . . bascd on maintaining
plancs in rcadincss lor ight.
83

Morcovcr, according to McMorriss tcstimony,
had thc maximum scarch bccn institutcd lrom Midway and
Pcarl Harbor on thc 27th ol Novcmbcr warning, thc situation
with rcgard to aircralt cngincs by thc 7th ol cccmbcr would
havc bccn in a highly critical situation.
84

82
!bid., part 36, p. 285.
83
!bid., pp. 278302.
84
!bid., p. 194.
!l allout rcconnaissancc was to bc carricd out in anticipation ol
an attack, it was impcrativc not to start so soon that thc plancs
and crcws would bc cxhaustcd whcn thc cmcrgcncy arosc. As
Hcwitt pointcd out, whcn thc war warning was rcccivcd on
27 Novcmbcr thcy had no idca that thc attack was coming |1
wccks latcr| on thc 7th. Tcy had no way to timc it. Tcy had to
makc plans lor patrol indcnitcly.
85

Hvwi)) !xouivy Coxciusioxs
Hcwitts invcstigation was complctcd on ]uly 12. Tc 134
pagc rcport rcvicwcd thc prcvious invcstigations, discusscd war
and dclcnsc plans, ]apancsc cspionagc, naval intclligcncc, rccon
naissancc, and thc cccmbcr 7 attack itscll.
Tc NC! rcport had absolvcd Kimmcl ol rcsponsibility lor
thc cxtcnt ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr. Tc Hcwitt rcport crcd
itcd Kimmcl with bcing cncrgctic, indclatigablc, rcsourcclul, and
positivc in his corts to prcparc thc Flcct lor war,
86
and it rcc
ognizcd thc di cultics hc had laccd in trying to jugglc his lim
itcd rcsourccs to maintain rcconnaissancc, training, antiaircralt
dclcnscs, patrols against submarincs, and moralc. Howcvcr, thc
rcport rcvivcd somc ol thc criticism lcvicd against Kimmcl by thc
Robcrts Commission. !t hcld that hc did havc su cicnt inlorma
tion in his posscssion to indicatc that thc situation was unusually
scrious, and yct hc had not disscminatcd |this inlormation| to
all ol his important subordinatc commandcrs whosc cognizancc
thcrcol was dcsirablc.
87

Tc Hcwitt rcport lollowcd thc lcad ol thc NC! rcport in
attributing somc ol thc blamc lor thc disastcr to Stark:
85
!bid., p. 297.
86
!bid., part 39, p. 526.
87
!bid., p. 524.
|T|hc Chicl ol Naval pcrations did not communicatc to
|Kimmcl| important inlormation which would havc aidcd him
matcrially in lully cvaluating thc scriousncss ol thc situation.
!n particular, thc lailurc to transmit thc Statc cpartmcnt
mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 26th and to scnd, by tclcphonc or othcr
cxpcditious mcans, inlormation ol thc 1:00 v.:. mcssagc
and its possiblc import, wcrc unlortunatc. . . . Although vari
ous mcssagcs ol thc ]apancsc Consul Gcncral at Honolulu,
which indicatcd ]apancsc intcrcst in spccic locations ol ships
in Pcarl Harbor, wcrc intcrccptcd by radio intcrccpt stations
ol thc Army and Navy and dccryptcd prior to thc attack, this
inlormation was not transmittcd by thc Navy cpartmcnt to
Admiral Kimmcl. . . .
A thorough apprcciation ol thc dangcr, thc capabilitics ol thc
availablc plancs, and thc importancc ol thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl
Harbor might havc justicd thc allotmcnt by thc Chicl ol Naval
pcrations ol additional patrol plancs to thc Pacic Flcct.
88

Rcgarding thc cxistcncc ol a Vinds xccutc, thc rcport hcld
uncquivocally that no mcssagc was intcrccptcd prior to thc attack
which uscd thc codc words rclating to thc Unitcd Statcs.
89

Vith thc Hcwitt !nquiry rcport nishcd, Forrcstal submit
tcd it lor analysis and rccommcndations to thc cpartmcnts
judgc advocatc gcncral and Admiral King, commandcrinchicl,
U.S. Flcct and Chicl ol Naval pcrations. n August 10, ]udgc
Advocatc Gcncral T.L. Gatch wrotc that now that this rcport is
in
thc invcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor attack should bc con
sidcrcd complctcd. . . . !t appcars that thcrc was no lack ol
88
!bid., pp. 52327.
89
!bid., p. 523.
apprcciation on thc part ol any ol thc rcsponsiblc o ccrs that
war was coming, and coming quickly, during thc critical pcriod
immcdiatcly prcccding 7 cccmbcr 1941. Tc point on which
thosc o ccrs lailcd to cxcrcisc thc disccrnmcnt and judgmcnt
to bc cxpcctcd lrom o ccrs occupying thcir positions, was
thcir lailurc to apprcciatc, lrom thc inlormation availablc to
thcm, that Pcarl Harbor was a likcly targct lor acrial attack and
thcir lailurc to takc thc ncccssary stcps to prcvcnt or minimizc
such a surprisc attack. ach ol thcsc o ccrs, in cstimating
thc critical situation, dcmonstratcd a poor quality ol stratcgi
cal planning, in that hc largcly rulcd out all possiblc courscs
ol action by which thc ]apancsc might bcgin thc war cxccpt
through an attack in thc Vcstcrn Pacic. . . . ! submit that
thc importancc ol inlormation lrom ]apancsc sourccs has bccn
ovcr cmphasizcd: lor had morc basically sound principlcs bccn
obscrvcd, thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr would not havc occurrcd.
Tc sccurity ol Pcarl Harbor was thc vcry corc ol our Pacic
stratcgy, a lact which did not rcccivc su cicnt considcration in
thc stratcgic conccpt ol rcsponsiblc o ccrs.
Gatch did not rccommcnd court martialing any o ccr,
although hc hcld that thc Navy cpartmcnt is morally obligatcd
to ordcr Admiral Kimmcl tricd by gcncral courtmartial should
Admiral Kimmcl so insist. Howcvcr, no courts martial should bc
hcld prior to thc cnd ol hostilitics with ]apan, not only would
it bc highly impractical but it would also bc dctrimcntal to thc
war cort.
90

!n his August 13 cndorscmcnt ol thc Hcwitt rcport, King
hcld that
thc cvidcncc is not su cicnt to warrant trial by court martial ol
any pcrson in thc Naval Scrvicc. . . . Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimmcl, though not culpablc to a dcgrcc warranting lormal
disciplinary action, wcrc ncvcrthclcss inadcquatc in cmcrgcncy,
90
!bid., pp. 38889.
duc to thc lack ol thc supcrior judgmcnt ncccssary lor cxcrcis
ing command commcnsuratc with thcir dutics.
Appropriatc action appcars to mc to bc thc rclcgation ol both
ol thcsc o ccrs to positions in which lack ol supcrior stratcgic
judgmcnt may not rcsult in luturc crrors. Tc action has bccn
takcn in thc casc ol both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmcl.
No lurthcr action is rccommcndcd.
91

Ci~vxv !xvvs)ic~)iox, P~v) !! ( ]uiy +:+, +o)
Tc Clarkc invcstigation was rcopcncd in ]uly 1945 at
Marshalls rcqucst.
92
!ts primary purposc was to invcstigatc
Fricdmans statcmcnts bclorc thc Hcwitt inquiry |May 14]uly
11, 1945| about thc dcstruction, under Marshall s orders, ol Pcarl
Harbor rccords, cspccially ol a Vinds Codc cxccutc, il onc had
actually bccn rcccivcd.
93
According to Army couricr Coloncl
8ratton at thc APH8
94
and Chicl ol G2, Military !ntclligcncc,
Major Gcncral Shcrman Milcs
95
lc copics ol all thc ]apancsc
intcrccpts wcrc supposcd to havc bccn hcld in tight sccurity in
both Army and Navy lcs. Yct no Vinds Codc cxccutc could bc
lound. So Clarkc wantcd to clcar up that mystcry.
Villiam F. Fricdman, Chicl Cryptanalyst, told Clarkc that hc
had had convcrsations with Captain Saord who said thcrc had
bccn such a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc and that hc bclicvcd that a
copy ol it was still in somcbodys salc in thc Navy cpartmcnt
but that all ol his attcmpts to locatc a copy ol thc Vinds cxccutc
91
!bid., p. 387.
92
!bid., part 34, p. 77.
93
!bid., pp. 7879.
94
!bid., part 29, p. 2416.
95
!bid., part 2, p. 789.
mcssagc in thc o cial lcs ol P20G had bccn lruitlcss.
96

Months latcr, somcbody highcr up in thc Var cpartmcnt
pcrhaps Gcncral 8issclldircctcd that a scarch bc madc through
our lcs at Signal Sccurity Agcncy to scc il wc could locatc such
a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, and that was lruitlcss.
97
Yct Saord
was quitc convinccd that disscmination had bccn madc to thc
Army, il not to thc Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc thcn to somc body
in G2. Saord could not cxplain this mystcrious disappcarancc
. . . ol all copics ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, cspccially as cop
ics ol all thc ]apancsc intcrccpts wcrc supposcd to havc bccn hcld
in tight sccurity in both Army and Navy pcrmancnt lcs. Tis
mystcrious disappcarancc was naturally also
ol cxtrcmc intcrcst to mc, and somc timc altcr my rst or pos
sibly sccond, convcrsation with Capt. Saord, ! lcarncd ol thc
rcturn to Vashington lor duty ol Coloncl Sadtlcr. Vc wcrc
old lricnds. . . . Shortly altcr hc camc back hc camc ovcr to my
o cc onc dayand ! dont know whcthcr hc had spccically
in mind to talk about Pcarl Harborhc may havcbut at any
ratc in thc coursc ol our rcminisccnccs about thosc days, hc told
mc somc vcry startling things. . . . ! askcd him about thc Vinds
cxccutc mcssagc his rccollcction was apparcntly cxtrcmcly clcar,
and hc ccrtainly was positivc about this rccollcction ol thc lact
that such a Vinds cxccutc mcssagc had bccn intcrccptcd by
a Navy sourcc, bccausc hc told mc that hc was callcd ovcr to
cithcr Gcn. Milcs o cc or Col. 8rattons o cc . . . ! rccall now
that hc said that Adm. Noycs callcd him onc morning and my
rccollcction is that it was on cccmbcr 4might havc bccn thc
5th1941, sayingand this stands vcry bright in my mcmory
!ts in, mcaning that thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc had bccn
transmittcd and had bccn intcrccptcd and that it mcant a brcak
in rclations bctwccn . . . ]apan and ngland, and that hc had
thcn gonc ovcr to cithcr Gcn. Milcs o cc or to Col. 8rattons
96
!bid., part 34, p. 78 (scc Hcwitt, part 36, pp. 30506).
97
!bid., part 34, p. 78.
o ccor Adm. Noycs had tclcphoncd thc samc mcssagc or
thc purport ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc to Gcn. Milcs or to
Col. 8ratton. At any ratc, Col. Sadtlcr was cithcr summoncd
or prcscntcd himscll to G2 and said that thc Vinds cxccutc
mcssagc had comc in and that somcthing should bc donc right
away. . . . Col. 8ratton, thc ]apancsc languagc cxpcrt, wantcd Col.
Sadtlcr to tcll him what thc ]apancsc word was that had bccn
includcd in thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc. . . . Sadtlcr said that hc
himscll had not sccn thc mcssagc, hc had gottcn thc inlorma
tion lrom thc Navy sourcc by tclcphonc and that hc thcrclorc
couldnt givc thc ]apancsc word. . . . |V|hcn hc was unablc to
producc thc mcssagc or thc ]apancsc word thcy said thcrc was
nothing thcy could do. . . . |H|c bcing dccply conccrncd about
thc thrcat ol ncgotiations with thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt and
noting thc tcnor ol thc mcssagcs that wc wcrc turning out in
translation, bccamc cxtrcmcly apprchcnsivc that war might
brcak out at almost any hour without any dcclaration on thc
part ol thc ]apancsc. And hc lclt that somcbody high up in thc
Var cpartmcnt ought to scnd a mcssagc out to Gcn. Short
warning him . . . thc typc ol mcssagc that hc actually prcparcd
in his own hand: 8rcak in rclations bctwccn ]apan and Unitcd
Statcs may bc cxpcctcd within thc ncxt 24 or 48 hours. Takc
all ncccssary stcps to insurc that thcrc will bc no rcpctition ol
Port Arthur. . . . Vcll hc tricd to intcrcst somc ol thc pcoplc
in thc highcr cchclons. . . . Hc tricd somcbody in G2, hc tricd
somcbody in pcrations ivision, thc Sccrctary ol thc Gcncral
Sta! cant cnumcratc thcm all nowbut at any ratc hc said
that hc got turncd down all thc way and nobody would pay any
attcntion to him. . . .
Vcll, in thc coursc ol this convcrsation ! askcd him, Vhat do
you supposc happcncd to thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc which wc
bclicvc so rmly was intcrccptcd: Vcll hc said hc was told that
thcy wcrc ordcrcd dcstroycd. And that sort ol took mc aback,
and ! said, 8y whom: And hc said, 8y Gcn. Marshall.. . . .
|M|y disbclicl ol thc story was discrcditcd by him apparcntly,
bccausc hc still rcmaincd vcry rm in his bclicl that all copics
ol thc Vinds cxccutc mcssagc, both in thc Army and in thc
Navy, had bccn dcstroycd and ordcrcd to bc dcstroycd. . . . ! am
quitc surc that it was not ol his own knowlcdgc. Hc was pass
ing on sccondhand inlormation.
98

Friedman: Col. Sadtlcr didnt imposc any sccrccy upon what
hc was tclling mc. h naturally hc trustcd to my discrction. . . .
! ccrtainly wouldnt havc said anything to Capt. Saord about
it il hc imposcd somc sort ol sccrccy upon what hc was tclling
mc, and ol coursc you undcrstand that, not giving any crcdcncc
to it myscll, ! didnt lccl that Saord would bclicvc any ol it.
8ut to my astonishmcnt, Saord sccmcd to think thcrc might
bc somcthing to it, at lcast hc thought thcrc was a Vinds cxc
cutc mcssagc and now it cant bc lound.
99
Colonel E.W. Gibson, aidc to Clarkc !nquiry: Mr. Villiam F.
Fricdman has tcsticd bclorc Adm. Hcwitt ol thc cpartmcnt
ol thc Navy rcccntly as lollows: Tcn il ! rcmcmbcr corrcctly
! askcd Col. Sadtlcr whcthcr hc had a copy, had cvcr gottcn or
sccn a copy ol this mcssagc |thc Vinds Codc cxccutc|, and
his answcr was, il ! rcmcmbcr corrcctly that hc hadnt himscll
sccn a copy but that hc had bccn told by somcbody that thc
copics had bccn ordcrcd or dircctcd to bc dcstroycd by Gcn.
Marshall.
Col. Sadtler: ! will makc an absolutc at dcnial ol that statc
mcnt madc by Mr. Fricdman bccausc as lar as ! know, that
mcssagc was ncvcr in thc Var cpartmcnt and ! ncvcr madc
any statcmcnt that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd or that
anyonc told mc that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd. . . .
Gibson: At somc timc did somcbody tcll you that mcssagcs
pcrtaining to thc Pcarl Harbor aair wcrc bcing dcstroycd:
98
!bid., pp. 7981.
99
!bid., p. 82.
Sadtler: Ycs. Somctimc during 1943 Gcn. !saac Spalding at Ft.
8ragg, North Carolina, told mc somcthing to thc ccct that
].T.8. 8isscll had told him that cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl
Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or had bccn dcstroycd. Sadtlcr
said that hc might possibly havc told that to Fricdman in onc
ol thcir convcrsations.
100
Sadtlcr wcnt on to tcll about thc warning mcssagc hc had
writtcn:
Altcr lcaving Gcn. Milcs o cc whcrc Gcn. Milcs and Col.
8ratton morc or lcss casually thrcw o this inlormation about
thc cxccutc ol thc Vinds mcssagc, ! wcnt back to my o cc and
thought that somcthing ought to bc donc. Tc mcssagc was
typcd up and ! wcnt to scc Gcn. Gcrow and talkcd this ovcr lor
a lcw momcnts with him and suggcstcd that hc notily thcm.
Gcrows rcply to thc ccct was that thcy had bccn adcquatcly
noticd, as ! rccall it. ! thcn wcnt to scc Sccrctary ol Gcncral
Sta, Col. 8cdcll Smith, and told him what had bccn donc and
suggcstcd hc scnd a mcssagc. His rcply was to thc ccct that hc
rcluscd to discuss it lurthcr.
101

Sadtler: ! ncvcr madc any statcmcnt that Gcn. Marshall ordcrcd
it |a Vinds Codc xccutc| dcstroycd or that anyonc told mc
that Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd. . . . Somc timc during 1943
Gcn. !saac Spalding at Fort 8ragg, North Carolina, told mc
somcthing to thc ccct that ].T.8. 8isscll had told him that
cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or
had bccn dcstroycd.
102

Clarkc and Gibson qucstioncd Spalding pcrsonally about
Fricdmans tcstimony about Sadtlcr having said that Spalding
100
!bid., p. 86.
101
!bid., pp. 8687.
102
!bid., p. 86.
said ccrtain mcssagcs had bccn dcstroycd undcr ordcrs lrom
Marshall and 8isscll,
103

Spalding: ! did not tcll him that in substancc, answcring spc
cically your qucstion, but ! did tcll him ccrtain things. 8ut at
no timc was thc namc ol Gcn. Marshall cvcr brought into thc
convcrsation. . . . ! wish it to appcar in my tcstimony that it is my
lull bclicl that thc Sccrctary ol Var, Mr. Stimson, and thc Chicl
ol Sta, Gcn. Marshall, arc not involvcd in any way whatsocvcr
with thc tcstimony which ! am about to givc, and it is my
bclicl that ncithcr onc kncw anything ol it. . . .Vc |Spalding
and 8isscll, whcn at Ft. 8ragg in thc summcr ol 1943| talkcd
about thc Pcarl Harbor incidcnt. ! rcmcmbcr cxprcssing to
him my lailurc to undcrstand how Shcrman Milcs and thc
Navy could lail to discovcr that thosc ]apancsc vcsscls had lclt
homc ports. . . . ! rcmcmbcr shooting o my mouth about
Shcrman Milcs, lor whom ! didnt havc a vcry high rcgard
prolcssionally . . . and 8isscll said that ccrtain mcssagcs had
bccn rcccivcd and wcrc in thc lcs ol G2 and hc dccmcd
it most ncccssary to dcstroy thcm. ! got thc imprcssion that
thcsc mcssagcs wcrc dcrogatory to thc Var cpartmcnt and
that hc |8isscll| on his own rcsponsibility dcstroycd thcm. !
had thc imprcssion that thcy wcrc sccrct inlormation which
it was most dcsirablc that thc prcsidcnt, Congrcss, thc public,
Mr. Stimson and Gcn. Marshall not know about. ! had a lccl
ing that 8isscll dcstroycd thcm without cvcn Gcn. Raymond
Lcc, thc G2 at that timc, knowing thcy wcrc in cxistcncc. . . .
8isscll having told mc that hc had dcstroycd what ! would call
vital rccords which, il known, would bc vcry unplcasant lor
thc Var cpartmcnt. 8isscll was thc only man who cvcr told
mc anything that ! rcmcmbcr. ! hopc it is clcar in hcrc that !
wouldnt want anything ! say to transgrcss thc intcgrity ol Mr.
Stimson or Gcorgc Marshall. Tcy arc two ol thc ncst mcn in
thc world and thcy would hcw to thc linc ! know.
104

103
!bid., p. 90.
104
!bid., pp. 9093.
Clarkc and Gibson qucstioncd Maj. Gcn. Ralph C. Smith: At
any timc during your scrvicc in thc Var cpartmcnt in 1941
until you lclt in March 1942, to your knowlcdgc wcrc any ol
thc rccords ol G2 dcstroycd:
Smith: Catcgorically, no. . . . ! am vcry ccrtain that no pcr
mancnt rccords altcr ]anuary 1941, pcrhaps, wcrc rcmovcd or
dcstroycd.
Gibson: At anytimc did you cvcr rcccivc any ordcr lrom any
onc altcr Pcarl Harbor whilc you wcrc in thc Var cpartmcnt
to dcstroy or havc any rccords dcstroycd:
Smith: ! did not. . . .
Gibson: As lar as you know, arc thc rccords ol G2 that pcrtain
to Pcarl Harbor lor 1941 and up until March 1942 complctc:
Smith: To thc bcst ol knowlcdgc thcy arc.
Gibson: Prior to ycstcrday had you cvcr hcard any commcnt
madc that il ccrtain rccords in G2 bccamc known or wcrc
madc public that it would bc vcry damning to thc Sccrctary ol
Var or Chicl ol Sta:
Smith: No ! had ncvcr hcard any such commcnt.
Gibson: id Col. 8isscll to your knowlcdgc, cvcr, dcstroy any
rccords in G2 in thc cpartmcnt:
Smith: Hc did not during my tcnurc ol o cc, and ! bclicvc that
il hc had ! would havc known about it lrom my subordinatcs.
Gibson: id Col. 8isscll cvcr tcll you that hc had dcstroycd
somc rccords dcaling with Pcarl Harbor:
Smith: Hc did not. . . .
Clarke: o you know whcthcr or not thc Chicl ol thc Countcr
!ntclligcncc Group, Col. 8isscll, had at his disposal all ol
thc inlormation and intclligcncc which was availablc to thc
!ntclligcncc Group:
Smith: ! havc a vaguc rccollcction that somc point was brought
up cithcr shortly bclorc Pcarl Harbor or possibly altcrward
that somc sourccs ol Countcr !ntclligcncc data wcrc in cxis
tcncc but not bcing cxploitcd to thc maximum. ! think ! can
statc as a ccrtainty that thc Countcr !ntclligcncc 8ranch did
not rcccivc thc pouch containing thc lull Magic matcrial. ! do,
howcvcr, havc a vaguc rccollcction that thc Far astcrn 8ranch
had somc contacts with thc Countcr !ntclligcncc 8ranch on
activitics ol ]apancsc agcnts in this country.
105

8rigadicr Coloncl ]ohn T. 8isscll, namcd by Sadtlcr and
Spalding as having dcstroycd documcnts, was thcn qucstioncd:
106

Gibson: Gcn. Spalding has tcsticd that, among othcr things
you told him that ccrtain mcssagcs had bccn rcccivcd, thcsc
mcssagcs pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor and wcrc in thc lcs ol
G2 and that you dccmcd it most ncccssary to dcstroy thcm.
id you cvcr makc such a statcmcnt:
Bissell: No ! did not. . . .
Gibson: To your knowlcdgc, whilc you wcrc conncctcd with
G2 wcrc cvcr any rccords pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor or any
thing clsc dcstroycd:
Bissell: Not as lar as ! know.
Gibson: And oncc a mcssagc was okaycd and scnt it was
kcpt:
105
!bid., pp. 9899.
106
!bid., pp. 99102.
Bissell: !t wcnt to thc lc immcdiatcly.
Gibson: And no lcs wcrc cvcr dcstroycd.
Bissell: Not as lar as ! know. . . .
Gibson: id you tcll Gcn. Spaulding |sic| at any timc, in sub
stancc that you had dcstroycd what you would call vital rccords,
rccords which il known to cxist would bc vcry unplcasant to
thc Var cpartmcnt:
Bissell: ! did not.
Gibson: id you cvcr tcll him anything lrom which hc might
inlcr such:
Bissell: No.
107

Clarkc qucstioncd not only Fricdman but also thc lour
army o ccrs supposcdly implicatcdColoncl tis K. Sadtlcr,
8rigadicr Gcncral !saac Spalding, Major Gcncral Ralph C. Smith,
and 8rigadicr Gcncral ]ohn T. 8isscll. ach in turn dcnicd hav
ing actually sccn a possiblc Vinds Codc xccutc.
Ci~vxv !xvvs)ic~)iox P~v) !! Su::~vy
Fricdman was told by Sadtlcr that hc rcmcmbcrcd hcaring
that a Vinds Codc cxccutc had bccn rcccivcd on cccmbcr 4 or
5 and that it had bccn dcstroycd on GCMs ordcrs.
108
Sadtlcr told
Fricdman hc had hcard this lrom Spalding.
109

Sadtlcr latcr contradicatcd this tcstimony. Hc said hc had
ncvcr sccn a Vinds Codc cxccutc himscll.
110
Hc latcr madc an
107
!bid., pp. 10102.
108
!bid., pp. 7981.
109
!bid., p. 81.
110
!bid., p. 80.
absolutc at dcnial ol that . . . bccausc as lar as ! know that mcs
sagc was ncvcr in thc Var cpartmcnt and ! ncvcr madc any
statcmcnt that Gcncral Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd or that
anyonc told mc that Gcncral Marshall ordcrcd it dcstroycd.
111
Sadtlcr said hc was told by Spalding in August 1943 that ]. T. 8.
8isscll said cvcrything pcrtaining to PH was dcstroycd.
112
Spalding
thcn addcd |A|t no timc was thc namc ol Gcn. Marshall cvcr
brought into thc convcrsation or discussion.
113

Spalding was told by 8isscll that hc dccmcd it ncccssary to
dcstroy lcs in G2, implying that hc had donc this on his own
rcsponsibility.
114
Spalding said lurthcr ! hopc it is clcar in hcrc
that ! wouldnt want anything ! say to transgrcss thc intcgrity ol
Mr. Stimson or Gcorgc Marshall. Tcy arc two ol thc ncst mcn
in thc world and thcy would hcw to thc linc ! know.
115
8isscll latcr tcsticd that as lar as hc kncw no mcssagcs pcr
taining to Pcarl Harbor had bccn dcstroycd, oncc a mcssagc was
okaycd and scnt, !t wcnt into thc lc immcdiatcly. . . . And no
lcs wcrc cvcr dcstroycd.
116

Ci~vxvs Rvvov)
Altcr quoting Fricdmans statcmcnt bclorc thc Hcwitt
!nquiry, Clarkc statcd:
! nd that Mr. Fricdman . . . was told by Col. Sadtlcr at somc
timc in 1943 that 8rig. Gcn. !saac Spalding told Col. Sadtlcr
that 8rig. Gcn. ].T.8. 8isscll had told Gcn. Spalding that
111
!bid., p. 86.
112
!bid., p. 86.
113
!bid., p. 90.
114
!bid., pp. 9093.
115
!bid.
116
!bid., pp. 10102.
cvcrything pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor was bcing dcstroycd or
had bccn dcstroycd.
! nd that Col. Sadtlcr was told by 8rig. Gcn. !saac Spalding
somctimc in August 1943 that 8rig. Gcn. ]. T. 8. 8issscll had
told Gcn. Spalding that ccrtain mcssagcs, pcrtaining to Pcarl
Harbor had bccn rcccivcd and wcrc in thc lcs ol G2 on 7
cccmbcr 1941 and that 8isscll had dccmcd it most ncccssary
to dcstroy thcm.
Ci~vxvs Coxciusioxs
! nd that Spalding was not told by 8isscll that ccrtain mcs
sagcs had bccn rcccivcd, wcrc in G2s lcs and that 8isscll
dccmcd it ncccssary to dcstroy thcm.
! nd that Sadtlcr did not tcll Fricdman that Spalding had told
Sadtlcr that ccrtain mcssagcs implcmcnting thc Vinds Codc
mcssagc wcrc dcstroycd as a rcsult ol an ordcr ol Marshall.
!n thc cnd, Clarkc concludcd:
! nd that no writtcn mcssagc implcmcnting thc Vinds Codc
mcssagc was cvcr rcccivcd by G2 |Military !ntclligcncc, Army|,
and ! nd that no rccords pcrtaining to Pcarl Harbor havc bccn
dcstroycd by G2 or by anybody conncctcd with G2.
Hc so rcportcd to Chicl ol Sta Marshall.
117

S)i:sox !ssuvs vvici~i Rvvov) . . .
(Aucus) :o, +o)
As wc havc sccn, Stimson rclraincd lrom rclcasing thc APH8
rcport whcn it was complctcd in ctobcr 1944. Howcvcr, upon
117
!bid., pp. 7576. (August 13, 1945) Clarkc rcport (part 34, p. 76).
conclusion ol Clauscns invcstigation Stimson promptly issucd
an cial Rcport . . . Rcgarding thc Pcarl Harbor isastcr,
datcd August 29, 1945.
118
Clauscns a davits did not rcally dcal
with thc APH8 chargcs, but Stimson uscd thcm and othcr docu
mcnts Clauscn had asscmblcd to ovcrturn its ndings, cspccially
with rcspcct to Marshall, and to rcconrm thc ndings ol thc
Robcrts Commission. !n this rcport, Stimson dclcndcd Marshall
and Gcrow lor having adcquatcly alcrtcd Short to thc impcnding
crisis, dclcndcd Hull, and placcd thc primary blamc oncc morc
on Short.
Stimson lound that insolar as thc Army was conccrncd, Short
borc |t|hc primary and immcdiatc rcsponsibility lor thc protcc
tion ol thc !sland ol ahu and Pcarl Harbor and that hc was
rcpcatcdly adviscd ol thc critical cvcnts which wcrc dcvclop
ing. Stimson did
not nd that thcrc was any inlormation in thc posscssion ol
thc Var cpartmcnt and which was not madc availablc to
Gcncral Short which would havc modicd thc csscncc ol thc
abovc inlormation which was scnt to him or which would havc
acctcd or incrcascd thc dutics ol vigilancc and alcrtncss thus
alrcady imposcd upon him.
His lailurc adcquatcly to alcrt his command to thc dcgrcc
ol prcparcdncss which thc situation dcmandcd . . . contributcd
mcasurably to thc cxtcnt ol thc disastcr. . . .
Tis lailurc rcsultcd not lrom indolcncc or indicrcncc or will
lul disobcdicncc ol ordcrs but lrom a vital crror ol judgmcnt . . .
|duc to| Gcncral Shorts condcncc that ]apan would not thcn
attack Pcarl Harbor. . . .
To sum up thc situation tcrscly, Gcncral Short was warncd by
Vashington that thcrc was immcdiatc dangcr both ol an attack
118
!bid., part 35, pp. 1319.
lrom without by ]apan and ol an attack lrom within by sabo
tagc. Tis warning rcquircd him to bc alcrt against both lorms
ol dangcr. Hc chosc to conccntratc himscll so cntircly upon a
dclcnsc against sabotagc as to lcavc himscll morc complctcly
cxposcd to an attack lrom without than il thcrc had bccn no
alcrt at all. . . . To such an crror ol judgmcnt it is no cxcusc that
hc rclicd upon assuranccs lrom anothcr scrvicc, cvcn though hc
thought that that scrvicc was bcttcr inlormcd than hc was as to
thc disposition ol thc ]apancsc cct.
119

As to thc APH8s conclusions conccrning Vashington o
cials, Stimson wrotc,
Such dutics as thc Var cpartmcnt in Vashington had in
thc supcrvision ol thc dclcnsc ol Hawaii dcvolvcd primarily
upon what was thcn known as thc Var Plans ivision ol thc
Gcncral Sta. . . . Tc !ntclligcncc Scction ol thc Gcncral Sta
(G2) also had dutics ol collccting and analyzing inlormation
and transmitting inlormation to othcr scctions ol thc Var
cpartmcnt and to thc thcatcr commandcrs.
! nd . . . that thc mcssagcs scnt to Gcncral Short gavc him adc
quatc inlormation as to thc statc ol thc ncgotiations with thc
]apancsc and thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc situation. . . . Furthcrmorc,
. . . ! do not think that any spccial and dctailcd warnings against
sabotagc should havc bccn considcrcd by Gcncral Short as jus
tilying his dccision that an alcrt against any possiblc cncmy
action was not also his duty.
120

Vith rcgard to thc chargcs against thc war plans division,
Stimson bclicvcd it
madc a mistakc in not transmitting to Gcncral Short morc
inlormation than it did. . . . |A| morc c cicnt lunctioning ol
119
!bid., pp. 1416.
120
!bid., p. 16.
thc division would havc dcmandcd that a carclul inquiry as to
thc mcaning ol Gcncral Shorts mcssagc |rcporting his sabo
tagc alcrt| bc madc and no room lor ambiguity pcrmittcd.
Howcvcr, Stimson madc cxcuscs lor thc division.
!t must clcarly bc bornc in mind that in Novcmbcr and
cccmbcr 1941, thc rcsponsibilitics ol thc Var Plans ivision
covcrcd many clds and many thcatcrs. . . . Tcir conduct must
bc vicwcd in an cntircly dicrcnt light lrom that ol thc thcatcr
commandcr, such as Gcncral Short, who was likc a scntincl
on post and whosc attcntion and vigilancc must bc cntircly
conccntratcd on thc singlc position which hc has bccn cho
scn to dclcnd and whosc alcrtncss must not bc allowcd to bc
distractcd by considcration ol othcr contingcncics in rcspcct
to which hc is not rcsponsiblc. Undcr all circumstanccs, ! nd
nothing in thc cvidcncc as now rccordcd which warrants thc
institution ol any lurthcr procccdings against any o ccr in thc
Var Plans ivision.
121

Stimson was cspccially anxious to ovcrturn thc APH8s
wickcd (FRs tcrm) criticism ol Marshall:
!n my opinion, this criticism is cntircly unjusticd. !t ariscs
lrom a lundamcntal misconccption ol thc dutics ol thc Chicl
ol Sta and ol his rclations with thc divisions and activitics ol
thc Gcncral Sta. !t is not thc lunction ol thc Chicl ol Sta
spccically to dircct and pcrsonally supcrvisc thc cxccution in
dctail ol thc dutics ol thc various scctions ol thc Gcncral Sta.
. . . Tc shortcomings ! havc pointcd out thus cannot in any
lairncss bc attributcd to thc Chicl ol Sta. n thc contrary,
throughout this mattcr ! bclicvc that hc actcd with his usual
grcat skill, cncrgy, and c cicncy.
122

121
!bid., p. 18.
122
!bid., pp. 1819.
Tcstimony as to thc dclivcry ol MAG!C to Marshall on thc
cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, had bccn contradictory. 8ratton, thcn
with Var cpartmcnts G2, had told thc APH8 that hc had
pcrsonally dclivcrcd that cvcning thc 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply
not only to Hulls duty o ccr, but also to Milcs and Marshalls
sccrctary.
123
Howcvcr, in his a davit lor Clauscn hc corrcctcd
his prcvious tcstimony and said hc had told uscnbury to dclivcr
Marshalls sct to his homc at Fort Mycr, and lurthcr that thc only
mcssagc hc, 8ratton, had dclivcrcd that night was to thc duty
o ccr lor thc Sccrctary ol Statc.
124
Stimson ignorcs thcsc con
tradictions and simply acccpts thc statcmcnt in 8rattons a da
vit. !n his cial Rcport Stimson wrotc: Tcrc is no disputc,
howcvcr, that Gcncral Marshall did not gct this inlormation |thc
]apancsc rcply| until thc morning ol cccmbcr 7.
125

Tc APH8 had suggcstcd also that il Hull had lollowcd a
dicrcnt proccdurc with thc ]apancsc cnvoys, hc might havc
prolongcd thc ncgotiations until such timc as thc Army and
Navy wcrc bcttcr prcparcd lor hostilc action. Tis, Stimson said,
amounts at bcst only to a conjccturc. Hc considcrcd thc boards
commcnt in this rcspcct uncallcd lor.
126

To thc apparcnt satislaction ol thc administration, thc thrcc
supplcmcntal invcstigations had shiltcd thc major rcsponsibility
lor thc ]apancsc attack away lrom top Vashington o cials
Marshall, Gcrow, and Hulland back oncc morc to Kimmcl and
Short, with somc blamc lclt ovcr lor Stark. Tc administration
considcrcd thc mattcr closcd.
123
!bid., part 29, p. 2349. 8ratton tcstimony bclorc APH8, Scptcmbcr 30,
1944.
124
!bid., part 35, pp. 9798.
125
!bid., p. 17. Stimsons cial Rcport rcgarding thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr
(August 29, 1945).
126
!bid., p. 19.
611
26.
Safeguarding
Military Information
B
y March 1945 thc Allics wcrc making progrcss on all lronts.
Tc Gcrmans, bcsicgcd lrom thc cast by thc Russians
and lrom thc wcst by Allicd lorccs, wcrc pulling back.
Tc ]apancsc wcrc in rctrcat in thc Pacic and southcast Asia.
Altcr lcaplrogging lrom onc Pacic island to anothcr, thc U.S.
Army undcr MacArthur had advanccd as lar as thc Philippincs.
Howcvcr, morc ghting lay ahcad.
Tc proccdurc cstablishcd to makc surc that our cncmics did
not lcarn that wc wcrc rcading thcir codcs sccmcd to bc ccctivc.
1

Vhcn thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations startcd, Army and Navy
o ccrs wcrc prohibitcd lrom mcntioning thc intcrccpts.
2
Tcrc
had bccn onc lcak in thc spring ol 1941, cvcntually attributcd
to thc Statc cpartmcnt, which had rcccivcd lrom thc Army
1
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 8, pp. 368182. (Saord tcsti
mony).
2
!bid., part 35, p. 101 (Milcss a davit lor Clauscn).
but had not rcturncd a ]apancsc MAG!C translation.
3
Tcn
in ]unc 1942 thc Chicago Tribunes publication ol thc namcs ol
thc ]apancsc ships at Midway indicatcd that wc had acccss to
sccrct ]apancsc mcssagcs.
4
As notcd, during thc 1944 campaign,
Marshall had succccdcd in prcvcnting Rcpublican prcsidcntial
candidatc Tomas . cwcy lrom spcaking out on thc subjcct ol
thc sccrct ]apancsc intcrccpts.
5
Rumors pcrsistcd, howcvcr. 8ut
thcrc had as yct bccn no public disclosurc that wc had brokcn thc
]apancsc Purplc codc. For all practical purposcs, inlormation
about MAG!C had bccn limitcd to thc lcw o cials privy to thc
intcrccpts bclorc and during thc war and thosc involvcd in thc
invcstigations. And thc authoritics wcrc anxious to kccp it that
way.
6

Svx~)v 8iii S.8o
n March 30, 1945, cmocratic Utah Scnator lbcrt
Tomas, chairman ol thc Scnatc Committcc on Military Aairs,
introduccd S.805 to insurc thc lurthcr military sccurity ol thc
Unitcd Statcs by prcvcnting disclosurcs ol inlormation sccurcd
through o cial sourccs. Tis bill providcd hcavy pcnaltics lor
disclosing, without propcr authorization, inlormation about U.S.
or lorcign codcs acquircd whcn scrving in U.S. or lorcign armcd
lorccs or whcn cmploycd or pcrlorming scrviccs lor thc Unitcd
Statcs or a lorcign govcrnmcnt. Authorization to rclcasc such
inlormation acquircd whilc working lor thc Unitcd Statcs shall
bc grantcd only in accordancc with rcgulations prcscribcd by thc
prcsidcnt. !nlormation acquircd as a rcsult ol pcrlorming scrviccs
lor a lorcign govcrnmcnt could not bc rclcascd without joint
3
!bid., part 8, p. 3735.
4
!bid., pp. 373538.
5
!bid., part 3, pp. 112436.
6
!bid., part 29, p. 2413.
Safeguarding Military Information 613
authorization by thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol Var, and
thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy.
7

Admiral Kimmcl rcad a bricl vclinc noticc about this bill in
thc New York Herald-Tribune, March 31, and immcdiatcly wrotc
his chicl counscl, Charlcs Rugg, to invcstigatc. Scvcral days latcr
Rugg nally obtaincd a copy ol thc bill and noticd Kimmcl and
Scnator Homcr Fcrguson ol Michigan. Rugg said that its pas
sagc would closc thc door to any invcstigation ol Pcarl Harbor.
8

Scnator Tomas statcd that this bill providcs lor lling a gap in
rcgard to thc punishmcnt ol pcrsons who may divulgc military
sccrcts. . . . Tc bill is sponsorcd by both thc Army and thc Navy.
!t is a mcasurc which is ncccssary in pcacctimc, but at thc prcscnt
timc it is cxtrcmcly ncccssary. Vithout any lurthcr discussion or
dcbatc, thc bill was passcd by voicc votc, no roll call was takcn.
Kimmcl was dcspcratc bccausc il thc Housc passcd thc bill, that
was thc cnd ol all disclosurcs about Pcarl Harbor.
9

Scnator Fcrguson had bccn out ol thc country whcn thc bill
camc bclorc thc Scnatc on April 9. n his rcturn to Vashington
hc cntcrcd a motion to rcconsidcr thc votcs by which thc bill
had bccn passcd. Hc said it was vcry important that thc Scnatc
should givc lurthcr considcration to thc mcasurc, and that it
should bc amcndcd.
10
Fcrgusons motion was agrccd to on April
11, and S.805 was tcmporarily sct asidc.
7
Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st scss., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3196.
8
Husband . Kimmcl, Admiral Kimmel s Story (Chicago: Hcnry Rcgncry,
1955), p. 127.
9
!bid., p. 127.
10
Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st scss., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3267.
Pv~cv)i:v Cvxsovsniv-
Kimmcl was in Vashington on April 12. Hc wcnt to thc
Washington Post with thc lacts and his vicws about thc bill. Hc
also callcd scvcral mcmbcrs ol Congrcss.
11

Tc ncxt morning, an cditorial sparkcd by Kimmcls rcvcla
tions, Vraps on History, appcarcd in thc Post. !t statcd thc issuc
clcarly: !t is rcgrcttablc to notc that wc can no longcr dcpcnd
upon thc Scnatc to protcct thc Nation against cxccutivc dcpriva
tions ol our libcrtics. Tc latcst illustration is S.805, which would
takc away lrom thc Amcrican pcoplc that vcry lrccdom ol inlor
mation which wc arc sccking to promotc in othcr countrics. Tc
bill was passcd on Monday without cxciting a ripplc, cithcr insidc
or outsidc thc Scnatc. nly onc hcaring was hcld, and that in
camera. !t was rcportcd that Army and Navy spokcsmcn had told
thc Scnatc Military Aairs Committcc that thc bill was mcrcly
intcndcd to protcct o cial inlormation and thc Committcc had
acccptcd thc bill on that absurd justication. . . .
Te Washington Post cditorializcd:
n Monday no disscnticnt could bc lound in a body sworn to
uphold thc Constitution. ithcr lrom incrtia or somnolcncc,
cithcr lrom lack ol intcrcst or just plain complaisancc, thc
Scnators approvcd thc sayso ol Chairman Tomas. . . . Yct this
bill would gag anybody who would publish any inlormation
which originally took thc lorm ol a codcd mcssagc. . . . And
you may bc surc, il this bill is cnactcd, almost cvcrything that
it is sought to kccp lrom thc prying cycs ol thc public will rst
bc put in codc. . . .
To our way ol thinking, thc nccd lor scrutiny ol rcqucsts lrom
thc armcd scrviccs has always bccn prcscnt, and it has ncvcr
bccn pointcd up as it is today. Vith thc approach ol thc cnd
ol thc ght lor libcrty, wc arc bcginning to rcprosclytizc lor it.
11
Safeguarding Military Information 615
Frccdom ol inlormation, spccically, is our immcdiatc crusadc.
. . . Tat thc Scnatc on Monday blackcd it out in thc Unitcd
Statcs was thc worst blackout that thc Scnatc has sustaincd in
our mcmory.
12
Axo)nvv Ax~iysis ov S.8o
n April 13 thc New York Times rcportcd on S.805:
Fcaring that a bill intcndcd to protcct military sccrcts, passcd
unanimously by thc Scnatc Monday, might intcrlcrc with
Congrcssional invcstigation ol govcrnmcnt dcpartmcnts and
supprcss lcgitimatc public inlormation, Scnators havc takcn
stcps to halt thc mcasurc and pcrhaps to rccxaminc thc Var
and Navy o ccrs who sponsorcd thc proposal.
Scnator Homcr Fcrguson, Rcpublican, ol Michigan, has movcd
lor rcconsidcration ol thc bill. Although hc sccs no sinistcr
dcsign in thc mcasurc, hc bclicvcs that through misusc thc lcg
islation could imposc a ccnsorship on ncwspapcrs and dcprivc
Congrcssional committccs ol many lacts. . . . isclaiming any
dcsirc to intcrlcrc with propcr protcction ol military sccrcts,
Scnator Fcrguson considcrs thc bill so broadly drawn as possi
bly to supprcss many political qucstions with which thc public
has a right to bc inlormcd. . . .
High Var and Navy o ccrs stood back ol thc bill, which it
was undcrstood today was submittcd by thc military authoritics
in pcrlcct good laith. !n its rcport to thc Scnatc thc Military
Aairs Committcc said thc bill had approval ol thc joint Chicls
ol Sta and was dccmcd csscntial in thc intcrcsts ol national
dclcnsc and sccurity.
13

12
Washington Post, April 12, 1945, p. 8.
13
Te New York Times, April 13, 1945, p. 30.

Tc Times ol April 13 also rcportcd thc dcath ol Prcsidcnt
Rooscvclt, which occurrcd thc day bclorc, April 12. Hc had bccn
at his rctrcat in Varm Springs, Gcorgia. FRs pcrsonal physi
cian wrotc latcr that thc prcsidcnt had laintcd at 1:20 v.:., and
dicd shortly thcrcaltcr, at 3:35 v.:.
14

Latcr whcn S.805 camc bclorc thc Housc committcc, action
was dclaycd su cicntly to allow lor a thorough invcstigation.
Vhcn thc bill was nally brought to thc oor a couplc ol months
latcr, it was dclcatcd.
15
14
Ross T. Mc!ntirc, White House Physician (Ncw York: G.P. Putnams Sons,
1946), pp. 24143.
15
617
27.
Joint Congressional
Committee on the
Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack
November 15, 1945May 31, 1946: Part 1
A
ltcr almost lour ycars ol ghting on land, sca, and in thc air,
altcr thc dctonation ol two atomic bombs on ]apanonc on
Hiroshima (August 6) and thc othcr on Nagasaki (August
8)thc ]apancsc nally admittcd dclcat. n August 25 mpcror
Hirohito broadcast to thc ]apancsc pcoplc that thc countrys
lorccs wcrc surrcndcring. August 25, 1945, was dcclarcd \] ay.
Vorld Var !! had cndcd.
A couplc ol wccks latcron August 29thc ncw prcsi
dcnt, Harry S. Truman, who had takcn o cc altcr thc dcath ol
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt on April 12, 1945, rclcascd thc rcports ol thc
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Navy Court ol !nquiry.
1
A vcrita
blc rcstorm cruptcd. Tc carlicr Robcrts Commission had lound
1
New York Times, August 30, 1945. pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, and S. 615.
thc two Hawaiian commandcrs, Admiral Kimmcl and Gcncral
Short, guilty ol dcrclictions ol duty and crrors ol judgmcnt
and thcy had bccn rctircd lrom scrvicc and dcmotcd in rank. Tc
Army and Navy rcports rclcascd by Truman ccctivcly absolvcd
Kimmcl and Short ol blamc and placcd much ol thc rcsponsi
bility on lour toplcvcl Vashington o cialsSccrctary ol Statc
Cordcll Hull, Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral Gcorgc C. Marshall,
Chicl ol thc Armys war plans division Gcncral Lconard T.
Gcrow, and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Harold R. Stark.
As thc New York Times rcportcd,
!t was not a prctty story that Prcsidcnt Truman rclcascd in mak
ing public Var and Navy rcports on thc rcasons why Army and
Navy o cials at ahu wcrc takcn by surprisc in thc ]apancsc
attack on cc. 7, 1941.
2

!n spitc ol thc volumc ol matcrial rclcascd by Truman, thc
public still was not satiscd. Tcrc wcrc obvious omissions.
Undcr ordcrs ol thc sccrctary ol war and thc sccrctary ol thc navy,
scctions ol both rcports had bccn dclctcd. And Top Sccrct por
tions wcrc still bcing withhcld. !n thc words ol Scnatc Majority
Lcadcr Albcn 8arklcy, thc rcports wcrc conlusing and conict
ing whcn comparcd with onc anothcr, and to somc cxtcnt contain
contradictions and inconsistcncics.
3
Morcovcr, both Sccrctary ol
Var Hcnry L. Stimson and Navy Sccrctary ]amcs Forrcstal had,
according to Scnator Homcr Fcrguson, issucd critical opinions
ol thc ndings ol thcir own boards.
4

2
!bid., p. 1.
3
Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in 79th Cong., 1st scss.
]oint (Congrcssional) Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor
Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt
Printing cc, 1946), part 1, p. 11.
4
!bid, p. 16.
Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 619
]oix) Coxcvvssiox~i Co::i))vv ( ]CC)
s)~niisnvb
Tc Rcpublicans in Congrcss, anxious to lcarn thc truth,
dcmandcd a lurthcr invcstigation. Scnator Fcrguson urgcd thc
cstablishmcnt ol a committcc to invcstigatc thc attack,
5
and on
Scptcmbcr 6 8arklcy introduccd a concurrcnt rcsolution similar
to Fcrgusons proposal.
6

Tc Scnatc dcbatc was subducd and politc.
7
!t was agrccd
that thc rccord so lar was incomplctc, conlusing, and conicting.
8arklcy proposcd an inquiry
ol such dignity and authcnticity as to convincc thc Congrcss
and thc country and thc world that no cort has bccn madc
to shicld any pcrson who may havc bccn dircctly or indircctly
rcsponsiblc lor this disastcr, or to condcmn unlairly or unjustly
any pcrson who was in authority, military, naval, or civilian, at
thc timc or prior thcrcto.
8arklcys Concurrcnt Rcsolution 27 sct up a ]oint Committcc on
thc !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack ( ]oint Congrcssional
Committcc, or ]CC) with broad authority to
makc a lull and complctc invcstigation ol thc lacts rclating to
thc cvcnts and circumstanccs lcading up to or lollowing thc
attack madc by ]apancsc armcd lorccs upon Pcarl Harbor in
thc Tcrritory ol Hawaii on cccmbcr 7, 1941.
5
Te New York Times, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, p. 1. Scc also ]oint Committcc, Pearl
Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 14, which rcprints Fcrgusons suggcstion lrom thc
Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945.
6
Te New York Times, Scptcmbcr 7, 1945, p. 7. Scc also ]oint Committcc, Pearl
Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 13, which rcprints 8arklcys concurrcnt rcsolution
lrom thc Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945.
7
Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in ]oint Committcc, Pearl
Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 1023.
Tc committcc was to complctc its tcstimony in lour months
and rcport to thc Scnatc and Housc not latcr than ]anuary 3,
1946. Tc rcsolution was passcd unanimously by thc Scnatc on
Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, and by thc Housc on Scptcmbcr 11.
8

Tcn mcmbcrs ol Congrcss, all lawycrs, wcrc appointcd to thc
committcc.
9
n thc Scnatc sidc, thrcc cmocrats: 8arklcy ol
Kcntucky, chairman, Valtcr F. Gcorgc ol Gcorgia, and Scott V.
Lucas ol !llinois, and two Rcpublicans: wcn 8rcwstcr ol Mainc
and Fcrguson ol Michigan. n thc Housc sidc, thrcc cmocrats:
]crc Coopcr ol Tcnncsscc, vicc Chairman, ]. 8ayard Clark ol
North Carolina and ]ohn V. Murphy ol Pcnnsylvania, and two
Rcpublicans: 8crtrand V. Gcarhart ol Calilornia and Frank 8.
Kcclc ol Visconsin.
Villiam . Mitchcll, who had scrvcd as solicitor gcncral lor
lour ycars undcr Calvin Coolidgc and attorncy gcncral lor lour
ycars undcr Hcrbcrt Hoovcr, was sclcctcd to scrvc as gcncral
counscl.
10
Gcrhard A. Gcscll was namcd Mitchclls chicl assistant
counscl, with ]ulc M. Hannalord and ]ohn . Mastcn as assistant
counscls.
11

8arklcy statcd that thc ]CC should conduct its invcstigation
without partisanship or lavoritism. . . . Such an invcstigation
should look solcly to thc asccrtainmcnt ol thc cold, unvarnishcd,
indisputablc lacts so lar as thcy arc obtainablc.
12
Scnator avid
!. Valsh ol Massachusctts had praiscd 8arklcy lor having liltcd
this qucstion abovc partisanship, and madc an appcal lor what
thc country wantsa highmindcd, clcan, judicial invcstigation
8
9
!bid., p. 4.
10
!bid., part 4, p. 1587.
11
!bid., part 1, p. 4.
12
!bid., p. 12.
ol all thc lacts conncctcd with thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr.
13
Yct
thc congrcssional committcc was soon cmbroilcd in politics.
Tc makcup ol thc committcc, with six cmocrats and lour
Rcpublicans, was stackcd in lavor ol thc administration. Tc
Rcpublicans maintaincd that thcir acccss to govcrnmcnt rccords
was bcing rcstrictcd and that thc cmocratic majority was try
ing to curb, by strict partylinc votc, thc scopc ol thc inquiry. No
provision was madc lor a sta to assist thc Rcpublican mcmbcrs.
Tc cmocrats claimcd thc Rcpublicans wcrc anxious to usc thc
inquiry to smcar Rooscvclt, whilc thc Rcpublicans implicd thc
cmocrats wcrc trying to shicld thc Rooscvclt administration.
Housc Majority Lcadcr ]ohn V. McCormack accuscd thc com
mittcc minority ol witchhunting.
14

Tis account ol thc Congrcssional hcarings is prctty much
lactual and nonpartisan. Tc cvcnts arc prcscntcd morc or lcss
in thc ordcr in which thc witncsscs to thcm appcarcd bclorc thc
Committcc. Somc witncsscs contradictcd othcr witncsscs, somc
cvcn contradictcd thcir own carlicr tcstimony, and thc rccollcc
tions ol othcrs wcrc oltcn conluscd or hazy. Pressure may have been
used to persuade some witnesses to change their stories. JCC Committee
members often encountered di culty in obtaining access to informa-
tion. Also, lricnds ol thc administration somctimcs tricd to sidc
track thc probing into scnsitivc issucs by disrupting thc procccd
ings. Tus a study ol thc hcarings alonc yiclds a rathcr disjointcd
picturc. nly altcr trying to rcconcilc thc various contradictions
and conlusions and arranging thc cvcnts rcvcalcd chronologically,
as has bccn donc in thc nal chaptcr ol this book, is it possiblc to
rccognizc thc rolcs playcd by thc scvcral principals involvcd in thc
Pcarl Harbor disastcrthcir actions, inactions, thcir ncgligcncc
and dilatorincss.
13
Congressional Record, Scptcmbcr 6, 1945, rcprintcd in ]oint Committcc, Pearl
Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 22.
14
Te New York Times, Novcmbcr 15, 1945, p. 3.
uvs)ioxs Tn~) Mus) 8v Asxvb
As thc hcarings progrcsscd, much timc and cncrgy was
dcvotcd to trying to nd answcrs to lour major qucstions:
1. Had top Vashington o cials, including thc prcsidcnt, com
mittcd this country to war in support ol thc 8ritish and utch
without rst obtaining congrcssional approval as rcquircd by
thc Constitution:
2. How much was known bclorc thc cccmbcr 7, 1941
]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor about ]apans plans to go to
war against thc Unitcd Statcs: Had Vashington o cials kcpt
thc cld commandcrs adcquatcly inlormcd:
3. Vas thcrc prcattack cvidcncc to indicatc a U.S. tcrritory,
possibly cvcn Pcarl Harbor, was a likcly targct ol thc ]apancsc:
!l so, wcrc thc Hawaiian commandcrs so adviscd: !l not, why
not:
4. Had thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs madc rcasonably intcl
ligcnt dccisions, givcn thc inlormation and rcsourccs availablc
to thcm:
]oix) Coxcvvssiox~i Co::i))vv Co::vxcvs
Tc committcc opcncd its hcarings on Novcmbcr 15. !t
was gcncrally admittcd that morc intclligcncc was availablc in
Vashington than in Hawaii. Tus any scrious attcmpt to account
lor thc trcmcndous losscs at Pcarl Harbor would havc to start
by cxploring thc inlormation availablc in Vashington bclorc
thc attack and by dctcrmining how much ol it had bccn scnt to
Hawaii. Tc ]CC obtaincd at thc start ol its hcarings thc sccrct
]apancsc dispatchcs which U.S. cryptographcrs had intcrccptcd,
dccodcd, and translatcd bclorc thc attack. Tcsc mcssagcs, most
ol thcm transmittcd on thc Purplc codc machinc, which U.S.
cryptographcrs had rcplicatcd in August 1940, yicldcd valuablc
intclligcncc known as MAG!C. xhibit 1 consistcd ol diplomatic
mcssagcs scnt and rcccivcd by thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt and its lor
cign cstablishmcnts which had bccn intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd and
translatcd by U.S. cryptographcrs bctwccn ]uly 1 and cccmbcr
8, 1941.
15
xhibit 2 containcd intcrccptcd mcssagcs conccrn
ing military matters such as military installations, ship movements,
espionage reports, etc., scnt and rcccivcd by thc ]apancsc gov
crnmcnt and its lorcign cstablishmcnts in Purplc and othcr
codcs bctwccn cccmbcr 2, 1940, and cccmbcr 8, 1941.
16
Tc
MAG!C inlormation dcrivcd lrom thcsc intcrccpts had bccn thc
basis ol much prcattack U.S. intclligcncc conccrning thc movc
mcnts and intcntions ol thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt.
U.S. A:n~ss~bov ]osvvn C. Gvvw
Rvvov)s Pvv~))~cx Si)u~)iox ix Toxyo
nc ol thc rst witncsscs was ]oscph C. Grcw, U.S. ambas
sador to ]apan sincc 1932. Altcr thc attack hc had bccn hcld
undcr housc arrcst until ]unc 25, 1942, whcn hc was rcpatriatcd
by thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt. Grcw tcsticd it was obvious that
by Novcmbcr 3 thc |U.S.| tradc cmbargocs had not scrvcd to
rcstrain thc ]apancsc Army lrom its cxpansion. Tcy wcrc going
right ahcad.
17
!n his vicw, thc risk and dangcr ol war was vcry
grcat and incrcasing.
18
]apans totalitarian rcgimcs propaganda
was lostcring antiAmcricanism. And in Vashington, thc U.S.
]apancsc ncgotiations wcrc clcarly dctcriorating. Although Grcw
15
16
!bid., pp. 254316.
17
!bid., part 2, p. 677.
18
!bid., p. 680.
ncvcr gavc up hopc, by carly cccmbcr it was apparcnt that war
bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd Statcs was cxpcctcd.
19

N! ~xb VP ]uvisbic)iox~i isvu)v isvuv)s
Cus)o:~vy !x)viiicvxcv issv:ix~)iox
nc goal ol thc committcc in invcstigating thc cvcnts
and circumstanccs lcading up to and lollowing thc attack was
to dctcrminc what had bccn known by thc top o cials bclorc
thc attack in Vashington, whcrc sccrct ]apancsc mcssagcs wcrc
rcgularly bcing intcrccptcd, dcciphcrcd and translatcd, and how
much intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom thcsc intcrccpts had bccn rclaycd
bclorc cccmbcr 7 to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. Tc situa
tion was compoundcd by conlusion ovcr a jurisdictional disputc
bctwccn thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (N!) and thc Navys
Var Plans ivision (VP). Vhcn Kimmcl took ovcr thc com
mand ol thc Pacic Flcct in Fcbruary 1941, hc had askcd CN
Stark to makc surc that thc rcsponsibility lor kccping him lully
inlormcd with pcrtincnt rcports on subjccts that should bc ol
intcrcst to thc Flcct bc clcarly dctcrmincd so that thcrc will bc
no misundcrstanding.
20
Stark rcplicd on March 22, that thc chicl
ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc, Captain Alan G. Kirk, was
lully awarc ol |N!s| rcsponsibility in kccping you adcquatcly
inlormcd.
21

8ut thc policy was changcd. Admiral Richard K. Turncr, chicl
ol thc Navys Var Plans ivision, had lought and won a battlc
with N! lor thc cxclusivc right to prcparc and disscminatc to
thc cct commandcrs inlormation about potcntial cncmy plans
and opcrations, including intclligcncc obtaincd by intcrccpting
and dccoding ]apans most sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs. As \icc
19
!bid.
20
!bid., part 16, p. 2229.
21
!bid., part 4, p. 1835.
Admiral Tcodorc S. Vilkinson, who bccamc N!s dircctor on
ctobcr 15, 1941, cxplaincd to thc ]CC, N! had bccn rcduccd
by thcn, lor all practical purposcs, to a lactgathcring agcncy. !t
was no longcr an analytical organization. Tc rcsponsibility lor
analysis had bccn takcn ovcr, thcorctically, by thc Navys Var
Plans ivision.
22
Stark told thc ]CC, N! had to givc thc matc
rial, all it had, to Var Plans. . . . 8ut thc nal cstimatc, which
wcnt into thc war plan . . . rcstcd with Var Plans.
23
Vilkinson
tcsticd that thc o cial rcgulations spccicd that N! valuatc
thc inlormation collcctcd and disscminatc as advisable |italics
addcd|. Tus, N!s rcsponsibility lor disscmination was quali
cd by thc words as advisablc.
24
Hc and Turncr clashcd vcry
dcnitcly on that issuc.
25
Tis jurisdictional disputc lclt a crack
in thc traditional channcl lor disscminating inlormation to thc
Navy commandcrs in thc cld.
M~ix)~ixixc )nv Svcvvcy ov )nv
]~v~xvsv !x)vvcvv)s
Vilkinson tcsticd on his undcrstanding conccrning thc
importancc ol maintaining thc sccrccy ol MAG!C, thc intcl
ligcncc dcrivcd lrom thc ]apancsc intcrccpts. Hc told thc ]CC
that
undcr ordcrs lrom Admiral Stark, ! was not authorizcd to
scnd to thc cld inlormation conccrning sccrct diplomatic
convcrsations . . . bccausc ol thc gcncral sccurity attachcd to
thc codcbrcaking activitics. . . . ! was not to put anything in
22
!bid., pp. 1729, 183449.
23
!bid., part 5, p. 2460.
24
!bid., part 4, p. 1730.
25
!bid., part 5, p. 2460. Congrcssman Kcclc, committcc mcmbcr, summarizing
to Stark his intcrprctation ol Vilkinsons tcstimony.
|my lortnightly summarics|, anything dcrivcd lrom what was
known as ultra or magic.
26

Tc situation was lurthcr complicatcd by thc lact that scvcral
top military o cials in Vashington bclicvcd, or at lcast thcy so
tcsticd, that Hawaii was intcrccpting and dccoding thc ]apancsc
mcssagcs thcmsclvcs and thus had acccss to thc inlormation
Vashington o cials wcrc dcriving lrom MAG!C. Gcncral
Milcs, Military !ntclligcncc (G2), told Clauscn that hc bclicvcd
thc Navy in Hawaii was dccoding and translating ]apancsc diplo
matic and consular mcssagcs, although hc latcr told thc ]CC that
Gcncral Short did not havc dccoding lacilitics.
27
And Admiral
Turncr told thc ]CC that it was his bclicl at that timc, and it was
Admiral Starks bclicl, that all ol thcsc major diplomatic mcssagcs,
at lcast in thc Pacic, wcrc bcing dccryptcd by both Admiral Hart
|Manila| and by Admiral Kimmcl |Pcarl Harbor|. Turncr said
hc did not know that Admiral Kimmcl did not hold thc codc lor
thosc dispatchcs until ! was so inlormcd at thc timc ol thc Navy
court ol inquiry on Pcarl Harbor.
28

Although thcsc top Vashington o cials tcsticd that thcy
bclicvcd Hawaii had acccss to thc samc inlormation thcy had in
Vashington, thcir actions bclicd thcir words. Tcy actcd as il it was
thcir rcsponsibility to kccp Hawaii adviscd. n Novcmbcr 27 both
Army and Navy scnt thc Hawaiian commandcrs spccial dispatchcs
bascd on MAG!C intclligcncc thcn availablc in Vashington. Tc
radiogram to Short rcad: Ncgotiations with ]apan appcar to bc
tcrminatcd.
29
Tc dispatch to thc Navy startcd out: Tis dispatch
is to bc considcrcd a war warning.
30
Army Chicl ol Sta Marshall
said in his a davit lor Clauscn that hc undcrstood Short was
26
!bid., part 4, pp. 173132.
27
!bid., part 2, p. 791.
28
!bid., part 4, p. 1923.
29
!bid., part 14, p. 1328, Armys ispatch #472.
30
!bid., p. 1406, Navys Novcmbcr 27, 1941, war warning ispatch #272337.
rccciving somc MAG!C inlormation through Army lacilitics on
ahu.
31
8ut in thc vcry ncxt paragraph hc contradictcd that undcr
standing whcn hc acknowlcdgcd that Shorts assistant intclligcncc
o ccr (G2), Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, rclicd on Vashington
lor inlormation.
32
And Marshalls urgcnt lastminutc mcssagc on
cccmbcr 7, ccrtainly indicatcd that hc didnt bclicvc his cld
commandcrs would havc sccn thc 14part MAG!C ]apancsc rcply
to our Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum or Tokyos mcssagc instructing
thc ]apancsc ambassadors in Vashington to makc dclivcry ol that
rcply at prcciscly 1:00 v.:., Vashington timc.
At thc timc ol thc attack, Gcncral Milcs, hcad ol G2, thc
Armys military intclligcncc division, acknowlcdgcd undcr qucs
tioning by thc ]CC that
Tcrc wcrc no stcps takcn to distributc thcsc |intcrccptcd and
translatcd| mcssagcs to |Gcncral Short in Hawaii|. . . . Tat
lollowcd lrom thc gcncral policy laid down by thc Chicl ol
Sta that thcsc mcssagcs and thc lact ol thc cxistcncc ol thcsc
mcssagcs or our ability to dccodc thcm should bc conncd to
thc lcast possiblc numbcr ol pcrsons, no distribution should bc
madc outsidc ol Vashington.
33

Milcs was gcncrally supportivc ol thc policy not to disscmi
natc thc MAG!C intcrccpts to Hawaii and othcr U.S. outposts.
Howcvcr, hc admittcd that thc succcss ol that ]apancsc attack
|had| dcpcndcd, in vcry largc mcasurc, on thcir catching thc
lorccs unalcrtcd and thcrclorc unprcparcd to mcct that attack.
34
Milcs said hc had not mcntioncd MAG!C bclorc thc APH8
in April 1944, whcn thc war was still in progrcss, bccausc undcr
no condition would ! havc . . . intimatcd in any way thc cxistcncc
31
!bid., part 35, p. 104.
32
!bid., pp. 10405. Marshall a davit lor Clauscn.
33
!bid., part 2, p. 791. Scc also pp. 810, 81112.
34
!bid., p. 877.
ol that sccrct without spccic authority ol thc Sccrctary ol Var
or thc Chicl ol Sta. Hc did not want to givc thc imprcssion that
hc had bccn gaggcd by thc Chicl ol Sta into trying to covcr
anything up, hc was only acting to protcct this vital military
sccrct that wc wcrc all guarding with thc grcatcst ol carc.
35
8ut by
thc timc hc gavc his a davit to Clauscn (August 16, 1945) and
bclorc hc tcsticd at thc ]CC hcarings, thc situation had changcd
radically, thc war with ]apan was ovcr and thc stricturcs against
mcntioning MAG!C did not apply.
Milcs pointcd out that much ol thc inlormation availablc in
Vashington did not dircctly apply to thc ovcrscas dcpartmcnts
unlcss and until it bccamc morc than inlormation and cntcrcd
thc rcalms ol an cstimatc ol thc situation which callcd lor mili
tary action on thc part ol thosc high commandcrs, and that was
a lunction ol thc command, in othcr words, ol thc Chicl ol Sta
himscll. Milcs rcalizcd, howcvcr, that thc availability ol intcl
ligcncc in Vashington which was not acccssiblc in thc cld
placcd a highcr dcgrcc ol rcsponsibility on Vashington to scc
that thc cld commandcrs wcrc adcquatcly prcparcd, alcrtcd, and
instructcd.
36

Milcs said thc Novcmbcr 27 mcssagc scnt ovcr Marshalls
signaturc had bccn dcsigncd to alcrt thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt.
Tat was a command action.
37
Milcs thought Short had not rcc
ognizcd thc signicancc ol Marshalls signaturc.
|T|hc mcrc lact that that mcssagc was signcd by thc Chicl ol
Sta himscll had a ccrtain signicancc. . . . Tc mcssagcs com
monly go out on thc signaturc ol thc Adjutant Gcncral. . . .
|8|y putting his namc to that mcssagc, it carricd to any military
35
!bid., p. 801.
36
!bid., p. 793.
37
!bid., p. 839.
mind . . . a much grcatcr signicancc than had it bccn signcd . . .
|by| anybody clsc.
38

!n Milcss opinion Shorts rcsponsc to Marshalls warning
that hc had alcrtcd lor sabotagc was a totally inadcquatc rcply to
thc mcssagc it purportcd to rcply to.
39
Howcvcr, Milcs thought
lurthcr warnings to Short, though dcsirablc, would havc bccn
rcdundant. . . . You do not havc to tcll a commanding gcncral
but oncc that a dangcr laccs him. You may, howcvcr, scc t to givc
him lurthcr inlormation as to thc situation hc laccs.
40

Pv~vi H~vnov No) Mvx)ioxvb ix
V~snixc)oxs PvvA))~cx ocu:vx)s
Vashington o cialdom had known lor somc timc that a
brcak in U.S.]apancsc rclations was incvitablc. Vc wcrc thor
oughly prcparcd, Milcs tcsticd, and had bccn lor somc days to
rcccivc an unlavorablc rcply to thc mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 26. Hc
said hc had a vcry strong imprcssion that hc rst kncw that thc
rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply to thc U.S. socallcd ultima
tum, wcrc in and wcrc translatcd on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr
6, ccrtainly bclorc hc lclt lor homc that Saturday. Hc had callcd
thc Army couricr |Coloncl 8ratton|, who had satiscd mc that
thc mcssagcs wcrc bcing dclivcrcd or would bc dclivcrcd carly
thc ncxt morning whcn thc complctc mcssagc was in. 8ut Milcs
saw no rcason that cvcning lor alcrting or waking up Marshall or
Hull.
41

]CC mcmbcrs Clark, Murphy, and Gcarhart callcd Milcss
attcntion to thc lact that thc prcattack cvaluations issucd by his
38
!bid., pp. 87778.
39
!bid., pp. 87980.
40
!bid., pp. 90001.
41
!bid., pp. 94042.
own division had givcn no hint that an attack might bc cxpcctcd
on Pcarl Harbor.
42
Milcs rcspondcd:
Vc had known lor many ycars that all thrcc ol thosc outposts
|Philippincs, Panama, and Hawaii| would probably bc subjcct
to an attack in a ]apancsc war. Tat is why wc had our lorccs
on thcm and why thc Chicl ol Sta warncd thcm whcn hc
considcrcd thc timc had arrivcd that hostilc ]apancsc action
was possiblc at any momcnt.
43

Murphy was disturbcd by thc inlcrcncc in Milcss tcsti
mony that hc was probably thc only pcrson in Vashington who
cxpcctcd thc attack at Pcarl Harbor. Timc altcr timc Milcs had
said how obvious it was, and how inhcrcnt it was in thc situa
tion. Yct Murphy said hc had rcad Milcss rcports
lrom covcr to covcr and . . . havc not sccn it |Pcarl Harbor|
mcntioncd oncc. Apparcntly pcoplc at Hawaii did not think it
was so obvious bccausc thcy wcrc takcn by surprisc, and appar
cntly thc othcrs in Vashington did not think it was so obvious
bccausc thcy wcrc takcn by surprisc.
44

Gcarhart pointcd out to Milcs,
|T|hcrc is plcnty in all ol this litcraturc, an abundancc, which
points out thc possibility ol attack in thc Philippincs, in thc
Kra Pcninsula, in Tailand, in !ndochina, cvcrywhcrc cxccpt
on thcsc two vcry grcat lortrcsscs at Singaporc and Hawaii.
. . . !l you havc anything to thc contrary ! would likc to havc
you point it out. . . . Vhy, cvcn on thc 27th, altcr Mr. Hull had
handcd his nal statcmcnt to thc ]apancsc, a lcttcr was writtcn
by thc ]oint Chicls ol Sta in which thcy point out all ol thcsc
42
!bid., pp. 87576, 902, and 92122.
43
!bid., pp. 89091.
44
!bid., p. 902.
othcr placcs as possiblc objcctivcs ol ]ap attack, and Hawaii is
not mcntioncd cvcn thcn.
45

Milcs admittcd that it was not until cccmbcr 6 or cccmbcr
7 that cvcnts nally ccntcrcd his attcntion on thc probablc
]apancsc attack somcwhcrc coincidcnt with thc dclivcry ol thc
]apancsc rcply at 1:00 that day.
46
Tc rst 13 parts had told thcm
only that thc ]apancsc rcply was unlavorablc. Tc 14th part and
thc mcssagc instructing thc ]apancsc ambassadors to dclivcr thc
rcply at 1:00 v.:. wcrc intcrccptcd Sunday morning. Vhcn wc
got thc lourtccnth part . . . |and| whcn wc got thc 1:00 v.:. mcs
sagc, wc saw quitc a dicrcnt picturc.
47
Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc,
hc said, mcant troublc somcwhcrc, against somconc, but still not
ncccssarily against thc Unitcd Statcs. Howcvcr, wc kncw somc
thing at last, not whcrc or against whom, but whcn.
48
Howcvcr,
1:00, as wc now know, mcant about 7:00, ! think, in Hawaii. . . . a
likcly timc ol attack on thc islands. . . . a likcly timc, not thc only
timc lor an attack.
49

Gvxvv~i Gvvow (Av:y V~v Pi~xs)
vvvvs )o Rviivvv M~vsn~ii ov Cuiv~niii)y
vov Axy F~iiuvv )o Ac)
Tc ]CC had planncd to intcrrogatc pcrsons with background
inlormation about thc intcrccpts bclorc qucstioning toplcvcl wit
ncsscs, including Marshall. Howcvcr, Prcsidcnt Truman had just
appointcd Marshall ambassador to China and was anxious lor
him to lcavc promptly lor his ncw post. 8ut Licutcnant Gcncral
Lconard T. Gcrow was callcd ahcad ol Marshall as, according to
45
!bid., pp. 92122.
46
!bid., p. 922.
47
!bid., p. 942.
48
!bid., part 3, p. 1362.
49
!bid., part 2, p. 931.
committcc counscl Mitchcll, hc kncw ccrtain things that would
bc wcll to lay into thc rccord.
50
Gcrow was a muchdccoratcd
war hcro and hc lookcd thc part. PrcPcarl Harbor hc had bccn
thc Armys chicl ol war plans. uring thc Var hc bccamc com
mandcr ol Army Filth Corps, which had takcn part in thc ay
landings going ashorc in Francc on maha 8cach. Hc had lought
wcll lor his country. Although not prcviously implicatcd in thc
Pcarl Harbor disastcr, Gcrow was onc ol thc lour top Vashington
o cials who had bccn criticizcd by thc APH8. Hc was chargcd
with having lailcd to kccp Short adcquatcly inlormcd, scnd a
clcar, concisc dircctivc on Novcmbcr 27, 1941, rccognizc Shorts
sabotagc alcrt as inadcquatc, and implcmcnt thc cxisting ]oint
ArmyNavy plans.
51

Gcrow was askcd about Shorts rcsponsc to thc Army dis
patch ol Novcmbcr 27 (#472). Tat dispatch had bccn prcparcd
by Stimson, Stark, and Gcrow whcn Marshall was out ol town,
but had bccn scnt out ovcr Marshalls namc, giving it thc status
ol a command action.
52
!n vicw ol thc impcnding crisis, Gcrow
tcsticd, it had bccn draltcd primarily with thc Philippincs in
mind, but csscntially thc samc mcssagc was also scnt to thc othcr
Pacic cld commandcrs.
53
!t rcad in part:
Ncgotiations with ]apan appcar to bc tcrminatcd. . . . ]apancsc
luturc action unprcdictablc but hostilc action possiblc at any
momcnt. !l hostilitics cannot . . . bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs
dcsircs that ]apan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Tis policy should
not bc construcd as rcstricting you to a coursc ol action that
might jcopardizc your dclcnsc.
50
!bid., p. 863.
51
!bid., part 39, p. 264.
52
!bid., part 2, p. 839.
53
!bid., part 3, p. 1021.
Tc radiogram wcnt on to say that thc commandcr should
undcrtakc such rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as |hc|
dccm|cd| ncccssary. All cld commandcr addrcssccs wcrc askcd
to Rcport mcasurcs takcn. Tc vcrsion scnt to Short had an
addcd phrasc, cautioning him not to alarm civil population or
disclosc intcnt.
54

!n rcsponsc, Short wircd that hc had ordcrcd a sabotagc
alcrt.
55
Tc dctails ol his thrcc possiblc alcrts wcrc a mattcr ol
rccord in Vashington,
56
so Shorts sabotagc alcrt gavc noticc to
thc Var cpartmcnt that hc had bunchcd his plancs and placcd
his ammunition whcrc it was rclativcly inacccssiblc. Hc rcccivcd
no rcsponsc lrom Vashington to indicatc whcthcr his sabotagc
alcrt was, or was not, satislactory. Stimson, who was rcsponsiblc
lor scnding thc Novcmbcr 27 mcssagc ovcr Marshalls signaturc,
saw Shorts answcr, initialcd it, and did nothing.
57
Gcrow also
saw Shorts rcply, initialcd it, and did nothing.
58
As lor Marshall,
thcrc was no clcar cvidcncc that hc actually saw Shorts rcply, thc
lc copy did not bcar Marshalls initials, Shorts rcply had bccn
staplcd and circulatcd undcrncath a mcssagc lrom MacArthur,
which Marshall did initial.
59

Gcrow admittcd that a lollowup inquiry to clarily Shorts
rcsponsc
might havc bccn dcsirablc. . . . |!|t would probably havc dcvcl
opcd thc lact that thc commanding gcncral in Hawaii was not
54
!bid., part 14, p. 1328.
55
!bid., p. 1330.
56
!bid., part 7, p. 2941.
57
!bid., part 11, pp. 5426, 5429.
58
!bid., part 3, pp. 1027, 1031.
59
!bid., pp. 102829. Scc also xhibit 46, ibid., part 15, pp. 147275, photos ol
mcssagcs routcd to Marshall.
at that timc carrying out thc dircctivc in thc mcssagc signcd
Marshall.
60

Gcrow voluntccrcd to rclicvc Marshall ol culpability:
|!|l thcrc was any rcsponsibility to bc attachcd to thc Var
cpartmcnt lor any lailurc to scnd an inquiry to Gcncral
Short, thc rcsponsibility must rcst on Var Plans ivision, and !
acccpt that rcsponsibility as Chicl ol Var Plans ivision. . . . !t
was my rcsponsibility to scc that thosc mcssagcs wcrc chcckcd,
and il an inquiry was ncccssary, thc Var Plans ivision should
havc draltcd such an inquiry and prcscntcd it to thc Chicl ol
Sta lor approval.
61

Hc was thcn askcd about thc ]apancsc Pilot Mcssagc, which
had bccn availablc in Vashington on thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr
6. Tc Pilot Mcssagc had announccd that ]apans rcply to thc
U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26 was cn routc. Gcrow was also askcd
about thc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply, which 8ratton said
hc dclivcrcd to Gcrow on cccmbcr 6.
62
Gcrow said hc had no
clcar rccollcction ol whcrc ! was on thc altcrnoon ol thc 6th.
63

Hc thought hc was at his o cc until 6 or 7 or 8:00 and that
hc was at homc in thc cvcning altcr thc dinncr hour.
64
!n any
cvcnt, il thc Var Plans o cc was closcd, it should havc bccn pos
siblc to rcach him by tclcphonc, Gcrows numbcr was on rccord in
thc Var cpartmcnt. r hc could havc bccn rcachcd through thc
duty o ccr who rcmaincd at his tclcphonc and could inlorm
him ol any important mcssagcs that might bc intcndcd lor mc.
. . . |!|l thcy had an important mcssagc to dclivcr to mc such as
thc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply, Gcrow bclicvcd Coloncl
60
!bid., part 3, p. 1031.
61
!bid., p. 1036.
62
!bid., part 4, p. 1632.
63
!bid., p. 1594.
64
!bid., part 4, pp. 1632, 1594.
8ratton, who usually dclivcrcd thosc mcssagcs, would havc tclc
phoncd mc at homc, rathcr than going through thc duty o ccr.
Mitchcll pursucd thc mattcr. Gcrow told thc committcc that
To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl, hc had not rcccivcd or
lcarncd ol thc 13part mcssagc on thc night ol cccmbcr 6. Hc
did not rccall having rcccivcd thc carlicr Pilot Mcssagc cithcr.
65

And hc was positivc hc had ncvcr sccn that 14part mcssagc,
or any part ol it, or thc 1:00 v.:. mcssagc, until hc rcachcd
Marshalls o cc around 11:30 on thc morning ol thc 7th.
66

Gvxvv~i Gvovcv C. M~vsn~ii ovs No)
Rvc~ii !:vov)~x) vcv:nvv 6 vvx)s
Marshall was undoubtcdly thc most important witncss thc
committcc could summon. Hc had bccn dccply involvcd in all
thc prcattack dcvclopmcnts, with thc possiblc cxccption ol thc
diplomatic phasc. Hc was thc only surviving principal in thc
prcPcarl Harbor drama still in good hcalth and ablc to tcs
tily. Rooscvclt and Knox wcrc dcad. Hull had rctircd right altcr
FRs clcction lor a third tcrm and by thc lall ol 1944 was in poor
hcalth and too wcak to lacc crosscxamination by thc Rcpublican
mcmbcrs ol thc committcc.
67
As lor Stimson, thc accumulatcd
strain ol vc ycars in Vashington had bcgun to acct his hcart.
Hc had rcsigncd on his 78th birthday, Scptcmbcr 21, 1945.
68
8ut
Marshall could not plcad inrmitics. Tcrc was no way hc could
avoid tcstilying. Tc mcmbcrs ol thc committcc had many qucs
tions. Tcy wcrc anxious to lcarn what hc could tcll thcm. And
thcy wcrc anxious to lcarn what hc would tcll thcm.
65
!bid., p. 1595, also p. 1632.
66
!bid., part 3, p. 1042.
67
]ulius V. Pratt, Cordell Hull (Ncw York: Coopcr Squarc Publishcrs, 1964),
vol. 2, pp. 76566.
68
Hcnry L. Stimson and McGcorgc 8undy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(Ncw York: Harpcr & 8ros., 1947/1948), pp. 331, 656, 668.
!n qucstioning Marshall, thc committcc lollowcd its usual
proccdurc. !ts counscl lcd o, thc cmocratic mcmbcrs lollow
ing onc by onc, thcn thc Rcpublican mcmbcrs.
Marshall camc bclorc thc ]CC on cccmbcr 6. All that rst
day, hc was cxamincd in a lricndly manncr by Mitchcll. Many
ol thc gcncrals answcrs wcrc cvasivc. Tcrc wcrc things hc could
not rccall, could not rcmcmbcr, could not rccollcct. Vhcn hc
had appcarcd bclorc thc NC! in Scptcmbcr 1944, hc had not
bccn ablc to rccall thc intcrccpt xing Novcmbcr 25, 1941, as
thc dcadlinc lor thc ]apancsc ambassadors to rcach a lavorablc
conclusion in thcir ncgotiations.
69
Howcvcr, whcn Mitchcll askcd
Marshall il hc rcmcmbcrcd sccing any ol thosc |mcssagcs| in
which thc ]aps instructcd thcir Ambassadors hcrc to gct an a r
mativc agrccmcnt rst by thc 25th ol Novcmbcr and latcr at lcast
by thc 29th Marshall rcplicdhis mcmory rclrcshcd pcrhaps
by Clarkcs inquiry which had bccn instigatcd by Marshall!
rcmcmbcr that vcry wcll, sir.
70

Tc ncxt day Mitchcll askcd Marshall il hc rcmcmbcrcd his
movcmcnts on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Marshall said hc
could only account lor thcm by sort ol circumstantial cvidcncc.
Hc cnumcratcd a numbcr ol placcs whcrc hc was not. Altcr rclcr
ring to Mrs. Marshalls cngagcmcnt book, hc concludcd, thc
probability is . . . wc wcrc homc.
71

Mitchcll askcd: You arc surc you wcrc not at thc Vhitc Housc
that cvcning: Marshall rcplicd, No, sir, not at all.
72
Vhat did
that mcan: Tat hc wasnt at thc Vhitc Housc: r that hc wasnt
surc hc was not at thc Vhitc Housc:
69
70
!bid., part 3, p. 1091.
71
!bid., p. 1110.
72
!bid.
Tc gcncral was supposcd to havc had a duty o ccr at his
o cc and an ordcrly at his homc who kncw whcrc hc was at all
timcs. Nonc ol his duty o ccrs or ordcrlics was callcd to tcstily.
Mitchcll askcd Marshall whcn hc rst kncw about thc 14part
]apancsc mcssagc and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc, and undcr what
circumstanccs. Hc did not answcr dircctly.
! rst was awarc ol this mcssagc whcn ! rcachcd . . . thc o cc
on thc morning ol Sunday, cccmbcr thc 7th. n that par
ticular morning, ! prcsumably had my brcaklast at about cight,
and lollowing thc routinc that ! had carricd out on prcvious
Sundays, ! wcnt riding at somc timc thcrcaltcr.
Howcvcr, hc said that on lurthcr considcration and discussion
with othcrs, hc had comc to thc conclusion, purcly by induction
and not by dcnitc mcmory, that that morning hc must havc
gonc out riding latcr than 8:00, just what timc ! do not know,
but bctwccn 8:00 and thc timc ! wcnt to thc Var cpartmcnt !
atc my brcaklast, ! probably lookcd at thc Sunday papcrs and !
wcnt lor a ridc. Marshall thcn discusscd thc avcragc lcngth ol
his ridcs, about 50 minutcs, bccausc ! rodc at a prctty livcly gait,
at a trot and a cantcr and at a lull run down on thc cxpcrimcntal
larm whcrc thc Pcntagon now is and rcturncd to thc housc, so !
would say that thc high probability is that thc ridc was an hour or
lcss, gcncrally or ccrtainly not longcr.
73

Tis cntirc tcstimony rclatcd to what Marshall prcsumably,
probably, gcncrally did on a Sunday morning, not what hc
actually did on that spccic Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, 1941.
Marshall continucd in thc samc vcin, saying nothing about thc
]apancsc intcrccpts hc had bccn askcd about.
n this particular Sunday morning, 8ratton had bccn try
ing to locatc Marshall sincc 9 or 9:15 ~.:. with thc 14th part
ol ]apans rcply and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Vhcn hc callcd
73
!bid., p. 1108.
Marshalls homc, an ordcrly told him Marshall was out riding.
8ratton askcd thc ordcrly to locatc Marshall and havc him con
tact 8ratton as promptly as possiblc. According to 8ratton,
Marshall callcd back somctimc altcr 10:00.
74

Marshalls rccollcction was that hc was cithcr in thc showcr,
or gctting in thc showcr, whcn hc hcard that 8ratton was trying
to rcach him with somcthing important. Marshall said 8ratton
wantcd to comc out to Fort Mycr, but Marshall scnt word that
hc was going into his o cc and 8ratton should mcct him thcrc.
Marshall thcn nishcd his showcr, drcsscd, and lclt lor thc Var
cpartmcnt. Hc said his avcragc timc ol taking a showcr and
drcssing would bc about 10 minutcs, possibly lcss. Hc had no
rccollcction as to what timc ! arrivcd at thc Var cpartmcnt.
Tat would bc a mattcr ol conjccturc.
75

Anyway, Marshall continucd,
shortly thcrcaltcr, il not immcdiatcly thcn, ! was at thc Var
cpartmcnt, bccausc it was a vcry quick drivc, and on Sunday
thcrc was no tra c. !t was a mattcr ol about 7 minutcs lrom
my housc to thc Munitions building.
76

Using his own cstimatc (allowing tcn minutcs lor his showcr
and drcssing and scvcn minutcs lor thc drivc), hc should havc
bccn ablc to rcach his o cc 20 or 30 minutcs altcr hc spokc
with 8ratton at 10 ~.:. 8ut according to 8ratton, who had bccn
waiting lor Marshall in thc sccrctarys antcroom, Marshall didnt
arrivc until 11:25 ~.:.
77

Vhcn Marshall arrivcd, 8ratton immcdiatcly walkcd in with
his papcrs. Marshall startcd rcading thc 14part ]apancsc rcply,
portions ol which Marshall rcad through twicc. Hc told thc
74
!bid., part 9, pp. 452425.
75
!bid., part 3, p. 1108.
76
!bid., p. 1109.
77
!bid., part 9, p. 4517.
committcc, Vhcn ! rcachcd thc cnd ol thc documcnt thc ncxt
shcct was thc 1:00 mcssagc ol cccmbcr 7. Tis was indicativc
to Marshall and to all thc othcrs who camc into thc room, ol
somc vcry dcnitc action at 1:00, bccausc that 1:00 was Sunday
and was in Vashington and involvcd thc Sccrctary ol Statc.
Takcn togcthcr, all thcsc lactors wcrc rathcr unusual.
78

Marshalls account ol his rcsponsc to thc mcssagcs was similar
to thosc ol 8ratton and Gcrow, both ol whom had tcsticd on thc
basis ol mcmoranda prcparcd shortly altcr thc attack.
79
Marshall
told ol contacting Stark and ol dispatching thc lastminutc warn
ing to thc cld commandcrs in thc Pacic, giving rst priority to
thc Philippincs and Panama. Altcr 8ratton had takcn Marshalls
dispatch to thc mcssagc ccntcr and rcturncd, Marshall scnt him
back with Coloncl 8undy, thc o ccr in chargc ol thc immcdiatc
dctails ol all Pacic aairs, to ask whcn thc mcssagcs would bc
dclivcrcd. Tcy camc back with cstimatcs ol thc dclivcry timcs in
various parts ol thc world.
80

Tc ncxt inlormation Marshall rcccivcd was thc notication
ol thc actual attack on Pcarl Harbor. Hc said hc could not rccall
whcthcr ! was at thc Var cpartmcnt or at thc housc. Hc said
Gcncral canc, acting sccrctary ol thc gcncral sta at that timc,
had told him that hc had rcturncd to his homc, but his ordcrly
said hc was at thc Var cpartmcnt.
81

Most astonishing! Tc Armys chicl ol sta, who was dircctly
conccrncd with thc dclcnsc ol thc country and thc protcction ol
thc cct whcn in harbor, who had just rcd o an urgcnt mcs
sagc to thc cld commandcrs, who had bccn conccrncd about thc
likcly timc whcn thc mcssagcs would bc dclivcrcd, didnt know
78
!bid., part 3, p. 1108.
79
8ratton tcstimony, APH8 and bclow, pp. 77885 and 80204, Gcrow tcsti
mony, abovc, pp. 62731.
80
!bid., p. 1109.
81
!bid.
whcrc hc was whcn hc hcard thc ncws ol thc attack. And yct that
]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor so shockcd thc rcst ol thc coun
try that almost cvcrybody rcmcmbcrs vividly prcciscly whcrc thcy
wcrc whcn thcy hcard thc ncws.
Marshall said inlormation about thc attack thcn camc in in
lullcr dctail, and tclcphonc communication was cstablishcd. Hc
talkcd on thc phonc with Shorts chicl ol sta, Coloncl Phillips.
Gcncral Short had gonc to his command post and thcrclorc was
not ablc to talk to mc dircctly. Marshall voluntccrcd: You could
hear the explosions at the time.
82

]CC Couxsvi Asxs M~vsn~ii ~nou)
His Co::~xb S)vuc)uvv
id you havc your sta organizcd at that timc so that il an
cspccially signicant or important intcrccpt was madc ol a ]ap
mcssagc, was thcrc anyonc on duty who had authority, il thcy
wcrc unablc to rcach you, to scnd a warning mcssagc out:
Marshall said hc didnt think thcrc was a sctup lor that spc
cial purposc. Tc Var cpartmcnt had an arrangcmcnt thcrc
whcrcby thc o ccr on thc rccciving cnd . . . kncw whcrc thc prin
cipal pcoplc wcrc, whcrc to rcach thcm. !n his own casc, Marshall
said that during that pcriod and lor about a ycar thcrcaltcr, hc
always maintaincd an ordcrly at thc housc at thc tclcphonc. !l
! lclt thc housc to go to a moving picturc, which was about thc
only placc ! wcnt, |thc ordcrly| was thcrc and kncw whcrc to
rcach mc.
83
Mitchcll thcn askcd him,
82
!bid., pp. 110910. mphasis addcd.
83
!bid., p. 1114.
!l thcy had not bccn ablc to rcach you on thc morning ol thc
7th, or at any timc whcn an important mcssagc camc in, was
thcrc anybody but yourscll that had authority to scnd a warn
ing mcssagc to thc outlying posts:
Ycs, Marshall said. Tc authority was vcstcd, lor instancc,
in thc cputy Chicl ol Sta |Major Gcncral Villiam 8rydcn|.
r cvcn thc hcad ol Var Plans ivision |Gcrow|.
84

According to Army rcgulations No. 1015, updatcd to
cccmbcr 7, 1941, howcvcr, this was not thc prccisc situation.
Tc cputy Chicl ol Sta was thc only o ccr who had thc
authority to act lor thc chicl ol sta in his abscncc. rdcrs could
bc scnt to Short in Pcarl Harbor by Rooscvclt, Marshall, or
Marshalls dcputy. Ncithcr Stimson nor Gcrow was in thc linc ol
command. Tat was why thcy had choscn to scnd thc Novcmbcr
27 war warning ovcr Marshalls namc.
85

Latcr in answcr to a qucstion lrom Scnator Fcrguson,
Marshall said that Gcrow did not normally havc any right to
issuc ordcrs to Short on a command basis, in pcacctimc it would
havc rcquircd quitc an assumption ol authority on his part to do
that without somc conrmation lrom a scnior o ccr. Howcvcr,
Marshall said, Tc prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Var, and myscll,
and in my abscncc, thc dcputy had authority to ordcr into ccct
a war plan, Rainbow, or any othcr ordcrs.
86

!n any cvcnt, apparcntly no arrangcmcnt was in placc lor any
onc to act in Marshalls stcad on that latclul morning ol cccmbcr
7, 1941, whcn hc was unavailablc. And thc ordcrly, supposcdly on
duty at his homc, lailcd to rcach him promptly.

84
!bid.
85
!bid., part 14, pp. 141621, xhibit 42.
86
!bid., part 3, p. 1115.
M~vsn~ii !x)vvvoc~)vb ~nou)
vcv:nvv vvx)s
Mitchcll askcd Marshall, id you havc any talk on thc
morning ol thc 7th with Sccrctary Stimson bclorc thc ncws ol
thc attack camc in: Marshall didnt rccall talking with Stimson
that morning, couldnt rccall sccing him bclorc lunch, although
hc kncw Stimson was at thc Statc cpartmcnt that morning.
87

A littlc latcr Mitchcll askcd:
o you rcmcmbcr whcthcr you had bccn told or tclcphoncd
or inlormcd in any way on thc cvcning ol thc 6th, latc in thc
cvcning, that any arrangcmcnt had bccn madc lor a mcct
ing bctwccn Sccrctary Stimson and Mr. Hull on thc ncxt
morning:
Marshall had no such rccollcction.
88

Tcn how did Marshall know Stimson was at thc Statc
cpartmcnt on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7: Tc mccting ol
Stimson and Knox with Hull at thc Statc cpartmcnt had bccn
arrangcd Saturday night after thc thrcc sccrctarics wcrc inlormcd
ol thc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply.
89
Yct Marshall dcnicd
that hc had bccn inlormcd in any way on thc cvcning ol thc 6th
ol thc plan lor that mccting. And if hc kncw ol that mccting, why
did hc not also know about thc 13part ]apancsc rcply that had
sparkcd it: Marshall tcsticd consistcntly that hc rst saw thosc
13 parts, togcthcr with thc 14th part, only altcr hc arrivcd at his
o cc in thc Var cpartmcnt at about 11:30 on thc morning ol
cccmbcr 7.
]CC mcmbcr Coopcr askcd Marshall il in thc wccks bclorc
thc attack hc had bccn kcpt lully adviscd as to diplomatic
87
!bid., p. 1115.
88
!bid.
89
!bid., part 33, p. 857.
dcvclopmcnts. Marshall said, |S|o lar as Mr. Hull pcrsonally
|was| conccrncd, hc had bccn. Marshall had a vcry distinct rcc
ollcction ol Hulls saying with considcrablc cmphasis in thosc
last days apropos ol his discussions with thc ]apancsc cnvoys,
Tcsc lcllows mcan to ght and you will havc to watch out.
90

Marshall said hc had cxpcctcd that thc rst ]apancsc attack on
thc Unitcd Statcs would occur in thc Philippincs. Hc thought
thcy would go
dircctly south towards Singaporc, that that would bc thc
main campaign, and thc Philippincs, ol coursc, would bccomc
involvcd in it. . . |and hc| assumcd that Guam . . . and . . . Vakc
would lall almost immcdiatcly.
91

|Hc| lclt . . . that il thc ]apancsc bccamc cngagcd in hostili
tics dircctcd toward thc Malay Pcninsula that our situation
dcmandcd that wc takc action to dclcnd our position. Tat,
howcvcr, was my opinion, and that would havc to bc dctcr
mincd by govcrnmcntal action.
92

As thc usual timc lor adjournmcnt on Friday altcrnoon
approachcd, thc lth ol thc six cmocratic Committcc mcmbcrs
was just starting his qucstioning.
Murphy: Had you any warning, Gcncral, or any rcason to
cxpcct on thc night ol cccmbcr 6 or on thc carly morning
ol cccmbcr 7 that thcrc was any spccial urgcncy rcquiring
you to bc at thc Var cpartmcnt carlicr than thc hour you did
arrivc thcrc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7.
Marshall: ! had no such conccption or inlormation.
93

90
!bid., part 3, p. 1148.
91
!bid., p. 1149.
92
!bid., p. 1338.
93
!bid., p. 1163.
8y this timc Marshall had bccn on thc witncss stand lor two
lull days, and thc Rcpublicans had not bcgun to qucstion him.
Tc committcc rcgularly hcld Saturday hcarings, so it rcccsscd
until 10 thc ncxt morning.
M~vsn~iis !x)vvvoc~)iox Cox)ixuvb
Vhcn thc hcaring rcsumcd on Saturday morning thc
Rcpublicans bcgan qucstioning Marshall. ctcrmincd to nd
out il hc could cxplain somc ol thc mystcrics surrounding thc
]apancsc attack, thcy rcluscd to yicld to cmocratic prcssurc to
curtail thcir intcrrogation.
Gcarhart bcgan. Hc told Marshall that Gcrow had acccptcd
lull rcsponsibility lor not having actcd on thc inadcquacy, as hc
callcd it, ol Shorts Novcmbcr 27 rcport that hc had alcrtcd lor
sabotagc. Marshall had not bccn in thc room whcn Gcrow tcs
ticd but, hc said, hc admircs vcry much his attitudc. Vhcn
Gcarhart askcd Marshall why hc had not takcn cxccption to
Shorts rcply, thc gcncral could only say that was my opportunity
to intcrvcnc and havc a lurthcr chcck madc and ! did not takc it.
]ust why, ! do not know.
94
Short had bccn issucd a command,
Marshall said,
and dircctcd to do somcthing. . . . ncc you issuc an ordcr,
amcndmcnts or, you might say, codicils arc vcry dangcrous
busincss whcn it is an opcrational ordcr. . . . |!|l possiblc . . . you
must avoid conlusing thc commandcr with a mass ol data.
95

Gcarhart rcad to Marshall thc scvcral socallcd 8omb Plot
mcssagcs conccrning thc location ol ships in Pcarl Harbor, which
had bccn rcccivcd, dccodcd, and translatcd in Vashington prior
to thc attack. Vasnt it
94
!bid., pp. 117273.
95
!bid., pp. 117677.
quitc apparcnt lrom thc rcading ol thosc mcssagcs that wcrc
rcccivcd, dccodcd, and placcd on your dcsk, rcad or not rcad,
that many mcssagcs dirccting thc attcntion ol our military and
naval authoritics to Hawaii had bccn rcccivcd:
Marshall had no rccollcction ol having rcad any ol thosc mcs
sagcs until prcparing lor thc ]CC hcarings.
96

Marshall also dclcndcd himscll against thc APH8s scvcral
chargcs:
1. In response to the charge that hc had lailcd To kccp thc
Commanding Gcncral ol thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt lully
adviscd, Marshall insistcd hc had givcn Short thc inlormation
hc nccdcd, as a rcsponsiblc commandcr, to bc prcparcd lor thc
possibility or probability ol war. Tc mass ol data that pourcd
into Vashington, hc said, would mcrcly imposc an additional
burdcn. !t was a mattcr ol judgmcnt how much additional
inlormation should havc gonc to him. Marshall thought only thc
cccmbcr 7 mcssagc ol 1:00 v.:. applicd, although hc admit
tcd ohand that thc mcssagcs you just rcad |thc shipsinharbor
bomb plot mcssagcs| . . . would havc bccn hclplul to Gcncral
Short, but particularly morc so to Admiral Kimmcl.
97

2. In response to the charge that hc should havc gottcn in touch
with Short on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6, whcn thc critical
inlormation indicating an almost immcdiatc brcak with ]apan
had comc in, Marshall tcsticd that hc did not bclicvc it had any
spccic bcaring onc way or thc othcr on Gcncral Shorts situation
and rcsponsibility.
98
Morcovcr, hc rcitcratcd that hc kncw noth
ing ol thc |13part| mcssagc whatsocvcr until his arrival in thc
Var cpartmcnt on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Hc prcsumcd
it was not thought ncccssary to bring that to my immcdiatc
96
!bid., p. 1181.
97
!bid.
98
!bid., p. 1182.
attcntion bccausc thc rst to thc thirtccnth part did not includc
thc critical statcmcnts.
99

3. In response to the charge that hc had lailcd to invcstigatc and
dctcrminc Shorts statc ol rcadincss . . . bctwccn Novcmbcr 27
and cccmbcr 7, hc dcnicd that thcy had in Vashington any
intimation that that |Hawaiian| command was not rcady. As a
mattcr ol lact, hc had no rcason to bclicvc that that command
was anything othcr than highly c cicnt and alcrt.
100

At midmorning Saturday, whcn Gcarhart nishcd his qucs
tioning, Fcrguson took ovcr. As chicl ol thc (privatcly paid)
minority sta, ! was at his clbow as usual with a collcction ol doc
umcnts and a host ol important qucstions to bc askcd.
101
Fcrguson
pcrsistcd in his qucstioning until Marshall had to admit it was
his rcsponsibility, not Gcrows, to scc that Short was adcquatcly
alcrtcd.
Fcrgusons pointcd qucstioning lastcd thc rcst ol thc day.
Marshall nally had to admit that hc was thc only Army o ccr
with authority ovcr Short,
102
that Gcrow had no authority undcr
Army rcgulations lor scnding an alcrt to Short,
103
that no rcspon
siblc Army o ccr was on duty Saturday cvcning, cccmbcr 6,
or Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, who could takc action bclorc
Marshalls bclatcd arrival at his o cc that morning,
104
that thc
99
!bid., pp. 132021.
100
!bid., pp. 118283.
101
Congrcss had providcd no lunds lor a rcscarch sta to assist thc Commit
tccs minority mcmbcrs. Tcrclorc, journalist ]ohn T. Flynn, who had bccn
intcrcstcd lor somc timc in cstablishing thc rcsponsibility lor thc Pcarl Harbor
disastcr, had raiscd lunds to pay lor mc and a sta ol scvcn to assist thc Rcpub
licans. Flynn had writtcn and publishcd privatcly two pamphlcts which had
crcatcd quitc a scnsation: Tc Truth About Pcarl Harbor (rst publishcd in
thc Chicago Tribune, ctobcr 22, 1944) and Tc Final Sccrct ol Pcarl Harbor
(Scptcmbcr 1945).
102
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 1183, 1188.
103
!bid., pp. 1188, 1202.
104
!bid., pp. 1114, 118485.
shortagc ol manpowcr in dcciphcring ]apancsc codcs was not duc
to lack ol congrcssional appropriations,
105
that wc had bccn trying
to kccp sccrct thc lact that Grcat 8ritain was inlormcd ol what
wc wcrc rcading in thc ]apancsc codcs bclorc thc attack,
106
that
hc, Marshall, was not awarc that thc scnding ol diplomatic intcl
ligcncc to Kimmcl was discontinucd somctimc in August 1941,
107

that Marshall dcnicd knowing that thc ]apancsc had lcarncd wc
wcrc rcading thcir codcs,
108
that portions ol thc Robcrts rcport
wcrc withdrawn bclorc it was madc public,
109
that thc Unitcd
Statcs initiatcd thc AngloutchAmcrican Agrccmcnt,
110
that
hc, Stimson, and Knox had approvcd thc agrccmcnt,
111
that it
wcnt into gcncral ccct bclorc thc attack bccausc it involvcd thc
policy ol thc main ght in thc Atlantic and thc dclcnsivc prin
ciplc in thc Pacic,
112
and that prior to cccmbcr 1941 o ccrs
ol thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc lurnishcd to China lor combat duty
against ]apan.
113

Marshall also admittcd that hc thought
thc ]apancsc wcrc cngagcd in a campaign southward lrom thc
China Sca. . . . Vc had in mind thc possibility ol an cort on
thc Panama Canal. Vc had in mind thc possibility ol an cort
to strikc a blow at our air plants in Scattlc, at our air plants in
San icgo, and wc had in mind thc possibility ol a blow in
thc Ccntral Pacic, in thc Hawaiian district. Vc thought thc
105
!bid., pp. 119697.
106
!bid., p. 1198.
107
!bid., p. 1199.
108
!bid., p. 1203.
109
!bid., p. 1206.
110
!bid., p. 1218.
111
!bid.
112
!bid., p. 1221.
113
!bid., pp. 122930.
lattcr was thc most improbablc. . . . Vc thought it |Hawaii| was
imprcgnablc against a ]apancsc landing cxpcdition.
114

Although hc had known lrom Admiral Richardson that thc
cct would havc to bc built up and propcrly supplicd bclorc going
out to sca, hc didnt think anyonc had cvcr told him, prior to
cccmbcr 7, that thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct in thc Pacic ccan,
was not ablc to takc carc ol itscll in thc cvcnt ol an attack.
115

Fcrguson continucd to qucstion Marshall whcn thc com
mittcc rcasscmblcd on Monday, hc qucstioncd him all that day
and Tucsday morning also. Hc askcd Marshall about thc Pilot
Mcssagc, which had bccn rcccivcd in Vashington on cccmbcr
6, and how hc accountcd lor its not bcing dclivcrcd to him that
day. Marshall didnt answcr dircctly. Hc digrcsscd about thc rst
13 parts and admittcd hc had bccn in Vashington that cntirc day.
Hc said thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol thc Chicl ol
Sta, thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol thc Var Plans
ivision, thcrc was somconc on duty in thc o cc ol G2, who
prcsumably could havc rcccivcd this particular mcssagc and actcd.
Finally, howcvcr, as Fcrguson prcsscd him, hc statcd: Tc point is
! did not rcccivc thc |Pilot| mcssagc that day.
116

Vhcn thc altcrnoon scssion opcncd, thc chairman announccd
that Marshall had bccn callcd to thc Vhitc Housc lor a conlcr
cncc with Prcsidcnt Truman about his mission to China. Marshall
lclt thc hcaring room at 3:00.
114
!bid., pp. 117071.
115
!bid., p. 1163.
116
!bid., pp. 132122.
Hv~vixcs !x)vvvuv)vb
A S)v~xcvv ~) )nv Co::i))vv T~niv-
Gcncral Milcs rcturncd bricy to thc witncss stand, and
Scnator Fcrguson, a Rcpublican, continucd thc qucstioning.
Scnator Lucas, a cmocrat, intcrruptcd:
A momcnt ago, whcn ! mcrcly suggcstcd to Scnator Fcrguson
that hc lct Gcncral Milcs answcr thc qucstion, thc gcntlcman
on Scnator Fcrgusons right got a hcarty chucklc out ol it. !
would likc to know just who thc gcntlcman is and what right
hc has to sit alongsidc ol thc committcc tablc and chucklc at
a mcmbcr ol thc Unitcd Statcs Scnatc. . . . ! do not proposc to
sit around this tablc and pcrmit somc individual that ! do not
know anything about, who is constantly in this casc and con
stantly rcminding Scnators ol thc typc and kind ol qucstions
thcy should ask, to givc a hcarty chucklc to somcthing ! might
suggcst in conncction with this hcaring.
117

Fcrguson spokc up. His namc is Pcrcy Grcavcs. Hc is with
Scnator 8rcwstcr and has chargc ol Scnator 8rcwstcrs lcs in
this casc. Scnator 8rcwstcr was out ol town on this particu
lar day attcnding his lathcrs luncral. Fcrguson had shiltcd into
8rcwstcrs scat and ! had movcd with my papcrs and documcnts
lrom my usual placc bchind thc committcc tablc to a scat ncxt to
Fcrguson at thc committcc tablc.
Scnator Lucas had known Marshall wcll whcn hc had bccn
]udgc Advocatc ol thc !llinois National Guard in thc 1930s and
Marshall had bccn Spccial !nstructor ol thc National Guard. Tc
cmocrat committcc mcmbcrs had bccn disturbcd lor somc timc
by thc sharp and pcrsistcnt intcrrogation ol administration wit
ncsscs and Lucas was cspccially upsct by thc pointcd qucstioning
ol Marshall.
117
!bid., p. 1372.
Senator Lucas: Vasnt hc |Grcavcs| thc Rcpublican National
Committcc rcscarch man in thc campaign ol 1944:
Mr. Greaves: ! was with thc Rcpublican National Committcc
up until thc cnd ol last ycar |1944|.
Senator Lucas: Tis is a nonpartisan hcaring.
Chairman Barkley: !n vicw ol that inlormation, would it bc
out ol placc to inquirc who has compcnsatcd Mr. Grcavcs lor
thc scrviccs hc has rcndcrcd to Scnator 8rcwstcr or Scnator
Fcrguson:
Ferguson: Hc is not rcndcring any scrviccs lor mc.
Lucas: Not much!
Barkley: Hc has bccn sitting by thc Scnator lrom Michigan
|Fcrguson| during thcsc wholc hcarings and apparcntly
prompting thc Scnator in thc intcrrogatorics hc has addrcsscd
to thc witncsscs. Maybc that is not a scrvicc to thc Scnator
lrom Michigan and thc Scnator will havc to bc thc judgc ol
that, but it has bccn a mattcr ol common obscrvation that that
has transpircd cvcr sincc wc bcgan thc hcaring.
8arklcy said hc did not objcct pcrsonally, hc didnt carc how
many assistants any mcmbcr ol this committcc may havc, or
dcsirc, or nccd. 8ut hc thought it was
not out ol placc that thc committcc know who it is who is
compcnsating anybody who is assisting any Scnator. . . |and
that| thc public would bc intcrcstcd in knowing whcthcr thcrc
is any partisan compcnsation bcing paid to anybody who is
cmploycd by a mcmbcr ol this committcc.
Fcrguson said that 8arklcy would havc to talk with 8rcwstcr
about that.
118

118
!bid., p. 1373 (cccmbcr 11).
At thc closc ol thc scssion, rcportcrs crowdcd around. Tc
Vashington Times-Heralds story, hcadlincd Spy !dcnticd at
Pcarl Harbor Probc, had a lourcolumn photo ol mc scatcd at
thc committcc tablc ncxt to Fcrguson with Scnators Lucas and
Gcorgc in thc background. Ncw Yorks PM rclcrrcd to mc as Tc
mystcrious sixth Scnator, whosc
Incognito is Punctured When He Chuckles Out of Turn.
. . . Tcrc wcrc somc liltcd cycbrows at his prcscncc at thc
Committcc tablc, but his gcncral busyncss and thc imprcssivc
aspcct ol thc documcnts hc luggcd to and lrom thc scssions
gavc him status as somc sort ol lunctionary.
Tc ncxt day PM dcscribcd a disputc bctwccn Fcrguson and
8arklcy: !t Sccms !dca Vas To Gct GPs Grcavcs ut ol thc
Hcadlincs.
Vhcn 8rcwstcr rcturncd to Capitol Hill a lcw days latcr, hc
told thc committcc that my position was not a mattcr about which
thcrc nccd bc any mystcry, hc had announccd my appointmcnt
at a prcss conlcrcncc in his o cc somc wccks ago. My dutics
consistcd ol rcading and analyzing thc voluminous documcnts,
lcs, and cxhibits prcscntcd to thc committcc, and scarching thc
rccord lor lcads to pcrsons who might bc callcd as witncsscs. ach
cvcning ! studicd thc background ol schcdulcd witncsscs and thc
matcrials pcrtincnt to thc ncxt days hcarings. Tcn cach morn
ing bclorc thc hcarings startcd, ! briclcd thc minority mcmbcrs,
suggcsting possiblc lincs ol inquiry.
8rcwstcr said hc was sorry that thc committcc hadnt lound
it practicablc to allow thc minority somc assistancc, so hc had
sccurcd Mr. Grcavcs. ! was 8rcwstcrs assistant and was bcing
paid by him. 8rcwstcr wantcd to makc it clcar that ! had not had
lor many months any conncction whatsocvcr with thc Rcpublican
National Committcc. Hc considcrcd mc a vcry compctcnt man.
. . . |Hc| is my assistant. . . . ! hopc hc may continuc. Ncithcr hc
nor ! wantcd to do anything which would in any way impair thc
propcr conduct ol this vcry important invcstigation.
119

!n a mcmorandum to 8rcwstcr, ! apologizcd to thc committcc
mcmbcrs. ! statcd that ! had grcat rcspcct lor Mcmbcrs ol both
Houscs ol Congrcss and had not intcndcd to insult or rccct on
any Mcmbcrs ol thc Unitcd Statcs Scnatc by thought, word or
action. ! thought Lucas had misconstrucd an unconscious and
. . . silcnt smilc that wcnt unnoticcd by anyonc clsc. ! also said !
was a rcgistcrcd Rcpublican but rcccivcd
no compcnsation lrom Rcpublican Party sourccs, and had not
lor many months bclorc cntcring 8rcwstcrs scrvicc. ! assurcd
8rcwstcr that my activitics lor him had not bccn ol a partisan
or a political naturc.
120

Tc incidcnt, a oncday mcdia scnsation, disruptcd thc hcar
ings only slightly. !t was soon lorgottcn and ! rcsumcd my scat
bchind, not at, thc committcc tablc. Tc invcstigation continucd.
8~vxivy Rviv~svs TP SCRT APH8 Rvvov)
n thc morning ol cccmbcr 12 Vashington was grcctcd
by a story in thc Washington Times-Herald bascd on thc TP
SCRT Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard Rcport. 8arklcy had rclcascd
it to rcportcrs thc cvcning bclorc, and thcy had pounccd on its
rcvclations. Tc Times-Herald story rcad:
Hcrctolorc top sccrctarmy documcnts on thc Pcarl Harbor
disastcr rcvcalcd . . . that army and navy witncsscs tcsticd that
]apancsc war plans wcrc known lour days bclorc thc Hawaiian
attack, but that thc witncsscs latcr changcd thcir tcstimony.
119
!bid., part 4, pp. 171920 (cccmbcr 17).
120
!bid., p. 1720.
A cartoon by C.. 8atchclor publishcd in thc samc issuc por
traycd ]apancsc Primc Ministcr Tojo in thc garb ol a towncricr
marching through thc strccts ol Vashington with a sandwich
board rcading, Vc arc going to attack carly in cccmbcr. Plcasc
dont tcll Kimmcl and Short, signcd T]. 8clow thc cartoon
thc words: Tcy didnt.
Tc TP SCRT documcnts that 8arklcy gavc thc prcss
introduccd to thc public still morc cvidcncc ol warnings rcccivcd
in Vashington in advancc ol thc ]apancsc attackthc dcad
lincs thc ]apancsc had xcd lor scrious ncgotiations with thc
Unitcd Statcs to cnd, a cccmbcr 3 intcrccpt rcporting that thc
]apancsc wcrc dcstroying thcir codcs and codc machincs, and thc
U.S. Navys intcrccption on cccmbcr 4 ol thc ]apancsc Vinds
xccutc indicating Var with ngland, war with Amcrica, pcacc
with Russia.
121

M~vsn~ii is Asxvb ~nou) Vixbs Cobv
Mvx)ioxvb ix APH8 Rvvov)
Marshall rcturncd to thc hcarings altcr mccting with Truman.
His qucstioning continucd with Rcprcscntativc Kcclc, a tall man
with broad shouldcrs, a lawycr with a dccp voicc whcn hc wantcd
to usc it. Hc intcrrogatcd Marshall vigorously, introducing into
thc rccord a grcat dcal ol inlormation prcviously misscd. Hc did
not lct thc gcncral cvadc rcsponsibility lor thc lailurc to rcspond to
Shorts inadcquatc sabotagc alcrt, or lor his uncxplaincd unavail
ability during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 and thc carly morning
hours ol cccmbcr 7.
122

Vhcn Marshall took thc witncss scat on Tursday, cccmbcr
13, Scnator Lucas askcd about thc Vinds Codc, which had
bccn mcntioncd in thc APH8 documcnts just rclcascd. Had
121
!bid., pp. 144397.
122
!bid., pp. 142122, 142930.
Marshall cvcr sccn any mcssagc . . . implcmcnting this winds
codc mcssagc: Marshall rcplicd: Not to my knowlcdgc.
123

Finally, at noon, altcr cach mcmbcr had anothcr chancc
to qucstion him, thc committcc nishcd its intcrrogation ol
Marshall, rclcascd him, and hc was lrcc to y to Chungking.
124

Gvxvv~i Miivs Rvc~iis )nv Piio) Mvss~cv,
Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii ovs No)
Altcr Marshall had complctcd his tcstimony, Milcs took thc
stand oncc morc. Fcrguson again askcd him about thc Pilot
Mcssagc, ]apans announccmcnt that hcr rcsponsc to thc U.S.
ultimatum was cn routc. Tis timc Milcs rcplicd that to thc
bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl it was in thc Saturday altcr
noon lockcd pouch among scvcral othcr mcssagcs, which you will
nd wcrc translatcd on that day, and that it did go to Gcncral
Marshall. Hc docs not rcmcmbcr sccing it.
125
Tat was as lar as
Milcs would go toward contradicting Marshall.
Pv~vi H~vnov Hv~vixcs, Scnvbuivb
)o L~s) Fouv Vvvxs, )o nv x)vxbvb
wi)n Nvw Couxsvi ~xb S)~vv

Tc Congrcssional Committcc had bcgun its hcarings
Novcmbcr 15. Gcncral Counscl Mitchcll and his chicl assistant,
Gcscll, had cxpcctcd to do most ol thc sclcction and qucstioning
ol witncsscs, with thc committcc mcmbcrs obscrving and asking
only occasional qucstions. Howcvcr, public intcrcst in thc invcs
tigation was intcnsc, and thc mcmbcrs discovcrcd many points
to probc. Tc Rcpublican mcmbcrs cspccially, Mitchcll said, had
123
!bid., p. 1507.
124
!bid., p. 1541.
125
!bid., p. 1555.
cngagcd in cxtcnsivc cxamination . . . lar bcyond what thc lcgal
sta anticipatcd.
126

Mitchcll rcmindcd thc committcc on cccmbcr 14 that it
has bccn sitting rcgularly lor a month, including all Saturdays
but onc. uring that pcriod only 8 witncsscs havc bccn com
plctcly cxamincd . . . thcrc rcmain at lcast 60 witncsscs to bc
cxamincd. Many ol thcsc witncsscs arc quitc as crucial as thosc
who havc tcsticd. At thc ratc ol progrcss during thc past
month, it sccms ccrtain that scvcral morc months ol hcarings
will bc rcquircd. . . .
Tc joint rcsolution ol thc Congrcss undcr which thc commit
tcc is acting rcquircs a nal rcport ol thc committcc to bc madc
not latcr than ]anuary 3, 1946. . . . Sincc thc start ol thc hcar
ing it has bccomc incrcasingly apparcnt that somc mcmbcrs ol
thc committcc havc a dicrcnt vicw than that cntcrtaincd by
counscl, cithcr as to thc scopc ol thc inquiry or as to what is
pcrtincnt cvidcncc.
As a rcsult, thc hcarings had bccn prolongcd. Tcrclorc, it was
ncccssary lor Mitchcll to ask thc committcc to arrangc lor
othcr counscl to carry on.
127

Congrcss grantcd thc committcc an cxtcnsion. Vhilc thc
committcc scarchcd lor rcplaccmcnts lor Mitchcll and his sta,
thc hcarings continucd with tcstimony lrom scvcral morc top
military o cials.
126
!bid., part 4, p. 1586.
127
!bid., pp. 158586.
Gvxvv~i Gvvow (Av:y V~v Pi~xs)
iscussvs Snov)s S~no)~cv Aivv) ~xb
vcv:nvv 6 vvx)s
Gcncral Gcrow maintaincd his Novcmbcr 27 dispatch had
givcn Short su cicnt warning and that Shorts rcplyRcport
dcpartmcnt alcrtcd to prcvcnt sabotagc. Liaison with Navy
could havc bccn takcn to mcan that hc was alcrtcd to prcvcnt
sabotagc and . . . also prcparcd to conduct rcconnaissancc and othcr
dclcnsivc missions.
128
!t could cvcn havc bccn intcrprctcd as
mcaning that thc Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt,
had prcparcd lor an attack ol thc kind that was actually madc.
129

Hcncc no lollowup had bccn considcrcd.
Scnator Fcrguson, a rclcntlcss cxamincr, quotcd lrom thc Sta
O cers Field Manual:
Tc rcsponsibilitics ol thc commandcr and his sta do not cnd
with thc issuc ol thc ncccssary ordcrs. Tcy must insurc rcccipt
ol thc ordcrs by thc propcr commandcrs, makc ccrtain thcy arc
undcrstood, and cnlorcc thcir ccctivc cxccution.
130

Hc askcd Gcrow il Short, altcr having rcportcd thc mcasurcs
takcn and |n|ot having hcard anything lor thc numbcr ol days
bctwccn thc 28th and thc 7th, wouldnt havc had a right to rcly
upon that lact, that |hc| had undcrstood his ordcr, and that hc
had propcrly intcrprctcd thc ordcr ol thc 27th: Gcrow rcplicd:
! think that is corrcct.
131

128
!bid., part 4, p. 1638.
129
!bid., p. 1640.
130
Var cpartmcnt. Sta O cers Field Manual: Te Sta and Combat Orders.
FM 1015. August 19, 1940, prcparcd undcr thc dircction ol thc Chicl ol
Sta, G.C. Marshall, p. 39, paragraph 63, Supcrvision ol xccution.
131
Gcrow voluntccrcd a dcscription ol his rcsponsibility as chicl
ol Var Plans. !t had bccn
to prcparc |action, not inlormation| mcssagcs and submit
thcm to thc Chicl ol Sta and thc Sccrctary ol Var lor thcir
approval. !n any cmcrgcncy, il thc Chicl ol Sta was not thcrc,
! would assumc thc rcsponsibility lor scnding thcm and acccpt
thc conscqucnccs il ! madc a mistakc.
132
Fcrguson also qucstioncd Gcrow about crucial cccmbcr
1941 mcssagcs. Gcrow rca rmcd his statcmcnts to Licutcnant
Coloncl Clauscnhc rccallcd ncithcr 8rattons rccommcnda
tion that additional warnings bc scnt thc ovcrscas commandcrs
bccausc ]apancsc diplomats had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs
and codc machincs,
133
nor Sadtlcrs tclling him on cccmbcr
5 that a Vinds Codc xccutc had bccn rcccivcd.
134
And hc
dcnicd rccciving thc Pilot Mcssagc and thc rst 13 parts ol
]apans rcply on cccmbcr 6, hc didnt scc thcm until cccmbcr
7 at 11:30 in thc Chicl ol Stas o cc.
135

Ab:iv~i Tuvxvv (N~vy V~v Pi~xs):
U.S. vvvxsv xco:v~ssvs vvvxsv ov U.K.
Ac~ixs) ]~v~x ~xb Gvv:~xy
Admiral Turncr, thc 1941 chicl ol thc Navys war plans scc
tion, rst camc bclorc thc ]CC on cccmbcr 19. Hc was am
boyant, somcthing ol a braggadocio, with a rcputation lor liking
morc liquor than was good lor him. Hc had boastcd bclorc thc
Navy Court ol !nquiry that hc had cxprcsscd thc opinion prcvi
ously that thc ]uly 1941 lrcczing ol ]apancsc asscts in thc Unitcd
132
!bid., p. 1653.
133
!bid., pp. 162730.
134
!bid., p. 1631.
135
!bid., pp. 163436
Statcs would vcry dcnitcly bring on war with ]apan.
136
Hc had
cxpcctcd thcy |thc ]apancsc| would makc somc sort ol an attack
on Hawaii.
137
Hc told thc ]CC hc had considcrcd a surprisc
attack on Pcarl Harbor not simply a possibility but probablc.
138

Tc attack, hc said, had comc as no surprisc to him.
Vhcn stationcd in ]apan in 1939, Turncr tcsticd, hc kncw
thc ]apancsc naval attach. 8oth mcn had comc to Vashington at
about thc samc timc. Altcr ]apancsc Ambassador Nomura arrivcd
in Vashington in Fcbruary 1941, thc naval attach arrangcd lor
Turncr to mcct Nomura about March rst. Turncr wrotc a mcm
orandum to CN Stark about that mccting, saying hc thought
hc should continuc thc talks.
139
Tcy mct scvcral morc timcs.
n ]uly 21, 1941, Turncr told thc Ambassador |Nomura|
that ! bclicvcd that Congrcss would dcclarc war il thcy |thc
]apancsc| attackcd cithcr thc utch or thc 8ritish in Malaya.
140

According to Turncrs mcmorandum ol that mccting, Turncr had
pointcd out to Nomura that
it is dccidcdly against thc military intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd Statcs
to pcrmit thc Unitcd Kingdom to bc ovcrcomc by Gcrmany.
For this rcason any action which thc Unitcd Statcs could takc
against Gcrmany is ncccssarily onc ol scll dclcnsc and would
ncvcr bc considcrcd as aggrcssion. Furthcrmorc, anything that
accts thc luturc sccurity ol thc Unitcd Kingdom in any part
ol thc world, also is ol intcrcst to thc Unitcd Statcs lrom thc
dclcnsivc vicwpoint.
141

136
!bid., part 32, p. 604.
137
!bid., part 33, p. 878.
138
!bid., part 4, p. 1940.
139
!bid., p. 2041.
140
!bid., p. 2042.
141
cpartmcnt ol Statc, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing
cc, 1943), vol. 2, p. 519.
Turncr was uncquivocal: Any U.S. action against Gcrmany
would bc scll dclcnsc and would ncvcr bc considcrcd aggrcs
sion! |T|hc luturc sccurity ol thc Unitcd Statcs and that ol
thc Unitcd Kingdom wcrc incxtricably allicd lrom thc dclcn
sivc vicwpoint! Rooscvclt, Hull, and Stark wcrc all scnt copics ol
Turncrs mcmorandum ol that mccting. Turncr told thc ]CC hc
rcccivcd no indication lrom any ol thcm that thcy disagrccd or
disapprovcd ol what hc had writtcn.
142

Vhcn askcd about thc cccmbcr 6 ]apancsc intcrccpts,
Turncr rccallcd sccing thc Pilot Mcssagc and thc rst 13 parts
ol thc ]apancsc rcply somc timc just prcccding thc 7th, somc
night, and ! now bclicvc it to havc bccn thc night ol cccmbcr
6, about 11:30 v.:. Hc said an o ccr camc to his housc, hc had
bccn in bcd but wcnt down and rcad a long dispatch in scvcral
parts which hc bclicvcd was thc dispatch in qucstion. Vhcn
askcd to whom thc o ccr had shown thcsc papcrs, thc o ccr
rcplicd, Admiral Vilkinson, Admiral !ngcrsoll, and Sccrctary
Knox. Tus assurcd that thc rcsponsiblc Navy o cials had bccn
adviscd, Turncr did nothing morc about it. Hc did not rccall
sccing thc 14th part until altcr thc attack.
143

At about 10:30 on Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7, Stark
phoncd Turncr at his homc, asking him to comc to thc o cc.
ncc thcrc, Stark askcd him to dralt a rcply to Harts inquiry con
ccrning Crcightons rcport that thc Unitcd Statcs had promiscd
armcd support to thc 8ritish and utch in thc lar cast.
144
Turncr
had bccn working on that whcn Stark summoncd him, at about
12 or 12:15, and showcd him thc nc v.:. Mcssagc. Stark told
142
143
!bid., pp. 197071.
144
!bid., p. 1971, Stark tcstimony. Scc also ibid., pp. 193516, Turncr tcstimony
conccrning rcply prcparcd cccmbcr 7 lor Hart, and part 10, pp. 508283,
Crcighton tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
Turncr that Marshall had noticd thc army cld commandcrs ol
that mcssagc, tclling thcm to inlorm thc naval authoritics.
145

Ab:iv~i S)~vx ox ]oix) U.S.8vi)isn
V~v Pi~x ~xb Movxixc ov vcv:nvv
Admiral Harold R. Stark, chicl ol naval opcrations at thc timc
ol thc attack, was sccond in linc ol command to thc prcsidcnt
in protccting thc Unitcd Statcs and its Navy. Stark had bccomc
CN on August 1, 1939, just onc month bclorc Hitlcrs lorccs
marchcd into Poland, launching what bccamc Vorld Var !!.
Stark was known to his associatcs as 8ctty, his nicknamc lrom
Annapolis days.
146
Hc was gcnial, politc, soltspokcn, not blunt
or brusquc likc Admiral Richardson, who had stood up boldly to
FR. 8ut Stark was no milquctoast cithcr. n occasion hc would
tcll FR lrankly what hc thought, as hc had, lor instancc, whcn
opposing thc dcstroycr dcal.
Stark appcarcd bclorc thc ]CC on cccmbcr 31, 1945. Hc
opcncd his tcstimony by rcading a statcmcnt containing substan
tial quotations lrom rcports and lcttcrs to his cld commandcrs
during his tcrm ol o cc.
147
Vhcn hc assumcd o cc, Stark rcal
izcd U.S. naval lorccs wcrc wcak, so hc had immcdiatcly sct about
trying to obtain morc ships, plancs, wcapons, and mcn. Navy bud
gct rcqucsts wcrc rst madc to thc 8urcau ol thc 8udgct, which
makcs rccommcndations lrom which thc prcsidcnts budgct is
prcparcd and submittcd to Congrcss.
148
Stark had appcarcd bclorc
congrcssional committccs to rcqucst authorization and lunds,
pointing out thc incrcasing dcmands lor mcn and matcricl lor thc
145
!bid., part 4, pp. 197172.
146
!bid., part 5, p. 2172.
147
!bid., pp. 209735.
148
!bid., p. 2458.
Atlantic thcatcr.
149
Hc had lound Congrcss coopcrativc: ||vcr
thc scal ycars 1934 to 1941, inclusivc, thosc gurcs show that
thc Congrcss cxcccdcd thc Prcsidcntial 8udgct cstimatc . . . in
thc mattcr ol appropriations.
150
Stark also told ol his strugglc
with thc prcsidcnt in sccking approval lor cxpanding thc naval
lorcc. Hc had plcadcd with FR on bchall ol thc Pacic Flcct,
it should at lcast at rst rcmain strong until wc scc what ]apan is
going to do.
151
Stark tcsticd that as CN hc had dcvclopcd war plans
Rainbow No. 3 lor govcrning naval opcrations in casc ol war with
]apan, Gcrmany, and !taly,
152
and thcn Rainbow No. 5, which
hc had hclpcd to dcvclop with thc Army. Rainbow No. 5 was a
joint basic war plan bascd on undcrstandings with thc 8ritish and
Canadians in A8C1]anuary 29March 27, 1941.
153

Stark said his dutics includcd kccp|ing| thc cct command
crs in Atlantic, Pacic, and Asiatic watcrs inlormcd ol signi
cant dcvclopmcnts in political and military mattcrs ol conccrn to
thcm.
154
n April 3, 1941, Stark wrotc Kimmcl about thc joint
U.S.8ritish war plan that had bccn drawn up and on which 8asic
Var Plan Rainbow No. 5 had bccn bascd. 8oth hc and Marshall
had approvcd this war plan. Stark had discusscd it at lcngth with
Rooscvclt, had rcad to him his April 3 lcttcr to Kimmcl sctting
lorth thc plans provisions, and had rcccivcd his |FRs| gcn
cral asscnt, and at an appropriatc timc, |thc plan| is cxpcctcd to
rcccivc thc |o cial| approval ol thc prcsidcnt.
155
According to
Rainbow No. 5, VPL46, thc U.S. Pacic Flcct was to
149
!bid., pp. 210001.
150
!bid., p. 2459.
151
!bid., p. 2112.
152
!bid., p. 2102.
153
!bid.
154
!bid., pp. 2109, 217577.
155
!bid., part 33, pp. 135758.
support thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs in thc Far ast by
divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr through
thc dcnial and capturc ol positions in thc Marshalls, and
through raids on cncmy sca communications and positions.
156

n April 4 Stark rca rmcd to Kimmcl FRs approval ol thc
U.S.Grcat 8ritain agrccmcnt lor joint military action.
157

Starks prcparcd statcmcnt to thc committcc rcad in part:
8ascd on thc undcrstandings arrivcd at in A8C1, thc Army
and Navy dcvclopcd a ]oint 8asic Var Plan, known as Rainbow
No. 5, which was approvcd by thc Sccrctarics ol Var and thc
Navy. Stark continucd: You will notc that ! havc crosscd out thc
words and by thc prcsidcnt. Tat is thc only changc madc in this
statcmcnt.
158

Vhcn Scnator Fcrguson askcd why hc had dclctcd thosc lour
words, Stark cxplaincd that hc
had no documcntary prool ol it. ! do know thc prcsidcnt,
cxccpt o cially, approvcd ol it,
159
although it shows hc was not
willing to do it o cially until wc got into thc war. Ncvcrthclcss
! scnt that plan out on April 3. . . . ! told Kimmcl and told
TommyAdmiral Hartthat ! had rcad to thc prcsidcnt my
o cial lcttcr ol April 3 and that thc prcsidcnt had approvcd it
and kncw ! was scnding it out. Tcrclorc, ! think it is salc to say
that thc prcsidcnt ccrtainly approvcd ol it.
160

!n othcr words, FR had approvcd an agrccmcnt, wcll bclorc
thc war startcd, to hclp thc 8ritish and utch militarily in south
cast Asia in thc cvcnt ol ]apancsc aggrcssion, even if the Japanese
had not actually attacked the United States itself.
156
!bid., part 18, p. 2889, xhibit 129.
157
!bid., part 16, pp. 216061.
158
!bid., part 5, p. 2102.
159
!bid., part 18, pp. 2875941, xhibit 129.
160
!bid., part 5, p. 2391.
uoting Kimmcls ]unc 30, 1941, rcport, Stark said hc rcal
izcd thc dclcnsc lorccs at Pcarl Harbor wcrc |i|nadcquatc . . . to
providc lor thc salcty ol thc Flcct in harbor.
161
Tcy had bccn
lurthcr wcakcncd in mid1941, as had bccn contcmplatcd in thc
Navy 8asic Var Plan, VPL46, whcn somc ol thc ccts ships
wcrc translcrrcd to thc Atlantic to bc uscd in taking thc Azorcs.
Although that plan was ncvcr carricd out, thc ships rcmaincd in
thc Atlantic and wcrc not rcturncd to Hawaii.
162
Tcn just bclorc
thc attack, thc strcngth ol thc cct was again rcduccd whcn 50
pursuit plancs wcrc translcrrcd, 25 cach, to Vakc and Midway.
163

n Novcmbcr 27, thc day altcr Hull prcscntcd thc Unitcd Statcss
notc to thc ]apancsc ambassadors, thc Navy had scnt thc thrcc cct
commandcrsHart, Kimmcl, and Kinga war warning. ]apan
was cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw days to launch an amphibious
cxpcdition against cithcr thc Philippincs, Tai or Kra pcninsula or
possibly 8ornco.
164
Stark tcsticd that hc had workcd lor hours
on this mcssagc, particularly thc war warning, which was all out.
Hc thought it would convcy what ! intcndcd it should convcy.
! thought it was vcry plain and it cw all thc dangcr signals.
165

Stark had clcarcd thc mcssagc pcrsonally with thc sccrctary ol thc
Navy and hc had cithcr told thc prcsidcnt bclorchand or immc
diatcly altcr. Stark did know that within 24 hours, il not bclorc
. . . it had his lull approval and that hc gavc us an .K.
166

Also on Novcmbcr 27 thc Army scnt warnings to
MacArthur in thc Philippincs and Short.
167
According to Stark,
|T|hc outstanding things in thc Army mcssagc . . . was that
war might comc at any momcnt. Tc mcssagc dircctcd Short
161
!bid., part 5, p. 2107.
162
!bid. Scc also part 6, p. 2505, Kimmcl statcmcnt to thc ]oint Committcc.
163
!bid., part 5, pp. 215471.
164
!bid., part 14, p. 1406, CN ispatch #272337.
165
!bid., part 5, p. 2447.
166
!bid., p. 2151.
167
!bid., part 14, pp. 132829.
to makc a rcconnaissancc and ! had dircctcd Kimmcl to makc a
dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. Stark lclt Tc two |warnings| hookcd
up togcthcr.
168

Vhilc qucstioning Stark, Rcprcscntativc Kcclc said hc had
hcard him say rcpcatcdly that hc
did not cxpcct an attack at Pcarl Harbor, you wcrc surpriscd,
thc prcsidcnt was surpriscd, Gcncral Marshall was surpriscd,
you wcrc all surpriscd . . . and yct you cxpcctcd Kimmcl with
lcss inlormation than you had ol thc situation, cvcn conccd
ing this ordcr which was givcn on thc war warning . . . to bc
prcparcd against an attack which nonc ol you thought would
takc placc.
Kcclc lound it di cult . . . to rcconcilc thosc two positions.
169

Stark admittcd hc had not cxpcctcd an attack on Pcarl Harbor,
although wc all rccognizcd it to bc a possibility.
170
Hc had scnt
to Kimmcl lor action a war warning signal containing a dircc
tivc and containing what inlormation wc had. !t had dircctcd
Kimmcl to makc a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt. Stark had thought
that with such a warning thc cct would bc put on a war looting
out thcrc so lar as any surprisc was conccrncd.
171

Starks rcsponsibility includcd kccping thc cct commandcrs
inlormcd and assuring thc salcty ol thc Navy. Yct undcr qucstion
ing Stark admittcd to having no rccollcction ol having sccn thc
]apancsc Pcarl Harbor bomb plot or shipsinharbor mcssagcs.
172

And hc dcnicd having hcard that a Vinds xccutc was rcccivcd
bclorc thc attack.
173
Morcovcr, hc said hc had not known until thc
168
!bid., part 5, p. 2447.
169
!bid., pp. 244748.
170
!bid., p. 2448.
171
!bid., p. 2445.
172
!bid., pp. 217374, 2396400.
173
!bid., p. 2182.
morning ol cccmbcr 7 about thc Pilot Mcssagc, which had
bccn rcccivcd in Vashington thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 6. And
Stark said hc had not lcarncd until thc morning ol cccmbcr
7 ol thc rst 13 parts ol thc 14part ]apancsc rcply, which had
bccn intcrccptcd and dccodcd thc prcvious altcrnoon and cvc
ning.
174
Hc did not rcmcmbcr whcn hc had rcccivcd thc complctc
14part rcply. Hc maintaincd only that hc rst saw it altcr ! got
in thc o cc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, just what timc hc
could not rccall.
175

Stark said hc bclicvcd hc was at homc thc cvcning ol thc 6th,
il hc was out, a scrvant, il not a duty o ccr, was on hand to takc
mcssagcs. Hc did not think anyonc had callcd him.
176
Hc also
maintaincd that hc had gonc as usual to his o cc that Sunday
morning:
! usually got down to thc o cc Sunday mornings about 10:30
and ! just assumcd that ! had gottcn thcrc somcwhcrc around
10:30 or 11:00. ! was lazy on Sunday mornings unlcss thcrc
was somc spccial rcason lor gctting up carly. ! usually took a
walk about thc grounds and grccnhouscs at thc Chicl ol Naval
pcrations quartcrs and didnt hurry about gctting down and
my usual timc, as ! rccall, was about 10:30 or 11. Vhat timc
it was on this particular Sunday morning ! couldnt go bcyond
that.
177

Tis tcstimony contradictcd othcr witncsscs, and Stark kncw
it. Vilkinson was onc who tcsticd that Stark was in his o cc
considcrably carlicr than 10:30about 9:15, hc saidwhcn hc
arrivcd with part 14 ol thc ]apancsc rcply. Altcr dclivcring that
174
!bid., pp. 2183, 2187.
175
!bid., p. 2187.
176
!bid., pp. 2187, 2291, 2335.
177
!bid., pp. 2183, 2335.
mcssagc, Vilkinson said, hc lclt, only to rcturn at 10:30 or 10:40
with thc nc v.:. Mcssagc.
178
Stark did not rcmcmbcr thc dclivcry ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc
and had no rccollcction as to whcn hc rcccivcd it.
My rcmcmbrancc, as ! said, was 10:40. Vhcn you say at lcast
10:30, ! think you will nd tcstimony to that ccct by a wit
ncss, and il hc statcs that, and ! think hc probably has good sup
porting data, ! acccpt it, that it was dclivcrcd to my o cc and
thcn altcr that was givcn, by whomcvcr hc gavc it, to mc.
179
Captain Arthur H. McCollum also said Stark must havc
arrivcd in his o cc considcrably carlicr than usual that Sunday
morning. McCollum said hc and Vilkinson had gonc togcthcr to
Starks o cc whcn thcy lcarncd that hc had arrivcd in thc Navy
cpartmcnt, probably about 9 or 9:15. Stark was alonc whcn
McCollum and Vilkinson cntcrcd but, according to McCollum,
various othcr o ccrs soon arrivcd!ngcrsoll, 8rainard, Noycs,
Turncr, and possibly Schuirmann. McCollum said, Tcrc was
considcrablc going in and out at that timc.
180
]CC Chicl Assistant
Counscl Gcscll commcntcd that onc witncss had said thcrc wcrc
15 o ccrs in thcrc.
181
Starks o cc was apparcntly a busy placc
that Sunday morning.
Starks acknowlcdgcd rccollcction ol that Sunday morn
ing bcgan only with his talk at 11:30 ~.:. with Marshall about
thc nc v.:. Mcssagc and thc dccision to scnd a lastminutc
mcssagc to thc cld commandcrs. Howcvcr, Stark was ccrtain
nobody mcntioncd Honolulu with rclcrcncc to a daylight attack.
178
!bid., part 4, pp. 176668.
179
!bid., part 5, pp. 218485.
180
!bid., part 36, p. 26.
181
!bid., part 5, p. 2185.
Hc was positivc ol that.
182
Hc was qucstioncd about thc nc
v.:. Mcssagc by ]CC Counscl Mitchcll.
Mitchell: Vcll, this was what wc lawycrs call a last clcar
chancc. Tcsc pcoplc wcrc not rcady at Pcarl Harbor, thc ]ap
Flcct was piling in, hcrc was a chancc to gct a mcssagc to thcm
that might havc savcd thcm, it rcachcd your hands, wc will say,
at 10:40, thc chancc wasnt takcn. ocs that sum up thc situa
tion as you scc it: . . .
Stark: ! gathcr lrom your qucstion you arc now pointing that
dispatch dircctly at Pcarl Harbor. !t didnt mcntion Pcarl
Harbor. !t gavc no inlcrcncc with rcgard to Pcarl Harbor any
morc than it did thc Philippincs or thc Ncthcrlands ast
!ndics. . . . !n thc light ol hindsight, il wc had rcad into that
mcssagc that it mcant an attack at that hour, and had scnt it
out, ol coursc, it would havc bccn hclplul. ! wish such an inlcr
cncc could havc bccn drawn.
Mitchell: Tc xing ol an cxact hour to dclivcr thc diplomatic
mcssagc and rout out thc Sccrctary ol Statc on a Sunday at
1:00 v.:., wasnt it obvious that thcrc was somc spccial signi
cancc, having in mind thc history ol thc ]aps striking rst and
dcclaring war altcrwards:
Stark: !l so, Mr. Mitchcll, ! would likc to say that so lar as
! know thc Sccrctary ol Var didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into
it, thc Sccrctary ol Statc didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it, thc
Sccrctary ol thc Navy didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it. Gcncral
Marshall and his sta didnt rcad that inlcrcncc into it, and
nobody mcntioncd it to mc.
Mitchell: !s it lair to say that il Marshall hadnt spottcd that
mcssagc and startcd to scnd word out to Pcarl Harbor that you
probably wouldnt havc scnt anything:
182
!bid., p. 2185.
Stark: ! dont know that ! would. ! think that might bc a lair
dcduction.
183

Fivs) Pos)A))~cx !xvvs)ic~)iox
(vcv:nvv +o+)
Sccrctary ol thc Navy Frank Knox had own to Pcarl Harbor
almost immcdiatcly altcr thc ]apancsc attack in ordcr to invcsti
gatc thc cxtcnt ol thc damagc. Hc had writtcn a rcport. No copics
ol that rcport had bccn rclcascd and it had rcccivcd practically
no publicity at thc timc. Howcvcr, during thc ]CC hcarings !, as
chicl ol thc committccs minority sta, locatcd a copy. n ]anuary
4, 1946, toward thc cnd ol Starks tcstimony, Fcrguson askcd him
to rcad Knoxs rcport into thc rccord.
184
Knox had madc thrcc
signicant points:
1. Ncithcr Short nor Kimmcl, at thc timc ol thc attack, had
any knowlcdgc ol thc plain intimations ol somc surprisc movc,
madc clcar in Vashington, through thc intcrccption ol ]apancsc
instructions to Nomura . . . by thc insistcncc upon thc prccisc
timc ol Nomuras rcply to Hull, at onc oclock on Sunday.
185

2. Trcc wavcs ol cncmy air lorcc swcpt ovcr Pcarl Harbor dur
ing thc assault. 8ccausc ol thc clcmcnt ol surprisc, thc rst
wavc, which lastcd lrom 7:55 to 8:30 ~.:., was substantially
unopposcd and wrcakcd considcrablc havoc. Yct, Navy anti
aircralt guns bcgan ring in only about lour minutcs altcr thc
attack startcd. Tc sccond wavc ovcr thc harbor |9:9:30 ~.:.|
was rcsistcd with lar grcatcr rc powcr and a numbcr ol cncmy
plancs wcrc shot down. Tc third attack ovcr thc harbor |lrom
about 11:30 to 1:00 v.:.| was mct by so intcnsivc a barragc
lrom thc ships that it was drivcn o without gctting thc attack
183
!bid., pp. 218586.
184
!bid., pp. 233845.
185
!bid., p. 2338.
homc, no ccctivc hits bcing madc in thc harbor by this last
assault.
186

3. Tc Armys lack ol thc bcst mcans ol dclcnsc against air
attack . . . ghtcr plancs . . . |was| duc to thc divcrsion ol this
typc |ol aircralt| bclorc thc outbrcak ol thc war, to thc 8ritish,
thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians.
187

Stark said hc hadnt sccn thc Knox rcport bclorc, but cxprcsscd
no particular surprisc at its rcvclations.
188
Hc said thcrc is vcry lit
tlc in that rcport that hc |Knox| didnt tcll a considcrablc numbcr
ol us in his o cc.
189
!t may bc, as Stark said, that thc Knox rcport
was no rcvclation to him. 8ut hc madc no mcntion ol two ol thc
thrcc aspccts that most imprcsscd thc committcc mcmbcrs: thc
lact that Kimmcl and Short had rcccivcd littlc intclligcncc lrom
Vashington, and that onc major rcason lor thc shortagc ol rccon
naissancc plancs in Hawaii was thc spccicd divcrsion ol ghtcr
plancs to thc 8ritish, thc Chincsc, thc utch and thc Russians.

Stark was thc last witncss to tcstily bclorc Mitchcll and his
lcgal sta lclt thc committcc. A wccks rcccss was callcd so thc
ncw staScth V. Richardson, gcncral counscl, Samucl H.
Kaulman, associatc gcncral counscl, ]ohn . Mastcn, dward P.
Morgan, and Logan ]. Lanccould bccomc lamiliar with thc
186
!bid., p. 2340. Tcstimony conccrning thc timing ol thc thrcc wavcs ol ]apa
ncsc attack vary according to thc dicrcnt vantagcs ol thc scvcral witncsscs.
For instancc, scc ibid., part 1, pp. 43, 47, and 48, account ol Admiral T.8.
!nglis, part 24, p. 1569, account ol Kimmcl, and part 22, pp. 8788, account ol
Short at thc Robcrts Commission.
187
!bid., part 5, p. 2342.
188
!bid., p. 2337.
189
!bid., p. 2352.
rccord. Tc hcarings rcsumcd ]anuary 15, 1946.
190
Scvcral impor
tant witncsscs still rcmaincd to bc hcardnotably Short and
Kimmcl, Saord, and thc Army and Navy couricrs Kramcr and
8ratton, rcspcctivcly.
190
!bid., p. 2493.
671
28.
Joint Congressional
Committee on the
Pearl Harbor Attack
S~vvovb x )nv Tv~ii ov )nv
~s) Vixbs xvcu)v
O
utsidc thc doors ol thc Committccs hcaring room, Captain
L.F. Saord continucd to pursuc thc latc ol thc missing
Pcarl Harbor documcnts. Saord playcd a crucial rolc in thc
scvcral invcstigations. !t was Saord who rst callcd Kimmcls
attcntion to thc lact that Vashington had rcccivcd inlormation
through ]apancsc MAG!C intcrccpts, inlormation that had not
bccn sharcd with thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. !t was Saord
who discovcrcd that thc intcrccpts wcrc missing. !t was Saord
who nally locatcd most ol thcm and had thcm copicd and
rcplaccd in thc lcs whcrc thcy bclongcd. Howcvcr, hc was ncvcr
ablc to locatc onc particular intcrccpt that hc considcrcd crucial.
Tis was thc Vinds Codc xccutc, with thc codcd wcathcr
words ast Vind Rain, announcing that thc Unitcd Statcs
would bc involvcd in ]apans intcndcd aggrcssion lrom thc vcry
bcginning.
Saord dcscribcd to thc Congrcssional Committcc in con
sidcrablc dctail thc proccdurc which had bccn lollowcd to prc
vcnt knowlcdgc ol MAG!C and cspccially ol thc Vinds Codc
xccutc lrom bccoming known. A copy ol this winds cxccutc
mcssagc should havc bccn in thc lcs ol Saords division, in
thc lockcd salc ol thcn Commandcr, now Captain, Kramcr. Tc
pcrsonal or immcdiatc custodian was Licutcnant Commandcr
Harrison, U.S. Naval Rcscrvc. Saord cxplaincd that thc only
pcoplc who had acccss to Captain Kramcrs salc wcrc thosc on
duty undcr Captain Kramcr. vcrything was normally clcarcd
through Commandcr Harrison. Tcrc wcrc not morc than tcn
pcoplc at thc mosttranslators and thc ycomcn on duty in
Kramcrs scction, thc hcad ol thc scction, Saord, or thc o ccr
who rclicvcd Saord, or it is possiblc that thc ircctor ol Naval
!ntclligcncc might havc callcd lor lcs at any timc. Any highcr
authority would havc bccn givcn thc lcs without qucstion il hc
had rcqucstcd it.
1

Saord: To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc thc combination to thc
salc was hcld by Kramcr and Harrison alonc. Tcrc was a copy
ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in my salc. Tcrc was
anothcr copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in thc
salc ol thc Aidc to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. Tat was
rcquircd lor all salcs in naval opcrations, so in casc ol casualty
to thc man who rcgularly opcncd thc salc thc salc could bc
opcncd whcn wc had to. . . . ! know ol no occasion whcn wc
1
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 8, pp. 367576.
cvcr had to opcn thosc scalcd cnvclopcs, and cntcr thc salc. !
might add, whcncvcr an o ccr was rclicvcd, wc changcd thc
combination on his salc and substitutcd thc ncw cards, and that
was thc only timc wc cvcr had to gct into thosc cnvclopcs.
2

Saord had appcarcd as a witncss bclorc thc Hart inquiry,
thc Navy Court ol !nquiry, thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, and
thc Hcwitt inquiry. Hc cxpcctcd to bc callcd again to tcstily il
Congrcss should dccidc to invcstigatc lurthcr altcr thc war cndcd.
Tcrclorc, as arrangcmcnts wcrc bcing madc to sct up thc con
grcssional committcc in thc lall ol 1945, hc continucd his scarch
lor thc missing Vinds xccutc, which hc was convinccd had
bccn rcccivcd.
8ccausc ol thc crratic pcrlormancc ol radio wavcs and atmo
sphcric disturbanccs, Saord kncw that thc bcst chancc ol intcr
ccpting thc Tokyo broadcasts at thc schcdulcd timcs in Novcmbcr
cccmbcr 1941 would havc bccn on thc cast coast ol thc Unitcd
Statcs. His rccollcction was that thc Vinds xccutc had bccn
pickcd up on cccmbcr 4, at Station M ol thc communica
tion intclligcncc group (Com!nt) in Chcltcnham, Maryland, and
thcn transmittcd by tclcwritcr to Saords o cc, P20G, in
Vashington, .C.
3

As Saord wcnt through thc lcs, hc ran across thc initials
RT on somc ol thc Chcltcnham intcrccpts. vcry codc clcrk
had his own pcrsonal sign, initials by which thc mcssagcs hc
intcrccptcd could bc idcnticd. Saord discovcrcd that RT was
thc sign ol Chicl Varrant ccr Ralph T. 8riggs, who had
bccn stationcd in Chcltcnham on cccmbcr 4, 1941, and who,
in 1945, was back in Vashington at onc ol thc o ccs ol Naval
2
!bid.
3
Tis account ol Saords contact with 8riggs is bascd primarily on 8cttina
Grcavcss intcrvicw ol 8riggs in Las \cgas, Ncvada, August 14, 1988, typc
script in thc authors lcs.
Sccuritys group command hcadquartcrs. Saord phoncd 8riggs
and askcd him to comc to his o cc.
vcn though thc war was ovcr and thc ]CC was rcvcaling a
grcat dcal about MAG!C, 8riggs was still sccurity conscious. Hc
kncw that thc prcss was trying to discrcdit Saord as thc onc pcr
son who continucd to insist that thc Vinds Codc xccutc had
bccn rcccivcd before thc ]apancsc attack and that it had indicatcd
war with thc Unitcd Statcs and Grcat 8ritain. Nonc ol thc pcr
sons who, Saord claimcd, had sccn thc mcssagc on cccmbcr 4
or 5 had comc lorward to support his position.
8ccausc ol sccurity considcrations, 8riggs was rcluctant to
talk. Howcvcr, whcn Saord showcd him somc ol thc inlorma
tion hc had lound, 8riggs bcgan to lccl that this man kncw what
hc was talking about. Hc rcalizcd Saord dcspcratcly nccdcd
support. 8riggs wantcd to hclp. Tc two mcn mct scvcral timcs.
8riggs told Saord hc had pickcd up thc Vinds Codc xccutc
in Morsc codc.
4
Saord askcd 8riggs il hc would bc willing to
tcstily bclorc thc ]CC. Ycs, hc rcplicd, !d bc glad to.
Somc timc altcr that mccting, Captain ]ohn S. Harpcr, thc
commanding o ccr ol thc Naval Sccurity station to which
8riggs was thcn assigncd, summoncd 8riggs to his o cc. 8riggs
dcscribcd Captain Harpcr latcr as vcry much chainolcommand
oricntcd, strictly a linc o ccr. Hc wantcd strict dccorum, rcgula
tion unilorm at all timcs, nonc ol this running round in public
with hats o as mcn did in thc Army and Air Forcc. Hc was a
gungho o ccr in all rcspccts.
Harpcr conlrontcd 8riggs.
! undcrstand that you havc bccn sccing Captain Saord.
Tats right.
4
Captain L.F. Saord, Cryptolog, 4:2, cccmbcr 7, 1982.
n what authority: Harpcr askcd. !m thc commanding
o ccr ol this station. Yct, ! had no knowlcdgc ol that mccting.
Vhy didnt you inlorm mc:
Vhy, ! didnt know you nccdcd to know, Captain.
Harpcr continucd: !t is my undcrstanding that hc has askcd
you to tcstily.
Ycs, thats right.
Vcll, lor your inlormation, Harpcr said, you arc not to tcs
tily. ! cant givc you thc rcasons at this timc, but somc day youll
undcrstand why. . . . ! know you must bc intcrcstcd in hclping
Captain Saord but at this point in timc too much damagc
has alrcady bccn donc. Much too much has bccn rcvcalcd. !
want you to undcrstand that you arc not to tcstily and thats it!
! dont want you to mcct with Captain Saord anymorc. o
you undcrstand:
8riggs was shockcd, shakcn up. 8ut hc obcycd Harpcrs ordcrs,
hc lclt hc had to. Hc assumcd Saord must havc contactcd somc
body on thc committcc, suggcstcd 8riggs as a potcntial witncss,
and told whcrc hc could bc locatcd. Vhcn 8riggs got back to his
o cc, hc phoncd Saord. At rst, Saord grcctcd his announcc
mcnt with stunncd silcncc. Tcn hc said, Vcll, !m sorry to hcar
that.
5

Howcvcr, 8riggs had supplicd Saord with thc conrmation
hc had bccn sccking lor so long, thc ]apancsc had actually implc
mcntcd bclorc thc attack thc lalsc wcathcr rcport ast Vind
Rain, indicating troublc ol somc sort, possibly war, with thc
Unitcd Statcs as wcll as with ngland. 8ut Saord rcalizcd that
hc wouldnt bc ablc to usc 8riggss namc.
5
uotations as rcportcd by 8riggs in 8cttina 8icn Grcavcss 1988 intcrvicw.

Vhcn thc committcc rcconvcncd on ]anuary 14, 1946, thcrc
wcrc still scvcral important witncsscs to bc hcardnotably Short
and Kimmcl, Saord, and thc Army and Navy couricrs Kramcr
and 8ratton, rcspcctivcly.
Ab:iv~i Husn~xb . Ki::vi
Uvox Avvoix):vx) ~s CixC 8vcixs
Rv~byixc Fivv) vov V~v
Kimmcl was thc lcado witncss altcr thc ncw lcgal sta took
ovcr. Hc bcgan by rcading a prcparcd statcmcnt to thc commit
tcc. Hc said hc rcalizcd thc cct was vulncrablc at Pcarl Harbor,
but hc had acccptcd thc dccision as an historical lact.
6

Tc cct was not thcn rcady lor war. So, Kimmcl said, hc sct
out through an intcnsivc training program to makc it rcady.
7

As notcd, thcrc wcrc shortagcs in Hawaii ol plancs, cspccially
lor rcconnaissancc and longrangc attack, shortagcs also ol planc
crcws and ol antiaircralt guns.
8
Kimmcl visitcd Vashington in
]unc 1941 and discusscd thc mattcr with Stark. Hc also had somc
convcrsations on thc subjcct with thc prcsidcnt, who was lully
cognizant ol thc problcm.
9
8y that timc thc cct had bccn sub
stantially wcakcncd by thc shilt to thc Atlantic ol a largc con
tingcnt ol ships, about onc quartcr ol thc cct. Kimmcl told thc
committcc hc lclt that a strong Pacic Flcct was a rcal dctcr
rcnt to ]apan, but that a wcakcr |cct| might bc an invitation
to attack.
10
According to his statcmcnt, Kimmcl had argucd
6
7
!bid., p. 2499.
8
!bid., pp. 2720, 2722.
9
!bid., p. 2719.
10
!bid., p. 2565. Scc also part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark,
Scptcmbcr 12, 1941.
vchcmcntly against still lurthcr translcrs, and in that hc had
prcvailcd.
11

Kimmcls dilcmma, givcn thc situation, had bccn to dccidc
how bcst to cmploy thc ccts limitcd ships, plancs, antiaircralt
guns, ammunition, othcr cquipmcnt and supplics, as wcll as his
mcn so as to lulll his scvcral rcsponsibilitics. Undcr qucstion
ing by thc committccs lcgal sta Kimmcl again rcvicwcd thc
situation that laccd him as commandcr ol thc Pacic Flcctnot
only thc shortagcs ol mcn and supplics but also thc conicting
and conlusing intclligcncc hc had rcccivcd, thc nccd to dcvclop
a traincd lorcc ol ghting mcn, and thc di culty ol rcconcil
ing Vashingtons rccommcndations lor still lurthcr rcductions in
cct strcngth with his instructions to prcparc lor ocnsivc action
as callcd lor undcr thc war plan, VPL46.
Kimmcl said hc had writtcn CN Stark and Chicl ol thc
8urcau ol Navigation Nimitz again and again ol thc dangcrous
conditions crcatcd by thc shortagc ol qualicd aviators and thc
continucd dctachmcnt ol qualicd o ccrs and cnlistcd mcn
nccdcd il thc cct wcrc to rcach thc high statc ol c cicncy
dcmandcd by a campaign. Hc could not sparc any considcrablc
numbcr ol qualicd o ccrs lrom thc Flcct without assuming an
cnormous risk.
12
vcry action has its cost, ol coursc. Tc trans
lcr ol ships to thc Atlantic in mid1941 rcduccd thc strcngth ol
thc Pacic Flcct. Passing 26 817s, thc plancs most suitablc lor
rcconnaissancc,
13
through Hawaii on thcir way to thc Philippincs,
outtting thcm with crcws, guns and ammunition, did not improvc
Pcarl Harbors rcconnaissancc capabilitics, at timcs it cvcn rcduccd
thcm as, Short tcsticd latcr, Hawaii had had to rclinquish somc
ol its own 817s lor thc bcnct ol thc Philippincs.
14
Nimitz had
11
!bid., part 6, p. 2505.
12
!bid., p. 2499, Kimmcl lcttcr to Nimitz, Fcbruary 16, 1941.
13
!bid., p. 2731.
14
!bid., part 7, pp. 2970, 3203.
warncd Kimmcl (March 3, 1941) that thc cnactmcnt ol lcnd
lcasc would makc thc supply situation still worsc, it would bring
about an cnormousalmost astronomicaldcmand lor ord
nancc supplics lor thc 8ritish Navy and Allics.
15
As a mattcr ol
lact, 1,900 plancs wcrc scnt abroad lrom Fcbruary 1 to cccmbcr
1, 1941 (about 1,750 ol thcm going to thc 8ritish), and 1,900
antiaircralt guns wcrc distributcd undcr lcndlcasc (somc 1,500
ol thcm going to thc 8ritish). Tat mcant 1,900 lcwcr plancs and
1,900 lcwcr antiaircralt guns availablc to improvc Pcarl Harbors
dclcnscs.
16

Ki::vis v~v)n ov !xvov:~)iox
Kimmcl may havc lound it di cult to obtain clcar instruc
tions and to procurc thc mcn and matcricl nccdcd to build thc
cct to ghting strcngth, but probably his chicl complaint was
lack ol inlormation. !n his dual capacity as thc commandcr in
chicl ol thc Unitcd Statcs Flcct and thc commandcr in chicl ol
thc Pacic Flcct, hc said hc lclt hc was cntitlcd to cvcry scrap ol
inlormation thcy had in Vashington. !t nccd not havc bccn sup
plicd in lull, hc said, it could havc bccn scnt in summarizcd lorm.
8ut hc lclt hc was cntitlcd to all thc csscntial inlormation which
had to do with thc Pacic situation.
17
According to Kimmcl, hc
had rcccivcd during ]uly 1941 at lcast scvcn dispatchcs quoting
intcrccptcd ]apancsc mcssagcs. As a mattcr ol lact, hc had bccn
givcn thc imprcssion that thcy were scnding him all thc impor
tant inlormation availablc. Yct littlc or nonc ol thc inlormation
glcancd lrom latcr intcrccpts was lurnishcd Kimmcl.
18

15
!bid., part 6 pp. 2499500, Nimitz March 3, 1941, lcttcr to Kimmcl.
16
!bid., part 10, pp. 487375, Var cpartmcnt Fcbruary 14, 1946 mcmo
randum lurnishcd thc ]oint Congrcssional Committcc at rcqucst ol Scth V.
Richardson, gcncral counscl.
17
!bid., part 6, p. 2628.
18
!bid., p. 2540.
Kimmcl had tricd to imprcss on thc Navy cpartmcnt that
what hc nccdcd out thcrc was inlormation . . . inlormation upon
which to basc my actions. Hc had rccognizcd thc vulncrability
ol thc cct largcly duc to thc lact that wc had only onc basc |at
Pcarl Harbor| and to thc limitations ol lucl and othcr things.
Furthcr, hc had hopcd and bclicvcd that thc inlormation would
comc . . . in timc to at lcast allcviatc thc situation. Having pointcd
out thc problcm, hc said, hc acccptcd thc risks.
19

Latcr whcn qucstioning Kimmcl, Rcprcscntativc Gcarhart
agrccd that, rathcr than bcing a dctcrrcnt, kccping thc cct at
Pcarl Harbor had actually provcd to bc a dircct invitation to
thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt to comc thcrc and put our cct out
ol commission. !l it had bccn stationcd on thc wcst coast, as
Richardson had rccommcndcd, thc addcd distancc would havc
madc a ]apancsc attack morc di cult. Morcovcr, thc wcstcoast
location, with a land mass on onc sidc, would havc simplicd thc
task ol rcconnaissancc, U.S. air patrols would havc had to survcy
only a radius ol 180, not 360 as in Hawaii.
20

Altcr rccciving thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning and thc
Novcmbcr 29 noticc dcscribing thc practical cnd ol U.S.]apancsc
ncgotiations, Kimmcl said hc rcccivcd no lurthcr ncws lrom
Vashington on thc rclations bctwccn thc two countrics and was
lclt to rcad public |ncwspapcr| accounts ol lurthcr convcrsa
tions bctwccn thc Statc cpartmcnt and thc ]apancsc cmissar
ics in Vashington which |in contradiction ol thc Vashington
mcssagcs| indicatcd that ncgotiations had bccn rcsumcd.
21

Hc also said that bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and thc attack, thcrc
was in Vashington a rising intcnsity in thc crisis in ]apancsc
19
!bid., pp. 271819.
20
!bid., pp. 284849.
21
!bid., p. 2548.
Unitcd Statcs rclations apparcnt in thc intcrccptcd dispatchcs.
22

Hc itcmizcd somc ol thc dispatchcs hc had not sccn at thc timc
but had sincc lcarncd about. For instancc, thcrc was thc intcrccpt
conccrning thc conccalcd ]apancsc plans which automatically
wcnt into ccct on Novcmbcr 29.
23
Tc Navy cpartmcnt had
also known, Kimmcl said, ol thc lalsc wcathcr broadcast, ast
Vind Rain, indicating a brcak in ]apancscU.S. rclations.
24
Hc
citcd scvcral intcrccpts that had bccn pickcd up, dccodcd, and
translatcd during this pcriod asking thc ]apancsc consulatc
in Hawaii lor inlormation on thc bcrthings ol ships in Pcarl
Harbor.
25
Tcsc intcrccpts, Kimmcl said, wcrc only somc ol
thc signicant indications ol crisis that had bccn availablc in
Vashington bctwccn Novcmbcr 27 and cccmbcr 7.
Vhcn qucstioning Kimmcl, Gcarhart quotcd a twopart
Tokyo8crlin mcssagc ol Novcmbcr 30 that had bccn intcr
ccptcd, dccryptcd, and translatcd, and that had bccn availablc
in Vashington on cccmbcr 1. !n that mcssagc ]apan rcassurcd
Gcrmany that thc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt adamantly stuck to thc
TriPartitc Alliancc as thc corncrstonc ol its national policy. Tc
Unitcd Statcs had takcn thc stand, Tokyo told 8crlin in part onc
ol this dispatch, that
As long as thc mpirc ol ]apan was in alliancc with Gcrmany
and !taly, thcrc could bc no maintcnancc ol lricndly rclations
bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd Statcs. . . . |!|t has bccomc
gradually morc and morc clcar that thc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt
could no longcr continuc ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs.
!t bccamc clcar, too, that a continuation ol ncgotiations would
incvitably bc dctrimcntal to our causc.
22
!bid.
23
!bid., p. 2547.
24
!bid., p. 2549.
25
!bid., p. 2547.
!n part two ol this dispatch, Tokyo told 8crlin that onc
particular clausc in thc notc thc Unitcd Statcs had handcd thc
]apancsc ambassadors on Novcmbcr 26 was cspccially insulting.
Tat clausc mcant in ccct that in casc thc Unitcd Statcs cntcrs
thc uropcan war at any timc thc ]apancsc mpirc will not bc
allowcd to givc assistancc to Gcrmany and !taly in accord with
thcir TriPartitc Alliancc.
Tis clausc alonc, lct alonc othcrs, makcs it impossiblc to nd
any basis in thc Amcrican proposal lor ncgotiations. Vhat is
morc, bclorc thc Unitcd Statcs brought lorth this plan, thcy
conlcrrcd with ngland, Australia, thc Ncthcrlands, and
Chinathcy did so rcpcatcdly. Tcrclorc, it is clcar that thc
Unitcd Statcs is now in collusion with thosc nations and has
dccidcd to rcgard ]apan, along with Gcrmany and !taly, as an
cncmy.
26

Kimmcl said thc Navy cpartmcnt had rcalizcd that thc high
point in thc crisis in ]apancscAmcrican aairs would bc rcachcd
whcn thc ]apancsc rcply to thc Amcrican notc ol Novcmbcr 26
was rcccivcd and thc cpartmcnt had bccn looking lor it cvcr
sincc that datc.
27

Ki::vis !xs)vuc)ioxs: C~vvy ou) V~v Pi~x 6
Starks Novcmbcr 27 war warning had adviscd Kimmcl
that
an aggrcssivc movc by ]apan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw
days. Tc numbcr and cquipmcnt ol ]apancsc troops and thc
organization ol naval task lorccs indicatcs an amphibious cxpc
dition against cithcr thc Philippincs Tai or Kra Pcninsula or
26
!bid., pp. 285455. Scc also ibid., part 12, pp. 20506, ]apancsc Mcssagc
#986.
27
!bid., part 6, p. 2549.
possibly 8ornco. xccutc an appropriatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt
prcparatory to carrying out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46.
28

Vashingtons attcntion was apparcntly locuscd on southcast
Asia, and Kimmcls attcntion was also dircctcd thcrc by this war
warning.
Kimmcl tcsticd that also on Novcmbcr 27, thc Navy
cpartmcnt suggcstcd that ! scnd lrom thc immcdiatc vicinity
ol Pcarl Harbor |to Vakc and Midway| thc carricrs ol thc cct
which constitutcd thc ccts main striking dclcnsc against an air
attack. Tat samc day, hc said, thc war and navy dcpartmcnts
suggcstcd that wc scnd lrom thc island ol ahu, 50 pcrccnt
ol thc Armys rcsourccs in pursuit plancs. . . . !n thcsc circum
stanccs no rcasonablc man in my position would considcr that
thc war warning was intcndcd to suggcst thc likclihood ol an
attack in thc Hawaiian arca.
29

Kimmcl lound his prcattack instructions most conlusing,
prcscnting him with a oont situation. Tc Novcmbcr 29
Navy mcssagc had told him that thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that
]apan commit thc rst ovcrt act. . . . |U|ndcrtakc such rccon
naissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary but thcsc
mcasurcs should bc carricd out so as not rcpcat not to alarm civil
population or disclosc intcnt. . . . Undcrtakc no ocnsivc action
until ]apan has committcd an ovcrt act.
30
Army Mcssagc #472 ol
Novcmbcr 27 had givcn similar instructions to Short.
31

Kimmcl cxplaincd:
28
!bid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy cpartmcnt ispatch 272337.
29
!bid., part 6, p. 2520.
30
!bid., part 14, p. 1407, CN Mcssagc #290110, datcd Novcmbcr 29, draltcd
Novcmbcr 28, 1941.
31
!bid., p. 1328, Army Mcssagc #472, Novcmbcr 27, 1941.
Tc Pacic Flcct was bascd in an arca containing ovcr 130,000
]apancsc, any onc ol whom could watch its movcmcnts. You
can apprcciatc thc psychological handicaps ordcrs ol this kind
placcd upon us. !n ccct, ! was told:
o takc prccautions.
o not alarm civilians.
o takc a prcparatory dcploymcnt.
o not disclosc intcnt.
o takc a dclcnsivc dcploymcnt.
o not commit thc rst ovcrt act.
nc last lcaturc ol thc socallcd war warning dispatch rcmains
to bc notcd. Tis is thc dircctivc with which it closcd:
xccutc an appropriatc dclcnsivc dcploymcnt prcparatory to
carry|ing| out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46.
Undcr VPL46, thc rst task ol thc Pacic Flcct was to support
thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs (8ritain, thc Ncthcrlands,
and thc Unitcd Statcs) in thc Far ast by divcrting cncmy
strcngth away lrom thc Malay barricr.
32

Tc Malay 8arricr was dcncd in VPL46 as thc Malay
Pcninsula, Sumatra, ]ava, and thc chain ol islands cxtcnding in
an castcrly dircction lrom ]ava to 8athurst !sland, Australia,
33
it
cncompasscd 8ornco, Ncw Guinca, thc Kra Pcninsula, thc Kra
!sthmus, which was a Malay Statc, and also 8ritish Singaporc.
34

According to Kimmcl,
Tc Navy cpartmcnt cmphasizcd this instruction |to divcrt
cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr| by rcpcating it
on Novcmbcr 29. Tc dispatch ol that datc dircctcd:
32
!bid., part 6, p. 2525.
33
!bid., part 18, pp. 2877941, xhibit No. 129, Navy 8asic Var Plan
Rainbow No. 5 (VPL46). Scc cspccially ibid., p. 2909.
34
!bid., part 6, p. 2864.
8c prcparcd to carry out thc tasks assigncd in VPL46 so lar
as thcy apply to ]apan in casc hostilitics occur.
Tus in two scparatc dispatchcs ! was ordcrcd by thc Navy
cpartmcnt to havc thc Pacic Flcct rcady to movc against thc
Marshalls upon thc cxpcctcd outbrcak ol war in thc Far ast.
Tis was a dctcrminativc lactor in thc most di cult and vital
dccisions ! had to makc thcrcaltcr. Tcrc was not a hint in thcsc
two dispatchcs ol any dangcr in thc Hawaiian arca.
35

n thc onc hand, Kimmcl had bccn instructcd to Undcrtakc
no ocnsivc action until ]apan has committcd an ovcrt act, that
is to sit and wait. And on thc othcr hand hc had bccn ordcrcd to
continuc prcparing to go on thc ocnsivc against thc ]apancsc in
thc Marshall !slandsas callcd lor in thc war plan.
Uxi)vb S)~)vs8vi)isn Miii)~vy Acvvv:vx)-
!n vicw ol this countrys policy ol coopcrating with thc 8ritish,
it was impcrativc that thc cld commandcrs bc adviscd ol any
U.S. agrccmcnts or commitmcnts that would involvc thcm and
thc military lorccs undcr thcm. uring thc months prcccding
thc attack, Kimmcl had qucstioncd Stark rcpcatcdly as to what
thc Unitcd Statcs would do and what Kimmcls rcsponsibilitics as
commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct would bc il thc ]apancsc
attackcd thc 8ritish and utch in southcast Asia without striking
U.S. tcrritory. To hclp him makc his own judgmcnts, hc prcsscd
Stark to kccp him postcd as to diplomatic and military aairs
accting thc situation.
n May 26, 1941, Kimmcl wrotc Stark:
Full and authoritativc knowlcdgc ol currcnt policics and objcc
tivcs, cvcn though ncccssarily latc at timcs, would cnablc thc
35
!bid., pp. 252526.
CommandcrinChicl, Pacic Flcct to modily, adapt, or cvcn
rcoricnt his possiblc courscs ol action to conlorm to currcnt
conccpts.
Hc askcd that hc bc immcdiatcly inlormcd ol all important
dcvclopmcnts as thcy occur and by thc quickcst sccurc mcans
availablc.
36

uring thc summcr ol 1941 altcr Gcrmany, 8ritains cncmy,
had attackcd thc U.S.S.R., which thcn bccamc 8ritains ncw ally,
thc conccrn bccamc whcthcr or not ]apan, Gcrmanys ally undcr
thc TriPartitc Alliancc, might attack Russias maritimc provinccs
on thc Asiatic coast wcst ol ]apan, just north ol Korca. Kimmcl
continucd to prcss Stark lor inlormation.
n ]uly 26 Kimmcl askcd spccically about thc U.S. attitudc
towards Russian participation in thc war. Vhat rolc il any would
thc Pacic Flcct havc to play
bctwccn thc U.S. and Russia il and whcn wc bccomc activc
participants. . . . (1) Vill ngland dcclarc war on ]apan il
]apancsc attack Maritimc Provinccs: (2) !l answcr to (1) is in
thc a rmativc, will wc activcly assist, as tcntativcly providcd in
casc ol attack on N..!. |Ncthcrlands ast !ndics| or |8ritish|
Singaporc: (3) !l answcr to (2) is in thc a rmativc, arc plans
bcing prcparcd lor joint action, mutual support, ctc.:
37

!n ctobcr Kimmcl lcarncd lrom a travclcr who had visitcd
Singaporc, Manila, ]ava, utch ast !ndics, Australia and Ncw
Zcaland that il ]apan attacks Russia thc 8ritish mpirc will
dcclarc war on ]apan. . . . |T|hc utch ast !ndics would lollow
Grcat 8ritain. n ctobcr 29, Kimmcl askcd Stark, !l thcy do
cmbark on such an advcnturc and 8ritain and thc utch ast
!ndics dcclarc war on ]apan, what will wc do:
38

36
!bid., part 16, p. 2238, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark, May 26, 1941.
37
!bid., pp. 223942.
38
!bid., p. 2251.
n Novcmbcr 7, Stark wrotc Kimmcl: Tings sccm to bc
moving stcadily towards a crisis in thc Pacic. ]ust whcn it will
brcak, no onc can tcll. Starks principal rcaction was that it
continually gcts worscr and worscr! A month may scc, litcrally,
most anything.
39

n Novcmbcr 14, Stark scnt Kimmcl a copy ol thc Novcmbcr
5 mcmorandum hc and Marshall had scnt thc prcsidcnt.
40
!n that
mcmorandum, Stark and Marshall had writtcn:
Tc only currcnt plans lor war against ]apan in thc Far ast
arc to conduct dclcnsivc war, in coopcration with thc 8ritish
and utch, lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Philippincs and thc 8ritish
and utch ast !ndics. . . . Var bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and
]apan should bc avoidcd whilc building up dclcnsivc lorccs in
thc Far ast, until such timc as ]apan attacks or dircctly thrcat
cns tcrritorics whose security to the United States is of very great
importance.
41

Tc closcst thing to a rcply that Kimmcl rcccivcd to his scv
cral rcqucsts lor inlormation as to how thc Unitcd Statcs would
rcspond il thc 8ritish and utch wcrc attackcd was Starks post
script to a Novcmbcr 25, 1941, lcttcr: Ncithcr |FR nor Hull|
would bc surpriscd ovcr a ]apancsc surprisc attack. From many
anglcs an attack on thc Philippincs would bc thc most cmbar
rassing thing that could happcn to us. Somc think such an attack
likcly, Stark said, but hc did not givc it thc wcight othcrs did.
Hc gcncrally hcld that it was not timc lor thc ]apancsc to pro
cccd against Russia. . . . |Rathcr hc lookcd| lor an advancc into
Tailand, !ndoChina, 8urma Road arca as thc most likcly. Hc
said hc wouldnt
39
!bid., part 33, p. 1360.
40
!bid., part 16, pp. 222021. Stark Novcmbcr 14, 1941, lcttcr, cnclosing copy
ol Marshall/Stark Novcmbcr 5, 1941, Mcmorandum lor thc Prcsidcnt (part
14, pp. 106162).
41
!bid., pp. 222223, italics addcd.
go into thc pros or cons ol what thc Unitcd Statcs may do. ! will
bc damncd il ! know. ! wish ! did. Tc only thing ! do know is
that wc may do most anything and thats thc only thing ! know
to bc prcparcd lor, or wc may do nothing! think it is morc
likcly to bc anything.
42

Latcr whcn Gcarhart qucstioncd Kimmcl, hc supportcd
Kimmcls rcasoning that Vashington cxpcctcd thc ]apancsc to
movc against thc Philippincs and/or southcast Asia, thousands ol
milcs wcst ol Hawaii. Gcarhart considcrcd this consistcnt with
thc jurisprudcntial intcrprctation ejusdem generis rulc, namcly
that A gcncral statcmcnt lollowcd by a spccic limitation, always
limits thc intcrprctation in thc courts to thc things ol thc samc
charactcr ol thc spccic things mcntioncd.
43
!n othcr words, thc
gcncral statcmcnt in thc Novcmbcr 27 war warning to thc ccct
that an aggrcssivc movc by ]apan is cxpcctcd within thc ncxt lcw
days was limitcd by thc spccic statcmcnt that lollowcd indicat
ing an amphibious cxpcdition against cithcr thc Philippincs Tai
or Kra pcninsula or possibly 8ornco.
44

Ki::vi H~b 8vvx Toib Li))iv ov No)nixc
vv U.S.8vi)isn Miii)~vy Acvvv:vx)s ~xb
]~v~xvsv Tnvv~) ix Sou)nv~s) P~civic
Tc U.S. Pacic Flccts task undcr thc war plan was to sup
port thc lorccs ol thc Associatcd Powcrs, i.c., thc Unitcd Statcs,
thc 8ritish Commonwcalth, and thcir allics, in thc Far ast by
divcrting cncmy strcngth away lrom thc Malay 8arricr,
45
thc
42
!bid., part 16, pp. 222425.
43
!bid., part 6, p. 2858.
44
!bid., p. 2857. Gcarhart quotcs lrom thc Navys Novcmbcr 27 war warning
(!bid., part 14, p. 1406), NC #272337.
45
!bid., part 18, pp. 28752941, xhibit 129, Navy 8asic Var PlanRainbow
No. 5 (VPL46). For U.S. Pacic Flccts task, scc chaptcr !!. Scction 1, Task
a.
imaginary linc connccting thc Malay Pcninsula, via Sumatra, ]ava,
and thc various islands to thc cast cxtcnding to 8athurst !sland,
just o thc northccntral coast ol Australia. Vhcn Fcrgusons
turn camc to qucstion Kimmcl, thc scnator dcvotcd most ol
thc timc to trying to nd out whcthcr inlormation availablc in
Vashington had bccn rclaycd to him, what thc Unitcd Statcs
intcrcst in thc Malay 8arricr was, and what commitmcnts, il any,
thc Unitcd Statcs may havc madc to thc 8ritish and utch.
Vhcn Fcrguson qucstioncd Kimmcl hc summarizcd Turncrs
carlicr ]CC tcstimony on thc situation in thc wcstcrn Pacic.
Turncr (Navy Var Plans) had said that hc
bclicvcd that wc would bc attackcd, dcnitcly . . . |i|n thc
Philippincs and il wc wcrc attackcd in thc Philippincs ! kncw it
would bc war. ! thought it would bc war il wc wcrc not attackcd,
! thought it would bc war il thcy attackcd thc 8ritish and thc
utch, but thcrc would havc bccn somc dclays possibly.
Fcrguson said,
!n othcr words, il thcy |thc ]apancsc| attackcd thc 8ritish and
thc utch alonc you thought it mcant war and |you madc| a
distinction that il thcy attackcd thc utch, thc 8ritish, and thc
Amcricans at thc Philippincs it did mcan war.
Turncr had agrccd with Fcrgusons summary.
46

Ferguson: |V|crc you awarc that Admiral Turncr had
inlormcd thc ]apancsc Ambassador . . . ]uly 23 or 24, that thc
Unitcd Statcs would not tolcratc, in vicw ol its policy ol aiding
8ritain and its intcrprctation ol sclldclcnsc, a ]apancsc thrcat
to thc Malay 8arricr:
46
!bid., part 4, p. 2044, italics addcd.
Kimmel: ! did not know that hc had madc any such
statcmcnts.
47

Ferguson: Now il you would havc had that inlormation in rcla
tion to Admiral Turncrs convcrsation . . . ncvcr disputcd as lar
as Turncr was conccrncd and hc was ncvcr callcd on thc carpct,
or it was ncvcr takcn up with him that hc was wrong . . . il you
had known ol that would you thcn havc known thc policy ol
Amcrica in casc ol an attack upon thc Malay 8arricr:
Kimmel: !t would havc bccn most hclplul to mc and il ! had
known all thc circumstanccs and thc lact that that was thc pol
icy ol thc Govcrnmcnt, ycs, it would havc hclpcd immcnscly.
48

Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you cvcr told that Admiral Stark was
callcd to thc Vhitc Housc by thc prcsidcnt on ]uly 24 and
that thcn hc hcard a statcmcnt by thc prcsidcnt to ]apan to thc
ccct . . . that il ]apan attcmptcd to gct utch oil by lorcc, thc
8ritish and utch would ght and thcrc would thcn rcsult a
most scrious situation bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apan:
Kimmel: ! dont rcmcmbcr cvcr having bccn inlormcd ol that
convcrsation. . . . No, sir.
49

Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you adviscd that rcsponsiblc lcadcrship
was intcrccpting sccrct ]apancsc mcssagcs whcrcin thc ]apancsc
Ambassador was advising his Govcrnmcnt that it must cxpcct
armcd opposition lrom Grcat 8ritain and thc Unitcd Statcs
should ]apan movc against thc Malay 8arricr:
Kimmel: ! was ncvcr inlormcd ol that.
50

47
!bid., part 6, p. 2866.
48
!bid., p. 2867, scc Turncr tcstimony rc his ]uly 21, 1941 convcrsation with
Nomura, ibid., part 4, pp. 204142.
49
!bid., part 6, p. 2867. Scc also cpartmcnt ol Statc, Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941 (Vashington, .C.:
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 52728.
50
Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you awarc lrom your own judgmcnt,
likc Admiral Stark and Admiral Turncr havc statcd hcrc, that
AngloutchAmcrican cmbargocs on ]apan oil supplics,
rcgardlcss ol thcir justication lor such cmbargocs, constitutcd
an actual and a logical causc ol war with ]apan:
Kimmel: Vcll, ! thought that thc cmbargocs would irritatc
]apan considcrably and ! kncw about thc cmbargocs.
Ferguson: Vcll, did you think it would irritatc thcm cnough,
as has bccn statcd by Admiral Stark, that wc should havc antic
ipatcd war ovcr that:
Kimmel: Not ncccssarily, no.
51

Ferguson: Vcll, now, wcrc you adviscd that on August 17, whcn
thc prcsidcnt rcturncd lrom thc Atlantic conlcrcncc |with
Churchill|, that thc prcsidcnt callcd thc ]apancsc Ambassador
to thc Vhitc Housc and told him in diplomatic languagc, and
it was rathcr blunt and in writing, that a ]apancsc thrcat or
show ol lorcc against thc Malay 8arricr or any movcmcnt in
thc Pacic would compcl thc Unitcd Statcs immcdiatcly to
takc any and all stcps ncccssary to protcct our rights:
Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not know about that.
52

Ferguson: Now, did that task |divcrting cncmy strcngth away
lrom thc Malay 8arricr as prcscribcd in thc U.S. war plan|
dcpcnd upon your rst knowing that Amcrica was in thc war
by virtuc ol an attack or dcclaration ol war:
Kimmel: !t did. ! had no authority to act until ! rcccivcd dc
nitc word lrom my Govcrnmcnt. . . . Had thc ]apancsc madc an
attack on thc Kra Pcninsula, had thcy madc an attack on ]ava,
51
!bid.
52
!bid., p. 2867. Scc also cpartmcnt ol Statc, Japan, 19311941, ral Statc
mcnt Handcd by Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt to thc ]apancsc Ambassador (Nomura)
on August 17, 1941, pp. 55657.
! would havc bccn unablc to do anything until ! got ordcrs to
movc.
53

n Scptcmbcr 11, 1941, Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt had issucd a
shootonsight ordcr to U.S. Navy ships aimcd at Gcrman ships
and submarincs opcrating within arcas in thc Atlantic considcrcd
vital to Amcrican dclcnsc. Kimmcl notcd that similar ordcrs
had bccn issucd thc Southcast Pacic Forcc lor surface raidcrs
cast ol 100 wcst, that is, about 700 milcs o thc wcstcrn coast
ol South Amcrica. Kimmcl wrotc Stark on Scptcmbcr 12 asking
whcthcr this shootonsight ordcr applicd also to thc rcst ol thc
Pacic.
54

Tc thrcat ol ]apancsc action, Kimmcl wrotc,
couplcd with currcnt rumors ol U.S.]apancsc rapproachcmcnt
|sic| and thc abscncc ol any spccic rclcrcncc to thc Pacic in
thc prcsidcnts spccch, lcavcs mc in somc doubt as to just what
my situation out hcrc is.
Kimmcl askcd Stark spccically,
Vhat ordcrs to shoot should bc issucd lor arcas othcr than
Atlantic and Southcast Pacic subarcas: Tis is particularly
pcrtincnt to our prcscnt cscorts lor ships procccding to thc Far
ast. So lar, my ordcrs to thcm havc bccn to protcct thcir con
voy lrom intcrlcrcncc, to avoid usc ol lorcc il possiblc, but to
usc it il ncccssary. Tcsc ordcrs, at lcast by implication, prccludc
taking thc ocnsivc. Shouldnt ! now changc thcm to dircct
ocnsivc mcasurcs against Gcrman and !talian raidcrs:
53
54
!bid., part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl Scptcmbcr 12, 1941, lcttcr to Stark.
8ccausc ol thc dclicatc naturc ol our prcscnt Pacic rclations,
Kimmcl lclt Stark was thc only onc who can answcr this
qucstion.
55

Kimmcl had also askcd what to do about submarinc contacts
o Pcarl Harbor and thc vicinity. His ordcrs at that timc wcrc
to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unlcss you arc in thc dclcn
sivc sca arca. Should wc now bomb contacts, without waiting to
bc attackcd:
56

!n his lcttcr Kimmcl cxprcsscd lcar that FRs cmphasis
on thc Atlantic might lcad to a possiblc lurthcr wcakcning ol
this Flcct. A strong Pacic Flcct is unqucstionably a dctcrrcnt to
]apana wcakcr onc may bc an invitation to attack. 8clorc thc
]CC Kimmcl tcsticd that hc bclicvcd thc maintcnancc ol thc
status quo in thc Pacic was
almost cntircly a mattcr ol thc strcngth ol this Flcct. !t must
|not| bc rcduccd, and, in thc cvcnt ol actual hostilitics, must bc
incrcascd il wc arc to undcrtakc a bold ocnsivc. . . . Until wc
can kccp a lorcc hcrc strong cnough to mcct thc ]apancsc Flcct
wc arc not sccurc in thc Pacicand thc Pacic is still vcry
much a part ol thc world situation.
57

Fcrguson askcd Kimmcl whcthcr hc had known that thc
]apancsc ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs, thc ]apancsc lorcign
ministcr, and ]apancsc prcss had indicatcd that thcy cxpcctcd thc
Unitcd Statcs to procccd in thc Pacic as it had in thc Atlantic
with a shootonsight ordcr. Kimmcl said hc had ncvcr hcard
anything to that ccct. As a mattcr ol lact, bccausc ol thc cor
rcspondcncc hc had had to thc ccct that wc did not want to
tacklc two wars at oncc, hc had gottcn thc imprcssion that thc
55
!bid. Scc also part 6, p. 2861, Kimmcl tcstimony.
56
!bid., part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to Stark.
57
!bid., part 6, pp. 282324. Scc also part 16, pp. 224849, Kimmcl lcttcr to
Stark.
govcrnmcnt wantcd to connc thc war to thc Atlantic, wc did
not want to go into thc Pacic. Hc thought thc Unitcd Statcs
was doing all it could to kccp out ol war in thc Pacic. Prior to
cccmbcr 7 hc had not bclicvcd that war was immincnt. . . . or
that wc wcrc in any way lorcing thc war. So hc had not consid
crcd that thc ]apancsc would cxpcct us to takc any such action in
thc Pacic as had bccn takcn in thc Atlantic.
58

n Scptcmbcr 23, 1941, Stark rcplicd to Kimmcl. For thc
prcscnt, hc wrotc, thc prcsidcnt has issucd shooting ordcrs only
lor thc Atlantic and Southcast Pacic subarca. Tc situation in
thc Pacic gcncrally, Stark said, is lar dicrcnt lrom what it is in
thc Atlantic. Kimmcls cxisting ordcrs to cscorts arc appropriatc
undcr thc prcscnt situation. Tcy arc also in accordancc with Art.
723 U.S. Navy Rcgulations: no ordcrs should bc givcn to shoot at
thc Prcscnt Timc, othcr than thosc clcarly sct lorth in this articlc.
. . . Art.723, U.S.N.R. rcads as lollows:
Tc usc ol lorcc against a lorcign and lricndly statc or against
anyonc within thc tcrritorics thcrcol, is illcgal.
Tc right ol scllprcscrvation, howcvcr, is a right which bclongs
to Statcs as wcll as to individuals, and in thc casc ol Statcs it
includcs thc protcction ol thc Statc, its honor, and its posscs
sions, and thc livcs and propcrty ol its citizcns against arbitrary
violcncc, actual or impcnding.
Stark talkcd with Hull bclorc scnding this lcttcr and addcd a
postscript. Hull askcd that thc lcttcr bc hcld vcry sccrct. Stark
summcd up Hulls commcnts by saying that conversations with
the Japs have practically reached an impasse, and Stark could scc
no chancc lor a scttlcmcnt and pcacc in thc Far ast until and
58
!bid., part 6, pp. 288182.
unlcss thcrc is somc agrccmcnt bctwccn ]apan and Chinaand
just now that sccms rcmotc.
59

8y this timc, thc ]apancsc wcrc rapidly complcting with
drawal lrom world shipping routcs.
60
Tc Unitcd Statcs also
issucd ordcrs to ships to avoid arcas whcrc thcy might cncountcr
]apancsc ships. n ctobcr 16, 1941, all U.S. mcrchant ships,
61

and on ctobcr 17, 1941, all U.S.ag shipping
62
wcrc dircctcd
to kccp to thc southward through thc Torrcs Straits bctwccn thc
northcrn coast ol Australia and thc southcrn shorcs ol thc island
ol Ncw Guinca, and to kccp wcll clcar ol rangc | ]apancsc|
mandatcs taking maximum advantagc ol utch and Australian
patrollcd arcas. 8y ctobcr 23, ships carrying U.S. Army and
Navy troops and military cargo wcrc bcing cscortcd both ways
bctwccn Honolulu and Manila.
63

n Novcmbcr 5, 1941, Marshall and Stark had scnt a joint
mcmorandum to thc prcsidcnt. Tcrc thcy admittcd that thc U.S.
Flcct in thc Pacic was thcn inlcrior to thc ]apancsc Flcct and
cannot undcrtakc an unlimitcd stratcgic ocnsivc in thc Vcstcrn
Pacic. To do so
it would havc to bc strcngthcncd by withdrawing practically
all naval vcsscls lrom thc Atlantic cxccpt thosc assigncd to
local dclcnsc lorccs. . . . Tc rcsult ol withdrawals lrom thc
Atlantic ol Naval and mcrchant strcngth might wcll causc thc
Unitcd Kingdom to losc thc 8attlc ol thc Atlantic in thc ncar
luturc. . . . Tc only currcnt plans lor war against ]apan in thc
Far ast arc to conduct dclcnsivc war, in coopcration with thc
59
!bid., part 16, pp. 221213, Starks Scptcmbcr 23, 1941, lcttcr to Kimmcl.
60
!bid., part 14, p. 1401, PNA\ August 14, 1941, ispatch #142155 to
C!NCAF, C!NCPAC, C!NCLANT.
61
!bid., part 14, p. 1402, CN ctobcr 16, 1941, ispatch #162300.
62
!bid., p. 1403, PNA\ ctobcr 17, 1941, Mcssagc #162258 to thc Philip
pincs, C!NCAF CM.12.
63
!bid., p. 1403, PNA\ ctobcr 23, 1941 Mcssagc #222250 to commandcrs
ol Pcarl Harbor, Manila, and San Francisco Naval istricts.
8ritish and utch, lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Philippincs and thc
8ritish and utch ast !ndics. Tc Philippincs arc now bcing
rcinlorccd.
Marshall and Stark rca rmcd that thc basic military pol
icics and stratcgy agrccd to in thc Unitcd Statcs8ritish Sta
Convcrsations rcmain sound. Tc primary objcctivc ol thc two
nations is thc dclcat ol Gcrmany.
!n this mcmorandum Marshall and Stark urgcd that war
bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs and ]apan should bc avoidcd whilc
building up dclcnsivc lorccs in thc Far ast, until such timc as
]apan attacks or dircctly thrcatcns tcrritorics whosc sccurity to
thc Unitcd Statcs is ol vcry grcat importancc. Stark and Marshall
closcd with a clcar and unmistakablc joint rccommcndation:
Tat no ultimatum bc dclivcrcd to ]apan.
64

n Novcmbcr 18 Kimmcl was adviscd that |u|ntil intcrna
tional conditions on and subscqucnt to 25 Nov. bccomc dcncd
and claricd . . . any lurthcr dircct or grcat circlc routing bctwccn
Hawaii and Philippincs should not rcpcat not bc uscd. And hc
was authorizcd to placc a utch ship, Bloemfontein, in a convoy
with Amcricanag vcsscls.
65

Ferguson: o you know why thcy uscd thc datc thcrc subsc
qucnt to Novcmbcr 25: . . . id you cvcr know that wc had
a mcssagc that wc intcrccptcd lrom thc ]aps showing that thc
dcad linc |sic| datc |lor thc ]apancsc ambassadors to complctc
thcir ncgotiations with thc Unitcd Statcs| was thc 25th ol
Novcmbcr:
64
!bid., part 16, pp. 222223, Marshall/Stark Novcmbcr 5, 1941, mcmorandum
to FR. Copy scnt Kimmcl with Starks lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 14, 1941 (!bid.,
part 16, pp. 222021, scc also pp. 222223).
65
!bid., part 14, p. 1404, PNA\ Novcmbcr 18, 1941 Mcssagc #181705.
Kimmel: No, sir, ! ncvcr had anything likc that. . . . ! do not
know what Novcmbcr 25 mcant, but ! was conccrncd . . . with
thc ordcrs ! rcccivcd to put thc Bloemfontein in thc convoy with
Amcricanag vcsscls. . . .
Ferguson: o you think thc lact that wc put that ship into our
convoy would indicatc that wc wcrc taking parallcl action: id
you takc it as such:
Kimmel: My mcmory is not cntircly clcar, but ! think wc had
somc matricl, or pcrsonncl, or somcthing on this ship that wc
wantcd to gct through, on thc Bloemfontein. . . . ! do not rccall . . .
just what it was. n onc ol thcsc utch ships that wc uscd, wc
had somc icrs that wcrc going out to China.
66

Ferguson: Vcll, now, what kind ol an ordcr do you intcrprct
that |to put a utch ship in an Amcrican convoy| to bc:
Kimmel: Tc way ! intcrprct that ordcr is that you would go in
bctwixt an attacking lorcc and a Ncthcrlands ship and il thcy
shot at you. . . . Vhy, ! would probably shoot back.
Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, that would crcatc at lcast an incidcnt,
would it not, an intcrnational incidcnt:
Kimmel: Ycs, sir, it probably would.
Ferguson: And thcrc would bc littlc usc thcn ol talking about
thc rst ovcrt act, wouldnt thcrc:
Kimmel: Vcll, thc ]aps would havc shot rst.
Ferguson: ! scc. vcn though you would havc run bctwccn thc
mark that |thcy wcrc| shooting at and that wasnt our mark,
that did not bclong to this country, you would considcr undcr
thosc circumstanccs that thc ]ap shot rst:
66
!bid., part 6, p. 2878.
Kimmel: ! would havc to know all thc circumstanccs rst.
67

Fcrguson thcn askcd Kimmcl il hc had cvcr bccn adviscd
what thc task ol thc Pacic Flcct should bc in thc cvcnt ol an
outbrcak ol war in thc Pacic which did not involvc a ]apancsc
attack dircctly on Amcrican posscssions.
68
Tis was prcciscly
what Kimmcl had bccn trying to nd out lor somc timcwith
out succcss.
Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you lully awarc on Novcmbcr thc 27th
that thc ]apancsc had conccntratcd lor an attack upon thc
Malay barricr:
Kimmel: ! was so inlormcd. . . .
Ferguson: Vcll, wcrc you awarc that such an attack, cvcn thc
obvious prcparation lor it, was a dircct dcancc ol thc lormal
and cxplicit warning against such movcmcnt givcn by thc
Unitcd Statcs |August 17, altcr thc FRChurchill mccting
at Argcntia|:
Kimmel: ! did not know ol thc lormal and cxplicit warning
givcn by thc Unitcd Statcs.
69

Ferguson: You wcrc adviscd by Admiral Stark |Stark lcttcr ol
Novcmbcr 25| altcr hc had a conlcrcncc at thc Vhitc Housc
that hc was damncd il hc kncw what thc Unitcd Statcs was
going to do should ]apan attack thc Malay 8arricr without
at thc samc timc attacking posscssions ol thc Unitcd Statcs.
. . . Now, bctwccn thc datc ol that lcttcr and its rcccipt you
had bccn instructcd, had you not, to prcparc to attack thc
Marshalls altcr ]apan had committcd an ovcrt act against thc
Unitcd Statcs. . . . Now, in thc manncr ol ordinary naval strat
cgy, would thc ]apancsc cxpcct an attack by thc Pacic Flcct on
67
!bid., pp. 287778.
68
69
!bid., p. 2868.
thc Marshalls in thc cvcnt thc Unitcd Statcs should implcmcnt
its dircct and spccic warning to opposc a ]apancsc movcmcnt
against thc Malay 8arricr:
Kimmel: Ycs, ! think thcy probably would cxpcct attacks on
thc Marshalls.
70
Ferguson: id you know thcn that thc prcscncc ol this ]apancsc
lorcc bclorc thc approachcs to Singaporc rcquircd thc rcspon
siblc lcadcrship in Vashington to act immcdiatcly or to back
down lrom thc lormcr position it had takcn with ]apan as ol
Sunday, August thc 17th, 1941:
Kimmel: No, sir, ! did not.
Ferguson: Vcll, il you had known that, would this lact that
thcy wcrc moving toward thc Kra Pcninsula |havc| madc a dil
lcrcncc with your action: . . . Vcll, . . . you had nothing bclorc
you, had you, that thc Unitcd Statcs Govcrnmcnt intcndcd to
back down lrom any stand or any policy that it had:
Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, il thc policy was such that wc should
havc anticipatcd that il thcy attackcd thc Kra Pcninsula it
would mcan war with Amcrica, should wc not havc thcn at thc
samc timc anticipatcd a coattack on Amcrica:
Kimmel: Tat would appcar to bc rcasonablc, ycs, sir.
Ferguson: Vcll, do you know why no onc sccms to havc antic
ipatcd that il thcy attackcd thc Kra Pcninsula thcy would not
also attack Amcrica at thc samc timc:
Kimmel: No, sir, ! do not.
70
!bid., pp. 286970. For Starks Novcmbcr 25, 1941, lcttcr, scc part 16, pp.
222325.
Ferguson: Vcll, at any timc altcr Novcmbcr thc 25th, 1941,
did thc chicl ol naval opcrations, that is Admiral Stark, advisc
you that instcad ol bcing damncd il hc kncw what thc Unitcd
Statcs was going to do in thc cvcnt that ]apan attackcd thc
Malay barricr altcr bypassing Amcrican positions, hc did
know what thc Unitcd Statcs was going to do: You scc, hc
wrotc you that lcttcr on thc 25th.
Kimmel: !l hc had inlormcd mc that hc kncw what thc Unitcd
Statcs was going to do and what thcy wcrc going to do, it would
havc bccn ol grcat assistancc to mc.
71

Ferguson: id you know that thc prcsidcnt by dircct ordcr
|PNA\ mcssagc cccmbcr 2, 7 p.m. Vashington timc,
to C!NCAF, Hart, CinC, Asiatic Flcct, Philippincs
72
| had
ordcrcd thrcc ships to go into thc Gull ol Siam or o thc Coast
ol China to watch lor this | ]apancsc convoy| movcmcnt into
thc Kra Pcninsula:
73

Kimmcl said hc had known that thc commandcr in chicl ol
thc Asiatic |Flcct| had bccn ordcrcd to scnd somc plancs ovcr to
scout, but hc had not known about thc ships. Howcvcr, Kimmcl
thought that was a pcrlcctly natural thing to do il wc wantcd
to know what thc ]apancsc wcrc doing, . . . whcthcr thcy would
comc to thc Philippincs or not.
Fcrguson pointcd out that thc stations thc thrcc small vcsscls
wcrc to assumc, as spccicd in thc mcssagc wcrc locatcd wcll to
thc wcst ol thc Philippincs, almost dircctly in thc projcctcd paths
ol thc southbound ]apancsc convoys sightcd by our ovcrights.
According to thc mcssagc, thcy wcrc to obscrvc and rcport by
radio ]apancsc movcmcnts in wcst China Sca and Gull ol Siam.
71
!bid., part 6, p. 2874.
72
!bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ Mcssagc #012356 to C!NCAF.
73
!bid., p. 2872.
How would this tcll us, Fcrguson wantcd to know, whcthcr or not
thc ]apancsc wcrc coming to thc Philippincs:
Fcrguson pointcd out also that thc mcssagc spccicd that
thcsc thrcc small ships wcrc to comply with Minimum rcquirc
mcnts to cstablish idcntity as U.S. mcnolwar. Tc prcsidcnt
had cvcn givcn cxact instructions what that mcant: command
by a naval o ccr and to mount a small gun and 1 machinc gun
would su cc.
Ferguson: Now, il you had known ol this mcssagc ol thc prcsi
dcnt, lrom PNA\ to C!NCAF . . . would that havc indicatcd
to you an answcr to that qucstion as to what wc wcrc going to
do in casc ol an attack upon thc Malay Pcninsula:
Kimmel: !t would havc bccn usclul inlormation. !t would havc
still bccn short ol any authoritativc statcmcnt ol what our
intcntions wcrc.
74

Altcr rccciving on cccmbcr 3 Starks Novcmbcr 25 lcttcr
conccrning thc possibility ol a ]apancsc surprisc attackon thc
Philippincsor what was morc likcly, a ]apancsc advancc against
thc Tailand!ndochina8urmaRoad arca,
75
Kimmcl had ccr
tainly not visualizcd U.S. naval action in thc Pacic likc that in
thc Atlantic. Howcvcr, in his tcstimony Kimmcl had to admit
that, judging lrom thc intcrccpts Fcrguson was showing him, that
]apan might wcll havc cxpcctcd thc Unitcd Statcs to lollow its
Atlantic stratcgy il thc ]apancsc got into a war with ngland.
76

74
!bid., part 6, pp. 287273. Scc also part 5, pp. 219091 and 241617, Stark
tcstimony rc FRs rolc in ordcring thc dispatch ol thc thrcc small vcsscls and
thc cort to coordinatc with thc 8ritish and utch thc scarch to dctcrminc
whcrc thc ]apancsc wcrc aimingtoward thc Kra Pcninsula or thc utch
ast !ndics.
75
!bid., part 16, pp. 222325.
76
!bid., part 6, p. 2882.
Fcrguson callcd Kimmcls attcntion to a Statc cpartmcnt,
Far astcrn aairs division, documcnt ol cccmbcr 4, 1941,
which told ol thc 8ritish attcmpt to makc arrangcmcnts with
thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt to withdraw or cxchangc 8ritish and
]apancsc o cials and nationals in thc tcrritory ol thc othcr in
thc cvcnt ol 8ritish]apancsc hostilitics.
77
nc scntcncc in this
documcnt conccrncd whcthcr thc Unitcd Statcs should not also,
whilc wc arc not at war with ]apan, try to makc a similar agrcc
mcnt with thc ]apancsc. Fcrguson, rcading:
Such attcmpt might, at this timc, bc advisablc also in that
it would bc dcnitc indication to thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt
ol thc rmncss ol thc Amcrican position in thc prcscnt cri
sis and would bc onc mcans ol imprcssing upon thc ]apancsc
Govcrnmcnt thc scriousncss with which wc vicw thc prcscnt
situation.
Ferguson: Now, that bcing truc, that coaction thcrc would
indicatc to thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt that wc wcrc acting with
8ritain . . . shouldnt wc havc anticipatcd that il thcy attackcd
onc thcy would attack both:
Kimmel: ! think that is rcasonablc, ycs, sir.
Ferguson: All right. Now wc go to thc cnd |ol thc documcnt|
and it is signcd by M.M.H. who, ! undcrstand, is Maxwcll
M. Hamilton |chicl, division ol Far astcrn aairs| . . . and
thcy arc spcaking now about gctting |Amcrican| nationals out
ol ]apancsc tcrritory in China bclorc thc dcclaration ol war,
bclorc thc shooting starts, and ! will rcad:
As thc making ol such an approach would bc intcrprctcd by
thc Amcrican public as a dcnitc indication that this govcrn
mcnt cxpccts war bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd Statcs, thc
Sccrctary may wish to spcak to thc prcsidcnt in rcgard to thc
77
!bid., part 15, pp. 174143, xhibit 74A.
advisability ol this Govcrnmcnts making such an approach at
this timc.
Ferguson (continuing): Now, that is datcd on cccmbcr thc
4th, 1941. . . . Now, lrom all that you havc lcarncd, whcrcin
thc mcssagcs wcrc intcrccptcd, and was known in Vashington,
havc you any doubt that war was immincnt and that wc kncw
wc wcrc going to war:
Kimmel: ! havc no doubt, sir.
Ferguson: Vcll, thcn, did you gct this mcssagc . . . |indicating|
that wc did not want thc Amcrican public to know that wc
wcrc going to war:
Kimmel: ! rcccivcd no such mcssagc, no, sir. . . .
Ferguson: Vcll, you wcrc told . . . you wcrc to do nothing that
would arousc thc population ol Hawaii to indicatc that wc
wcrc going to war:
Kimmel: Tat was containcd in mcssagcs which camc to mc,
ycs, sir.
78

Ferguson: Now, would it bc corrcct to say that your rst and
your chicl objcctivc in thc cvcnt ol an Amcrican]apancsc war
was an attack upon thc Marshall !slands to divcrt thc ]apancsc
lrom thc Malayan barricr which compriscd vital posscssions ol
thc utch and thc 8ritish, who would bc our allics:
Kimmel: Ycs, sir. . . . Tat was il and whcn wc got into thc war.
Ferguson: Vcll, now, would thc attack on thc Marshalls
accomplish thc chicl purposc ol thc Amcrican war plan that
you thcn had, il that attack occurrcd altcr Singaporc had lallcn
to thc ]apancsc:
78
!bid., part 6, pp. 287576. Rcadings lrom Statc cpartmcnt cccmbcr 4,
1941, documcnt, part 15, pp. 174143, xhibit 74A.
Kimmel: Tat would havc bccn a littlc latc. . . .
Ferguson: Tat would havc also bccn latc altcr thc ]apancsc
had gonc into 8ornco and ]ava, would it not:
Kimmel: Ycs, sir.
Ferguson: Vcll, now, was thc Marshall opcration and its valuc
contingcnt upon it bcing undcrtakcn bclorc thc ]apancsc had
brcachcd thc Malay 8arricr:
Kimmel: Vcll, ccrtainly bclorc thcy had had a chancc to takc
thosc land arcas which comprisc thc Malay 8arricr. !t had to
draw thc lorccs away in timc, bclorc thcy had conqucrcd that
country and bclorc thcy had gonc down thcrc rcally.
Ferguson: Vcll, now, is that why you wcrc intcrcstcd in thc
movcmcnt and why thc Unitcd Statcs was intcrcstcd in thc
movcmcnt south: . . . And did you also want to know what you
wcrc to do in casc you wcrc surc that thcy wcrc going south:
Kimmel: Ycs, sir.
Ferguson: And did you cvcr nd that out prior to thc attack
on thc 7th:
Kimmel: Vhat ! was to do: . . . No, sir, not dcnitcly.
Ferguson: Vcll, now you comc back to thosc words Not dc
nitcly. id you cvcr nd any inlormation on it:
Kimmel: No. . . . ! wantcd to know what wc wcrc to do. ! did
not nd out.
79

Fcrguson thcn showcd Kimmcl thc mcssagc lrom U.S.
Ambassador ]ohn G. Vinant in London announcing thc prcs
cncc ol two ]apancsc convoys ol about 60 ships o Cambodia
79
!bid., part 6, pp. 286465.
Point. Tis dispatch had bccn rcccivcd in thc Statc cpartmcnt
on cccmbcr 6 at 10:40 ~.:.
80
Fcrguson askcd Kimmcl il anyonc
in Vashington had adviscd him on cccmbcr 6 that a ]apancsc
invasion cct ol sixtysomc vcsscls had bccn sightcd and was
within a day or 14 hours . . . ol striking distancc ol thc approachcs
to Singaporc . . . thc socallcd Vinant mcssagc. Kimmcl said hc
didnt think hc had rcccivcd that mcssagc, although hc had rcccivcd
similar inlormation on cccmbcr 6, through a copy ol a mcssagc
lrom Hart to PNA\ in Vashington. Tat mcssagc pointcd out
that a 25ship convoy with cruiscr and dcstroycr cscorts had bccn
sightcd hcading wcst toward Kohtron |Koh Rong:| on thc wcst
coast ol !ndochina, not vcry lar lrom thc Tai bordcr. 8ccausc
ol what thc Navy cpartmcnt had told Kimmcl, hc thought thc
]apancsc wcrc probably conccntrating thcir lorccs ovcr thcrc to
go into Tai. Tirty additional ships and onc largc cruiscr had
bccn spottcd by Harts scouting lorcc in Camranh 8ay on thc
cast coast ol !ndochina.
81

Fcrguson wantcd to know lrom Kimmcl
why in thc world would thcy scnd you that mcssagc: Tat was
anothcr powcr. Vc wcrc a scparatc and distinct nation. . . .
Amcrica is an indcpcndcnt and sovcrcign powcr. Vhy wcrc
wc conccrncd il wc did not havc a war plan in rclation to that
attack: . . . ! rcalizc . . . you wcrc trying to nd out what wc
wcrc going to do: . . . And you told us now that you ncvcr did
nd out. . . . You wcrc positivc about that, that you ncvcr got an
answcr as to what wc wcrc to do.
80
!bid., part 14, p. 1246, xhibit No. 21, cccmbcr 6, 1941, tclcgram lrom
London to Statc cpartmcnt.
81
!bid., part 6, p. 2871.
Kimmel: Tc last answcr ! had on that subjcct bclorc thc attack
was . . . Admiral Starks lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 25, which ! rcccivcd
on cccmbcr 3.
82

Fcrguson thcn askcd Kimmcl il hc had known that Hart in
thc Philippincs had gottcn word lrom Singaporc on cccmbcr 6
to thc ccct that thc 8ritish had rcccivcd assurancc ol Amcrican
armcd support undcr scvcral cvcntualiticsil thc ]apancsc
attackcd thcm, il thc ]apancsc attackcd thc utch, or il thc
]apancsc attackcd Siam or thc !sthmus ol Kra and thc 8ritish and
utch wcnt to thcir dclcnsc. bviously this would mcan that thc
Unitcd Statcss Asiatic Flcct would bc askcd to assist thc 8ritish
in Singaporc.
83
Hart had bccn scnding out ying missions to
obscrvc thc movcmcnts ol thc ]apancsc convoys. Hc had con
lcrrcd in Manila with 8ritish Admiral Tomas S.\. Phillips on
how bcst to coordinatc U.S. and 8ritish corts and had rcportcd
to Vashington thcir arrangcmcnts lor coopcrating.
84
Howcvcr,
thc ncws lrom Singaporc that thc 8ritish had rcccivcd assurancc
ol Amcrican armcd support was a surprisc to Hart. Hc wircd
Vashington lor instructions.
85
Turncr prcparcd a rcply lor Hart.
!t was still in thc proccss ol dralting at thc timc ol thc attack,
Turncr said. Hc bclicvcd that it was prcparcd in thc lorcnoon ol
thc 7th.
86

Ferguson: So somconc kncw hcrc in Vashington bclorc thc
attack camc what was to bc scnt to Admiral Hart in rcply to
his inquiry, whcrcas you had madc a similar inquiry and, as !
undcrstand it, you had no inlormation scnt to you, that you
82
!bid., pp. 287172. Scc part 16, pp. 222325, Starks Novcmbcr 25 lcttcr.
83
!bid., part 10, pp. 508283, cccmbcr 5, 1941, tclcgram lrom ]ohn M.
Crcighton, (ALUSNA) naval attach in Singaporc, to Hart.
84
!bid., part 4, pp. 193335, HartPhillips vcpart rcport, cccmbcr 7, Phil
ippinc timc, i.c., cccmbcr 6 in Vashington.
85
!bid., part 14, p. 1412, C!NCAF tclcgram 070645.
86
!bid., part 4, pp. 193536, Turncr tcstimony.
rcccivcd, or scnt to you that you did not rcccivc, prior to thc
attack. . . . At lcast, Admiral, you didnt know ol this rcply to
Admiral Hart:
Kimmel: My rccollcction is that ! didnt know anything about
that until altcr thc attack.
87
vcv:nvv )n L~s)Mixu)v Mvss~cv ibx)
Rv~cn Ki::vi Ux)ii Av)vv )nv A))~cx
Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc had bccn intcrccptcd and was avail
ablc in Vashington bctwccn 7:00 and 9:00 ~.:. (1:303:30
~.:. in Hawaii). Yct it was not until almost noon that Marshall
draltcd and scnt his lastminutc mcssagc advising Kimmcl and
Short ol thc dcadlinc. For sccurity rcasons it was not transmit
tcd by scramblcr phonc, thc lastcst mcans thcn availablc, lcst it
bc intcrccptcd by thc ]apancsc. !t did not rcach Kimmcl or Short
until hours altcr thc attack. Fcrguson rclcrrcd to this mcssagc
whcn qucstioning Kimmcl.
Ferguson: |H|ow could thc lact that Gcncral Marshall or
Admiral Stark would havc alcrtcd you on Sunday morning, say
bctwccn 7:00 and 9:00 |Vashington timc|, that that mcssagc
was rcccivcd, how could thc intcrccpting ol that mcssagc by thc
]aps havc changcd thc situation: . . . |S|upposc thc ]apancsc
cct had lcarncd at 7:00 in thc morning, that is 7:00 our timc,
on Sunday, which was . . . 51/2 hours bclorc thcir ships camc
in, thcir airplancs camc into Hawaii: . . . Supposc that thcy had
ashcd to that cct thc lact that thc Hawaiian !slands wcrc
lully alcrtcd and kncw that thcrc was somcthing going to hap
pcn and our ships would havc gonc out, how would that havc
intcrlcrcd with thc ]aps othcr than probably to havc stoppcd
thcm coming in:
87
!bid., part 6, p. 2883.
Kimmel: ! dont undcrstand how it would havc intcrlcrcd in thc
slightcst dcgrcc. . . . ! cannot undcrstand why ! did not gct . . .
that inlormation.
88

n ]anuary 21, 1946, altcr tcstilying lor six days, Admiral
Kimmcl was cxcuscd by thc committcc. Kimmcl agrccd with
\icc Chairman Coopcr that hc had bccn givcn a lull, amplc, and
complctc opportunity . . . to prcscnt my sidc ol thc mattcr.
89

Gvxvv~i V~i)vv C. Snov): Tnv A))~cx
Suvvvisvb Pv~vi H~vnovAiso V~snixc)ox
Finally on ]anuary 22, Gcncral Short was givcn an opportunity
to tcll his story. At thc timc ol thc attack, Short had bccn com
manding gcncral, Hawaiian dcpartmcnt. Likc Kimmcl, hc had
appcarcd bclorc thc Robcrts Commission and had to appcar thcrc
alonc, without counscl. Also likc Kimmcl, hc had not bccn pcrmit
tcd to hcar or crosscxaminc othcr commission witncsscs.
90
Short
had not cvcn bccn allowcd to hcar or crosscxaminc witncsscs
bclorc thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8), as Kimmcl had
bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!), thc Navys countcrpart.
And hc was not allowcd to scc thc ]apancsc MAG!C intcrccpts,
copics ol which thc APH8 obtaincd on ctobcr 6, 1944, at thc
vcry cnd ol its hcarings.
91
Shorts military counscl, 8rigadicr
Gcncral Tomas H. Grccn, was cvcntually allowcd to scc thcm,
although not to commcnt on thcm to Short, Grccns rolc was
limitcd to giving Short advicc.
92
Tc APH8 did lurnish Short
88
!bid., p. 2876.
89
!bid., p. 2915.
90
!bid., part 7, p. 2921, Short tcstimony.
91
!bid., part 28, pp. 94647.
92
!bid., part 7, p. 3155, Short tcstimony. Scc also part 29, pp. 243538.
with a copy ol its hcarings, cxccpt lor thc TP SCRT parts
conccrning MAG!C.
93
Short was not a Vcst Pointcr, hc had gonc into thc Army altcr
graduating lrom thc Univcrsity ol !llinois in 1901. Hc scrvcd in
thc Philippincs and Alaska. From March 1916 to Fcbruary 1917
hc was in Mcxico with thc Pcrshing cxpcdition, and hc scrvcd
in Francc and Gcrmany lor two ycars during Vorld Var !. 8ack
in thc Statcs, hc hcld various positionson thc Army gcncral
sta and at Forts Lcavcnworth and 8cnning. Hc also hcld scvcral
command positions, organizing and commanding Army brigadcs,
divisions, and corps, and dirccting soldicrs and National Guard
troops in mancuvcrs. Vhcn hc took ovcr as commanding gcncral
ol thc Hawaiian dcpartmcnt on Fcbruary 7, 1941, hc was pro
motcd to licutcnant gcncral. Hc scrvcd until altcr thc cccmbcr
7 attack, whcn hc was rclicvcd ol his command (cccmbcr 17).
Vhcn hc rctircd on Fcbruary 28, 1942, hc was rcduccd to a major
gcncral.
94

Likc Kimmcl, Short bcgan his tcstimony bclorc thc ]CC with
a lcngthy prcparcd statcmcnt. His rcmarks parallclcd Kimmcls to
somc cxtcnt in that hc tcsticd that hc had rcccivcd ncithcr thc
cquipmcnt hc had rcqucstcd nor thc inlormation to which hc, as
commanding gcncral, lclt hc was cntitlcd.
Short said hc had had only a bricl conlcrcncc with Marshall
bclorc hc assumcd command ol thc Hawaiian dcpartmcnt.
Marshall had not thcn told him ol any ol thc probablc dangcrs
in thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt although hc had writtcn him a
long lcttcr on thc day that ! assumcd command dctailing his idca
ol my mission.
95
Marshall wrotc on Fcbruary 7, 1941:
93
!bid., part 7, pp. 292122, Short tcstimony.
94
!bid., pp. 296667, Short tcstimony.
95
!bid., p. 2967.
Tc lullcst protcction lor thc Flcct is the rathcr than a major
considcration lor us, thcrc can bc littlc qucstion about that. . . .
Plcasc kccp clcarly in mind in all your ncgotiations that our mis
sion is to protcct thc basc and thc Naval conccntrations
at Hawaii.
96
!n this lcttcr, Marshall also discusscd thc pcrsonal
charactcristics ol Kimmcl, who was thcn taking ovcr command
ol thc cct.
97

Shorts primary rcsponsibility had bccn dicrcnt lrom
Kimmcls. Kimmcls task had bccn to prcparc thc cct lor oen-
sive action. Shorts principal task, hc tcsticd, was defensive,
to dclcnd thc !sland ol ahu lrom surlacc attacks, air attacks,
sabotagc, intcrnal disordcrs such as uprisings, with particular
attcntion to thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor and ol thc cct whcn
in harbor,
always ol coursc with thc support and assistancc ol thc Navy.
98

uring his tour ol duty in Hawaii, hc and Marshall cxchangcd
lcttcrs (26 pagcs in thc printcd hcarings), cablcs, tclcgrams, and
radiograms (cight pagcs).
99
Tcir corrcspondcncc was rclativcly
bricl, comparcd with that ol Kimmcl and Stark during thc samc
pcriod113 pagcs ol lcttcrs in thc printcd hcarings and 14 pagcs
ol cablcs, tclcgrams, and radiograms.
100
!n his communications
Short rcportcd shortagcs ol mcn,
101
plancs, 817s, intcrccptors,
96
!bid., part 15, pp. 160102, xhibit 53, Marshalls Fcbruary 7, 1941, lcttcr
to Short on his assumption ol command. Scc also part 7, p. 3083, Short tcsti
mony.
97
!bid., part 15, p. 1601.
98
!bid., part 7, p. 2970.
99
!bid., part 14, pp. 132634, xhibit 32, part 15, pp. 160026, xhibit 53.
100
!bid., part 14, pp. 13951409, xhibit 37, part 16, pp. 214457, xhibit
106.
101
!bid., part 7, p. 2925. Short statcmcnt.
ghtcrs, torpcdo bombcrs, antiaircralt guns, machinc guns,
102
and
radar cquipmcnt.
103
Marshalls lcttcrs dcalt primarily with mili
tary housckccping dctailsthc construction ol airclds, roads,
trails, a rccrcation camp, antiaircralt artillcry, thc aircralt warning
scrvicc (radar), prcparations lor air and ground dclcnsc, ctc, thcy
containcd littlc inlormation conccrning thc intcrnational situa
tion. !t was thc Var cpartmcnts rcsponsibility to kccp Short
inlormcd, and hc said hc did rcccivc dcpartmcnt mcssagcs lrom
timc to timc.
104
8ut thosc mcssagcs wcrc oltcn conicting and
conlusing, cspccially comparcd with thosc scnt to Kimmcl by thc
Navy during this pcriod and thcn rclaycd by Kimmcl to Short.
105

nc chargc madc against Short was that thc attack had takcn
him by surprisc bccausc hc had not bccn prcparcd. Hc pointcd
out that cvcn thc o cials in Vashington who had had acccss to
thc ]apancsc intcrccpts had not cxpcctcd thc attack, rathcr thcy
had cxpcctcd thc ]apancsc to aim at thc 8ritish and utch in
thc southwcst Pacic. Vhcn thc ncws rcachcd Vashington, top
o cials lrom FR, Hull, and Stimson on down all cxprcsscd
surprisc.
Army ]udgc Advocatc Gcncral ( ]AG) Myron C. Cramcr was
lorccd to admit that Short had not bccn alonc in lailing to antici
patc an attack. His
nonlcasancc or omissions wcrc bascd on an cstimatc ol thc
situation which, although provcd laulty by subscqucnt cvcnts,
was . . . madc or concurrcd in by all thosc o ccrs in Hawaii bcst
qualicd to lorm a sound military opinion. Tat cstimatc was
that an attack by air was in thc highcst dcgrcc improbablc.
106

102
!bid., p. 2963. Short statcmcnt.
103
!bid., pp. 296970, 315758. Short tcstimony.
104
!bid., pp. 2958, 2971.
105
!bid., pp. 293135, 294546. Short tcstimony.
106
!bid., part 18, p. 3205, ]anuary 27, 1942, mcmorandum to Marshall.
Short quotcd Cramcrs Novcmbcr 25, 1944, commcnts on
thc APH8 rcport:
|S|incc thc Var Plans ivision had rcccivcd substantial inlor
mation lrom thc !ntclligcncc Scction, G2, thc 8oard argucs
that had this additional inlormation bccn transmittcd to Short
it might havc convinccd him not only that war was immincnt
but that thcrc was a rcal possibility ol a surprisc air attack on
Hawaii.
107

Tc ]AG wcnt on to blamc Gcrow lor Failurc to apprcciatc thc
signicancc ol thc intcrccpt mcssagcs which wcrc availablc in
Vashington and lor a lack ol thc typc ol skill in anticipating and
prcparing against cvcntualitics which wc havc a right to cxpcct in
an o ccr at thc hcad ol thc Var Plans ivision.
108

From timc to timc G2 issucd spccial cstimatcs ol thc mili
tary situation. Tc Far astcrn parts ol thcsc cstimatcs wcrc
always prcparcd initially by 8ratton in thc Far astcrn scction ol
thc military intclligcncc scrvicc. !nlormation lrom thc scrviccs
othcr gcographic scctions was incorporatcd and discusscd. Tcn
thc cstimatc was prcscntcd to Gcncral Milcs, chicl ol military
intclligcncc scrvicc, lor approval or rcvision.
109

n Novcmbcr 29 thc intclligcncc branch prcparcd such an
cstimatc (!.8.159), which thc wholc division, including Milcs
himscll, considcrcd pcrhaps thc most important wc had cvcr
gottcn out, not so much bccausc ol
thc dangcr that wc saw lrom ]apan, although dangcr in that
cld was prctty thoroughly discusscd, but primarily bccausc
107
!bid., part 39, p. 265, mcmorandum.
108
!bid., also part 7, p. 2961.
109
!bid., part 34, p. 45, tcstimony ol 8rigadicr Gcncral Haycs A. Kroncr, chicl,
intclligcncc branch, G2, bclorc Clarkc !nquiry.
Gcn. Milcs wishcd to locus Var cpartmcnt thought on thc
dclcat that could bc administcrcd to thc Nazi powcrs.
110

Tis cstimatc, Short tcsticd, containcd no mcntion ol ]apans
potcntial capability against Pcarl Harbor bccausc ncithcr
Gcncral Haycs A. Kroncr, chicl ol thc intclligcncc branch, G2,
who |according to Short| was rcsponsiblc lor maintaining
inlormation and lor thc prcparation ol cstimatcs as to probablc
action,
111
nor othcrs in his branch had any inlormation which
would lcad |thcm| to bclicvc that thcy |thc ]apancsc| wcrc capablc
ol or planncd such an attack.
112
Apparcntly thc Armys military
intclligcncc scrvicc (G2) did not cxpcct an attack on Hawaii any
morc than had thc top Vashington o cials. !n othcr words, Pcarl
Harbor was omittcd lrom G2s cstimatcs not bccausc it was too
obvious to mcntion, as Milcs tcsticd bclorc thc committcc,
113

but bccausc, cvcn with all thc inlormation it had, it did not bclicvc
]apan was capablc ol making such an attack.
Kroncr, who had hclpcd prcparc this cstimatc, rcmcmbcrcd
it distinctly bccausc whcn thc word camc through thc radio on
that latclul Sunday, cccmbcr 7, that ]apan had attackcd Pcarl
Harbor, ! was sitting in my o cc in thc Munitions 8uilding
rcading lrom this papcr. Hc lclt that ]apans potcntial capability
against Pcarl Harbor was lclt lrom this cstimatc bccausc ncithcr
Col. 8ctts nor ! had any inlormation which would lcad us to
bclicvc that thcy wcrc capablc ol or planncd such an attack.
114

Tc immincncc ol crisis was bccoming apparcnt in
Vashington. Yct thc Var cpartmcnt, Short said, lailcd to rclay
that scnsc ol urgcncy to him. And hc had rcccivcd no intimation
110
!bid., pp. 4748, tcstimony ol Gcncral Kroncr.
111
!bid., part 7, pp. 298889.
112
!bid., p. 2989.
113
!bid., part 2, pp. 90203.
114
!bid., part 7, p. 2989. Short tcstimony. Scc also part 34, pp. 4748, Kroncr
tcstimony at Clarkc.
lrom Vashington that Hawaii might bc attackcd. Hc cxplaincd
that hc had bccn lcd to think that thc ]apancsc wcrc not going
to attack Hawaii in that hc had rcccivcd no warning such as
had bccn scnt his prcdcccssor in ]unc 1940. At that timc, Short
cxplaincd in a statcmcnt, Marshall alcrtcd thcnCommandcr
Gcncral Hcrron ol a possible transPacic raid scarc.
115
Hcrron
had thcn takcn all ncccssary prccautions. Altcr a month Marshall
authorizcd Hcrron to rclax thc alcrt provisions cxccpt insolar as
thcy pcrtaincd to sabotagc and thc maintcnancc ol rcadincss.
116

Short said hc had cxpcctcd that il thc Chicl ol Sta oncc again
had inlormation causing him to cxpcct a transPacic raid
against ahu, hc would lollow thc coursc hc had prcviously sct
as an cxamplc.
117

Snov)s A))vx)iox ivvc)vb Vvs)w~vb
!t was obvious that ]apans lorccs wcrc hcading south around
!ndochina and toward southcast AsiaSingaporc, Malaya, and
thc utch ast !ndics. Tc inlormation scnt Short by thc Var
cpartmcnt, hc said, had always pointcd in that dircction, toward
an attack to thc Southwcst Pacic, and including thc Ncthcrlands
ast !ndics.
118

Short had bccn told that thc Philippincs might bc thrcat
cncd. Hc kncw thc Unitcd Statcs was doing its bcst to build up
its Philippinc dclcnscs. 817s wcrc bcing own thcrc lrom thc
Statcs via Hawaii. Tc plancs wcrc bcing outttcd in Hawaii, and
crcws wcrc bcing traincd thcrc. Tcn guns and crcws, hc said,
wcrc bcing scnt in thc 817s on thcir way to thc Philippincs.
119

At timcs, somc ol Hawaiis own Army 817s had cvcn bccn own
115
!bid., part 7, p. 2930.
116
!bid., part 15, pp. 15931600, xhibit 52, cspccially pp. 159758.
117
!bid., part 7, p. 2930.
118
!bid., p. 3176.
119
!bid., p. 3217.
out thcrc, thus dcplcting thc Armys cct ol plancs in Hawaii.
Vc had 21 817s at onc timc, Short said,
and 9 ol thosc wcrc scnt to thc Philippincs and wc wcrc down
to 12, and had to rob 6 ol thosc ol parts to kccp thc othcrs
going through. . . . Tcy wcrc lcrrying in thc last lcw months
cvcrything to thc Philippincs thcy could.
Still othcr typcs ol plancs wcrc shippcd through |to thc
Philippincs| on transports.
120
8ut it was not only plancs that
wcrc bcing scnt out thcrc. Short said that
a lcw days bclorc cccmbcr 7, ! had a wirc lrom thc Var
cpartmcnt asking mc il ! would bc willing to ship lortycight
75millimctcr guns and 120 30calibcr machinc guns to thc
Philippincs.
Short had agrccd. Tc Var cpartmcnt said thc plancs and guns
would bc rcplaccd vcry soon.
121

Hc quotcd thc lcw tclcgrams or cablc warnings hc had
rcccivcd lrom Vashington altcr assuming command.
122
A Var
cpartmcnt dispatch on ]uly 8 adviscd him that
dcduction lrom inlormation lrom numcrous sourccs is that
]apancsc Govt has dctcrmincd upon its luturc policy . . . onc ol
watchlul waiting involving probablc aggrcssivc action against
maritimc provinccs ol Russia. . . . pinion is that ]ap activity in
thc south will bc lor thc prcscnt conncd to scizurc and dcvcl
opmcnt ol naval army and air bascs in !ndo China, although
an advancc against thc 8ritish and utch cannot bc cntircly
rulcd out.
123

120
!bid., p. 3203.
121
!bid., p. 3204.
122
!bid., pp. 293135, part 14, pp. 132634, xhibit No. 32.
123
!bid., part 14, p. 1326, Var cpartmcnt radio, ]uly 8, 1941. Tis tclcgram,
as transcribcd in Robcrts Commission Rcport (ibid., part 24, p. 2164, xhibit
Short thought that ]uly 8 mcssagc, whcn thcy wcrc pointing out
action ol thc ]apancsc against Russia, was a rathcr dcnitc prc
diction, and was thc only prcdiction that thc Var cpartmcnt
cvcr madc dircct to mc.
124
Short said that at no timc altcr ]uly 8
did ! cvcr havc an Army mcssagc that indicatcd any probablc linc
ol action by thc ]apancsc.
125

Hc said hc was adviscd on ctobcr 16, through a Navy mcs
sagc to Kimmcl, that hostilitics bctwccn ]apan and Russia arc a
strong possibility. Sincc thc U.S. and 8ritain arc hcld rcsponsiblc
by ]apan lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is also a pos
sibility that ]apan may attack thcsc two powcrs.
126
n ctobcr
20 Short had a mcssagc lrom thc Var cpartmcnt that appcarcd
to conict. Tcnsion bctwccn Unitcd Statcs and ]apan rcmains
straincd, it said, but according to thc Var cpartmcnts cstimatc
ol thc ]apancsc situation, no rcpcat no abrupt changc in ]apancsc
lorcign policy appcars immincnt.
127
Short also tcsticd that on ctobcr 17 onc ol Shorts intcl
ligcncc o ccrs, Licutcnant Coloncl Gcorgc V. 8ickncll, had
prcparcd a rcport on thc situation. Following thc principlcs ol
dclcating onc opponcnt at a timc, hc had writtcn,
it is bclicvcd that ]apan, il laccd with ccrtain 8ritish military
rcsistancc to hcr plans, will unhcsitatingly attack thc 8ritish,
and do so without a simultancous attack on Amcrican posscs
sions, bccausc ol no known binding agrccmcnt bctwccn thc
8ritish and Amcricans lor joint military action against ]apan,
36), varics slightly in punctuation, ctc., and is datcd ]uly 7 (not ]uly 8), 1941.
124
!bid., part 7, p. 3180.
125
!bid., p. 3072.
126
!bid., p. 2933. Scc part 14, p. 1327, ctobcr 16, 1941, Navy Mcssagc
162203.
127
!bid., part 7, p. 2933. Scc part 14, p. 1327, Var cpartmcnt ctobcr 20,
1941, mcssagc. Tis tclcgram as transcribcd in Robcrts Commission Rcport
(part 24, p. 2164, xhibit 36) is datcd ctobcr 18 (not 20), 1941.
and that thc Amcrican public is not yct lully prcparcd to sup
port such action. Howcvcr,
8ickncll continucd, it must bc cvidcnt to thc ]apancsc that in
casc ol such an attack on thc 8ritish, thcy would most ccrtainly
havc to ght thc Unitcd Statcs within a rclativcly short timc.
128

Vhat do you undcrstand by binding agrccmcnt: Fcrguson
askcd. To bc binding, Short said, it should bc approvcd by thc
Congrcss. Hc thought 8ickncll might havc mcant simply any
agrccmcnt that had bccn madc and approvcd by thc prcsidcnt,
and not madc public, somcthing that thc prcsidcnt cxpcctcd to
sct lorth in thc Scnatc.
129

Fcrguson rccallcd that wc wcrcnt consultcd on thc qucstion
ol thc shooting ordcrs in thc Atlantic. . . . Congrcss didnt say
anything about that.
130
Short said hc kncw that thc Navy 8asic
Var Plan, Rainbow No. 5, had bccn drawn up with thc idca
apparcntly that whcn it wcnt into ccct wc would bc allicd with
8ritain and thc utch.
131
Howcvcr, Short said hc lclt at that
timc that thc Amcrican public would not havc bccn willing to
havc an agrccmcnt raticd that wc would go to war to dclcnd thc
Ncthcrlands ast !ndics or Singaporc.
132

n Novcmbcr 24 hc said hc rcccivcd, through Kimmcl, a
Navy cpartmcnt mcssagc stating that a surprisc aggrcssivc
movcmcnt in any dircction including attack on Philippincs or
Guam is a possibility.
133

Tcn on Novcmbcr 27 Short said hc rcccivcd Var cpartmcnt
radiogram No. 472 notilying him that Ncgotiations with thc
128
!bid., part 7, p. 3173.
129
!bid., p. 3174.
130
!bid., p. 3180.
131
!bid., p. 3175.
132
!bid., p. 3174.
133
!bid., part 7, p. 2934, part 14, p. 1328, Novcmbcr 24, 1941, Navy Mcssagc
242005.
]apancsc appcar to bc tcrminatcd to all practical purposcs. . . .
]apancsc luturc action unprcdictablc but hostilc action possiblc
at any momcnt. Short was told that !l hostilitics cannot comma
rcpcat cannot comma bc avoidcd thc Unitcd Statcs dcsircs that
]apan commit thc rst ovcrt act. Short was to undcrtakc such
rcconnaissancc and othcr mcasurcs as you dccm ncccssary . . . so
as not comma rcpcat not comma to alarm thc civil population
or disclosc intcnt.
134
!n rcsponsc, hc alcrtcd lor sabotagc and so
noticd Vashington. thcrwisc hc rcccivcd no Army warning
ol likcly ]apancsc action or mcssagc giving diplomatic or military
background that would havc cnablcd him to judgc thc situation
in thc Pacic lor himscll.
Snov) No) Abvisvb ov
Av~ii~niv vibvxcv ov !::ixvx) Cvisis
Short said hc was convinccd that thc
Var cpartmcnt was awarc ol thc lact that ! did not havc this
inlormation |rcgarding thc mounting U.S.]apancsc crisis| and
had alrcady dccidcd that ! should not gct this inlormation. . . .
A dcnitc dccision had bccn madc by thc Var cpartmcnt
that ncithcr thc ]apancsc intcrccpts nor thc substancc ol thcm
should bc givcn to thc commanding gcncral in Hawaii.
135

Hc quotcd Milcss tcstimony bclorc thc committcc: Tcrc wcrc
no stcps takcn to distributc thcsc mcssagcs to that Gcncral
|Short|. Tis dccision was in linc with
thc gcncral policy laid down by thc Chicl ol Sta that thcsc
mcssagcs and thc lact ol thc cxistcncc ol thcsc mcssagcs or our
ability to dccodc thcm should bc conncd to thc lcast possiblc
134
!bid., part 7, p. 2935, part 14, p. 1328, Novcmbcr 27, 1941, Army Mcssagc
472.
135
!bid., part 7 pp. 295354. Scc also part 29, p. 2403.
numbcr ol pcrsons, no distribution should bc madc outsidc ol
Vashington.
136

Not only was Short dcnicd thc intclligcncc dcrivcd lrom
MAG!C, but thc inlormation hc did rcccivc was conlusing.
Navy mcssagcs wcrc habitually rathcr morc aggrcssivc than thc
Army, Short said.
n ctobcr 16 |Kimmcl| had a |Navy cpartmcnt| mcssagc
in which thcy said ]apan would attack. n ctobcr 20 ! had
onc lrom thc Var cpartmcnt saying thcy didnt cxpcct any
|attack|. My mcssagc said nothing about a war warning and
|Kimmcls| did.
Short thought thc Navy mcssagcs wcrc inclincd to bc morc
positivc, possibly . . . morc alarming, in thc contcxt than thc
Armys.
137

Tc Var cpartmcnt had scnt Short no inlormation con
ccrning any U.S. military commitmcnts arising out ol thc Unitcd
Statcs8ritish Sta Convcrsations and thc ]oint CanadaUnitcd
Statcs clcnsc Plan, which might havc lcd him to cxpcct U.S.
involvcmcnt in thc Far ast. !l hc had known that Singaporc
had bccn alcrtcd and that thc Govcrnor ol thc Ncthcrlands ast
!ndics had ordcrcd comprchcnsivc mobilization ol his armcd
lorccs, Short tcsticd, hc would havc rcalizcd that thcy consid
crcd war vcry immincnt out thcrc. . . . !t would havc mcant pos
siblc hostilitics on Hawaii, but not ncccssarily an attack.
138

Hc was askcd about two cccmbcr 3 Navy mcssagcs scnt
to Kimmcl. nc had announccd that ]apancsc diplomatic and
consular posts at Hong Kong, Singaporc, 8atavia, Manila,
Vashington, and London had bccn instructcd to dcstroy codcs,
136
!bid., part 7, p. 2954. Scc also part 2, p. 791, Milcs tcstimony.
137
!bid., part 7, p. 2983. Scc part 14, p. 1327, Navy ctobcr 16, 1941, Mcssagc
162203, and Var cpartmcnt ctobcr 20, 1941, Mcssagc 1234P.
138
!bid., part 7, p. 3176.
ciphcrs, and sccrct documcnts.
139
Tc othcr rcportcd that Tokyo
had ordcrcd London, Hong Kong, Singaporc, and Manila cach
to dcstroy its Purplc machinc, thc 8atavia machinc, it said, had
alrcady bccn rcturncd to Tokyo.
140
Short dcnicd having known
about cithcr mcssagc.
141

Likc Kimmcl, Short did not cxpcct a brcak in U.S.]apancsc
rclations as long as thc rcprcscntativcs ol thc two nations wcrc
still talking in Vashington. Ncithcr man kncw, as Vashington
o cials had lcarncd lrom thc intcrccpts, that thc ]apancsc con
sidcrcd thc ncgotiations de facto rupturcd and that thc ]apancsc
ambassadors wcrc only kccping up thc prctcnsc ol ncgotiat
ing. From what Kimmcl and Short could glcan lrom ncwspapcr
accounts, thc ncgotiations wcrc continuing, supposcdly in good
laith.
Short, again likc Kimmcl, had bccn lcd to bclicvc that an
attack on Pcarl Harbor, although possiblc, was not probablc. !n
vicw ol Hawaiis largc population ol ]apancsc alicns, sabotagc and
subvcrsion sccmcd much morc likcly than an attack lrom out
sidc. Hc rcitcratcd that mcssagcs lrom thc Var cpartmcnt (scc
abovc) had lcd him to thc vicw that thc primc dcsirc ol thc U.S.
govcrnmcnt was to avoid war and to not lct any intcrnational
incidcnt happcn in Hawaii that might bring on war.
142

Shorts task, as hc intcrprctcd No. 472, was to guard against
hostilc action in thc lorm ol sabotagc and subvcrsion. Tus
Short had rcspondcd by rcporting that hc had alcrtcd lor sabo
tagc. Scvcral othcr mcssagcs lrom Vashington at about thc samc
timc also adviscd him to guard against sabotagc, rcassuring him
in his dccision. Hcaring nothing lurthcr lrom Vashington dur
ing thc ninc days bctwccn his Novcmbcr 27 sabotagc alcrt rcport
139
!bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ #031850.
140
!bid., p. 1408, PNA\ #031855.
141
!bid., part 7, p. 3105.
142
!bid., pp. 297879.
and thc attack, hc could only assumc that his action had bccn
appropriatc.
Short mcntioncd two mcssagcs in particular that had bccn
availablc in Vashington and that would havc bccn morc impor
tant than thosc that wcrc scnt to Pcarl Harborthc shipsin
harbor bombingplan intcrccpts and thc cccmbcr 7 nc v.:.
Mcssagc.
143
Hc said that had that mcssagc bccn rclaycd immc
diatcly by scramblcr phoncboth hc and Marshall had such
phoncs and it took only about tcn or 15 minutcs to gct a mcssagc
throughit would havc rcachcd him lour hours bclorc, instcad
ol scvcn hours altcr, thc attack.
144

Short said Marshalls lastminutc mcssagc, conccrning thc
nc v.:. Mcssagc, was markcd:
clay in dcciphcring duc to not bcing markcd Priority in
Vashington. . . . !l this mcssagc had bccn scnt by scramblcr
tclcphonc thcrc would havc bccn timc to warm up thc plancs
and put thcm in thc air. . . . Tc lact that thc Var cpartmcnt
scnt this mcssagc by radio in codc instcad ol tclcphoning it in
thc clcar . . . indicatcs that thc Var cpartmcnt, cvcn as latc as
6:48 ~.:., cccmbcr 7th, Honolulu timc, did not considcr an
attack on Honolulu as likcly cnough to warrant drastic action
to prcparc thc islands lor thc sncak attack.
145

Short quotcd thc Var cpartmcnts Field Service Manual on
thc importancc ol adcquatc and timcly military intclligcncc to
cnablc thc commandcr to draw logical conclusions conccrning
cncmy lincs ol action. Military intclligcncc is thus an csscntial
lactor in thc cstimatc ol thc situation and in thc conduct ol sub
scqucnt opcrations.
146
Askcd il hc was complaining bccausc hc
143
!bid., part 12, pp. 26163, 248.
144
!bid., part 7, pp. 3220, 3041.
145
!bid., pp. 2940, 3220322.
146
!bid., p. 2961. Scc Var cpartmcnt, FM 1005. Field Service Regulations:
Operations, May 22, 1941, p. 40, paragraph 194.
had madc an crror and Vashington hadnt corrcctcd him, Short
rcplicd: |!|l you arc not lurnishcd inlormation you in all prob
ability will makc an crroncous cstimatc.
147
Also in thc Var
cpartmcnts Field Service Regulations:
Tc bcst inlormation will bc ol no usc il it arrivcs too latc at thc
hcadquartcrs lor which it is intcndcd. . . . !mportant and urgcnt
inlormation . . . is scnt by thc most rapid mcans availablc to
all hcadquartcrs acctcd, without rcgard to thc usual military
channcls.
148

Committcc Chairman 8arklcy was skcptical that morc inlor
mation would havc cnablcd Short to judgc thc situation any bct
tcr than hc had.
Barkley: vcrybody in Vashington, all thc high o ccrs in
VashingtonNavy, Army, !ntclligcncc, Var Plans, Gcncral
Staall saw thcsc intcrccptcd mcssagcs. . . . Tcy all havc tcs
ticd that, notwithstanding thosc mcssagcs, thcy did not rcally
cxpcct an attack at Pcarl Harbor and wcrc surpriscd whcn it
camc. o you think that il you . . . or il thc admiral . . . or
both ol you togcthcr had gottcn thcm, you would havc rcachcd
any dicrcnt conclusion lrom that rcachcd by cvcrybody in
Vashington:
Short: ! think thcrc was a possibility bccausc Pcarl Harbor
mcant a littlc morc to us. Vc wcrc a littlc closcr to thc situ
ation and . . . would havc bccn inclincd to look at that Pcarl
Harbor inlormation a littlc morc closcly. Vc might not havc
madc thc corrcct dccision, but ! bclicvc thcrc was morc chancc
that cithcr wc or somconc on our stas would havc had thc
idca. . . .
147
148
Var cpartmcnt, FM 1005. Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 22,
1941, pp. 4647, paragraphs 227 and 228.
Barkley: !l that is truc, why did you rcly lor thc action you took
upon somc dcnitc instruction lrom Vashington instcad ol
cxcrcising grcatcr judgmcnt and discrction in doing what you
could do with what you had:
Short: 8ccausc thcy wcrc my only sourccs ol inlormation. !
had no sourcc ol inlormation outsidc Hawaii, cxccpt thc Var
cpartmcnt. . . . |T|hc Var cpartmcnt had many sourccs ol
inlormation. Tcy had military attachcs. Tcy got rcports lrom
thc Statc cpartmcnt and thc Commcrcc cpartmcnt. Tcy
had a ccrtain numbcr ol agcnts scattcrcd around in thc Far
ast. !l thcy wcrc in a position to gct inlormation that ! had no
acccss to at all, ! had cvcry rcason to bclicvc that thcir judgmcnt
would bc bcttcr than my just . . . rcading thc ncwspapcrs.
149

Snov) vvvxbs Av:ys vvov)s uvixc A))~cx
!mmcdiatcly altcr thc attack, Short said hc madc scvcral rcports
by tclcphonc to Vashington. Tcn hc scnt a radiogram giving a
succinct account ol thc cvcnt lrom thc Armys vicwpoint:
]apancsc cncmy divc bombcrs cstimatcd numbcr sixty attackcd
Hickam Ficld Vhcclcr Ficld Pcarl Harbor at cight am Stop
xtcnsivc damagc to at lcast thrcc hangars Vhcclcr Ficld thrcc
hangars Hickam Ficld and to plancs caught on thc ground
Stop ctails not yct known Stop Raid lastcd ovcr onc hour
Stop Unconrmcd rcport that thc ships in Pcarl Harbor badly
damagcd Stop Marinc air cld VA also badly damagcd Stop
ctails latcr.
150

8clorc thc last raid was complctcd, Short said, a total ol 14
U.S. plancs got in thc air. Tcy shot down 10 cncmy plancs.
Scnator Lucas was imprcsscd: So it is a prctty salc assumption
149
150
!bid., p. 3096.
that il thc plancs had bccn warmcd up and rcady to go that, con
sidcring what you did with thc 14 plancs . . . thc damagc would
havc bccn minimizcd considcrably:
Short: No qucstion about that. ! think our pilots showcd that
thcy wcrc supcrior to thc ]apancsc pilots in individual combat
that day.
151

Vhcn Navy Sccrctary Knox visitcd Pcarl Harbor immcdi
atcly altcr thc attack, Short said,
Hc wcnt complctcly through my cld hcadquartcrs and spcnt,
! would say, probably 2 hours, in which wc had o ccrs dctailcd
lrom cvcry scction to cxplain cvcrything that had happcncd.
Hc got a vcry complctc picturc not only ol our hcadquartcrs but
how wc wcrc lunctioning and cxactly what happcncd, and at thc
cnd ol thc timc hc was so imprcsscd with our hcadquartcrs that
hc dircctcd thc Navy to makc arrangcmcnts to movc ovcr into
an undcrground hcadquartcrs right alongsidc ol us.
152
Rcprcscntativc Kcclc said to Short, summarizing:
|A|s commandcr at Pcarl Harbor prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941,
and subscqucnt to your appointmcnt to that important posi
tion, you did cvcrything within your powcr to providc thc
physical things ncccssary to providc lor thc dclcnsc ol thc
Hawaiian !slands.
Yct, Kcclc said, Short had tcsticd as to many itcms ol physical
propcrty, such as guns, installations, radar cquipmcnt, air strips,
buildings, and so on, that hc had not rcccivcd but a small part ol
thc matcrial that you had rcqucstcd prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941.
8ut according to Marshalls tcstimony,
151
!bid., pp. 3068, 306970.
152
!bid., p. 3165.
thc matcrial which you did havc at Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr
7, il alcrtcd and ccctivcly uscd, would havc givcn a good
account ol itscll and pcrhaps cnablcd you to rcpcl thc attack,
or to scvcrcly minimizc thc damagc that was causcd. o you
agrcc with that:
Short said hc could havc givcn a bcttcr account ol himscll il
hc had had morc cquipmcnt. For cxamplc, thc bcst antiaircralt
dclcnsc against lowying plancs, thc armamcnts that had donc
thc most damagc in thc attack, wcrc .50 calibcr machinc guns. At
thc timc ol thc attack, hc had had only 109, although thc program
at that timc had callcd lor 345. Tc numbcr ol .50 calibcr machinc
guns in Hawaii had actually bccn incrcascd by cccmbcr 1, 1942,
to 793, showing how many thc Var cpartmcnt considcrcd ncc
cssary. |A|nd kccp in mind that that datc is altcr thc ]apancsc
had bccn scriously dclcatcd at Midway.
Kcclc prcsscd on. Tc lact ol thc mattcr is, is it not, that
cxccpt lor thc possibility ol gctting a lcw morc guns into action
and possibly minimizing, to a small cxtcnt, thc damagc that was
donc . . . this attack would havc comc in by surprisc, isnt that
truc:
Short: Vith thc inlormation . . . wc had lrom Vashington, it
was bound to bc a surprisc.
153

Snov) Ci~i:s His Rv)ivv:vx)
H~xbivb ny Gvxvv~i S)~vv, M~bv Hi:
~ Sc~vvco~), Hv vvvxbs Hi:sviv Ac~ixs)
Ronvv)s Co::issiox Cn~vcvs
Altcr thc attack, Short had bccn rclicvcd ol his command.
According to him, Marshalls tcstimony convcycd thc idca that
153
!bid., p. 3210.
Shorts rctircmcnt had bccn handlcd cntircly by thc Sccrctary
ol Var |Stimson| and that hc |Marshall| had had nothing to do
with it, in lact hc was not cognizant ol what was bcing donc.
Howcvcr, that apparcntly was not thc casc, thc corrcspondcncc,
Short said, did not agrcc with that.
154

Fcrguson quotcd lrom Shorts prcparcd statcmcnt to thc
ccct that hc did not lccl hc had bccn trcatcd lairly, or with
justicc by thc Var cpartmcnt. !n that statcmcnt, hc said hc
thought hc had bccn singlcd out as an cxamplc, as thc scapcgoat
lor thc disastcr.
155

Ferguson: ! wish you would bc spccic and tcll mc whom you
had in mind |by saying| thc Var cpartmcnt:
Short: ! had in mind thc Gcncral Sta in particular |hcadcd
by Marshall|, bccausc thcy wcrc primarily rcsponsiblc lor thc
policics pursucd by thc Var cpartmcnt. . . . Gcncral Gcrow
as hcad ol thc Var Plans ivision had thc dircct rcsponsibility
lor kccping mc inlormcd. Gcncral Milcs, thc hcad ol G2, had
a vcry dircct rcsponsibility.
Ferguson: Vhat about thc Sccrctary ol Var: . . .
Short: . . . ! would not havc cxpcctcd him to bc as lully awarc
ol thc signicancc ol tcchnical things. ! would cxpcct him to bc
lully awarc ol any policy.
Ferguson: Now, whcn you usc thc word scapcgoat, will you
givc us thc mcaning that you want to convcy to us in that
word:
Short: !t sccms to mc that may bc a slang cxprcssion, but it is a
word in vcry common usagc, and ! mcant just cxactly what thc
common usagc mcant, that it was somconc that thcy saddlcd
154
!bid., part 7, p. 3170.
155
!bid., p. 2964.
thc blamc on to gct it o ol thcmsclvcs. . . . Tat is cxactly what
! want to convcy.
156

Tc samc two basic accusations madc against Kimmcl by thc
Robcrts Commission had also bccn madc against Short: dcrclic
tion ol duty and crrors ol judgmcnt. Undcr datc ol April 20,
1942, thc Var cpartmcnt lormalizcd thc Robcrts Commission
accusations against Short into 11 spccic chargcs, cach ol which
was considcrcd a violation ol thc 96th Articlc ol Var.
157
Vhcn
Fcrguson qucstioncd Short, hc plcadcd not guilty to cach ol
thc 11 chargcs.
158
Hc cxplaincd that his actions in cvcry casc had
bccn limitcd by cquipmcnt shortagcs and shapcd by thc limitcd
inlormation supplicd him. Hc had donc thc bcst hc could, hc
said, givcn thc rcsourccs and inlormation availablc.
1. Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
Not guilty, Short said. Hc did havc an adcquatc patrol. Tc
air pcoplc wcrc satiscd and had lull control. . . . |!|t was not
dcsigncd lor air dclcnsc. Hc was using all thc cquipmcnt hc
had.
2. Failure to provide adequate antiaircraft defenses.
Not guilty. Vc would havc had an adcquatc antiaircralt dclcnsc
il thc Var cpartmcnt had givcn us thc cquipmcnt and had
givcn us thc inlormation which indicatcd immincnt attack. r,
il thcy had rcplicd to my |sabotagc alcrt| rcport and indicatcd
any dcsircd modication.
156
!bid., p. 3169.
157
!bid., part 18, pp. 321115, F. Granvillc Munson, Coloncl, ].A.G.., April
20, 1942, mcmorandum lor judgc advocatc gcncral.
158
!bid., part 7, pp. 319195.
3. Failure to set up an Interceptor (radar) Command.
Not guilty. Vc wcrc training pcrsonncl as last as wc could to
opcratc an ccctivc intcrccptor command, and it was sct up
and opcrating as ccctivcly as it could.
Short told ol considcrablc dclay cncountcrcd not only in gct
ting thc nccdcd cquipmcnt, but also in obtaining cpartmcnt
ol !ntcrior pcrmission to crcct thc radar towcrs on national park
land.
159

4. Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Not guilty. Vc wcrc training our pcrsonncl as last as wc
could to sct up an ccctivc aircraltwarning scrvicc. !t was in
opcration.
160

5. Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings
to interested agencies.
Not guilty. Vc wcrc rcstrictcd by dircct ordcr lrom Marshall,
lrom transmitting thc Novcmbcr 27 warning to any othcr
than thc minimum csscntial o ccrs. . . . !l ! had sct up an
aircraltwarning scrvicc and gottcn it to cvcrybody wc would
havc had to givc it to all thc cnlistcd mcn.
6. Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and
coordination with the Navy.
Not guilty. Vc had lull, complctc plans lor dclcnsc by coop
cration with thc Navy, which had bccn approvcd by Gcncral
Marshall and Admiral Stark. . . . !t would havc bccn carricd
out 100 pcrccnt il thcy would havc givcn us thc inlormation
thcy had.
159
!bid., pp. 315758.
160
!bid., p. 3192. Scc also pp. 305758, 318284.
7. Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their
duties in case of sudden attack.
Not guilty. ! could not tcll subordinatcs to cxpcct a suddcn
attack which ncithcr ! nor thc Var cpartmcnt nor anyonc
clsc cxpcctcd. ur inlormation rcgarding impcnding hostilc
action was, by dircction ol thc chicl ol sta, limitcd to thc min
imum csscntial o ccrs. ur standard opcrating proccdurc ol 5
Novcmbcr 1941 prcscribcd lully thc dutics ol all pcrsonncl in
cvcnt ol any suddcn attack.
As to thc civilians,
Vc had a numbcr ol alcrts and blackouts. Vc had had dcnitc
training ol thc surgical tcams and ol thc rstaid pcoplc and ol
thc ambulancc corps. . . . And ! think that thc civilian agcncics
that had to act not only kncw but thcy pcrlormcd thcir dutics
cxtrcmcly wcll on cccmbcr 7.
8. Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor.
Not guilty. ! took cvcry mcasurc ! thought ncccssary to protcct
thc cct and naval basc against sabotagc. ! so rcportcd to thc
Var cpartmcnt. Marshall tcsticd that ! was rcasonablc in
assuming that ! was doing cxactly what hc wantcd, bccausc
othcrwisc hc would havc noticd mc that hc wantcd morc
mcasurcs takcn.
9. Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile
attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Not guilty. ! was ncvcr warncd ol any immincnt dangcr ol an air
attack. Tc plancs wcrc thcrclorc groupcd lor morc adcquatc
protcction against hostilc action in thc lorm ol sabotagc.
10. Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an
attack.
Not guilty. My aircralt wcrc not in a statc ol rcadincss lor a sur
prisc attack, but wcrc protcctcd against sabotagc as dircctcd by
thc Var cpartmcnt in thc sabotagcalcrt mcssagcs ol 27th, ol
28th Novcmbcr 1941, and as rcportcd to thc Var cpartmcnt
by mc. !l thcy had bccn cquippcd with ammunition, groupcd
as thcy wcrc, and a sabotagc attack had bccn madc, thcrc would
havc bccn much morc damagc by cxploding ammunition.
11. Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their
families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.
Vc madc a quitc claboratc plan lor cvacuating thc lamilics
ol civilians on thc military rcscrvation. Vc askcd thc Var
cpartmcnt lor moncy to cstablish a camp somc 4 milcs cast
ol Schocld. ! wrotc a pcrsonal lcttcr to thc Chicl ol Sta and
told him that wc wcrc asking lor thc moncy to cstablish thcsc
camps on thc basis ol rccrcation camps. . . . |8|ut our rcal pur
posc was to gct rcady lor a possiblc attack. . . . Hc answcrcd
my lcttcr and statcd that guns wcrc nccdcd worsc lor othcr
purposcs.
Tus Short plcadcd not guilty to numbcr 11 also.
161

As thc committcc wound up its qucstioning ol Short, 8arklcy
askcd him il hc wishcd to makc any lurthcr statcmcnt. Short
said,
As a mattcr ol thc intcrcsts ol thc country and as a loyal soldicr,
! maintaincd a stcadlast silcncc lor 4 ycars and ! borc thc load
ol public ccnsurc during this timc and ! would havc continucd
to bcar it so long as ! thought thc qucstion ol national sccurity
was involvcd. Howcvcr, thc war is now cndcd.
161
!bid, pp. 319495.
Hc said hc was vcry apprcciativc ol thc opportunity |! havc
bccn givcn| to makc a lull and lrank statcmcnt ol my point ol
vicw. Short thankcd thc committcc mcmbcrs lor thcir attitudc
and assurcd thcm that hc had tricd to givc thcm lully and lrankly
all thc inlormation hc could on thc subjcct.
162

162
!bid., p. 3231.
731
29.
Joint Congressional
Committee on the
Pearl Harbor Attack
T
hc ]oint Congrcssional Committcc still had many potcn
tial witncsscs on its list whosc tcstimony was cxpcctcd to
provc important. Among thcsc wcrc Admiral R.. !ngcrsoll,
Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations, as wcll as scvcral mcn
who had bccn closcly conccrncd with MAG!CCaptain L.F.
Saord, who had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval
Communications, Captain A.. Kramcr, Navy translator and
couricr, and Coloncl Rulus S. 8ratton, Army couricr. Tc ]CC
mcmbcrs did not nd it casy to lcarn how much was known in
Vashington bclorc thc attack about thc immincncc ol war, whcn
it was known, and how much inlormation was rclaycd to thc Pcarl
Harbor commandcrs.
Tov V~snixc)ox vvici~is Coxvvv ~iiy
ox !:vvxbixc Cvisis
Vhcn tcstilying bclorc thc Hart and Navy Court !nquirics,
Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations !ngcrsoll had admittcd having
sccn thc Vinds xccutc bclorc cccmbcr 7, 1941.
1
Howcvcr, in
his ]CC tcstimony hc bclittlcd its importancc as a war warning:
|T|hc wording in that winds mcssagc did not say that wc arc
going to bc in a statc ol war or that hostilitics now cxist. !t
rclcrrcd to a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotiations or that thc sit
uation bctwccn thc countrics was bccoming critical. . . . !l you
rupturc diplomatic ncgotiations you do not ncccssarily havc to
burn your codcs. Tc diplomats go homc and thcy can pack up
thcir codcs . . . and takc thcm homc.
!ngcrsoll considcrcd thc dcstruction ol thc codc dispatchcs much
morc important.
|T|hcy not only told thcir diplomats in Vashington and
London to burn thcir codcs but thcy told thcir consuls in
Manila, in Hong Kong, Singaporc, and 8atavia to burn thcir
codcs. And that did not mcan a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotia
tions, it mcant war, and that inlormation was scnt out to thc
ccts as soon as wc got it.
2

|V|hcn wc rcccivcd thc original mcssagc which sct up thc
winds codc that bccamc important thcn bccausc that would
bc thc rst indication that wc would gct ol whcn thc ]apancsc
thought thcy would rupturc ncgotiations or bc at war il a
broadcr intcrprctation wcrc placcd on it. . . . |8|ut oncc wc had
1
U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), part 9, pp. 422324, portions ol Hart
and NC! tcstimony rcproduccd.
2
!bid., p. 4226.
lcarncd that thcy wcrc dcstroying thcir codcs thcn thc winds
mcssagc lost its importancc. . . . |T|hc lact that thc consulatcs
wcrc includcd cinchcd it in my opinion that it was war and not
a rupturc ol diplomatic ncgotiations or diplomatic rclations.
3

!ngcrsoll did not rccall having sccn any ol thc scvcral ships
inharbor intcrccpts, not cvcn thc onc that dividcd Pcarl Harbor
into vc arcas to rcport cach shilting and visit ol ships lrom onc
arca to anothcr. !l hc had, hc would havc wantcd to know why
thcy wcrc intcrcstcd in thc actual location ol a ship within a har
bor as distinguishcd lrom whcthcr or not thc ship just happcncd
to bc in port. !l hc had sccn that dispatch, his suspicion would
havc bccn arouscd. Hc thought Admiral Kimmcl should havc
bccn inlormcd.
4

!ngcrsoll had known ol thc Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc sct by thc
]apancsc, altcr which things wcrc automatically going to hap
pcn. !t was wcll known that ]apancsc troops could rcach scvcral
potcntial targcts in southcast Asia in a vcry short timc: China,
!ndochina, Formosa. Tc situation was rcvicwcd almost daily,
hc said, at conlcrcnccs in thc o cc ol Navy Sccrctary Knox. Yct
day altcr day wcnt by altcr thc Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc without a
]apancsc strikc.
Ingersoll: Tcrc was a conlcrcncc in Mr. Knox o cc cvcry
morning in which thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc prcscntcd
thc wholc situation . . . and thc possibilitics wcrc discusscd . . .
by thc ircctor ol Var Plans, Admiral Turncr. . . . Tc situation
was rcvicwcd cvcry morning.
Gearhart: Vcrc thcrc in thosc mcctings altcr thc 29th dis
cussions ol why that had occurrcd, altcr wc had rcad thc ]ap
intcrccpt that altcr thc 29th things wcrc going to happcn
3
!bid., pp. 423233.
4
!bid., pp. 423637.
automatically: . . . id anybody in thosc mcctings raisc thc
qucstion that possibly thc ]apancsc wcrc sailing to a distant
point ol attack:
Ingersoll: No: nonc that ! rccall. . . . Tc qucstion ol an attack
on Pcarl Harbor, ol coursc, was always considcrcd as a possi
bility. . . . |T|hc placcs in thc Far ast wcrc thc only placcs ol
which wc had dcnitc inlormation towards which thc ]apancsc
wcrc moving.
5
. . . ! did not think that thc ]apancsc would risk
an air attack on Pcarl Harbor. . . . ||ur cstimatc was that thc
]apancsc would not do that, that thcy wcrc lully occupicd with
what thcy wcrc doing at that timc, and that thc risks wcrc too
grcat.
6

!n vicw ol our knowlcdgc ol ]apancsc military movcmcnts and
our closc political tics with thc 8ritish and utch, Rcprcscntativc
Gcarhart and Scnator Fcrguson tricd to dctcrminc what thc
Unitcd Statcs would havc donc had thc ]apancsc struck 8ritish
and/or utch positions and not U.S. tcrritory.
Ferguson: id you know what our policy was prior to Pcarl
Harbor . . . il thcrc was an attack on thc Malay Pcninsula, what
thc position would bc ol thc Unitcd Statcs ol Amcrica, as lar
as thc Navy or thc Army wcrc conccrncd:
Ingersoll: As lar as thc Navy and Army wcrc conccrncd, what
wc would do was containcd in our war plans. . . . ! do not think
thcrc was anybody in thc Navy cpartmcnt who kncw what
would happcn il ]apan wcnt into thc Malay Pcninsula, or into
Siam, or Tailand. . . . Tc position ol thc Navy would havc
bccn thc position takcn by thc Unitcd Statcs Govcrnmcnt, and
what thc prcsidcnt would havc rccommcndcd to thc Congrcss
5
!bid., pp. 423536.
6
!bid., pp. 4237, 4239.
about dcclaring war. Tc Navys position would havc bccn
cxactly thc position ol thc Unitcd Statcs.
7

!ngcrsoll did not bclicvc thc Unitcd Statcs would go to war in
thc Pacic without any rccommcndation to thc Congrcss, as thcy
had in thc Atlantic. Tat was not a lcgal war. . . . |T|hc Gcrmans
wcrc still hcrc in Vashington and thcy had not dcclarcd war on
us lor all that wc had bccn doing to thcm in thc Atlantic.
8
Tc
ncxt day !ngcrsoll hallapologizcd lor this rcmark. Hc had
almost humorously callcd thc war in thc Atlantic as illcgal. !t
was morc in thc naturc ol irrcgular. . . . !n thc Atlantic wc wcrc
doing somc things which only a bclligcrcnt docs. Tcrc had
bccn no dcclaration ol war. Vc had donc a grcat many things
that undcr intcrnational law, as it was undcrstood bclorc thc last
war, wcrc unncutral. . . . !t was apparcntly to hcr |Gcrmanys|
advantagc to havc us as a nonbclligcrcnt rathcr than as a lull
bclligcrcnt.
9

Pvvsibvx) vbvvs vvvxsivv !xvov:~)iox
P~)voi ix Sou)n Cnix~ Sv~
Tc U.S. govcrnmcnt was rccciving inlormation on ]apancsc
ship movcmcnts in thc southwcst Pacic and China Sca lrom
our daily ovcrights as wcll as lrom rcports lrom thc 8ritish.
Yct at about 7 v.:. on cccmbcr 1, thc prcsidcnt dircct|cd|
Admiral Tomas Hart, commandcrinchicl ol thc Asiatic Flcct
in Manila, to chartcr 3 small vcsscls to lorm a dclcnsivc inlor
mation patrol.
10
Tc thrcc small ships wcrc to bc manncd by a
U.S. naval o ccr and cquippcd with onc small gun and a machinc
7
!bid., p. 4246.
8
!bid., pp. 424647.
9
!bid., p. 4249.
10
!bid., part 14, p. 1407, PNA\ ispatch #012356.
gun, thc |m|inimum rcquircmcnts to cstablish idcntity as U.S.
mcnolwar. Tcy wcrc to bc stationcd in thc paths ol known
]apancsc ship movcmcnts: (1) bctwccn Hainan !sland (China)
and Huc on thc cast coast ol !ndochina, now \ictnam, (2) cast ol
thc !ndochina coast bctwccn Camranh 8ay and Capc St. ]acqucs,
and (3) o Pointc dc Camau on thc southcrn tip ol !ndochina.
All thrcc vcsscls wcrc to obscrvc and rcport by radio ]apancsc
movcmcnts in wcst China Sca and Gull ol Siam.
Fcrguson wantcd to know why Stark had ordcrcd thrcc small
vcsscls to watch lor ]apancsc movcmcnts on 8ritish posscssions.
!ngcrsoll rcplicd simply thc dispatch had said,
prcsidcnt dirccts. . . . Tat was our rcason lor doing it. Admiral
Stark was told by thc prcsidcnt to do it. . . . Admiral Hart was
alrcady conducting rcconnaissancc o that coast by plancs
lrom Manila. . . . ! am surc Admiral Stark would not havc donc
this unlcss hc had bccn told. . . . Vc did not initiatc this movc
mcnt, sir, and wc wcrc gctting . . . su cicnt inlormation lrom
Admiral Hart by thc scarchcs which his plancs wcrc making.
11

11
!bid., part 9, pp. 425253. l thcsc thrcc small vcsscls, only onc got to sca
bclorc thc ]apancsc attack. Tc Isabel lclt Manila on cccmbcr 3, with ordcrs
to procccd to Camranh 8ay on thc !ndochina coast, ostcnsibly to scarch lor a
lost Navy P8Y planc. n thc 5th, about 22 milcs lrom thc !ndochina coast,
shc was sightcd by a ]apancsc Navy planc, and ordcrcd to rcturn to Manila,
whcrc shc arrivcd on cccmbcr 8 (Kcnt Tollcy, Cruise of the Lanikai |Annap
olis, Md.: Naval !nstitutc, 1973|, pp. 26970). Tc sccond ship, thc Lanikai,
skippcrcd by thcn Licutcnant Kcnt Tollcy, was prcparing to lcavc Manila whcn
thc attack camc. Shc patrollcd thc coast ol thc Philippincs lor a couplc ol
wccks, nally dcparting Manila on cccmbcr 26, and altcr somc advcnturcs
rcachcd Australia (ibid., p.120). Tc third small ship sclcctcd, thc Molly Moore,
was ncvcr commissioncd, whcn thc attack camc, hcr mission bccamc supcr
uous (ibid., p. 272). Authors notc: Apparcntly Hart lookcd on thc mission ol
thcsc thrcc small vcsscls as mission impossiblc. Vhcn ordcring thc Lanikai
to thc coast ol !ndochina (ibid., p. 19), Hart said hc had lclt hc was scnding
its skippcr on what lookcd likc a onc way mission. Tollcy thought FR may
havc bccn ocring thcsc small ships and thc mcn aboard to bait an incidcnt,
a casus bclli (ibid., p. 279). Hart wantcd to know why thc prcsidcnt had scnt
Had thc prcsidcnt pcrsonally givcn him, Stark, thc ordcr
to scnd thc dispatch conccrning thcsc vcsscls: Stark said hc had
discusscd with thc prcsidcnt
whcrc this | ]apancsc| cxpcdition going south was likcly to hit.
His |thc prcsidcnts| thought was thc Kra Pcninsula. . . . Tc
Philippincs was a possibility and . . . thc ast !ndics, and just
whcrc it would go wc did not know and thcsc thrcc small vcsscls
wcrc to assist in that dctcrmination. . . . |Y|ou will scc whcrc
thc prcsidcnt put thcm thcy wcrc wcll placcd to gct inlorma
tion cithcr positivc or ncgativc and it was lor that rcason and
lor thc rcasons as statcd in thc dispatch, to gct inlormation,
that hc dircctcd that bc donc. . . . Hc says to lorm a dclcnsivc
inlormation patrol, to accomplish a purposc which is to obscrvc
and rcport by radio ]apancsc movcmcnts in thc Vcst China
Sca and Gull ol Siam, and thcn hc himscll dcsignatcd whcrc
thosc vcsscls wcrc to bc placcd and thcy wcrc wcll placcd lor
thc purposcs lor which hc wantcd thcm. . . . ! simply think that
hc thought that was additional prccautions. Hc was intcnscly
intcrcstcd in cvcry movc at that timc, as wc all wcrc.
12

l coursc, onc cannot know what FR had in mind in issu
ing this dircctivc, it may havc bccn out ol conccrn lor his com
mitmcnts to thc 8ritish and utch, hc may havc bccn trying to
do what Stimson had suggcstcd at FRs Var Cabinct mcct
ing, Novcmbcr 25, to mancuvcr thcm |thc ]apancsc| into thc
position ol ring thc rst shot without allowing too much dangcr
to oursclvcs.
13
Fcw would bc killcd or woundcd by a shot rcd
on such a minimallycquippcd U.S. manolwar. Yct it might
bc incidcnt cnough to call lor U.S. military intcrvcntion against
thc ]apancsc.
thc mcssagc ordcring thcsc vcsscls to sca, hc lclt thc ordcr might havc bccn a
rccction on his ovcright rcports. (PLG 1962 intcrvicw ol Hart.)
12
13
!bid., part 11, p. 5433, Stimsons diary cntry ol Novcmbcr 25, 1941.
M~ix)~ixixc )nv Svcvvcy ov )nv ]~v~xvsv
!x)vvcvv)s ~xb MAG!C
!t was apparcnt throughout thc scvcral invcstigations that spc
cial cort had bccn madc to kccp inlormation about thc Purplc
machincs and thc MAG!C intcrccpts sccrct. uitc undcrstand
ably, cxtrcmc caution was ncccssary bclorc thc war to prcvcnt any
sccurity lcak. And during thc war, whcn thc intcrccpts wcrc still
yiclding intclligcncc valuablc in thc strugglc against thc ]apancsc,
it was ncccssary to continuc to maintain tight sccurity. Howcvcr,
thc dctcrmination to maintain silcncc pcrsistcdcvcn altcr
August 1945, whcn ]apan surrcndcrcd, and cvcn altcr Prcsidcnt
Truman, who had takcn o cc on thc dcath ol FR, had rcvcalcd
thc cxistcncc ol MAG!C by rclcasing to thc public thc SCRT
1944 rcports ol thc Navy Court ol !nquiry and thc Army Pcarl
Harbor 8oard.
14
Vhcn nally, in cccmbcr 1945, thc rcstric
tions against rcvcaling MAG!C wcrc lurthcr rclaxcd to pcrmit
witncsscs bclorc thc ]CC to tcstily and givc inlormation rcgard
ing cryptanalytic activitics which had to do with thc invcstiga
tion ol thc Pcarl Harbor incidcnt,
15
many witncsscs rcviscd thcir
storics.
Saord, 8ratton, and Kramcr had bccn intimatcly involvcd in
handling thc ]apancsc intcrccpts and cach had bccn qucstioncd
at lcngth during prcvious invcstigations whilc thc war contin
ucd. ach had thcn laccd thc samc dilcmmahow to rcspond
to prcssurcs placcd on thcm by wartimc patriotism and loyalty to
thcir supcrior o ccrs, and how to tcstily undcr oath to thc truth
as thcy saw it without rcvcaling military sccrcts. Tcn whcn qucs
tioncd during thc ]CC hcarings altcr thc war and altcr rcstric
tions had bccn rclaxcd, thcy had to dccidc whcthcr to modily or to
14
!bid., part 8, pp. 373640.
15
!bid., Rcport, p. 498.
dclcnd thcir prcvious tcstimony. As wc shall scc, cach rcspondcd
dicrcntly.
C~v)~ix L.F. S~vvovb, N~v~i Co::uxic~)ioxs
Svcuvi)y, iscovvvs Ki::vi H~b No)
8vvx Svx) MAG!C
!n 1941 Saord had bccn in chargc ol thc sccurity scction
ol Naval Communications. Hc tcsticd that altcr thc attack, hc,
likc millions ol othcr Amcricans, blamcd Kimmcl lor thc tcr
riblc losscs at Pcarl Harbor. Hc assumcd Kimmcl had bccn scnt
inlormation dcrivcd lrom MAG!C. Saord was bittcr, hc could
not undcrstand why Kimmcl had not bccn rcady lor thc attack.
Saord said hc thought that il Kimmcl had rcccivcd thc Vinds
xccutc, which Saord had sccn on cccmbcr 4, Kimmcl surcly
would havc rccognizcd its signicancc and would havc bccn
complctcly rcady lor thc attack on Pcarl Harbor, in lact with his
cct at sca, and Pcarl Harbor just an cmpty ncst.
16
Altcr Saord rcad thc Robcrts Commission rcport, hc
cxpcctcd to bc callcd as a witncss lor thc prosccution against
Kimmcl. So hc bcgan to rcvicw thc prcattack rccord.
17
To his
dismay, Saord discovcrcd that important inlormation dcrivcd
lrom thc MAG!C intcrccpts dccodcd bclorc thc attack, had not
gonc to Kimmcl. 8y mid]anuary 1944, Saord rcalizcd that thc
Navy cpartmcnt had not scnt out thc war warning prcparcd by
Captain McCollum, which Saord had rcad in Admiral Noycss
o cc on thc altcrnoon ol cccmbcr 4, 1941. His scnsc ol jus
ticc was arouscd, Kimmcl had bccn unlairly accuscd. Saord
thcn shiltcd lrom siding with thc prosccution to siding with thc
16
!bid., part 8, p. 3859.
17
!bid., pp. 3715, 3877.
dclcnsc.
18
At that point, Saord sct thc whccls in motion that
lcd in timc to rcvcaling Purplc and MAG!C inlormation.
19

n Fcbruary 21, 1944, Saord callcd on rctircd Kimmcl
in Ncw York.
20
From notcs and mcmory, Saord rclatcd to
Kimmcl inlormation that had bccn availablc bclorc thc attack
in Vashington, inlormation which would havc bccn invalu
ablc to thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. Saords rcvclations
wcrc Kimmcls rst intimation that, in spitc ol his rcqucsts to
bc kcpt lully inlormcd, Vashington had not scnt him prcattack
U.S.]apancsc inlormation rclcvant to his situation as U.S. Flcct
commandcrinchicl. Vhcn Saord rcturncd to Vashington
and attcmptcd to documcnt his asscrtions to Kimmcl, howcvcr,
hc lound to his amazcmcnt that prcattack MAG!C intcrccpts,
which wcrc supposcd to havc bccn pcrmancntly rctaincd in lockcd
Navy lcs, wcrc missing.
Vhcn Saord camc bclorc thc ]CC (Fcbruary 15, 1946),
hc had alrcady appcarcd, whilc thc war was still going on, bclorc
thc Hart inquiry, thc APH8, thc NC!, and thc Hcwitt inqui
ry.
21
8oth thc APH8 and NC! had bccn authorizcd by Congrcss
to conduct thorough invcstigations and to handlc supcrsccrct
matcrials. Saord had told thcm thc truth about MAG!C and
Purplc as bcst hc could, and hc continucd to stick to his story
whcn appcaring at thc ]CC.
Saord dcscribcd to thc Congrcssional Committcc in consid
crablc dctail thc proccdurc which had bccn lollowcd to prcvcnt
knowlcdgc ol MAG!C and cspccially thc Vinds Codc xccutc
lrom bccoming known. Tc pcrsonal or immcdiatc custodian
was Licutcnant Commandcr Harrison, U.S. Naval Rcscrvc.
Saord cxplaincd that thc only pcoplc who had acccss to thcn
18
!bid., p. 3715.
19
!bid., pp. 385759.
20
!bid., p. 3751.
21
!bid., part 8, pp. 3555813, 384293.
Commandcr, now Captain, Kramcrs salc wcrc thosc on duty
undcr Captain Kramcr. vcrything was normally clcarcd through
Commandcr Harrison. Tcrc wcrc not morc than tcn pcoplc at
thc most translators and thc ycomcn on duty in Kramcrs scc
tion, thc hcad ol thc scction, Saord, or thc o ccr who rclicvcd
Saord, or thc ircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc might possibly havc
callcd lor lcs at any timc. Any highcr authority would havc bccn
givcn thc lcs without qucstion il hc had rcqucstcd thcm.
22
A
copy ol thc winds cxccutc mcssagc should havc bccn in thc lcs
ol Saords division, in thc lockcd salc ol Captain Kramcr.
Saord: To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc thc combination to thc
salc was hcld by Kramcr and Harrison alonc. Tcrc was a copy
ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in my salc. Tcrc was
anothcr copy ol thc combination in a scalcd cnvclopc in thc
salc ol thc Aidc to thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations. Tat was
rcquircd lor all salcs in naval opcrations, so in casc ol casualty
to thc man who rcgularly opcncd thc salc thc salc could bc
opcncd whcn wc had to. . . . ! know ol no occasion whcn wc
cvcr had to opcn thosc scalcd cnvclopcs, and cntcr thc salc. !
might add, whcncvcr an o ccr was rclicvcd, wc changcd thc
combination on his salc and substitutcd thc ncw cards, and that
was thc only timc wc cvcr had to gct into thosc cnvclopcs.
23

Finally in 1944, Saord succccdcd in locating a singlc sct ol
most ol thc missing intcrccpts, had copics madc, and placcd in
thc lcs whcrc thcy bclongcd.
24
Howcvcr, onc mcssagc, ]apans
Vinds xccutc which Saord considcrcd cspccially crucial,
was not lound.
22
!bid., part 8, pp. 367576.
23
!bid.
24
Saords convcrsations with thc author. Scc also chaptcr 21, pp. 43233.
S~vvovb Ci~i:vb Vixbs xvcu)v V~s Rvcvivvb
nvvovv vcv:nvv . !v So, V~s Tn~) Sicxivic~x)-
Vashington o cials wcrc wcll awarc ol thc impcnding cri
sis, Saord said. n cccmbcr 3 thc U.S. military attach in thc
Amcrican cmbassy in Tokyo had bccn ordcrcd to dcstroy his
ciphcrs and codcs.
25
n cccmbcr 4, Grccnwich timc (cccmbcr
3, Vashington timc), thc U.S. naval attach in Tokyo was ordcrcd
to do thc samc.
26
Also on cccmbcr 4 thc U.S. consular agcnts in
thc Far ast had bccn told to dcstroy thcir codcs.
27

Vhcn Saord kncw hc would bc callcd to tcstily bclorc thc
Congrcssional Committcc, hc prcparcd a writtcn statcmcnt. !t
was primarily about thc Vinds Codc sctup. n Novcmbcr 26
and 28 Vashington had lcarncd lrom Tokyo Circulars 2353 and
2354 that ]apan planncd to broadcast in thc coursc ol a routinc
ncws program a lalsc wcathcr mcssagc with a hiddcn mcan
ing.
28
!l thc ]apancsc cmbassics and consulatcs worldwidc had
to dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs and could no longcr
dcciphcr cncodcd mcssagcs, this socallcd Vinds Codc sctup
would cnablc Tokyo to communicatc sccrctly with hcr ovcrscas
o cials and to advisc thcm whcn cvcnts lcading to war would
automatically bcgin to happcn.
29

Saords prcparcd statcmcnt startcd: Tcrc was a Vinds
Mcssagc. !t mcant Varand wc kncw it mcant Var.
30
8y wc
25
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1409, Sccrct radiogram
No.40, cccmbcr 3, 1941. Scc also part 2, p. 841, Milcs tcstimony.
26
!bid., part 8, p. 3782, part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc #040330.
27
!bid., part 8, p. 3770, part 14, p. 1408, Mcssagc #040343 to C MARTs,
Pciping and Ticntsin.
28
!bid., part 12, xhibit 1, p. 154, ]apancsc Circular #2353, translatcd Novcmbcr
28, 1941, and p. 155, ]apancsc Circular #2354, translatcd Novcmbcr 26, 1941.
29
!bid., part 8, p. 3580.
30
!bid., p. 3579.
Saord mcant thosc who had bccn working on MAG!C and with
whom hc had bccn in closc contact, such as Kramcr, McCollum,
Vilkinson, and Noycs.
31
Saord considcrcd that mcssagc
clcar cvidcncc ol thc immincncc ol war. Tus hc was puzzlcd
whcn Vashington o cials did not scnd out any truly urgcnt
warnings.
32
!n Saords words, thc Vinds xccutc was thc
unhccdcd warning ol war.
33
As soon as thcsc ]apancsc Vinds
Codc sctup mcssagcs wcrc intcrccptcd, Admiral Vilkinson,
dircctor ol Naval !ntclligcncc, dircctcd Saord through Admiral
Noycs, dircctor ol Naval Communications, to alcrt all intcrccpt
stations capablc ol monitoring ]apancsc ncws broadcasts to listcn
lor such a lalsc wcathcr announccmcnt. Saord dcscribcd lor thc
committcc thc prcparations hc had madc lor intcrccpting this
mcssagc.
34

Saord not only considcrcd thc Vinds Codc sctup cxtrcmcly
important,
35
8ut hc bclicvcd that thc cagcrncss ol scnior U.S.
o ccrs to havc ]apancsc ncws programs lollowcd closcly on thc
chancc ol intcrccpting such a lalsc wcathcr broadcast was cvi
dcncc that thcy sharcd his vicw that it conccrncd somcthing
much morc important than mcrcly a brcak in diplomatic ncgo
tiations, that rcccipt ol a Vinds xccutc would cvcn portcnd
thc actual outbrcak ol war. U.S. govcrnmcnt o cials rcalizcd that
il thc ]apancsc implcmcntcd thcir Vinds Codc and actually
scnt such a lalsc wcathcr mcssagc, it would havc had still lurthcr
signicancc as a dcnitc portcncc ol conict. Saord considcrcd
thc implcmcntation ol thc Vinds Codc thc most important
mcssagc wc had up to thc timc ol thc pilot mcssagc on cccmbcr
31
!bid., p. 3704.
32
!bid., p. 3655.
33
!bid.
34
!bid., p. 3584.
35
!bid., pp. 3678, 3683, 379697.
6, announcing that thc ]apancsc rcply to our notc ol Novcmbcr
26 was on its way.
36

Tc signicancc ol thc Vinds xccutc, il rcccivcd, was
rcinlorccd by intclligcncc availablc lrom othcr sourccs: (1) thc
]apancsc cablc dcsignating Novcmbcr 29 thc dcadlinc lor tcr
minating U.S.]apancsc ncgotiations, altcr which things arc
automatically going to happcn,
37
(2) thc instructions to ovcrscas
]apancsc nationals to dcstroy thcir codcs.
38
Tc Vinds xccutc
gaincd lurthcr signicancc bccausc ol its indication that ]apan
wantcd to rcach its nationals all ovcr thc world altcr thcir codcs
wcrc dcstroycd,
39
bccausc ol thc positivc cvidcncc it would givc
that ]apan dcnitcly intcndcd to actsoon,
40
and that war was
about to start against thc country or countrics indicatcdng
land: Russia: Unitcd Statcs: According to Saord, any coun
try, or countrics, namcd in a Vinds xccutc would actually bc
involvcd in thc war lrom thc vcry bcginning, and not just as a
spcctator.
41
Tus thc intcrccption ol a Vinds xccutc would
providc us with an announccmcnt ol thc intcntions and dccision
ol thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt.
42
!n Saords words, it would bc a
short rangc lorccast ol war.
43

Saord tcsticd that a Vinds xccutc was actually intcr
ccptcd in Morsc codc,
44
and that Navy couricr Kramcr had
36
!bid., p. 3640.
37
!bid., p. 3770, part 12, p. 165, Tokyo Mcssagc #812.
38
!bid., part 8, p. 3770, part 12, various Tokyo Mcssagcs, pp. 209, 215, 216,
231.
39
!bid., part 8, p. 3770.
40
!bid., pp. 3711, 3770.
41
!bid., p. 3663.
42
!bid., p. 3664.
43
!bid., p. 3663.
44
!bid., p. 3579, Saord statcmcnt, and pp. 3642, 3708, 3769, 3843, 3848,
Saord tcstimony.
dclivcrcd it to him in his o cc on thc morning ol cccmbcr 4,
1941, typcd on ycllow tclctypc papcr.
45
!t had indicatcd war with
ngland and with thc Unitcd Statcs. Kramcr had undcrscorcd
thc thrcc codc words in thc mcssagc and had writtcn bclow in
pcncil or colorcd crayon a rough translation:
Var with ngland (including N!, ctc.)
Var with thc U.S.
Pcacc with Russia.
Tis is it! Kramcr said as hc handcd thc papcr to Saord.
Tis mcant that ]apan would soon bc at war, not only with Grcat
8ritain but also with thc Unitcd Statcs. Tis was thc broadcast
wc had straincd cvcry ncrvc to intcrccpt, Saord said.
Tis was thc lcathcr in our cap. Tis was thc tipo which would
prcvcnt thc U.S. Pacic Flcct bcing surpriscd at Pcarl Harbor
thc way thc Russians had bccn surpriscd at Port Arthur. Tis
was what thc Navy Communication !ntclligcncc had bccn prc
paring lor sincc its cstablishmcnt in 1924War with Japan!
46

Saord had immcdiatcly scnt thc Vinds xccutc by spccial
mcsscngcr to Noycs, Naval Communications. !l thc mcsscngcr
could not nd Noycs in a rcasonablc timc, hc was to lct Saord
know. !n a lcw minutcs, Saord rcccivcd word that thc mcssagc
had bccn dclivcrcd.
47

Rcprcscntativc Clark wantcd to know il Saord had immc
diatcly put it in thc proccss ol handling and distribution and dis
posal just as in thc casc ol all othcr magic: Saord said hc had.
Hc had chcckcd Kramcrs loldcr ol intcrccpts bclorc Kramcr had
sct out to makc his daily routinc dclivcrics ol MAG!C intcrccpts
45
!bid., part 8, pp. 3580, 3586.
46
!bid., p. 3586.
47
!bid.
about noon that day, cccmbcr 4, thc Vinds xccutc had bccn
includcd.
48
So prcsumably it was dclivcrcd that day to thc usual
rccipicnts. Not only that, Saord said, but in addition, it was
tclcphoncd around to various pcoplc by Admiral Noycs and so lar
as ! know that was thc rst timc that had cvcr bccn donc.
49

About an hour latcr, Noycs callcd Saord on thc intcrphonc.
Hc did not mcntion thc Vinds xccutc spccically, but told
Saord that wc had bcttcr tcll Guam to dcstroy all thcir cxccss
codcs and ciphcrs.
50
Saord thcn wcnt to Noycss o ccthat
was at about 3:00 v.:.and thcrc Noycs showcd him a scvcral
pagc mcssagc prcparcd in McCollums Far astcrn Scction ol
Naval !ntclligcncc.
51
Tc nal paragraph ol McCollums long
mcssagc, Saord tcsticd, closcly lollowcd thc Vinds xccutc
giving cvcry indication . . . that Captain McCollum had rcad thc
winds mcssagc, had apprcciatcd its importancc, and was trying to
gct an urgcnt war warning out to thc Pacic Flcct.
52

Saord rccallcd that according to McCollums mcssagc:
]apan was about to dcclarc war on thc Unitcd Statcs, about to
dcclarc war on ngland, including thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics,
and so lorth, and would maintain pcacc with Russia. Tc last
scntcncc addcd thc lorccast or cvaluation war is immincnt.
53

Altcr thc discussion ol McCollums mcssagc, Saord saw
Vilkinson lcavc Noycss o cc with it in his hand, saying, ! am
going to scnd this mcssagc il ! can gct thc lront o cc to rclcasc
48
!bid., p. 3690.
49
!bid., pp. 3587, 3683.
50
!bid., pp. 3587, 3690.
51
!bid., pp. 3667, 3761, 3811, 3812.
52
!bid., p. 3667.
53
!bid., pp. 3796, 381112.
it.
54
Saord lcarncd much latcr that thc McCollum mcssagc had
not bccn scnt.
55

S~vvovb Rvsvoxbs )o Vixbs xvcu)v
~s Cnivv, N~v~i Co::uxic~)ioxs Svcuvi)y
8cing in chargc ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval
Communications, Saords jurisdiction and rcsponsibilitics wcrc
limitcd to maintaining thc sccurity ol communications, hc was
not pcrmittcd to scnd cvaluations or ordcrs to mcn in thc cld.
56

Any mcssagcs hc scnt had to dcal spccically with maintaining
documcnt sccurity. !n lulllmcnt ol this obligation and as a rcsult
ol thc rcccipt ol thc Vinds xccutc, hc lcd lour mcssagcs
lor transmittal bctwccn 3:00 and 3:20 v.:. on thc altcrnoon ol
cccmbcr 4. Hc instructcd thc naval attachs at Tokyo, Pciping,
8angkok, and Shanghai to dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial lcs
cxccpt thosc csscntial lor currcnt purposcs.
57
Similar instructions
wcrc scnt to thc commandcrinchicl Asiatic Flcct in Manila.
58

Saord also scnt a PR!R!TY mcssagc to Guam and Samoa
at 8 v.:. ordcring a changc in codcs lrom thcir thcncurrcnt
codc R!P 65 to a ncw codc, R!P 66.
59
Tis ordcr was promptly
rcccivcd in Guam. Scvcntccn minutcs latcr, a SCRT mcssagc
was rclcascd by !ngcrsoll to Guam, FRR prcccdcncc to
allow timc lor thc ncw codc, R!P 66, to bc implcmcntcd, asking
Guam to
54
!bid., p. 3812.
55
!bid., pp. 3701, 3715, 3812, 3878. Scc also pp. 376162, Saords ]anuary 22,
1944, lcttcr to Kramcr.
56
!bid., p. 3781.
57
!bid., pp. 3810, 3844, part 29, p. 2397, pNav. No. 042019, with an inlor
mation copy to thc commandcrinchicl Asiatic Flcct (Hart) but not to thc
CinC ol thc Pacic Flcct (Kimmcl).
58
!bid., part 29, p. 2397, #042018. No inlormation copy was scnt to Kimmcl.
59
!bid., p. 2397, #042000.
dcstroy all sccrct and condcntial publications. . . . rctaining
minimum cryptographic channcls ncccssary lor csscntial com
munications. . . . 8c prcparcd to dcstroy instantly in cvcnt ol
cmcrgcncy all classicd mattcr you rctain.
60

Tcn in thc attcmpt to warn Vakc, Saord prcparcd a
strong mcssagc that rcad in part: !n vicw ol immincncc ol war
dcstroy all rcgistcrcd publications on Vakc !sland cxccpt this
systcm and currcnt cditions ol aircralt codc and dircction ndcr
codc.
61
!ngcrsoll rcluscd to scnd this strongly wordcd mcssagc
as draltcd by Saord. Hc rclcascd instcad an ambiguous mcs
sagc with Vakcs namc dclctcd lrom thc tcxt.
62
Morcovcr, it was
hcld up until cccmbcr 6, whcn it was scnt dclcrrcd prcccdcncc
which mcant dclivcry |in Pcarl Harbor lor rclay to Vakc| by 9:00
on Monday morning, cccmbcr 8, 1941. Saord didnt know
whcn it got to Pcarl Harbor but, hc said,
no action was takcn on it until long altcr thc attack on Pcarl
Harbor, and thcn, bccausc wc had scnt an ambiguous mcs
sagc, thc cct communication o ccr scnt anothcr ambiguous
mcssagc. Tc nct rcsult was that whcn Vakc was capturcd, !
bclicvc thc 24th ol cccmbcr, somc ol thc cryptographic aids
lcll into ]apancsc hands, and it was rcportcd at thc timc by
Commandant 14th Naval istrict, and latcr on somc ol thc
alphabct strips wcrc capturcd at Kiska in somc ol thc aban
doncd ]apancsc dugouts.
63

Givcn thc limitations ol thcir rcsponsibilitics and thc Navys
rcstrictions on thcir dutics, Saord and McCollum did all thcy
60
!bid., part 8, p. 3845, part 14, p. 1408, #042017, part 29, p. 2398, #042017.
Saord tcstimony at APH8, part 33, pp. 117879. #042017, NC! xhibit 21.
!nlormation copy to commandcrinchicl, Pacic Flcct.
61
!bid., part 29, p. 2399.
62
!bid., part 14, p. 1408, part 29, p. 2399.
63
!bid., part 29, p. 2399.
could to notily thc cld commandcrs.
64
8ut thcir intcndcd warn
ings wcrc watcrcd down, thcir urgcncy rcduccd by bcing scnt
dclcrrcd priority, or withhcld. Tc Vinds xccutc sccmcd to
bc virtually ignorcd. Saord could not undcrstand why anyonc
would want to lail to makc usc ol a wind cxccutc mcssagc that
mcant war.
65

Rvcviv) ov Vixbs xvcu)v
Cox)vs)vb ny )nvv Vi)xvssvs
Most ol thc qucstions addrcsscd to Saord by mcmbcrs ol thc
]CC conccrncd thc Vinds Codc and its implcmcntation. Had
wc, or hadnt wc, intcrccptcd a Vinds xccutc bclorc thc attack
on Pcarl Harbor, as Saord maintaincd: ncc thc Navy intcr
ccptcd and translatcd ]apans Vinds Codc sctup on Novcmbcr
28, its codc clcrks had bccn alcrtcd to listcn to ]apancsc ncws
broadcasts. Saord insistcd thcir corts succccdcd and that thc
broadcast in which thc crucial lalsc wcathcr mcssagc was cmbcd
dcd was intcrccptcd on cccmbcr 4. Yct lcw pcoplc prolcsscd
to bclicvc him. Tcy prclcrrcd to bclicvc that thc ]apancsc gov
crnmcnt rcally hadnt implcmcntcd thc sctup bclorc thc attack
at all and that thcrclorc wc couldnt havc intcrccptcd a Vinds
xccutc. Tc situation was complicatcd by thc lact that Saord
could nd no copy ol it in thc Navy cpartmcnts lcs. |T|hosc
lcs could not bc locatcd, hc said. All documcntary cvidcncc
conccrning thc rcccipt ol a Vinds xccutc, togcthcr with all
inlormation rclating to thc instructions to watch lor it, which had
bccn scnt to Chcltcnham, Maryland, thc station Saord claimcd
had intcrccptcd it,
66
had vanishcd.
64
!bid., p. 3668.
65
!bid., p. 3655.
66
!bid., pp. 375658. Rcgulations rcquircd thc rccciving stations, including
Chcltcnham, to rctain onc copy ol cvcry intcrccpt only until noticd that thc
othcr two copics lorwardcd to thc Navy cpartmcnt had bccn rcccivcd. Tcn
Until thc August 1945 rclcasc to thc prcss ol thc SCRT
Army and Navy Pcarl Harbor rcports, thc public had hcard littlc
or nothing about Vinds Codc. Saord gavc Hart a list ol 15
rcliablc witncsscs hc bclicvcd had sccn thc Vinds xccutc.
67
!n
a May 14, 1945, mcmorandum to Licutcnant Commandcr ]ohn
F. Sonnctt, assistant attorncy gcncral in thc Navy who had scrvcd
as counscl to thc Hcwitt invcstigation, Saord listcd 26 o ccrs
who hc bclicvcd had known ol its intcrccption on cccmbcr 4,
1941.
68
8ut whcn qucstioncd, thcy dcnicd it. Most ol thc pco
plc who had bccn in a position bclorc thc attack to know ol thc
Vinds xccutc, il it had cxistcd, sworc thcy had ncvcr sccn
it.
69
!n spitc ol thcir tcstimony, Saord bclicvcd that McCollum,
Vilkinson, Hcwitt, and Noycs, among othcrs, kncw it had bccn
intcrccptcd.
8y thc timc Saord appcarcd bclorc thc committcc, hc could
not namc a singlc pcrson whom hc could condcntly cxpcct to
corroboratc thc prcattack rcccipt ol thc mcssagc, hc would
rathcr not attcmpt to cstimatc what any othcr witncss is going
to say on thc stand.
70
Fcrguson thcn citcd thrcc or lour pcrsons
involvcd in thc Pcarl Harbor invcstigations othcr than Saord
who admittcd to having sccn a Vinds xccutc prior to thc
attack. Hc quotcd spccically lrom thc tcstimony ol Assistant
Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral !ngcrsoll bclorc thc Hart
!nquiry and thc Naval Court ol !nquiry
71
Saord said this was
thc rccciving stations wcrc lrcc to dcstroy thcir copics il thcy wishcd. r thcy
could rctain thcm tcmporarily lor rclcrcncc.
67
!bid., p. 3727.
68
!bid., p. 3611, part 18, p. 3347, xhibit 151.
69
!bid., part 8, pp. 375960.
70
!bid., p. 3727.
71
!bid., pp. 378890, !ngcrsoll tcstimony bclorc thc Hart !nquiry. Conccrning
othcrs who admittcd having sccn a Vinds cxccutc prior to thc attack, Fcrguson
citcd an a davit by a Coloncl Moscs V. Pcttigrcw rclcrring to an implcmcn
tation mcssagc which hc had sccn on or about thc 5th ol cccmbcr 1941.
thc rst timc that ! did not know that ! was standing alonc against
thc world in my tcstimony.
72

Svvxixc Covvonov~)iox ov His Mv:ovy
S~vvovb Vvi)vs Kv~:vv ox u)y ix )nv P~civic
Saord kncw that Kramcr was lamiliar with thc Vinds
xccutc. Altcr all, it was Kramcr who had translatcd thc crucial
passagcs and handcd thc tclctypcd intcrccpt to Saord on thc
morning ol cccmbcr 4. Tcn a wcck or so latcr Kramcr and
Saord togcthcr had gonc ovcr a spccial loldcr ol mcssagcs lcad
ing up to Pcarl Harbor that Kramcr was asscmbling lor Acting
Navy Sccrctary Forrcstal, in Sccrctary Knoxs abscncc lrom thc
countryin Hawaii, thcn a tcrritory, not yct a statcto invcsti
gatc thc attack. Saord bclicvcd a copy ol thc Vinds xccutc
was includcd in that spccial loldcr.
73

Saord had discusscd thc Vinds intcrccpt with Kramcr in
thc spring ol 1943, bclorc Kramcr lclt lor Pcarl Harbor and activc
duty in thc Pacic. At that timc Kramcrs mcmory, Saord said,
coincidcd with his own. Tcy had not thcn lookcd lor it, lor thcy
had both cxpcctcd to nd cvcrything pcrtaining to that winds
mcssagc in thc lcs.
74
!n any cvcnt, thc Vinds xccutc was not
thcn in controvcrsy.
75

Fcrguson also quotcd lrom NC! Top Sccrct tcstimony by Admiral Turncr to
thc ccct that hc had lcarncd on cccmbcr 6 that Tc Vinds mcssagc camc
in and that it mcant at lcast a brcak in diplomatic rclations and probably
war. Also a Lt. Col. Kcndall ]. Ficldcr who had tcsticd bclorc thc Robcrts
Commission to thrcc signal words . . . as an indication that thc codc had bccn
lollowcd and that thc attack was planncd (ibid., part 8, pp. 379294).
72
!bid., p. 3793.
73
!bid., p. 3689.
74
!bid., pp. 3693, 3697.
75
!bid., pp. 3731, 377476.
Altcr that, Saord had had no occasion to talk to anyonc
about thc Vinds xccutc until latc 1943, whcn hc had bccn
ordcrcd by thc ircctor ol Naval Communications to prcparc
a history ol radio intclligcncc up to and including thc attack
on Pcarl Harbor.
76
Hc thcn bcgan rcscarching thc prcPcarl
Harbor rccord, including ol coursc thc Vinds Codc sctup
and thc Vinds xccutc. At that point Saord startcd asking
anyonc hc cncountcrcd who had bccn on duty in thc Var and
Navy cpartmcnts, prior to Pcarl Harbor, and might havc bccn
cxpcctcd to havc rst hand knowlcdgc ol thc winds mcssagc,
what thcy could rcmcmbcr about cvcnts ol that pcriod. Tat was
whcn Saord lcarncd lrom Commandcr Vcslcy A. Vright,
77

who had had it lrom McCollum, that McCollums long warning
mcssagc ol cccmbcr 4 had not bccn scnt.
78
Hc also discovcrcd
thcn that many intcrccpt lcs wcrc missing.
79

!n his rcscarch ol prcPcarl Harbor radio intclligcncc, Saord
tcsticd, hc wantcd thc bcnct ol Kramcrs rccollcctions. So on
cccmbcr 22, 1943, hc wrotc Kramcr, thcn in thc Pacic.
80
Hc
askcd Kramcr primarily about his cccmbcr 67, 1941, dclivcrics
ol thc ]apancsc 14part rcply to Vashingtons top o cials. Tc
war was still in progrcss, so Saord phrascd his qucstions vcry
carclully, in thc cvcnt that my lcttcr might lall into unauthorizcd
hands. Hc wrotc: Vc cant nd thc original Vcathcr Rcport
. . . and its translation. Vhat bccamc ol it:
81
Vhcn Kramcr
76
!bid., pp. 3602, 3693.
77
Commandcr Vcslcy A. Vright. As ol cccmbcr 7, 1941, Vright was Assis
tant Communications ccr, in Pcarl Harbor on thc Sta ol CinC. Scc
Hcwitt !nquiry, ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 261.
78
!bid., part 8, p. 3701, Saord ]anuary 22, 1944, lcttcr to Kramcr.
79
!bid., p. 3706.
80
!bid., p. 3691.
81
!bid., p. 3698.
rcplicd, cccmbcr 28, 1943,
82
hc answcrcd thc qucstions about
thc cccmbcr 67 dclivcrics, but had misundcrstood Saords
qucstion about thc Vcathcr Rcport.
83

Saord wrotc a sccond lcttcr ]anuary 22, 1944, asking many
morc qucstions about thc Vinds xccutc.
84
Tis timc hc
assigncd codc numbcrs to pcrsons, datcs, mcssagcs, placcs, ctc., so
that Kramcr could answcr Saords qucstions by citing numbcrs.
85

Hc also askcd lor Kramcrs commcnt on Saords suspicions
sincc Novcmbcr 15, 1943, which hc said had bccn conrmcd
cccmbcr 2, 1943, and absolutcly provcd ]anuary 18, 1944, that
Kimmcl, long considcrcd a scapcgoat, was actually thc victim
ol a lramcup. Saord said hc had ovcrwhclming prool ol thc
guilt ol pNav and thc gcncral sta.
86

Kramcr did not rcply to Saords sccond lcttcr. Vhcn Kramcr
latcr turncd thc corrcspondcncc ovcr to thc ]CC, Saords rcmarks
about a lramcup, pNav, and thc gcncral sta rcturncd to haunt
him.
Vny V~s S~vvovb Pvvssuvvb )o Cn~xcv nis
Tvs)i:oxy Anou) )nv Vixbs xvcu)v-
Saord kncw that whcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc NC! in
Pcarl Harbor during thc summcr ol 1944, hc had dcscribcd in
somc dctail thc intcrccption ol thc Vinds xccutc and his rolc
in its translation and disposition.
87
Saord lully cxpcctcd Kramcr
to acknowlcdgc that a Vinds xccutc had bccn rcccivcd bclorc
cccmbcr 7. !n lact, Saord said also that Kramcr had told him,
82
!bid., pp. 3699700. Kramcr to Saord, cccmbcr 28, 1943.
83
!bid.
84
!bid., pp. 370004. Saord to Kramcr, ]anuary 22, 1944.
85
!bid.
86
!bid., p. 3700.
87
!bid., pp. 380405, 380607.
cvcn altcr thc start ol thc ]CC hcarings as rcccntly as |j|ust bclorc
Christmas 1945, that hc rcmcmbcrcd thc Vinds xccutc.
88
vcr and ovcr again thc ]CC mcmbcrs askcd Saord about
thc Vinds Codc sctup and whcthcr a Vinds xccutc had
actually bccn rcccivcd bclorc thc attack. Vhy was no onc othcr
than Saord willing to tcstily to having sccn thc Vinds xccutc
bclorc cccmbcr 7:
Saord: !n 1945, thcrc was a dctcrmincd cort madc to havc
mc rcvcrsc my tcstimony bclorc prcvious invcstigations and to
say ! had ncvcr sccn thc winds mcssagc.
89

Rclcntlcss cort was madc to pcrsuadc him that hc must bc
mistakcn, that thcrc had ncvcr bccn a Vinds xccutc. Licutcnant
Commandcr ]ohn Sonnctt, spccial rcprcscntativc ol thc sccrctary
ol thc Navy and lcgal adviscr to Admiral Hcwitt, intcrvicwcd
Saord scvcral timcs. Sonnctt had told Saord rcpcatcdly that
hc thought his mcmory was playing him tricks, that hc might bc
sucring lrom hallucinations. Sonnctt told Saord hc should
changc |his| tcstimony to pcrmit rcconciling all prcvious dis
crcpancics. . . . !n somc cascs thc idca was statcd outright, in
somc cascs it was implicd, and in othcr cascs it was uncxprcsscd
but obviously thc cnd in vicw.
90

!n all his cxpcricncc as a commissioncd o ccr ol thc Navy,
Saord said, hc had ncvcr sccn anything likc it. Tc wholc pro
ccdurc struck Saord as quitc unusual, and hc had prcparcd a
mcmorandum on thc subjcct whilc thc cvcnts wcrc still lrcsh in
88
!bid., p. 3710.
89
!bid., p. 3606.
90
!bid., pp. 360809, From Saord ]uly 14, 1945, Mcmorandum ol Convcrsa
tions in Conncction Vith Admiral Hcwitts !nvcstigation ol thc Pcarl Harbor
isastcr.
my mcmory.
91
Saord bclicvcd Sonnctt had cmploycd similar
tactics on othcr witncsscs whosc tcstimony had lavorcd Admiral
Kimmcl, particularly Rochclort and Kramcr.
92
Vhcn Sonnctt
tcsticd bclorc thc ]CC latcr, hc dcnicd that hc had tricd to inu
cncc Saord in any way.
93

Many witncsscs mcntioncd a lalsc winds mcssagc that was
at onc timc bclicvcd authcntic.
Richardson: id it cvcr occur to you, that that |thc lalsc winds
mcssagc| was thc only mcssagc that cvcr camc in thcrc on thc
4th, and that you wcrc mistakcn:
Saord: Tis is only about thc 20th timc such suggcstion has
bccn madc to mc, but ! saw thc winds mcssagc myscll.
94

To Saord it bcgan to look likc a conspiracy. A mcssagc had
bccn intcrccptcdhc was surc ol thatthc socallcd Vinds
xccutc, that hc considcrcd a short rangc lorccast ol war, posi
tivc cvidcncc that thc Unitcd Statcs would bc involvcd lrom thc
vcry bcginning in thc war that was looming with ]apan. Yct thc
Vashington o cials who, according to Saord, had rcccivcd thc
mcssagc had rcally donc nothing to warn thc cld commandcrs
about it. McCollums long warning mcssagc had not bccn scnt.
Vhat sccmcd likc an orchcstratcd attcmpt had bccn madc to pcr
suadc anyonc who might havc sccn, or who had cvcr admittcd scc
ing, thc Vinds xccutc bclorc thc attack to dcny it. nc pcrson
altcr anothcr namcd by Saord as possiblc witncsscs, including
thosc who had admittcd during carlicr invcstigations that thcy
had sccn it bclorc thc attack, changcd thcir storics, dccidcd thcy
had bccn mistakcn, or dcnicd that thcy had sccn it at all. Saord
91
!bid., p. 3607.
92
!bid., p. 3610.
93
!bid., part 10, pp. 500912.
94
!bid., part 8, p. 3645.
himscll, who rcluscd to changc his story, was vilicd. 8lamc lor
thc surprisc attack had bccn lcvicd by thc Robcrts Commission
and by public opinion against thc two Pcarl Harbor commandcrs.
And thcn thcrc was thc disappcarancc, not only ol thc Vinds
xccutc mcssagc itscll, which should havc bccn rctaincd in thc
lcs, but also any rclcrcncc to thc instructions to Chcltcnham
station conccrning its intcrccption.
95
Morcovcr, othcr crucial prc
attack MAG!C intcrccpts had turncd up missing as wcll.
96

Rcprcscntativc ]ohn V. Murphy qucstioncd Saord about
his rcmarks in his lcttcr to Kramcr, to thc ccct that No onc
in pNav can bc trustcd and that Kimmcl was victim ol a
lramcup.
Murphy: Tcll us who was in pnav who could not bc trustcd.
. . . Plcasc givc us somc namcs. . . . Vho wcrc you saying could
not bc trustcd: Namcs plcasc. Vho could not bc trustcd: . . .
Namcs, plcasc. ! am still waiting. Vaiting. Vill you plcasc givc
us thc namcs as to who could not bc trustcd in pnav: Plcasc,
sir. . . .
Saord: ! prclcr not to answcr.
97

Murphy also askcd Saord whom hc was accusing ol lram
ing Kimmcl and Short. Framing somcbody, Murphy said, was
onc ol thc mcancst and lowcst crimcs. Vhcn prcsscd to say
whcthcr hc lclt that thc Gcncral Sta ol thc Unitcd Statcs Army
undcr Gcncral Marshall, and thc Gcncral Sta ol thc Navy undcr
Admiral Stark had lramcd Kimmcl and Short, Saord rcplicd,
! lclt that way.
98

95
!bid., part 8, p. 3652, Saord tcstimony.
96
!bid., p. 3686.
97
!bid., pp. 372122.
98
!bid., pp. 372324.
Scnator Scott V. Lucas also qucstioncd Saord ruthlcssly
about his lcttcr to Kramcr. Hc askcd cspccially why thc mcn whosc
namcs Saord had mcntioncd, loyal and patriotic Amcricans all,
would want to sccrctc or dcstroy or disturb an important mcssagc
ol this kind. Saord nally said that hc rcally had no propcr basis
lor suspicion against Stark and Marshall. Hc had no suspicion
dircctcd against any individual who can bc namcd. 8ut thc lact
rcmaincd. cial rccords havc disappcarcd lrom thc lcs ol thc
Navy cpartmcnt, and that is a suspicious circumstancc. ! havc
no idca how thcy disappcarcd. !t is a lact that thcy arc not prcscnt
and cannot bc accountcd lor. Howcvcr, Saord said hc had no
suspicion against any individual. Hc could namc nobody.
99

Rcprcscntativc ]. 8ayard Clark was also rclcntlcss in qucstion
ing Saord. Tc ccct ol Saords Vinds xccutc tcstimony il
truc, Clark pointcd out, was to accusc thc most scnior Army and
Navy o ccrsStark and Marshallnot only ol ncglcct ol duty
but also ol violating thc criminal law ol thc land by sccrcting,
rcmoving, dclacing or dcstroying public rccords. Saord admit
tcd that his tcstimony was diamctrically opposcd to that ol othcr
witncsscs. Howcvcr, hc said, thc lact rcmaincd that documcnts
wcrc missing lrom thc lcs.
100

Murphy cvcn badgcrcd Saord about his bchavior at thc timc
ol thc attack. Saord told thc committcc hc had intcrprctcd thc
Vinds xccutc to mcan
that war would commcncc within two or thrcc days in all
probability, possibly Saturday, cccmbcr 6, possibly Sunday,
cccmbcr 7. Tat was thc bcst cstimatc that could bc madc as
to thc timing implicd by a mcssagc ol that naturc.
101

99
!bid., pp. 370406.
100
!bid., pp. 368486.
101
!bid., p. 3684.
Tc nc v.:. Mcssagc had comc in carly that Sunday morn
ing. Yct, Murphy pointcd out, Saord had had no onc on duty to
translatc that mcssagc promptly. Hc had lclt thc o cc Saturday
at 4:30 v.:. and was at homc, in Murphys words, still in pajamas
having brcaklast at 2:00.
102

Saord cxplaincd that hc had lulllcd his rcsponsibilitics as
hcad ol thc sccurity scction ol Naval Communications bclorc hc
lclt thc dcpartmcnt on Saturday. Hc had donc his bcst to alcrt thc
mcn in thc cld by scnding out instructions conccrning thc nccd
to dcstroy condcntial codcs and ciphcrs. Hc was not authorizcd
to scnd out warnings to thc cld, and hc had no rcsponsibility
to issuc ordcrs to thc translators.
103
Ncithcr thc ]apancsc rcply to
our notc ol Novcmbcr 26 nor thc nc v.:. Mcssagc had comc
in bclorc Saords duty cndcd on Saturday. Morcovcr, Sunday
was his rcgular day o.
104
vcn so, Murphy practically accuscd
Saord ol not bcing intcrcstcd in protccting thc Amcrican navy.
Murphy: o ! undcrstand you to say you wcrc not rcsponsiblc
lor anything at all that might hclp with winning thc war:
Keefe: Mr. Chairman, ! dont think that thc answcr bcars any
such intcrprctation. ! think it is an unlair qucstion. Tc witncss
didnt tcstily to any such thing. Tc witncss is cntitlcd to somc
dcgrcc ol lairncss and lair play. . . . ! objcct bccausc thc witncss
has tcsticd that undcr thc sctup hc had no rcsponsibility lor
translators. You arc trying to makc it appcar that hc did havc
and had no intcrcst in protccting thc wcllarc ol thc Nation.
105

Vhcn Kcclc had an opportunity to qucstion Saord, hc said
hc was puzzlcd and assumcd othcr committcc mcmbcrs wcrc
102
!bid., pp. 371518.
103
!bid., p. 3746.
104
!bid., p. 3777.
105
!bid., p. 3746.
too. Vhat possiblc intcrcst, pcrsonal intcrcst might Saord
havc in this controvcrsy: You rcalizc, ol coursc, Kcclc said to
Saord, that in vicw ol thc implications that havc bccn statcd in
thc crosscxamination ol you, cspccially by thc gcntlcman lrom
Pcnnsylvania |Murphy|, that you havc madc somc rathcr strong
chargcs: . . . Tat may wcll militatc against your carccr as a naval
o ccr. id you rcalizc that whcn you camc hcrc as a witncss:
l coursc, Saord rcplicd, cvcry timc hc had tcsticd. Truc,
hc had no pcrsonal intcrcst, cxccpt ! startcd it and ! havc got to
scc it through.
Keefe: And dcspitc thc lact that you havc nothing pcrsonally
to gain, and cvcrything to losc, you havc pcrsistcd in this story
cvcry timc you havc tcsticd:
Saord: ! havc.
106
. . . ! bclicvc thc bcst dclcnsc is tclling thc
truth.
107

Finally Saord complctcd vc days (Fcbruary 16) bclorc thc
]CC, battcrcd and bruiscd pcrhaps, but unbowcd. His tcstimony
rcmaincd consistcnt throughout thc invcstigations.
Chicl Varrant ccr Ralph T. 8riggs, thc Chcltcnham codc
clcrk who had intcrccptcd thc Vinds xccutc, had bowcd to thc
command ol his supcrior o ccr and did not tcstily. Saord had
rcspcctcd 8riggss rcqucst lor condcntiality, ncvcr mcntioncd his
namc, and rcvcalcd nothing 8riggs had told him in condcncc.
108

(8ccausc ol pcrsonal problcmshis wilc was going blind
8riggs complicd with thc ordcr ol Captain Harpcr, his supcrior
o ccr, out ol lcar hc would bc rcd il hc disobcycd. nly sincc
his rctircmcnt in 1977 has hc acknowlcdgcd intcrccpting thc
106
!bid., pp. 380708.
107
!bid., p. 3717.
108
Scc Chaptcr 28, pp. 671.
Vinds xccutc and locatcd rccords proving this.
109
Tc rcassur
ancc Saord rcccivcd lrom 8riggs that a Vinds xccutc had
actually bccn pickcd up on cccmbcr 4, 1941 must havc givcn
him addcd condcncc in standing up to thc vigorous and grucl
ing crosscxamination by somc ol ]CCs cmocratic mcmbcrs.
His dctcrmination to lcarn thc truth about Pcarl Harbor pcr
sistcd lor thc rcst ol his lilc. Hc workcd closcly with this author
in trying to lollow invcstigativc lcads and to cxplain discrcpancics
in somc ol thc tcstimony.
Saord latcr was rccognizcd lor somc ol his contributions
to cryptography. n Fcbruary 11, 1946, thc Navy cpartmcnt
awardcd him thc Lcgion ol Mcrit lor his work as a crypto
graphic cxpcrt lrom March 1942 to Scptcmbcr 1945.
110
!n 1958
Congrcss rcwardcd him 8100,000 lor his corts in solving lorcign
codcs and constructing our own codcs.
111
And in 1983, a dccadc
altcr his dcath, hc was awardcd a dclaycd patcnt lor his invcntion
that ovcrcomcs jamming ol radio communications.
112

Kv~:vv, U.S. N~vy Tv~xsi~)ov
~xb Couvivv, Tvs)ivivs
n Fcbruary 6 Captain Alwin alton Kramcr took thc
stand. Fortytwo ycars old and a 1925 graduatc ol thc Annapolis
Naval Acadcmy, Kramcr had 21 ycars in thc Navy. Hc had bccn
in chargc ol a scction ol thc ivision ol Naval Communications,
109
Scc ]ohn Tolands Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Ncw York: 8crklcy
8ooks, 1983), Postscript, scction 4, pp. 34647. Toland rcports thc rccol
lcctions ol thc ]apancsc naval attach in Vashington, Captain Yuzuru Sanc
matsu, who pickcd up thc Vinds xccutc on cccmbcr 4, 1941, and thosc
ol assistant attach, Licutcnant Commandcr. Yoshimori Tcrai. Scc chaptcr 10,
pp. 22829.
110
111
Washington Star, May 18, 1973.
112
Te New York Times, August 27, 1983.
but at thc timc ol thc attack hc had actually bccn scrving undcr
Saord in thc sccurity scction. uring thc crucial months bclorc
cccmbcr 7, hc had bccn thc Navys couricr and ]apancsc trans
lator. A couplc ol ycars altcr thc attack, hc was scnt to thc Pacic
whcrc hc scrvcd undcr Admiral Nimitz in Pcarl Harbor and
thcn undcr Admiral Halscy in Noumca, Ncw Calcdonia. Hc had
bccn promotcd during thc war lrom licutcnant commandcr to
captain.
113

As ]apancsc translator and Navy couricr, Kramcr had bccn a
crucial playcr in thc prcattack situation. !t was hopcd that, with
his intimatc knowlcdgc ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts, hc would bc
ablc to shcd somc light on thc rcccipt ol thcsc intcrccpts and thc
timing ol thcir dclivcry to thc various rccipicnts.
Vhcn hc was sworn in by Chairman 8arklcy, thc old Scnatc
Caucus Room was packcd, thc audicncc tcnsc in anticipation.
Among thosc who had bccn attcnding thc hcarings rcgularly
lor wccks was Alicc Rooscvclt Longworth, daughtcr ol thc latc
Rcpublican prcsidcnt, Tcodorc Rooscvclt, and widow ol thc latc
spcakcr ol thc Housc, Nicholas Longworth. Mrs. Longworth was
in hcr usual scat on a bcnch bchind thc committcc mcmbcrs. At
thc othcr cnd ol thc room, was Mrs. Kramcr, who was oltcn sccn,
standing on hcr scat ncrvously biting hcr ngcrnails, during thc
vc days hcr husband was a witncss.
Kramcr said hc had bccn thoroughly lamiliar with thc ]apancsc
MAG!C intcrccpts, but !t was not csscntial lor thc activitics
ol my scction that ! bc so lamiliar with thc ncgotiations, nor
with thc status ol thc diplomatic arrangcmcnts and intcrcoursc
bctwccn this country and ]apan.
114
Howcvcr, his lamiliarity with
thc intcrccpts clcarly madc him onc ol ]CCs most important
witncsscs.
113
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 389495, 3897.
114
!bid., part 36, p. 81.
Kramcr had not bccn callcd to tcstily bclorc thc Robcrts
Commission or thc Hart inquiry. Howcvcr, in 194344, whcn
stationcd in thc South Pacic, hc had had occasion to rcvicw
thc prcattack situation. At that timc hc rcccivcd two lcttcrs
lrom Saordonc datcd cccmbcr 22, 1943,
115
which hc had
answcrcd, and a sccond datcd ]anuary 22, 1944,
116
which hc had
not.
117
Tcn in midMay 1944, Kramcrs commanding o ccr,
Halscy, rcccivcd a lcttcr lrom Kimmcl.
118
Kimmcl askcd Halscy
to consult Kramcr about thc Vinds xccutc and thc cccmbcr
67 dclivcrics ol thc crucial lastminutc ]apancsc intcrccpts to top
Vashington o cials.
Kramcr rcvicwcd thc situation in his mind at that timc and
wrotc a mcmorandum For thc bcnct ol Halscy, answcring in
ccct both Saords sccond lcttcr and Kimmcls lcttcr to Halscy.
Halscy rcad Kramcrs mcmorandum and rcturncd it to him.
119

Kramcr did not scnd it to Saord. For rcasons ol sccurity, hc
madc only a singlc copy, which hc rctaincd in his pcrsonal lcs in
a scalcd cnvclopc.
120

!n Scptcmbcr 1944 Kramcr was issucd travcl ordcrs to go
lrom Halscys hcadquartcrs in Ncw Calcdonia to Pcarl Harbor
to tcstily bclorc thc Navy Court ol !nquiry. Vhcn hc appcarcd
on Scptcmbcr 13 hc spokc quitc rcadily about thc arrangcmcnts
madc to intcrccpt wcathcr broadcasts, about his having bccn
115
!bid., part 8, pp. 369899.
116
!bid., pp. 370004.
117
!bid., part 9, p. 4093.
118
!bid., p. 408081, also part 18, pp. 333334, xhibit 150, Kimmcl lcttcr to
Halscy.
119
!bid., part 9, pp. 407984. Scc also pp. 4096124, Kramcr 1944 mcmo
randum.
120
!bid., pp. 415356.
shown thc Vinds xccutc whcn it was rcccivcd, and about his
having hclpcd to intcrprct it.
121

Tc lollowing spring thc Hcwitt inquiry had bcgun. n May
22, 1945, whcn Kramcr appcarcd thcrc, hc was lcss positivc that
thc Vinds xccutc had includcd thc words rclcrring to thc
Unitcd Statcs, Higashi no kazc amc.
122

Vhcn rccallcd by Hcwitt a couplc ol months latcr, Kramcr
was again qucstioncd about thc Vinds xccutc, this timc by
Licutcnant Commandcr ]ohn F. Sonnctt, counscl to Hcwitt and
spccial assistant to thc sccrctary ol Navy. His tcstimony this timc,
on ]uly 6, 1945, dicrcd in important rcspccts lrom his 1944 tcs
timony bclorc thc NC!. !n rcplying to Sonnctt, Kramcr adoptcd
Sonnctts phrascology, agrccing that thcrc was a winds mcssagc,
but hc could not say with ccrtainty what thc contcnts wcrc. Nor
could hc
rccall thc cxact ]apancsc nomcnclaturc uscd, but thc phrasc
not in accordancc with cxpcctations. . . could havc thc impli
cation ol our words rclations arc rcaching a crisis,. . . cithcr a
minor crisis or a major crisis.
!t could mcan simply that ncgotiations conccrning an undcr
standing with thc Unitcd Statcs wcrc at an cnd or that rclations
wcrc to bc brokcn or it could cvcn mcan that thc crisis was so
scvcrc that war was immincnt.
123

!n his tcstimony bclorc thc ]CC, Kramcr said that in mid
or latc Scptcmbcr, bclorc thc committcc bcgan its work, hc was
invitcd to Starks homc lor lunch. Also invitcd wcrc Schuirmann
and McCollum.
124
Tc lunchcon was largcly and primarily a
social aair and wc discusscd old timcs. 8ut Kramcr said somc
121
!bid., part 33, pp. 84776.
122
!bid., part 36, pp. 7985.
123
!bid., pp. 33950.
124
!bid., part 9, p. 4060.
aspccts ol Pcarl Harbor wcrc discusscd. |T|hc chicl point hc
rcmcmbcrcd was as to what timc Admiral Stark got down |to
his o cc Sunday morning, cccmbcr 7| and whcthcr thcrc was
a conlcrcncc in his o cc. Tcrc wcrc no papcrs at thc lunchcon,
and no mcntion was madc ol thc Vinds Codc mcssagc, thc
Pilot Mcssagc, or thc 14part ]apancsc rcply.
125

Tcn on Scptcmbcr 28 Kramcr was hospitalizcd.
126
(A month
carlicr hc had gonc to thc Navy Mcdical Hospital at 8cthcsda
lor a routinc physical chcckup.) Tc hospitalization ol thc most
important witncss in thc |upcoming congrcssional| invcstigation
attractcd prcss attcntion.
127
A Unitcd Prcss dispatch rcportcd
Rcpublican chargcs, dcnicd by thc Navy, that hc had bccn bro
kcn in mind and body and was bcing hcld incommunicado in a
hospital psychopathic ward.
128
An Associatcd Prcss story also
hcld, quoting an unidcnticd sourcc, that Kramcr was bcing
badgcrcd to changc his original tcstimony.
129
According to thc
New York Times, Kramcr had bccn bcsct and bclcagucrcd . . .
badgcrcd and bcsct by an cort to brcakdown (sic) his tcstimony.
Hc dcnicd thc chargc and asscrtcd that hc was lccling vcry wcll
and would appcar bclorc thc committcc prcparcd to statc lully
anything ! know that thcy may want to know.
130

Kramcr was visitcd in thc hospital by Saord and committcc
mcmbcrs Gcarhart and Kcclc. Tcir convcrsation was vcry plcas
ant in naturc, Kramcr said, thcy madc no attcmpt to bulldozc
125
!bid., pp. 4061, 4063.
126
!bid., pp. 3964, 4060.
127
!bid., pp. 396465.
128
!bid., p. 3966.
129
!bid.
130
!bid., p. 3965. Also C.P. Trusscl, New York Times, Novcmbcr 12, 1945.
him into changing his opinion or anything ol that kind.
131

Kramcr was also intcrvicwcd at thc hospital by rcportcrs.
132

Kv~:vvs NC! Vixbs Cobv Tvs)i:oxy
vs. nis Rvvvvsnvb ]CC Tvs)i:oxy
!n his cccmbcr 1943 and ]anuary 1944 lcttcrs, Saord had
askcd Kramcr about his rccollcctions ol thc prcattack situation in
Vashington, cspccially about thc Vinds xccutc and Kramcrs
cccmbcr 67 intcrccpt dclivcrics. Vhcn Kramcr appcarcd
bclorc thc ]CC, Kcclc qucstioncd him about his 1944 mcmoran
dum prcparcd lor Admiral Halscy.
133
!n that mcmorandum and
again bclorc thc NC!, Kramcr had dctailcd his rolc in translat
ing and dclivcring thc prcattack intcrccpts. Passagc by passagc,
Kcclc wcnt ovcr thc mcmorandum with Kramcr. And passagc by
passagc, Kramcr modicd his 1944 statcmcnts.
134

Tcrc wcrc scrious discrcpancics bctwccn Kramcrs carlicr
(1944) NC! tcstimony and his latcr ncwly rclrcshcd ]CC rcc
ollcctions conccrning thc rcccipt, or nonrcccipt, ol a Vinds
xccutc. At thc NC!, Kramcr had tcsticd quitc rcadily about
thc Vinds xccutc, cvcn voluntccring dctails on his own:
Higashi No Kazc Amc is ast Vind, Rain. . . . Tc scnsc ol that,
howcvcr, mcant straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possi
bly cvcn implying war with a nation to thc castward, thc Unitcd
Statcs.
135
Howcvcr, whcn Kcclc qucstioncd Kramcr, hc wa cd:
Keefe: Vas it thc truth:
131
132
!bid., p. 4078.
133
!bid., part 9, pp. 408081.
134
!bid., pp. 4093.
135
!bid., p. 4128.
Kramer: !t was not, sir. . . . !t was thc truth as it camc to my
mind at thc timc. . . . |T|hat occasion, namcly, thc Naval Court
ol !nquiry, was thc rst timc that thc qucstion ol what country
appcarcd in that piccc ol tclctypc cvcr camc up in any convcr
sation in which ! was participating. . . .
Keefe: So that wc now havc a situation whcrc you makc a
statcmcnt on a vital issuc bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry
which you admit was not truc bccausc you claim that subsc
qucnt cvcnts havc now convinccd you that thc answcr which
you gavc was not |truc|, is that thc lact: . . .
Kramer: ||cspitc thc lact that ! was caught cold |at thc NC!|
on that point whcn thc qucstion was propoundcd my rcaction
cvcn thcn was that only onc country was involvcd on that piccc
ol tclctypc papcr.
136

Keefe: Now you want us to undcrstand whcn ! rcad your tcs
timony bclorc thc naval court that according to your prcscnt
rclrcshcd and currcnt rccollcction you wcrc mistakcn, that
thcrc wcrc no such words in thc mcssagc that you saw:
Kramer: No words rclcrring to thc Unitcd Statcs. . . .
Keefe: You do not rcmcmbcr what words wcrc in thc mcssagc,
is that your tcstimony, Captain:
Kramer: Vhat ! mcan to imply by that! think it has bccn
rcitcratcd many timcsis that ! do not now and havc ncvcr
known sincc thc timc ! saw that piccc ol tclctypc cxactly what
]apancsc phrascology was in it, sir. . . .
Keefe: You prctcndcd to know what words wcrc in it whcn you
tcsticd bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry, did you not:
Kramer: Tat was apparcntly thc imprcssion ! crcatcd, ycs, sir.
136
!bid., part 9, pp. 412829.
Keefe: Ycs. Now, ! want to undcrstand what your tcstimony is
today. Am ! corrcct in thc assumption that according to your
prcscnt, or what you havc rclcrrcd to many timcs as your currcnt,
rccollcction altcr bcing rclrcshcd, you arc not ablc to tcll this
committcc what words wcrc in that codcd cxccutc mcssagc:
Kramer: My prcscnt bclicl and conviction is that piccc ol tclc
typc rclcrrcd to onc country and that country was ngland. . . .
Nishi No Kazc Harc.. . .
Keefe: ! askcd you thc simplc qucstion as to whcthcr thc statc
mcnt which you madc, which ! havc rcad to you, thc answcrs
that you gavc in rcsponsc to thosc qucstions was thc truth. Vas
it or wasnt it:
Kramer: |!|t was not thc wholc truth as ! scc it now, inasmuch
as thcrc was no rclcrcncc in that answcr to any handwriting |on
thc tclctypc mcssagc|.
137
Kcclc thcn turncd Kramcrs attcntion to his mid1945 tcsti
mony bclorc Hcwitt. Conccrning thc Vinds xccutc, Kramcr
had said at that timc:
Kramer: !t may havc bccn Higashi no kazc amc, spccically
rclcrring to thc Unitcd Statcs, as ! havc prcviously tcsticd at
Pcarl Harbor, but ! am lcss positivc ol that now than ! bclicvc
! was at that timc. Tc rcason lor rcvision in my vicw on that
is thc lact that in thinking it ovcr, ! havc a rathcr sharp rccol
lcction in thc lattcr part ol that wcck ol lccling that thcrc was
still no ovcrt mcntion or spccic mcntion ol thc Unitcd Statcs
in any ol this tra c, which ! was sccing all ol and which also
was thc only sourcc in gcncral ol my inlormation sincc ! did
not scc, as a rulc, thc dispatchcs lrom thc cct commandcrs or
going out to thcm lrom pcrations.
138

137
!bid., pp. 413132.
138
!bid., pp. 413335.
Keefe: So as latc as thc timc you tcsticd bclorc Admiral
Hcwitt you wcrc ol thc opinion that it may havc containcd thc
words Higashi no kazc amc, but you wcrc bccoming unccr
tain about it in thc light ol your lurthcr rclrcshing:
Kramer: ! mcant to imply by that spccically that ! did not
rccall, and still do not rccall, thc prccisc wording ol thc ]apancsc
on thc piccc ol tclctypc papcr. . . .
Keefe: So wc now gct to thc point ol your tcstimony hcrc that
thcrc was a mcssagc, it had somcthing on it, and must havc had
somcthing on it to dcsignatc it as a wind codc cxccutc mcssagc:
. . . Tcn ! am to undcrstand, Captain Kramcr, that this mcs
sagc, which was considcrcd ol top importancc by cvcrybody,
which cvcrybody was looking lor and on thc lookout lor, and
lor which you havc tcsticd spccic arrangcmcnts had bccn sct
up as in conncction with no othcr mcssagc, altcr this mcssagc
comcs in you scc it, you rcad it, you dctcrminc that this is thc
mcssagc you havc bccn looking lor, and you cant tcll us now
what was on that mcssagc: . . . r what it said: . . .
Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir.
139

Keefe: . . . . Tcn Mr. Sonnctt cxamincd you about a lot ol othcr
mattcrs. Tcn, Captain Kramcr, at thc conclusion ol thc cxami
nation ol Admiral Hcwitt, is it a lair assumption to concludc
that as lar as your tcstimony discloscs, thcrc was a wind cxccutc
codc mcssagc rcccivcd in thc middlc ol thc wcck, thc cxact datc
ol which you wcrc thcn unccrtain, which may havc rclcrrcd to
thc Unitcd Statcs, ngland, or possibly Russia, you wcrc not
ccrtain: you wcrc not thcn ccrtain, and you arc not ccrtain what
thc mcssagc spccically said but it may havc rclcrrcd to onc or
both or all thrcc ol thc countrics in thc original codc sctup, is
that what you mcant to tcll Admiral Hcwitt:
Kramer: Tat is what ! mcant to tcll him at thc timc. . . .
139
!bid., pp. 413637.
Keefe: Now, you, as thc man in chargc ol translations ol thcsc
mcssagcs, with knowlcdgc that thc wholc Govcrnmcnt was
sct up to pick up this vcry vital and important mcssagc, who
handlcd that mcssagc, who saw it, who rcad it, who chcckcd
thc intcrprctation ol thc watch o ccr on that mcssagc, sit hcrc
bclorc us today, and say you cant tcll us what thc mcssagc said,
you havc no collcction ol what it said at all, is that corrcct:
Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. Howcvcr, ! would likc to point out
to you, Mr. Kcclc, that ! think that an cntircly unwarrantcd
cmphasis and importancc is bcing attributcd to that mcssagc,
not only in this hcaring but in past hcarings, and in thc prcss.
Tcrc wcrc many othcr mcssagcs morc spccic as to ]apancsc
intcntions during this pcriod. . . . A wind mcssagc would havc
bccn only onc lurthcr indication ol thc gcncral trcnd ol this tral
c as wcll as thc gcncral trcnd ol thc intcrnational situation.
Keefe: Vcll ! am vcry happy that you havc madc that statc
mcnt, Captain, bccausc ! havc concludcd that, as onc mcmbcr ol
this committcc, a long timc ago that thcrc wcrc plcnty ol mcs
sagcs to havc warncd thosc who rcad thcm and saw thcm that
war was immincnt and just about to brcak, without this winds
cxccutc mcssagc. 8ut, Captain Kramcr, thc Navy cpartmcnt
and all ol thc o cials in thc Navy cpartmcntand ! assumc
thc Var cpartmcnt, tooconsidcrcd that that winds cxccutc
mcssagc was ol suprcmc importancc, othcrwisc why did thcy
sct up this grcat sctup ol cards and trcat it as thcy did, with
complctc priority ovcr cvcry othcr mcssagc that was rcccivcd:
. . . Vcll it did appcar, didnt it. . . . Now, this mcssagc camc in
ovcr thc tclctypc, didnt it: . . .
Kramer: Ycs, sir.
Keefe: Ycs. You saw it:
Kramer: ! saw it.
140

140
!bid., pp. 413839.
Keefe: . . . . Tc thing that attractcd thc attcntion ol thc GY
watch o ccr was that in this mcssagc appcarcd thc samc
]apancsc languagc words that wcrc in thc original sctup, isnt
that truc: . . . And you still want to say to us that you cant rccall
what thosc words wcrc:
Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir.
Keefe: Tcy must havc bccn thc words ol thc original codc,
othcrwisc you wouldnt havc paid any attcntion to it. . . . And
it is bccausc thc words on this tclctypc tapc wcrc thc original
]apancsc codc words in thc original codc sctup that you dctcr
mincd that this was thc codcd cxccutc mcssagc at that timc,
isnt that truc:
Kramer: !t is not sir. . . . ! should likc to cxplain prcciscly what
! mcan by that. Tc dctcrmination was not madc by mc in thc
casc ol this piccc ol tclctypc. n thc numbcr ol prcvious timcs
whcn ! had bccn callcd down conccrning possiblc mcssagcs in
this winds systcm, ! had cxamincd long shccts ol this tclctypc
papcr, had lookcd lor thc point ol whcthcr or not thc cxprcs
sion was rcpcatcd or appcarcd as it was supposcd to appcar
in thc middlc or at thc cnd, or both. !n this particular casc
my prcsumption was that thc GY watch o ccr had madc that
dctcrmination inasmuch as thc piccc ol papcr ! saw was only
a short piccc ol papcr, 3 or 4 inchcs in lcngth as ! rccollcct,
and that prcsumably hc had idcnticd this mcssagc as bcing
an authcntic winds mcssagc, not only lrom thc wording that
actually appcarcd in it, but lrom its location in thc ]apancsc
plain languagc broadcast. Tat was a lunction ol thc GY watch
o ccr not only as rcgards this winds systcm, but as rcgards all
systcms to dctcrminc its authcnticity and to brcak it down. Tc
only rcason lor having shown this piccc ol papcr to mc was in
conncction with thc ]apancsc words thcrcon, and that is all, sir.
. . .
Keefe: And you lookcd at thosc words and lookcd at thc intcr
prctation which hc had givcn thcm. You may havc corrcctcd it
in somc particular, and you bccamc convinccd that thc ]apancsc
languagc words on that piccc ol tclctypc madc that mcssagc thc
]apancsc codc cxccutc mcssagc and you so dctcrmincd at that
timc and wcnt down to Captain Saords o cc and handcd it
to him, or saw thc watch o ccr hand it to him and said, Hcrc
it is. Tis is it. Tc thing that wc havc bccn straining our
sclvcs lor and sctting up all this intcrccpting apparatus. Tat is
truc, isnt it:
Kramer: !t is, sir.
141

Keefe: . . . . So il thc words Higashi no kazc amc appcar
on this winds cxccutc mcssagc thc intcrprctation would mcan
ast wind rain, that is right, isnt it: . . . Tcn you say that
is plain ]apancsc languagc. Tc scnsc ol that, howcvcr, mcant
straincd rclations or a brcak in rclations, possibly cvcn imply
ing war with a nation on thc castward, thc Unitcd Statcs. Now
that intcrprctation is thc samc today as it was whcn you tcsti
cd out thcrc bclorc thc Naval Court ol !nquiry, isnt it:
Kramer: xactly, sir.
Keefe: So that il you had wantcd to you could havc indicatcd
that thosc words mcant war with thc Unitcd Statcs, couldnt
you, and bc within thc intcrprctation which you had givcn to
thc Naval Court ol !nquiry: !t was onc ol thc thrcc altcrna
tivcs, was it not:
Kramer: nly, Mr. Kcclc, insolar as you would cvaluatc thc
]apancsc instructions containcd in thc sctup ol this wind mcs
sagc rclcrring to thc dcstruction ol codcs and classicd papcrs.
An cvaluation which concludcd that that mcant war would
thcn includc that intcrprctation, ycs, sir.
142

141
!bid., pp. 414142.
142
!bid., p. 4144.
Kcclc thcn askcd Kramcr about thc cards distributcd at thc
dircction ol Noycs to pcrsons who wcrc to watch lor a plainlan
guagc ]apancsc Vinds xccutc. Kramcr had tcsticd bclorc thc
NC! that thcsc cards had on thcm thc | ]apancsc| cxprcssions
containcd in this cxhibit, and thc mcaning.
143
Howcvcr, Kramcr
told thc ]CC that apparcntly my mcmory was laulty at that
momcnt as to what was on thc cards. My prcscnt bclicl and con
viction is that thc ]apancsc cxprcssions did not appcar on thosc
cards. Kcclc thought it pcrlcctly in linc with common scnsc lor
Kramcr to havc listcd thc ]apancsc words on thc card, togcthcr
with thcir mcaning, so that thcsc topight pcoplc to whom thc
cards wcrc dircctcd . . . would bc ablc to comparc it |a Vinds
xccutc| with thc ]apancsc words on thc card and thcn know
thc mcaning. Howcvcr, Kramcr wantcd to changc that tcstimony.
Hc insistcd that, according to his prcscnt, currcnt, rclrcsh|cd|
rccollcction, thc only words hc had put on thc cards wcrc thc
nglish translation and thc country rclcrrcd to and that was all.
. . . ast VindrainUnitcd Statcs, wcst windclcarng
land, north windcloudyRussia.
144

As Kcclcs qucstioning wound down, Kramcr admittcd
that thcrc had bccn a Vinds xccutc, on that point hc and
Saord wcrc in agrccmcnt. And hc had bclicvcd that it was an
authcntic mcssagc ol that winds systcm . . . |u|ntil thc last lcw
days whcn !. . . . had bccn making lurthcr studics, including thc
rcading ol intcrrogations ol high ]apancsc o cials by Gcncral
MacArthur.
145

Vhcn Rcpublican Rcprcscntativc Kcclc nishcd qucstion
ing Kramcr, cmocratic Scnator Lucas took ovcr. Hc pointcd
out that Kramcr had had only a lcw bricl scconds ol contact,
143
!bid., part 9, p. 4126.
144
!bid., pp. 412627.
145
!bid., pp. 412324, part 18, pp. 332331, xhibit 142, lor Novcmbcr 7,
1945, rcport on intcrrogation ol ]apancsc o cials rc Vinds.
Not ovcr 30 scconds. Probably ncarcr 10 or 15 scconds with
thc Vinds xccutc bclorc it was handcd to Saord. Hc had
not bccn involvcd in its dccoding, translation, and dclivcry. !t was
by mcrc chancc that hc had happcncd to bc in his o cc as thc
GY watch o ccr passcd on his way to dclivcr it to Saord. Tus,
Lucas implicd, Kramcrs contact with thc mcssagc was so bricl
that it was not surprising his rccollcctions wcrc not too clcar.
146

Piio) Mvss~cv Rvcvivvb, Axxouxcixc ]~v~xs
Rvsvoxsv )o U.S. Novv:nvv :6 Ui)i:~)u:
n Saturday morning, cccmbcr 6, 1941, U.S. intclligcncc
pickcd up a ]apancsc dispatch that bccamc known as thc Pilot
Mcssagc bccausc it announccd to thc ]apancsc ambassadors in
Vashington thc impcnding arrival ol thcir govcrnmcnts 14part
rcsponsc to thc U.S. notc ol Novcmbcr 26 rcjccting thcir latcst
proposal lor compromisc. Tis Pilot Mcssagc told thc ]apancsc
ambassadors that thc timc lor its prcscntation to thc Unitcd
Statcs would bc wircd scparatcly
147
in Purplccodcd nglish,
it would nccd dccrypting but not translating.
Tc timc shcct shows that thc Pilot Mcssagc was intcr
ccptcd by a Navy station on thc wcst coast cccmbcr 6, 1941,
bctwccn 7:15 to 7:20 ~.:. (castcoast timc) and thcn tclctypcd
in ]apancsc codc to thc Navy in Vashington.
148
!t was morc than
lour hours latcr (12:05 v.:.) whcn thc Army, whosc day it was
to dccodc, rcccivcd it lrom thc Navy. Tis abnormal dclay was
ncvcr accountcd lor. !t was thcn dccodcd, typcd up by thc Armys
Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc, and dclivcrcd to thc Army and Navy
o ccr couricrs.
146
!bid., pp. 414546.
147
!bid., part 12, pp. 23839.
148
!bid., part 14, p. 1413, xhibit 41, mcssagc timc shcct.
Vhcn Kramcr appcarcd bclorc thc ]CC on Fcbruary 6, hc
acknowlcdgcd that thc Navy had intcrccptcd thc Pilot Mcssagc
bctwccn 7:15 and 7:20 ~.:. that Saturday morning and that it
hadnt rcachcd thc Army, until 12:05 v.:.
149
!n any cvcnt, Kramcr
was as ccrtain as hc could bc that thc rst knowlcdgc ! had
that thc |14part| ]apancsc notc was bcing scnt to thc Unitcd
Statcs was around 3 or shortly altcr 3:00 v.:. Saturday, cccmbcr
6, 1941. Although thc Army might possibly havc dclivcrcd thc
Pilot Mcssagc to Kramcrs scction carlicr in thc altcrnoon, hc
had no rccollcction ol sccing that mcssagc until latcr in thc
altcrnoon.
150

Two days latcr Kramcr changcd thc story hc was tclling thc
]CC. Hc said hc didnt bclicvc thc Pilot Mcssagc had bccn dis
scminatcd Saturday altcrnoon at all and listcd it (Navy #7149)
as onc ol scvcral intcrccpts that wcrc dclivcrcd at 10:30 Sunday
morning.
151

! nd as a rcsult ol my study last night |altcr rclcrring to a
Navy cpartmcnt lc| that thc pilot mcssagc was not disscmi
natcd, at lcast in thc Navy, until Sunday morning subscqucnt
to 10:00, at thc timc whcn thc socallcd hiddcn word mcssagc
and a numbcr ol othcr short mcssagcs, including thc 1:00 mcs
sagc, wcrc disscminatcd.
152
Vhcn Scnator Fcrguson askcd Kramcr:
!l you did not know what this pilot mcssagc was until 10:30 . . .
on Sunday morning how did you know thcrc was going to bc a
lourtccnth part: . . . How did you know without thc pilot mcs
sagc that you wcrc going to gct an answcr to thc 26th notc:
149
!bid., part 9, pp. 410001.
150
!bid., part 8, p. 3898.
151
!bid., part 9, pp. 401718.
152
!bid., pp. 4015.
Kramcr rcplicd that hc
did not, at lcast, know positivcly but ccrtainly at thc timc and
now prcsumcd lrom thc contcxt ol thc parts wc wcrc brcak
ing down that that must bc thc rcply to Mr. Hulls notc ol 26
Novcmbcr.
153
Fcrguson tricd to nd out what thcrc was in thc rccords to
show whcthcr thc Pilot Mcssagc had actually bccn rcccivcd in
thc Navy cpartmcnt Saturday, cccmbcr 6, or Sunday morn
ing, cccmbcr 7. Kramcr admittcd that Tcrc is nothing what
socvcr in thc lc, Scnator, to show dcnitcly onc way or anothcr
that point.
154

Kramcr rcpcatcd again thc ncxt day his account ol thc Sunday
morning rcccipt and dclivcry ol thc Pilot Mcssagc. His prcscnt
bclicl, hc told thc ]CC, was that hc did not gct it in my scction
lrom thc Army until thc ncxt morning, Sunday, cccmbcr 7. . . .
Somctimc bctwccn 9 and 10:30 that morning. His mcmory had
bccn rclrcshcd . . . sincc ! got to studying this on my arrival at
Vashington.
155

As a mattcr ol lact, Kramcr told thc ]CC two days latcr that
hc did not bclicvc thc Pilot Mcssagc had cvcn bccn includcd
with thc rst dclivcry carly on thc morning ol thc 7th, but that it
had bccomc availablc only in timc lor thc sccond round ol dcliv
crics. According to thc study ! madc . . . a lcw days ago, my bcst
knowlcdgc and prcscnt conviction is that my scction in thc Navy
cpartmcnt did not rcccivc it until approximatcly 10:25 or 10:30
Sunday morning.
156
His solc rcason lor saying this, hc told
Fcrguson, was duc to thc lact that in thc Navy book it |thc Pilot
Mcssagc| appcars after thc 14part mcssagc and after thc 1:00
153
!bid., p. 4019.
154
!bid., pp. 401920.
155
!bid., p. 4102.
156
!bid., p. 4188.
mcssagc (italics addcd). Tus hc had bccn lcd to thc conclusion
that it must havc bccn dclivcrcd Sunday instcad ol Saturday.
157

Kv~:vv Tvs)ivivs Fuv)nvv ox ]~v~xs Rvviy )o
U.S. Novv:nvv :6 No)v ~xb )nvv M~))vvs
Vhcn Rcpublican Scnator 8rcwstcr took ovcr thc qucstion
ing ol Kramcr, hc said hc was amazcd that Kramcr had not
rcrcad thc mcmorandum hc had writtcn at Halscys rcqucst in
1944, not cvcn whcn hc had shown it to othcrsLicutcnant
Commandcr 8acchcr, Admiral Vilkinson, his longtimc pcr
sonal lricnd Captain Rochclort, and Marinc Corps Coloncl
8alcs.
158
8rcwstcr could scc no rcason why Kramcr shouldnt havc
rcvicwcd his mcmorandum prior to his appcarancc bclorc thc
]CC. !t would havc bccn lar casicr to crcdit his story il hc had,
rathcr than basing his cntirc prcscnt rccollcction on thc rclrcsh
mcnt rcccivcd lrom consultation with o ccrs who cxamincd that
documcnt.
159

Kramcr, likc Saord, had bccn cxamincd by Sonnctt, counscl
in thc Hcwitt inquiry. Scnator Lucas askcd Kramcr il his cxpcri
cncc with Sonnctt had bccn at all similar to Saords. Kramcr
dcnicd that Sonnctt had badgcrcd or bcsct him at any timc or
tricd to pcrsuadc him to changc his tcstimony. Hc kncw ol no onc
in thc Navy, Army, Statc cpartmcnt, or chicl cxccutivcs o cc
who had provokcd, angcrcd, or trickcd thosc pcaccloving and
harmlcss ]aps into attacking Pcarl Harbor or who had mancu
vcrcd, conspircd, or attcmptcd to lay thc solc blamc lor thc Pcarl
Harbor disastcr on Kimmcl and Short.
160

157
!bid., p. 4208.
158
!bid., p. 4153.
159
!bid., pp. 415556.
160
!bid., pp. 414849.
Kramcr was also askcd why thcrc wcrc occasional gaps in thc
numbcrcd intcrccpts. Somctimcs thc numbcring machinc would
skip a numbcr, hc said. Army and Navy both oltcn workcd on
dccryption ol thc samc intcrccpt, hc said, and both would assign
it a numbcr. Vhcn it was discovcrcd latcr that thc samc mcssagc
had bccn givcn two dicrcnt numbcrs, onc was cancclcd.
161

Vhcn askcd to cxplain thc missing Vinds xccutc tclc
typc, Kramcr said hc bclicvcd
thc purposc ol having duplicatcs lor any ol this tra c, whcthcr
cncodcd or plain languagc, was to havc an cxtra copy lor sys
tcms which wc wcrc not rcading so that morc than onc pcrson
could work on that systcm in attcmpting to brcak it down.
162

As lor thc Vinds xccutc, Kramcr had not had anything
spccically to do with it, it had gonc dircctly to Noycss o cc and
had not bccn handlcd through Kramcrs o cc.
163

Rcprcscntativc Coopcr, vicc chairman ol thc committcc,
qucstioncd Kramcr about how all thc documcnts rclating to thc
Vinds xccutc could havc vanishcd lrom thc lcs. Hc could
ocr no cxplanation. Givcn thc prccautions that had bccn takcn
to conccal thc combination to thc salc in which thcsc papcrs wcrc
kcpt, Kramcr couldnt undcrstand it. nly hc and two othcrs
kncw thc combination, and il anyonc had brokcn into thc dou
blcscalcd cnvclopc in thc Navy cpartmcnts lront o ccs whcrc
thc combination was kcpt, somconc would surcly havc known.
164

Vice Chairman: ! undcrstand thcn, Captain that thcsc mcs
sagcs, including thc numbcr 7001, wcrc in your custody. . . .
And wcrc kcpt in your salc in your o cc:
161
!bid., p. 3931.
162
!bid., p. 4140.
163
!bid., p. 3978.
164
!bid., p. 3939.
Kramer: Ycs, sir. . . .
Vice Chairman: And all ol thc lcs wcrc in thcir propcr ordcr
and in thcir propcr placc and kcpt thcrc in your salc:
Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. ! might lurthcr amplily that
answcr, sir, to this ccct, that thc socallcd numcrical lc, altcr
a scrics ol mcssagcs wcrc numbcrcd lor disscmination, a copy
was invariably and immcdiatcly inscrtcd in that numcrical lc.
Mcssagcs wcrc ncvcr rcmovcd lrom that numcrical lc lor rcl
crcncc or lor any othcr purposc. Tat numcrical lc had two
primary purposcs, onc to havc a solid lc ol what had bccn
translatcd and disscminatcd and, two, thc primary purposc was
to havc somcthing to which thc translators could turn in casc ol
rclcrcnccs to back tra c whcn luturc mcssagcs wcrc rcccivcd.
Vc had a vcry complctc and involvcd crossindcx systcm on 3
by 5 cards, covcring cvcry originator in thc ]apancsc diplomatic
scrvicc. 8y that ! mcan cvcry consulatc, cvcry cmbassy, cvcry
lcgation that originatcd mcssagcs had thcir own scrial numbcrs
lor thcir scrics ol mcssagcs. . . .
From this basic numcrical lc thcrc was no occasion that !
know ol whcrc anything was rcmovcd or dcstroycd lrom that
lc with thc cxccption ol thc lact that il it was dctcrmincd latcr,
probably a lcw days or a wcck latcr, that wc had two idcnti
cal mcssagcs, onc ol which was a duplication ol anothcr, whcn
that was discovcrcd thc latcst numcrical lc numbcr would bc
cancclcd as a duplication ol thc carlicr onc. . . .
Vice Chairman: Vcll, could anybody havc gonc in thcrc and
lchcd or stolcn all ol thc mcssagcs rclating to thc winds cxc
cutc mcssagc and you havc known nothing about it:
Kramer: ! dont scc how that would bc possiblc, sir, with this
possiblc cxccption, that thc combination ol thc salc in which
thcsc wcrc kcpt, thcrc was a copy ol that combination in a dou
blcscalcd cnvclopc in somc ol thc lront o ccs. !l that cnvc
lopc had bccn opcncd somconc clsc would, ol coursc, bc ablc to
opcn my salc. thcrwisc, thc only pcoplc who kncw thc com
bination ol thc salc in which that particular lc was kcpt wcrc
thrcc pcoplc, Licutcnant Harrison, thc thcn Chicl Ycoman
8ryant, and myscll. . . . From an cxamination ol thc lcs last
Saturday in thc Navy cpartmcnt and this study, cxhibit 142,
ol about a wcck or so ago . . . ! am as positivc as ! can bc that
that lc numbcr 7001 could not possibly havc bccn any winds
mcssagc. Tat is in addition to thc lact that ! havc absolutcly no
mattcr ol any kind, no rccollcction, no knowlcdgc that a winds
mcssagc was cvcr writtcn up by my scction.
165

Kcclc qucstioncd Kramcr about thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnts
14part rcply. According to Kramcrs 1944 mcmorandum,
Kramcr rccallcd rccciving thc rst 13 parts during thc altcrnoon
ol cccmbcr 6. Hc had tricd by phonc to locatc 8cardall, Turncr,
Vilkinson, and 8ratton. Hc had tricd, unsucccsslully, to rcach
Stark. Kramcr said hc had dclivcrcd thc 13 parts to 8cardalls
aidc at thc Vhitc Housc that Saturday cvcning.
166
Hc also told
thc ]CC that hc dclivcrcd thc 13 parts about 9:45 v.:. to Knox
at thc Vardman Park and had thcn gonc to Vilkinsons homc in
Arlington, \irginia, whcrc hc was having a dinncr party. |Kramcr
dclivcrcd to Vilkinsons homc and 8cardall was thcrc. Kramcr
thought Vilkinson MAY havc phoncd Stark and Turncr that
cvcning.| Admiral Vilkinson was prcscnt, also Captain 8cardall
|FRs naval aidc|. Kramcr said his mcmory had bccn rclrcshcd
only quitc rcccntly to thc ccct that Gcncral Milcs was also prcs
cnt. Kramcr had thcn rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt, bclorc
going homc.
167

Hc was positivc that hc had not dclivcrcd thc 13 parts ol
thc ]apancsc rcply that cvcning cithcr to !ngcrsoll, thc assistant
chicl ol Naval pcrations, or Turncr, chicl ol thc Navy Var Plans
165
!bid., part 9, p. 3939.
166
!bid., pp. 409697.
167
!bid., part 8, pp. 390304, 4025.
ivision. Yct apparcntly Turncr had sccn it that cvcning, hc tcsti
cd bclorc thc NC! that a rathcr long dispatch had bccn brought
to him somc timc during thc vcry latc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 or
thc carly morning ol cccmbcr 7. . . . |T|hc o ccr who brought
thc dispatch to thc housc statcd that thcrc was a part ol thc mcs
sagc missing . . . thc lattcr part.
168
Still Kramcr maintaincd hc
had ncithcr tclcphoncd !ngcrsoll nor dclivcrcd to him dircctly
any ol thcsc intcrccpts that night.
169

Kramcr hcld also that hc had not dclivcrcd thc 13 parts to
Turncr, although hc had tcsticd to thc contrary.
170
Fcrguson rcad
an cxccrpt lrom Turncrs ]CC tcstimony, and Kramcr had to agrcc
that Admiral Turncr kncw what hc was talking about. Howcvcr,
Kramcr continucd to maintain that hc had madc no dclivcry to
Turncr that cvcning. Hc would admit only that Turncrs rccollcc
tion obviously dicrs lrom my rccollcctions.
171

Fcrguson clicitcd lrom Kramcr that hc had draltcd lor
Noycs a cccmbcr 1 mcssagc conccrning ]apancsc movcmcnts
in Tailand, thousands ol milcs lrom any U.S. posscssions.
172

Fcrguson wantcd to know why, cspccially il Kramcr kncw noth
ing about our policy in casc ol an attack by thc ]apancsc on thc
8ritish,
173
hc
lclt that wc should insurc that thcy |C!NCAF and C!NCPAC|
got that picturc, sir, cvcn though thcy may havc rcccivcd it and
rcad it on thc Asiatic station, thc 8ritish also at Singaporc, and
thc unit at Honolulu.
174

168
!bid., part 9, p. 4027.
169
!bid., p. 4026.
170
!bid., part 4, pp. 197071.
171
!bid., part 9, p. 4029.
172
!bid., pp. 417576 (cxtcnsion #2027).
173
!bid., p. 4176.
174
!bid., p. 4175.
Vhy would hc, Kramcr, scnd a mcssagc that involvcd thc
8ritish and thc ]apancsc a thousand milcs lrom any ol our
posscssions dircctly to thc inlormation ol CincPac, which was
Admiral Kimmcl,
175
whcn hc had not scnt to cithcr thc Pacic
or Asiatic Flcct thc ship movcmcnt mcssagc, which sct up a plan
ol Pcarl Harbor, indicating what thcy wantcd it lor was an attack
latcr.
176

Kramcr said that vcry mcssagc bcaring on ship movcmcnts,
cithcr ol our Navy, our mcrchant marinc, or lorcign navics, spc
cically ngland, was givcn high priority in my scction and all
wcrc translatcd and disscminatcd by my scction.
177
Hc admittcd
that thc ]apancsc had uscd |this grid bombing map| lor all ship
movcmcnts subscqucntly to sctting up ol this abbrcviatcd systcm
ol rcporting ships in Pcarl Harbor.
178
Howcvcr, cvaluation . . . was
ncvcr at any timc a lunction ol his scction.
179
Morcovcr, Kramcr
pointcd out, Pcarl Harbor was not thc only basc thc ]apancsc had
bccn watching: 8ack in 1940, during thc coursc ol ncgotiations
with thc utch in ]ava . . . thc ]apancsc conductcd rathcr rigorous
rcconnaissancc ol all military cstablishmcnts, not only in ]ava but
in othcr islands ol thc utch ast !ndics. Tcy had also rcqucstcd
inlormation on thc military cstablishmcnts, air bascs, cct lacili
tics, in Panama and in part ol thc Vcstcrn Hcmisphcrc undcr
Unitcd Statcs jurisdiction. Tc ]apancsc diplomatic scrvicc, as
wcll as thcir military and naval attachcs abroad, Kramcr tcsticd,
wcrc vcry conscicntious pcoplc and rcportcd in mcticulous dctail
all lacts that thcy could lcarn. . . . Tcy likcwisc rcportcd in grcat
dctail thc air bascs in thc vicinity ol Scattlc and 8rcmcrton Navy
175
!bid., p. 417677.
176
!bid., part 12, p. 261, xhibit 2, p. 12, Tokyo to Honolulu Mcssagc #83.
177
!bid., part 9, p. 4174.
178
!bid., p. 4177.
179
!bid., p. 4178.
Yard, sir, similarly on thc San Francisco arca.
180
Ncvcrthclcss,
Kramcr could not point to any rcqucsts lrom thc ]apancsc in thc
lattcr part ol Novcmbcr or cccmbcr |1941| in rclation to San
Francisco and Scattlc lor bombing maps ol any locations othcr
than Pcarl Harbor.
181

Kramcr was on thc witncss stand lor vc long days (Fcbruary
611, 1946, Fcbruary 10 was a Sunday). Altcr hc nishcd tcstily
ing, hc rcturncd to thc hospital whcrc hc rcmaincd until altcr thc
committccs rcports wcrc rclcascd lor thc Sunday papcrs ol ]uly
21. Tc ncxt month at agc 46, hc was givcn a mcdical dischargc
and an untaxcd pcnsion. Hc maintaincd his silcncc on Pcarl
Harbor throughout his rcmaining 26 ycars. Hc dicd in 1972.
8v~))ox, Av:y Couvivv, ox viivvvy ov
]~v~xs Rvviy )o U.S. No)v ov Novv:nvv
Coloncl Rulus 8ratton was anothcr kcy gurc in thc cvcnts
ol cccmbcr 67. As Army couricr, hc had bccn Kramcrs coun
tcrpart, chargcd with thc dclivcry ol thc ]apancsc MAG!C intcr
ccpts to thc Armys list ol o cials cntitlcd to scc thcm. Tcsc
includcd Hull, Stimson, Marshall, Gcrow, and Milcs. 8rattons
chicl assistant had bccn Coloncl Carlislc C. uscnbury.
vcry timc 8ratton tcsticd hc changcd his story slightly in
somc rcspccts.
n Scptcmbcr 15, 1944, hc had told Coloncl Clarkc, who
was conducting a spccial invcstigation lor Marshall, that ]apans
14part rcply startcd coming in on thc 6th ol cccmbcr. !t was
thcn his rccollcction that hc had transmittcd a copy to thc
Sccrctary ol Statc that night.
182
Hc madc no mcntion ol any
othcr dclivcrics that cvcning.
180
!bid., p. 4179.
181
!bid.
182
!bid., part 34, p. 21.
n Scptcmbcr 30, 1944, whcn appcaring bclorc thc Army
Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 8ratton tcsticd that hc had had thc bulk
ol it |thc ]apancsc rcply| sincc thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. !t
camc in lourtccn parts. . . . Tirtccn ol thosc parts wcrc rcccivcd
thc altcrnoon and cvcning ol thc 6th.
183
Hc said hc had dcliv
crcd thc rst 13 parts to thrcc rccipicnts that cvcning: thc o cc
ol thc Chicl ol Sta |actually Marshalls sccrctary, Coloncl, latcr
Gcncral, 8cdcll Smith|, thc A.C. ol S. G2 |actually Gcrows
cxccutivc o ccr, Coloncl Gailcy|, thc o cc ol thc Sccrctary ol
Statc.
184
n ]uly 27, 1945, in an a davit lor Clauscn, who was touring
thc Armys scvcral thcatcrs ol opcrations undcr ordcrs ol Stimson
to intcrvicw and collcct sworn a davits lrom pcrsons involvcd
in somc way with Pcarl Harbor, 8ratton had givcn a still dicr
cnt account ol thc cvcnts ol cccmbcr 67. Clauscn had shown
8ratton scvcral sworn a davits submittcd by mcn 8ratton kncw,
somc ol thcm 8rattons supcriors in thc Army. 8ratton had intcr
prctcd somc ol thosc a davits as dicring lrom his prcvious tcs
timony, although on cxamination it is apparcnt that thcy wcrc not
actual contradictions so much as mcrcly carclully craltcd cvasions.
Howcvcr, thcy inucnccd 8ratton to rcvisc his statcmcnt.
185

!n his a davit lor Clauscn, 8ratton had said that, altcr
rccciving thc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply and asccrtaining
that thc 14th part would not bc coming in that cvcning, hc had
dircctcd uscnbury to dclivcr thc sct lor thc Chicl ol Sta at his
homc at Fort Mycr. Tc a davit statcd lurthcr, in contradiction
to his APH8 tcstimony, that hc had dclivcrcd only onc sct ol
thosc 13 parts that cvcning himscll, thc sct dcstincd lor thc sccrc
tary ol statc, which hc had lclt bctwccn 10 and 11:00 v.:. with
183
!bid., part 29, p. 2349.
184
!bid., pp. 2349 (Scptcmbcr 30, 1944), 2419, 242122 (ctobcr 2, 1944), and
2455 (ctobcr 6, 1944).
185
!bid., part 10, p. 4616.
thc night duty o ccr at thc Statc cpartmcnt. Hc also said in his
a davit that thc scts lor thc othcr o cials on 8rattons list wcrc
dclivcrcd thc ncxt morning, 7 cccmbcr 1941, with thc lour
tccnth part. 8ratton had said that whcn hc saw Marshall that
morning, Marshall had on his dcsk thc 14part mcssagc, which
hc had not givcn him. Hc could not cxplain how it had rcachcd
Marshall. According to 8ratton,
Any prior statcmcnts or tcstimony ol minc which may bc con
trary to my statcmcnts hcrc |thc a davit lor Clauscn| . . .
should bc modicd and considcrcd changcd in accordancc with
my statcmcnts hcrcin. Tis a davit now rcprcscnts my bcst
rccollcction . . . altcr having my mcmory rclrcshcd in scvcral
ways and rcspccts.
186

8y thc timc 8ratton was nally callcd to thc witncss stand
by thc ]oint Congrcssional Committcc, hc had bccn listcning lor
months to thc sworn tcstimony ol witncsscs, somc ol whom had
contradictcd onc anothcr, somc had cvcn contradictcd thcir own
carlicr tcstimony, and somc had ocrcd to shouldcr thc blamc lor
Marshalls possiblc dclinqucncics.
187
As thc bcwildcrcd 8ratton
took thc chair on Fcbruary 14, 1946, suspcnsc pcrvadcd thc
packcd hcaring room.
viivvvy )o Tov vvici~is vvxixc ov vcv:nvv
6 ov ]~v~xvsv Rvviy )o U.S. Ui)i:~)u:
Rcspccting thc rcccipt ol thc Pilot Mcssagc, 8ratton con
tradictcd thc tcstimony ol his Navy oppositc, Kramcr. Kramcrs
rclrcshcd tcstimony was that thc mcssagc had not rcachcd
him, rcady lor dclivcry, until about 10 or 10:30 Sunday morning,
cccmbcr 7.
188
Howcvcr, it was undoubtcdly availablc to Navy
186
!bid., part 35, pp. 9698, 8ratton a davit.
187
!bid., part 3, p. 1036.
188
!bid., part 9, pp. 4015, 401819, 4022, 410102.
o cials in Vashington on Saturday altcrnoon, lor scvcral Navy
o ccrs tcsticd that it had bccn phoncd or distributcd to thc
usual Navy rccipicnts by thcn.
189

8ratton told thc ]CC thc mcssagc had rst comc to his attcn
tion at about 2:00 v.:. on Saturday, that it had bccn translatcd by
thc Army, typcd, and dclivcrcd to him. Hc thcn had it distributcd
that altcrnoon about 3:00
190
to thc lull list ol pcrsons lor whom
hc was rcsponsiblc.
191
8ratton said hc cvcn rccallcd discussing its
contcnts with both Gcrow and Milcs.
192

!l thc Pilot Mcssagc had bccn dccodcd and distributcd on
Saturday, as 8ratton tcsticd, thcn Vashington o cials would
havc bccn on noticc that Tokyos rcply to our Novcmbcr 26 notc
was on its way. Tcy cxpcctcd this rcply to bc a rcjcction ol our
proposal, so thcy would havc had rcason to anticipatc a nal
brcak with ]apan, possibly thc outbrcak ol war, and would havc
had somc opportunity to think about how bcst to rcspond. !l it
had not bccn availablc until Sunday morning, as Kramcr said, thc
top pcrsonncl would not havc bccn cxpccting ]apans rcsponsc
and would havc had littlc timc to anticipatc and dccidc how to
rcspond to thc ]apancsc thrcat.
When thc rst 13 parts ol ]apans rcply, which had bccn intcr
ccptcd, dccodcd, and typcd up by carly Saturday cvcning, wcrc
actually placcd in thc hands ol thc top Vashington o cials was
crucial lor dctcrmining what wc kncw ol ]apans intcntions prior
to thc attack. 8ratton had tcsticd variously about his dclivcrics
ol this intcrccpt. ]CC Associatc Gcncral Counscl Kaulman askcd
him about thcsc scvcral discrcpancics.
Now, bclorc answcring your qucstion, 8ratton bcgan,
189
!bid., part 3, p. 1874, part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, 1972, 2056, part 10, p. 4668.
190
!bid., part 9, pp. 450912.
191
!bid., p. 4513.
192
!bid., pp. 4513, 4536.
! would likc to statc that this is thc lth timc ! havc appcarcd
as a witncss in this Pcarl Harbor invcstigation, ! hopc it will
bc thc last timc, but it is also thc rst timc that ! havc had
an opportunity to cxaminc lcs, rccords and documcnts in thc
Var cpartmcnt to rclrcsh my mcmory as to thc dctails ol
various cvcnts and it is thc rst timc that ! havc had an oppor
tunity to talk to thc pcoplc ! workcd lor and with at that timc.
!n conscqucncc my mcmory as to thc dctails ol ccrtain cvcnts
havc |sic| bccn grcatly improvcd. As to thc dctails ol ccrtain
othcr cvcnts it is loggicr than cvcr lor thc rcason that ! havc
hcard and sccn so many conicting argumcnts and statcmcnts
hcrc and clscwhcrc sincc my rcturn to Vashington.
193

Rcturning to thc 13 parts:
Tcrc arc scvcral dctails . . . that stand out vcry clcarly in my
mind. . . . First, ! callcd up thc S!S |Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc|
. . . to ask il thcrc was any likclihood ol thc lourtccnth part
coming in latcr that night |cccmbcr 6|. . . . Altcr somc dis
cussion in thc S!S, this o ccr rcturncd to thc phonc and hc
said No, thcrc is vcry littlc likclihood ol that part coming in
this cvcning.
8ratton kncw Hull had a strong intcrcst in this mcssagc, so hc
put thc 13 parts in thc pouch, lockcd it, and dclivcrcd it pcr
sonally to thc Statc cpartmcnts night duty o ccr somc timc
altcr 10:00 v.:. Hc adviscd thc night duty o ccr that this was
a highly important mcssagc as lar as thc Sccrctary ol Statc was
conccrncd and it should bc scnt out to his quartcrs immcdiatcly.
8ratton was assurcd it would bc.
194

Tcn at about 11:00 v.:. 8ratton had rcturncd to his quar
tcrs. From thcrc hc phoncd Milcss homc and was told hc was
out. Vhcn Milcs got homc and rcturncd 8rattons call, 8ratton
193
!bid., p. 4510.
194
!bid., pp. 451314.
dcscribcd thc 13 parts in guardcd tcrms and addcd that thc 14th
and most important part had not yct bccn rcccivcd. Milcs said hc
had sccn thc 13 parts whcrc hc had bccn a dinncr gucst. 8ratton
also told Milcs that hc, Milcs, had dclivcrcd thc rst 13 parts to
Hull.
195
Kaulman askcd 8ratton il Milcs had told him it wasnt
ncccssary to dclivcr thc 13 parts to Marshall that night. 8ratton
rcmcmbcrcd no such instructions. Kaulman thcn rcad into thc
rccord Milcss ]CC tcstimony, in which hc took
lull rcsponsibility lor that . . . mcssagc not going to thc Chicl
ol Sta that night. . . . ! kncw its substancc. ! did not considcr
that it was ncccssary to arousc thc Chicl ol Sta at that timc ol
night lor that mcssagc.
196

Altcr having this tcstimony callcd to his attcntion, 8ratton addcd:
! would likc to say lurthcr at this point that il thcrc was any crror
ol omission or commission with rcspcct to thc dclivcry ol thc
13 parts ol that mcssagc Saturday night ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr
1941 to Army pcrsonncl thc crror was minc, and ! acccpt lull
rcsponsibility lor it.
197
!n this way, both Milcs and 8ratton addcd
thcir namcs to thc list ol thosc willing to takc thc rcsponsibility
lor a possiblc lailurc on thc part ol Marshall.
vxi~is ny Tov vvici~is Lv~b 8v~))ox )o
oun) His ~viivv Tvs)i:oxy
Tc pcrsons in thc Army who customarily rcccivcd MAG!C,
8ratton said, wcrc Marshall, Gcrow, and Milcs. And do wc havc
it now, Kaulman askcd, that no dclivcry was madc to any ol
thosc pcrsons othcr than to thc Sccrctary ol Statc and cxccpting
195
!bid., p. 4514.
196
!bid., part 3, p. 1554.
197
!bid., part 9, p. 4515.
Gcncral Milcs who had alrcady sccn it at Admiral Vilkinsons
housc:
Tis is thc point 8ratton said at which his mcmory bcgins
to go bad, hc could not statc positivcly whcthcr thcrc was any
dclivcry madc that night or not at this timc. Hc had tcsticd
bclorc thc APH8 that hc had madc dclivcry to thc Sccrctary ol
thc Gcncral Sta, to thc night duty o ccr, or to Gcncral Gcrow
and to Gcncral Milcs. Tat, 8ratton said, was his normal pro
ccdurc. Hc tricd to makc simultancous dclivcry to all thcsc
pcoplc. Howcvcr, whcn hc madc that statcmcnt to thc APH8
hc had not rcmcmbcrcd . . . that Coloncl uscnbury was work
ing with mc in thc o cc that night.
198
Also Clauscn had shown
him a numbcr ol sworn a davits collcctcd lrom various o ccrs:
8cdcll Smith, Gcncral Ralph Smith, Gcrow, Gailcy, and othcrs
to thc ccct that thcy did not rcccivc thc 13 parts ol this mcs
sagc lrom mc or lrom anyonc clsc Saturday night. Now, !
know all thcsc mcn. ! do not doubt thc honcsty and intcgrity
ol any onc ol thcm, and il thcy say that ! did not dclivcr thcsc
pouchcs to thcm that night, thcn my mcmory must havc bccn
at lault.
199

Askcd by Fcrguson why hc had changcd his tcstimony,
8ratton rcplicd:
!t was a combination ol lacts, sir. . . . My subscqucnt rccollcc
tion that Coloncl uscnbury was at work with mc in thc o cc
that cvcning . . . and thc a davits ol various o ccrs stating that
! did not makc dclivcrics to thcm on Saturday cvcning, and my
rccollcction ol thc tclcphonc convcrsation with Gcncral Milcs
at about hallpast clcvcn Saturday night, my subscqucnt con
vcrsations with Coloncl uscnbury, with whom ! havc talkcd
hcrc in Vashington, my convcrsations with Gcncral Gcrow,
198
!bid., p. 4515.
199
!bid.
with whom ! talkcd hcrc in Vashington, my convcrsations
with Gcncral Milcs bclorc hc appcarcd bclorc thc Committcc,
all ol thcsc havc combincd to lcad mc to thc bclicl that thc
cvidcncc that ! havc givcn bclorc thc committcc today is my
bcst rccollcction ol thc lacts.
200

Altcr thc lcngthy qucstioning ol Saord, Kramcr, 8ratton,
and all thc othcr o ccrs conccrncd, it was di cult to know just
what to bclicvc. Tcir tcstimony had oltcn bccn conlusing and
contradictory. Kramcrs tcstimony did littlc to clcar up thc mys
tcry ovcr whcthcr a Vinds xccutc had bccn intcrccptcd bclorc
cccmbcr 7or il it had bccn, what it had mcant. His tcstimony
about thc Pilot Mcssagc raiscd qucstions as to whcthcr it was
actually rcccivcd bclorc or altcr thc 14part rcsponsc itscll. And
8rattons tcstimony on thc dclivcry ol thc ]apancsc intcrccpts
during thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6 hclpcd littlc in clarilying thc
situation.
!x)vvcvv)s !xbic~)ixc !::ixvxcv ov
V~v viivvvvb )o )nv Vni)v Housv
vvxixc, vcv:nvv 6
At my suggcstion, committcc mcmbcr rcqucstcd a list ol all
pcrsons who had bccn on duty at thc Vhitc Housc on cccmbcr
6 and 7. nc namc on that list was Navy Commandcr Lcstcr R.
Schulz.
n Fcbruary 12, 1946, whilc at sca aboard thc Indiana, Schulz
rcccivcd ordcrs to comc to Vashington.
201
Vhcn hc arrivcd at thc
Capitol, Scnator Fcrguson and Licutcnant Commandcr 8acchcr,
assistant counscl and thc Navys liaison to thc committcc, took
him asidc in a room adjoining thc chambcr whcrc thc hcarings
200
!bid., part 9, pp. 4597, part 10, 461112.
201
!bid., pp. 466869.
wcrc bcing hcld.
202
Vhcn thc scnator rcturncd to thc committcc
tablc, hc said to mc sotto voce, Tis is it!
Schulz had told his story about thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6
to no onc cxccpt whcn hc had spokcn bricy with 8acchcr thc
prcvious cccmbcr. Tis was his rst timc to tcstily, hc said.
203
Hc
had ncvcr writtcn his cxpcricnccs down and had no notcs.
204

!n 1941 Schulz had bccn a Navy licutcnant in thc cc ol
Naval Communications lor communications intclligcncc. Hc had
rst cntcrcd thc Vhitc Housc on cccmbcr 5, on a tcmporary
assignmcnt lrom thc communications division. n thc cvcning
ol cccmbcr 6 hc had bccn on tcmporary duty at thc Vhitc
Housc as a communications assistant to Naval aidc Captain
8cardall.
205
At about 4 v.:. 8cardall told Schulz to rcmain in thc
o cc to rcccivc a spccial mcssagc lor thc prcsidcnt.
206
||uring
thc cvcning Captain Kramcr would bring up somc magic matcrial
and that ! was to takc it and givc it immcdiatcly to thc prcsidcnt,
Schultz tcsticd. Tc matcrial would bc in a lockcd pouch, and
8cardall gavc Schultz thc kcy so hc could rcmovc thc matcrial.
207

8cardall told him it was ol such importancc that thc prcsidcnt
was cxpccting it.
8cardall himscll lclt at about 5:30 to attcnd a dinncr party.
208

Tis was thc rst timc in his scvcn months as FRs naval aidc
that hc had bccn askcd to makc spccial arrangcmcnts to dclivcr
a mcssagc to thc prcsidcnt altcr 5:30 or 6:00 in thc cvcning, i.c.,
altcr thc closc ol thc ordinary workday.
209

202
!bid., pp. 4666, 4669.
203
!bid., p. 4669.
204
!bid., p. 4664.
205
!bid., p. 4660.
206
!bid., p. 4668.
207
!bid., p. 4661.
208
!bid., p. 4668.
209
!bid., part 11, p. 5278, 8cardall tcstimony.
Tc rst 13 parts ol thc ]apancsc rcply wcrc in thc Navy
cpartmcnt and rcady lor distribution by 9:00 v.:. on cccmbcr
6. 8clorc dclivcring thc lockcd pouch with thcsc 13 parts to any
onc clsc, Kramcr took thcm to thc Vhitc Housc.
210

Schulz had bccn givcn a small o cc, not in thc Vhitc Housc
propcr, but in a corncr ol thc mailroom in thc Vhitc Housc
o cc building. At about 9:30 v.:. Kramcr camc in with a lockcd
pouch, which hc handcd to Schulz. Schulz immcdiatcly took thc
pouch ovcr to thc Vhitc Housc and obtaincd pcrmission to go
up to thc prcsidcnts study on thc sccond oor. Hc was accom
panicd by somconc lrom thc ushcrs o cc who announccd him
to thc prcsidcnt. Tcn Schulz wcnt into FRs study alonc. Tc
prcsidcnt was thcrc scatcd at his dcsk, and Mr. |Harry| Hopkins
was thcrc, Schulz said. Hc told FR that hc was dclivcring thc
matcrial which Kramcr had brought.
211

Schulz unlockcd thc pouch, took out thc papcrs, pcrhaps 15
typcwrittcn pagcs . . . lastcncd togcthcr in a shcal, and handcd
thcm to Rooscvclt pcrsonally. According to Schulz,
Tc prcsidcnt rcad thc papcrs, which took pcrhaps 10 min
utcs. Tcn hc handcd thcm to Mr. Hopkins. . . . Mr. Hopkins
thcn rcad thc papcrs and handcd thcm back to thc prcsidcnt.
Tc prcsidcnt thcn turncd toward Mr. Hopkins and said in
substancc . . . Tis mcans war. Mr. Hopkins agrccd, and thcy
discusscd thcn, lor pcrhaps 5 minutcs, thc situation ol thc
]apancsc lorccs, that is, thcir dcploymcnt.
212

Schulz was a young graduatc ol Annapolis, dcccnt and upright
in appcarancc, his manncr opcn and lorthright. Tcrc could bc no
doubting thc truth ol what hc was saying. Tc spcctators in thc
210
!bid., part 9, p. 4025.
211
!bid., part 10, pp. 466061.
212
!bid., p. 4662.
packcd hcaring room listcncd in complctc silcncc, straining to
catch his cvcry word.
Counscl Richardson askcd Schulz il hc could rcmcmbcr
anything spccic that FR or Hopkins had said. Schulz could
rcmcmbcr only a lcw words, but hc could say dcnitcly that
thc substancc ol it was that! bclicvc Mr. Hopkins mcn
tioncd it rstthat sincc war was immincnt, that thc ]apancsc
intcndcd to strikc whcn thcy wcrc rcady, at a momcnt whcn
all was most opportunc lor thcm. . . . Tat is, whcn thcir lorccs
wcrc most propcrly dcploycd lor thcir advantagc. !ndochina
in particular was mcntioncd, bccausc thc ]apancsc lorccs had
alrcady landcd thcrc and thcrc wcrc implications ol whcrc thcy
would movc ncxt.
213

Tc prcsidcnt mcntioncd having scnt a mcssagc to thc
]apancsc cmpcror conccrning thc prcscncc ol ]apancsc troops in
!ndochina and rcqucsting thcir withdrawal.
214
Schulz did not scc
Rooscvclts mcssagc, but hc rccallcd
thc prcsidcnt quoting lrom this mcssagc that hc draltcd to thc
ccct that hc had told Hirohito that hc could not scc how it
could bc hcld that thcrc was any dangcr to pcacc in thc Far
ast as lar as thc Unitcd Statcs was conccrncd il thcrc wcrc no
]apancsc lorccs in !ndochina.
!n othcr words, wc wcrc not going to attack !ndochina, nor
was anyonc clsc. Tcrclorc thc prcscncc ol ]apancsc lorccs in
!ndochina was lor an aggrcssivc purposc or lor ultcrior pur
poscs on thc part ol thc ]apancsc. Vc oursclvcs hcld no thrcat
lor !ndochina.
215

213
!bid., pp. 466263.
214
!bid., p. 4663.
215
!bid., p. 4671.
Schulz continucd:
Mr. Hopkins thcn cxprcsscd a vicw that sincc war was undoubt
cdly going to comc at thc convcnicncc ol thc ]apancsc, it was
too bad that wc could not strikc thc rst blow and prcvcnt
any sort ol surprisc. Tc prcsidcnt noddcd and thcn said, in
ccct, No, wc cant do that. Vc arc a dcmocracy and a pcacclul
pcoplc. Tcn hc raiscd his voicc, and this much ! rcmcmbcr
dcnitcly. Hc said, 8ut wc havc a good rccord.
216

Schulz got thc imprcssion that wc would havc to stand on
that rccord, wc could not makc thc rst ovcrt movc. Vc would
havc to wait until it camc.
217

Tc only gcographic namc Schulz rcmcmbcrcd was !ndochina.
Tcrc was no mcntion ol Pcarl Harbor. Tc timc whcn war might
bcgin was not discusscd. |T|hcrc was no indication that tomor
row was ncccssarily thc day, hc said. Schulz carricd that imprcs
sion away bccausc it contributcd to my pcrsonal surprisc whcn
thc ncws did comc. According to Schulz, Tcrc was no mcntion
madc ol scnding any lurthcr warning or alcrt.
218

Altcr thc discussion to thc ccct that thc war was going to
bcgin at thc convcnicncc ol thc ]apancsc, thc prcsidcnt said
hc bclicvcd hc would talk to Admiral Stark. Hc startcd to gct
Admiral Stark on thc tclcphonc. !t was thcn dctcrmincd!
do not rccall cxactly, but ! bclicvc thc Vhitc Housc opcrator
told thc prcsidcnt that Admiral Stark could bc rcachcd at thc
National Tcatcr.
Schulz could not hcar what thc opcrator said, but hc did hcar
thc National Tcatcr mcntioncd. Tc prcsidcnt thcn wcnt on
216
!bid., p. 4663.
217
!bid.
218
!bid.
to statc, in substancc, that hc would rcach thc admiral latcr,
that hc did not want to causc public alarm by having thc admi
ral pagcd or othcrwisc whcn in thc thcatcr, whcrc, ! bclicvc, thc
lact that hc had a box rcscrvcd was mcntioncd and that il hc
had lclt suddcnly hc would surcly havc bccn sccn bccausc ol
thc position which hc hcld and unduc alarm might bc causcd,
and thc prcsidcnt did not wish that to happcn bccausc hc could
gct him within pcrhaps anothcr hall an hour in any casc.
219

According to Schulz, nothing was said about tclcphoning
anybody clsc. To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc that is all that was
discusscd. Tc prcsidcnt rcturncd thc papcrs to mc and ! lclt thc
study. Schulz had bccn thcrc about a hall hour, hc lclt about
tcn.
220

Hc thcn wcnt back to thc o cc ovcr toward thc Statc
cpartmcnt. . . . on thc bascmcnt lcvcl. Kramcr was waiting.
According to Schulzs rccollcction, hc rcturncd thc lockcd pouch
to Kramcr.
Tc happcnings during that particular pcriod arc somcwhat
hazy but ! know that ! did not havc thc papcrs thc ncxt day.
Furthcr, ! hadnt too suitablc a placc to put thcm during thc
night bccausc ol thcir high sccrccy classication. . . . ! would
not havc kcpt thcm undcr any circumstanccs.
221

Schulz phoncd 8cardall to inlorm him that ! had rcccivcd
thc papcrs, thc prcsidcnt had sccn thcm and ! had carricd out
my instructions. Schulz was thcn lrcc to go homc. Hc lclt thc
Vhitc Housc at about 10:30.
222

Schulzs tcstimony dcmolishcd thc administrations claim
ol shockcd surprisc at thc ]apancsc attack. Thc cmocratic
219
!bid.
220
!bid., p. 4664.
221
!bid., p. 4665.
222
!bid., p. 4666.
mcmbcrs ol thc ]CC wcrc stunncd, thcy did not attcmpt to
rcbut. His appcarancc was a highlight ol thc congrcssional
invcstigation.
Gvxvv~i M~vsn~ii ovs No) Rvc~ii His
Ac)ivi)ivs S~)uvb~y Nicn), vcv:nvv 6
Tcrc is no cvidcncc in thc ]CC hcarings that FR actu
ally summoncd his closcst aidcs to thc Vhitc Housc thc night
ol cccmbcr 67. 8ut lor FR to call a mccting to discuss thc
growing crisis would havc bccn consistcnt with his opcrational
stylc, hc likcd to talk things ovcr with his associatcs. Marshall and
Stark wcrc thc only oncs askcd il thcrc might havc bccn such a
mccting, and thcir answcrs wcrc not vcry hclplul.
223

Keefe: Can you statc dcnitcly whcthcr or not you havc a prcs
cnt rccollcction as to whcthcr thc prcsidcnt did in lact contact
you:
Marshall: ! am quitc ccrtain that hc |thc prcsidcnt| did not
|contact mc|. . . . Tcrc is no qucstion in my mind, no. Tat is
a positivc answcr.
Keefe: And you arc ccrtain that you did not attcnd any mcct
ing thcn, at thc Vhitc Housc that night:
Marshall: ! am absolutcly ccrtain ol that. . . . So, all thc cvi
dcncc, in my own mind, short ol my absolutc knowlcdgc ol thc
mattcr, is that ! was homc, as was customary. . . .
Keefe: 8ut you arc ccrtain ol onc thing and that is that you
rcccivcd no communication lrom thc prcsidcnt on thc cvcning
ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr and that you didnt attcnd any mccting
at thc Vhitc Housc that night:
223
!bid., Marshall tcstimony, part 11, pp. 519394, Stark tcstimony, part 5, pp.
229192.
Marshall: Tat is corrcct. ! will add that thc rst inlormation !
had ol anything unusual was, as ! havc tcsticd, altcr ! got into
my showcr, or was going into my showcr |cccmbcr 7, ~.:.|
whcn this mcssagc was rclaycd to mc lrom Coloncl 8ratton
that hc wantcd to comc out to thc housc with an important
mattcr.
224

Gearhart questioning Stark: Vhcn you lclt thc o cc on
Saturday night didnt you lcavc word thcrc as to whcrc you
wcrc going to bc and whcrc you could bc rcachcd on cccmbcr
6, 1941:
Stark: Ycs, whcn ! wcnt out ! always lclt word. ! do not rccall
ol any timc whcn ! did not. . . . ! do not rccall bcing out that
night but ! also do not rccall whcthcr ! was out or not, so thcrc
it is. . . . |!|l ! wcrc going out at night my aidc would usually
lcavc word with thc duty o ccr whcrc ! could bc lound, assum
ing that my intcntions to go out wcrc bclorc ! lclt thc o cc.
!l altcr ! got homc ! suddcnly dccidcd to go out somcwhcrc, !
would lcavc word with thc housc and usually call up thc duty
o ccr in addition.
Gearhart: Vcll, havc you scarchcd thc rccords in thc o cc ol
thc chicl ol Naval pcrations to asccrtain whcrc you wcrc on
Saturday night, thc 6th day ol cccmbcr 1941:
Stark: Vc havc lound nothing as to whcrc ! was and it lollows
my assumption that my thought was that ! was at homc. Tcrc
is nothing ! havc bccn ablc to nd out which locatcs whcrc !
was that cvcning.
Gearhart: !n vicw ol thc lact that thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall|
cannot rcmcmbcr whcrc hc was on that night is it possiblc that
you and hc could havc bccn togcthcr:
Stark: ! think wc had no such conspiracy at that timc, sir.
224
!bid., part 11, p. 1594.
Gearhart: Vcll, do you shut it out as bcing an uttcr impossibil
ity that you and hc could havc bccn in cach othcrs company
that night:
Stark: ! do not shut it out as an uttcr impossibility that wc
could havc bccn in cach othcrs company, but ! think wc wcrc
not.
Gearhart: You do not rcmcmbcr that.
Stark: No, but ! lccl that pcrhaps wc both would havc rcmcm
bcrcd it il that had occurrcd.
Gearhart: Vcll, you not rcmcmbcring whcrc you wcrc ccr
tainly you cannot rcmcmbcr that you wcrc not with Gcncral
Marshall on that night, can you:
Stark: Vcll, ! think that may bc a rcasonablc assumption.
Gearhart: You wcrc togcthcr a grcat dcal all thc timc, wcrc
you not:
Stark: Vc wcrc togcthcr cithcr talking by tclcphonc or intcrol
cc visits a grcat dcal during o cc hours. Vc wcrc not togcthcr
a grcat dcal in thc cvcning. . . . ! havc hcard that an cort was
madc to locatc mc.
Gearhart: And you also havc lcarncd that a couricr callcd at
your quartcrs and you wcrc not thcrc:
Stark: No, ! havc not hcard that.
Gearhart: id you havc any tclcphonc call that cvcning lrom
Coloncl Knox, thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy:
Stark: Not that ! rccall.
225

225
!bid., part 5, pp. 229192.
Tirty two ycars altcr thc attack, cvidcncc ol just such a
cccmbcr 67 Vhitc Housc mccting surlaccd. !t camc in a lct
tcr lrom ]amcs G. Stahlman, a longtimc lricnd ol Knox, thcn
on activc duty in thc Navy. n his rcturn lrom Pcarl Harbor
immcdiatcly altcr thc attack, Knox condcd to Stahlman that
hc, Stimson, Marshall, 8ctty Stark and Harry Hopkins had spcnt
most ol thc night bclorc |thc attack| at thc Vhitc Housc with
FR, all waiting lor what thcy kncw was coming altcr thosc
intcrccpts.
226

!x)vvcvv) Hvv~ibixc Ac)u~i
Avvvo~cn ov V~v viivvvvb )o )nv N~vy
Suxb~y Movxixc, vcv:nvv
Saturday cvcning, with thc dclivcry ol thc rst thirtccn parts
ol ]apans 14part rcply to our notc ol Novcmbcr 26, it was appar
cnt that war with ]apan was immincnt. !t was thc ncxt morning,
Sunday, cccmbcr 7, 1941, that thc ]apancsc intcrccpts that hcr
aldcd thc nal approach ol war wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington.
Most notablc among thcsc wcrc thc lourtccnth part ol Tokyos
rcply and thc nc v.:. Mcssagc giving thc ]apancsc ambassa
dors in Vashington instructions as to prcciscly how and whcn to
dclivcr that rcply to Sccrctary ol Statc Hull. ]CC mcmbcrs
dcvotcd considcrablc timc to asking Navy couricr Kramcr about
his Sunday morning dclivcrics.
Kramcr had said in his 1944 mcmorandum that on his rst
trip Sunday morning hc had sccn Stark with othcrs in his o cc
|a|bout 0900 whcn hc, Kramcr, had lclt nightbclorc mattcrs,
227

including all lourtccn parts ol ]apans rcply to our notc ol
226
]amcs G. Stahlman lcttcr ol Novcmbcr 26, 1973 to Admiral Kcmp Tollcy.
227
Tc scqucncc ol Kramcrs cccmbcr 7 morning dclivcrics varicd slightly
lrom account to account:
At thc NC! ( ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp.
85860), in mid1944, hc said hc had dclivcrcd thc 13 parts plus part 14
and othcr ncw matcrial to (1) Stark, (2) thc Vhitc Housc and (3) Knox
Novcmbcr 26. Howcvcr, altcr talking it ovcr with pcoplc upon
at thc Statc cpartmcnt. Tcn upon his rcturn to thc Navy cpart
mcnt at 10:20, hc lound thc nc v.:. Mcssagc had bccn rcccivcd.
n Fcbruary 6, 1946 bclorc thc ]oint Committcc, hc tcsticd (ibid.,
part 8, pp. 390408) that hc had dclivcrcd all 14 parts to (1) McCollum,
(2) Vilkinson, (3) Stark, possibly through McCollum and Vilkinson,
and (4) dircctly to Knox, whom hc saw pcrsonally, at Statc. Hc had
thcn rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt whcrc hc had cncountcrcd thc
nc v.:. Mcssagc. Tis account madc no mcntion ol dclivcring thc
14 parts to thc Vhitc Housc ( ]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack,
part 8, pp. 390408).
Kramcr tcstimony Fcbruary 6, 1946 at thc ]CC:
Richardson: Now, how carly did you go to thc o cc thc ncxt
morning:
Kramer: My rccollcction is it was vcry shortly altcr 7:30. . . . Tc
normal o cc hours commcnccd at 8 oclock . . . ! lurthcr wantcd to bc
at thc o cc carlicr that morning |cccmbcr 7| than usual bccausc ol
thc likclihood that ! would havc to makc carlicr disscminations that
morning than usual |latc morning|. . . . ! had a spccic appointmcnt to
bc at thc Statc cpartmcnt by 10 that morning, on instructions lrom
Sccrctary Knox. ! gathcrcd lrom convcrsation with Admiral Vilkinson
that Admiral Stark would vcry likcly bc in Sunday morning, which was
not a usual practicc. . . . it was an unusual thing lor Admiral Stark to
bc thcrc on Sunday morning |italics addcd|. n a numbcr ol occasions
that lall on Sunday morning ! had dclivcrcd loldcrs to his homc and
had bccn rcccivcd in his study on thc sccond dcck, hc bcing in pajamas
and drcssing gown on onc occasion having brcaklast. ! rccollcct that
bccausc ! was ocrcd somc cocc. . . .
Richardson: Now you got in your o cc around 7 oclock on Sunday
morning.
Kramer: Shortly altcr 7:30, is my bcst rccollcction. . . . |M|y rccol
lcction is that thc lourtccnth part was thcrc shortly altcr ! got in that
morning, or possibly whcn ! got in that morning. . . . ! was on a 24hour
basis, and my translators wcrc also. ! had on at lcast two dozcn occa
sions, during thc coursc ol 1941, bccn callcd to my o cc at odd hours
ol thc night, somctimcs 2 or 3 in thc morning. ! had standing instruc
tions with thc GY watch o ccr to call mc any timc thcy lclt a trans
lator was rcquircd. . . . ! was thc ncarcst translator to my o cc, only 5
minutcs away in Arlington ncar Fort Mycr. ! thcrclorc put myscll in
his arrival in Vashington and altcr having had his mcmory
rclrcshcd as to thc cvcnts, Kramcr rcviscd his tcstimony slightly
as to his dclivcry timcs, hc said thcn that |a|ctually |hc| did not
thc status ol bcing thc rst onc callcd rathcr than onc ol thc translators
whosc homcs wcrc in outlying districts. . . .
Richardson: Vhcn thc dclivcry was madc on Sunday morning
thcn thc cntirc 14part mcssagc was dclivcrcd as onc mcssagc:
Kramer: Tat is corrcct, sir. . . . Somc dctails ol dclivcry bctwccn
8 and 9 oclock ! havc only in thc last month or so had my mcmory
rclrcshcd on, in convcrsations with othcr o ccrs. Tc rst dclivcry, to
my prcscnt bcst rccollcction, was madc to Commandcr McCollum,
hcad ol thc Far astcrn Scction, Navy !ntclligcncc. . . . !t was probably
about 8 oclock or a lcw minutcs altcr. . . . Anothcr dclivcry was madc, !
bclicvc, about a quartcr ol 9 to Captain McCollum also, or Commandcr
McCollum thcn, whcn ! was inlormcd that Admiral Vilkinson had
arrivcd at his o cc, and ! thcrclorc automatically dclivcrcd anothcr
copy to Admiral Vilkinson. !t was about that timc, or shortly altcr
ward that anothcr copy was dclivcrcd to Admiral Starks o cc. . . . Tat
rst dclivcry to Admiral Starks o cc, ! bclicvc, was donc by cithcr
Admiral Vilkinson or Captain McCollum. . . . My rst positivc rccol
lcction ol sccing Admiral Stark is whcn ! was on my way to thc Statc
cpartmcnt to kccp my 10 oclock appointmcnt whcn ! lclt a copy
ol somc ol thc othcr tra c that had comc in in Admiral Starks outcr
o cc. Tat was probably 9:30 or 9:40. . . . ! was at thc Statc cpart
mcnt almost cxactly 10 minutcs ol 10.
Richardson: And to whom did you makc dclivcry actually:
Kramer: Actually to Mr. Knox dircctly. Hc camc in, as ! rccollcct,
about 5 minutcs ol 10, a lcw minutcs altcr ! got thcrc, and wcnt into
thc conlcrcncc room, Mr. Hulls o cc. . . . Tcrc was a bricl discussion
bctwccn myscll, thc Army couricr, and Mr. Hulls privatc sccrctary in
Mr. Hulls outcr o cc. !t lastcd probably not morc than 3 or 4 minutcs,
and thcn ! hcadcd back lor thc Navy cpartmcnt.
Richardson: Vhat timc did you rcturn to thc Navy cpartmcnt:
Kramer: My bcst rccollcction is about 10:20. . . . n my arrival
thcrc at 10:20, thc most striking rccollcction ! havc is thc rst sighting
ol that mcssagc lrom Tokyo dirccting thc dclivcry ol this notc lrom
Tokyo at 1 oclock v. :., cccmbcr 7, Vashington timc. . . . ! immcdi
atcly instructcd by chicl ycoman to prcparc anothcr sct ol loldcrs so !
could makc immcdiatc dclivcry ol thcm.
go to Admiral Starks o cc until about 9:30, although hc admit
tcd hc was still a littlc hazy on prccisc timcs.
228

Vhcn Kramcr rcachcd Starks o cc on Sunday morning,
cccmbcr 7, all ol thc highcr Navy cchclon, including, Stark,
Vilkinson, and Turncr, wcrc thcrc. Kramcr agrccd with
Congrcssman Kcclc who was qucstioning him that Sunday was
not usually a day lor thc big boys in thc Navy to asscmblc at thcir
o ccs
229
and that thc arrangcmcnts lor such a group ol top lcvcl
o ccrs to mcct that Sunday morning must havc bccn madc thc
night bclorc.
230
!t was no lormal conlcrcncc, but many o ccrs
wcrc in Admiral Starks o cc, and going and coming. Kramcr
said,
!t was in a similar manncr that thc normal 11:00 conlcrcncc
was hcld morc or lcss daily in Admiral Starks o cc, similarly
asscmblcd. . . . Howcvcr, it was no lormal conlcrcncc but a con
tinuing discussion that Sunday morning.
231
Altcr making his rst round ol dclivcrics that Sunday morning,
Kramcr rcturncd to thc Navy cpartmcnt. Tcrc hc had cncoun
tcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc plus scvcral othcr intcrccpts
232

with nal words ol advicc and thanks to thc ]apancsc ambassa
dors lor thcir corts. Kramcr rccognizcd thc importancc ol thc
nc v.:.Mcssagc immcdiatcly and this addcd spccial urgcncy
228
]oint Committcc, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, pp. 410203. Kramcr tcsti
mony.
229
!bid., p. 4097. Kramcr Fcbruary 9, 1946 tcstimony.
230
!bid., p. 4098. Kramcr Fcbruary 9, 1946 tcstimony.
231
!bid., p. 4105. Kramcr tcstimony.
232
!bid., p. 3997. !ncluding also thc Pilot Mcssagc, il 8rattons rclrcshcd
]CC tcstimony is bclicvcd, although 8ratton docsnt mcntion it in his tcsti
mony conccrning his Sunday morning dclivcry rounds.
to his sccond round ol dclivcrics.
233
!n his 1944 mcmorandum
lor Admiral Halscy, Kramcr had dcscribcd in prctty mcticulous
dctail
234
his hastc to dclivcr thc nc v.:. Mcssagc that Sunday
morning, cccmbcr 7.
!n his tcstimony bclorc thc NC! in 1944 Kramcr said that on
this, his sccond trip ol thc morning, hc had rst dclivcrcd thc nc
v.:. Mcssagc to Starks o cc bctwccn 1030 and 1100, sccondly
to thc Vhitc Housc and nally to Navy Sccrctary Knox who was
still in a mccting at thc Statc cpartmcnt with Sccrctary Hull.
235

233
!bid., part 8, pp. 390809. Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc:
Kramer: n my arrival thcrc |back at thc Navy cpartmcnt| at
10:20, thc most striking rccollcction ! havc is thc rst sighting ol that
mcssagc lrom Tokyo dirccting thc dclivcry ol this notc lrom Tokyo at
1:00 v.:., cccmbcr 7, Vashington timc . . . ! immcdiatcly instructcd
my chicl ycoman to prcparc anothcr sct ol loldcrs so ! could makc
immcdiatc dclivcry ol thcm. . . . ]ust as ! was about to lcavc thc o cc, a
plain languagc ]apancsc mcssagc was scnt in to my o cc by thc GY
watch o ccr that carricd, ! bclicvc thc socallcd hiddcn word mcssagc.
. . . ! rccognizcd it as such lrom an cxtcrnal indicator, namcly thc word
Stop at thc cnd, and rccognizcd thc rst word as bcing onc ol thc
codc words rclcrring to ngland. !n scanning thc rcst ol thc mcssagc,
as ! rccollcct, thc sixth or scvcnth word had anothcr codc word, which,
incidcntally, wcrc all propcr namcs. Tc word was Hattori which,
although ! rccognizcd |it| as a codc word, ! did not immcdiatcly rccall
thc mcaning ol, and hastily rclcrrcd to thc list ol such codc words . . .
intcrprctcd as rclations bctwccn ]apan and (blank) country, to bc
inscrtcd, was not in accordancc with cxpcctations. ! dictatcd to my
chicl ycoman thc scnsc ol that mcssagc.
234
!bid., part 9, p. 4110. Kcclcs dcscription ol Kramcrs 1944 account.
235
!bid., part 33, pp. 85960. Kramcr tcstimony rc nc v.:. Mcssagc at thc
NC! in mid1944:
At thc NC!, Kramcr said that hc had rcturncd to thc Navy cpart
mcnt altcr his rst dclivcry on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Tcrc
hc had discovcrcd thc nc v.:. Mcssagc along with scvcral othcrs.
Vithin tcn or ltccn minutcs hc was at Admiral Starks o cc. From
thcrc hc had gonc to thc Vhitc Housc and then |italics addcd| to Statc,
whcrc Knox and Stimson wcrc mccting with Hull. Kramcr said hc had
not sccn Knox pcrsonally, but hc had madc a point ol vcrbally inviting
At thc ]CC, hc changcd thc scqucncc ol his dclivcrics slightly,
saying that altcr dclivcring rst to CN Stark, hc had dclivcrcd
it sccondly to Knox at thc Statc cpartmcnt and thcn nally to
thc Vhitc Housc.
236

Vhcn Kramcr tcsticd bclorc thc ]CC about dclivcring
thc nc v.:. Mcssagc to Navy Sccrctary Knox at thc Statc
cpartmcnt, whcrc Knox was still mccting with Sccrctary ol
Statc Hull, hc said that bclorc thc loldcr was takcn in to Mr.
Hull thcrc was a bricl convcrsation . . . pointing out thc ticup ol
thc timc 1:00 Vashington, with thc situation in thc Southwcst
Pacic. Kramcr had talkcd with onc ol Mr. Hulls privatc sccrc
tarics about that, also with thc Army couricr, hc thought it could
havc bccn 8ratton who was thcrc at thc timc making dclivcry to
Sccrctarics Hull and Stimson.
237

Saord had told thc NC! that whcn Kramcr madc dclivcry
to Knox at thc Statc cpartmcnt on Sunday morning, cccmbcr
7, Kramcr had scnt a notc via Knoxs pcrsonal aidc, a lorcign scr
vicc o ccr, saying in ccct, that this mcans a sunrisc attack on
Pcarl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.
238

thc attcntion ol Mr. Knox through a Statc cpartmcnt Forcign
Scrvicc ccr who rcgularly handlcd this matcrial lor Mr. Hull thc
implications ol thc timcs. 1300 Vashington timc was 7:30 at Pcarl
Harbor and a lcw hours bclorc sunrisc at Kota 8haru, whcrc thc ]apa
ncsc appcarcd to bc hcading.
236
!bid., part 8, pp. 390912. Kramcr tcstimony:
Kramcr told thc ]CC (part 8, pp. 391012) that hc had dclivcrcd
thc nc v.:. Mcssagc to (1) thc Statc cpartmcnt whcrc hc had
most cmphatically not spokcn with Knox, (2) thc Vhitc Housc, and
thcn (3) back to thc Navy cpartmcnt.
237
!bid., part 8, pp. 3910, 3912. Kramcr tcstimony.
238
!bid., part 9, p. 4180. xccrpt rcprintcd lrom Saord NC! tcstimony.
!bid., part 9, p. 3909. Kramcr tcstimony:
Kramer: ! stoppcd o at Admiral Starks o cc |Stark was in his
o cc, it was bctwccn 10:30 and 10:35|. . . . Tc o cc door was closcd.
. . . Vord was scnt in . . . that ! had somcthing lor him. My imprcssions
Kramcr said hc had not thcn sccn Knox pcrsonally, and hc had
most cmphatically not scnt him a notc. Tcrc was only thc
vcrbal cxplanation.
239
Kramcr had not said that thc timc, 1:00,
had any signicancc in conncction with any attack at Pcarl
Harbor.
240
!t had bccn Saords intcrprctation, Kramcr said latcr,
that turncd that rcmark into a rclcrcncc to Pcarl Harbor.
carlicr havc bccn that it was his Flag Sccrctary, thcn Commandcr Vcll
born. Tat has only quitc rcccntly bccn corrcctcd on that scorc sincc !
am inlormcd that Vcllborn was not thcrc that morning at all. My
rccollcctions wcrc lully rclrcshcd in a convcrsation only in thc last lcw
days with Captain McCollum to thc ccct that hc was thc onc who
camc to thc door. ! distinctly rccollcct that now. ! lurthcr rccollcct
pointing out to Captain McCollum thc ticup ol thc timc, 1:00 Vash
ington, with thc schcmc that had bccn dcvcloping lor thc past wcck or
so in thc Southwcst Pacic with rclcrcncc to Malaya and thc Kra
Pcninsula. Captain McCollum rcactcd instantancously to my pointing
that out. His rcactions, ! bclicvc, wcrc idcntical with minc. ! do not
bclicvc our convcrsation lastcd morc than 10 scconds or so, and thcn !
hcadcd lor thc Statc cpartmcnt.
!bid., part 8, p. 3910:
|Arriving at Statc at about 10:45, Kramcr madc dclivcry to| onc ol
thc privatc sccrctarics ol Mr. Hull. . . . 8clorc that loldcr was takcn in
to Mr. Hull thcrc was a bricl convcrsation ol thc idcntical naturc that
! had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Starks door, pointing
out thc ticup ol thc timc 1:00 Vashington, with thc situation in thc
Southwcst Pacic.
Richardson: nc oclock Vashington mcant dawn in Hawaii, did
it not:
Kramer: !t was 7:30 in Hawaii, ycs, sir.
Richardson: And was that lact pointcd out in your convcrsation
with McCollum, and at thc Statc cpartmcnt:
Kramer: !t was mcntioncd in passing, ycs, sir.
239
!bid., p. 3911. Kramcr tcstimony.
240
!bid., pp. 390912. Kramcr tcstimony:
ucstioncd by Richardson, Kramcr said: Tc primary point ol
that |thc 1:00 dclivcry timc| was thc conviction, at lcast in my mind,
that thc ]apancsc intcndcd to carry out thcir plans against Kota 8haru,
with thc intcntion and purposc ol lorcing thc hand ol thc Tai Prcmicr,
|T|hc rclcrcncc to Pcarl Harbor was purcly a passing rclcrcncc
lor thc bcnct ol nonnaval pcrsonncl, namcly, thcsc lorcign
scrvicc o ccrs and thc Army o ccr prcscnt. . . . |Hc| ncvcr
intcndcd in thc lcast to imply that thosc rcmarks . . . indicatcd
an attack on Pcarl Harbor, or, in lact, any ovcrt intcntion on thc
part ol thc ]apancsc dircctcd toward thc Unitcd Statcs.
241

Hc had only intcndcd to commcnt on how thc hour |1:00 v.:.
T| ticd with thc sun and movcs in progrcss clscwhcrc,
242

Pibul, who had bccn maintaining, lor somc timc past, thc position that
his country was ncutral, that any lorcign nation that invadcd his quar
tcrs would bc considcrcd an cncmy, and that thc momcnt such an inva
sion took placc hc would call on thc othcr party lor assistancc. 8y othcr
party ! rclcr to ]apan or to 8ritain.
!bid., part 9, pp. 4110, 4116. xccrpts ol Kramcrs 1944 mcmorandum
rcprintcd. Kramcr cxplaincd thc signicancc ol thc nc v.:. Mcssagc lor
Knoxs bcnct, as hc oltcn had cxplaincd othcr ]apancsc intcrccpts to thc Navy
pcrsonncl authorizcd to scc thcm:
Tc implications wcrc so obvious in thc light ol what wc know,
that it was not ncccssary to statc that invasion ol 8ritish tcrritory was
undoubtcdly schcdulcd lor 1300 (T), and that at lcast a complctc
brcak with thc U.S. was schcdulcd simultancously. . . . ! rccollcct
convcrsation only lor Mr. Knox bcnct rcgarding thc implications ol
thc 1300 hour. ! distinctly rcmcmbcr that thc ticup ol thcsc timcs
would bc apparcnt to cxpcricnccd naval o ccrs, but that a civilian (Mr.
Knox) might ovcrlook it. Hcncc thc pains ! took to point it out at thc
Statc cpartmcnt. ! rcpcatcd this point at lcast hall a dozcn timcs that
morning to othcrs, chicy subordinatcs, ! think, but including onc ol
Mr. Hulls sccrctarics who handlcd this matcrial lor him, to onc or two
ol my o cc workcrs, and ! bclicvc also to Coloncl 8ratton |thc Army
couricr| in Mr. Hulls outcr o cc, probably to Commandcr Vcllborn,
and Admirals ag sccrctary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to
you |Saord| too.
241
!bid., part 9, pp. 418082. Kramcr tcstimony.
242
!bid., p. 4180. Kramcr quoting lrom 1944 mcmorandum prcparcd lor
Halscy.
Altcr dclivcring thc nc v.:. Mcssagc at Statc, Kramcr had
gonc to thc Vhitc Housc to dclivcr thc samc sct ol tra c.
243

!x)vvcvv) !xbic~)ixc Ac)u~i Avvvo~cn ov V~v
viivvvvb )o )nv Av:y Suxb~y Movxixc
n or about cccmbcr 10, 1941 Milcs and 8ratton draltcd
a mcmorandum lor thc rccord, ol |thcir| rccollcction ol what took
placc in Gcncral Marshalls o cc that morning ol cccmbcr
7.
244
8ratton had rclcrrcd to this mcmorandum whcn appcaring
bclorc both thc Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard and Clarkcs invcsti
gation.
245
Most ol 8rattons tcstimony bclorc thc ]CC conccrning
thc cvcnts ol this morning wcrc also bascd on that mcmorandum.
8ratton told thc ]CC that thc lourtccnth part ol thc | ]apancsc|
mcssagc was not dclivcrcd to mc until bctwccn 8 and 9:00, around
8:15 or 8:30 on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. !t had thcn bccn
dclivcrcd immcdiatcly to thc Statc cpartmcnt. 8ratton didnt
rcmcmbcr whcthcr hc had takcn it himscll.
!t is cntircly possiblc that ! may havc gottcn a car and rushcd
ovcr thcrc with thc 14th part so that thc Sccrctary ol Statcs
book would bc complctc. n thc othcr hand, ! may havc givcn
it to Coloncl uscnbury to dclivcr.
!n any cvcnt 8ratton kncw that thc Sccrctary ol Statc had all 14
ol thc parts bclorc 10 oclock that morning.
246

Hc continucd:
|A|t about 9:00 or shortly bclorc 9:00 thcrc was placcd in my
hands thc socallcd 1:00 v.:. dclivcry mcssagc. Tis immcdiatcly
243
!bid., part 8, p. 3911. Kramcr tcstimony.
244
!bid., part 29, p. 2347, APH8.
245
!bid., part 34, p. 19, Clarkc invcstigation.
246
!bid., part 9, p. 4516.
stunncd mc into lrcnzicd activity bccausc ol its implications
and lrom that timc on ! was busily cngagcd trying to locatc
various o ccrs ol thc Gcncral Sta and conlcrring with thcm
on thc cxclusivc subjcct ol this mcssagc and its mcaning.
247

8ratton said hc washcd my hands ol all othcr mattcrs, turning
thcm ovcr to my assistant, Coloncl uscnbury, and procccdcd to
takc stcps with thc 1:00 v.:. dclivcry mcssagc. Vhcn hc
discovcrcd that ncithcr thc Chicl ol Sta |Marshall|, Chicl
ol Var Plans ivision |Gcrow|, or G2 |Milcs|, wcrc in thcir
o ccs |!| immcdiatcly put in a phonc call lor Gcncral Marshall
at his quartcrs at Fort Mycr. nc ol his ordcrlics answcrcd thc
tclcphonc and inlormcd mc that thc Gcncral had gonc horsc
back riding.
8ratton askcd thc ordcrly to nd Marshall and tcll him who !
am and tcll him to go to thc ncarcst tclcphonc, that it is vitally
important that ! communicatc with him at thc carlicst practi
cablc momcnt. Tc ordcrly assurcd 8ratton hc would do so.
248

Hc thcn phoncd Milcs at his homc and told him to comc
to thc o cc. Milcs camc in about 10:00. 8ratton discusscd this
wholc busincss with Gcncral Milcs in his o cc. . . . So that
Gcncral Milcs was thoroughly convcrsant with thc cntirc mattcr
bclorc hc and 8ratton wcnt togcthcr latcr into Marshalls o cc
altcr hc had arrivcd. 8ratton or Milcs had thcn phoncd Gcrow,
although 8ratton said hc didnt rcmcmbcr sccing Gcncral Gcrow
that morning until hc joincd us in Gcncral Marshalls o cc at
about 11:25.
249

8rattons lrantic call had rcachcd Marshalls ordcrly shortly
altcr 9:00, probably bctwccn 9 and 9:15. From that timc until
247
!bid., p. 4517.
248
!bid., p. 4524.
249
!bid., p. 4525.
Marshall arrivcd in his o cc, 8ratton kcpt |Marshalls| copy |ol
thc nc v.:. Mcssagc| in my hands until ! gavc it to |Marshall|
in his o cc.
250
Marshall had rcturncd 8rattons call in pcrson
somctimc bctwccn 10 and 10:30. 8ratton cxplaincd to him that
! had a most important mcssagc that hc must scc at oncc, and
that il hc would stay whcrc hc was, ! would gct a car and bring
it to him.
251
8ratton thought hc could havc gottcn thcrc in 10
minutcs.
252
Marshall rcplicd, No, dont bothcr to do that. ! am
coming down to my o cc. You can givc it to mc thcn.
253

Marshall nally arrivcd about an hour latcr, at 11:25 ~.:.
8ratton couldnt cxplain why it had apparcntly takcn Marshall
an hour or morc to rcach thc Var cpartmcnt, whcn it was nor
mally a tcnminutc trip lrom his quartcrs to his o cc.
254
!t took
Marshall only tcn minutcs to makc that samc trip in thc altcr
noon altcr hc had hcard thc ncws ol thc attack.
255

Altcr his phonc convcrsation with Marshall, 8ratton wcnt
up towards Gcncral Marshalls o cc, and stood around thcrc in
thc hall, or in thc o cc ol thc sccrctary ol thc Gcncral Sta,
waiting lor Gcncral Marshall to arrivc. Vhcn Marshall nally
arrivcd at 11:25, hc wcnt into his o cc lrom thc door that opcns
into thc hall and Gcncral Milcs and ! . . . not morc than a minutc
or 2 minutcs altcr that walkcd in through thc othcr door.
256

8ratton was positivc that whcn hc rcachcd Marshalls o cc
at 11:25, thc chicl ol sta had on his dcsk all 14 parts ol thc mcs
sagc that 8ratton had not dclivcrcd to him.
257
8ratton was waiting
250
!bid., p. 4524.
251
!bid., p. 4525.
252
!bid., p. 4546.
253
!bid., p. 4525.
254
!bid., pp. 454850.
255
!bid., part 14, p. 1411, xhibit 39.
256
!bid., part 9, pp. 4546, 4573.
257
!bid., p. 4544.
lor him with thc nc v.:. Mcssagc in his hand. Gcncral, hc
said, ! havc a vcry important mcssagc hcrc which ! think you
should scc at oncc.
258
8ut Marshall did not look up, hc had thc
14part rcply and was rcading it. 8ratton and Milcs tricd to
intcrrupt him with this 1:00 v.:. dclivcry busincss but hc would
not bc intcrruptcd, and hc wcnt right ahcad with his rcading until
hc got to thc cnd ol thc 14 parts.
259
Marshall hurricdly draltcd
his lastminutc warning to thc cld commandcrs.
260

8ratton had takcn this mcssagc to Coloncl Frcnch, Signal
Corps o ccr in chargc ol thc mcssagc ccntcr, and had cxplaincd
to him that it was Gcncral Marshalls dcsirc that thc mcssagc bc
transmittcd to thc addrcssccs by thc lastcst possiblc salc mcans,
giving thc Philippincs rst priority. 8ratton tcsticd that hc
rcportcd back to Marshall, who askcd him to rcturn to thc mcs
sagc ccntcr and nd out how long it would takc lor thc mcssagcs to
rcach thc addrcssccs. Frcnch said thc mcssagc would bc cncodcd
in about thrcc minutcs, on thc air in about cight minutcs, and in
thc hands ol thc addrcssccs in about thirty minutcs.
261
8ratton
chcckcd his watch, it was thcn 11:50 ~.:.
262
Tc mcssagc should
bc in thc hands ol thc Army Signal ccr in Hawaii, still in
codc, by 12:30 T7:00 ~.:. in Hawaii.
nc important qucstion still rcmaincd unanswcrcd whcn
8ratton nishcd tcstilying: !l hc hadnt dclivcrcd thc 14part
rcply to Marshall, how was it on his dcsk whcn hc arrivcd at
11:25 ~.:.: Gcarhart askcd 8ratton whcrc Marshall could havc
obtaincd it whcn thc only placcs that thc 14 parts had bccn dcliv
crcd bclorc that mccting at 11:25 was at thc Vhitc Housc and
258
!bid., p. 4573.
259
!bid., p. 4547.
260
!bid., part 3, p. 1112.
261
!bid., part 9, p. 4554.
262
!bid., p. 4555.
thc Statc cpartmcnt and to Admiral Stark.
263
Had Marshall
obtaincd a copy mcssagc lrom Stark or thc Vhitc Housc, whcrc
Kramcr had madc dclivcrics that morning:
264
id 8rattons assis
tant, uscnbury, dclivcr it to onc ol Marshalls sccrctarics, pos
sibly Coloncl canc, carlicr that morning, as 8ratton said hc
might havc:
265
r could hc havc gottcn a copy ol thc rst 13 parts
at thc Vhitc Housc during thc night, possibly lrom Hull lor
whom 8ratton had dclivcrcd thcm to thc Statc cpartmcnt, or
lrom Knox to whom Kramcr had dclivcrcd in his Vardman Park
apartmcnt: FR had not kcpt copics ol thc mcssagcs dclivcrcd
to him Saturday cvcning.
M~vsn~iis Suxb~y Movxixc Vnvvv~nou)s
Anothcr unanswcrcd qucstion conccrns Marshalls whcrc
abouts on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Hc was supposcdly on
duty 24 hours a day. !l unavailablc lor somc rcason, an aidc or
duty o ccr should havc bccn ablc to rcach him at any momcnt.
Yct 8ratton told thc ]CC that whcn hc callcd his quartcrs at
about 9:00 Sunday morning in thc attcmpt to dclivcr thc urgcnt
nc v.:. Mcssagc, hc was told Marshall was out horscback
riding.
266

Vhcrc was Marshall during thc hour and a hall bctwccn 10
or 10:30 ~.:., whcn hc rcturncd 8rattons 9:00 call, and 11:25
whcn hc arrivcd in his o cc: Marshall may havc gonc horscback
riding carlicr, but whcrc was hc whcn hc callcd 8ratton: 8ratton
assumcd hc was still at his quartcrs at Fort Mycr. 8ut was hc:
Pcrhaps hc was calling lrom somcwhcrc clsc and that was why hc
had told 8ratton not to drivc out, but to wait in his o cc. id hc
263
!bid., p. 4547.
264
!bid., pp. 454445, 4547.
265
!bid., pp. 454748, 4573.
266
!bid., p. 4524.
call lrom somcwhcrc in thc Var cpartmcnt: From Starks o cc
in thc Navy cpartmcnt: Tc Vhitc Housc:
nc rcport ol Marshalls whcrcabouts that morning comcs
lrom thcn Coloncl (latcr Major Gcncral) ]ohn R. canc. n thc
day ol thc attack, canc was onc ol thc sccrctarics ol thc gcn
cral sta. Marshall had askcd him to comc in to thc o cc that
Sunday morning to writc a oncpagc statcmcnt on thc numbcr
ol plancs and antiaircralt guns in thc Unitcd Statcs. Marshall
wantcd that inlormation to rclcr to during his schcdulcd appcar
ancc bclorc a congrcssional committcc thc ncxt day. Latcr, in
dcscribing thc cvcnts ol thc day, canc wrotc that Marshall had
arrivcd at thc o cc at about 10:00 or shortly thcrcaltcr and had
a scrics ol conlcrcnccs with sta o ccrs lrom G2 and thc Var
Plans ivision.
267

So Marshall could havc phoncd 8ratton lrom thc Var
cpartmcnt at 10:00. 8ut why would Marshall not want to tcll
8ratton whcrc hc was: Vhy would hc want to conccal his activi
tics that morning: Vould thcy havc dcstroycd thc myth that thc
]apancsc attack was uncxpcctcd: r was somc dcvious schcmc
aloot that would havc ruincd thc nations rcputation as a pcacc
loving nation il it had bccomc known:
Somc ycars latcr in an intcrvicw (May 3, 1961), Captain
Arthur H. McCollum, at thc timc ol thc attack chicl ol thc Far
astcrn scction ol thc Navys communications division, told
mc that hc kncw nothing about thc ]CC tcstimony rcporting
Marshall out horscback riding that Sunday morning, but hc was
willing to swcar that hc had sccn Marshall coming out ol Starks
o cc at around 9:30.
267
!bid., part 14, p. 1411, xhibit 39, canc ]unc 8, 1942, mcmorandum about
thc cvcnts ol thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, 1941.
S)~vx C~xxo) Rvc~ii His
S~)uvb~y vvxixc Vnvvv~nou)s ov
~viy Suxb~y Movxixc Ac)ivi)ivs
Likc Marshall, Stark was supposcd to bc availablc 24 hours
a day, il hc was not homc or in his o cc, an aidc or duty o ccr
should havc bccn ablc to locatc him at any timc. Yct Kramcr,
who had phoncd Starks homc Saturday cvcning about thc 13
parts, had not bccn ablc to rcach him. Vilkinson tcsticd that hc
had also tricd, unsucccsslully, to tclcphonc Stark at his homc that
cvcning.
268

Askcd during thc ]CC hcarings whcrc hc had bccn thc night
bclorc thc attack, Stark rcplicd,
Nobody rcachcd mc |that cvcning|. . . . ! thought ! was homc
but il thcy had tricd to rcach mc ! should havc bccn thcrc. Also
il ! wcrc not thcrc word would havc bccn lclt whcrc ! was. Also
thc duty o ccr was gcncrally inlormcd ol my whcrcabouts.
269

Stark tcsticd that hc had tricd to chasc down scvcral lcads
in thc attcmpt to discovcr whcrc hc had bccn that cvcning.
Unlortunatcly, hc said, his wilc had
dcstroycd hcr datc calcndar ol that timc. . . . Vc havc lound
nothing as to whcrc ! was and it lollows my assumption that my
thought was that ! was at homc. Tcrc is nothing ! havc bccn
ablc to nd out which locatcs whcrc ! was that cvcning.
270

Gcarhart askcd Stark: !n vicw ol thc lact that thc Chicl ol
Sta cannot rcmcmbcr whcrc hc was on that night is it possiblc
268
!bid., part 4, pp. 1762, 1874.
269
!bid., part 5, p. 2183.
270
!bid., p. 2291.
that you and hc could havc bccn togcthcr: Stark thought thcy
had no such conspiracy at that timc. Hc did
not shut it out as an uttcr impossibility that wc could havc bccn
in cach othcrs company, but ! think wc wcrc not. . . . Vc wcrc
togcthcr cithcr talking by tclcphonc or intcro cc visits a grcat
dcal during o cc hours. Vc wcrc not togcthcr a grcat dcal in
thc cvcning.
271

]CC gcncral counscl Mitchcll told Stark that, according to
thc rccord, Knox and Vilkinson had both rcccivcd ]apans rst 13
parts during thc cvcning. As a rcsult, Knox had madc an appoint
mcnt lor thc ncxt morning with Stimson and Hull. Yct Stark
said hc had no rccollcction ol having sccn or hcard ol thc pilot
mcssagc announcing that thc ]apancsc rcply would soon bc cn
routc, his rst inlormation on that scorc, hc said, was Sunday
lorcnoon.
272
Stark also insistcd hc had not hcard anything at all
that cvcning about thc 14part mcssagc.
Hc was askcd by ]CC mcmbcrs whcn hc had gonc to his
o cc on Sunday morning. Hc didnt answcr dircctly.
! can only gucss on that. . . . ! usually got down to thc o cc
Sunday mornings around 10:30 and ! just assumcd that ! had
gottcn thcrc somcwhcrc around 10:30 or 11:00. ! was lazy on
Sunday mornings unlcss thcrc was somc spccial rcason lor gct
ting up carly. ! usually took a walk around thc grounds and
grccnhousc at thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations quartcrs and
didnt hurry about gctting down and my usual timc, as ! rccall,
was about 10:30 or 11:00. Vhat timc it was on this particular
Sunday morning ! couldnt go bcyond that.
273

271
!bid., pp. 229192.
272
!bid., p. 2183.
273
!bid.
According to Stark, thcrclorc, it was about 10:30 or 11altcr
hc rcachcd his o cc that morningthat hc saw thc 14part
]apancsc rcply. !t was thcn also, hc said, that hc had lcarncd that
thc ]apancsc ambassadors had bccn dircctcd to prcscnt his gov
crnmcnts rcply to thc Sccrctary ol Statc at 1:00 v.:. that samc
day.
274
Stark said hc had discusscd thc ]apancsc rcply and thc
timc ol its prcscntation with Navy Captain Schuirmann, Statc
cpartmcnt liaison.
275
Howcvcr, scvcral othcr witncsscs told ol
sccing Stark in his o cc much carlicr than 10:30 or 11:00. Kramcr
told thc 1944 Naval Court ol !nquiry that hc madc thc hurricd
dclivcry ol thc 14part ]apancsc rcply to Stark in his o cc at
about 9:00 ~.:. on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7.
276
Stark had not
bccn alonc, hc said, thcrc wcrc thcn about 12 or 15 o ccrs prcs
cnt. Most ol thc hcads ol divisions in thc Navy cpartmcnt and
thosc that attcndcd thc Admirals conlcrcncc wcrc thcrc. Kramcr
was rclicvcd that Vilkinson was thcrc bccausc Kramcr could lct
him carry thc ball with Admiral Stark as lar as any lurthcr cxpla
nation ol rclcrcnccs wcrc conccrncd.
277

!n Fcbruary 1946 bclorc thc ]CC, Kramcr changcd his story
slightly. Hc tcsticd: As soon as this 14th part was typcd up . . .
shortly altcr 8:00, dclivcry was madc to Captain McCollum along
with thc othcr 13 parts.
278
Kramcrs 1946 rccollcction was that
it was about 9:30 that all lourtccn parts wcrc dclivcrcd to Starks
o cc.
279

Vilkinson also tcsticd bclorc thc ]CC that Stark was in his
o cc carlicr that Sunday morning than 10:30 or 11:00, Starks
usual arrival timc. Vilkinson had rcachcd his own o cc shortly
274
!bid., p. 2184.
275
!bid.
276
!bid., part 33, p. 865.
277
!bid.
278
!bid., part 9, p. 4006.
279
!bid., part 9, p. 4038. Kramcr tcstimony bclorc thc ]oint Committcc.
altcr 8:00 on thc morning ol Sunday, thc 7th. Hc thought it was
about 9:15 whcn hc and McCollum wcnt to thc o cc ol thc
Chicl ol Naval pcrations |Stark|, whcrc, hc rccallcd, Admiral
Stark, Admiral !ngcrsoll, and Admiral Turncr wcrc prcscnt.
280

!n any cvcnt, hc was quitc clcar that Stark had rcad thc 14part
mcssagc in its cntircty by 9:15 or 9:30. Vilkinson was struck by
thc ghting words in thc 14th part. Hc was morc imprcsscd
by that languagc than by thc brcaking o ol ncgotiations and hc
had pointcd out to Stark thc scriousncss ol that languagc.
281

Vilkinson bclicvcd thc ]apancsc wcrc going to prcss on in
thc dircction ol thc advancc which thcy wcrc thcn lollowing in
thc South Sca and that somcthing might bc cxpcctcd in that or
othcr dircctions. Hc was particularly conccrncd that, in vicw ol
this strong languagc, thc cct should bc adviscd ol thc latcst
dcvclopmcnt. According to Vilkinson, Stark had thc author
ity to act. Vilkinson thought Stark should act. 8ut Stark did not
act.
282

!t would ccrtainly appcar that Stark was in his o cc and had
sccn thc 14part rcply and cvcn thc nc v.:. Mcssagc scvcral
hours bclorc thc ]apancsc ambassadors dclivcry dcadlinc. Yct,
cxccpt lor thc asscmbly ol an unusual numbcr ol naval o ccrs,
thc apparcnt lack ol any scnsc ol urgcncy in Starks o cc con
trastcd sharply with thc lrantic activity in Marshalls o cc at thc
last minutc, altcr hc nally arrivcd thcrc at 11:25.
283

Stark said that whcn Marshall phoncd him at about 11:40
and askcd what ! thought about scnding thc inlormation con
ccrning thc timc ol prcscntation on to thc various commandcrs in
thc Pacic, Starks rst rcsponsc was that wc had scnt thcm so
much alrcady that ! hcsitatcd to scnd morc. A minutc or so latcr,
280
!bid., part 36, p. 236.
281
!bid., part 4, pp. 176667.
282
!bid., p. 1800.
283
!bid., part 5, pp. 213233.
Stark callcd Marshall back and told him thcrc might bc somc
pcculiar signicancc in thc ]apancsc Ambassador calling on Mr.
Hull at 1:00 v.:. and askcd him to includc instructions to his
Army pcoplc to inlorm thcir naval oppositcs.
284

Pv~vi H~vnov A))~cx
No) ~ Co:viv)v Suvvvisv )o FR
Furthcr cvidcncc that thc attack did not takc thc adminis
tration by complctc surprisc is rcvcalcd in FRs lcttcr, dictatcd
cccmbcr 5, to Vcndcll Villkic, dclcatcd 1940 Rcpublican prcs
idcntial candidatc. !n that lcttcr, FR had suggcstcd that Villkic
visit Australia and Ncw Zcaland as spccial rcprcscntativc ol thc
prcsidcnt.
!t would, ol coursc, bc ol rcal valuc to ccmcnt our rclations
with Ncw Zcaland and Australia and would bc usclul not only
now but in thc luturc. Tcrc is always thc ]apancsc mattcr to
considcr. Tc situation is dcnitcly scrious and thcrc might
bc an armcd clash at any momcnt il thc ]apancsc continucd
thcir lorward progrcss against thc Philippincs, utch !ndics or
Malays or 8urma. Pcrhaps thc ncxt lour or vc days will dccidc
thc mattcr.
Altcr thc attack, bclorc mailing, thc prcsidcnt had addcd in
longhand: Tis was dictatcd Friday morninglong bclorc this
vilc attack startcd. F..R.
285

Co::i))vv Abiouvxvb
Tc committcc, crcatcd by a Scnatc Rcsolution ol Scptcmbcr
6, 1945, had hcld its rst opcn hcarings on Novcmbcr 15, 1945.
8y thc timc Commandcr Schulz appcarcd on Fcbruary 15, 1946,
284
!bid., part 5, p. 2133, Stark opcning statcmcnt.
285
!bid., part 17, p. 2457, xhibit 111, part 6, p. 2495.
most ol thc principals involvcd in thc attack had bccn hcard lrom.
Tc hcarings continucd a lcw morc days and a lcw morc pcrsons
wcrc qucstioncd. Finally thc committcc mcmbcrs dccidcd it was
timc to wind up thcir hcarings. !n closing Chairman 8arklcy con
gratulatcd thc mcmbcrs: ||n thc wholc thc attcndancc ol this
committcc and thc intcrcst it has manilcstcd in thc tcstimony ol all
thc witncsscs has bccn cxtraordinary. Tc committcc adjourncd
Fcbruary 20, 1946, subjcct to rccall by thc chairman.
286

Co::i))vv Rvcoxvvxvb )o Hv~v
Tvs)i:oxy vv vcv:nvv 6 Vnvvv~nou)s
ov S)~vx ~xb M~vsn~ii
n April 9 8arklcy rcconvcncd thc committcc to qucs
tion Stark and Marshall oncc morc as to thcir whcrcabouts on
cccmbcr 67.
287

Marshall had bccn appointcd ambassador to China by
Prcsidcnt Truman in Novcmbcr 1945, but was back in Vashington
lor a bricl visit in April 1946. At that timc hc appcarcd oncc morc
bclorc thc committcc.
8rcwstcr askcd Marshall, among othcr things, to cxplain why,
in vicw ol all prcattack considcrations and lactors, hc had not
cxpcctcd an attack on Pcarl Harbor. Marshall said hc had
lclt that was a vital installation. . . . |T|hat was thc only installa
tion wc had anywhcrc that was rcasonably wcll cquippcd. . . . !n
our opinion, thc commandcrs had bccn alcrtcd. !n our opinion,
thcrc was nothing morc wc could givc thcm at thc timc lor thc
purposc ol dclcnsc. !n our opinion, that was onc placc that had
cnough within itscll to put up a rcasonablc dclcnsc.
286
!bid., part 10, pp. 515051.
287
!bid., part 11, p. 5153.
MacArthur, in thc Philippincs, was just bcginning to gct somc
thing. His position was pitiablc, and it was still in a statc ol
complctc ux, with thc ships on thc occan cn routc out thcrc
and thc plancs hall dclivcrcd and hall still to go.
Tc Panama Canal was quitc inadcquatc at that pcriod, scri
ously inadcquatc in plancs, and, ol coursc, ol vast importancc
to anything in thc Pacic.
Tc only placc wc had any assurancc about was Hawaii, and
lor that rcason wc had lcss conccrn about Hawaii. . . . |V|c
had workcd on it vcry industriously . . . and wc lclt rcasonably
sccurc at that onc point.
288

Vhcn Marshall was in Vashington tcstilying, Fcrguson
in thc mcns room in thc Capitol ovcrhcard him talking with
8arklcy. Fcrguson did not scc thc two mcn, but hc rccognizcd
thcir voiccs and hcard Marshall tcll 8arklcy that il Marshall wcrc
to say whcrc hc was on thc night ol cccmbcr 67, it would gct
thc Chicl (FR) in troublc.
289

Tcsc rcmarks may also havc sparkcd thc lollowing linc ol
qucstioning by Kcclc. Hc rcmindcd Marshall that on Saturday
cvcning, altcr thc prcsidcnt had rcad thc rst 13 parts, hc had
turncd to Hopkins saying, in substancc, Tis mcans war. Tc
Prcsidcnt had thcn tricd to gct in touch with Stark.
288
!bid., part 11, pp. 518687.
289
Tis story, rclatcd to mc by Fcrguson, lcnds crcdcncc to Stahlmans asscr
tion that Marshall and Stark along with Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins, had
spcnt most ol thc night bclorc |thc attack| at thc Vhitc Housc with FR.
Scc ]amcs G. Stahlmans Novcmbcr 26, 1973 lcttcr to Admiral Kcmp Tollcy
(copy in authors lcs). Scvcral attcmpts wcrc madc in thc coursc ol thc ]CC
hcarings to dctcrminc il thcrc had bccn such a Vhitc Housc mccting. Scc lor
instancc thc qucstioning ol Marshall. !bid., part 3, pp. 1110 and part 11, p.
5193. And thc intcrlocutory with Stark at part 11, p. 5549.
Keefe: Can you statc dcnitcly whcthcr or not you havc a prcs
cnt rccollcction as to whcthcr thc Prcsidcnt did in lact contact
you:
Marshall: ! am quitc ccrtain that hc did not. . . . Tcrc is no
qucstion in my mind, no. Tat is a positivc answcr.
Keefe: And you arc ccrtain that you did not attcnd any mcct
ing thcn, at thc Vhitc Housc that night:
Marshall: ! am absolutcly ccrtain ol that. . . . ! might say that
. . . not only had ! no dinncr cngagcmcnts ol any kind bctwccn
thc 1st ol Novcmbcr and thc 7th ol cccmbcr . . . but that Mrs.
Marshall was convalcscing lrom having brokcn thrcc or lour
ribs and wc didnt go out anywhcrc. . . . So all thc cvidcncc . . .
is that ! was homc, as was customary. . . .
Keefe: Tat is your prcscnt rccollcction: . . .
Marshall: ! cant say that is my rccollcction. ! am ccrtain ! was
at homc, but ! dont rccall anything about it.
Keefe: 8ut you arc ccrtain ol onc thing and that is that you
rcccivcd no communication lrom thc prcsidcnt on thc cvcning
ol thc 6th ol cccmbcr and that you didnt attcnd any mccting
at thc Vhitc Housc that night:
Marshall: Tat is corrcct.
290

Vhcn askcd about thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, Marshall
rcpcatcd his account ol his Sunday morning routinc. Hc said
thc rst inlormation ! had ol anything unusual was . . . altcr
! got into my showcr, or was going into my showcr whcn
290
!bid., part 11, pp. 519394.
this mcssagc was rclaycd to mc lrom Coloncl 8ratton that hc
wantcd to comc out to thc housc with an important mattcr.
291

Vhcn Stark appcarcd bclorc this rcconvcncd scssion ol thc
]CC, his mind still drcw a blank as to whcrc hc had bccn or
what hc had bccn doing Saturday cvcning. Hc rcmcmbcrcd vcry
clcarly having sccn a rcvival ol Te Student Prince, but ! had not
conncctcd it with that Saturday night. Nor did hc now. My rcc
ollcction was it was in Philadclphia that hc had sccn thc rcvival
and hc had contactcd my daughtcr and hcr husband who wcrc
thcrc, and thcy said no. Tc ncxt ! hcard ol it was in conncction
with Commandcr Schulzs tcstimony. 8ut cvcn that did not ring
any bcll with him. Hc could only assumc, in vicw ol thc tcsti
mony ol Commandcr Schulz and ol othcrs who tricd to contact
mc . . . that ! probably was thcrc.
292
And Stark did not rcmcmbcr hcaring lrom thc prcsidcnt that
cvcning. To thc bcst ol my knowlcdgc and bclicl, thc prcsidcnt
did not call mc that night. Nor did hc think hc had lcarncd
thcn that thcrc was a dispatch down thcrc |at thc Vhitc Housc|
which was clcarcut and which mcant war.
293
!n any cvcnt, hc
was absolutcly ccrtain that hc did not go to thc Vhitc Housc
that night, cccmbcr 6 and that hc did not scc thc rst 13parts
ol thc ]ap 14part mcssagc that night.
294

Stark pcrsistcd in saying that his visit to thc o cc Sunday
morning had bccn routinc.
295
Hc did not rccall mccting thcrc
that morning with various o ccrs, as Kramcr and Vilkinson had
tcsticd that hc had.
296

291
!bid., pp. 5191, 5194.
292
!bid., p. 5154.
293
!bid., pp. 5157, 5159.
294
!bid., p. 5232.
295
!bid., p. 5155.
296
!bid., p. 5163.

n April 11, 1946, altcr introducing additional matcrial on
thc rccord, thc committcc stood adjourncd subjcct to thc call ol
thc Chair.
297
Howcvcr, on May 23, it rcopcncd to acccpt a lcw
morc documcnts. Among othcr matcrials, Fcrguson introduccd
lor thc rccord writtcn statcmcnts lrom lormcr Sccrctary ol Statc
Hull
298
and lormcr Sccrctary ol Var Stimson.
299
Stimsons notcs
lor cccmbcr 7 dcscribcd a mccting with Hull and Knox that
morning and told ol his position that thc main thing is to hold
thc main pcoplc who arc intcrcstcd in thc Far ast togcthcrthc
8ritish, oursclvcs, thc utch, thc Australians, thc Chincsc. For
thc rccord, Stimson attachcd copics ol thc statcmcnts cxprcssing
similar scntimcnts hc had solicitcd that morning lrom Hull and
Knox.
300

Vith thc introduction ol thcsc documcnts, thc hcarings wcrc
o cially closcd and thc committcc stood adjourncd, subjcct to
call by thc Chair.
301

]CC Hv~vixcs Rvovvxvb Ac~ix )o Hv~v ~x
Accoux) ov S)~vxs vcv:nvv 6 vvxixc
Although o cially closcd, thc committcc rcopcncd oncc morc
on May 31, 1946, at thc spccial call ol 8arklcy. Stark had writtcn
8arklcy a lcttcr advising that hc had nally bccn rcmindcd ol his
297
!bid., part 11, p. 5364.
298
!bid., pp. 5367416, Rcplics to !ntcrrogatorics Propoundcd by thc Honor
ablc Homcr Fcrguson.
299
!bid., pp. 541640, 544163, Sccrctary ol Var Stimsons Statcmcnt ol Facts
as Shown by My Currcnt Notcs and My Rccollcction as Rclrcshcd Tcrcby.
300
!bid., pp. 543941.
301
!bid., p. 5542.
whcrcabouts on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6.
302
8arklcy did not
lccl hc should sit on Starks lcttcr. Nor did hc think hc should
simply put it in thc rccord whcrc it would in ccct bc lost and
buricd. Tc mattcr could not bc dclaycd as Stark was lcaving lor
London that altcrnoon.
303

8arklcy hurricdly rcopcncd thc hcarings just to hcar lrom
Stark and his inlormant. Somc ol thc tcn committcc mcmbcrs
wcrc out ol town and unablc to attcnd on such short noticc. nly
lour cmocrats appcarcd, and onc RcpublicanKcclcwho,
having had only a lcw minutcs noticc by phonc, arrivcd latc.
Stark had writtcn 8arklcy that Navy Captain Harold . Krick,
a pcrsonal lricnd and Starks lormcr ag captain, had rcmindcd
Stark that thc two mcn and thcir wivcs had spcnt that cvcning
togcthcr. Tcy had attcndcd a pcrlormancc ol Te Student Prince
at thc National Tcatcr in Vashington. Vhcn thcy rcturncd
lrom thc thcatcr to Starks quartcrs, onc ol Starks scrvants told
him that thc Vhitc Housc had callcd. Stark wcnt immcdiatcly
upstairs to phonc FR lrom his study, whcrc a dircct linc to thc
Vhitc Housc was locatcd. According to Krick, whcn Stark camc
back downstairs, hc told him in substancc that thc situation with
]apan was vcry scrious.
304

Vhcn thc two couplcs again mct socially on Saturday, May
25, 1946, Krick happcncd to rclatc thcsc cvcnts to Stark. Stark
did not rcmcmbcr thc occasion, but hc rcalizcd that this mcant
that his tcstimony that hc had not talkcd to FR that cvcning
was incorrcct. Tc morc Stark thought about this, thc morc dis
turbcd hc bccamc. Hc thought thc committcc should havc this,
thc rccord should havc it straight. Hc got up around 2 or 3 in
302
!bid., pp. 554344.
303
!bid., pp. 5544, 5555.
304
!bid., p. 5544, quoting Starks lcttcr to 8arklcy.
thc morning and wrotc thc lcttcr that hc had dclivcrcd to 8arklcy
on May 27.
305

Counscl Richardson askcd Stark:
Admiral, il thc prcsidcnt had told you in his talk with you that
night . . . that this thirtccnthpart mcssagc mcant war, thcrcby
imprcsscd you with his vcry scrious cstimatc ol it, what would
havc bccn, in accordancc with your custom, thc action lor you
to havc thcn takcn, with that inlormation:
Stark thought that hc should havc gottcn in touch with
!ngcrsoll |assistant CN| and with Turncr |chicl, Navy Var
Plans|. Vc had had a conlcrcncc a lcw days prcviously, Stark
said,
going ovcr thc scriousncss ol thc situation, il thcrc was any
thing morc wc could havc scnt, and, as ! say, wc practically
rcpcatcd this lourtccnth point . . . somc days carlicr wc had
scnt thc samc thing. Vc thought, and thc prcsidcnt kncw cvcry
movc that wc had madc, that wc had scnt cvcrything possiblc,
on that prcmisc, that war was in thc immcdiatc o ng. ! dont
know that ! would havc donc anything. ! couldnt say.
Richardson thcn took advantagc ol thc opportunity to ask
Stark anothcr odd qucstion about a possiblc latcnight cccmbcr
67 mccting at thc Vhitc Housc.
! ncvcr hcard ol such a conlcrcncc. ! know ol nothing now
rcgarding such a conlcrcncc, was not prcscnt at it, ! had ncvcr
cvcn hcard anyonc suggcst such a thing until it was mcntioncd
hcrc in prcvious hcarings. My honcst opinion is that nothing
ol thc sort took placc. !t was a complctc surprisc to Marshall
that cvcn thc qucstion camc up. !t was to mc. ! am ccrtain that
! didnt lcavc thc housc altcr thc Kricks lclt. ! just cant think ol
any such thing as happcning. Ccrtainly ! was not prcscnt, and
305
!bid., p. 5548.
Coloncl Knox ncvcr mcntioncd any such thing to mc. . . . |S|uch
a conlcrcncc at thc Vhitc Housc, undcr thosc circumstanccs,
Stark said, would havc bccn so cxtraordinarily unusual that it
should unqucstionably havc stood out in his mcmory. 8ut hc
didnt rcmcmbcr any such mccting.
306

!n spitc ol Kricks dctailcd account ol thc cvcnts ol thc cvc
ning, Starks mcmory did not rcvivc. Hc rcmaincd consistcnt in
saying that hc could rccall ncithcr attcnding thc thcatcr with thc
Kricks nor phoning thc prcsidcnt whcn hc rcturncd homc. Hc
did not rcmcmbcr that cvcning.
307

Kcclc had arrivcd at this spccial mccting only altcr Stark had
givcn thc bulk ol his tcstimony. Hc lcarcd that by rcopcning thc
hcarings lor this purposc thcy wcrc cstablishing a prcccdcnt now
that may plaguc us in thc luturc and that its procccdings could
go on and on.
308
Tc ]CC nally acccptcd Richardsons suggcs
tion to takc thc Captains |Kricks| tcstimony . . . and thcn il thc
committcc latcr dccidcs not to usc any ol this tcstimony, all right,
on thc othcr hand, il thcy allow it to go in, wc havc it.
309
Krick tcsticd that hc and his wilc had sccn thc Starks socially
on May 25, 1946. Tc subjcct ol thcir cccmbcr 6 mccting camc
up quitc casually in thc coursc ol thc convcrsation. Krick hadnt
bccn lollowing thc ]CC tcstimony closcly, and so hc hadnt rcal
izcd what Stark had told thc committcc. 8ut thcn hc had sccn a
hcadlinc to thc ccct that thc admiral couldnt rcmcmbcr whcrc hc
had bccn that cvcning.
310
Hc told Stark that thcy all had attcndcd
a pcrlormancc ol Te Student Prince at thc National Tcatcr on
thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Vhcn thcy rcturncd to thc admirals
306
!bid., p. 5549 (part 11).
307
!bid., pp. 555455.
308
!bid., p. 5550.
309
!bid., p. 5552.
310
!bid., p. 5558.
quartcrs, onc ol thc scrvants had told Stark that thcrc had bccn
a Vhitc Housc call during thc cvcning. Stark cxcuscd himscll
and rctircd to his study on thc sccond oor. Vhcn hc rcturncd
hc said only that thc conditions in thc Pacic wcrc scrious . . . in
a critical statc, somcthing ol that sort.
311

Kricks rcmindcr ol thcir cccmbcr 6 thcatcr party madc
Stark rcalizc that hc had givcn wronglul tcstimony to thc ]CC
and, according to Krick, hc was vcry disturbcd. Stark told him:
You rcalizc that ! havc tcsticd to thc contrary, and hc implicd
that this mattcr should bc laid bclorc thc committcc.
312
Askcd by Lucas how hc could rcmcmbcr this so vividly, Krick
rcplicd that thc cvcnts ol thc cvcning wcrc strongly imprcsscd on
his mind bccausc ! was a vcry small sh, and grcat things wcrc
transpiring, and you dont lorgct that sort ol thing. !t is not likc
looking down, whcn you look up at somcthing. Vhcn thc Pcarl
Harbor disastcr struck thc lollowing day, thc cntirc cvcning was
dcnitcly imprcsscd on him, and hc said it will bc thcrc lor a
long timc to comc.
313

Tus by chancc thc committcc lcarncd ol Starks whcrcabouts
on thc cvcning ol cccmbcr 6. Unlortunatcly, no witncss cvcr
camc lorward to cnlightcn thc ]CC similarly as to Marshalls
doings during thcsc crucial hours.
Finally, thc Committcc adjourncd subjcct to call.
314

311
!bid., p. 5557.
312
!bid., p. 5558.
313
!bid., p. 5560.
314
!bid.
827
30.
Joint Congressional
Committee on the
Pearl Harbor Attack:
Reports
]CC Rvvov), ]uiy :o, +o6
T
hc committccs rcport was publishcd in a scparatc unnum
bcrcd volumc and transmittcd to Congrcss undcr datc ol ]uly
20, 1946.
1
Tc hcarings had continucd much longcr than
anticipatcd, and thc dcadlinc lor thc rcport had bccn cxtcndcd.
8y thc timc thc committcc closcd down in May 1946, it had
1
ol thc Pcarl Harbor Attack. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on
the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe
Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster (Vashington,
.C.: U.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing cc, 1946), p. i.
hcld 70 days ol opcn hcarings, cxamincd 43 witncsscs, takcn
15,000 pagcs ol tcstimony, introduccd countlcss documcnts, and
admittcd somc 183 cxhibits.
2
!ncorporatcd in thc volumcs ol thc
hcarings wcrc thc ndings ol all prcvious Pcarl Harbor invcs
tigations. Morcovcr, thc ]CC had had acccss to a grcat dcal ol
sccrct inlormation that had not bccn availablc bclorc, much ncw
matcrial had bccn rcvcalcd. To organizc all this data, gathcrcd
lrom various sourccs, to scparatc thc whcat lrom thc cha, thc
rclcvant lrom thc irrclcvant, and to dctcrminc rcsponsibility was
a lormidablc task.
Tnv M~iovi)y Rvvov)
Tc Majority Rcport itscll was a vcritablc book, 492 pagcs
long. !t rcvicwcd in considcrablc dctail thc historical background
ol thc attack, ]apans Asiatic policy, thc ]apancscU.S. ncgotia
tions, U.S. diplomacy, and U.S. agrccmcnts to coopcratc with thc
8ritish and thc utch. !t dcscribcd thc attack itscll, including thc
]apancsc plan lor making and cxccuting thc attack, thc dclcnscs
ol U.S. lorccs in Hawaii, thc surprisc occasioncd in Pcarl Harbor
by thc attack, and thc U.S. losscs that rcsultcd.
Tc Majority Rcport was signcd by only cight ol thc com
mittccs tcn mcmbcrs. nc ol thc signatorics, Kcclc, disscntcd in
somc rcspccts and prcscntcd Additional \icws.
3

Tc conclusion ol thc Majority Rcport was that thc ulti
matc rcsponsibility lor thc attack rcstcd with ]apan, thc top
Vashington o cials had donc nothing to provokc thc ]apancsc
into attack and had
dischargcd thcir rcsponsibilitics with distinction, ability, and
lorcsight . . . and had madc cvcry possiblc cort, without sacri
2
!bid., p. xiv.
3
!bid., pp. 266266V.
Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 829
cing our national honor and cndangcring our sccurity, to avcrt
war with ]apan.
4

Tc Majority Rcport did not lct Vashington military o
cials gct o scotlrcc, howcvcr. !t chargcd thc war plans divi
sion ol thc Var cpartmcnt with having lailcd to dischargc its
dircct rcsponsibility to advisc thc commanding gcncral hc had
not propcrly alcrtcd thc Hawaiian cpartmcnt.
!t also hcld:
Tc !ntclligcncc and Var Plans ivisions ol thc Var and
Navy cpartmcnts lailcd: (a) To givc carclul and thought
lul considcration to thc intcrccptcd mcssagcs lrom Tokyo to
Honolulu ol Scptcmbcr 24, Novcmbcr 15, and Novcmbcr 20
(thc harbor bcrthing plan and rclatcd dispatchcs) and to raisc
a qucstion as to thcir signicancc. . . . (b) To bc propcrly on
thc qui vive to rcccivc thc onc oclock intcrccpt and to rccog
nizc in thc mcssagc thc lact that somc ]apancsc military action
would vcry possibly occur somcwhcrc at 1 v.:. cccmbcr 7. . .
. Notwithstanding thc lact that thcrc wcrc o ccrs on twcnty
lour hour watch, thc Committcc bclicvcs that undcr all ol thc
cvidcncc thc Var and Navy cpartmcnts wcrc not su cicntly
alcrtcd on cccmbcr 6 and 7, 1941, in vicw ol thc immincncc
ol war.
5
Tus thc Majority Rcport was somcwhat critical ol Gcrow
(Var Plans) and Turncr (!ntclligcncc), lor not bcing morc alcrt,
and it placcd somc blamc indircctly on Marshall and Stark lor
not having rcactcd morc promptly on rccciving thc nc v.:.
Mcssagc. Howcvcr, it hcld Hulls diplomatic rolc justicd and
praiscd Knox and Stimson.
According to thc Majority Rcport,
4
!bid., pp. 25152.
5
!bid., p. 252.
cvcryonc was surpriscd that ]apan struck thc Flcct at Pcarl
Harbor at thc timc that shc did. Yct o ccrs, both in Vashington
and Hawaii, wcrc lully conscious ol thc dangcr lrom an attack,
thcy rcalizcd this lorm ol attack on Pcarl Harbor by ]apan was
at lcast a possibility, and thcy wcrc adcquatcly inlormcd ol thc
immincncc ol war.
6
Tc Rcport listcd scvcral lailurcs on thc part ol thc Hawaiian
commandcrs and concludcd: Tc crrors madc by thc Hawaiian
commands wcrc crrors ol judgmcnt and not ol dcrclictions ol
duty.
Tc principal rccommcndations wcrc to institutc unity ol
command . . . at all military and naval outposts and to intc
gratc Army and Navy intclligcncc agcncics in ordcr to avoid thc
pitlalls ol dividcd rcsponsibility which cxpcricncc has madc so
abundantly apparcnt.
7

Kvvvvs Abbi)iox~i \ivws
!n his Additional \icws, Kcclc said that hc agrccd with
most ol thc Majority Rcports conclusions and rccommcnda
tions. For instancc, hc rccognizcd, as thc majority did, that both
Vashington and Hawaii wcrc surpriscd. Apparcntly ncithcr
bclicvcd that Pcarl Harbor would bc ]apans initial targct, both
cxpcctcd ]apan to strikc rst in thc Asiatic arca. !l this bclicl was
unjusticd, as Kcclc bclicvcd it was,
thcn thc mistakc lics on thc Vashington doorstcp just as
much as it docs upon that ol Hawaii. Troughout thc long
and arduous scssions ol thc committcc in thc prcparation ol
thc committcc rcport |! had| continuously insistcd that what
cvcr yardstick was agrccd upon as a basis lor dctcrmining
6
!bid., p. 251.
7
!bid., pp. 25253.
rcsponsibilitics in Hawaii should bc applicd to thc high com
mand at Vashington.
Tis was Kcclcs lundamcntal objcction to thc committcc
rcport. !l thc high command in Hawaii was subjcct to criti
cism lor concluding that Hawaii was not in dangcr, thcn Kcclc
insistcd that thc samc criticism with thc samc lorcc and scopc
should apply to thc high command in Vashington.
8

Kcclc pointcd out that it was FR who had madc thc dcci
sion to rctain thc cct at Pcarl Harbor. Yct
thc position ol thc Flcct in thc Hawaiian arca was inhcrcntly
untcnablc and dangcrous. . . . ncc thc ships wcrc in Pcarl
Harbor, with its singlc channcl, thcy wcrc a targct lor any suc
ccsslully launchcd air attack lrom carricrbornc plancs.
As thc cct lackcd su cicnt patrol plancs to conduct thc ncc
cssary rcconnaissancc, out as lar as 800 milcs and lor 360 dcgrccs
all around ahu, thc chancc ol discovcring such a hostilc carricr
would bc only by lucky accidcnt.
An inlcrior Flcct, undcr cncmy survcillancc in an cxposcd
naval basc without rcsourccs to protcct it, Kcclc wrotc,
could only avcrt disastcr by rccciving thc bcst possiblc cvidcncc
ol thc intcntions ol its potcntial cncmy. Tc Commandcrin
Chicl ol thc Flcct in 1941 rccognizcd that inlormation was
csscntial to his making appropriatc disposition to mcct any cri
sis. Hc lormally rcqucstcd thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations that
hc bc immcdiatcly inlormcd ol all important dcvclopmcnts as
thcy occur and by thc quickcst sccurc mcans availablc.
9

Yct Kimmcl was not kcpt so inlormcd.
8
!bid., p. 266A.
9
!bid., pp. 2668266C.
Kcclc rcvicwcd somc ol thc morc vital inlormation that had
bccn availablc in Vashington but which had not bccn rclaycd to
Pcarl Harborthc cvidcncc ol ]apancsc intcntions, thc bomb
plot or ships in harbor mcssagcs, FRs scvcral statcmcnts
conccrning thc immincncc ol war, thc Pilot Mcssagc, thc thir
tccn parts ol ]apans rcply, ctc. All in all, Kcclcs objcctions to thc
Majority Rcport wcrc so substantial that Scnators 8rcwstcr and
Fcrguson wcrc surpriscd and disappointcd that hc did not join
thcm in dralting thcir Minority Rcport.
]CC Mixovi)y Rvvov)
Tc two committcc mcmbcrs who rcluscd to sign thc Majority
Rcport, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson, submittcd thcir own Minority
Rcport.
10
!n it thcy pointcd out that thc rst purposc ol thc
invcstigation, according to 8arklcy, was that ol xing rcspon
sibility lor thc Pcarl Harbor disastcr upon an individual, or a
group ol individuals, or upon a systcm undcr which thcy opcratcd
or coopcratcd or lailcd to do cithcr.
11
Tcy procccdcd to lay thc
blamc dircctly at thc door ol thc Rooscvclt administration.
!nasmuch as all dccisions and activitics conncctcd with this
occurrcncc at Pcarl Harbor wcrc dccisions and activitics ol
cxccutivc authoritics ol thc Govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs,
thc issuc ol rcsponsibility lor thc dcgrcc ol succcss attaincd by
thc ]apancsc attack involvcs at lcast onc gcncral qucstion and
lour subsidiary and spccic qucstions:
Tc gcncral qucstion is: id all thc civil, military and naval
authoritics ol thc Unitcd Statcs chargcd with rcsponsibility
lor thc conduct ol diplomatic ncgotiations with thc ]apancsc
Govcrnmcnt and lor prcparcdncss and dclcnsc at Pcarl Harbor
compctcntly, c cicntly, and with propcr rcgard lor thc trust
10
!bid., pp. 495573.
11
!bid., p. 495.
imposcd in thcm lulll thc dutics ol thcir rcspcctivc o ccs
undcr thc constitution and laws ol thc Unitcd Statcs:
Tc subsidiary and spccic qucstions arc:
1. id thc high civil, military, and naval authoritics in
Vashington sccurc in advancc ol 10:00 ~.:. (.S.T.) cccmbcr
7, 1941, inlormation rcspccting ]apancsc dcsigns and intcn
tions su cicnt to convincc thcm bcyond all rcasonablc doubt
that war with ]apan was immcdiatcly immincnt:
2. !l so, did thcy givc to Gcncral Valtcr C. Short and Admiral
Husband . Kimmcl, thc commandcrs at Pcarl Harbor, clcar
and dcnitc ordcrs, immcdiatcly prior to thc ]apancsc attack,
instructing thcm to bc lully alcrt lor dclcnsc against such an
attack:
3. Vas Hawaii adcquatcly cquippcd lor its dclcnsc against a
]apancsc attack in accordancc with thc known circumstanccs:
4. id thc commandcrs at Pcarl Harbor takc thc appro
priatc mcasurcs rcquircd by thc ordcrs issucd to thcm lrom
Vashington, by thc dutics ol thcir rcspcctivc o ccs, and by thc
inlormation in thcir posscssion and thc rcsourccs at thcir dis
posal, to maintain thc sccurity ol thc posscssions ol thc Unitcd
Statcs as lar as that rcsponsibility was invcstcd in thcm:
12
Tc Minority Rcport objcctcd to thc troublc thc committcc
had in obtaining documcnts. Tc proposal prcscntcd to Congrcss
just bclorc thc dcath ol FR in April 1945, to prcvcnt all dis
closurc ol U.S. cryptanalysis activitics, had lailcd to pass, thanks
to thc chargcs ol ccnsorship raiscd by Fcrguson.
13
Howcvcr, thc
mcmbcrs ol thc ]oint Congrcssional Committcc still cncountcrcd
obstaclcs to obtaining documcnts crucial to thcir invcstigation.
12
!bid., p. 496.
13
Scnatc 8ill S.805. Scc Congrcssional Rccord, April 9, 1945, p. 3196, and
Congrcssional Rccord, April 11, 1945, p. 3267.
Undcr datc ol August 28, 1945, Prcsidcnt Truman issucd
an ordcr similar to thc April proposal.
14
Tis ordcr was rclaxcd
somcwhat in ctobcr 1945, whcn its application was limitcd to
thc statc, war, and navy dcpartmcnts, also thc sccrccy ol rccords
was rclaxcd only so lar as thc ]oint Committcc was conccrncd.
Tc opportunity to scarch thc rccords was still dcnicd to indi
vidual mcmbcrs ol thc committcc. Morcovcr, thc ordcr
containcd thc unlortunatc phrasc any inlormation in thcir
|thc govcrnmcnts| posscssion material to the investigation,
which providcd a cloak lor thosc rcluctant to yicld inlormation
rcqucstcd by mcmbcrs ol thc Committcc. !t was always pos
siblc to conlront individual mcmbcrs with thc vicw that thc
papcrs, data, and inlormation dcsircd was not matcrial to thc
invcstigation. . . .
!n an ordcr ol Novcmbcr 7, 1945, Prcsidcnt Truman rclaxcd
rcstraints on cxccutivcs ol thc Govcrnmcnt in ordcr that thcy
may spcak lrccly to individual members ol thc Committcc but
thc ordcr closcd with thc dircction: Tis docs not includc any
lcs or writtcn matcrial.
15

8rcwstcr and Fcrguson chargcd in thcir rcport that whcn thcy
askcd to havc a scarch madc lor missing rccords, \igorous and
public dcnial was madcprcsumably on xccutivc authority
that any rccords wcrc missing. Yct whcn it dcvclopcd that somc
rccords actually wcrc missing
most inadcquatc cxplanations wcrc supplicd. How any public
intcrcst could possibly havc bccn prcjudiccd by aording any
14
]oint Committcc, Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investiga-
tion of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with
Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, p. 498.
15
!bid.
opportunity to cxaminc thc manncr ol kccping rccords ol this
charactcr has ncvcr bccn satislactorily cxplaincd.
16

Tc major criticism ol 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson was ol thc top
authoritics in VashingtonRooscvclt, thc sccrctarics ol statc,
war, and navy, thc Army chicl ol sta, and chicl ol naval opcr
ations.
17
Hours, cvcn days, bclorc thc attack thcsc mcn all had
acccss to dctailcd inlormation about ]apans intcntions, inlorma
tion that was not availablc to thc cld commandcrs. Tcy kncw
that a ]apancsc strikc was immincnt. Yct thcy did not act. Tcy
just waitcd. Tcy waitcdlor ]apan to strikc thc rst blow. Yct all
this timc thcy lailcd to advisc thc military mcn in thc cld ol thc
scriousncss ol thc thrcat. And thc warnings Vashington did scnd
to thc cld wcrc
couchcd in such conicting and imprccisc languagc that thcy
lailcd to convcy to thc commandcrs dcnitc inlormation on thc
statc ol diplomatic rclations with ]apan and on ]apancsc war
dcsigns and positivc ordcrs rcspccting thc particular actions to
bc takcnordcrs that wcrc bcyond all rcasonablc doubts as to
thc nccd lor an allout alcrt. !n this rcgard,
according to 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson, thc said high authoritics
lailcd to dischargc thcir lull duty.
18

Tc Minority Rcport rcvicwcd somc ol thc crucial inlorma
tion that had bccn availablc in Vashington, but which had not
bccn transmittcd to Hawaii:
!ntcrccpts ol ]apancsc mcssagcs madc by thc Army and Navy
intclligcncc scrviccs showcd high authoritics in Vashington
that thc ]apancsc Govcrnmcnt had ordcrcd its agcnts in Hawaii
to rcport on Amcrican military and naval installations and ship
16
!bid., p. 500.
17
!bid., pp. 50306.
18
!bid., pp. 50405.
movcmcnts in that rcgion. Tcy also rcquircd rcports on lack
ol movcmcnt. For cxamplc, Scptcmbcr 24, 1941, it ordcrcd an
agcnt to subdividc thc watcrs ol Pcarl Harbor into vc sub
arcas, as wcll as to rcport on ship movcmcnts thcrc. Prior to
and altcr this datc ]apancsc agcnts wcrc, up to thc ]apancsc
attack, rcporting on ship movcmcnts, installations, and othcr
mattcrs ol military and naval signicancc to thc ]apancsc
govcrnmcnt.
19

Vitncsscs bclorc thc Committcc, it may bc notcd, in cxtcnu
ation ol thcir lack ol cmphasis on thc probability ol an attack
on Pcarl Harbor, callcd attcntion to thc lact that ]apancsc
agcnts wcrc also rcporting on thc military and naval installa
tions ol thc Unitcd Statcs at Panama, thc Philippincs, thc wcst
coast, and othcr points. 8ut to mcn, compctcnt, carclul, and
watchlul, mcn alcrt on thcir allaround and indivisiblc rcspon
sibility, this lact providcd no cxcusc whatcvcr lor minimizing
thc probability ol an attack on Pcarl Harbor any morc than
at any othcr Amcrican outpost. Nor docs it cxcusc thc lail
urc ol Vashington authoritics to notc that lar grcatcr dctail
was bcing askcd lor by thc ]apancsc about Hawaii at a timc
whcn ]apancsc movcmcnts in thc Southcastcrn Pacic had to
contcnd with thc stratcgic position ol Hawaii whcrc thc rcal
Amcrican striking lorcc, thc cct, rcstcd.
20

8asically, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson hcld Rooscvclt to blamc:
Tc Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs was rcsponsiblc lor thc lail
urc to cnlorcc continuous, c cicnt, and appropriatc coopcra
tion among thc Sccrctary ol Var, thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, thc
|Army| Chicl ol Sta, and thc Chicl ol Naval pcrations, in
cvaluating inlormation and dispatching clcar and positivc ordcrs
to thc Hawaiian commandcrs. . . . !n thc nal instancc ol cru
cial signicancc lor alcrting Amcrican outpost commandcrs, on
19
!bid.
20
!bid., pp. 52324.
Saturday night, cccmbcr 6, and Sunday morning, cccmbcr
7, thc Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs lailcd to takc that quick
and instant cxccutivc action which was rcquircd by thc occa
sion and by thc rcsponsibility lor watchlulncss and guardian
ship rightly associatcd in law and practicc with his high o cc
lrom thc cstablishmcnt ol thc Rcpublic to our own timcs.
21

vidcncc sct lorth in this rcport in dctail is amplc to show that
in thc pcriod approximatcly lrom May 1940 to cccmbcr 7,
1941, thc high authoritics at Vashington assumcd so much
ol thc dircction ol aairs at Hawaii as to rcmovc many ol thc
basic rcsponsibilitics lrom thc commandcrs in thc cld. Tc
rcsult was to rcducc thc discrction ol thc commandcrs in thc
cld by thosc things which thcy wcrc ordcrcd to do by dircc
tions lrom Vashington and not to do ccrtain things unlcss
thcy wcrc so ordcrcd lrom Vashington. Anothcr rcsult ol this
practicc was to lull thc commandcrs in thc cld into awaiting
instructions lrom Vashington.
22

Admittcdly Marshall and Stark wcrc
carrying hcavy burdcns in prcparing thc armcd lorccs ol thc
Unitcd Statcs lor war, in making war plans, in building up an
Army and Navy (which thcy kncw wcrc not yct rcady lor war),
and in struggling lor a postponcmcnt ol thc war until thc Army
and Navy wcrc bcttcr prcparcd to copc with thc loc. Vith
rcgard to thc Prcsidcnt, thc Sccrctary ol Statc, thc Sccrctary ol
Var, and thc Sccrctary ol thc Navy, it may bc said justly that
thcy wcrc carrying hcavy burdcns also. 8ut all thcsc o cials, as
Sccrctary Stimsons diary dcmonstratcs, spcnt many days bclorc
cccmbcr 7 in gcncral discussions which lcd to no dccisions.
Tis thcy did at a timc whcn thcy posscsscd spccial knowlcdgc
ol ]apancsc dcsigns and wcrc acquaintcd with thcir own intcn
tions and rcsolvcs and ccrtainly had thc lcisurc to do thc onc
21
!bid., pp. 50506.
22
!bid., p. 553.
obvious duty dictatcd by common scnscthat isdraw up a
bricl plan lor tclling thc outpost commandcrs just what to do
in a ccrtain contingcncy |a ]apancsc attack on Amcrican pos
scssions somcwhcrc| on rcccipt ol ordcrs lrom Vashington. . . .
Tcy had plans lor action or actions by thc armcd lorccs ol thc
Unitcd Statcs if Congrcss dcclarcd war or if by somc proccss
thc Unitcd Statcs got into or cntcrcd thc war. Var plans (lor
cxamplc, Rainbow No. 5 which was VPL 46) wcrc to go into
opcration only altcr war had bcgun and wcrc not intcndcd lor
prcparation in mccting a surprisc attack.
Tcy prcparcd no plan giving thc outpost commandcrs instruc
tions about thc mcasurcs thcy wcrc to takc in prcparing lor
and mccting a ]apancsc attack on Amcrican posscssions whcn
and il it camc. Tis plan could havc bccn drawn up in a lcw
hours at most and sct down in two or thrcc typcwrittcn pagcs
at most.
23

As to Kimmcl and Short, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson said,
Vhatcvcr crrors ol judgmcnt thc commandcrs at Hawaii com
mittcd and whatcvcr mismanagcmcnt thcy displaycd in prc
paring lor a ]apancsc attack, attcntion to chain ol rcsponsibility
in thc civil and military administration rcquircs taking notc
ol thc lact that thcy wcrc dcsignatcd lor thcir posts by high
authoritics in Vashington. . . .
Tc dclcnsc ol Hawaii rcstcd upon two scts ol intcrdcpcndcnt
rcsponsibilitics: (1) Tc rcsponsibility in Vashington in rcspcct
ol its intimatc knowlcdgc ol diplomatic ncgotiations, widc
sprcad intclligcncc inlormation, dircction ol aairs and consti
tutional duty to plan thc dclcnsc ol thc Unitcd Statcs, (2) thc
rcsponsibility cast upon thc commandcrs in thc cld in chargc
ol a major naval basc and thc cct csscntial to thc dclcnsc ol thc
tcrritory ol thc Unitcd Statcs to do thosc things appropriatc to
23
!bid., p. 558.
thc dclcnsc ol thc cct and outpost. Vashington authoritics
lailcd in (1), and thc commanding o ccrs at Hawaii lailcd in
(2).
24

Tc Minority Rcport acknowlcdgcd that, Tc qucstion ol
thc wisdom ol thc lorcign policy pursucd by thc Govcrnmcnt ol
thc Unitcd Statcs |was| cxcludcd by thc tcrms ol thc committccs
instructions.
25
Howcvcr, thc two Scnators did approach thc mat
tcr as it rclatcd to military tactics. Tcy askcd why ]apans rcqucst
lor a modus vivendi had bccn rcjcctcd.
Vholly apart lrom thc mcrits or dcmcrits ol . . . thc ]apancsc
proposal ol Novcmbcr 20, hcrc was an opportunity at lcast to
prolong thc brcathing spcll lor which Gcncral Marshall and
Admiral Stark wcrc plcading in thcir corts to strcngthcn thc
armcd lorccs ol thc Unitcd Statcs lor war.
Although Rooscvclt had at rst approvcd ol a thrccmonth
modus vivendi, as opposcd to thc sixmonth vcrsion prcviously
proposcd, Hull had rcjcctcd it altcr talking with FR. !n doing
this, hc |Hull|
gavc no advancc noticc to Gcncral Marshall and Admiral Stark,
who wcrc thcn prcparing thcir sccond carclul mcmorandum to
thc Prcsidcnt bcgging lor a postponcmcnt ol war with ]apan
until thc Army and Navy could makc bcttcr prcparation lor
waging it.
26

As thcy closcd thcir Minority Rcport, 8rcwstcr and Fcrguson
said,
How to avoid war and how to turn waril it nally comcsto
scrvc thc causc ol human progrcss is thc challcngc to diplomacy
24
!bid., p. 505.
25
!bid., p. 497.
26
!bid., pp. 561, 563.
today as ycstcrday. Hcrc, too, much cannot bc known rcgarding
all thc pctty cpisodcs that nally add up to war. No war comcs
in a momcnt. Var is thc sum ol many minor dccisions and
somc that arc major. !n this diplomatic aspcct thc Pcarl Harbor
invcstigation has sadly lailcd to livc up to thc lolty prospcctus
with which it was launchcd. . . .
!n our opinion, thc cvidcncc bclorc this Committcc indicatcs
that thc tragcdy at Pcarl Harbor was primarily a lailurc ol mcn
and not ol laws or powcrs to do thc ncccssary things, and carry
out thc vcstcd rcsponsibilitics. No lcgislation could havc curcd
such dclccts ol o cial judgmcnts, managcmcnt, coopcration,
and action as wcrc displaycd by authoritics and agcnts ol thc
Unitcd Statcs in conncction with thc cvcnts that culminatcd in
thc catastrophc at Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr 7, 1941.
Tis dcmonstratcs thc wcakncss ol dcpcnding on thc political
hcad ol thc Govcrnmcnt to bring about thc ncccssary coordi
nation ol thc activitics ol thc military branchcs, particularly
in thc arca ol intclligcncc, and unication ol command. Tc
major lcsson to bc lcarncd is that this coordination should bc
accomplishcd in advancc ol a crisis. . . .
Tc lailurc to pcrlorm thc rcsponsibilitics indispcnsably csscn
tial to thc dclcnsc ol Pcarl Harbor rcsts upon thc lollowing
civil and military authoritics:
Franklin D. Roosevelt Prcsidcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs and
Commandcr in Chicl ol thc Army and Navy
Henry L. Stimson Sccrctary ol Var
Frank Knox Sccrctary ol thc Navy
George C. Marshall Gcncral, Chicl ol Sta ol thc Army
Harold R. Stark Admiral, Chicl ol Naval pcrations
Leonard T. Gerow Major Gcncral, Assistant Chicl ol Sta
ol Var Plans ivision
Tc lailurc to pcrlorm thc rcsponsibilitics in Hawaii rcsts upon
thc military commandcrs:
Walter C. Short Major Gcncral, Commanding Gcncral,
Hawaiian cpartmcnt
Husband E. Kimmel Rcar Admiral, Commandcr in Chicl
ol thc Pacic Flcct
8oth in Vashington and in Hawaii thcrc wcrc numcrous and
scrious lailurcs ol mcn in thc lowcr civil and military cchclons
to pcrlorm thcir dutics and dischargc thcir rcsponsibilitics.
Tcsc arc too numcrous to bc trcatcd in dctail and individually
namcd.
Sccrctary ol Statc, Cordcll Hull, who was at thc ccntcr ol
]apancscAmcrican ncgotiations bcars a gravc rcsponsibility
lor thc diplomatic conditions lcading up to thc cvcntuality ol
Pcarl Harbor but hc had no dutics as a rclcvant link in thc mili
tary chain ol rcsponsibility stcmming lrom thc Commandcr in
Chicl to thc commandcrs at Hawaii lor thc dclcnsc at Pcarl
Harbor. For this rcason and bccausc thc diplomatic phasc was
not complctcly cxplorcd wc ocr no conclusions in his casc.

S/ Homcr Fcrguson
S/ wcn 8rcwstcr
27
27
!bid., pp. 57273.
31.
Epilogue
W
orld Var !! is now history. Tc gcncrally acccptcd vicw is
that thc Unitcd Statcs was brought into that war as a rcsult
ol ]apans suddcn, uncxpcctcd and dastardly cccmbcr 7,
1941, attack on thc U.S. Flcct in Hawaii. As Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt
pointcd out thc lollowing day in his mcssagc to Congrcss this
attack had bccn planncd and undcrtakcn cvcn as U.S. and
]apancsc diplomats wcrc still cngagcd in ncgotiations sccking to
scttlc thcir dicrcnccs in pcacc. !n rcsponsc Congrcss dcclarcd
war on ]apan almost immcdiatcly. Although it is obvious that
thc ]apancsc lorccs must bcar thc dircct rcsponsibility lor thc
attack, thc rcsponsibility lor thc lull cxtcnt ol thc disastcr is much
broadcr.
Tc Prcamblc ol thc U.S. Constitution providcd lor a govcrn
mcnt to cstablish ]usticc, insurc domcstic Tranquility, providc lor
thc common dclcncc, promotc thc gcncral Vcllarc, and sccurc
thc 8lcssings ol libcrty to oursclvcs and our Postcrity. xccpt
as thosc goals rclicd on thc countrys bcing at pcacc, thcy did
not dcal spccically with intcrnational rclations. Howcvcr, inhcr
cnt in thc Prcamblc was thc idca that dclcnding this nation and
salcguarding thc libcrty ol its citizcns calls lor protccting thcm
lrom domcstic and lorcign aggrcssion. Tc ncw Unitcd Statcs
should mind its own busincss, basc its policics and practiccs on
843
pcacclul social coopcration and pcrmit its citizcns to tradc and
to travcl as thcy wishcd. Gcorgc Vashington, thc rst prcsidcnt
ol thc Unitcd Statcs, cxprcsscd this idca in his Farcwcll Addrcss
(Scptcmbcr 1789):
bscrvc good laith and justicc toward all nations, cultivatc
pcacc and harmony with all. . . . Tc grcat rulc ol conduct lor
us in rcgard to lorcign nations is, in cxtcnding our commcrcial
rclations to havc with thcm as littlc political conncction as pos
siblc. . . . !t is our truc policy to stccr clcar ol pcrmancnt alli
anccs with any portion ol thc lorcign world. . . .
And Tomas ]ccrson in his rst inaugural addrcss (March 4,
1801) again rccommcndcd pcacc, commcrcc, and honcst lricnd
ship with all nationscntangling allianccs with nonc. 8y thc
timc ol thc ]apancsc attack, thc Rooscvclt administration in
Vashington had bccn violating thcsc principlcs lor months at
lcast.
As wc all know, thc dircct rcsponsibility lor thc U.S. cntry
into Vorld Var was ]apans catastrophic attack by hcr bombcrs
and plancs on thc U.S. Flcct in Pcarl Harbor. Howcvcr, whcn
considcrcd in thc light ol thc timcs, it sccms that thc attack might
havc bccn anticipatcd as thc logical act ol a bclcagurcd nation
hoping to prcvcnt thc disruption ol its military plans. Howcvcr,
to dctcrminc rcsponsibility lor thc lull cxtcnt ol thc disastcr, onc
must ask why thc Flcct was caught so complctcly by surprisc,
unprcparcd and unwarncd.
Franklin . Rooscvclt took o cc as prcsidcnt in 1933. From
thcn on, in vicw ol his powcrs and dutics undcr thc Constitution,
his position as CommandcrinChicl ol thc Army and Navy, and
thc trust vcstcd in him by thc pcoplc as Chicl xccutivc ol thc
Unitcd Statcs, hc must bcar rcsponsibility lor U.S. lorcign pol
icy. A rcvicw ol thc historical rccord lrom thc Vashington point
ol vicwas rcvcalcd in thc invcstigationsnow shows that thc
]apancsc attack on Pcarl Harbor should not havc bccn a complctc
Epilogue 845
surprisc to thc administration o cials. As a mattcr ol lact, it
is now apparcnt also that thc prcsidcnt himscll, cvcn bclorc thc
attack, had intcndcd to ordcr thc U.S. armcd lorccs to makc a
prccmptivc strikc against thc ]apancsc in thc southwcst Pacic
in ordcr to assist thc 8ritish in southcast Asia. 8ut thc ]apancsc
jumpcd thc gun on him by bombing Pcarl Harbor on cccmbcr
7, 1941. Tus, thc attack was Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts excuse, not his
reason, lor having thc Unitcd Statcs go to war with thc ]apancsc.
His)ovic~i Rvvivw
8y thc mid1930s, thc world was in turmoil. !n 1933, shortly
altcr FR bccamc prcsidcnt, thc Unitcd Statcs rccognizcd and
cstablishcd diplomatic rclations with thc Sovict Union. Hitlcr
had comc to powcr in Gcrmany and was bccoming morc and
morc militaristic, laying claim to tcrritory bcyond his countrys
bordcrs. n ctobcr 3, 1935, !taly invadcd thiopia. A civil war
opcncd in Spain in ]uly 1936. !n ]uly 1937 ]apan was drawn into
war with China. Howcvcr, thc pcoplc in this country did not want
to bccomc involvcd in any ol thcsc conicts.
!n 1935, Congrcss cnactcd and on August 31, thc prcsidcnt
signcd thc rst Ncutrality Act which prohibitcd thc cxport ol
arms, ammunition, and implcmcnts ol war to bclligcrcnt coun
trics and thcir transportation in U.S. vcsscls.
Rooscvclt had long sympathizcd with 8ritain pcrsonally and
stcpbystcp hc abandoncd U.S. ncutrality. Two ycars bclorc thc
war actually bcgan, hc startcd to cxplorc with thc 8ritish what
wc could do il wc both lound oursclvcs involvcd in a war in thc
Far ast with ]apan. Hc pcrsonally instructcd U.S. Admiral
Royal . !ngcrsoll whcn hc lclt in cccmbcr 1937 lor a con
lcrcncc in London to discuss arrangcmcnts in casc ol a U.S.
8ritishutchRussianChincsc war against ]apan. Tcn altcr
thc war had startcd in uropc, Rooscvclt gavc instructions on
August 6, 1940, to thrcc top U.S. military o ccrs who wcrc going
on anothcr sccrct mission to London.
arly in thc morning on Scptcmbcr 1, 1939, Hitlcrs lorccs
invadcd Poland. ngland and Francc dccidcd to honor thcir
commitmcnts to go to thc dclcnsc ol Poland il shc wcrc attackcd.
n Scptcmbcr 3, both countrics issucd ultimatums to Gcrmany
which wcrc rcjcctcd. uropc was at war. n Scptcmbcr 3, 1939,
FR rcconrmcd U.S. ncutrality and during thc months that
lollowcd, hc continucd to strcss his dctcrmination to maintain
U.S. ncutrality. Ncvcrthclcss, FR bcgan almost immcdiatcly to
hclp thc 8ritish in thcir ght against Gcrmany.
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt institutcd a Ncutrality Patrol in thc
Atlantic and instructcd thc U.S. Navy, to watch lor cncmy vcsscls,
to rcport sightings in plain nglish, so as to allow 8ritish ships
to invcstigatc and dcstroy. Vhcn latcr Churchill askcd lor 40 or
50 ol this countrys dcstroycrs, FR arrangcd lor thcir translcr to
thc 8ritish. And as 8ritains war cxpcnditurcs mountcd and shc
was running out ol gold to pay lor military supplics, Rooscvclt
gavc thc grccn light lor hcr to ordcr 12,000 aircralt. Vhcn
Hitlcr chargcd that such U.S. aid to thc U.K. was moral aggrcs
sion, FR rcplicd that it was a dclcnsivc mcasurc.
n thc othcr sidc ol thc world, ]apan, an ally ol Gcrmany
through thc 1939 Tripartitc Pact, was taking actions in southcast
Asia that thc U.S. hcld could thrcatcn U.S. and 8ritish intcrcsts
in that part ol thc world. !n ]anuary 1940, thc U.S. bcgan block
ing cxports to ]apan ol ccrtain commoditics that wcrc csscntial
to ]apans cconomy and military vcnturcsvarious chcmicals,
munitions, iron and stccl scrap, and cspccially pctrolcum products.
Upon thc dclcat ol Francc in ]unc 1940, ]apancsc troops wcrc
admittcd into thc lormcrly Frcnch !ndochina. And in Scptcmbcr,
]apan cstablishcd air bascs and stationcd troops thcrc.
FR announccd that Pcarl Harbor would bc madc thc pcr
mancnt basc ol thc U.S. Flcct. Tis was against thc advicc ol his
Epilogue 847
naval adviscrs, who pointcd out that thc harbors narrow cntrancc,
inadcquatc anchoragcs and airclds, and its limitcd lucl supplics
would makc thc Flcct vulncrablc to attack. !t is quitc possiblc
that FRs dccision was in rcsponsc to 8ritish Primc Ministcr
Churchills suggcstion, madc carlicr that vcry samc day, May 15,
1940, that thc U.S. kccp that ]apancsc dog quict in thc Pacic.
8y midsummcr 1940, U.S. cryptographcrs had succccdcd
in dcciphcring thc vcry complcx ]apancsc govcrnmcnts diplo
matic codc and duplicating thc cxtrcmcly intricatc typcwritcr,
codcnamcd Purplc, on which it was cncodcda trcmcndous
accomplishmcnt. From thcn on, thc U.S. had acccss to most ol
thc sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt scnt on
this machinc to its cmissarics throughout thc world.
As FR campaigncd in 1940 lor a third tcrm as prcsidcnt,
hc continucd to assurc thc public ol thc Unitcd Statcss ncutral
ity, hc was doing all that hc could to kccp war away lrom thcsc
shorcs. Hc assurcd thc votcrs that Your boys arc not going to bc
scnt into any lorcign wars.
+ o +
Yct Rooscvclt continucd to ask Congrcss to hclp thc 8ritish
who wcrc at war. At FRs urging, in carly 1941 Congrcss passcd
LcndLcasc, which providcd many millions ol dollars worth ol
war supplicsships, plancs, munitions, lood, ctc.to thc nations
who wcrc ghting Gcrmany. Tc U.S. war plans, as Rooscvclt
outlincd thcm at this timc, callcd on thc Unitcd Statcs to rcmain
on thc dclcnsivc in thc Pacic, with thc cct bascd in Hawaii, but
supportivc ol 8ritain in thc Atlantic. At thc timc, thc possibil
ity ol ]apans attacking in thc southwcst Pacic was discusscd in
Vashington. Although it was lclt that public opinion would sup
port U.S. action in thc Far ast il thc ]apancsc go into Singaporc
or thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, Gcrmany was considcrcd thc
grcatcst thrcat.
!n Fcbruary and March 1941, U.S. military o cials mct
sccrctly in Vashington with 8ritish o cials and drcw up a joint
U.S.8ritish war plan cmbodying a 8cat Hitlcr rst principlc.
Tc Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, bascd on this worldwidc
Var Plan, was scnt out to U.S. military cld commandcrs. Undcr
this ArmyNavy plan, Admiral Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor was
ordcrcd to prcparc thc Pacic Flcct to undcrtakc oensive opcra
tions against thc ]apancsc and to support thc 8ritish lorccs in
thc Far ast south ol thc cquator. Howcvcr, at a Vhitc Housc
conlcrcncc it was dccidcd that thc most urgcnt mattcr still was to
go all out in thc Atlantic. As a rcsult, approximatcly onc lourth
ol thc ghting ships ol thc U.S. Flcct, practically all thc traincd
and cquippcd marincs on thc wcst coast, scvcral small transports,
and somc othcr small cralt, wcrc translcrrcd lrom thc Pacic to
thc Atlantic. Tis, ol coursc, rcduccd substantially thc strcngth ol
thc Flcct in thc Pacic.
!n thc spring ol 1941, thc Unitcd Statcs placcd in protcc
tivc custody thc ships in U.S. ports ol Gcrmany, !taly, and Nazi
occupicd cnmark. !n ]unc, FR authorizcd thc acquisition ol
all idlc lorcign mcrchant ships in our ports and ordcrcd Axis lunds
in thc Unitcd Statcs lrozcn. Tc Unitcd Statcs also rcqucstcd
withdrawal ol Gcrman and !talian consular stas by ]uly 10.
Gcrmany and ]apan had hopcd thcir 1939 TriPartitc Pact
alliancc would kccp thc Unitcd Statcs lrom intcrlcring in thc
war in uropc. Howcvcr, thc U.S. startcd intcrlcring with thc war
in uropc indircctlyby trying to kccp thc ]apancsc lully occu
picd in thc ongoing ]apanChina war so thcy would not go to
thc aid ol Gcrmany. Tc Unitcd Statcs assistcd Chiang Kai Shck
in China nancially. And shc hclpcd to build thc 8urma Road
and organizcd Chcnnaults Amcrican \oluntccr |Flying Tigcr|
Group which cw supplics ovcr thc hump into China.
Rcprcscntativcs ol thc Amcricans, utch, and 8ritish mct in
Singaporc in thc spring ol 1941. Tcy drcw a linc bcyond which thc
]apancsc armcd lorccs could not attack without cvoking rcsponscs
Epilogue 849
lrom thc govcrnmcnts ol thc Unitcd Statcs, thc 8ritish, and thc
utch. Tis linc was drawn wcst ol longitudc 100
ast and
south ol latitudc 10
Norththat is south and wcst ol Frcnch

!ndoChina (currcntly \ictnam).
Hitlcr attackcd Russia on ]unc 22, 1941 and two days latcr,
FR rclcascd Russian crcdits and promiscd Amcrican aid in
linc with his |p|olicy ol giving matcrial assistancc to any country
ghting Gcrmany.
As thc war in thc Atlantic hcatcd up, Gcrman Uboats wcrc
sinking 8ritish ships in largc numbcrs. FR cxtcndcd thc arca
ol thc U.S. Ncutrality Patrol to covcr most ol thc Atlantic. !n
]uly, wc occupicd !ccland and wc soon bcgan convoying 8ritish
ships in thc North Atlantic. !t wasnt long bclorc U.S. ships wcrc
shooting, bcing shot at, and cvcn sunk, with thc loss ol Amcrican
livcs.
!n August 1941, Rooscvclt and 8ritish P.M. Churchill mct pcr
sonally lor thc rst timc in sccrccy o thc coast ol Ncwloundland.
Churchill plcadcd with Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt to cntcr thc war. FR
rcmindcd Churchill that in thc Unitcd Statcs, only Congrcss
could dcclarc war: ! may ncvcr dcclarc war, ! may makc war. !l
! wcrc to ask Congrcss to dcclarc war, thcy might arguc about it
lor thrcc months. Tc two mcn discusscd thc ]apancsc situa
tion also. Although FR said that, to strcngthcn Amcricas lorcc,
hc must scck to dclay a brcak with ]apan, hc agrccd to warn
]apan that il shc cncroachcd lurthcr in thc southwcst Pacic, thc
U.S. would bc compcllcd to takc countcrmcasurcs, cvcn though
thcsc might lcad to war. Morcovcr, hc assurcd Churchill that
thc Unitcd Statcs, cvcn il not hcrscll attackcd, would comc into a
war in thc Far ast. . . . |and| that il ]apan ran amok in thc Pacic,
wc |thc 8ritish| should not ght alonc.
!n thc spring ol 1941, thc U.S. and ]apan had cmbarkcd upon
diplomatic ncgotiations in Vashington in thc attcmpt to scttlc
thc China]apan conict and cstablish pcacc in thc Pacic arca.
Tcsc discussions conccrncd ]apans war in China, hcr rolc on thc
Asian mainland, thc TriPartitc Pact binding ]apan to thc Axis
and thc U.S. tradc cmbargo ol ]apan. Tcsc ncgotiations con
tinucd o and on through Novcmbcr. uring all this timc, wc
wcrc rcading ]apans sccrct diplomatic mcssagcs to hcr cmissarics
throughout thc world.
!n Scptcmbcr, FR issucd a shoot on sight ordcr to U.S.
Navy ships in thc Atlantic.
|V|hcn you scc a rattlcsnakc poiscd to strikc, you do not wait
until hc has struck bclorc you crush him. Tcsc Nazi subma
rincs and raidcrs arc thc rattlcsnakcs ol thc Atlantic. . . . ||ur
patrolling vcsscls and plancs will protcct all mcrchant ships
not only Amcrican ships but ships ol any agcngagcd in com
mcrcc in our dclcnsivc watcrs. . . . From now on, il Gcrman or
!talian vcsscls ol war cntcr thc watcrs thc protcction ol which is
ncccssary lor Amcrican dclcnsc thcy do so at thcir own pcril.
Tc ]apancsc movcd lorccs into !ndoChina. Tc U.S. o cials
rcmonstratcd. 8y mid1941 it bccamc apparcnt that as a rcsult
ol ]apans war in China and hcr military vcnturcs in S.. Asia
hcr most scrious shortagc was ol oil. Rooscvclt told thc ]apancsc
ambassador:
|!|l ]apan attcmptcd to scizc oil supplics by lorcc in thc
Ncthcrlands ast !ndics, thc utch would, without thc shadow
ol a doubt rcsist, thc 8ritish would immcdiatcly comc to thcir
assistancc, war would thcn rcsult bctwccn ]apan, thc 8ritish
and thc utch, and, in vicw ol our own policy ol assisting
Grcat 8ritain, an cxcccdingly scrious situation would immc
diatcly rcsult.
FR said that ]apan would do much bcttcr il shc tricd to obtain
thc supplics shc nccdcd pcacclully rathcr than by occupying
!ndochina. 8ut thc Unitcd Statcs continucd to cmbargo oil to
]apan. And shc pcrsuadcd thc 8ritish and utch to do thc samc.
Epilogue 851
!n ]uly, ]apan was adviscd that thc Unitcd Statcs considcrcd
it sclldclcnsc to protcct thc 8ritish against aggrcssion in thc
Atlanticalso in Singaporc. Tc ]apancsc Ambassador spokc
ol ]apans dctcriorating cconomic situation, hcr objcctions to
U.S. support ol China, improving thc 8urma Road and supply
ing plancs and pilots to Chungking, also ol hcr, ]apans, plans to
occupy Frcnch !ndochina and hcr nccd to station troops in !nncr
Mongolia to supprcss Chincsc Communist clcmcnts and hintcd
that wcrc thc Unitcd Statcs to acccpt thcsc conditions, ]apan
would not bc particularly conccrncd about any action thc Unitcd
Statcs might takc in thc Atlantic. !n rcsponsc, thc U.S. ircctor
ol thc Navys Var Plans cquatcd protccting thc 8ritish lrom thc
Nazis with dclcnding thc U.S.:
|!|t is dccidcdly against thc military intcrcsts ol thc Unitcd
Statcs to pcrmit thc Unitcd Kingdom to bc ovcrcomc by
Gcrmany. . . . Furthcrmorc . . . |t|hc occupation ol !ndoChina
by ]apan is particularly important lor thc dclcnsc ol thc Unitcd
Statcs sincc it might thrcatcn thc 8ritish position in Singaporc
and thc utch position in thc Ncthcrlands ast !ndics.
Tc ]oint 8oard ol thc Army and Navy was not cagcr lor thc
Unitcd Statcs to bccomc involvcd in a war with ]apan. A major
war cort in thc Pacic would rcquirc an cnormous amount ol
shipping . . . lrom thc Atlantic and othcr csscntial arcas, which
would matcrially acct Unitcd Statcs aid to ngland. CN
Stark warncd his Admirals: Sincc thc US and 8ritain arc hcld
rcsponsiblc by ]apan lor hcr prcscnt dcspcratc situation thcrc is
also a possibility that ]apan may attack thcsc two powcrs.
Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor had to rcly on Vashington lor intcl
ligcncc. CN Stark assurcd Kimmcl that thc cc ol Naval
!ntclligcncc rccognizcd its rcsponsibility on that scorc. !n mid
ctobcr, Stark wrotc Kimmcl:
Pcrsonally ! do not bclicvc thc ]aps arc going to sail into us.
. . . Pcrhaps ! am wrong, but ! hopc not. !n any casc altcr long
powwows in thc Vhitc Housc, it was lclt wc should bc on
guard, at lcast until somcthing indicatcs thc trcnd.
!n carly Novcmbcr 1941, Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral
Marshall and Chicl ol Naval pcrations Admiral Stark adviscd
FR that Unitcd Statcs policy in thc Far ast should bc bascd
rst on thc dclcat ol Gcrmany. Var bctwccn thc Unitcd Statcs
and ]apan should bc avoidcd whilc thc U.S. built up hcr dclcn
sivc lorccs in thc Far ast. Tcy told FR that it was all right to
continuc to scnd U.S. armcd lorccs and othcr aid to China lor
intcrvcntion against ]apan. Howcvcr, Marshall and Stark wantcd
timc bclorc thc cruption ol any conict and thcy rccommcndcd
that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. |italics addcd|
U.S. ambassador to ]apan, ]oscph Grcw warncd FR,
Novcmbcr 3, 1941, that war bctwccn ]apan and thc Unitcd
Statcs may comc with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.
At thc Cabincts wcckly Friday mccting at thc Vhitc Housc,
Novcmbcr 7, 1941, FR took
thc rst gcncral poll ol his Cabinct . . . on thc qucstion ol thc
Far astwhcthcr thc pcoplc would back us up in casc wc
struck at ]apan down thcrc. . . . !t was unanimous in lccling thc
country would support us.
Sccrctary ol Var Stimson bclicvcd thc votc would havc bccn
much strongcr il thc Cabinct mcmbcrs had known what thc
Army was doing to rccnlorcc thc Philippincs and how rcady thc
Army was to pitch in in casc ol an attack on thc 8ritish or utch
in southcastcrn Asia.
To lacilitatc thc U.S.]apancsc diplomatic ncgotiations
in Vashington, ]apan scnt a sccond ambassador, Kurusu, to
Vashington in Novcmbcr. Vhcn Hull prcscntcd him to thc prcs
idcnt, Hull rcmindcd Kurusu ol ]apans alliancc with Gcrmany:
Epilogue 853
|V|hcn Hitlcr starts on a march ol invasion across thc carth
with tcn million soldicrs and thirty thousand airplancs, . . . this
country lrom that timc was in dangcr. . . . |T|his country with
no othcr motivc cxccpt sclldclcnsc has rccognizcd that dan
gcr, and has procccdcd thus lar to dclcnd itscll bclorc it is too
latc.
Tc prcsidcnt and Hull madc it clcar that wc wcrc not thc
aggrcssors in thc Pacic but that ]apan was thc aggrcssor.
Tc U.S. cryptographcrs intcrccptcd a mcssagc lrom Tokyo
sctting a dcadlinc lor thc U.S.]apancsc diplomats to rcach agrcc
mcnt in thcir ncgotiations:
8ccausc ol various circumstanccs, it is absolutcly ncccssary
that all arrangcmcnts lor thc signing ol this agrccmcnt |bcing
ncgotiatcd with thc Unitcd Statcs| bc complctcd by thc 25th
ol this month |latcr cxtcndcd to thc 29th|. . . .
n Novcmbcr 20, thc two ]apancsc Ambassadors suggcstcd
a modus vivendi, a tcmporary arrangcmcnt, to continuc thc status
quo whilc ncgotiations continucd. 8oth ]apan and thc Unitcd
Statcs would makc somc conccssions. Tc Unitcd Statcs would
supply ]apan a rcquircd quantity ol oil. Chinas Chiang Kai
shck bombardcd Vashington with dcmands that no lurthcr
conccssions bc madc to Tokyo.
]apancsc ship movcmcnts in Far ast grabbcd thc attcntion
ol Vashingtons top o cials. At a Novcmbcr 25, 1941, mccting,
FR said wc wcrc likcly to bc attackcd |by ]apan| pcrhaps |as
soon as| ncxt Monday, lor thc ]apancsc arc notorious lor making
an attack without warning. Stimson rcmarkcd: Tc qucstion
was how wc should mancuvcr thcm into thc position ol ring thc
rst shot without allowing too much dangcr to oursclvcs. Hull
was askcd to prcparc an ultimatum to ]apan likc that ol August,
notilying hcr that il shc crosscd thc bordcr into Tailand shc was
violating our salcty.
Stark scnt a warning to Kimmcl. Ncithcr FR nor Hull
would bc surpriscd ovcr a ]apancsc surprisc attack. . . . |A|n
attack on thc Philippincs would bc thc most cmbarrassing thing
that could happcn to us. Stark didnt bclicvc thc ]apancsc would
procccd against Russia, hc considcrcd an advancc into Tailand,
!ndoChina, 8urma Road arca as thc most likcly.
Novcmbcr 26, 1941: Stimson told FR that a ]apancsc
cxpcdition ol vc divisions had gonc south lrom Shantung and
Shansi to Shanghai, whcncc thcy had cmbarkcd on 30, 40, or 50
southbound ships.
Novcmbcr 26, 1941: Tc modus vivendi was jcttisoncd. And a
10point ultimatum was issucd to ]apan.
Altcr this Novcmbcr 26 ultimatum had gonc out, Vashington
o cials discusscd what to tcll MacArthur in thc Philippincs. !t
was agrccd wc should scnd thc nal alcrt, namcly, that hc should
bc on thc qui vive lor any attack. FR was particularly con
ccrncd . . . by currcnt southward troop movcmcnts lrom Shanghai
and ]apan to thc Formosa arca, prcparing
lor an carly aggrcssivc movcmcnt ol somc charactcr . . .
dircctcd against thc 8urma Road, Tailand, Malay Pcninsula,
Ncthcrlands ast !ndics or thc Philippincs. . . . |T|his ncxt
]apancsc aggrcssion might causc an outbrcak ol hostilitics
bctwccn thc U.S. and ]apan.
Novcmbcr 27, 1941: Vashington warncd (1) Manila, (2)
Hawaii, (3) Atlantic cct that ]apancsc southbound convoys wcrc
hcading lor thc Philippincs, Tai, or Kra Pcninsula or possibly
8ornco.
Novcmbcr 27, 1941: Marshall and Stark ask lor timc to prc
parc U.S. dclcnscs. Tcy wcrc cspccially conccrncd about thc
Philippincs: Tc most csscntial thing now, lrom thc Unitcd
Statcs vicwpoint is to gain timc. !t is rccommcndcd that: mili
tary countcraction bc considcrcd only il ]apan attacks or dircctly
Epilogue 855
thrcatcns Unitcd Statcs, 8ritish or utch tcrritory. And ]apan
should bc warncd that advancc bcyond thc lincs indicatcd . . .
may lcad to war.
Novcmbcr 28, 1941: Tc mcmbcrs ol FRs Var Cabinct
all agrccd that
il thc | ]apancsc| cxpcdition wcrc pcrmittcd to land in thc Gull
ol Siam it would placc a strong ]apancsc lorcc in such a stra
tcgic position as to bc a scvcrc blow at all thrcc ol thc powcrs
in southcast Asiathc 8ritish at Singaporc, thc Ncthcrlands
in thc !ndics, and oursclvcs in thc Philippincs. Vc all agrccd
that it must not bc allowcd, that, il thc ]apancsc got into thc
!sthmus ol Kra, thc 8ritish would ght, and, il thc 8ritish
lought, wc would havc to ght.
According to Stimson, Te possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor
was not [then] discussed since our thoughts were all focused on this
movement toward southeast Asia.
Novcmbcr 28, 1941: Vc intcrccptcd ]apans instructions to
hcr ambassadors in Vashington conccrning our Novcmbcr 26
ultimatum.
Tc !mpcrial Govcrnmcnt can by no mcans usc it as a basis
lor ncgotiations. Tcrclorc . . . thc ncgotiations will bc dc lacto
rupturcd. . . . Howcvcr . . . |dont| givc thc imprcssion that thc
ncgotiations arc brokcn o. Mcrcly say . . . that you arc awaiting
instructions.
How should thc Unitcd Statcs rcspond il thc ]apancsc
attackcd 8ritish tcrritory in southcast Asia: Sccrctary ol Statc
Hull proposcd that FR prcscnt a mcssagc to Congrcss con
ccrning thc ]apancsc aggrcssion. Hull, Stimson and Knox draltcd
such a mcssagc.
Tc suprcmc qucstion prcscntcd to this country along with
many othcr countrics by thc Hitlcrdominatcd movcmcnt ol
world conqucst is that ol sclldclcnsc. . . . Vc do not want war
with ]apan, and ]apan docs not want war with this country. !l,
howcvcr, war should comc, thc lault and thc rcsponsibility will
bc thosc ol ]apan. Tc primary cause will havc bccn pursuit by
]apan ol a policy ol aggrcssion.
At a mccting on cccmbcr 1, 1941, thc ]apancsc ambassa
dors told Hull that thc U.S. ultimatums tcn points, had bccn
communicatcd to thcir govcrnmcnt which was studying thc
casc. Hull rcspondcd: Tc hcavy ]apancsc troop movcmcnts into
!ndochina. . . . crcatc an incrcasing mcnacc to Amcrica and hcr
lricnds. . . . |V|c will not allow oursclvcs to bc kickcd out ol thc
Pacic. Hull accuscd thc ]apancsc ol using Hitlcrian mcthods
in China. |V|c cannot losc sight ol thc movcmcnt by Hitlcr to
scizc onchall ol thc world. Tc ]apancsc militarists, Hull said,
wcrc moving in a similar dircction to scizc thc othcr hall ol thc
carth. . . . |T|his Govcrnmcnt cannot yicld to anything ol that
kind.
n cccmbcr 1, Rooscvclt dircctcd Admiral Hart in Manila
to dispatch thrcc small ships |minimally armcd and cquippcd to
bc classicd as mcn ol war| to takc up positions in thc path
ol thc southbound ]apancsc convoysto obscrvc and rcport by
radio ]apancsc movcmcnts.
n cccmbcr 1, ]apan ordcrcd hcr cmbassics worldwidc to
dcstroy thcir codcs and codc machincs.
n cccmbcr 3, 1941: ]apan ordcrcd its cmbassy in
Vashington to dcstroy all sccrct lcs, documcnts and codcs but
thosc now bcing uscd with thcir codc machinc. A cccmbcr 1
Tokyo to 8crlin Purplc intcrccpt dccodcd and translatcd in
Vashington rcad in part: war may suddcnly brcak out bctwccn
thc AngloSaxon nations and ]apan through somc clash ol arms
. . . quickcr than anyonc drcams. A sccond Tokyo8crlin mcssagc
intcrccptcd, dccodcd, and translatcd rcad: 8clorc rcjccting ]apans
modus vivendi, thc Unitcd Statcs
Epilogue 857
conlcrrcd with ngland, Australia, thc Ncthcrlands, and China
. . . . |!|t is clcar that thc Unitcd Statcs is now in collusion
with thosc nations and has dccidcd to rcgard ]apan, along with
Gcrmany and !taly, as an cncmy.
Tc Unitcd Statcs continucd to assurc 8ritish and utch ol
Amcrican support. FR to 8ritish Ambassador Lord Halilax:
!n thc casc ol a dircct attack on thc 8ritish or thc utch, wc
should obviously all bc togcthcr. According to Halilax, thc prcsi
dcnt said thc 8ritish could count on Amcrican support il wc |thc
8ritish| carricd out our movc to dclcnd thc Kra !sthmus |on Tai
tcrritory| in thc cvcnt ol a ]apancsc attack.
n cccmbcr 2,Rooscvclt told thc ]apancsc ambassadors that
thc continuing troop movcmcnts to southcrn !ndochina portcnd
]apancsc aggrcssion against thc Philippincs, N!, 8urma, Malaya,
Tailand. Such ncw aggrcssion would, ol coursc, bc additional to
thc acts ol aggrcssion alrcady undcrtakcn against China, our atti
tudc towards which is wcll known.
Tc ncxt day FR rcconrmcd his plcdgc ol armcd support
to thc 8ritish and hc told Halilax
that, whcn talking ol support, hc mcant armcd support, and
that hc agrccd with thc 8ritish plan lor opcrations in thc Kra
!sthmus il thc ]apancsc attackcd Tailand. Tc U.S. and 8ritish
talkcd about joint war plans, as to whcn and whcrc thc U.S. and
Grcat 8ritain should strikc.
n cccmbcr 4, Lord Halilax cxprcsscd his Govcrnmcnts vcry
dccp apprcciation lor FRs promiscs ol armcd support. Hc
thought thc warning thcy had talkcd about should apply
to an attack by ]apan on Tailand, Malaya, thc utch ast
!ndics, or thc 8urma Road (through !ndoChina). Mr.
Rooscvclt was doubtlul about including thc 8urma Road, but
othcrwisc agrccd to thc warning.
Tc Unitcd Statcs warncd its U.S. outposts in Asia ol thc
immincncc ol war with ]apan. Navy Captain McCollum, in chargc
ol thc Far astcrn scction ol Naval !ntclligcnccs lorcign branch,
draltcd a warning mcssagc (cccmbcr 3, 1941) to Admiral Hart
(Manila), Admiral Kimmcl (Pcarl Harbor), and to commandants
ol thc naval districts in Hawaii and thc Philippincs:
|!|nstructions wcrc scnt ycstcrday to ]apancsc diplomatic and
consular posts at Hongkong x Singaporc x 8atavia x Manila x
Vashington and London to dcstroy most ol thcir codcs and
ciphcrs at oncc and to burn all othcr important condcntial
and sccrct documcnts.
uring thc rst wcck ol cccmbcr 1941, scvcral warnings
ol impcnding ]apancsc aggrcssion wcrc rcccivcd in Vashington
lrom Purplc codc MAG!C intcrccpts. Tc ]apancsc consul
was askcd to rcport to Tokyo, at irrcgular intcrvals but at a ratc
ol twicc a wcck, on a systcm ol grids, thc location ol ships in
|Pcarl| Harbor. A spccial ]apancsc codc bascd on lalsc wcathcr
rcports, thc Vinds Codc, had also bccn sct up so Tokyo could
communicatc sccrctly with its cmbassics and consulatcs around
thc world il, as, and whcn, it was no longcr possiblc to rcach
thcm with codcd mcssagcs altcr thcir codc machincs had bccn
dcstroycd. Tis codc was implcmcntcd cccmbcr 4, by a Vinds
Codc xccutc indicating troublcd rclations with Grcat 8ritain,
thc utch ast !ndics and thc U.S., but not with Russia. Tcsc
crucial intcrccpts, indicating that U.S tcrritory, quitc possibly thc
U.S. Flcct in Pcarl Harbor, was likcly to bc a targct ol ]apans
aggrcssion, wcrc scnt to all thc top brass in Vashington, but not
to our commandcrs in Hawaiinot to Gcncral Short, who was
rcsponsiblc lor thc salcty ol thc cct whilc in port, nor to Admiral
Kimmcl, commandcrinchicl ol thc Pacic Flcct bascd in Pcarl
Harbor. Upon rcccipt ol thc Vinds xccutc, Saord, Chicl ol
Sccurity ol Naval Communications, alcrtcd U.S. outposts in thc
Pacic to dcstroy classicd documcnts, but his alcrts wcrc dclaycd
and didnt rcach thcir addrcssccs until altcr thc attack.
Epilogue 859
Captain McCollum, Naval !ntclligcncc, Far astcrn 8ranch,
draltcd a mcssagc bascd on thc Vinds xccutc to warn Pcarl
Harbor, but hc lcarncd latcr that it had not bccn scnt.
n cccmbcr 3, U. S. Army military intclligcncc cablcd thc
U.S. military attach in Tokyo to dcstroy its codcs. n cccmbcr
4, thc Statc cpartmcnt suggcstcd that thc U.S. and 8ritish coor
dinatc thcir withdrawal or cxchangc ol Amcricans lrom ]apan,
Manchuria, and ]apancscoccupicd China in thc cvcnt ol 8ritish
]apancsc hostilitics.
Morc indications ol thc immincncc ol war wcrc intcrccptcd
cccmbcr 6, 1941: Mcssagcs lrom !taly, thc ]apancsc mbassy
in Vashington, and Tokyo, indicatcd that war was immincnt.
]apancsc o ccs worldwidc acknowlcdgcd Tokyos codcdcstruct
ordcr. Tc 8ritish and utch wcrc on thc qui vive in Southcast
Pacic. Admiral Hart in Manila rcportcd U.S. ovcrights had
sightcd ]apancsc convoys in South China Sca hcading toward
Malaya and thc !sthmus ol Kra.
n Saturday, cccmbcr 6, U.S. cryptographcrs startcd to pick
up ]apans scvcralpart rcsponsc to thc Unitcd Statcs Novcmbcr 26
ultimatum. A Pilot Mcssagc announccd that ]apans 14part
rcply was cn routc to hcr ambassadors in Vashington. Tc rst 13
parts wcrc rcccivcd, dcciphcrcd and dclivcrcd to top Vashington
o cials and to FR about 9:30 v.:. Altcr rcading it, FR said
to his aidc, Mr. Hopkins: Tis mcans war. Tc two mcn spccu
latcd as to whcrc and whcn thc strikc would comc. Pcarl Harbor
was not mcntioncd. Nor was thcrc any indication that tomorrow
was thc day. No mcntion was madc ol scnding a lurthcr warning
or alcrt.
n cccmbcr 6, 1941, FR announccd to thc prcss and to
thc world that hc had scnt ]apancsc mpcror Hirohito a plca
lorpcacc. Tc Statc cpartmcnt had complctcd on cccmbcr
5, its dralt ol a mcssagc lor thc prcsidcnt to prcscnt to Congrcss,
possibly on cccmbcr 89, dcpcnding on Hirohitos rcsponsc to
FRs plca lor pcacc.
cccmbcr 67, 1941: A latc night mccting ol FRs inncr
circlc was hcld in thc Vhitc Housc, thcy wcrc waiting lor what
thcy cxpcctcd was cominga ]apancsc strikc against 8ritish
Malaya or Tailands !sthmus ol Kra, and possibly thc utch
ast !ndics. Tcy had bccn agonizing ovcr this lor wccks and
FRs Cabinct Sccrctarics had bccn askcd to dralt statcmcnts
prcscnting thc rationalc lor our going to war against ]apan to
dclcnd thc 8ritish and utch.
!n thc Philippincs, on thc othcr sidc ol thc datclinc (cccmbcr
7, 1941) Admiral Hart, altcr talking with thc top 8ritish admiral
who had bccn visiting Manila lrom Singaporc, cablcd Vashington
lor instructions conccrning U.S. commitmcnts to thc 8ritish in
southcast Pacic, thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor.
!n thc morning ol cccmbcr 7, 1941, Hull and Knox, at thc
rcqucst ol Sccrctary ol Var Stimson, cach draltcd a statcmcnt
as to what thc Unitcd Statcs should do in thc cvcnt ol ]apancsc
action in southcast Asia.
Hull: Tc ]apancsc govcrnmcnt is dominatcd by military
rccatcrs who wcrc aiming to acquirc military control ovcr
onchall ol thc world with ncarly onchall its population. . . .
|A|ll ol thc conqucrcd pcoplcs would bc govcrncd . . . militar
ily, politically, cconomically, socially, and morally by thc worst
possiblc military dcspotism
such as that uscd by ]apan in China and Hitlcr in uropc.
|C|ontrol ol thc South Sca arca by ]apan is thc kcy to thc con
trol ol thc cntirc Pacic arca, and thcrclorc dclcnsc ol lilc and
commcrcc and othcr invaluablc rights and intcrcsts . . . must bc
commcnccd within thc South Sca arca. . . . Sclldclcnsc, thcrc
lorc, is thc kcy point lor thc prcscrvation ol cach and all ol our
civilizcd institutions.
Epilogue 861
Knox: Vc arc ticd up incxtricably with thc 8ritish in thc
prcscnt world situation. Tc lall ol Singaporc and thc loss
to ngland ol Malaya will automatically not only wrcck hcr
lar castcrn position but jcopardizc hcr cntirc cort. . . . !l thc
8ritish losc thcir position thc utch arc almost ccrtain to losc
thcirs. . . . !l thc abovc bc acccptcd, thcn any scrious thrcat
to thc 8ritish or thc utch is a scrious thrcat to thc Unitcd
Statcs . . . |T|hc ]apancsc should bc told that any movcmcnt
in a dircction that thrcatcns thc Unitcd Statcs will bc mct by
lorcc.
Tc lourtccnth part ol ]apans rcply to thc U.S. ultimatum
was pickcd up and dclivcrcd to top U.S. Army and Navy o cials
on thc morning ol cccmbcr 7. Also thc ]apancsc govcrnmcnts
mcssagc dirccting its Ambassadors in Vashington to dclivcr
Tokyos 14part rcply to thc Unitcd Statcs at prcciscly nc v.:.
Vashington timc.
cccmbcr 7, 1941 (just bclorc noon): Marshall, with Starks
approval, mcssagcd Manila, Panama, Pcarl Harbor:
]apancsc arc prcscnting at onc v.:., astcrn Standard Timc
today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, thcy arc undcr ordcrs
to dcstroy thcir codc machincs immcdiatcly. ]ust what signi
cancc thc hour sct may havc wc do not know but bc on alcrt
accordingly. !nlorm naval authoritics ol this communication.
Tis mcssagc wcnt right through to Manila and Panama, but
duc to atmosphcric conditions it did not rcach Hawaii until latc
that altcrnoon.
cccmbcr 7, 1941 (8 ~.:. , Hawaii timc, 1:30 v.:. Vashington
timc): ]apancsc plancs, launchcd lrom aircralt carricrs a lcw hun
drcd milcs north, bombcd and torpcdocd thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl
Harbor. Kimmcl in Hawaii radiocd all U.S. stations that an air
raid attack was on and that it was no drill.
Pos) A))~cx
So thc Unitcd Statcs had bccn attackcd. Morc than 2,500
soldicrs, sailors and marincs had bccn killcd at Pcarl Harbor on
that cccmbcr 7, 1941. !n his addrcss to Congrcss thc lollowing
day, Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt callcd immcdiatcly lor a dcclaration ol
war against ]apan. And Congrcss complicd.
Tc pcoplc wcrc mad at thc ]apancsc and cagcr to rcvcngc
thc dastardly attack. Apparcntly ]apans brilliantly planncd and
brilliantly cxccutcd attack had caught thc U.S. lorccs at Pcarl
Harbor complctcly unawarcs. Tc pcoplc wantcd to know who
was rcsponsiblc. Tcy wantcd to know why thc U.S. lorccs at Pcarl
Harbor had bccn caught o guardunwarncd, illcquippcd, and
poorly prcparcd.
!t was obvious that ]apan was dircctly rcsponsiblc lor thc
attack. Howcvcr, it is not so casy to dctcrminc rcsponsibility lor
thc extent ol thc Pcarl Harbor disastcrthc clcmcnt ol surprisc,
thc tragic loss ol lilc, and thc catastrophic dcvastation ol ships,
plancs, ctc. Tc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs, Admiral Kimmcl and
Gcncral Short, wcrc hcld rcsponsiblc and publicly blamcd lor thc
disastcr. Howcvcr, it is now apparcnt that in thc nal analysis it
was Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt himscll, who was truly rcsponsiblc lor
Pcarl Harbors lack ol prcparcdncss. !t was hc who dctcrmincd
U.S. policy and who dircctcd thc Sccrctarics ol Statc, Var, and
Navy how to implcmcnt that policy. Tc top Vashington o cials
who wcrc privy to MAG!C also contributcd to thc cxtcnt ol thc
disastcr by not adcquatcly warning Pcarl Harbor in a timcly man
ncr. Tcir contributions, howcvcr, wcrc sins ol omission rathcr
than sins ol commission.
An Administration covcrup, undcr thc guidancc ol FR
and with thc support ol his loyal licutcnants, was apparcntly
aimcd at kccping thc public lrom lcarning ol thc Administrations
rolc in lailing to kccp thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs adcquatcly
cquippcd and inlormcd ol thc immincncc ol war with ]apan, and
Epilogue 863
ol thc likclihood that Pcarl Harbor could bc a targct. Morcovcr,
it has ncvcr bccn cxplaincd how thc sccrct ]apancsc intcrccpts,
which had bccn rcccivcd, dccodcd, translatcd and distributcd
bclorc thc attack, which had rcvcalcd a grcat dcalnot all
ol ]apans thinking to thosc in Vashington who wcrc privy to
MAG!C, disappcarcd lrom both Army and Navy lcs whcrc
thcy had bccn hcld undcr tight sccurity.
Upon a rcvicw ol thc cvcnts that took placc ovcr thc months
prcccding thc attackas rcvcalcd in thc scvcral invcstigations
thc top Vashington o cials had amplc rcason to cxpcct that a
]apancsc attack on U.S. tcrritory was immincnt. Yct thcy did not
rclay that scnsc ol urgcncy to Kimmcl and Short. Morcovcr, thcir
warnings dircctcd thc attcntion ol thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs
to thc southcast Pacic.
!t sccms in rctrospcct that thc U.S. diplomatic ncgotiations,
which wcrc o cially still ongoing at thc timc ol thc attack, wcrc
not always conductcd in complctcly good laith, timc and again
U.S. o cials rcjcctcd compromiscs ocrcd by thc ]apancsc. Tc
U.S. cmbargocd thc salc to ]apan ol oil and othcr commoditics
shc nccdcd, and pcrsuadcd thc 8ritish and utch to lollow suit.
U.S. o cials in Vashington apparcntly lailcd to rcalizc that ]apan
might considcr thc U.S. Flcct at Pcarl Harbor a thrcat to ]apans
plans lor military cxpansion in thc southwcst Pacic, and thus
might try to put it out ol commission bclorc cmbarking on a war
against thc U.S. Tcy not only lailcd to lurnish thc Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs with thc mcn, plancs, munitions and othcr matc
ricl thcy rcqucstcd, but a substantial numbcr ol thc Flccts ships
had bccn translcrrcd to thc Atlantic thus rcducing substantially
thc U.S. dclcnsivc strcngth in thc Pacic. Morcovcr, Vashington
o cials had rcmindcd Kimmcl and Short again and again that
thc Unitcd Statcss principal cncmy was Hitlcr, and that thc war
was in thc Atlantic.
Top Vashington o cials lailcd rcpcatcdly to rclay important
intclligcncc to thc commandcrs in thc cld. Tcy lailcd to advisc
Kimmcl and Short that ]apan was rcporting rcgularly to Tokyo
on a grid plot thc locations ol ships in Pcarl Harbor. Tcy lailcd
to rccognizc thc importancc ol thc ast Vinds Rain mcssagc,
intcrccptcd on cccmbcr 4, 1941, indicating that an attack on
U.S. tcrritory, as wcll as thc 8ritish and utch, was a likcly rst
targct. As a mattcr ol lact, no rccord has cvcr bccn lound ol what
happcncd to thc ast Vinds Rain mcssagc altcr it was dclivcrcd
to Naval Communications on thc morning ol cccmbcr 4, 1941.
Tc top Vashington o cials warncd Kimmcl and Short ol ]apans
advanccs bcing madc thousands ol milcs wcst ol Pcarl Harbor,
toward thc Philippincs and southcast AsiaTailand, 8ornco,
thc utch ast !ndics and thc !sthmus ol Kra. U.S. intclligcncc
o cials had lost track ol thc ]apancsc aircralt carricrs. Apparcntly
thcy did not drcam that thcy could bc stcaming across thc Pacic
toward Hawaii with bombcrs and torpcdo plancs onboard, and
that Novcmbcr 29 was thc ]apancsc ambassadors dcadlinc lor
complcting thcir diplomatic ncgotiations bccausc it might bc thc
dcadlinc lor rccalling ]apancsc lorccs lrom an intcndcd mission
scvcral days away.
Rooscvclt and his top Vashington adviscrs wcrc undoubtcdly
conccrncd lcst blamc bc attachcd to thcm lor lailurc to lulll thcir
rcsponsibilitics lor thc countrys dclcnsc. According to Rooscvclt
condant and spccchwritcr Robcrt Shcrwood, thc Prcsidcnt
may cvcn havc had qualms that his prcattack dcalings with thc
8ritish might bc considcrcd impcachablc ocnscs. Sccrctary ol
Navy Knox apparcntly lclt guilty lor not having morc adcquatcly
warncd thc Pcarl Harbor commandcrs. And Gcncral Marshall
too, must havc had qualms about his dilatory tactics in warning
thc arca commandcrs, lor hc bcgan his own invcstigation almost
immcdiatcly into thc dclay in dclivcring his last minutc mcssagc
to Pcarl Harbor. Tus, thc lcading principals in Vashington wcrc
hcsitant to havc invcstigations that might rcvcal somc ol thcir
own actions as dcrclictions in duty and/or crrors in judgmcnt.
Epilogue 865
Morcovcr, FR was cspccially anxious to kccp thc world lrom
lcarning that, all thc timc hc had bccn assuring votcrs that hc had
no intcntion ol scnding thcir sons to ght in a lorcign war
unlcss wc wcrc attackcdhc had bccn planning a prccmptivc
strikc to scnd U.S. armcd lorccs to dclcnd thc 8ritish and utch
lrom thc ]apancsc thousands ol milcs lrom our shorcs. And that
Admiral Kimmcl in Pcarl Harbor had bccn undcr ordcrs to prc
parc thc Flcct to takc oensive action against thc ]apancsc in thc
southcast Pacic.
Altcr thc wars cnd, Congrcss commissioncd thc ycarlong
]oint |Congrcssional| Committcc on thc !nvcstigation ol thc
Pcarl Harbor Attack. Many ol thc lacts prcscntcd in this book
wcrc rcvcalcd in its hcarings (Novcmbcr 15, 1945May 31,
1946).

Coxciusiox
It must be said also that the evidence revealed in the course of the
several investigations leads to the conclusion that the ultimate respon-
sibility for the catastrophe inicted on the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, must rest on the shoulders of President Roosevelt,
to whom the Constitution assigns authority as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy and the responsibility to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States. It is now evident that
the stage was set for a Japanese attack on U.S. territory by President
Roosevelts decisions and actions. He was responsible for squeezing the
Japanese economically until they were forced to try to use force to seize
the resources they needed and to prevent the U.S. Fleet from trying to
stop them. It was thanks to Roosevelts decisions and actions that an
unwarned, ill-equipped, and poorly prepared Fleet remained stationed
far from the shores of continental United States, at a base recognized
by his military advisers as indefensible and vulnerable to attack. Given
that situation, it is not strange that the Fleet was surprised by the
attack of Japanese torpedo planes and bombers that fateful Sunday
morning, December 7, 1941. And then when the extent of the damage
was known, it was Roosevelt who orchestrated a cover-up to make
Admiral Kimmel and General Short scapegoats and to conceal any
negligence on the part of the administration.
Tc rcvclation hcrcwith ol thc addrcss Rooscvclt would havc
madc to Congrcss on cccmbcr 8 or 9, il thc cccmbcr 7 attack
had not intcrvcncd, indicatcs that Rooscvclt would havc ordcrcd
thc U.S. armcd lorccs to takc thc ocnsivc against thc ]apancsc,
without waiting for an attack on U.S. territory. Tus thc attack on
Pcarl Harbor bccamc FRs cxcusc, not his rcason, lor calling lor
thc Unitcd Statcss cntry into Vorld Var !!.

Appendix:
Dramatis Personae
8vi)isn/Aus)v~ii~x
8rookc Popham, Sir Hcnry Robcrt Moorc
Air Chicl Marshall in Command ol ntirc Far ast, 19401942, stationcd
in Singaporc.
8urnctt, Sir Charlcs, Air Chicl Marshall
Chicl ol Sta, Royal Australian Air Forcc.
Cadogan, Sir Alcxandcr
Undcr Sccrctary ol Forcign Aairs.
Cascy, Richard G.
Australian Ministcr to thc Unitcd Statcs.
Chambcrlain, Ncvillc
Primc Ministcr, 19371940.
Churchill, Vinston
First Lord ol thc Admiralty, 19111915, Primc Ministcr, 19401945,
19511955.
Craigic, Sir Robcrt
Ambassador to ]apan.
dcn, Anthony
Sccrctary ol Statc lor Forcign Aairs (19401945, 19511955), Primc
Ministcr (19551957).
Halilax (dward Frcdcrick Lindlcy Vood), Lord
Ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs, 19411946.
867
Hcwitt, Air Commodorc
Royal Australian Air Forcc intclligcncc o ccr.
Layton, Valtcr, Sir
ircctor Gcncral, Programmcs in thc 8ritish Ministry ol Supply.
Lothian (Philip Hcnry Kcrr), Lord
Ambassador to thc U.S., 19391940 (dicd in o cc).
arl ol Lytton.
Phillips, Sir Frcdcrick
Rcprcscntativc ol 8ritish Trcasury.
Phillips, Sir Tom S.\.
CommandcrinChicl, astcrn Flcct, lost at sca whcn his ship, thc Prince
of Wales was sunk, cccmbcr 8 (:), 1941.
Purvis, Arthur 8.
Hcad, AngloFrcnch Purchasing Mission.
Ramscy A.H.M., Captain
Mcmbcr ol 8ritish Parliamcnt who saw and rcportcd mcssagcs Tylcr
Kcnt had takcn lrom thc U.S. mbassy.
Stcphcnson, Villiam, Sir
8ritish agcnt, !ntrcpid, Chicl, 8ritish Sccurity Coordination in thc
U.S.
u)cn
Salm, Commandcr
utch !ndics naval liaison o ccr to Australian govcrnmcnt.
Fvvxcn
Rcynaud, Paul. Frcnch Forcign Ministcr.
Cnixvsv
Chiang KaiShck
Gcncralissimo in war against ]apan, 19371941, appointcd suprcmc
commandcr, allicd lorccs, Chincsc Var Tcatcr, ]anuary 1942, Prcsidcnt
National Govcrnmcnt, 19431949, and on Taiwan, 19501975.
Appendix: Dramatis Personae 869
Chiang KaiShck, Madamc
Mciling Soong, sccond wilc ol thc Gcncralissimo.
Hu Shih
Ambassador in Vashington.
uo Taichi
Chincsc Forcign Ministcr.
Soong, T.\., r.
Chiangs brothcrinlaw and pcrsonal cmissary in Vashington, China
clcnsc Supplics, !nc.
Gvv:~x ~xb !)~ii~x
Ciano, Contc Galcazzi
!talian Ministcr ol Forcign Aairs, 19361943, soninlaw ol Mussolini.
Hitlcr, Adoll
Gcrman Chanccllor, 19331945, dictator.
Mussolini, 8cnito
Prcmicr, ictator, altcr lall ol Francc lcd !taly into war, 1940, dcposcd
1943, imprisoncd, rcscucd by Gcrmans, Scpt. 1943, assassinatcd by !talian
partisans April 28, 1945.
Racdcr, rich, Admiral
CommandcrinChicl, Gcrman Navy.
Ribbcntrop, ]oachim von
Gcrman Forcign Ministcr, convictcd ol war crimcs and hangcd, 1946.
]~v~xvsv
Ando
mbassy, Vashington, associatc ol Tcrasaki, ordcrcd by Tokyo prcattack
to lcavc thc U.S.
Hirohito. mpcror (19261989).
Konoyc, Princc
Primc Ministcr, ]unc 4, 1937ctobcr 18, 1941.
Kurusu, Saburo
Sccond ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs (arrivcd in Vashington,
Novcmbcr 15, 1941).
Nomura, Kichisaburo, Admiral
Ambassador to thc Unitcd Statcs (appointcd ]anuary 1941).
gimoto
Pctty ccr, intclligcncc o ccr posing as a codc clcrk, ]apancsc cmbassy
in Vashington.
hashi, Chiuchi
\icc Ministcr lor Forcign Aairs.
Sancmatsu, Yuzuru
Assistant Naval Attachc, ]apancsc mbassy in Vashington.
Shigcmitsu
]apancsc Ambassador to London.
Takagi
mbassy, Vashington, associatc ol Tcrasaki, ordcrcd by Tokyo prcattack
to lcavc thc U.S.
Tcrasaki, Hidcnari
First Sccrctary, ]apancsc mbassy, Vashington, hcad ol ]apancsc cspio
nagc in Vcstcrn Hcmispcrc.
Tojo, Hidcki, Licutcnant Gcncral
Primc Ministcr, 19411944, convictcd as war criminal and hangcd, 1948.
Yamamoto
Chicl, Amcrican 8urcau ol ]apancsc Forcign cc.
Yamamoto, !soroku, Admiral
Commandcr in chicl ol Combincd Flcct, shot down in air action, 1943.
Uxi)vb S)~)vs
PvvFv~xxiix . Roosvvvi) Ab:ixis)v~)iox
Castlc, Villiam R., ]r.
Formcr Ambassador to ]apan, Undcrsccrctary ol Statc undcr Hoovcr.
Coolidgc, Calvin
U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19231929.
Hoovcr, Hcrbcrt
Hurlcy, Patrick
Sccrctary ol Var, 19291933, Ambassador to China, 19441945.
Kcnt, Tylcr
U.S. codc clcrk (London) who smugglcd sccrct mcssagcs out ol thc U.S.
mbassy and was tricd and imprisoncd in ngland lor thc duration ol
thc war.
Pcrshing, ]ohn ]., Gcncral
Commandcr in Chicl, Amcrican xpcditionary Forcc 19171919.
Rooscvclt Tcodorc
Talt, Howard
Yardlcy, Hcrbcrt .
Vorld Var ! Var and Statc cpartmcnt cryptographcr, author ol Te
American Black Chamber (1931).
V~snixc)ox (+o+)Civiii~x, Poii)ic~i
Austin, Varrcn R., U.S. Scnator
(R) \crmont.
8allantinc, ]oscph V.
Forcign Scrvicc ccr, U.S. Statc cpartmcnt.
8arklcy, Albcn V., U.S. Scnator
() Kcntucky.
8iddlc, Francis
Attorncy Gcncral.
8loom, Sol, U.S. Rcprcscntativc
() Ncw York. Chairman Forcign Aairs Committcc.
8ullitt, Villiam C.
First U.S. Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 19331936. Ambassador to Francc,
19361940.
8yrd, Harry Flood, U.S. Scnator
() \irginia.
Cartcr, dward C.
Formcr Sccrctary Gcncral ol thc !nstitutc ol Pacic Rclations, Ncw York.
Connally, Tom, U.S. Scnator
() Tcxas, Chairman, Scnatc Forcign Rclations Committcc.
Curric, Lauchlin
Administrativc Assistant to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt.
ooman, ugcnc H.
Counsclor, U.S. mbassy in Tokyo.
arly, Stcphcn
Sccrctary to thc Prcsidcnt.
aton, Charlcs A., U.S. Rcprcscntativc
(R) Ncw ]crscy.
dison, Charlcs
Sccrctary ol Var, 19331940.
Gauss, C..
U.S. Ambassador to China.
Grcw, ]oscph C.
U.S. Ambassador to ]apan prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941.
Hackworth, Grccn H.
Lcgal Advisor, Statc cpartmcnt.
Hamilton, Maxwcll M.
Chicl ol ivision ol Far astcrn Aairs in Statc cpartmcnt.
Harriman, Avcrcll
Spccial Rcprcscntativc ol thc Prcsidcnt, with ambassadorial rank.
Hcndcrson, Lcon
Hcad ol cc ol Pricc Administration and Civilian Supply.
Hillman, Sidncy
Labor union lcadcr, codircctor (with Villiam S. Knudscn) ol cc ol
Production Managcmcnt.
Hopkins, Harry
Pcrsonal adviscr to FR, Sccrctary ol Commcrcc (19381940), hcad
ol LcndLcasc Administration (1942), mcmbcr Var Production 8oard
(1942), spccial assistant to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt (19421945).
Hornbcck, Stanlcy K.
Spccial Assistant to Sccrctary ol Statc, Advisor on Political Rclations.
Hull, Cordcll
Sccrctary ol Statc, 19331944.
!ckcs, Harold
Sccrctary ol thc !ntcrior, 19331946, Pctrolcum Coordinator lor National
clcnsc, 1941.
]ohnson, Hiram,V., U.S. Scnator
(R) Calilornia.
Kcnncdy, ]oscph P.
U.S. Ambassador to ngland (19331940), lathcr ol ]ohn F. Kcnncdy,
U.S. Prcsidcnt (19611963).
Knox, Frank
Rcpublican candidatc lor \icc Prcsidcnt, 1936, Sccrctary ol Navy,
19401944.
Knudscn, Villiam S.
Commissioncr ol Council ol National clcnsc (1940), codircctor (with
Hillman) ol cc ol Production Managcmcnt (1941), dircctor ol pro
duction, Var cpartmcnt (19421945).
Krock, Arthur
Columnist, New York Times.
LaGuardia, Fiorcllo H.
Mayor ol Ncw York City, 19351943, chicl, U.S. cc ol Civilian
clcnsc.
Landon, Allrcd M.
Rcpublican prcsidcntial candidatc, 1936.
Lattimorc, wcn
U.S. political adviscr to Chiang in China.
Martin, ]oscph V., ]r., U.S. Rcprcscntativc
(R) Massachusctts, Housc Minority Floor Lcadcr.
McCormack, ]ohn V., U.S. Rcprcscntativc
() Massachusctts, Housc Majority Floor Lcadcr.
McCoy, Frank, Major
Longtimc aidc to Hcnry L. Stimson.
Mc!ntirc, Ross, r.
Rooscvclts pcrsonal physician.
McNary, Charlcs L., U.S. Scnator
(R) rcgon.
McrlcSmith, \an S., Coloncl
U.S. Military Attachc, Mclbournc, Australia.
Morgcnthau, Hcnry ]., ]r.
Sccrctary ol Trcasury, 19341945.
Nclson, onald M.
xccutivc ircctor ol Supply Prioritics, cc ol Production and
Managcmcnt (1941), Chairman, Var Production 8oard (19421944).
Pcrkins, Franccs
Sccrctary ol Labor.
Powcll, ]oscph V.
\icc Prcsidcnt ol 8cthlchcm Shipbuilding Co., Spccial Assistant to Knox,
accompanicd him to Pcarl Harbor, cccmbcr 814.
Rayburn, Sam, U.S. Rcprcscntativc () Tcxas.
Rooscvclt, lcanor, Mrs.
Vilc ol Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt.
Rooscvclt, Franklin . (FR)
Sayrc, Francis 8.
U.S. High Commissioncr in thc Philippincs
Stimson, Hcnry L.
Sccrctary ol Var, 19401945.
Truman, Harry S., U.S. Scnator
() Missouri, U.S. Prcsidcnt, 19451953.
\inson, Carl, U.S. Rcprcscntativc
() Gcorgia, Chairman, Housc Naval Aairs Committcc.
Valkcr, Frank C.
Postmastcr Gcncral, 19401945.
Vallacc, Hcnry A.
Sccrctary ol Agriculturc (19331940), \icc Prcsidcnt during Rooscvclts
2nd tcrm (19411945).
Valsh, avid L., U.S. Scnator
() Massachusctts, prcwar critic ol FRs lorcign policy, Chairman,
Scnatc Naval Aairs Committcc.
Vatson, dwin Martin (Pa), Major Gcncral
Prcsidcnt Rooscvclts appointmcnt sccrctary.
Vcllcs, Sumncr
Undcr Sccrctary ol Statc (19331943).
Vhitc, Harry cxtcr
Adviscr to Trcasury Sccrctary Morgcnthau.
Vinant, ]ohn G.
U.S. Ambassador in London (19411946).
Voodring, Harry Hincs
Sccrctary ol Var (19331940).
V~snixc)ox (+o+)N~vy
8adt, Harry A.
Captain, Tuscaloosa.
8cardall, ]ohn R., Rcar Admiral
Naval Aidc to Prcsidcnt Rooscvclt.
8catty, Frank ., Captain (latcr \icc Admiral)
Aidc to Knox, accompanicd him to Pcarl Harbor, cccmbcr 814.
8rainard, Roland M., \icc Admiral
ircctor ol Ship Movcmcnts, CN cc, Vashington.
8riggs, Ralph T.
Radioman stationcd at Chcltcnham, Maryland.
8rothcrhood, Francis M., Licutcnant Commandcr
Vatch ccr in p20G, Naval Communications.
Crcighton, ]ohn M., Captain
U.S. Naval bscrvcr, Singaporc.
aston, Licutcnant
Air Corps Pilot who cw Navy Sccrctary Knox to Pcarl Harbor cccmbcr
814.
dgcrs, Mrs. orothy
Rcscarch Analyst, N!.
Halscy, Villiam F., \icc Admiral
Commandcr Aircralt Patrol Forcc, Commandcr, Task Forcc Two.
Hart, Tomas C., Admiral
CommandcrinChicl, Asiatic Flcct, thc Philippincs (Manila). Hcadcd
Hart !nquiry into Pcarl Harbor Attack (March]unc, 1944).
Haycs, Licutcnant Commandcr
Formcr court stcnographcr, typcd Knoxs rcport on rcturn ight lrom
Pcarl Harbor.
Hcard, V.A., Captain
!n chargc ol Forcign 8ranch, N!.
Hindmarsh, Albcrt ., Licutcnant
Naval !ntclligcncc, Far astcrn Scction, cconomic analyst.
!ngcrsoll, Royal ., Admiral
Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations.
King, rncst ]., Admiral
CommandcrinChicl, Atlantic Flcct.
Kramcr, A.., Commandcr
p20G, Navy Communications, Hcad ol translation scction ol com
munication sccurity.
Krick, H.., Captain
Fricnd and thcatcr companion cccmbcr 6, 1941, ol Admiral Stark.
Lcahy, Villiam Admiral
Chicl ol Naval pcrations
Lynn, G.V., Lt. Commandcr
Scnior Vatch ccr, p20G, dccoding ]apancsc diplomatic
cryptographs.
McCollum, Arthur H., Captain, USN
!n chargc ol Far astcrn Scction, Forcign 8ranch, cc ol Naval
!ntclligcncc.
McrlcSmith
U.S. Naval Attachc, Australia.
Morccll, 8cn, Admiral
Chicl, 8urcau ol Yards and ocks (Scabccs).
Nimitz, Chcstcr V., Admiral
Chicl ol 8urcau ol Navigation.
Noycs, Lcigh, Rcar Admiral
ircctor ol Naval Communications.
Pcring, Allrcd F., Lt. Commandcr
n duty in p20G, Naval Communications.
Rcdman, ]oscph R., Admiral
Assistant ircctor ol Naval Communications.
Richardson, ].., Admiral
CincUS prior to Admiral Kimmcl.
Saord, Laurcncc F., Captain
!n chargc ol Sccurity Scction ol Naval Communications, intcrccpts.
Schuirmann, R.., Captain (latcr Rcar Admiral)
ircctor Ccntral ivision, Liaison with Statc cpartmcnt lor CN.
Schulz, Lcstcr Robcrt, Licutcnant
Communication Vatch ccr, on tcmporary duty at thc Vhitc Housc,
cccmbcr 6, 1941.
Smith, Lconard 8.
nsign, U.S. Navy, adviscr aboard 8ritish planc who spottcd thc Gcrman
Bismarck.
SmithHutton, H.H., Captain
Naval Attachc in Tokyo prior to cccmbcr 7, 1941.
Stark, Harold R., Admiral
Chicl ol Naval pcrations (CN).
Tollcy, Kcmp, Licutcnant (latcr Rcar Admiral)
Commandcr, Lanikai.
Torpc, lliott R.
ALUSNA, Naval Attachc in 8atavia, Ncthcrlands ast !ndics.
Turncr, Richmond Kclly, \icc Admiral
ircctor ol Navys Var Plans ivision, CN.
Viglc, aryl
Chicl, Station M, Chcltcnham, Maryland.
Vilkinson, Tcodorc S., Rcar Admiral, USN
ircctor ol thc cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc.
V~snixc)ox (+o+)Av:y
Arnold, H. (Hap) H., Gcncral
Commanding Gcncral, Army Air Corps.
8ratton, Rulus S., Coloncl
Chicl, Far astcrn Scction, Military ivision.
canc, ]ohn R., Coloncl
Aidc to Army Chicl ol Sta Gcncral Marshall.
uscnbcrry, Carlislc Clydc, Coloncl
Assistant to Army couricr 8rattton.
Frcnch, dward F., Coloncl
Signal ccr, Army Mcssagc Ccntcr.
Gailcy, Charlcs K., ]r., Gcncral
xccutivc ccr to Gcncral Gcrow.
Gcrow, Lconard T., Gcncral
Army Chicl ol Var Plans.
Gullion, Gcncral
Provost Marshall.
Harrison, Gcorgc L., Major
Aidc to Hcnry L. Stimson, Var cpartmcnt.
MacArthur, ouglas, Licutcnant Gcncral
Commandcr, U.S. Forccs Far ast in Manila, Allicd Suprcmc Commandcr,
S.V. Pacic (1942), Gcncral ol thc Army (1944).
Marshall, Gcorgc C., Gcncral
Army Chicl ol Sta (19351945).
Milcs, Shcrman, Major Gcncral
ircctor ol Military !ntclligcncc, G2.
cll, Robcrt H.
Assistant Military Attachc, Australia.
Rooscvclt, lliott
FRs 2nd son.
Rooscvclt, ]amcs, Captain
FRs cldcst son, Marinc Corps Rcscrvc, liaison bctwccn Marinc Corps
H and cc ol Coordinator ol !nlomation.
Smith, 8cdcll, Coloncl
Sccrctary to Army Chicl ol Sta, Gcncral Marshall.
Vcdcmcycr, V.C., Major (latcr Licutcnant Gcncral)
Var Plans ivision, Var cpartmcnt (latcr Commandcr ol thc Amcrican
troops in thc China Tcatcr).
Pv~vi H~vnov (+o+)N~vy
8cllingcr, Patrick Nclson L., \icc Admiral
Comdr. Hawaiian 8ascd Patrol Vings and Comdr. Patrol Ving Two,
Comdr. Task Forcc Ninc, Comdr. Flcct Air ctachmcnt, Pcarl Harbor,
Liaison with Com14, Comdr. Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc.
8loch, Claudc C.
Com14, Comdr. Local clcnsc Forccs, Comdr. Hawaiian Sca Fronticr,
Comdt. Navy Yard Pcarl Harbor, Naval 8asc clcnsc ccr undcr 2CL
4, Comdr. Task Forcc Four.
8rown, Vilson, Rcar Admiral
Commandcr, Scouting Forcc, Task Forcc 3, Pacic Flcct.
Calhoun, V.L., \icc Admiral
Commandcr 8asc Forcc, U.S. Flcct.
Colcman, H.M., Licutcnant. CinCPACs sta.
cLancy, V.S., Rcar Admiral
Assistant Chicl ol Sta lor pcrations (lor Admiral Kimmcl).
Ghormlcy, Robcrt L., Rcar Admiral
Assistant Chicl ol Naval pcrations, participant in U.S.8ritish convcr
sations (London), August 1940.
Halscy, Villiam F., Admiral
Commandcr ol thc carricr, Enterprise; Cmdr., U.S. 3rd Flcct in Pacic
( ]unc 1944Nov. 1945), Admiral ol thc Flcct, 1945.
Kimmcl, Husband ., Rcar Admiral
CincPac and CincUS.
Kingman, Howard F., Rcar Admiral
istrict !ntclligcncc ccr ol 14th Naval istrict.
Kitts, !!!, V.A., Rcar Admiral
Flcct Gunncry ccr (on Admiral Kimmcls sta).
Layton, .T. Captain
Flcct !ntclligcncc ccr and Combat !ntclligcncc ccr, U.S. Pacic
Flcct.
Maycld, !rving H., Captain
istrict !ntclligcncc ccr 14th Naval istrict.
McCormick, L.., Rcar Admiral
Assistant Chicl ol Sta and pcrations ccr lor CincPac.
McMorris, C.H., Rcar Admiral
pcrations ccr on sta ol Commandcr Scouting Forcc, Var Plans
ccr lor CincPac.
Ncwton, ].H., Admiral
Commandcr ol thc carricr Lexington.
utcrbridgc, Villiam Voodward, Licutcnant
Commanding ccr, USS Ward.
Pyc, V.S., \icc Admiral
Comdr. 8attlc Forcc, Comdr. Task Forcc nc, Scnior ccr in Pcarl
Harbor.
Ramscy, L.C., Captain
pcrations o ccr to Adm. 8cllingcr (Adm. 8cllingcr in command ol Pat.
Ving 2 and Pat. Vings Hawaiian Arca), Comdr. Task Forcc Ninc, avia
tion liaison o ccr to coopcratc with Com14, Comdr. Naval 8asc clcnsc
Air Forcc.
Rochclort, ]oscph ]., Commandcr
Assistant pcrations ccr, Forcc !ntclligcncc ccr lor Scouting
Forcc Commandcr, ccr in chargc ol combat intclligcncc 14th Naval
istrict.
Vithcrs, Tomas, Rcar Admiral
Commandcr Submarincs, Pacic.
Pv~vi H~vnov (+o+)Av:y
lliott, Gcorgc ., Scrgcant
pana radar station.
mmons, clos C., Major Gcncral
Commanding Gcncral, GH Air Forcc, participant in U.S.8ritish con
vcrsations (London) August 1940, Chicl ol Armys Var Plans ivision,
participant in U.S.8ritish convcrsation (London) August 1940.
Fricdman, Villiam
Hcad ol Armys Signal !ntclligcncc Scrvicc, loundcd 1930.
Lockard, ]oscph. L., Privatc (latcr Licutcnant)
pana radar station.
Phillips, V.C., Coloncl
Chicl ol Sta (lor Gcncral Short).
Short, Valtcr C., Major Gcncral
Commanding Gcncral, Hawaiian cpartmcnt.
Smith, Villiam V., Rcar Admiral
Chicl ol Sta to CincPac.
Strong, Gcorgc \., Major Gcncral
Chicl ol Armys Var Plans ivision, participant in U.S.8ritish convcr
sations (London) August 1940.
Taylor, V.G., Commandcr
Adviscr to Army on radar.
Tylcr, Kcrmit A., Licutcnant (latcr Licutcnant Coloncl)
Aircralt Varning Ccntcr.
!xvvs)ic~)ovs ~xb His)ovi~xs
Abbazia, Patrick
Author ol Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War of the Atlantic Fleet,
19391942, 1975.
8lum, ]ohn Morton
8iographcr ol Hcnry ]. Morgcnthau, ]r.
Shcrwood, Robcrt
FR spccch writcr.
883
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895
Subject Index
agcnts, sccrct, 35, 56, 165
aircralt rcconnaissancc
APH8 tcstimony rcgarding,
445, 459, 490
APH8 tcstimony rcgarding
di cultics ol, 45253
di cultics ol lor Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs, 16869
Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony
rcgarding, 59193
]CC invcstigation
tcstimony rcgarding
di cultics ol, 669, 67679,
682, 831
tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc troops, 736
tcstimony war warning and,
633, 656, 664
Knoxs rcport rcgarding
di cultics ol, 360
NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 502,
544
obscrvation ol ]apancsc troops,
166, 17576, 200, 25657,
312, 316
Robcrts Commission
tcstimony rcgarding, 37981,
386, 39599
war plan and, 163
Amcrica First Committcc,
11213
Amcrican xpcditionary Forcc
(AF), 221
Amcrican8ritishConvcrsations
(A8C)
dcvclopmcnt ol war plans,
16163, 66162
locus on war in Atlantic and,
115, 43031
!ngcrsolls talks with 8ritish
Admiralty, 13n14, 61
outlinc ol agrccmcnts, 6062
translcr ol ships lrom Pacic
to Atlantic, 9293
Amcricanutch8ritish (A8)
Convcrsations
ccct on ]apancsc
advanccmcnt, 191
mobilization ol war plan, 265
obscrvation ol ]apancsc
convoys, 257
outlinc ol agrccmcnt, 9092,
84849
rcsponsibilitics ol U.S. cct,
19798
AngloFrcnch Purchasing
Mission, 23, 37
antiwar scntimcnt, 11214
Argcntina, 39, 48
Arizona (U.S. battlcship), 353
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard (APH8)
appointmcnt ol board, 44142
Hawaiian military pcrsonncl,
tcstimony ol, 46162
]apancsc intcrccpts, tcstimony
rcgarding, 47187, 673, 707,
73960
military intclligcncc, tcstimony
rcgarding, 44851, 45461,
46366
rclcasc ol rcport, 61718, 65253,
738
rcport, 48892
sabotagc alcrt, tcstimony
rcgarding, 44447
U.S. cct, dclay in strcngthcning,
45153, 46366
U.S.]apan rclations, 44244,
44748, 46263, 46671
Atlantic Chartcr, 69, 100
Augusta (U.S. cruiscr), 67
Australia, 272
dcclaration ol war by ]apan, 350,
681
cvacuation ol ]apancsc rcsidcnts,
189
FRs addrcss to Hirohito, 272
FRs lcttcr to Villkic, 816
Modus Vivendi, 135, 137, 143, 196
U.S. alliancc with ngland and,
90, 26566, 334, 681, 821
U.S.]apancsc rclations and, 159,
681, 857
Vhitcs nly policy, 6
Axis Powcrs
alliancc with ]apan, 258
8attlc ol thc Atlantic, U.S.
uno cial participation and,
7073
cconomic sanctions, 65
]apancsc alliancc with, 26
scizurc ol ships by U.S., 70
See also Gcrmany, !taly, ]apan
bascs, cxchangc ol dcstroycrs lor,
4144, 660
Bismark (Gcrman battlcship), 6465
bomb plot mcssagc, 10810
See also Ships in Harbor mcssagc
bonds, wartimc, 21112
8ornco, 864
8oxcr Rcbcllion (18991901), 5
8urma, ]apancsc thrcat to, 189, 204
8urma Road
building ol, 15, 848
Chincsc objcctions to Modus
Vivendi, 147
closing ol, 25
]apancsc thrcat to, 138, 158, 164,
166, 172, 854
Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding
war plans, 700
rcopcning ol, 46
U.S. dclcnsc ol, 234
Calypso (U.S. Coast Guard cuttcr),
67
Canada, 189
carding ol ]apancsc in Unitcd
Statcs, 8
Carolinc !slands, 163
Ccntral Aircralt manulacturing
Company ol China, 59
Chcnnaults Amcrican \oluntccr
Group, 59, 848
China
Allicd support ol, 26
conict with ]apan, 57, 1017,
15660, 845
]apancsc attcmpts to ncgotiatc
with, 95
Subject Index 897
objcction to Modus Vivendi, 144
45, 14951, 180, 853
U.S. ultimatum to ]apan, 114, 306
China, U.S. support lor
altcrnativc to Modus Vivendi, 135
building ol 8urma Road. See
8urma Road
communism and, 66, 27879, 339
nancial aid, 59
Marshall/Stark rccommcndations,
119
military aid, 191, 852
objcction to Modus Vivendi,
13738
rcasons lor, 126
Chincsc Currcncy Stabilization
Fund, 26
City of Rayville (U.S. mcrchant
vcsscl), 54
Civil Acronautics 8oard, 210
Civilian Conscrvation Corps, 7879
Clark !nvcstigation
rcgarding, 56873, 596606,
782
rcasons lor, 419, 56768
rcopcning ol, 588
summary and conclusions,
60406
Clauscn !nvcstigation
rcgarding, 483, 57483
codcs
Amcrican
dcstruction ol codc machincs
and mcssagcs, 21719, 229
32, 26163, 85859
]CC tcstimony rcgarding
dcstruction ol codcs, 74748
Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony
rcgarding, 56873, 596606, 782
Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony
rcgarding, 57483
dccryption ol, xv, 4041, 24953
dcscription, 13033
dcstruction ol codc machincs,
148, 19697, 21317, 23233,
732, 85658
Fourtccn Part rcply. See Fourtccn
Part rcply
Hart !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding,
43136, 673, 740
immincnt brcak in ]apancscU.S.
rclations, 11718, 126
indications ol impcnding attack,
339
]apancsc, viii
47187, 673, 707, 73960
]apancsc cconomic conditions,
mcssagc rcgarding, 9899
]CC invcstigation
8rattons tcstimony, 78289,
80610
Kramcrs tcstimony, 76182,
798806
navy codcs, 108
NC! tcstimony conccrning,
49496, 50619, 53343, 673,
740, 76266
nc p.m. Mcssagc. See nc p.m.
Mcssagc
Pilot Mcssagc. See Pilot Mcssagc
prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944 and,
55154
sccrccy surrounding, x, 36567,
40911, 61116, 73839
sccurity lcak in Vashington,
8990
See Ships in Harbor mcssagc
systcm ol codcwords, 208
translcr ol intcrccpts to Forrcstal,
35152
unavailability to Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs, 671
See Vinds Codc mcssagc
See also military intclligcncc
Colorado (U.S. battlcship), 353
Columbus (Gcrman occan lincr),
2021
Comintcrn, 910, 14
communism
goals ol, 910
]apancsc opposition to, 7, 1415,
5960, 96, 141, 339
U.S. attitudc toward, 4, 151
U.S. support lor, 66, 278
Communist !ntcrnational, 910
compulsory military scrvicc, 35, 122
conccntration camps, 8, 263
Congrcss
dcclaration ol war, 307
dclivcry ol, 33234
invcstigation ol cccmbcr 4th
lcak to prcss, 294
notication ol possiblc war with
]apan, 173, 206
See also ]oint Congrcssional
Committcc ( ]CC) on Pcarl
Harbor invcstigation
dcclaration ol national cmcrgcncy,
209
dcclaration ol war
Churchills hopc lor, 6869
Congrcss and, 307
on ]apan, 32829, 34750, 843
against ]apan, 862
public opposition to, 11214
cnmark, 63
dcprcssion, cconomic, 3, 6, 36, 338
dcstroycrs lor bascs agrccmcnt,
4144, 660
dctcntion ol ]apancsc nationals, 348
diplomatic codc, dcciphcring. See
codcs, ]apancsc
octrinc ol Nonrccognition, 153
dralt, military, 35, 122, 210, 338
utch, 141
utch ast !ndics
166, 860
pcrccivcd thrcat to, 864
U.S. dclcnsc ol, 234
ast Vinds Rain mcssagc. See
Vinds Codc mcssagc
cconomic conditions
ol ngland, 3639, 4849
ol ]apan, 1617, 98, 11112,
125, 19293. See also cconomic
sanctions toward ]apan
ol Unitcd Statcs, 3, 6, 24, 36, 209,
338
cconomic sanctions
Axis powcrs, 65, 848
lrcczing ol asscts, 9798
Grcws warning rcgarding, 111
12, 339, 852
]apancsc ambassadors attcmpts to
ncgotiatc, 125, 18586
]apan as act ol war, 20406, 850
]apans rcply to U.S. ultimatum,
28283
proposcd withdrawal ol, 143
shortagc ol stratcgic matcrials,
10607, 19293
tcrmination ol tradc trcaty,
1617, 22
clcctions, prcsidcntial. See
prcsidcntial clcctions
cmbargocs toward ]apan. See
cconomic sanctions toward ]apan
cncryption ol codcs. See codcs,
]apancsc
Subject Index 899
ngland
alliancc with USSR, 96
attitudc toward ]apan undcr
Chambcrlain, 16
8attlc ol 8ritain, 25
8urma Road, 15, 25, 46
cccts on U.S. ncgotiations with
]apan, 18081
Franccs lall to Gcrmany and,
3133
sccrct agcnts in U.S., 35, 165
See also Churchill, Vinston
ngland, U.S. support lor
dcstroycrs lor bascs agrccmcnt,
4145
cscorts lor 8ritish ships, 6667,
7073
FRs corrcspondcncc with
Churchill, 17, 2939, 52, 6769,
849
!ngcrsolls talks with 8ritish
Admiralty, 13, 845
]CC invcstigation
Kimmcls tcstimony rcgarding,
68495, 705
Shorts tcstimony rcgarding,
71516
67778
joint warning to ]apan, 23437
military procurcmcnt, 2225,
3639, 4849, 5358
military sta convcrsations, 39,
6062
mobilization ol U.S. troops,
10304
NC! tcstimony rcgarding, 530
ocnsivc action toward ]apancsc,
16163, 19798
promisc ol armcd support,
26667, 28487, 33234, 339,
85761
public opinion and, 11214
rcjcction ol Modus Vivendi, 149,
15556
summary ol involvcmcnt, 84552
ultimatum to ]apan, 10001, 306
Enterprise (U.S. carricr), 176
thiopia, 845
xclusion Act, 6
Fcdcral 8urcau ol !nvcstigation
(F8!), 35
cct ol thc Unitcd Statcs. See U.S.
cct
Flying Tigcrs, 59
Formosa, 158
Fourtccn Part rcply
APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 469,
479
Clark !nvcstigation, 56870
Clauscn !nvcstigation, 578
dclivcry ol, 274, 27677, 28789,
305
Hcwitt !nquiry, 588
Hulls knowlcdgc ol, 324
intcrccption and dccoding ol,
27072, 28284
]CC invcstigation
8rattons tcstimony rcgarding,
78284, 78789, 80610
Gcrows tcstimony rcgarding,
635
Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding,
77375, 789, 798806
Marshalls tcstimony rcgarding,
627, 63738, 642
Milcss tcstimony rcgarding,
631
Saords tcstimony rcgarding,
752
Starks rcccipt ol, 81216
78289
Turncrs tcstimony rcgarding,
659
518, 52021, 52829, 537
Pilot Mcssagc and, 25556
rcccipt ol intcrccpt, 859
sccrccy surrounding, 259
Francc
dclcat by Nazis, 26
dclcnsc ol Poland, 846
Gcrman occupation ol, 3133
See also \ichy govcrnmcnt
Frcnch !ndochina
]apancsc occupation ol, 26, 76, 97,
135, 846
]apancsc ocr to rcmovc troops,
137
obscrvation ol ]apancsc convoys,
257
proposcd withdrawal ol ]apancsc
troops, 14243
See also !ndochina
Gallup poll, 112n1
Gcrman]apancsc AntiComintcrn
Pact, 10
Gcrmany
alliancc with ]apan, 126, 135, 148,
186, 19596, 85253
Allicd progrcss against, 611
attack on Russia, 65
8attlc ol 8ritain, 25
considcration ol U.S. dcclaration
ol war, 328, 735
dclcat ol Francc, 26
Gcrman]apancsc Anti
Comintcrn Pact, 10
Hitlcrs coming to powcr, 845
invasion ol Poland, 17, 846
invasion ol USSR, 9697, 222,
849
]CC invcstigation tcstimony
rcgarding
alliancc with ]apan, 68081
opposition to, 65859
U.S. opposition to, 57, 62, 190
93, 848, 850
See also Hitlcr, Adoll
Grcat cprcssion, 3, 6, 36
Grcat Var. See Vorld Var !
Grccnland, 63
Greer (U.S. dcstroycr), 70
Gruncrt 8oard. See Army Pcarl
Harbor 8oard (APH8)
Guam
]apancsc thrcat to, 450
Hart !nquiry tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc
attack, 347, 349
survcillancc ol, 188
thrcat to, 139, 170, 313, 394
]CC invcstigation
tcstimony rcgarding ]apancsc
thrcat to, 643, 716
tcstimony rcgarding ordcrs to
dcstroy codcs, 74748
NC!
thrcat to, 516, 531
tcstimony rcgarding ordcrs to
dcstroy codcs, 53435
ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 218,
22930, 261
rcinlorccmcnts scnt to, 261
Hart !nquiry
Hawaiian military pcrsonncl,
tcstimony ol, 42331
]apancsc codcs, tcstimony
rcgarding, 673, 740
Saords tcstimony, 43136
Subject Index 901
Hcwitt !nquiry
conclusions, 59396
]apancsc codcs, tcstimony
war warning, tcstimony rcgarding,
585, 593
Hong Kong, 189, 349
Hood (8ritish battlc cruiscr), 64
hot linc tclcphonc, 29
Hyperion (8ritish dcstroycr), 20
!ccland, 66, 70
!ndia, 189
Indianapolis (U.S. carricr), 176
!ndochina
]apancsc
occupation ol, 135, 846,
85051
ocr to rcmovc troops, 137
prcscncc in, 18489, 20304,
23335
thrcat to, 126, 147, 15860,
85455
war plans, 700, 704
257, 264
Schulzs tcstimony rcgarding
Shorts tcstimony rcgarding war
plans, 714
intcrnmcnt ol ]apancsc, 263
!taly, 195, 258, 845
]apan
ambassadors lrom. See Kurusu,
Saburo, Nomura, Kichisaburo
Convcrsations. See Amcrican
utch8ritish (A8)
Convcrsations
anticipatcd war with, 191201,
21011, 23236, 23943,
30609
rclations with U.S., 46671
attack on Pcarl Harbor, 31626,
84345
attcmpts to ncgotiatc with U.S.,
9496, 99100, 12227, 181,
84950, 85253
brcakdown ol diplomatic
rclations with thc U.S., 17987,
24445
considcrations ol war with
Unitcd Statcs, 15660
21317, 590
dctcrioration ol rclations with
U.S., 1017, 7578, 9798,
11112, 11720, 17677
diplomatic codcs ol. See codcs,
]apancsc
cxpiration ol trcaty with Unitcd
Statcs, 40
Fourtccn Part rcply. See Fourtccn
Part rcply
Gcrman]apancsc Anti
Comintcrn Pact, 10
Grcws tcstimony rcgarding,
62324
inammatory spccch by Primc
Ministcr Tojo, 18183
intcrnational rclations bclorc
VV!!, 47
military buildup in !ndochina. See
!ndochina
occupation ol Frcnch !ndochina.
See Frcnch !ndochina
occupation ol Manchuria, 45
nc p.m. Mcssagc. See nc p.m.
Mcssagc
opposition to antagonizing,
8488
proposal ol Modus Vivendi. See
Modus Vivendi
rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 26979,
28284, 50708, 856
rcply to U.S. ultimatum, Starks
tcstimony rcgarding, 665
risc to powcr ol military party,
10406
surrcndcr ol, 617
thrcat to !ndochina. See
!ndochina
thrcat to U.S. intcrcsts in
Philippincs, 16573
Tripartitc Pact. See Tripartitc Pact
U.S. alliancc with ngland. See
ngland, U.S. support lor
U.S. dcclaration ol war, 32829,
34850
U.S. cconomic sanctions toward.
See cconomic sanctions toward
]apan
U.S. ultimatum rcgarding
cncroachmcnt in Pacic, 68,
10001, 11420, 849, 853
U.S. warning rc: Ncthcrlands
!ndics, 2425
]apancsc consular codcs. See codcs,
]apancsc
]apancsc navy codcs, 108
]apancscChincsc Var, bcginning,
11
]CC on Pcarl Harbor invcstigation.
See ]oint Congrcssional
Committcc ( ]CC) on Pcarl
Harbor invcstigation
]oint Congrcssional Committcc
( ]CC) on Pcarl Harbor
invcstigation, viii
8rattons tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc intcrccpts, 78289,
80610
cccmbcr 6 mccting with FR,
dclcnsivc inlormation patrol,
cstablishmcnt and commission ol,
xiii, 61923
Gcrows rccollcction ol cvcnts
surrounding thc attack, 65657
Gcrows tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc intcrccpts, 63435
Grcavcss attcndancc ol, 64952
!ngcrsolls tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc thrcat to Pcarl Harbor,
73235
cct rcadincss, 67678
military intclligcncc, 67881,
70607
war plans, 681706
Knoxs rcport ol thc attack,
Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc bombing maps,
78082
Kramcrs tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc intcrccpts, 76182,
798806
Majority Rcport, 82832
Marshalls command structurc,
64041
Marshalls rccollcction ol cvcnts
surrounding thc attack, 63540,
64249
Marshalls whcrcabouts
cccmbcr 7, 81011, 81720
rcgarding, 62429, 67881,
70713
Minority Rcport, 83241
ncws covcragc ol, xvixvii
Subject Index 903
Saords tcstimony rcgarding thc
Vinds Codc mcssagc, 73960
Schulzs tcstimony rcgarding
Fourtccn part rcply, 78995
Shorts dclcnsc against Robcrts
Commission chargcs, 72429
Shorts tcstimony rcgarding
attack on Pcarl Harbor, 72224
Shorts tcstimony rcgarding
]apancsc thrcat to Pcarl Harbor,
71322
Shorts tcstimony rcgarding lack
ol military intclligcncc, 70713,
72022
Starks whcrcabouts cccmbcr 7,
81216, 82025
U.S. support lor Allics, tcstimony
rcgarding, 65762
war warning, tcstimony
conccrning, 68384, 746
62934, 66364
Kearny (U.S. dcstroycr), 72
Kcllogg8riand pact, 4, 12
Kra !sthmus, 236, 533
Kra Pcninsula
anticipatcd attack on, 860
war plans, 69799
war warning, 85455
KuomintangCommunist
agrccmcnt, 7
labor, prcsidcntial control ol, 209
Lcaguc ol Nations
invcstigation ol ]apancsc
occupation ol Manchuria, 7
production ol, 4
lcndlcasc plan
cccts on strcngthcning cct, 84
ngland, U.S. support lor, 5658,
64, 847
cscorts lor 8ritish ships and, 67
promisc to U.S.S.R., 65
Lexington (U.S. carricr), 176
MAG!C
attcmpts to kccp sccrct, 36567,
40911, 61116, 73839
Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony
rcgarding, 57483
dcscription, 249
dcvclopmcnt ol, 41, 132
rcgarding, 58390
rclations, 11718, 15960
indications ol impcnding attack,
339
]CC invcstigation
Kramcrs tcstimony, 76182
qucstions rcgarding, 623
Shorts tcstimony, 718
tcstimony rcgarding
disscmination, 62429
mcssagc rcgarding ]apans
cconomic conditions, 9899
missing intcrccpt, 8990
Pilot Mcssagc, 25455
55154
translcr ol intcrccpts to Forrcstal,
35152
commandcrs, 311, 626, 671,
70708
See also codcs, ]apancsc,
military intclligcncc, Purplc
(diplomatic codc)
Malaysia
anticipatcd attack on, 164, 189,
207, 257, 860
dclcnsc ol rubbcr supplics lrom,
148
ccct ol A8 agrccmcnt on
]apancsc advanccmcnt on,
19091
!ngcrsolls tcstimony rcgarding
war plans, 73435
]apancsc attack, 347, 349
]apancsc thrcat to, 158, 204
Kimmcls tcstimony to ]CC
rcgarding war plans, 682, 687
90, 69799, 70203
264
U.S. war plans rcgarding, 61
warning to ]apan rcgarding, 234
Manchukuo. See Manchuria
Manchuria
]apancsc ncutrality pact with
Russia, 60n20
]apancsc occupation ol, 47
Modus Vivendi and, 135
Ncw rdcr and, 1415
participation in war, 510, 859
Russian invasion ol, 5, 278
Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt, 1011
Marshall !slands
]apancsc bascs, 163, 175, 390
U.S. war plans rcgarding, 313,
384, 684, 702
Maryland (U.S. battlcship), 353
mcrchant ships, scizurc ol, 65
mcssagcs, ]apancsc cncodcd. See
codcs, ]apancsc
Midway
aircralt rcconnaissancc and, 317,
380
dclcat ol ]apancsc at, 724
dclcnsc ol, 38486
rcgarding war warning, 592
]CC invcstigation, tcstimony
rcgarding translcr ol troops,
663, 682
Robcrts Commission tcstimony
rcgarding war warning, 395
troop placcmcnt at, 171, 17576
war warning and, 313
military intclligcncc
dcciphcring ]apancsc codcs. See
codcs, ]apancsc
dcscription, 12930, 24953
corts to salcguard, 61116
shilts in rcsponsibility lor, 107
10, 624
sourccs givcn to 8ritish
govcrnmcnt, 39
military intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor
Pcarl Harbor commandcrs
44851, 45461, 46366
dcpcndcncc on Vashington to
supply, 85152, 86364
]CC invcstigation
Kimmcls tcstimony, 67881
qucstions rcgarding, 623
tcstimony rcgarding
disscmination, 62429
lack ol ability to dccodc consular
mcssagcs, 21213, 31112
99, 52030, 53343
nc p.m. Mcssagc and, 35355
U.S.]apan rclations and, 194
volumc ol intcrccpts and, 237
military scrvicc, compulsory, 35, 122
Subject Index 905
Minority Rcport on Pcarl Harbor
invcstigation, viii
Modus Vivendi
Chinas objcctions to, 13741,
14447, 14951, 180, 853
proposal ol, 13336, 853
28284
U.S. countcrproposal, 14247
U.S. rcjcction ol, 14956
U.S. rcply, 15960, 17677, 184
Monroc octrinc, 14
Mukdcn cxplosion, 6
National clcnsc Mcdiation 8oard,
209
Naval 8asc clcnsc Air Forcc
pcration Plan, 591
Naval Limitation and Non
Fortication Trcaty, 56
Navy Court ol !nquiry (NC!)
appointccs to court, 49394
attcmpts to conccal ndings,
55466
ndings and conscqucnccs ol,
54647
]apancsc intcrccpts, introduction
ol, 49496
rcgarding, 50630, 673, 740,
76266
]apancsc rcply to U.S. ultimatum,
537
rcgarding, 49698, 52030
rclcasc ol rcport, 61718, 738
vulncrability ol cct, tcstimony
rcgarding, 50206, 519, 54145
499502, 53134
Nazis. See Gcrmany
Ncthcrlands ast !ndics
189
198, 847, 85455
U.S. dclcnsc ol, 193, 207, 234
ncutrality ol Unitcd Statcs, 36, 45
cash and carry purchascs, 3639
Congrcssional position in 1935, 8
continucd movcmcnt toward
participation in thc war, 193,
22123
]apancscChincsc Var, 11, 1516
Morgcnthaus opposition to, 23
Ncutrality Act, cnactmcnt ol, 89,
845
opposition to, 23, 34
Patrol Forcc, 1821, 45, 70, 846,
849
Rooscvclts assurancc ol, 17, 21,
4952
Rooscvclts campaign against, 20
violations ol, 56, 62, 65, 9697
Nevada (U.S. battlcship), 353
Ncw cal, 24, 36, 78, 338
Ncw rdcr agrccmcnt, 1415, 22,
141
ncws covcragc
APH8 and NC! rcports, 618
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard,
56266
ol Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard
rcports, 65253
ol Grcavcss attcndancc at ]CC
invcstigation, 651
ol Knoxs rcport, 35859
ol Scnatc 8ill S.805, 61415
ol Tojos spccch, 18283
Niblack (U.S. dcstroycr), 63
Ninc Powcr Trcaty ol 1922, 12
NonFortication Trcaty, 56
Nonrccognition doctrinc, 6
cc ol Civilian clcnsc, 209
cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc (N!),
8, 107
cc ol Production Managcmcnt,
209
Oklahoma (U.S. battlcship), 353
nc p.m. Mcssagc
rcgarding, 569
dclay in action rcgarding, 37172
dclivcry ol, 287301, 305
rcgarding, 58890
intcrccption ol, 284, 287301,
861
]CC invcstigation
8rattons tcstimony, 80610
Marshalls tcstimony, 63739
Starks tcstimony, 66668
Turncrs tcstimony, 65960
N! ( cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc).
See cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc
(N!)
pcn oor agrccmcnt, 6
Panaman (nonbclligcrcnt ship), 70
Panay (U.S. gunboat), 13
Patrol Forcc (Ncutrality Patrol),
1821, 45, 70, 846, 849
Pcarl Harbor
abscncc ol military intclligcncc.
See military intclligcncc,
abscncc ol lor Pcarl Harbor
commandcrs
aircralt rcconnaissancc. See
aircralt rcconnaissancc
appointmcnt ol Kimmcl as
commandcrinchicl, 8081
attcmpts to strcngthcn cct, 101
03, 45152. See also U.S. cct:
attcmpts to strcngthcn
bcrthing plan mcssagc, 10810,
21213
commandcrs. See Kimmcl,
Husband ., Short, Valtcr C.
26163
invcstigations. See spccic
invcstigations, c.g., Army Pcarl
Harbor 8oard
Knoxs invcstigation ol thc attack,
35161, 66869
sabotagc alcrt. See sabotagc alcrt
Ships in Harbor mcssagc. See
Ships in Harbor mcssagc
stationing ol U.S. cct, 2728,
84647
translcr ol ships lrom Pacic to
Atlantic, 17576
vulncrability ol cct, 863
vulncrability ol cct, ]CC
vulncrability ol cct, NC!
warning to commandcrs, 17475,
31316, 854
Vashingtons ncgligcncc, 33940
Pcarl Harbor invcstigations. See
spccic invcstigations, c.g., Army
Pcarl Harbor 8oard
Pennsylvania (U.S. battlcship), 353
Philippincs
asscssmcnt ol strcngth ol U.S.
cct, 118
basc lor 8ritish battlc cct, 285
189
Subject Index 907
Hcwitt !nquiry, tcstimony
rcgarding thrcat, 58890
]apancsc thrcat to, 148, 15860,
16471, 204, 31316
war plans, 68687, 699700
rcgarding war plans, 682
MacArthurs advanccmcnt, 611
257
prcscncc ol U.S. Flcct in, 8588
Purplc (diplomatic codc)
machinc, 131
war warning, 85455
Pilot Mcssagc
intcrccption and disscmination ol,
25356, 26970, 859
]CC invcstigation
tcstimony, 63435, 654, 657,
659
518, 528
Poland, 17, 29
prcsidcntial clcctions
ol 1932, 34
ol 1940, 22, 3335, 38, 4952,
847
ol 1944, 54954
prcsidcntial rcaction to attack,
32123, 32932, 33435, 33739,
34750, 84345
prcss covcragc. See ncws covcragc
Prince of Wales (8ritish battlcship),
67, 264
attcmpts to kccp intcrccptions
sccrct, 36567, 40911, 61116
bcrthing plan mcssagc, 21213
dccryption ol, 41
23233, 25961
rcgarding, 584
immincnt brcak in ]apancsc
U.S. rclations, 11718, 15960,
19496
]apancsc attcmpts to ncgotiatc,
123
]CC invcstigation, qucstions
rcgarding, 623
mcssagc rcgarding ]apans
cconomic conditions, 9899
19, 53738
55154
commandcrs, 311
U.S. ability to dccodc, 13132,
847
See also codcs, ]apancsc, MAG!C,
military intclligcncc
uakcrs, 113
Rainbow war plans. See war plans
rationing, 210
Rcconstruction Financc
Corporation, 49
Rcpublican National committcc, viii
Repulse (8ritish battlc cruiscr), 264
Reuben James (U.S. dcstroycr), 7273
Robcrts Commission
appointmcnt ol board, 37374
ndings and conscqucnccs ol,
396406, 444, 618
Hawaiian commandcrs, tcstimony
ol, 37692
]apancsc consulatc, F.8.! ndings
ol, 39293
Saords rcaction to, 739
Vashington o cials, tcstimony
ol, 37476, 39396
Robin Moor (U.S. lrcightcr), 65
Rooscvcltcwcy prcsidcntial
clcction campaign ol 1944, viii
Russia. See USSR (Union ol Sovict
Socialist Rcpublics)
Russian Maritimc Provinccs, 164,
68586, 714
Russo]apancsc Var ol 1904, 5
sabotagc alcrt
APH8 tcstimony rcgarding, 482,
48890
rcgarding, 570
]CC invcstigation
Shorts tcstimony, 71920, 728
tcstimony conccrning, 63334,
656
as rcsponsc to war warning, 167
69, 17475, 312
Robcrts Commission tcstimony
rcgarding, 387, 389, 394, 397,
402
Shorts rcasons, 355, 44447
Samoa, 74748
sanctions, by U.S. against ]apan. See
cconomic sanctions toward ]apan
sccrct agcnts, 35, 56, 165
Sclcctivc Scrvicc, 35, 122, 210, 338
Scnatc 8ill S.805, 61216
Scnatc Naval Aairs Committcc,
36465
Sessa (Panamanian ship), 70
Shanghai !ntcrnational Scttlcmcnt,
7
Ships in Harbor mcssagc
intcrccption and dccoding ol,
10809, 213, 232
]CC invcstigation
!ngcrsolls tcstimony, 733
53941
war warning and, 858
Singaporc
Convcrsations, 9092, 84849
8urma Road and, 25
189
intcrnmcnt ol ]apancsc, 263
]apancsc attack, 347
847, 85455
war plans, 702
rcgarding war plans, 682
machinc, 131
stationing ol 8ritish commandcr
inchicl, 236
U.S. acccss to, 30
Sino]apancsc Var ol 1895, xiv, 5
South Amcrica, 189
Sovict Union. See USSR (Union ol
Sovict Socialist Rcpublics)
Spain, 845
Steel Seafarer (nonbclligcrcnt ship),
70
Stimsons cial Rcport, 60610
stock markct crash ol 1929, 34
Supply Prioritics and Allocations
8oard, 210
tclcphonc hot linc, 29
Tennessee (U.S. battlcship), 353
Tailand, ]apancsc thrcat to
advanccmcnt ol ]apancsc lorccs,
166, 191, 204
Subject Index 909
attack on Kra Pcninsula and,
19899
]apancsc rcinlorccmcnt ol
Mandatcs, 158
war plans, 700, 704
promisc ol armcd support by
U.S., 266, 287, 860
U.S. warning to ]apan rcgarding,
164, 234
war warning and, 189, 864
See also Kra !sthmus
Tripartitc Pact
rclations, 19495
inucncc on ]apancsc
ncgotiations, 850
initiation ol, 26, 846
]CC invcstigation, tcstimony
U.S. involvcmcnt in war and, 186,
848
Tuscaloosa (U.S. hcavy cruiscr),
2021, 56
uncmploymcnt, 24, 36, 338
Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics.
See USSR
U.S. Constitution, 92, 199, 287, 307,
843
U.S. xclusion Act ol 1924, 6
U.S. cct
attcmpts to strcngthcn, 8084,
10103, 45152
cscorts lor 8ritish ships, 6667,
7073
invcntory ol, 27273
]apancsc obscrvation ol, 10810,
23233, 260, 590. See also Ships
in Harbor mcssagc
]CC invcstigation
tcstimony rcgarding attcmpts
to strcngthcn, 66061
tcstimony rcgarding dclcnsivc
patrols in thc Pacic, 73537
tcstimony rcgarding cscorts lor
8ritish ships, 69596
199200, 25658, 853, 856
ocnsivc action toward ]apancsc,
16263
placcmcnt in Hawaii, 2728,
4548
prcscncc in Midway and Vakc,
313
prcscncc in Philippincs, 8588
ships movcd to Atlantic, 64
Atlantic, 9293, 17576, 451
52, 67778, 848
U.S.8ritish military agrccmcnts
and, 68791, 705. See
also Amcrican8ritish
Convcrsations (A8C)
vulncrability ol cct, 84647, 863
vulncrability ol cct, ]CC
682
vulncrability ol cct, NC!
54145
U.S. Housc committcc on Forcign
Aairs, 10
USSR (Union ol Sovict Socialist
Rcpublics)
aid to China, 45
aim ol Comintcrn, 910
Allicd support ol, 68586, 849
cstablishmcnt ol rclations by U.S.,
845
Gcrman invasion ol, 9697
]apancsc thrcat to, 71415. See
also Russian Maritimc Provinccs
support ol China, 1011
\crsaillcs Trcaty, 4
\ichy govcrnmcnt, 26, 76, 97, 203
\ictory Program, 97, 10304,
12122, 222
Vakc
aircralt rcconnaissancc, 317
]apancsc thrcat to, 390, 395
]CC invcstigation
thrcat to, 643
tcstimony rcgarding translcr ol
troops, 663, 682
NC! tcstimony rcgarding
placcmcnt ol troops and plancs,
502
ordcrs to dcstroy codcs, 263,
74748
placcmcnt ol troops and plancs,
17576, 261, 313, 38385
war plans
A8C agrccmcnt and, 62, 16263
Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony,
573
Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony, 592
]CC invcstigation
Kimmcls tcstimony, 67778,
68184
rc: military intclligcncc and,
62425
tcstimony rcgarding support
lor ngland, 65763
Kimmcls rcsponsc, 17576
prcparation lor ocnsivc action,
170, 285, 84748
sabotagc alcrt and, 16769,
17475
war warning
to Hart and Kimmcl, 858
Hcwitt !nquiry, tcstimony
rcgarding, 585, 593
]CC invcstigation tcstimony
rcgarding, 63335, 68384, 746
502, 53134
Shorts sabotagc alcrt and, 167
69, 17475, 312, 355, 444
wartimc bonds, 21112
wartimc matcricl
cstimation ol, 10304. See also
\ictory Program
production ol, 94, 9697, 209,
22123
Vashington Naval Conlcrcncc, 56
Vinds Codc mcssagc, xvii
Clark !nvcstigation tcstimony,
570, 572, 596606
Clauscn !nvcstigation tcstimony,
57879
Hcwitt !nquiry tcstimony,
58388
intcrccption and disscmination
ol, 85859
intcrccption ol, 17778, 246
]CC invcstigation
51114, 517, 520, 52326,
53539, 543
Saords attcmpts to nd, 67176
Vinds xccutc, 22332
Vorld Var !, x, 56, 19, 78
Yangtzc Rivcr, 13
911
Name Index
Bold numbers dcnotc photographs
Abbazia, Patrick, 67
Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te
Private War of the Atlantic
Fleet, 19391942, 18n27,
19n29, 21n3233, 43n30,
44n35, 6364nn2931,
65n33, 6667nn3839,
70nn4647, 72n50, 73n52
Adams, Hcnry M.
Harry Hopkins: A Biography,
234n3739, 322n44
Administration of the Navy
Department in World War II
(Furcr), 42n29, 43n30, 83n16
Admiral Ambassador to Russia
(Standlcy and Agcton), 374n4,
376n14
Admiral Kimmel s Story (Kimmcl),
4056nn13336, 416n20,
419n2627, 495n7, 495n10,
558n30, 613n8, 614n11, 616n15
Aectionately, FDR: A Sons Story
of a Lonely Man (Rooscvclt and
Shalctt), 330n66, 550n4
Agcton, Arthur A., 374n4
Admiral Ambassador to Russia,
376n14
Albion, Robcrt Grccnhalgh
Forrestal and the Navy, 84n17
America First: Te Battle Against
Intervention, 19401941 (Colc),
113n3
American Foreign Policy in the
Making, 19321940 (8card),
9n6, 50nn4849
And I Was Tere: Pearl Harbor and
MidwayBreaking the Secrets
(Layton, Pincau, Costcllo),
316n19, 414n13
Andcrson, Valtcr S., 426
Ando, 259
Andrcws, Adolphus, 493
Arnold, Hcnry Harlcy
446n20, 447, 45455
dclcnsc ol U.S. intcrcsts in thc
Pacic, 166
Rooscvclts Var Cabinct, 142
U.S. aid to ngland, 2324
Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story
of American War Production
(Nclson), 21011nn1819
Austin, Varrcn R., 335
Back Door to War: Te Roosevelt
Foreign Policy, 19331941
(Tansill), 10n9, 11n11
8adt, Harry A., 21
8acchcr, ]ohn Ford, 583, 776,
78990
8alcs, 776
8allantinc, ]oscph V., 183, 302, 324
8ard, Ralph A., 480
8arklcy, Albcn
]CC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation,
816
Pcrcy Grcavcs incidcnt, 64953
rolc as Scnatc Majority Lcadcr,
335, 61820
8arncs, Harrry lmcr, xiii, 330n64,
353nn23, 35658nn1417, 373n2,
410n1
8atchclor, C.., 653
Battle Report: Te Atlantic War
(Karig), 4344nn3233, 314
15nn1112, 317n25, 318nn2728
8card, Charlcs A., 92n31
American Foreign Policy in the
Making, 19321940, 9n6, 50
51nn4852
8cardall, ]ohn R.
anticipatcd attack lrom ]apan,
433
dcstruction ol ]apancsc codcs,
260
276, 289, 305
]CC Pcarl Harbor invcstigation
Schulzs tcstimony, 790, 794
nc P.M. Mcssagc, 293
Pilot Mcssagc, 25556, 271
8catty, Frank, 352
8cllingcr, Patrick Nclson L.
Hcwitt !nquiry, 59192
Navy Court ol !nquiry, 505
o cial notication ol thc attack,
32021
rcconnaissancc to guard Hawaii,
168, 31617, 42728
Robcrts Commission rc: air
patrols, 379
8cntlcy, lizabcth, 151n44
8ctts, 712
8ickncll, Gcorgc V., 464n87, 582,
627, 71516
8iddlc, Francis, 405
8icscmcicr, Harold, 49395, 49798,
50607, 53436
8irkcnhcad, arl ol, 197n27,
198n30, 306n100
8isscll, ]ohn T.
Clarkc !nvcstigation, 571, 597,
60006
Hcwitt !nquiry, Saords
tcstimony, 587
Marshalls lcttcr to Tomas
cwcy, 553
8loch, Claudc C.
accusations against, 366
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 451
Navy Court ol !nquiry, Saords
tcstimony, 514
Richardsons rcplaccmcnt ol as
C!NCUS, 21
Robcrts Commission rc
air patrols, 37980
cct prcparcdncss, 383, 38586
rcsponsibility lor dclcnsc,
37677
Starks war warning, 170
8loom, Sol, 335
Name Index 913
8lum, ]ohn Morton
From the Morgenthau Diaries:
Years of Urgency, 19381941,
2324nn3742, 37n1719,
38n21, 58n16, 140n18, 144n28,
150n40, 212n20
8rainard, Roland M., 288
8ratton, Rulus S.
433
47175
Marshalls tcstimony, 46869,
48384
tcstimony bclorc, 48487
Clarkc !nvcstigation, 56873,
59798, 600
Clauscn !nvcstigation, 57479,
582
260
Hcwitt !nquiry, 589
276, 288
731, 738, 78289, 80611
Gcrows tcstimony, 634, 657
Kramcrs tcstimony, 779, 803
820
Milcss tcstimony, 629
32628
nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29398,
30001, 371
Stimsons o cial rcport, 610
Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178n38
8rcwstcr, wcn
appointmcnt to, 620
Kcclcs additional vicws, 832
8riggs, Ralph T.
Saords tcstimony, 67376,
75960
British Foreign Policy in the Second
World War (Voodward), 198
99nn3031, 23536nn4043,
266nn4546
8rookcPopham, Robcrt, 236, 263,
26667, 286
8rough, ]amcs
A Rendezvous with Destiny: Te
Roosevelts of the White House,
330n67
8rown, Vilson, 176, 429
8ryant, 779
8rydcn, Villiam, 641
8ullitt, Villiam C., 4, 3132, 52
How Vc Von thc Var and Lost
thc Pcacc, 57n12
8undy, McGcorgc, 639
On Active Service in Peace and
War, 7n2, 3435nn1314,
635n68
8urnctt, Charlcs, 265
8urns, ]amcs MacGrcgor
Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom,
550n1
8yrd, Harry Flood, 364
Cadogan, Alcxandcr, 257
Cartcr, dward C., 150, 151
Cascy, Richard G., 272
Chiang KaiShck
Allicd support ol, 26, 117
inucncc on U.S. rclations with
]apan, 114, 182, 853
]apans Ncw rdcr and, 1415
KuomintangCommunist
agrccmcnt, 7
proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 144
47, 14951, 153, 155, 18081
U. S. aid to China, 59, 848
Chambcrlain, ]ohn, xvii
Chambcrlain, Ncvillc, 16
Chambcrs, Vhittakcr, 151n44
Chcnnault, Clairc, 59
Churchill, Vinston, 341
appointmcnt as First Lord ol thc
Admiralty, 1718
corrcspondcncc with Rooscvclt,
2933
Grand Alliance, Te, 68n42,
323n45 on ]apancsc
cncroachmcnt in Far ast,
6769, 266
322
44, 149, 155
rcqucsts lor aid, 3033, 4145
ultimatum to ]apan and, 10001
U.S. aid to ngland, 55, 6367,
84647, 849. See also ngland,
U.S. support lor
Ciano, Count Galcazzi, 195
Clark, Grcnvillc, 328
Clark, ]. 8ayard, 620, 629, 745, 757
Clarkc, Cartcr
Clarkc !nvcstigation, 561, 568
73, 596, 60206
Marshalls lcttcr to Tomas
cwcy, xvi, 55253
Clauscn, Hcnry C.
appointmcnt to, 441
57383
8rattons tcstimony, 783, 788
Gcrows tcstimony, 657
sccrccy ol ]apancsc codcs, 410n1
Codebreakers: Te Story of Secret
Writing, Te (Kahn), 41n27, 131n1,
132n4
Colc, Vaync S.
America First: Te Battle Against
Intervention, 19401941, 113n3
Colcman, H.M., 216
Conict of Duty: Te U.S. Navys
Intelligence Dilemma, 19191945
(orwart), 8n45
Congressional Record, 613n7,
618nn34, 619n7, 621n13
Connally, Tom, 335, 369
Conncry, Robcrt Howc
Forrestal and the Navy, 84n17
Consent of the Governed, and Other
Deceits (Krock), 58n15
Coolidgc, Calvin, 620
Coopcr, ]crc, 620, 642, 707, 77779
Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of
State and Teir Diplomacy (Pratt),
203n1, 302n87, 635n67
Costcllo, ]ohn
MidwayBreaking the Secrets,
316n19
Craigic, Robcrt, 77
Cramcr, Myron C., 40203,
487n171, 55759, 71011
Crcighton, ]ohn M., 26364, 266,
286, 33233, 659
Cruise of the Lanikai (Tollcy),
736n11
Name Index 915
Cryptolog (Saord), 674n4
Curric, Lauchlin, 145, 151
anicls, ]onathan
White House Witness, 550n2
avis, Arthur C., 424
canc, ]ohn R.
Clauscn !nvcstigation, 577, 578
811
323, 32628
nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29394, 302
cpartmcnt ol Statc
Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 33n10
Te Far East, 138n14, 141n2021,
144n2627, 14547nn3034,
149n39, 155n48, 198b29,
279n36
Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers, Te Far
East, 1938, 11n10, 7778nn45,
101n55, 136n10, 17980nn12,
24041nn35, 277nn2931
Japan, 19311941, 15n19, 17n23,
137n12, 148n36, 155n47,
183n7, 183n9, 187n11, 205n8,
279n35, 690n52
Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States:
Japan, 19311941, 14n1516,
9596nn3640, 12526nn25
27, 13335nn68, 182n4,
2045nn37, 24143nn68,
27778nn3233, 325n51,
658n141, 689n49
Peace and War: United States
Foreign Policy, 19311941,
12n1213, 16n21, 17n24, 21n34,
25n45, 44n34, 58n14, 63n27,
69n45, 70n49, 10001nn5254,
114n5, 123n20, 325n51, 350n4,
454n46
cwcy, Tomas .
]apancsc intcrccpts, xii, xvxvi,
55254, 565, 612
prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944, 547,
54950
ickinson, dward, 405
illon, ]ohn H., 321n41
Diplomatic Papers, 1940
(cpartmcnt ol Statc), 33n10
ooman, ugcnc H., 77
orwart, ]crcy M.
Conict of Duty: Te U.S. Navys
Intelligence Dilemma, 1919
1945, 8n45
uscnbury, Carlislc C., 29597
578, 582
788, 80607
arl ol 8irkcnhcad
Halifax, 197n27, 198n30,
306n100
arly, Stcvc, 330, 334
aton, Charlcs A., 335
dcn, Anthony, 68, 77, 240, 341
dison, Charlcs, 34
iscnhowcr, wight, 151n44
lliot, Gcorgc ., 31920, 505
mmons, clos C., 39, 411n4
Events Leading up to World War
II (U.S. Housc Committcc on
Forcign Aairs), 10n8, 16n22,
17n25, 18n28, 20n31, 24n43,
44n34, 57n13, 69n43, 70n48,
141n19
Far East, Te (cpartmcnt ol Statc),
138n14, 141n2021, 144n2627,
14547nn3034, 149n39, 155n48,
198n29, 279n36
Farlcy, ]im
Jim Farleys Story, 34n12
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928
1945 (Rooscvclt), 42n28, 77n3
Fcis, Hcrbcrt
Te Road to Pearl Harbor,
307n102
Fcllcrs, 8onncr, 367, 410n1
Fcrguson, Homcr (Scnator), 344
]apancsc intcrccpts, xii
appointmcnt to, 61920
692, 695707
Kramcrs tcstimony, xvii, 774
75, 780
64648, 818
Milcss tcstimony, 64951, 654
Schulzs tcstimony, 789
Starks tcstimony, 662, 668, 821
Navy Court ol !nquiry and Army
Pcarl Harbor 8oard ndings,
618
Prcsidcntial clcction ol 1944, 554
Scnatc 8ill S.805, 613, 615
Field Service Regulations: Operations,
720n146, 721n148
Ficldcr, Kcndall ]., 751n71
Final Sccrct ol Pcarl Harbor, Tc
(Flynn), 646n101
Financial Policy, 19391945 (Saycrs),
39n24
Flynn, ]ohn T., 112, 646n101
Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers, Te Far
East, 1938 (cpartmcnt ol Statc),
11n10, 7778nn45, 101n55,
136n10, 17980nn12, 240
41nn35, 277nn2931
Forrcstal, ]amcs V.
Hcwitt !nquiry, 56768, 583,
58687, 594
]apancsc intcrccpts, 480
Knoxs invcstigation ol damagc to
Pcarl Harbor, 35152, 43637
Navy Court ol !nquiry, 49395,
496, 547
and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard
ndings, 55464
Forrestal and the Navy (Albion and
Conncry), 84n17
Forrestal Diaries, Te (Millis),
436n4950
Frank, Valtcr H., 441, 483
Frcnch, dward F., 30001, 37172,
569, 809
Fricdman, Villiam, 130, 572, 587
88, 596600, 604
From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years
of Urgency, 19381941 (8lum),
2324nn3742, 37n1719, 38n21,
58n16, 140n18, 144n28, 150n40,
212n20
Furcr, ]ulius A.
Administration of the Navy
Department in World War II,
42n29, 43n30, 83n16
Gailcy, Charlcs K., 575, 578
Name Index 917
Gatch, T.L., 557, 559, 59496
Gauss, C.., 155
Gcarhart, 8crtrand V.
appointmcnt to, 620
687
Marshalls tcstimony, 644, 646
Starks tcstimony, 79697,
81213
Gcorgc, Valtcr F., 344, 620
George C. Marshall: Education of a
General: 18301939 (Poguc), 79n7,
308n105
George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope,
19391942 (Poguc), 160n53
Gcrow, Lconard T., 342
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard, 447,
449
48586
ndings, 556, 573
Clauscn !nvcstigation, 575, 577,
578, 580
Pacic, 16667, 207
277
63135, 65657
8rattons tcstimony, 782, 785,
78788, 788, 807
Marshalls tcstimony, 639, 641,
644, 646
618
Pilot Mcssagc, 255
Robcrts Commission rc: cct
prcparcdncss, 39496
Gcscll, Gcrhard A., 620
Ghormlcy, Robcrt L., 39
Gibson, .V., 599600, 60206
Gish, Lillian, 113
Glcason, S. vcrctt
Te Undeclared War, 65n34,
67n40, 93n34
Grand Alliance, Te (Churchill),
68n42, 323n45
Grcavcs, 8cttina 8icn, xvii
Grcavcs, Pcrcy, 344
background, viiix, xvii
64952, 668
Tc Pcarl Harbor
!nvcstigations, 131n1
Grccn, Tomas H., 465, 707
Grcw, ]oscph C.
46263
62324
on Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt,
11
military intclligcncc, 45354
Ten Years in Japan, 200n34,
201n36
Tojos spccch, 182
tradc bctwccn thc U.S. and ]apan,
40, 76, 9798, 11112
U.S. dccision to cnd ncgotiations
with ]apan, 20001
on U.S. shipping on Yangtzc
Rivcr, 15
warning to Rooscvclt, 852
Gromyko, Andrci, 140
Gruncrt, Gcorgc
466, 470
Pycs tcstimony, 45253
Saords tcstimony, 478, 480
Gullion, Gcncral, 328
Hackworth, Grccn H., 324
Halifax (arl ol 8irkcnhcad),
197n27, 198n30, 306n100
Halilax, Lord (dward Frcdcrick
Lindlcy Vood)
17980, 24041, 306
proposal ol Modus Vivendi,
15556
U.S. aid to ngland, 19799, 234,
857
Hall, H. uncan
North American Supply, 24n4344,
25n46, 36n16, 38n2223, 48
49nn4347, 53n1, 55nn78
Halscy, Villiam F.
Pacic, 176, 385
Hart !nvcstigation, 313n8, 426,
428
Kramcrs tcstimony, 761, 765,
776, 802
Hamilton, Maxwcll M., 302, 701
Hanily, dward 8., 419, 438, 495,
523
Hannalord, ]ulc M., 620
Hanncgan, Robcrt ., 550
Harpcr, ]ohn S., 67475, 759
Harriman, Avcrcll, 322
Harris, Frcdcrick R., 414
Harrison, Gcorgc L., 272, 672,
74041, 779
Harry Dexter White: A Study in
Paradox (Rccs), 140n17, 150n41,
151n44
Harry Hopkins: A Biography
(Adams), 322n44
Hart, Tomas C.
aid to ngland, 26467, 28487
158, 16566, 313
dcstruction
ol ]apancsc codcs, 215, 21719
ol U.S. classicd documcnts,
231
invcstigation ol attack, 42139
!ngcrsolls tcstimony, 735, 736
Vilkinsons tcstimony, 626
military aid to ngland, 33233
199200, 25657, 856, 859
postattack promotion, 411
Robcrts Commission rc: warnings
lrom Vashington, 376
Haycs, dward A., 352, 357
Hcard, Villiam A., 25354
Hcndcrson, Lcon, 209
Hcwitt, Air Commodorc, 265
Name Index 919
Hcwitt, Kcnt H.
invcstigation ol attack on Pcarl
Harbor, 561, 58396
776
Hillman, Sidncy, 209
Hindmarsh, Albcrt ., 75n1, 98n47,
106
Hirohito, mpcror ol ]apan
dcclaration ol war on thc Unitcd
Statcs, 350
Rooscvclts addrcss to, 272, 277
79, 30607, 859
surrcndcr ol ]apancsc lorccs, 617
Hitlcr, Adoll
alliancc with ]apan, 148, 18586,
195, 242, 331, 853
attcmpts to avoid clash with
Unitcd Statcs, 64
locus as U.S. main cncmy, 863
Gcrman invasion
ol Poland, 17, 20, 29, 79, 660
ol Russia, 9697, 222
risc to powcr, 4, 856
U.S. aid to ngland, 57, 212, 846
Honolulu Advertiser, 424n10
Hoovcr, Hcrbcrt, 3, 67, 153, 620
Hoovcr, ]. dgar, 151n44
Hopkins, Harry, 341, 344
acquaintancc with Marshall, 79
27475, 27980, 305, 859
appointmcnt to Production
Planning 8oard, 209
mccting with 8ritish Ambassador
Lord Halilax, 197
322, 331
rcaction ol FR to attack,
33738
sinking ol thc Robin Moor, 65
Stahlmans lcttcr, 798
Hopkins: A Biography (Adams),
234n3739
Hornbcck, Stanlcy, 46, 141, 302, 514
How Vc Von thc Var and Lost
thc Pcacc (8ullitt), 52n53, 57n12
Hu Shih, 141, 14647, 306, 309
Hull, Cordcll, 341
aid to ngland, 308
207, 23941, 30205, 433,
85556, 860
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard
ndings, 55556
Clarkc !nvcstigation, 568
FRs addrcss to Hirohito,
27779
Hcwitt !nquiry, 588
]apancsc
prcscncc in !ndochina,
17273
rcply to U.S. ultimatum, 289
629, 821
Kimmcls tcstimony, 686, 694
80203
Starks tcstimony, 663, 668,
813, 816
Marco Polo 8ridgc incidcnt, 11
mcctings with ]apancsc
ambassadors, 12427, 158,
18087, 194, 210, 24143, 314,
85253
618
Ncthcrlands !ndics, warning to
]apan conccrning, 2425
32325, 33435
Pilot Mcssagc, 255
prcattack intclligcncc, 132
47, 15051, 15456
rclations with ]apan and, 96,
10405, 114, 337
Richardsons opposition to cct
placcmcnt in Hawaii, 45
Robcrts Commission, 375
Stimsons o cial rcport, 607, 610
1617, 99100, 11112
ultimatum to ]apan and, 101, 121,
457
!ckcs, Harold, 209
Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its
Aftermath (Toland), 59n19,
227n17, 438n57, 49596nn1213,
495n9, 760n109
!ngcrsoll, Royal .
aid to ngland, 13, 845
attcmpts to strcngthcn cct,
11417
214
Hart !nvcstigation, 429, 43031,
435
276, 288
73136
tcstimony, 512, 516
!nglis, T.8., 344
!rving, . astmcn, 210n17
Japan, 19311941 (cpartmcnt
ol Statc), 15n19, 17n23, 137n12,
148n36, 155n47, 183n7, 183n9,
187n11, 205n8, 279n35, 690n52
Japanese Trust, Te (Vigmorc),
236n44, 263n37, 265n40
]ccrson, Tomas, 844
Jim Farleys Story (Farlcy), 34n12
]ohnson, Hiram V., 335
]oncs, . Stanlcy, 113
Kahn, avid
Te Codebreakers: Te Story of
Secret Writing, 41n27, 131n1,
132n4
KaiShck, Chiang. See Chiang Kai
Shck
Kalblus, dward C., 493
Karig, Valtcr
Battle Report: Te Atlantic War,
4344nn3233, 31415nn11
12, 317n25, 318nn2728
Kaulman, Samucl H., 669, 785
Name Index 921
Kcclc, Frank 8.
Additional \icws, 83032
appointmcnt to, 620
779
79596, 81819
Kccr, Archibald Clark, 344
Kcnncdy, ]oscph P., 33
Kichisaburo Nomura. See Nomura,
Kichisaburo
Kimmcl, Husband . (Admiral), 343
accusations against, viii, xi, 366,
369, 373, 618, 86266
313, 316
appointmcnt ol as commandcr
inchicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 8081
44, 449, 45861, 46869, 471
ndings, 488
attcmpts to strcngthcn cct,
8384, 10103
cartoon by C.. 8atchclor, 653
dclcnsc ol
Philippincs and, 8788
U.S. intcrcsts in thc Pacic,
163, 17576, 28687, 333,
848
dcstruction ol U.S. classicd
documcnts, 230, 26163, 858
Hart !nvcstigation, 42128, 438
Hcwitt !nquiry, 584, 59396
624, 676707
Minority Rcport, 833, 83839,
841
40, 75556
Shorts tcstimony, 70710, 715,
716, 71819, 726
Starks tcstimony, 66164,
66869
Pcarl Harbor, 35354, 359
504, 505, 54147
ndings, 555, 55759, 56266
321
opposition to Scnatc bill S.805,
61314
prcparations lor courtmartial,
40911, 41320
problcms with military
intclligcncc, 194, 213, 215,
218, 858, 863. See also military
intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl
Harbor commandcrs
rcaction to thc attack, 370
rcqucsts lor intclligcncc, 8889,
10405, 107, 85152
rctircmcnt ol, 40407
Robcrts Commission ndings,
396401
air patrols, 379, 381
37677
warnings lrom Vashington,
37576
Starks war warning and, 16971,
854
survcillancc ol ships in Pcarl
Harbor, 110
Atlantic, 9293
King, rncst ].
analyscs ol APH8 and NC!
rcports, 55760
appointmcnt as Chicl ol Naval
pcrations, 411
]apancsc intcrccpts, 495, 552, 556
Kirby, S. Voodburn
Te War Against Japan: Te Loss of
Singapore, 26n4748, 59nn17
18, 60nn2021, 236n45
Kirk, Alan G., 107, 624
Kita Mcssagc: No Longcr a
Mystcry, Tc (Saord), 438n56
Kitts, Villard A., 427
Knox, Frank, 343
166, 17273, 211, 27980, 302
4, 305, 30809, 433, 85556,
86061
appointmcnt
as Sccrctary ol thc Navy, 34
ol Robcrts Commission, 373
courtmartial ol Kimmcl, 41516
dcath ol, 436
dclay ol invcstigation ol attack,
439
Hart !nvcstigation, 422
invcstigation ol damagc to Pcarl
Harbor, 35161, 36971
]apancsc
prcscncc in !ndochina,
20607
28889
821
647
824
ncwspapcr articlc about U.S.
Navy, 28182
cc ol Managcmcnt
Production, 209
32122, 331
14244
rcaction to thc attack, 864
on Richardsons rcmoval as
commandcrinchicl ol thc U.S.
Flcct, 81
Name Index 923
air patrols, 378
ndings, 397
Stahlmans lcttcr, 798, 818n289
Knudscn, Villiam S., 37, 209
Konoyc, Fuminaro, 99, 10405, 112,
141, 447
Konoyc, Princc Fuminaro, 14
Kramcr, Alwyn .
271
Hart !nvcstigation, Saords
tcstimony, 43334
27377, 28384, 28789
xvii, 731, 738, 76082, 798805
789
Saords tcstimony, 672, 741,
74345, 75153, 75657
Schulzs tcstimony, 791, 794
Noycs tcstimony, 536
Pilot Mcssagc, 255, 270
intclligcncc, 21517
Saords scarch lor missing
intcrccpts and, 437
Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178n39,
227, 246
Krick, Harold ., 82225
Krock, Arthur, 58, 56466
Kroncr, Haycs A., 571, 711n109,
712
Kurusu, Saburo
attcmpts to ncgotiatc with
Unitcd Statcs, 12327, 18287,
210, 235, 314, 85253
]apancsc prcscncc in !ndochina,
20306, 24143
Navy Court ol !nquiry, Noycs
tcstimony, 534, 535
325
nc P.M. appointmcnt with
Hull, 30405
40, 15155, 17677
LaGuardia, Fiorcllo H., 209
Landon, Allrcd M., 34, 53
Lanc, Logan ]., 669
Langcr, Villiam L.
Te Undeclared War, 65n34,
67n40, 93n34
Lash, ]oscph P.
Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939
1941: Te Partnership Tat Saved
the West, 33n9, 55n6, 56n9,
57n12, 135n9, 165n10
Lattimorc, wcn, 14546, 151
Lavcndcr, Robcrt A., 416, 423, 480,
49597, 523
Layton, dwin Tomas
disappcarancc ol ]apancsc
carricrs, 31516
Hcwitt !nquiry, 590
And I Was Tere, 414n13
military intclligcncc, 413, 425
Layton, Sir Valtcr, 49, 55
Lcahy, Villiam . (chicl ol Naval
pcrations Admiral), 8, 293
Lcc, Raymond, 601
Lcvinc, !ssac on, xv
Libby, 8ill
My Parents: A Diering View,
330n66
Life, xvi
Lindbcrgh, Charlcs A., 113
Te Wartime Journals of Charles A.
Lindbergh, 364nn34
Lockard, ]oscph L., 31920, 505
Lombard, Hclcn
While Tey Fought: Behind the
Scenes in Washington, 1941
1946, 306n101
Longworth, Alicc Rooscvclt, 112,
761
Longworth, Nicholas, 761
Loomis, Richard T.
Tc Vhitc Housc Tclcphonc
and Crisis Managcmcnt, 29n2
Lothian, (Philip Hcnry Kcrr), Lord,
36, 39, 4849, 55
Lovctt (Aidc to army gcncral), 328
Lucas, Scott, 344
appointmcnt to, 620
Lucc, Hcnry, xvi
MacArthur, ouglas
advanccmcnt in thc Philippincs,
611, 854
158, 16567, 258, 331
sccrccy ol ]apancsc codcs, 410n1
Magrudcr, ]ohn, 114
Man Called Intrepid: Te Secret War,
A (Stcvcnson), 35n15, 56n11,
165n10
Marshall, Gcorgc C. (Gcncral), 342,
344
aid to ngland, 333
16673, 190, 207, 27980, 305
appointmcnt
as Army Chicl ol Sta, 7880
ol Robcrts Commission, 373
44151, 454, 45657, 46671,
48184
Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard
48687
ndings, 488, 55556, 55861
attcmpts to conccal wartimc
sccrcts, 367, 410
attcmpts to strcngthcn armcd
lorccs, 16365, 85455
573, 596, 599, 601, 606
57576, 58083
invcntory ol supplics and nccds
lor armcd lorccs, 94, 97
63548, 65354, 79596,
81720
8rattons tcstimony, 782, 784,
787, 80611
Kimmcls tcstimony, 686, 695,
706
Name Index 925
720, 72325, 72728
667, 812, 81516, 823, 825
last minutc warning, 320, 861
lcttcr to Tomas cwcy, xii, xvi,
55254
51922
618
322, 32628, 331
302, 371
opposition to antagonizing ]apan,
11621
Pilot Mcssagc, 255
14244
rclations with ]apan and, 864
rcsponsibility lor U.S. Flcct,
8182, 160
rctircmcnt ol Gcncral Short,
40104
Robcrts Commission
ndings, 399
warnings to Short and Kimmcl,
375
Stahlmans lcttcr, 798
Stimsons o cial rcport, 607,
60910
\ictory Program, 12122, 222
Marshall, Kathcrinc Tuppcr
Together, Annals of an Army Wife,
78n6
Marshall Story, Te (Paync), 160n53
Martin, F.L., 379
Martin, ]oscph V., 336, 348
Mastcn ]ohn ., 620, 669
Matsuoka, Yosukc ( ]apans Forcign
Ministcr), 1415
McCollum, Arthur H.
18789, 193, 21417
58990
28788
804n238
47, 750, 752, 755
Starks tcstimony, 666, 81415
tcstimony, 515
prcattack intclligcncc, 415, 858,
859
intcrccpts and, 437
McCormack, ]ohn V., 336, 621
McCoy, Frank, 79, 328
Mc!ntirc, Ross T., 30506
White House Physician, 616n14
McMorris, Charlcs H., 385, 590,
592
McNarncy, ]oscph, 49596
McNary, Charlcs L., 335
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Te (Hull),
302n87, 305n97, 32425nn4752,
325n52
McrlcSmith, \an S., 258, 265, 334
Milcs, Shcrman
48, 454
asscssmcnt ol Atlantic and Pacic
thcatcrs ol war, 18993, 207
596, 60001
57981, 583
21719
62931, 649, 654
89, 80609
804n238
725
Millis, Valtcr
Te Forrestal Diaries, 436n4950
Mitchcll, Villiam .
appointmcnt to, 620
Gcrows tcstimony, 632, 635
64042
rcsignation as counscl lor ]CC
Pcarl Harbor invcstigation,
65455
Molotov, 344
Morccll, 8cn, 43, 83, 330n64
Morgan, dward P., 669
Morgcnthau, Hcnry ].
proposal ol Modus Vivendi, 140,
144, 14950
U.S. aid to ngland, 2225,
3639, 4849, 55, 58
U.S. bond salc, 21112
Morison, Samucl liot
Te Two-Ocean War: A Short
History of the United States Navy
in the Second World War, 72n52
Mr. Roosevelts Navy: Te Private War
of the Atlantic Fleet, 19391942
(Abbazia), 18n27, 19n29, 21n32
33, 43n30, 44n35, 6364nn2931,
65n33, 6667nn3839, 70nn4647,
72n50, 73n52
Munson, F. Granvillc, 726n157
Murata, Toshio, xx, 229n23
Murn, rin G., 493, 556
Murphy, ]ohn V., 620, 62930, 643,
75658
Mussolini, 8cnito, 195, 258
My Parents: A Diering View
(Rooscvclt and Libby), 330n66
Nakano, Kcntaro, xx, 229n23
Nclson, onald M., 21011
Arsenal of Democracy: Te Story
of American War Production,
21011nn1819
New York Times, Te, 21n35, 240n2,
243n9, 244n11, 348nn23,
358n18, 361n24, 364n1, 365nn5
6, 373n1, 4067nn13741,
43839nn5859, 492nn18384,
493n1, 547n198, 556nn2021,
Name Index 927
557n23, 56366nn4751, 615n13,
61718nn12, 619nn56, 621n14,
760n112, 764n130
Ncwton, ].H., 176, 313n9, 386
Nimitz, Chcstcr V., 45, 411n4,
67778
Nomura, Kichisaburo, 343
attcmpts to ncgotiatc with Unitcd
Statcs, 9496, 12227, 18287,
210, 314
codc mcssagcs and, 90
20306, 24143
knowlcdgc ol Pcarl Harbor, 463
Navy Court ol !nquiry, Noycs
tcstimony, 534, 535
Novcmbcr 29 dcadlinc, 509
32325
nc P.M. appointmcnt with
Hull, 30405, 354
40, 15155
rcply to Hull at 1:00, 359. See also
nc P.M. Mcssagc
99
North American Supply (Hall),
24n4344, 36n16, 38n2223,
4849nn4347, 55nn78
Noycs, Lcigh
attcmpts to conccal inlormation
about attack, 36566
dcstruction ol U.S. classicd
documcnts, 26263
288
74547, 750
53339
intcrccpts and, 437
Vinds Codc mcssagc, 178,
22830, 246
cll, Robcrt H., 265
gimoto, 22829
hashi, Chiuchi, 77
On Active Service in Peace and War
(Stimson and 8undy), 7n2, 34
35nn1314, 635n68
On Te Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
(Richardson), 2728nn4952,
31n5, 4648nn3842, 8081nn10
11
smun, 580
utcrbridgc, Villiam Voodward,
31718
Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States:
Japan (cpartmcnt ol Statc),
19311941, 14n1516, 123n20,
12526nn2527, 13335nn68,
182n4, 2045nn37, 24143nn68,
277nn2931, 325n51, 658n141,
689n49
Pattcrson, 328
Paync, Robcrt
Te Marshall Story, 160n53
Peace and War: United States Foreign
Policy (cpartmcnt ol Statc),
19311941, 12n1213, 16n21,
17n24, 44n34, 58n14, 63n27,
69n45, 70n49, 114n5, 123n20,
325n51, 350n4, 454n46
Pearl Harbor Attack ( ]oint
Congrcssional Committcc), 13n14,
46n37, 6062nn2226, 72n51,
7980nn89, 8283nn1215,
8491nn1829, 93n3233,
9899nn4851, 1023nn5660,
1056nn6466, 10710nn6874,
11421nn617, 12324nn2124,
132n2, 132n5, 135n9, 136n11,
137n13, 140n16, 142n22, 148n35,
149nn3738, 150nn4243,
15759nn5052, 16162nn12,
162nn48, 16671nn1322,
17378nn2539, 181n3, 182nn56,
183n8, 18790nn1218, 190nn19
21, 19496nn2226, 198n28,
200n33, 201n35, 2068nn915,
21218nn2141, 22325nn616,
22728nn1822, 22931nn24
29, 23234nn3139, 239n1,
24447nn1217, 25261nn232,
26263nn3436, 26566nn4144,
267nn4748, 27077nn128,
279n34, 28385nn18, 294
301nn4585, 30204nn8898,
3089nn1078, 31214nn210,
31517nn1323, 31617nn2023,
318n29, 319nn3133, 320
22nn3543, 323n46, 32627nn53
54, 327n57, 32829nn5961,
329n63, 33234nn7073,
33435nn7576, 336n81, 347n1,
352n1, 35456nn414, 359
60nn2023, 364n2, 36668nn721,
36768nn1721, 370n24, 374n3,
37576nn713, 377405nn15
133, 411n23, 41214nn812,
417n22, 418n2425, 422n2, 423n9,
42435nn1148, 437nn5255,
44192nn1182, 49395nn26,
496523nn14111, 52347nn113
97, 55254nn59, 55556nn1619,
55759nn2531, 56162nn4044,
567610nn1126, 61112nn16,
61935nn566, 63646nn69
100, 64656nn10229, 656
58nn13140, 65970nn142190,
67273nn12, 676721nn6147,
72230nn149162, 73241nn123,
74260nn25108, 760n110, 761
97nn113225, 798825nn227314,
82733nn112
Pcarl Harbor !nvcstigations, Tc
(Grcavcs), 131n1
Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet
Salvage and Final Appraisal
(Vallin), 317n21, 319n20, 320n34
Pcarson, rcw, 566
Pcring, Allrcd F., 284n6, 287n13
Pcrkins, Franccs, 336
Te Roosevelt I Knew, 334n74,
335nn7778
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace,
131n1 (8arncs, cd.)
Pcrry, Matthcw C. (U.S. Navy
Commandcr), 5
Pcrshing, ]ohn ]., 78
Phillips, Sir Frcdcrick, 3738, 4849
Phillips, Sir Tom S.\., 26465,
28587, 640
Phillips, V.C., 640
Pincau, Rogcr
MidwayBreaking the Secrets,
316n19
Poguc, Forrcst
George C. Marshall: Education of
a General: 18301939, 79n7,
294n42, 308n105
Name Index 929
George C. Marshall: Ordeal and
Hope, 19391942, 160n53
Powcll, ]oscph V., 352
Pratt, ]ulius V.
Cordell Hull: American Secretaries
of State and Teir Diplomacy,
203n1, 302n87, 635n67
Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Te
(Rooscvclt), 4n1, 8n3, 9n7, 20n30,
50nn4849
Purvis, Arthur, 37, 49, 53
Pyc, Villiam S., 411n4, 426, 45154
uo, Taichi, 146
Racdcr, rich, 64
Ramscy, Logan C., 168
Rayburn, Sam, 335, 348
Rcdman, ]oscph R., 216, 366,
54041
Rccs, avid
Harry Dexter White: A Study
in Paradox, 140n17, 144n28,
150n41, 151n44
Rendezvous with Destiny:Te
Roosevelts of the White House
(Rooscvclt and 8rough), 330n67
Rcynaud, Paul, 3233
Ribbcntrop, ]oachim von, 195, 510
Richardson, ]..
appointmcnt as commandcrin
chicl ol thc U.S. Flcct, 21
cct placcmcnt in Hawaii, 2728,
4548
opposition to cct placcmcnt in
Hawaii, 83, 102, 360
ordcrs to rcmain in Pcarl Harbor,
31
rcmoval as commandcrinchicl
ol thc U.S. Flcct, 8081
prcparcdncss, 382
On Te Treadmill to Pearl Harbor,
45n36, 8081nn1011
Richardson, Scth V.
appointmcnt as gcncral
counscl lor ]CC Pcarl Harbor
invcstigation, 669
800n227, 804n238
Rickcnbackcr, dward, 113
Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of the
Japanese Empire, 19361945, Te
(Toland), 1415nn1718, 15n20
Road to Pearl Harbor, Te (Fcis),
307n102
Robcrts, wcn ]., 373, 391
Rochclort, ]oscph ]ohn
disappcarancc ol ]apancsc
carricrs, 315
prcattack intclligcncc, 389,
41315, 438
Rooscvclt, lcanor, 7677, 33031
Rooscvclt, lliot, 330
Rooscvclt, Franklin clano, 341
accusations against, 621
addrcss to Hirohito, 272, 27779,
859
aid to ngland, 4144, 5458,
6367, 19799, 234, 84550,
857. See also ngland, U.S.
support lor
14849, 158, 17173, 27980,
3058
attcmpts to
conccal inlormation about
attack, 364
strcngthcn cct and, 8384
corrcspondcncc bctwccn ngland
and thc U.S., 2933, 165
dcath ol, 616, 617
dcclaration ol war, 32832,
86266
439
cconomic conditions in ]apan,
106
clcction ol
1933, 34
1940, 22, 3335, 38, 4752, 53
1944, 420, 547, 55052
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters,
19281945, 42n28, 77n3
rst rcsponsc to attack, 34750
rst ultimatum to ]apan, 121
involvcmcnt in Far ast, 6769
203, 20607, 233, 85054
on ]apancscChincsc Var, 1112
Kcclcs additional vicws,
83132
686, 69192, 694, 699
795, 81819
Minority Rcport, 83233,
83537, 83940
822, 824
lcttcr to Vcndcll Villkic, 816
Marshalls dcvotion to, 7880
mcctings with ]apancsc
ambassadors, 12427
Navy Court ol !nquiry
and Army Pcarl Harbor 8oard
ndings, 55455, 56164
ncutrality ol Unitcd Statcs,
attitudc towards, 8, 1516
ncwspapcr lcak ol U.S. war plans,
24344
322, 32526, 327
40, 14047, 14951
Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
Te, 4n1, 8n3, 9n7, 20n30,
5051nn4852
rcaction to thc attack, 33439,
84345
rclations with ]apan and, 46,
8588, 96, 10405
Richardsons distrust ol, 80
Robcrts Commission,
appointmcnt ol, 373
Tojos spccch and, 182
7678, 9799, 112
ultimatum to ]apan and, 10001,
27475
undcclarcd battlc ol Atlantic and,
7073
Name Index 931
\ictory Program, 222
Rooscvclt, ]amcs, 165, 330
of a Lonely Man, 550n4
Rooscvclt, Tcodorc, 113
Roosevelt and Churchill, 19391941:
Te Partnership Tat Saved the West
(Lash), 33n9, 55n6, 56n9, 57n12,
135n9, 165n10
Roosevelt and Churchill: Teir
Secret Wartime Correspondence
(Locwcnhcim, Langlcy, and ]oncs,
cds.), 18n26, 29n1, 3031nn34,
55n5, 56n10, 63n28
Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate
History (Shcrwood), 92n3031,
322n44, 338n85
Roosevelt I Knew, Te (Pcrkins),
33435nn7576, 335nn7778
Roosevelt: Te Soldier of Freedom
(8urns), 550n1
Rugg, Charlcs 8., 41617, 438, 495,
613
Russcll, Hcnry ., 441, 468, 47576,
483
Sadtlcr, tis K., 474
600, 60406
57980
Hcwitt !nquiry, 588
Saord, Laurcncc F., 41, 343
47580
ndings, 488
attcmpts to conccal wartimc
sccrcts, 367, 411
97, 599600
communication sccurity and,
8990
dcstruction ol
]apancsc codcs, 21517
U.S. classicd documcnts,
22932, 26162
intcrvicw with author, 131n1,
132n3
67176, 731, 73860
77173, 804
50816
Navy intclligcncc occ, 130, 193
rcmoval ol top burcau chicls, 107
scarch lor missing intcrccpts,
43637
Vinds Codc mcssagc, 22324,
22732, 246, 858
Salm, Commandcr, 265
Sancmatsu, Yuzuru, 229
Saycrs, R.S.
Financial Policy, 19391945,
39n24
Sayrc, Francis 8., 158, 165
Glad Adventure, 166n11
Schuirmann, R..
50708
warnings to ]apan, 114
Schulz, Lcstcr Robcrt, 256, 27377,
78995, 816, 820
Shalctt, Sidncy
of a Lonely Man, 550n4
Shcrwood, Robcrt ., 92, 864
Roosevelt and Hopkins: An
Intimate History, 322n44,
338n85
Te White House Papers of Harry
L. Hopkins, 322n44, 329n62,
331n69, 336n80, 33738nn84
85
Shigcmitsu, Mamoru, 77
Short, Valtcr C. (Gcncral), 342
accusations against, viii, xi, 369,
373, 86266
17475, 313
appointmcnt as commanding
gcncral ol thc Hawiian
dcpartmcnt, 8182
51, 45861, 482
ndings, 48889, 55559,
56466
cartoon by C.. 8atchclor, 653
577, 58182
70730
Gcrows tcstimony, 63134,
65657
Kimmcls tcstimony, 677, 682,
706
64446, 653
Minority Rcport, 833, 83839,
841
Vilkinsons tcstimony, 62627,
629
Pcarl Harbor, 35355
499502
prcparations lor courtmartial,
40911, 415, 417, 420
intclligcncc, 110, 194, 213,
858, 863. See also military
intclligcncc, abscncc ol lor Pcarl
Harbor commandcrs
rctircmcnt ol, 40104, 406
Robcrts Commission
ndings, 396401
cct prcparcdncss, 38289
37677
sabotagc alcrt, 39495
warnings lrom Vashington,
37576
sabotagc alcrt, 16769, 312
Signal Corps: Te Test (Tompson),
319n33
Smith, Lconard 8., 64
Smith, Ralph C., 60204, 604, 788
Smith, (Valtcr) 8cdcll, 342
580
27677
Smith, Villiam.V., 424, 426, 591
Smuts, ]an Christian, 69n43
Sonnctt, ]ohn F.
Hcwitt !nquiry, 583
776
Name Index 933
75455
Soong, T.\., 144, 14950
Spalding, !saac, 600, 60406
Sta O cers Field Manual: Te
Sta and Combat Orders (Var
cpartmcnt), 656n130
Stahlman, ]amcs G., 279n38, 798,
818n289
Stalin, ]oscl, 65, 341, 344
Standlcy, Villiam H., 371, 37374,
396
Admiral Ambassador to Russia,
376n14
Stark, 8ctty, 798
Stark, Harold R., 343
aid to ngland, 4144, 54, 6667,
33233
16671, 17273, 27980, 305,
30809, 433
43, 477
attcmpts to
conccal wartimc sccrcts, 367,
41011
strcngthcn cct and, 83, 101
03, 16365, 85455
Columbus incidcnt, 21
59396
inlormation givcn to Scnators
about attack, 36364
275, 288
62426, 66070, 79697, 812
16, 817, 82025
811
681, 68486, 690, 69295,
697, 699700
798, 80102
Minority Rcport, 83738, 839
40, 840
Kimmcls rcqucsts lor
intclligcncc, 8889, 107, 85152
last minutc warning, 861
Navy Court ol !nquiry, 493, 496
507, 500, 51619, 539, 546
521
618
32122, 331
nc P.M. Mcssagc, 29192,
29899, 371
opposition to antagonizing ]apan,
76, 8588, 11721, 467
rctircmcnt ol Admiral Kimmcl,
40406
Richardsons conccrns, 27, 4546
Robcrts Commission, 37576,
382, 393, 395
98
undcclarcd battlc ol Atlantic and,
72, 93
war warning to Kimmcl, 16971,
189, 854
Stcphcnson, Sir Villiam, 35, 56, 165
Stcvcnson, Villiam
A Man Called Intrepid:Te Secret
War, 35n15, 56n11, 165n10
Stimson, Hcnry L., 341
14749, 16667, 17173,
27980, 30204, 305, 30809,
85556, 860
appointmcnt as Sccrctary ol Var,
3435
57374, 579
439
octrinc ol Nonrccognition
and, 153
invcntory ol supplics and nccds
lor armcd lorccs, 97, 27273
]apancsc intcrvcntion in
Manchuria, 6
20607
821
647
Minority Rcport, 83738, 840
55464, 618
Navy Court ol !nquiry, Kramcrs
tcstimony, 529
ncwspapcr lcak ol U.S. war plans,
24344
cc ol Managcmcnt
Production, 209
322, 32526, 331, 33435
cial Rcport Rcgarding thc
Pcarl Harbor isastcr, 60610
Pilot Mcssagc, 255
44, 16465
rctircmcnt ol Gcncral Short, 403
Robcrts Commission ndings,
397
rc: air patrols, 378
Shorts scarch lor codcd mcssagcs
and, 465
Stahlmans lcttcr, 798, 818n289
ultimatum to ]apan and, 101,
12021, 289
U.S. support lor war, 852
Stimson, Hcnry L., works by
On Active Service in Peace and
War, 7n2, 3435nn1314
Stimson iary, 55455nn1013,
556n22, 55960nn3339, 564n46,
566n52
Name Index 935
Strong, Gcorgc \., 39
Sun Yatscn, 7
Takagi, 259
Tansill, Charlcs Callan
Back Door to War: Te Roosevelt
Foreign Policy, 19331941, 10n9,
11n11
Taylor, Villiam .G., 504
Ten Years in Japan (Grcw), 200n34,
201n36
Tcrasaki, Hidcnari, 183, 25859
Navy Court ol !nquiry, Kramcrs
tcstimony, 524
Tcobald, Admiral, 381
Tis I Remember (lcanor Rooscvclt),
331n68
Tomas, lbcrt, 612, 614
Tomas, Norman, 113
Tompson, Gcorgc Raynor
Te Signal Corps: Te Test, 319n33
Together, Annals of an Army Wife
(Marshall), 78n6
Togo, Forcign Ministcr, 463
Tojo, Hidcki, 105, 18184, 447, 653
Toland, ]ohn, 41617nn2021,
419n28, 523n112
Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its
Aftermath, 59n19, 227n17,
438n57, 495n9, 760n109
Rising Sun: Te Decline and Fall of
the Japanese Empire, 19361945,
Te, 1415nn1718, 15n20
Tollcy, Kcmp, 279n38, 798n226
Cruise of the Lanikai, 736n11
Toulmin, Harry A., 441
Truman, Harry
appointmcnt ol Marshall as
ambassador to China, 631, 648,
653, 817
as chairman ol thc Scnatc
clcnsc !nvcstigating
Committcc, 365
sccrccy ol rccords, 834
61718
notication ol communist
sympathizcrs, 151n44
Rooscvclts dcath, x
Truth About Pcarl Harbor, Tc
(Flynn), 646n101
Turncr, Richmond Kclly
433
Hart !nvcstigation, 16162nn12,
42930, 435
276, 288
624, 65760, 751n71
Kimmcls tcstimony, 688, 690
52934
32122
prcparcdncss, 393, 395
U.S. aid to ngland, 6162
Two-Ocean War: A Short History of
the United States Navy in the Second
World War, Te (Morison), 73n52
Tylcr, Kcrmit A., 31920
Undeclared War, Te (Langcr and
Glcason), 65n34, 67n40, 93n34
Union ol Sovict Socialist Rcpublics.
See USSR (Union ol Sovict
Socialist Rcpublics)
United States Naval Chronology,
World War II, 44n34, 54, 64n32,
6566nn3537, 73n52, 411
12nn56
U.S. Committcc on Forcign Aairs
Events Leading up to World War II,
57n13
U.S. Congrcss
Events, 16n22, 17n25, 18n28,
20n31, 24n43, 69n43, 70n48
See Pearl Harbor Attack ( ]oint
Congrcssional Committcc)
U.S. cpartmcnt ol Navy
United States Naval Chronology,
World War II, 54, 64n32, 65
66nn3537, 73n52, 411n5
U.S. Housc Committcc on Forcign
Aairs, 10n8
Events Leading up to World War II,
141n19
U.S. News & World Report, 374n6
\ictims ol thc Kita Mcssagc, Tc
(Saord), 412n8, 413n10, 414n14
\inson, Carl, 363
\ovoshilov, 344
Valkcr, Frank, 336
Vallacc, Hcnry A., 211, 335
Vallin, Homcr N.
Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet
Salvage and Final Appraisal,
317n21, 320n34,
Valsh, avid !., 348, 36365, 620
War Against Japan: Te Loss of
Singapore, Te (Kirby), 26n4748,
59nn1718, 60nn2021, 236n45
Var cpartmcnt
Field Service Regulations:
Operations, 720n146, 721n148
Sta O cers Field Manual:
Te Sta and Combat Orders,
656n130
War Department: Chief of Sta:
Prewar Plans and Preparations,
Te (Vatson), 39n2526, 94n35,
122n1819, 162n3, 190n19, 221
22nn13, 222n5, 244n10, 251n1
Wartime Journals of Charles A.
Lindbergh (Lindbcrgh), 364nn34
Vashington, Gcorgc, 844
Washington Post, 615n12
Washington Star, 41516nn1617,
417n23, 760n111
Vatson, dwin Martin (Pa), 210
Vatson, Mark Skinncr
Te War Department: Chief of Sta:
Prewar Plans and Preparations,
39n2526, 54n34, 94n35, 103
4nn6163, 122n1819, 162n3,
190n19, 22122nn13, 222n5,
244n10, 251n1
Vcdcmcycr, A.C., 94, 97, 10304,
222, 367, 410n1
Vcllborn, 804n238
Vcllcs, Sumncr
179
97, 20306, 20607
15556
Vcst, Charlcs V., 441
While Tey Fought: Behind the
Scenes in Washington, 19411946
(Lombard), 306n101
Vhitc, Harry cxtcr, 140, 14950,
151
White House Papers of Harry L.
Hopkins, Te (Shcrwood), 322n44,
329n62, 331n69, 336n80, 337
38nn8485
Name Index 937
White House Physician (Mc!ntirc),
305n98, 616n14
Vhitc Housc Tclcphonc and Crisis
Managcmcnt, Tc (Loomis), 29n2
White House Witness (anicls),
550n2
Viglc, aryl, 22526
Vigmorc, Lioncl
Te Japanese Trust, 236n44,
263n37, 265n40
Vilkinson, Tcodorc S.
18889, 253, 271, 433
appointmcnt as chicl ol N!
( cc ol Naval !ntclligcncc),
108, 25152
214
276, 284, 288
62526
801
750
81215, 820
Navy Court ol !nquiry,
51516
Pilot Mcssagc, 256
Villkic, Vcndcll, 53, 816
Vilson, Voodrow, 328
Vinant, ]ohn G., 257, 322, 70304
Vood, Robcrt ., 112
Voodring, Harry Hincs, 23, 34
Voodward, Llcwcllyn
British Foreign Policy in the Second
World War, 19899nn3031,
23536nn4043, 266nn4546
World Almanac, Te, 113n4, 210n17
Vright, Vcslcy A., 751
Yamamoto, 18283

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