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In the late-1970s, EMS Namboodiripad had perceptively observed that India has democracy at the top and bureaucracy at the bottom. It is a little noticed fact that the basic criminal laws of the land -- the Indian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Act -- that were prepared under colonial rule, prioritise state security, maintenance of public order and intelligence collection as the main functions of the police. The Union home ministrys information on conflict situations stems mainly from the IPS-controlled Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the state police forces, which prioritise state security and maintenance of public order. These two agencies are not equipped to study the multiple complexities of developmental conflicts but tend to view all conflicts through the lens of their basic state security preoccupations. Further, the basic criminal law governing the working of the police, as distinct from the Constitution, stresses state security and maintenance of order at the cost of service to the people. These police agencies are the major information and intelligence providers to the government, a fact that necessarily distorts the nature and quality of the information provided. Given the limitations of police agencies in reporting developmental conflicts objectively, the ministry set up its own agency, the Research and Policy Division, in 1967, to study and report on such conflicts independently. The Division worked very well but was soon converted into a convenient parking lot for officers moving from one job to another in government. IB reportage on conflicts and the reports produced by the R&P Division often differed on facts and interpretations. The Division was mysteriously wound up sometime in the 1990s. Further, according to the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, the Union home ministry was in charge of the development and protection of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, a major area of concern in the Constitution. Two separate divisions of the ministry dealt respectively with the SCs and STs. Steps were taken in the 1980s to develop and implement special measures for the development of these communities, including the Tribal Sub Plan for the adivasis (STs) and the Special Component Plan for the dalits (SCs). Two joint secretaries were in charge. Special arrangements were in place to study and deal with atrocities against SCs and STs. Increasing atrocities were seen as a contributory cause of the emergence of Naxalite violence. The two phenomena were studied in juxtaposition, and guidelines were issued to
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Using violence to quell violence: A flawed response Maoist violence, which originated in a single police station area in a single district in West Bengal, is now reported to have spread to over 2,000 police stations, in 223 districts across 20 states, as admitted by the Union home minister himself. And the police budgets of the Union and state governments have reportedly gone up over a thousand-fold from 1967 to 2007. The lesson seems to be that a mere police response is far from adequate in dealing with Maoist violence. The annual reports of the Union home ministry show that its budget has gone up from over Rs 23,000 crore to over Rs 38,000 crore today. Though state violence tends to aggravate the cult of violence, the colonial precedent of using violence to quell violence appears to have become customised with our post-colonial rulers. The prime minister stated at a chief ministers conference in April 2006 (the statement has been repeated frequently) that Maoist violence is Indias biggest internal security threat. This was probably based on the IB analysis of the subject. Communism, based on the philosophy of violence and under the tutelage of foreign interests, has for long been perceived by the IB as a major security threat. The then Union home minister sent a large CRPF force to the Naxalite/Maoist-affected states. He asked states not to enter into dialogue with the Maoists unless they gave up arms. Local resistance by vigilante groups (the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh) was to be upscaled. Though the 2004 National Common Minimum Programme had said that extremist violence was not just a law and order problem but had deeper socio-economic roots, the state police agencies thought otherwise and acted on the suggestions contained in documents on left-wing extremism produced by the IB. The ministry of home affairs, influenced by IB reports, further geared up to deploy central paramilitary forces on a massive scale. The ministrys annual report for 2008-9 states that the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa together accounted for about 86% of all incidents of Maoist violence in 2008. Though the Constitution imposes a special responsibility on the Indian state for the welfare, development and protection of dalits and adivasis with special provisions in law and procedure for the purpose, the home ministry is no longer in charge of the subject. The prime ministers statement on Maoism in 2006 did not make even a passing reference to the growing violence against dalits and adivasis. Interestingly, neither the newly created ministry of social justice and empowerment (now responsible for dalits and adivasis), nor the National Commissions for the SCs and STs, were invited to attend the 2006 and 2009 meetings of state chief ministers though this was required under the Constitution. Speakers came out strongly against Maoist violence but no one referred to the vexed issue of the increasing violence against dalits and adivasis, especially in the Central Tribal Belt (CTB), as reported by official agencies. A seminal 1969 home ministry report, the first major report of its kind prepared by the Research and Policy (R&P) Division, titled The Causes and Nature of Agrarian Tensions had warned that the Green Revolution could turn into a red revolution in the absence of agrarian reforms. The report pointed to the administrative obstacles in the implementation of agrarian reforms including the lack of qualifications and integrity necessary for the administration of tenancy reforms on the part of civil servants who were overburdened with other responsibilities; insufficient coordination between the state agency for land reforms and the agriculture and cooperative departments; lack of correct and updated land records; weak budgetary support; illiteracy and ignorance on the part of tenants, and so on. In the early-1980s the ministry attempted to set up interdisciplinary study-cumaction groups on conflict situations but was discomfited by the obsession with secrecy on the part of the defence ministry whose agencies were deployed in the Northeast. The winding up of the R&P Division in the 1990s, too, proved costly for the home affairs ministry. Ironically, though the ministry was aware of the deficiencies in its information base on conflict resolution, as seen in its setting up of the R&P Division, it did not take the additional step to institutionalise policymaking. There was, and still is, no such mechanism at the top in the ministry. As such, traditional reliance on police reports Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites
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GOI 2008, 'Combating Terrorism: Protecting by Administrative Reforms Commission, Eighth Report.
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GOI (2007) Public Order, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Fifth Report. GOI (2008) Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution: Friction to Fusion, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Seventh Report. GOI (2008) Planning Commission Report of the Experts Group on Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas. Guha, Ranajit, 2000 Subaltern Studies Reader 1986-95, OUP New Delhi. Human Rights Watch, 2009 'Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse and Impunity in the Indian Police'. Oommen, T K 2008 'Reconciliation in Post-Godhra Gujarat: The Role of Civil Society', Pearson-Longman, New Delhi. Sharma, B D, 2010 Open Letter to the President of India, Mainstream , May 22, New Delhi Srinivasavaradan, TCA 1992, The Federal Concept: The Indian Experience, Allied Publishers, New Delhi. Subramanian, K S 2007, Political Violence and the Police in India, Sage Publications. Wallace, Paul 2007, A Grassroots Approach to Healing Terrorism, in Democracy and Counter-terrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington DC, US Institute of Peace). Infochange News & Features, August 2010
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