Grammar in Philosophy, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar

Grammatically, a subjectpredicate sentence consists of any noun phrase and verb phrase in combination, the constraints on the combination being syntactic rather than semantic. Of greater interest to philosophers has been the narrower notion of a logical subject predicate sentence, where the eligible noun phrases are restricted to those having a certain semantic function, namely, that of referring to something or someone. Thus, whereas Nothing dies and Nero fiddled would both satisfy the grammatical description, only the latter would be reckoned a logical subjectpredicate sentence. More precisely, the predicate in such a sentence is described as a first-order predicate, whereas a predicate which attaches not to a name but to a first-order predicate is known as a second-order predicate. The logical variety is in question when it is said that exists is not a predicate. In saying, for example, The Loch Ness monster does not exist we can hardly be referring to a monster in the loch, so the grammatical subject is not a logical subject, and the predicate accordingly not a logical predicate. The hierarchy of predicates indicated is also thought important to an understanding of related terms, as there is and something. Starting with atomic sentences, as Rome burned and Vesuvius is a dormant volcano, we can derive the forms Something burned and There is a dormant volcano. Something and there is are not logical subjects, but are predicates of a predicate, or second-order predicates. This whole mode of classification calls for scrutiny. Consider Here is a key. This provides a good contrast to a subjectpredicate sentence in that we are not saying of something named here that it is a key, but the adverb simply demarcates the locality where the description ostensibly applies. Similarly with There is a key, and not merely when this features there as an adverb of place. In the existential reading what we have is a variation on this pattern, even though there now lacks demonstrative force, approximating more to somewhere: provided a key is somewhere to be found, the form is in order. At all events, so long as the behaviour of is a key can be reckoned the same whether it follows here or there, we have reason not to think of There is a key as in some way deriving from particular predications, as This is a key. Since we do not then have a predicative use of a key in There is a key, nothing which can be attached to the former phrase can be described as a predicate of a predicate. It can also be queried whether Something is a key features a second-order predicate, but now because is a key may be said to function in just the same way as in This is a key, despite the absence of any namelike term. More generally, there is good reason for broadening the category of subject to include a greater range of noun phrases than is customary, even those that are negative, as nothing or no one. So we might include here Every dog has its day, Gentlemen prefer blondes, and Nothing surprises him any more. In Every dog has its day the phrase every dog is a genuine unit, relevantly on a par with Fido, though of course not a name. It is relevantly on a par in so far as we can say: has its day is true of every dog. Similarly, prefer blondes is true of gentlemen and surprises him any more is true of nothing. The contrast here continues to be with Here is an F, where we cannot say: is an F is true of here.

Bibliography and More Information about subject and predicate

P. T. Geach , Subject and Predicate, Mind (1950). B. Rundle , Grammar in Philosophy (Oxford, 1979).

P. F. Strawson , Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (London, 1974).

Read more: subject and predicate - Grammar in Philosophy, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar - Key, there, Logical, Sentence, Phrase, and True http://science.jrank.org/pages/23266/subject-predicate.html#ixzz1US32rn1N