Copyright Ergon 2004 Issue II Author: Brett Gaul Article: Is Moores Criticism of Idealism Uncharitable?

Ergon 2004 The Student Journal of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina Article: Is Moores Criticism of Idealism Uncharitable? Author: Brett Gaul Is Moores Criticism of Idealism Uncharitable? In The Refutation of Idealism, G.E. Moore argues that all arguments for Idealism are flawed because he thinks that one claim all Idealists consider necessary to their positionthe claim that esse is percipi (to be is to be perceived)is false in all the senses ever given to it.1 However, it is no secret that Moore himself later came to believe that the paper, written early in his philosophical career, is very confused and embodies a good many down-right mistakes.2 Yet as C. J. Ducasse points out, Moores mistakes are not specified, and, since he does not repudiate the article as a whole, it may be presumed that he still adheres at least to its essential contention.3 Recently, however, Michael Durrant has formulated new criticisms of Moores treatment of esse is percipi. Durrant argues, I. that Moore can be held to have a misconception of the nature of metaphysics at least in the sense of revisionary metaphysics and consequently that none of the interpretations of Esse is percipi which he offers does justice to Esse is percipi as a principle of a metaphysical or revisionary metaphysical scheme. I shall subsequently offer an interpretation which I hold does do such justice;
G.E. Moore, The Refutation of Idealism, in Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 5. All references are to this text. The paper was originally published in 1903 in Mind, 12, 433-453. 2 Moore, Philosophical Studies, viii. 3 C.J. Ducasse, Moores The Refutation of Idealism, in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1942) 225. Ducasse argues that there is a certain class of cases concerning which it is true that esse is percipi, but makes it clear that the considerations he sets forth neither constitute an argument for Idealism nor open the way for Idealism (225-226). Moore, in A Reply to My Critics (same volume), agrees with Ducasses criticism. He writes, I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and hold that that early paper of mine was wrong. As an argument for my present view I should give the assertions that a toothache certainly cannot exist without being felt, but that, on the other hand, the moon certainly can exist without being perceived (653).
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II. that all three interpretations Moore offers for the is in Esse is percipi are open to objection both on the grounds of misunderstanding and confusion and that hence his conclusion that the sense he has found for Esse is percipi is such that no would believe that it was true is defective; III. that Moore does not show that the Idealist contradicts himself in his thesis that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject and hence that Esse is percipi in particular is inherently self-contradictory and, more generally, that the position of the Idealist is inherently self-contradictory. . ; IV. that, even so, if we examine the possible answers the Idealist may offer to the question of the criterion of identity for sensations and extend the impetus of Moores principal contention discussed under III above to a deeper level, we may hold that the Idealists position in untenable in a radical sensenamely that it implicitly has to presuppose what it explicitly denies.4 I shall argue that Durrants three criticisms of Moores argument (points I-III above) are incorrect because his charge that Moore held a misconception of the nature of revisionary metaphysics is specious. However, I agree with Durrants general assertion that the Idealists position is untenable. Moores argument, as it is stated in The Refutation of Idealism, is a refutation of Idealism. I Moore characterizes Modern Idealism as an assertion that the universe is spiritual. Such an assertion is thought to imply (1) that the universe is not what it appears and (2) that the universe has many of the properties that we do not think it does. He mentions these two points, he says, because when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this Idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of

Michael Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, Philosophical Investigations 23, no. 1 (January 2000): 26-27.

Copyright Ergon 2004 Issue II Author: Brett Gaul Article: Is Moores Criticism of Idealism Uncharitable?

different propositions which the idealist must prove.5 Because the Idealist must prove a number of different propositions to prove Idealism, it appears that Moore must argue against every one of these propositions in order to refute Idealism as a doctrine. Moore concedes that if an Idealist thinks that no argument is necessary to demonstrate that reality is spiritual, Moore cannot refute him. However, he realizes that if he can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, he shall have proved that Idealists have no reason whatever for their conclusion.6 The proposition that Moore thinks is essential to Idealism is esse is percipi. He admits that this proposition is very ambiguous, but holds that it is a necessary part of all Idealistic arguments. Moore begins his argument against Idealism by noting in what relation he takes esse is percipi to stand to Idealistic arguments: That wherever you can truly predicate esse you can truly predicate percipi, in some sense or other, is, I take it, a necessary step in all arguments, properly to be called Idealistic, and, what is more, in all arguments hitherto offered for the Idealistic conclusion.7 He continues, If esse is percipi, this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is experienced; and this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that whatever is, is something mental. But this is not the sense in which the Idealist conclusion must maintain that Reality is mental. The Idealist conclusion is that esse is percipere [to be is to perceive]; and hence, whether esse be percipi or not, a further and different discussion is needed to show whether or not it is also percipere. And again, even if esse be percipere, we need a vast quantity of further argument to show that what has esse has also those higher mental qualities which are denoted by spiritual.8
5 6

Moore, Refutation, 2. Moore, Refutation, 3. 7 Moore, Refutation, 5-6 8 Moore, Refutation, 6.

Copyright Ergon 2004 Issue II Author: Brett Gaul Article: Is Moores Criticism of Idealism Uncharitable?

In this passage we see Moore pointing out that esse is percipi is a necessary part of all arguments for Idealism and criticizing Idealists for conflating the former proposition with esse is percipere. As he notes, if esse is percipi, then whatever there is, is perceived, i.e., experienced. However, if Idealists hold only esse is percipi, they lack an explanation for the existence of whatever it is that is doing the perceiving. If esse is percipi, what is it that perceives whatever it is that recognizes the relationship between esse and percipi? For whatever it is that recognizes the relationship between esse and percipi to exist itself, it must also be perceived. This is why Moore says that the Idealist conclusion must be esse is percipere. He is pointing out that, even before disambiguating esse is percipi, Idealists have to show that esse is percipere for Idealism to be true. Nevertheless, because Moore thinks all Idealists use esse is percipi as a premise in an argument that yields the conclusion esse is percipere he also thinks that if can demonstrate that esse is percipi is false in all the senses ever given to it, he will have refuted Idealism. Moore thinks that that problem with the phrase esse is percipi is the copula is. He distinguishes three senses of esse is percipi, where percipi must be understood to include not sensation only, but that other type of mental fact, which is called thought. . . .9 One meaning of the phrase is that the words esse and percipi are synonymous. 10 Another meaning is that although what is meant by esse is not absolutely identical with what is meant by percipi, the former includes the latter as a part of its meaning. 11 However, the only important meaning of the phrase for Moore is the one distinguished

Moore, Refutation, 7. Moore, Refutation, 8. 11 Moore, Refutation, 9.

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third: that the part x is necessarily connected with the part percipi.12 He explains, Esse is percipi asserts that wherever you have x you also have percipi that whatever has the property x also has the property that it is experienced.13 Moore characterizes the third meaning of esse is percipi as a necessary synthetic proposition because in addition to asserting that whatever has esse has percipi, the proposition also asserts a necessary connexion between esse on the one hand and percipi on the other; these two words denoting each a distinct term, and esse denoting a term in which that denoted by percipi is not included.14 Moore thinks that if the Idealist understands esse is percipi as a necessary synthetic proposition, it cannot be refuted. However, it can have another senseone that is falseand Moore believes that Idealists all hold this important falsehood.15 All Idealists hold this important falsehood, he asserts, because [t]hey do not perceive that Esse is percipi must, if true, be merely a self-evident synthetic truth, not a necessary one.16 Esse is percipi must be merely a self-evident truth because Idealists must assert that whatever is experienced, is necessarily so, and this doctrine they commonly express by saying that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject.17 But Moore thinks that the doctrine must be false because it is selfcontradictory.18 Moore begins his demonstration of how the doctrine that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject (the third sense of esse is percipi) is selfcontradictory by discussing necessary truths and analytic truths. He writes, [N]ecessary
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Moore, Refutation, 10. Moore, Refutation, 10. 14 Moore, Refutation, 11. 15 Moore, Refutation, 12. 16 Moore, Refutation, 12. 17 Moore, Refutation, 12. 18 Moore, Refutation, 12.

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truths in general, but especially those of which it is said that the opposite is inconceivable, have been commonly supposed to be analytic, in the sense that the proposition denying them was self-contradictory.19 Thus, those who think this way think that the law of contradiction alone can prove many truths.20 Among Idealists, however, it has become more fashionable to assert that truths are both analytic and synthetic. 21 But, Moore writes, if we understand analytic in the sense just defined, namely, what is proved by the law of contradiction alone, it is plain that, if synthetic means what is not proved by this alone, no truth can be both analytic and synthetic.22 Idealists think that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject, he suggests, because they think it is an analytic truth in this restricted sense that it is proved by the law of contradiction alone.23 According to Moore the Idealist maintains that object and subject are necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct, that they are two, at all.24 Maintaining that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject means that the Idealist thinks yellow is absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow.25 Moore writes, To assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellowa purely identical proposition, and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone. Of course, the proposition also implies that experience is, after all, something distinct from yellowelse there would be no reason for insisting that yellow is a sensation: and that the argument thus both
19 20

Moore, Refutation, 12. Moore, Refutation, 12. 21 Moore, Refutation, 12. 22 Moore, Refutation, 13. 23 Moore, Refutation, 13. 24 Moore, Refutation, 13. 25 Moore, Refutation, 13-14.

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affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct, is what sufficiently refutes it.26 A few lines later he continues, The facts present themselves as a kind of antinomy: (1) Experience is something unique and different from anything else; (2) Experience of green is entirely indistinguishable from green; two propositions which cannot both be true. Idealists, holding both, can only take refuge in arguing from the one in some connexions and from the other in others.27 Moore acknowledges that some Idealists do think that yellow is not absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow. However, these Idealists assert that the two form an inseparable unity.28 Although a distinction between yellow and the sensation of yellow is asserted, Moore writes, it is also asserted that the things distinguished form an organic unity. But, forming such a unity, it is held, each would not be what it is apart from its relation to the other. Hence to consider either by itself is to make an illegitimate abstraction.29 Thus, although some Idealists maintain that yellow is not absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow, they never consider it legitimate to abstract one from the other. So, it is not true that one can consider yellow apart from the sensation of yellow after all. Moore writes of the principle of organic unities, [a]nd this principle, so far from being a useful truth, is necessarily false. For if the whole can, nay must, be substituted for the part in all propositions and for all purposes, this can only be because the whole is absolutely identical with the part.30 Therefore, Idealists are committed to

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Moore, Refutation, 14. Moore, Refutation, 14. 28 Moore, Refutation, 14. 29 Moore, Refutation, 15. 30 Moore, Refutation, 15.

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the self-contradictory view that yellow is absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow. Thus, Idealism is false. II Durrants first criticism of Moores argument is (1) that Moore can be held to have a misconception of the nature of metaphysics at least in the sense of revisionary metaphysics and consequently that none of the interpretations of Esse is percipi which he offers does justice to Esse is percipi as a principle of a metaphysical or revisionary metaphysical scheme. Durrant argues that Moore misunderstands how the Idealist conceives of the nature of metaphysics. While, according to P.F. Strawson, [d]escriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.31 Durrant understands the Idealist as offering a revisionary metaphysics, and chastises Moore for interpreting the Idealist as offering a descriptive metaphysics. Because revisionary metaphysics is concerned with producing a better structure of our thought about the world and not a description of what we think the actual structure of the world is, Durrant criticizes Moores opening remarks that intimate that the Idealist position is absurd. After Moore opens by characterizing Modern Idealism as an assertion that the universe is spiritual and saying that such as assertion is thought to imply (1) that the universe is not what it appears, and (2) that the universe has many of the properties that we do not think it does, he elaborates on his first point. He writes, Chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far

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P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), 9.

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more like us than we think.32 Durrant asserts that [s]uch remarks make it look as if the Idealists are intending to talk within the language of common sense, within the metaphysics of common sense, when this is not what they intend. They reject the common sense scheme in favour of, e.g., a scheme based on immediate experience.33 He adds, Reality is spiritual or Everything exhibits a form of consciousness, are not, as metaphysical theses and hence as revisionary metaphysical theses, descriptions of the world internal to some scheme or system, e.g. the common sense scheme, but rather present a scheme, or part of a scheme, for describing the world, for organising the manifold of experience. Moore has, I suggest, misunderstood the nature of metaphysical theses, holding metaphysical theses and hence revisionary metaphysical to be theses within a system of description of experience, in particular within the common sense system of description of the world and, as theses within that system, incompatible with its fundamental principles and hence rejectable. In that Moore has so misunderstood, he has a misconception of the nature of metaphysics and hence of revisionary metaphysics. It is, of course, absurd to those who work within a system of description or use of language in which chairs and tables, cups and saucers, are clearly to be distinguished from human beings (and other sentient beings) to say that cups and saucers, chairs and tables have consciousness. To so say within that language, that system of discourse, would be nonsense. . . . 34 Because Durrant thinks that Moore has misunderstood the nature of the metaphysical theses offered by Idealists, he thinks that none of the interpretations of esse is percipi which Moore offers does justice to esse is percipi. However, Durrants criticism does no damage to Moores argument. First, the terms revisionary metaphysics and descriptive metaphysics originally appear only (as

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Moore, Refutation, 1. Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, 29. 34 Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, 29-30.

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far as I can tell) in Strawsons 1959 bookStrawson himself appears to have come up with the distinctionbut Moores The Refutation of Idealism was published in 1903. Thus, if the distinction between revisionary metaphysical theses and descriptive ones was not made not until 1959, it is not appropriate to take Moore to task for failing to recognize this distinction. Second, even if Moore were aware of the revisionary and descriptive labels and knew that the Idealists were offering revisionary metaphysical theses, he still has a good reason for criticizing Idealism: it is inconsistent with common sense. Although Durrant criticizes Moore for precisely this, Moores comparison of the Idealist worldview with the common sense one is justified. Durrant argues that Idealists should be interpreted as presenting a better structure of our thought about the world, not a description of what the actual structure of the world is. However, even if Idealists are merely offering a better structure of our thought about the world, it seems justified to question whether the structure is consistent with what we know (or think we know) about the structure of the world. Of course, it is possible that the structure of the world is very different from what we think it is, but any offered structure of the world that is radically different from the common sense view and is given no support can and should be criticized. For if all Idealists are doing is offering possible structures of the world, why should any of their suggestions be better than any other? On the assumption that Idealists also think that their proposed structures of the world are correct, and therefore descriptive, it seems fair to criticize their proposals if they seem very different from how we think we experience the world. How we think we experience the world is the only criterion we have to judge whether one conception of the structure of the world is more accurate than any other. It is possible that we could be mistaken about the structure of the

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world, but any offered structure that seems vastly different from how we think we experience the world must have something in its favor if it is to be taken seriously. Durrants second criticism of Moores argument is (2) that all three interpretations Moore offers for the is in Esse is percipi are open to objection both on the grounds of misunderstanding and confusion and that hence his conclusion that the sense he has found for Esse is percipi is such that no would believe that it was true is defective. Moores three interpretations are (1) that the words esse and percipi are synonymous; (2) that although what is meant by esse is not absolutely identical with what is meant by percipi, the former includes the latter as a part of its meaning; and (3) that wherever you have esse you also have percipi that whatever has the property x also has the property that it is experienced. Regarding interpretation (1), Durrant agrees with Moore that the Idealist is not offering synonyms. He writes, He [an Idealist] would consider himself as putting forward a fundamental truth; but in that the truth he advocates is a principle which we may construe as what Strawson would call a revisionary metaphysical principle, then I hold we have the following position: (i) It is a principle of the Idealist system that whatever is, is experienced and this may be expressed as: (ii) For any occurrence of esse one substitutes percipi. It is this interpretation of the principle as a rule for the use of esse within the revisionary metaphysical scheme of Idealism that I advocate as an interpretation which gives justice to Esse is percipi; that is a grammatical remark, grammatical rule for the system advocated by the Idealist. And it is this interpretation which Moore fails to consider for the reason that whilst acknowledging Esse is percipi is a metaphysical

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principle, he nevertheless regards it as a proposition made within the conceptual scheme of ordinary language, common sense.35 However, if Idealists are offering a better structure of the world, it seems justified to question whether or not the structure is consistent with what we know or think we know about the structure of the world. Because the proposition For any occurrence of esse one substitutes percipi is inconsistent with what we know about being and being perceived, Moores rejection of this interpretation of esse is percipi is warranted. Concerning interpretations (2) that esse is not absolutely identical with percipi but includes the latter as a part of its meaning and (3) that wherever you have esse you also have percipi that whatever has the property x also has the property that it is experienced, Durrant again argues that these interpretations suppose that the Idealist is offering a descriptive metaphysical thesis, not a revisionary one. But my earlier response is still appropriate here. To be true, any proposed structure of the world will likely have to be consistent with what we know about the world. Thus, it is appropriate to reject any structure that is not consistent with what we know. Finally, Durrant argues, (3) that Moore does not show that the Idealist contradicts himself in his thesis that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject and hence that Esse is percipi in particular is inherently self-contradictory and, more generally, that the position of the Idealist is inherently self-contradictory. One might think that Durrant would try a new tactic here, but he does not. His third major criticism of Moores argument again rests on Moores supposed confusion about what the Idealist is attempting to do. Moore argues that the Idealist contradicts himself in his thesis
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Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, 32-33.

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that the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject because it means that the Idealist thinks yellow is absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow. But how can yellow be absolutely identical with the sensation of yellow? In other words, how can yellow be absolutely identical with the sensation of itself? Durrant responds, To such points an Idealist could reply that whilst ordinary language, common sense, makes a clear distinction between colours and sensations of colours (colour sensations), he does not; and since he can plausibly hold that it is not a necessary truth that one subscribes to the dictates of common sense, and furthermore that he positively rejects the common sense, our ordinary language conceptual scheme, in favour of e.g., a scheme based on immediate experience, he may consistently hold, as he does, that the colour yellow (e.g.) is no less than, is not to be distinguished from, the sensation of yellow, from a yellow sensation. It is not, as Moore claims, that he, the Idealist, fails to see that there is something more in sensation of yellow than in yellow; for him there precisely is not. Colours are reducible to sensations of colours, colour sensations, in his language game, conceptual scheme, and he is yet to be supplied with a reason, other than a question begging one which would bar him from such a thesis.36 But again, ordinary language or common sense is all we have as a criterion to judge whether one proposed structure of the world is better than another. Because this is so, it seems likely that the most nearly accurate structure will have to be one that is consistent with what we know about the world. If Idealists protest that their point is not to say which proposed structure of the world is best, that they are merely offering views for consideration, what is their point? Offering revisionary metaphysical theses that are radically different from what we know about the world seems of little value unless it is thought that such theses are also descriptive as well.

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Contra Durrant and Strawson, I think it can be argued that all revisionary theses are, and should be interpreted as, descriptive theses. All new descriptive metaphysical theses are trivially revisionary because they are non-identical to the descriptive theses that came before them. One new descriptive thesis, call it thesis A, can be more revisionary than another, call it thesis B, if A differs more from the current commonly held thesis than B does. Both new theses must be taken as offering descriptions of the world, however. If metaphysical theses are not intended to describe the actual world at all (and this indeed is how Durrant and Strawson understand revisionary metaphysical theses), the theses seem useful only for conceptual playan intellectual game of What if the structure of the world were x? If revisionary theses are to be philosophically interesting to othersthose who are not part playing the gamethe theses must be descriptive. Although Durrant relies heavily on Strawsons revisionary/descriptive distinction to criticize Moores attack on Idealism, Strawson himself intimates that the distinction between the two kinds of metaphysical theses is not as sharp as he initially makes it out to be. After stating that descriptive metaphysics describes the actual structure of the world and revisionary metaphysics produces a better structure, Strawson admits that [r]evisionary metaphysics is at the service of descriptive metaphysics. Perhaps no actual metaphysician has ever been, both in intention and effect, wholly the one thing or the other.37 Consequently, in addition to faulting Durrants argument because (1) Moore wrote The Refutation of Idealism in 1903 while the distinction between revisionary metaphysical theses and descriptive ones does not appear to have been explicitly made

36 37

Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, 39. Strawson, Individuals, 9.

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until 1959; (2) no other philosopher besides Strawson (at least to my knowledge) has recognized this distinction; and (3) that even if Moore were aware of the revisionary and descriptive labels and knew that the Idealists were offering revisionary metaphysical theses, he still has a good reason for criticizing Idealism because it is inconsistent with common sense; we seem justified in adding a another charge: (4) Durrant himself misunderstands the nature of revisionary metaphysical theses. A revisionary thesis is merely a descriptive thesis that is non-identical to any other. Therefore, contra Durrant, Moore was right to interpret Idealism as a descriptive metaphysical thesis. III Although I think Durrants criticism of Moores argument fails, I join him in holding that the Idealists position in untenable in a radical sense. Durrant thinks the Idealists position is untenable because the distinction between yellow and the sensation of yellow is a necessary presupposition which the Idealist implicitly has to acknowledge if he is to offer a coherent account of the identity of colour sensations within his revised metaphysical scheme.38 While I agree that even within a revised metaphysical scheme the Idealist implicitly has to presuppose what he explicitly denies, I also contend that it is legitimate to regard the Idealists position as untenable because it conflicts with our common sense thinking about the world (e.g., that in our ordinary language or conceptual scheme yellow is distinguished from the sensation of yellow). Thus, Moore is not being uncharitable to Idealism. Idealism simply does not provide the best explanation of how we experience reality.

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Bibliography Ducasse, C.J. Moores The Refutation of Idealism. In The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 225-251. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1942. Durrant, Michael. On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi. Philosophical Investigations 23, no. 1 (January 2000): 26-47. Moore, G.E. A Reply to My Critics. In The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 653-660. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1942. Moore, G.E. The Refutation of Idealism. In Philosophical Studies, 1-30. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922. Strawson, P.F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1959.

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Durrant, On Moores Refutation of Esse is Percipi, 47.