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Green Ambivalence about Science: Legal-Rational Authority and the Scientific Legitimation of a Social Movement Author(s): Steven Yearley

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 511-532 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591338 . Accessed: 04/05/2011 23:33
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Steven Yearley

Green ambivalence aboutscience: legal-rational authorityand the scientific legltlmatlonof a soclalmovement


ABS'I'RAGI'

Unlikemanysocialmovements,the environmental movementhasa profound dependence on scientificevidence and scientificexpertise. Withoutmodern scienceno-one would knowabout the ozone layer, much less about the well publicizedsholes'in it. Yet, at the same time, many within the green movement are distrustfulof scientific authority and of the fruits of technology. This paper examinesthe waythis incipientparadoxaffects the environmental movementand analyses,throughcase-studymaterial,the practical implications the movement's of dependenceon science.
IN'l'RODUC'l'XON: 'I'HE SCIENCEOF SAVING 'I'HE PLANE'I'

At the start of the l990s the arguments of the greens appear all pervasive.Green garb has been adopted by politicalpartiesof right and left, by advertisingagencies,by publishers,by supermarkets and by the media. Reasonably enough, manyof the characteristics the of green movementand of green politicshave been subjectto systematicanalysis.lYet it is curiousthat littleattentionhas been paid to the particularrole of the scientificcredentialsof green argumentsdespite the fact that, unlike many preceding social movements, the environmentalmovement claims a scientificbasis. It is not entirely alone in claimingsuch a foundation.Movementsfor the adoptionof scientificmedicine and for public hygiene, for example, shared it. And, of course, the label 'scientific' itself open to negotiationand is extension, so that movementsdedicatedto preparinga welcome for visitors from outer space or to the promotion of a biblicallybased Creation Science might be heralded as scientific,at least by their supporters.2 But the green argumentis very profoundlya scientific one. Amongst its strongestplanksis the assertionthat disasterfor the humanraceis a naturalinevitability certainpractices if continue.if we
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persistin allowingCFCsto escapeinto the atmosphereor if we do not reduce the emissionof greenhousegases. Other argumentsconcern the damage to the world's other inhabitants:the need to protect wildlife by not bleaching nappies with chlorine, by conserving endangered habitatsand by not using detergents which are rich in phosphaticwatersofteners. Whileeach of these argumentsis now beginningto commandpublic attention,it is importantto appreciatethe extent to whichthey are all basedin a distinctively scientificperceptionof the world.Thus, to take the most dramaticexample, the ozone layeris only availableas an objectof knowledgebecauseof our scientificculture. At ground level, ozone is uncommonand remote from experience.The stratosphere, where it is prevalent,is probablyeven more remote. Knowledge about the hole in the ozone layer is only availablethrough high-technologyventures into the atmospherehigh over the poles. Equally,our everydaysuppositionis that detergentshave done their job once they have left OUI washingmachinesor sinks.We would not readilythink of the damagethey might be doing in riversand estuaries. It is biological scientists who detail the connection between water-softening agents and the algal bloomswhichchoke life out of the watercourses. Thus, the environmentalists' case is tied to science. It states that natural realities constrainour options in various ways. Moreover, these constraints relativelyindependentof people'smoralstandare point. By this I mean to contrast the greens' arguments with the motivating concernsof othersocialmovementssuchas those involved in the disputeaboutabortionand the rightto life. Whilst'life'itselfhas the appearance a scientific of notion,and scientific evidenceis brought to bear in the debate (for example, when claimsare made about the times at which variousbodilyorgans in the foetus stalt to function), scientistsare generallyreluctantto pronounceon the point at which life begins.They commonlypresentthisas a metaphysical ratherthan a scientific issue.Additionalmoralargumentsare alsobroughtto bear in this case; for example, it is often argued that, if 'pro-lifers'are serious in their convictions,then they should be campaigningwith equalvigourfor more help for AIDSsufferers. To take another example, we can turn to the case of campaigns against'too much' sex and violence on television.The claimsabout exposureto too muchsex are typically madein moralterms.Freedom of artisticexpressionis weighed againstmoral propriety.Of course there is an empiricalaspect to this dispute. Campaigners may assert that- as a matterof fact- 'over-exposure' licentiousmaterialleads to to moral degeneracy.But such claimshave proved very resistantto empiricaltest; degeneracy,for example, is itself a morallycharged notion and thus hard to measure in an agreed way. Furthermore, participants the debate often call on their personalexperiencesto in

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claimsand are reluctantto of assessthe validity the competing'factual' or hand the matterover to those,suchas psychologists mediaanalysts, who purportto havedisinterestedexpertise. By contrast with these social problem issues, environmentalists would see their case as unanswerable by virtue of its scientific and the consequencewill credentials.The ozone layeris disappearing be greater amounts of damaging radiation; greenhouse gases are accumulatingand a consequence will be the expansion of oceanic watersand associatedflooding. These are held to be mattersof fact and there is littleroom for moraldisputeaboutthem. see manyenvironmentalists theircaseas motivated,in Accordingly, Moore, who was a leading Moore'swords, by 'objectivereasoning'.3 scientific authority in the Nature ConservancyCouncil until his retirementin the mid-1980s,relateshow he wasable to establishthat in toxic pesticidesaccumulated the food chain.4It was not a question of opinion; he had demonstrated that through unexpected but relentless natural processes, farming practiceswere threatening to poison people. The scientific demonstrabilityof the connection and betweenthe use of agrochemicals the presenceof toxins in food and was decisive.Max Nicholson,a leading environmentalist former makesthe same point. of Director-Ceneral the Nature Conservancy, though thistimein insecticides, Againspeakingof the organochlorine industryto change attemptsto persuadethe agrochemicals relationto policy, he states, 'had not the scientific base of ecology and its agreementwiththe been alreadyso sound,the successful conservation could not havebeen concluded'.=' industry Moore and Nicholsonsuggest that the scientificcredentialsof the authority.This claimcan conservationmovementlent it considerable usefully be understoodin relationto Weber'sfamed analysisof the three basicforms of socialauthority:the traditional,the charismatic and the legal-rational.6 The testimony of scientific conservationistssuch as Moore and movementis Nicholsoncanbe recastas a claimthatthe environmental peculiarlycommitted to, and uniquely favoured by, legal-rational authority.Other contemporarysocialand politicalmovementscommonly draw on traditional authority (for example, nationalism), authority(new spiritualmovements)or on some combicharismatic nationof these. the Moreover,as both Nicholsonand Mooreacknowledge, environmental movement'sties to science extend from the present into the societiesin natureconservation past.Manyof the more'establishment' the UK have a backgroundin naturalhistory:the RoyalSocietyfor the Nature Conservation, BritishTrust for Ornithology,the various NaturalistsField Clubs and so on.7 Scientificviews and scientific authority have been central to the movement'sorganizationaldevelopment,as Nicholsonremarks:8

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While parallelmovementssuch as those for developmentand the reliefof povertyin the Third World,or for peaceand disarmament, have had to create their own often sketchyfoundations,environmentalconservationdiffers in resting upon a comprehensiveand profound set prepared for it in advance by the natural history movement. On this view the green movement is doubly bound to science, by epistemological affinityand commondescent. My aim in this paper is to examine the sociologicalimplications of environmentalists' of, and dependence on, scientificreasoning use and scientific authority.I shallarguethatsomegreenshavemisgivings about this close relationshipto science. More surprisingly,I shall suggest that those greens who embrace the authority offered by sciencefindthatscienceis a lessgood allythantheymighthavewished. Letus startby examiningenvironmentalists' misgivings aboutscience.
IS SCIENCEAN IDEOLOGICALFRIENDOF I HE EARI H?

Despite the benefitswhich,accordingto Mooreand Nicholson,flow from scientificconservation,many greens are uneasyabout aligning themselvestoo closelywith science. Such ambivalenceabout science stems in part from the role science and technology have played in bringing about our ecological problems. In some instances this connectionis clearand direct. Humansinventedthe CFCswhichare threateningthe ozone layer.Technologicaladvanceallowedhumans to develop nuclear power, which in turn has brought us persistent environmental problems,suchas thoseassociated withthe calamitous explosion at Chernobylin 1986. It was scientistswho developed the pesticideswhichin the lastthreedecadeshavecontaminated food our and our wildlife.In such caseswe can traceenvironmental problems directlyto specificproductsof scienceand technology.There is also a more diffuse connection:present-day industrial societyis inseparable from the pollutioncaused by motor vehicles,power generationand wastedisposal.Manyenvironmentalists thus criticalof technical are progress and, at least, equivocal about science. Scientists may be viewed as active collaboratorsin our society's ecological destructiveness. Additionally, greens maydistrustsciencebecauseof the particular activitiesof sections of the scientificestablishment: account, for on example, of scientists'involvementin the development of nuclear powerand weaponryor in the geneticengineeringof foodcropsand domesticated animals.Equally, greensmayjust be repelledby casesof the deliberateharmingor mistreatment laboratory of animals. In the face of these inherent problemswith the scientificlegitimationof environmentalisIIl, someof the ideologistsof the movexsent

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have been attractedto versions of the green argument which are principallyfounded on non-scientificforms of authority.9For example, it is possible to seek to underpin an ecologicalworldviewin conventionallyreligiousor other spiritualways. People can claim to gain a knowledgeof nature'spurposesand needs throughthis sort of inquiry.l' In early 1991 David Icke, a former Green Partyspokesfor person,createdmuch mirthas well as embarrassment the greens withhis verypublic,'divinelyinspired'predictionsaboutearthquakes and sundry calamitiessuch as the disappearanceof Cuba. But in secular Western societies these appeals can exercise only a limited attraction and the principal form of legitimation in the leading remalnstnat ot sclentlhcexpertlse. envlronmenta organlzatlons Indeed both of the most prominent radical and campaigning environmental groups in the UK (and indeed Western Europe), Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, are increasing their use of science and their relianceon scientificauthority.Thus, Greenpeace appointedan academicscientistas its directorof sciencein Londonin 1989; its authorizedhistoriansnow announce that it has equipped in itself with the 'mostsophisticatedmobile laboratory Europe'." In the late 1980s Friends of the Earth (FOE) increased the technical staffand now boastsof its 'enhanced of sophistication its campaigning ... standing in academic and institutionalcircles'.l2Both organizations now supply scientificreferencesin supportof their campaign material.Their campaignersinsist on the importanceof getting the scienceright.l3
OF AND 'I'HE SOG,XOLOGY S()XENCE AU'I'HORI'I'Y LEGAL-RA'I'XONAL

green groups Up to this point I have claimed that 'establishment' embracedscience early on and that there is evidence that - despite some ideologicalmisgivings- the more radicalgroups are following suit. However, I wish to argue that the turn to science has been less beneficial than had been anticipated; in some straightforwardly respectsthe movementhas even been confoundedby science. of To understandthe sociologicalimplications embracingscience, we need to examine the special authorityenjoyed by legal-rational forms of argument, an authority which has often been taken for grantedby socialscientists.Indeed, since socialscienceitself appears to reston thisformof authority,to throwit into questionmightseem a self destructivepursuit.But in the last two decades there has been a re-assessment of this kind of authority among sociologists and philosophersof science who have studied decision making in what thinking, natural might be taken to be the temple of legal-rational science. What they have suggested is that the authoritycommonly associated with scientific beliefs is not as straightforwardor as

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unequivocalas many people, including Weber, appear to have assumed.'4These sociologistsand philosophershave argued that the public, policy makersand more traditional haveexaggeratedthe authorityof science. philosophersof science Characteristically, these analystsaccepted an uncontentiousdefinition of science. For example, most would concur with Wallis in acceptingNewton-Smith's suggestionthat scienceis the undertaking whose 'point . . . is to discover[general]explanatory truths world'.l=' What is radicalis not their definition of scienceaboutthe but their insistence that scientists' practical authorityis limitedby twofactors.'6 First,they argue that scientists' judgments inevitablygo beyond the evidenceon whichtheyare based,so thatscientific authority justified a simpleappealto its factualfoundations.In cannotbe by scientificfacts undermine the conclusions which are other words, drawn them.l7 Second, these analystsof scienceargue that even facts from themselvesare provisional.Factualclaims cannot be legitimatedby an unquestionable appealto observation.8 Observations 1 be affected by scientists'assumptionsor by their maythemselves prior theoretical commitments. short,even its factualbasisdoes not grant In sciencean indubitable authority. These points can be brieflyillustratedusing one of the given above.The factswhichsupplyevidencefor global examples warmingare ofvital practicalimportancebut, despite that, are very difficult to establish. mannerof causes may affect the world's All sea level;thusit is hardto knowwhetheranychanges climateor the measuredcanbe put down to a warmingtrend or whetherthey should be ascribedto some other factor.In some casesthe evidencemayeven be subject distortions which are acknowledgedbut for which there can be to no simple compensation.Thus, in order to establishclimatic trends, series temperaturemeasurementsneed to be of compiled over decades. Untilrecentlysuchmeasurements havecommonlybeen madeat recording stationssited in urbanareas,areaswhich have got warmer preciselybecause of urbanization.For such themselves reasons as these, thereis no indisputable of establishing way whatthe factsof the matter Moreover, are. even if the factsof warmingwere accepted, there still need not be agreement about the unanimously implications. Warming might have causes other than the greenhouse effect: for example, there might be astronomical reasonsfor temperaturevariations the earth'satmosphere. in 19 At this point it is importantto emphasizethatI have not these argumentsas a criticism scienceor of scientists. introduced of Rather,I have introduced becausethey indicatethe waysin which them the acquisition scientificknowledgeis far more complex of than is normally supposed. Scientificknowledgedepends on judgment and interpretation; therefore the environmentalmovement'sdependence on scienceitself not likelyto offer straightforward is accessto authority.

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On the basis of this re-assessmentof scientificauthoritywe have good reason for thinkingthere maybe sociologicalinterestin seeing try whathappenswhen environmentalists to enlistscienceas a 'friend of the earth'. We can approachthis issue by examining the ways in which green groups seek to 'cash in' on their scientificskills. The evidence presented in the following pages comes from two sources: from my two-year observation and interview study of nonof groupsin NorthernIrelandand froman analysis the governmental by leading environmental published literature on issues tackled Datafrom the former permitme to examine how scientific groups.20 expertise is used on a day-to-daybasiswhile materialfrom the latter allows an analysisof the role of scientific knowledge in the more complexdebates,for exampleover globalwarmingor acid technically In both cases I shall examine the difficultiesin 'cashingin' on rain. scientificauthorityand ask how good a friend scienceis to the green movement.
SCIENCEAS AN UNRELIABLEFRIEND-EMPIRICALLY

ally The firstwayin whichscienceis an unreliable is a simplyempirical one. Comparedto socialmovementswhichappealto an orthodoxyor leader,avowedlyscientificmovementsface a number to a charismatic of pragmaticdisadvantages.Scientistsmay not have an answer to every question. Similarly,they accept in principle that their knowmaymanifest ledge is revocableand incomplete.This incompleteness itself in a number of ways. For example, membersof the scientific committee of one of the groups studied, the Ulster Wildlife Trust (UWT), were concerned to learn of proposalsto use a quarrysome twenty miles north of Belfast for dumping domestic refuse. At present,the principalsite for domesticwastedumping in the Belfast areais the north foreshoreof BelfastLoughand there is considerable anxietyabout the impactof this practice.It may be damagingto the marinelife in the lough and to visitingbirds;the site is also flat,open site and clearlyvisible.Thus, the prospectof havingan alternative for dumping was initially attractive.However, there were also reservationsabout the controlwhich might be exercisedover the leachate from the proposedquarrysite,especiallysincethe quarrywasclose to LarneLough, anothershelteredmarinelough whichis the site of an RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) reserve. The committee members had no special expertise on the matter of leachingand did not wishto appearoppositionalfor the sakeof it, but The they were uneasyabout being seen to consent to the quarry-fill. position: committeefound itself in a rather'counter-factual' scientific whiletheyassumedthattherewasan answerto the question'whichsite is better',they had to acknowledgethey did not knowwhatit was.

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The same problemcan be even more acutelyfelt if there is some public pressure to announce an answer. In a recent case the same organization invitedto commenton a proposedholidaydevelopwas ment. In thiscasethe scientific committeeof the UWTwasgratifiedto find that they had been consultedabout plans to extend a sewerage systemfor a caravanparkand amenitycentre whichhappened to be close to a nature reserve of theirs. However, they had no specific expertiseon this subjectand, at leastin the shortterm,no preciseway of findingout whateffectswouldbe. They were embarrassed their by lack of knowledge in the light of the unusual invitation.To have nothing to say when specifically asked to comment seemed to contradict theirclaimto speakfor nature's needs;but therewereequal dangersto speakingwithoutauthoritative knowledge. Althoughthe explicitinvitation commentmadethiscaseunusual, to this difficultyin respondingto planningproposalsis not uncommon. There is a clear feeling in the UWT, as in other of the UK'sWildlife Trusts, that there is a need to be 'reasonable'and not oppose all development, yet the very rigours of scientificevidence and proof render 'reasonability' very difficult.The situationis further complicatedsincethe conservationists havean additionalreasonfor wanting to oppose potentially harmfulmeasures: theyconsiderthatit is harder to stop something from continuingonce it has been set up than to preventit altogether.For instance,oncejobs have been createdby a fish-farming projectit is harderto closethe operationdown,even if its effects are shownto be harmfulto wildlife,than not to have hadjobs createdin the firstplace. The limited and provisionalnature of scientificknowledge thus makes it hard to respond satisfactorily innovativeproposals.But to 'notknowing' alsobe disadvantageous can becauseof the impactit has on the public. Membersof the public may look for authoritative judgmentsand maybe dismayedby factlessness. They maylook to the scientificexperts in conservationorganizationsfor the answers to questionswhich concern them personallyand be frustratedbecause the 'experts'do not know. Birdwatchers, even shooters,may be and concerned about the reasons for fluctuationsin bird populations. They see this as the kind of question which conservationscientists should be able to settle,but the scientistsmaywell not knownor even be sure how to find out. Science may thus be a poor ally to environmentalistsbecause scientistsfind their lackof knowledgeexposed. Sometimesthey may lackthe abilityor expertiseto determinesomethingwhichtheywishto know;at other timesthey mayknowless than the publicwouldlike to know. Unlike a traditional charismatic or authoritythey do not have the abilityto respondto everycontingency. In some measure,such 'shortcomings' may well be common to all forms of the public use of scientific expertise but conservation

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concentratedway. For scientistsface these problemsin a particularly pressuregroupsoften one thing, scientistsworkingin environmental cannotcommissionor carryout the researchwhichthey wouldideally like to see performed.Accordingto Cramer,such scientiststherefore She argues that they are commonly face 'pragmaticuncertainty'.2' called on to make recommendationsat short notice, often using research material which may be very variable in readily-available quality.They are frequentlywithoutthe time or resourcesto conduct effects of minute researchof their own. Studiesof the environmental a greatdeal of time for quantitiesof contaminants, example,demand since the substancesonly build up in the environmentvery slowly. Scientificequipment and researchcan also be very expensive. Environmentalgroups simply do not have the financialresources to commit funds to majorresearchprojects.Even those organizations with big budgets face many conflicting demands. For example, Greenpeace's campaign boats continually require high levels of largestnatureconservation funding. Forits part,the RSPB(Europe's and environmentalorganization)uses much of its income for the purchase of reserves for the direct protection of birds. To spend money on research is to divert funds from direct environmental action. In many cases environmentalgroups are not even able to monitor all the potentially useful scientific information which is publishedin journals;after all, even universitylibrariessubscribeto journals.22 scientific only a fractionof the available environwhentheydo turnto the academicliterature Furthermore, mentalists typically find that research reports are directed to answering the theoretical problems posed by the development of scientific disciplines rather than to meeting their own practical queries. As sociologists of science have long pointed out, most academic scientific research is principallyaddressed to problems It whicharisewithinthe matrixof the discipline.2$ is not intendedfor of and immediateuse by 'customers' the researchobjectives academic ecologists are unlikely to coincide with those of practicalconservationists.This distancebetween the partiesis reflected in the style and contentof scientificpublications.24 In addition, Cramer points out that environmentalscientistsare handicappedby 'the low level of theoreticaldevelopment of (ecoThere is less consensusin ecologicalsciencethan ecology'.25 systems-) in many other areas of naturalscience so that the interpretationof ecologicalinformationis likely to be disputed. Finally,in Cramer's view, environmentalistsface a further form of uncertaintywhich stemsfrom the fact that they are dealingwithlarge-scalephenomena takingplacein open systems.The empiricalmaterialwhichecological science sets out to describeis inherentlymore complicatedthan the phenomenaaddressedby manyother partsof naturalscience. There is, however, at least one sense in which Cramer'saccount

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conservationscientists of uncertaintywhich the complexity of the the extent understates derive from bulk of uncertaintieswhich Ahe face. deal and from the sheer conservationists considerwith which systems be augmented by another observaavailableto them can the marginsof material matterswhich are on - in a there ation: are somesignificanceof this factor is attested to the development Ironically, bility. in the courseof the manner- by Nicholson of scientificknowledge in the roundabout the importance earlyconflicts argument for of his case. He summarizes conservationists' groups such as of the progress and various established environmentalists were not regulatingdischarges),pestibetween entry of concerns (which oil-shipping (who were not awareor carelessof the increase manufacturers cide (whowere aimingto food chain)and farmers of habitatdestruction).He into toxinsthe of wildlife and at the productivity cost foughtout throughargument, eachof thesecaseswas saying how documents and concludesby and publicitylobbying, sooneror later conservation thatenvironmental a tangible character but recordshows The inwith offences of in succeeds dealing been towards much more disturbing let has the recently trend environment,either through chemicals or to damage the tangable layers of the atmosphere, are particularly to roam through different loose The resultingproblems of global life radiation. nuclear through widelyat the roots difficultto so becausethey strikeso disturbing are technically because theiragents spontaneouslywith one supportsystems, when they combine especially monitor, of their ability to become release, and because and at varyingaltitudesby another after (emphases rapidlyover long distances understood transported are movements imperfectly whose air currents, added).26 to decide difficultywhentheyhave almost a particular face whichare Environmentalists damage'and to agents respondto 'intangible to how to impossible monitor. as an empiricalfriend to the environmental not for role of science The in such cases.Wereit almostparadoxical about ozone depletion or becomes movement campaign greens could hardly scientific evidence may disappoint science, the Yet some globalwarming at all. ambiguity.For instance, to greater its uncertaintyand by effect will lead campaigners suggest that the greenhouse well as warmingcould be as predictions so that cooling as was in variation the weather existence of the effect. In any case, the climateor seen as evidence for is hardto get reliableseriesof dataon long-term mentionedearlier,it of the seas which could demonstrate carbon on the temperature informationabout the prove to It is also difficultto compile warming. in past decadesin order have been causedby, content of the atmosphere plausibly dioxide and followed, thus could thatwarming

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about Green ambivalence science increases in this greenhouse gas.27 Similar points arose in the 521 internationaldispute over acid rain which raged between environmental campaignersand the Britishelectricitysupply service.While there was no doubt that power stations emitted acidic gases, the authoritieswould not accept responsibilityfor acidificationof the patternof environment.It waspossibleto arguethatthe geographical acidificationdid not correspond with what was known about the did dispersalof waste gases, that the chemicalscausingacidification not appearto be identicalto the rangeof gasesemittedfrom the power stations,and that there were other, more local, causes which could lead to acidificationof rivers and lakes.28Scientificauthority was needed to authenticatea campaignabout acid rain but the scientific evidence was refractoryand ambiguous.Becausethe issues involved strained against the outer limits of scientific knowledge and of scientists'power to make observations,science was only a grudging friend to the greens. Even the interpretationof less esoteric ecological issues, such as in fluctuations the numbersof migratorybirds,is subjectto the same Huge flocksof birdsare verydifficultto monitor sortsof problems.29 site in detail;if the numbersat a particular fall for one seasonthis may be becausethat localhabitatis decliningin quality,or it maybe due to any number of other factors: harsh conditions during migration, unusualpredationduringbreedingand so on. Admittedly, these may be extreme cases (although it should be noted thatthey includethree of the mostpressingglobalissues:ozone and greenhousewarming).But they do depletion, acid precipitation serve to make clear one central point: the empirical fallibilityof science, most pronounced when phenomena are at the limits of means that social problemclaims founded on science observability, mustoffer hostagesto fortune.
SCIENCEAS AN UNRELIABLEFRIEND-EPIS I EMOLOGY

Up to thispointwe haveexaminedwaysin whichinfact sciencemaybe a might anticipate.It may not less good friend than conservationists whenit wouldbe politicto havethem providethe answerson occasions to it impatientof factlessness; is seldompossiblefor environmentalists carriedout whichtheywouldliketo see done;andsome get the research maybe elusive. mightliketo marshal of the factswhichconservationists these problemsstem from the characterof ecological By and large, profession.But in some scienceand from the sociologyof the scientific cases these deficienciescome close to endemic problemsof scientific knowledge- to do withsciencesas a wayof knowingat all. Mostnature conservationistswould defend science as a form of knowledge by basisand its methodicdevelopment.But, pointingto its observational

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as we have seen and as Nicholson made clear, the observational basis is open to discrepant interpretations. As soon as there arise competing and plausible accounts of what the observational facts are, then the basis which appears so secure becomes itself problematic. The empirical and provisional basis of scientific knowledge - its apparent strength - can readily be re-formulated as an uncertain basis. 4 his argument achieves its most spectacular form when it is posed as the philosophical problem of 'induction'. For centuries philosophers have pointed out that although, for example, we may believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every day so far, this can only be an assumption. We cannot know such things for certain. In the past, traditionalists tended to use such arguments to contrast science unfavorably with other canonical forms of knowledge, such as religion or logic. Logical deduction appears much more certain than empirical
. . .

Inductlon.

In recent years these arguments have not been regarded as having much practical importance. People have not worried about the likelihood of there being a sunrise tomorrow. But this line of thought does show up the Achilles heel of science, a weakness which can be used in a practicalways to evade scientific authority. Those opposed to a scientificjudgment can always say that science is not fully certain and that, for this reason, they do not recognize expert scientific opinion in this matter as ultimately authoritative. As one might expect, environmentalists tend to play down this issue in many public contexts. Thus, in a recent issue of the BBC Wildlife Magazine, Jonathon Porritt, former director of Friends of the Earth, wrote the scientists are now with us rather than against us. On occasions ... they actually seem to be out in front of the activists of the Environment Movement. In the early seventies, the protagonists of the 'limits to growth' scenario relied primarily on an inadequately programmed computer model. Politicians had little difficulty dismissing it as sensationalist speculation. Today, there's nothing speculative about the depletion of the ozone layer, the deforestation of the Amazon, the build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or the pesticide residues in our water and food. Hard scientific evidence counts for a lot in a hard materialisticworld.30 It is interesting to note that scientific proof is associated with hard materialism, almost as though scientific support for environmental policies would not be needed in a more compassionate society. None the less, this embrace of the 'hardness' of scientific evidence displays the kind of strategy which can be adopted in chasing off the horrors of doubt. However, other strategies may be adopted. As an example, in 1989 Greenpeace ran a newspaper advertisement campaign in the UK

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Minister,NicholasRidley,that opposingclaimsby then Environment increasedinvestmentin nuclearpower generationwould help solve the greenhouse problem. The minister was pictured with his pronuclear assertion printed across his mouth, beneath it was written: speaking, it'sjust a lot of hot air'.3'Greenpeacethen 'scientifically printed a declaration disagreeing with Mr Ridley, a declaration apparentlysigned by '100 of the country'sleading scientists,doctors, and engineers'.Now, there is somethingcuriousaboutthe logicof this move:althoughGreenpeaceseemsto be invokingscientificauthority, appeal also. Their argumentseems to be not there is a majoritarian think opinion' is withthem,but thata lotofscientists just that'scientific this way. Yet, one couldjust as easilyargue that in the context of the UK, one hundred 'scientists,doctors and engineers'is actuallyvery few. I suggestthatGreenpeaceare forcedinto thisroundaboutappeal difficulty.They wish becausethey are confrontedby an interpretative to claimto be in the right epistemologically- to say that Mr Ridleyis rightmayin principlebe simplywrong.Yet,whilethe epistemological straightforwardand unambiguous, in practice both sides in any dispute can usuallycount on some scientificsupporters.Both sides highground.An appeal to large may try to claimthe epistemological numbers of qualified supporters is perhaps the simplest way to respondto thisdifficultyin a masspublicmedium. Such an appeal to the majorityscientificopinion has also recently been employed by Friendsof the Earth.Campaignstaff workingon globalwarmingweredisturbedby a programmein the Equinoxseries on broadcast UK'sChannelFouron 12 August 1990 whichsought to question the scientific evidence for the greenhouse effect. The programmeeven implied that scientistsmight be attractedto make extreme and sensationalclaimsabout the urgencyof the problemin order to maximize their chances of receiving funding. The programme was criticizedin the 'campaignnews' section of the FOE An magazine,EarthMatters.32 unfavourablecomparisonwas drawn between the sceptical views expressed in the programmeand the conclusions of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate whichhad warnedof the realityof impendingclimate Change(IPCC), changes and with whose scientific analysis FOE is generally in agreement.FOEinvokedthe weightof over 300 scientists [who] prepared the IPCC's Science Report comparedto abouta dozen who were interviewedfor Equinox.33 are Whenscientists seen to disagreeit is verydifficultto claimsimply and thatone is in the right.An attractive, in manyrespectsreasonable, alternativeis to invoke the power of the majority.But of course this cannot alwaysbe done. For many years, as the earlier quote from were in the scientificminority. Porrittmade plain, environmentalists

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Appealsof this kind therefore fall a long way short of the authority one might expect from science. Whatever the complexities of enlisting scientific authority in a positive fashion, from the conservationists' point of view the difficulty is most acutelyfelt when it goes the other way- when they are confronted with the barrier scientific proof. As Richard North, scienceand environmentwriterfor TheIndependent, noted has Even now, scientific exactitude can debilitate conservation by insisting (as governmentsrejoice to notice) that the evidence of damagecaused mtlstbe total:whichit almostnever will be.34 This argumentativestrategy is probably best known in the UK throughits use in relationto acid rain.As was mentionedearlier,the authoritiesused the lackof certainknowledgethat acid rain (and in particularBritish acid rain) was responsiblefor the death of trees and the acidification lakesin Europeas a justificationfor continuof ing with powerstationemissions.33 Different groups adopt a different kind of response to this problem. Greenpeace,whom North was criticizingin his article in TheIndependent, to be impatientof the limitationsof scientific tend proof. North acceptsthatGreenpeacemaybe correctto supposethat it 'wouldget little [media]coveragewere it to stickto the facts'.But, he charges, 'In any case, it does not'.36He goes on to list ways in which Greenpeace's public statements have been, as he puts it, 'economicalwith the truth'. His contentionseems to be that Greenpeace has often bent the scientifictruth to make issues appear more grave than they truly are in order to stir people into action. It remains unclear what strategy North would endorse, given the uncertaintieswhich inevitablyaccompany'good' scientificpractice. Moreover,it should be appreciatedthat activistorganizationscan point to a numberof occasionson which their gloomy expectations have been vindicated- when further spills or leaks have followed assurancesthat the 'problem'has been overcome.Withsome plausibility they could argue that there is a practicalasymmetrybetween doing nothing (the situation will worsen) and doing something (it may bring unnecessary cost but no permanent damage to the environment). The specific epistemologicalcharacter of science thus leads to difficultieswhen groups try to 'cashin' on scientificauthority.If you are relentlesslycommitted to scientificproprieties,you will not be able to make instant, unequivocaljudgments. But if you are not publicly committed in this way, you are open to criticism. The resultingpractical difficultiesmaybecomeapparentduring scientific disputes or in public controversies.But they can also surface in a virulent form in specialized forums of debate. In particular,the conventions of legal cross-examination and the standardsof legal

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argumentand of proof maynot meshwellwiththe character scientific expertise.


CER'I'AIN'I'Y OF LEGALIN'I'ERPRE'I'A'I'IONS SCIEN'I'IFICJ

A numberof case studies have shown that scientificargumentsoften do not stand up in court or in public inquiriesas well as might be In expected from the general publicauthorityenjoyed by science.37 factors. After all, the part this may be explained by circumstantial to of majority scientistsare unaccustomed the kind of questioningto whichthey are subjectedin court. Further,skilledexaminerscan use the fact that the discussionis not free- that the questionerhas great control over the topic- to weaken the scientists'presentation.But scientists also fare badly because legal procedure can focus on in apparentweaknesses scienceas a form of knowledge. this To illustrate pointwe canturnto the caseof a publicinquiryinto plans to develop a Northern Irish peat bog for horticulturalpeat In extraction.38 the late 1980s governmentecologistshad conducteda surveyand evaluationof Northern Irish bogs, held to be an increasingly endangered habitat.But a peat-cuttingcompany had already taken steps to develop one of the bogs whichhad come out as highly ratedin this survey.A publicinquirywascalledto determinewhether development should be allowed to proceed. The developers were relied on while the conservationists representedby a senior barrister scientificallytrained representatives.Although the barristermight scientificskills have been expected to try to circumventthe witnesses' (for example, by concentratingon the trade-off between economic development and conservationor by highlighting details of legal procedure),he chose to confront the scientificwitnessesdirectly.In of doing so he called attentionto importantcharacteristics scientific
expertise.

In essence the barristeradopted two lines of argument. First,he questionedthe scoring systemby means of which the surveyedbogs had been assessed.Forexample,bogs maybe valuedbecausethey are virtuallyintact or because they are home to a wide varietyof plant species. To some extent the the rankingsof the variousbogs in the surveywill depend on how these, and other, attributesare weighted. thus suggestedthatthe scoresweremerelya convention The barrister and could, in fact, have been very different. In effect the scores are just a construct,an artefact.Yet, he claimed,the scientists'behavedas The on though the scoreswere "written tabletsof stone"'.39 scientists couldnot showfor certainthatthe techniqueadoptedwasthe bestway of scoringbogs; therefore, it could be implied, their scoring system wasof littleworth. The barristerdid not here.40 It is importantto note an asymmetry

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to scoringsystemaccording thattherewasa good developed. He only had to demonstrate to have could safelybe case.The the bog in question which hadbeen used in this scoringsystemwhich scientists' lack of absolute doubt caston the the of argument traded on character science. developer's epistemological wordson the Not every feature in other authority, be operatedto similareffect. second argument be important to conservation could the His might case of bog of a which scoring system. For example, in the one in the additional features, represented there were two striking its likelyvalue.On the one bog, disputed bog was the bog, othercompromising favouring therare butterflybut, on the other, the drying a to prone it supported hand circularand thus unusually scoringsystem rather in the elongated than was represented was of representative Neither these features out. by witnesses.The legalthe bog wasactually alluded to of both yet were arguethatthe assessment earlier on, scientific to use able thisfactto described methodic. As was hos adrather than of judgment and interpretative to make must depend on elements expertise of science can be highlighted aspects These skill. informal appearlike opinion. that legal rules and reasoning evidence scientific the impression case. In some instances do I not wish to give environmentalists' hinder the havebeen ableto use or necessarily as Greenpeace FOE groupssuch if therearelaws campaigning scientific evidence.Forexample, aluminiumor rules legal in placeof aboutthe permittedlevelsof, say, guidelines groups can demonofficial or the water and if environmental ableto criticize in nitratedrinking havebeenexceeded,theyare those that strate theselevelshavingto prove that the watercontaining without The existence of official government is actuallyharmful. of course, this potential of levels contaminants sidestepped.But, allowsscience to be groupsdoes not often comeinto playsince, rules arguing to advantagecampaigningthese groups have typicallybeen succeed in present, 1 least at up to the should be made more restrictive. o that the present the 'safe'limits that to have scientificevidence cases,one either has a second best, proof that laws in other such or, as is limit too relaxed are stricter. countries comparable
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it the on science may not bring there dependence The green movement's either in practiceor principle.But to be it seeks seems cognitiveauthority whereitsinsufficiency arguments Accordingto the aresomeenvironmental case of the baskingshark. the of anothersort.Take Society(MCS),baskingsharksare endangered is scientifically Conservation Marine assuming the MCS fishing practices. Even arguethatthe sharksare not worth by our be possibleto correct,it mightstill

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the loss of fishingwhichwould be entailedin conservingthem. What this suggests is that the argumentsfor the green movementare far from solely scientific; indeed they look rather similar to those surroundingabortionand artisticfreedom. To put this another way, the scientificcorrectnessof the greens' analysis- even when that correctnessis undisputed- still does not carrymanyclearimplications practical for action.If it is believedthat the destructionof the ozone layer will result in many human deaths then possiblythere is a commonpractical need to takestepsto remedy the problem.But in the case of the majorityof other environmental problemsthe practicalimplications more disputable.There may are be manyreasonsfor tryingto conservethe rainforests:for the sakeof the tribespeoplewho live there, for the sakeof the plantsand animals themselves,on account of the likely medicinalvalue of rain forest plantsand so on. The sameis true for speciesconservation: elephants can be valued in their own right as well as for the possibleeconomic benefitsof managedherds. When mounting campaigns,environmentalists tend to invoke as many of these reasons as they can in order to attractthe greatest numberof supporters.Thus, the RSPBappealsto naturalists, bird to enthusiastsand those with a diffuse concern for the countryside. Greenpeace attractsanimal lovers as well as those opposed to the nuclearindustry.Although,therefore,scienceis used in makingsocial problem claims, science itself does not dictate which claims will be made.Forinstance,the RSPBdrawson considerable scientific skillsin conservingbirdsbutit is not scientific reasoningwhichleadsthe group to work for birds rather than field mice and voles. Science is not a sufficient guide to what conservation groups should provide the members'reasonsfor engagingin conservation activities. a narrow In sense, sciencedoes not seem to compel people to conserveparticular bits of their environment nor tell them what the conservation prlorltlesare.
. . .

RE-MORALIZING SCIENCE:GAIA

Up to this point I have suggested that science seems not to offer a moralbasisfor the green movement.However,the 1980switnesseda great growth in popularityfor an idea which ties the science of the environmentto moral concern for the planet, the Gaia hypothesis. This hypothesiscan bestbe explainedthroughan example.Commentatorsdescribingthe greenhouseeffect commonlypoint out that the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere seems to regulate the earth's temperature.4l Without the greenhouse effect the earth would probablybe too cold to support life; it would resemble Mars.That many life forms have persisted for hundreds of millions of years

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been regulated.To talk temperaturehas long suspect and anthropothat the implies earth's might seem intelligence,to way about 'regulation' in this wasno-one there, no guidingtalkin thisway, Afterall, morphic. there mostpeople are happyto regulating.However,a metaphor. dothe the descriptionas just a metaphor; regarding proposes that it is not the Gaia hypothesis the earth truly is regulated.Life on the But the to this which works to keep according hypothesis co-ordinatedin a way be regarded is somehow planet the planetshouldproperly gave the On this idea habitable. thisview, planet Jim Lovelockwho proposed Clearly,if the earth superorganism. as a of workings thissuperorganism.expectationof the Gaia name to the it might change our describedin this waymeddling and alter our attitude to the be can response to human a moralobligationnot globe's now see ourselvesas having - we planet might but to Gaia. has tohumansand animalsthe Gaian idea would claim that it just of itsemphasis supporters through Scientific the ecologyof the earth them helped understand livingorganismsmaketo the maintenance is which the on contribution ideas stress the extent to which the planet without Gaian operate the processes of world. few physical that with example, it is argued suffused life. Surprisingly For of living organisms. in determiningthe earth's intervention the play a central role of carbon dioxide in the in organismsthe sea the amount by hypothesis might temperature controlling demythologized Gaia Thus, a empirically atmosphere.42 thatlivingthingsare than has earth a beliefamongstscientists to amount and chemistryof the importantto the physics more one in been hitherto recognized. version is not the only to However, this demythologized ideashaveprovedattractive holisticGaian the At More movement.43 circulation. overtly in the environmental and to many ideas as deeply scientists some have perceived these and time other scientists raisebothempirical logicaldoubts. same scientists Sceptical seek to query the disturbing. for example, one might appearto have At an empiricallevel, whichorganisms contribution by startof ice ages. hypothesis citingthe of global cooling at the thanassistsuch to made the intensification wouldcounteractrather Gaia of the it Surely, mightbe said, addressedto the logic to argumentshave been strongresemblance those But cooling? most whichbeara it is hypothesis(arguments in sociology). Thus, to Gaia functionalisttheories of ascribing purposes mobilizedagainst problems aboutthe idea seem to need to thatthereare argued a metaphor,Gaiawould a few be more than Gaia.If it is to humansand (conceivably) in the way that onlyplantsor bacteriaas though they have purposes Even, do not treat animalsdo. Scientists how then can the plantpossessthem?of the intentions; to talk be possible haddeliberate is. We acceptsthat it might scepticsargue, if one impossibleto know what that purpose is planet'spurpose, it

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cannot communicatewith the planet. Moreover,from time to time there are ice ages and other catastropheswhich result in mass assumedpurposes? fatalities.How can these be reconciledwithGaia's Of course, one could say that the purpose is not to retain any particularlife form but an aggregatelife force but, since we do not knowto count this aggregate,we could never test such a theory. claims;for several Manyscientistsfelt indignantabout Lovelock's In yearshis paperswere routinelyturneddown by leadingjournals.44 HorsfalldismissesLovelockas a a recentdenunciationin TheGuardian 'scientist sorts'and claimsthathis ideasappealonly to 'scientifically of illiterategreens'.45 The pragmaticstrength of the Gaia hypothesisis that it offers to combine environmental science with morality. It thus seems to providethe kind of authoritywhich,as we have seen, a more routine dependence on science fails to deliver. But it has strong scientific opponents and is disadvantagedby its unorthodox character;its prospectslook poor. In anycase,even wereit accepted,the hypothesis that it would be hard to operates at such a high level of abstraction guidelinesfrom it. deriveagreed practical

CONCLUSION

To regardthe green movementas profoundlyanchoredin scienceis have found terms,green campaigners surelycorrect.But, in practical it far harder to cash in on that scientificauthoritythan might have been anticipated.In this paper I have soughtto explainwhy scienceis less of a cognitiveallyto greens than they mighthope. In part, the explanation is philosophical.Scientificknowledge is provisional.Particularly inherentlyopen to revision;it is intrinsically at the forefrontof science,it is alwayspossiblethat the truthis at odds with scientists'current beliefs. Despite science'scognitive power, it proposubstantive supportfor particular cannotoffer transcendental sitions.Moreover,the green movementis dependent on extra-scienScientificstudiesindicatingthat the whale tific,moralconsiderations. populationsare declining to non-sustainablelevels may well offer good groundsfor not whaling.But when (as now maybe the case for populationsbegin to recover,sciencedoes not suffice minkewhales)46 to saywhetherhuntingshouldbe resumed. The professionand practiceof The explanationis also sociological. sciencemeanthatthe researchwhichgreensdesireor need maynot be done. The socialcompositionof green groups may not afford them the scientificexpertise they require. Governments,firms, unionseven campaigners- may be far from disinterestedin the uses they and makeof scientificinformation.Finally,philosophical sociological

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factots mayoverlapand interact.The socialcorltextof legal inquiries encouragesthe tendentiousexploitationof science'sepistemological weaknesses;media conventions about 'fairness'encourage broadcastersto give 'equal time' to competing views evMen the scientific if credentials those viewsare far from equal. of Together, these sociological and philosophical factorshelp explain why even a socialmovementwith profoundscientificsupportexperiences difficultyin winning over the authoritiesand bringingabout policychanges.In turn, this experienceof frustration when science fails to deliver the expected benefits- is likely to reinforce greens' attitudeof ideologicalambivalence towardsscienceand to stimulate demandfor alternative sourcesof legitimation. The tensionbetweena scientific professionalizationof movement organizationsand the pursuitof morecomprehensive legitimations set to continue. is
(Date accepted: May 1991 )
Steven Yearley Department of Sociology University of Ulster atJordanstown

NO I ES

1. See for example A. Dobson, (;een Per.spective, (hichester, John Wiley,1983, Political Th7ught, London, U n win pp.329-=)2 as well as in two books by 1. Hyman, 1990; P. Lowe and A. Flynn, Sheail: Natu-ein Trust:theHi.story Nature 7f 'Environmental politics and policy in the Con.senvation Britain, (^lasgow, Blackie, in 19230s', J. Moran, T/lePoliticalGe7gralphy1976, pp. 48-53 and Selwenty-Five in in Year.s of Contemporary Britain, London, Mac- Ecology:TheBritishEcologicalSociety,Lonmillan, 1989, pp.255-79; and P. Lowe don, Blackwell,1987. and W. Rudig, 'Review article: political 8. Nicholson, 7p. pp. 91-2. cit., ecology and the social sciences - the state 9. See J. B. (allicott, 'Traditional of the art', British J(lurnal of Political American lndian and traditional Western European attitudes towards nature: Science,vol. 16,1986, pp. 513-50. 2. For an exploration of these issues an overview', in R. Elliot and A. Gare, see R. Wallis, 'Science and pseudo- Environmental Philo.sophy, Milton Keynes, science', SocialScienceInformati7n, 24, Open University Press, 1983, pp.231vol. 1985, pp. 585-601. 59. 3. N. W. Moore, TheBirct Time:The of 10. Discussed in (j. Spretnak and F. Scienceand P(llitic.s NatureC'(m.servati(ln,(apra, Green Politic.s: GlobalPromi.se, (lf the (ambridge, (>ambridgeUniversity Press, London Paladin,1985, pp.230-58. 1987, p. xviii. 11. Respectively, Time.s Higher Eslu4. Ibid.,pp. l5746. cationSupplement, April 1989, p. 8 and 7 5. M. Nicholson, The New Envir(m- M. Brown and J. May, The Greenpeace mentalAge, (ambridge, (ambridge Uni- Story,London, Dorling Kindersley,1989, versity Press,19237,p.49. p. 150. 12. Friends of the Earth, AnnualReport 6. M. Weber, The Theory S(lcialanct (lf Ec(m(lmic Organizati(m,New York, Free ansl Account.s1989190, London FOE, Press,1964, pp.328-9. 1990, P. 6. 7. This is documented in P. Lowe, 13. This comment reflects the actual 'Values and institutions in the history of words used by campaigners as well as the British nature conservation in A. War- ethos of these groups' campaigning work; ren and F. B. (Joldsmith, Con.servation for information on my data collection and in

ab()ut science Creenambivalence


interpretative methods see below and note 2(). 14. For one good account see B. Barnes, AboutScience,Oxf'ord, Blackwell, 1985, pp. 72-23915. M/t. H. Newton-Smith, T/le Ratiotllity of Science, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p.14, cited in Wallis, 7t' p. 591. cit., 16. Among many helpf'ul comments, one of the ref'erees of this paper suggested that Popper's demarcation criterion - an intended method f'or
. . .. .

531

how much money to put into research as against acquiring new plant; engineers t:acepragmatic uncertainty too. The contrast I am drawing is between environmentalists' hopes (or fears) of science and the practicalitiesthey experience. 23. For a systematic elaboration of this W. van den Daele and view see (J. BOhme, W. Krohn, 'Finali7ationin science', Social Science Inprmati(m, vol. 15, 1976, pp. 307-30. See '=>4. (J. N. (^ilbert and M. Mulkay, ()peNing Pandora'.s B(lx. A Sociologzcal (ambridge, f Di.scour.se, Analy.si.s Scienti.st.s' trom non-sclence separatlng sclence should be discussed. I have not included (Jambridge University Pres, 1984, such a discussion in the main text, largely pp. 3942 and B. Latour, '(^ive me a because the issue of demarcation is itself' laboratoryand I will raise the world', in K. D. Knorr-(etina and M. Mulkay, Science so open to dispute (f'or an empirical on Per.spective.s theSocial Studyof rather than conceptual - analysis of' Ob.senwed: demarcation-making see Wallis, op. cit.). Science,London Sage, 1983, pp. 141-70. In any case - and I suspect this was the cit., 25. (ramer, ()1). p. 50. referee's point- the problems of'judge26. Nicholson o1).cit., pp. 44-53 and ment and interpretation which I come on p. 54. 27. ]. Silvertown and P. Sarre, Environto illustrate would bejust as likely to dog a pseudo-scientific environmentalism as metlt and Society, London, Hodder and Stoughtons 1990, pp. 834. the mainstream, scientific one. 17. M. Mulkay, Scienceand theSociology 28. A. Irwin, 'Acid pollution and pubLondon, Allen and Unwin, lic policy: the changing climate of enof Knowledge, vironmental decision-making', in M. Rad1979, pp. 2942. 18. A. F. (halmers, Whati.sthi.sThing ojevic and R. Harrison, Atmo.spheric C'alled Science?, Milton Keynes, Open Acidity: Source.s, Con.sequenGe.sand Abatement,Amsterdam, Elsevier, forthUniversity Press,1982, pp. 22-37. 19. For a recent twist here see S. coming. Baliunas and R. Jastrow 'Evidence for 29. The RSPB is increasingly interlong-term brightness changes of solar- ested in the places to which British birds type stars', Nature, vol. 348, 6 December migrate and in preserving crucial sites 1990, pp. 52W3. along migration routes. For this, scientific 20. The research from which the data tracking is needed. The issue of multi-caused fatalities was derive was supported by the UK ESR(, grant A0925 0006, under programme on recently illustrated by the case of racing the Public Understanding of' Science. pigeons which, apparently, suffer high The fieldwork, using interview and par- rates of attrition, particularly on popular ticipant observation, ran from 1987 to cross-(hannel races. This was blamed by 1989. many on peregrines which, although proin tected by law, were being shot by fanciers 21. J. (ramer, Mission-Orientation Ecology: the Case of Dutch Fre.sh-Water and, in one spectacular instance, even Ecology, Amsterdam, Rodopi,1987, p. 50. killed by 'kamikazee' pigeons (ageing 22. As mentioned at the start of this birded fitted with explosive charges). paragraph, and as I was forcefully re30. J. Porritt, '(^reen shoots, rotten minded by Keith Pavitt and Erik Mill- roots', BBC Wildlife,vol. 7, no. 6, 1989, stone of the Science Policy Research Unit, pp. 353-3. Sussex, I am not claiming that these 31. For example, it was printed in The 5July 1989, p. 9. features are unique to the use of science lndependent, by greens. For example, I(I faces the 32. Earth Matter.s, Autumn/Winter same problem as the RSPB in knowing 1990,p.4.

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33. Ibi(l.,p. 4. 34. R. North, '(^reenpeace: still credible?', T11eltldel)erl(letlts September 21 19237, 15. p. 35. See Irwin, o1). cit. 36. North ol). cit., p. 15; he also addressed this argument in his Radio 4

StevenYearley

19232 and S. Yearley, 'Bog standards: science and conversation at a public in4uiry', SocialStudie.s KScience, 19, of vol. 19239, 421-323. pp. 3X. Yearley, op. cit. 39. Ibid., 431. p. 40. See Oteri, Weinberg and Pinales, programme about (^reenpeace broadcast o).cit.,p. 2523. on 6 December 19239and entitled 'The 41. F. Pearce, Turningup the Heat, Zero Option'. London, Paladin, 19039, 3S9. pp. 37. SeeJ. S. Oteri, M. Weinberg and 42. Ibid., 143-50. pp. M. S. Pinales, '(ross-examination of 43. See J. Porritt and D. Winner, The chemists in drug cases', in B. Barnes and Coming the (,reen.s, ondon, Fontana, of I D. Edge, Scietlce (,lmtext, itl Milton Keynes, 192323, 249-53. pp. Open University Press, 19232,pp. 25044. Pearce, op. cit.,p. 37. 45. ] . Horsfall, 'The hijack of reason', 259 as well as B. Wynne, Rationality an(l Ritllal. The WitlsSscale Inquiryatld Nlzclear The Cuardiatl, April 1990, p. 25. 20 Deci.sion.s Britain, (halfont St. (^iles, in 46. Thus, see The Cuarctian, May 10 British Society for the History of Science, 1991, p. 29.
(J.

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