Valencia v. CA GR No.

119118 Feb 19, 2001

The case was re-raffled to Branch 6 presided by Judge Ildefonso E. Gascon. The former previous judge inhibited himself from the case due to the administrative complaint filed against him by petitioner. On January 26, 1994, Judge Gascon denied the motion for execution and deferred action on the petition for relief. He found the motion bereft of cogent and good reasons under Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the portion of the decision aimed to be executed had been vacated by private respondents appeal. Further, he found there were no special circumstances that justify urgency in the execution of the judgment, and which could outweigh the injury or damage in case of reversal of judgment. The trial court also said that a grant of the petition for relief during the pendency of the appeal would pre-empt the appellate courts ruling in case private respondents would appeal. The court added that they were entitled to have their appeal given due course, otherwise, the grant of the petition might bring incalculable harm to them. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. He contended that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his motion for execution pending appeal and to defer action on his petition for relief. He further claimed that the portion of the judgment dismissing his counterclaim was null and void for lack of due process. In their Comment, private respondents averred that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to execute pending appeal and deferring its action on the petition for relief. They claimed petitioner was forum-shopping when he filed a complaint for annulment of judgment. They insisted that the trial courts dismissal of the counterclaim was correct. On October 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for execution pending appeal. According to the appellate court, it is clear from Section 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that it is discretionary for the trial court to grant or deny a motion for execution. Thus, it cannot be compelled to allow execution, after finding that there was no cogent and good reason for it. Further, the CA said a reading of the trial courts order revealed that the denial of the motion is anchored on both law and jurisprudence, which hardly indicated grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court concluded that there was nothing capricious or whimsical in the trial courts decision to defer action on the petition for relief on the ground that it would pre-empt the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Lastly, since the petition for relief remained to be resolved by the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not deem it appropriate to pass upon the issue of whether the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim was a violation of his right to due process Issue: Should the trial court have granted the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38?

Valencia entered into a lease agreement with the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM) involving a fishpond, registered in the latters. The people of Barrio Sta. Cruz, Paombong, (private respondents), filed a complaint against RCBM, with the RTC for declaration of nullity of the OCT of the fishpond. Respondents alleged that they were the true owners of the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere trustee. They prayed for the issuance of an injunction to prevent RCBM from leasing the fishpond or in case it had already been leased, from implementing the lease. The RTC judge granted the injunction. Later, the judge allowed, Bagtas, the lessee of the private respondents to operate the fishpond subject to the supervision of the court. This dispossessed Petitioner Valencia. He thus filed an answer in intervention with a counterclaim in the case and moved to set aside the order allowing Bagtas to operate the fishpond. Bagtas operation of the fishpond was terminated, but he moved for reconsideration. This was granted. After presentation of evidence and submission for decision, the RTC Judge dismissed the main case motupropio for lack of jurisdiction, saying the case was under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Both parties moved to reconsider, thus the case was scheduled anew for pretrial. Petitioner was not informed thereof, hence he failed to attend the pre-trial. On that day, Judge Masadao issued an order stating that the parties adopted the evidence already presented and considered the case submitted for decision. Petitioners former counsel received a copy of the order but failed to inform petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment upholding the validity of RCBMs title and its lease contract with petitioner.However, he dismissed petitioners counterclaim for lack of evidence. Upon belatedly learning of said judgment, petitioner moved for execution pending appeal, contending that since the trial court found him entitled to possession of the fishpond, it is unfair to deprive him thereof. Meanwhile, he filed a petition for relief from the portion of the judgment dismissing his counterclaim, where he alleged that his failure to move for reconsideration of or appeal from said judgment was due to a mistaken belief of his former counsel that he was no longer interested to pursue the counterclaim.

Held: No, the the Trial Court and the CA did not err in denying the petition/refusing to compel the RTC to grant the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Ratio: Second, should the trial court have allowed the petition for relief? Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to compel the trial court to act on the petition for relief. According to him, the trial courts duty under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, except sections 4 & 6 thereof, is ministerial such that upon finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the judge must order the other party to answer, conduct a hearing and decide whether to grant or deny the petition. The judge was therefore remiss in his duty when he deferred action on the petition, since his only role was either to dismiss or grant it, according to petitioner. Private respondents argue that the trial court was correct in deferring action on the petition for relief, in the interest of justice and equity. To grant the petition pending private respondents appeal, they aver, would pre-empt the Court of Appeals. This, they say, is not abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. We find no merit in petitioners argument. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment. In this case, the trial courts judgment subject of the petition for relief has not yet attained finality because of the timely appeal by private respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot require the judge to follow the procedure laid down in Rule 38. The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion when he deferred action on the petition. Corollarily, the Court of Appeals did not err in failing to annul the portion of the trial courts judgment dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of due process. This can well be settled in the petition for relief before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that parties can avail of the action for annulment of judgment when a petition for relief is no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In the present case, the latter remedy was still available.

The trial court directed respondent NHA to maintain the status quo ante and set for the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunctive relief. NHA Answerwith Special and Affirmative Defenses. The lower court granted the injunction. Private respondent Asis filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to which the NHA filed its Comment followed by the formers Reply. On 8 March 1988 the trial court dismissed the petition of private respondent after taking into account the unequivocal admission and recognition by the NHA of the title of Asis. The order however, was amended later on. Private respondents counsel received the order of 8 March on 21 March 1988, and by counsel for the NHA on 22 March 1988. Both parties through counsel received the amendatory order on 14 April 1988. Petitioners Mago and Macasinag, on the other hand, learned of the 30 March 1988 Order on 24 May 1988. On 2 August 1988 petitioner Antonio Mago and DaniloMacasinag filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, and on the same day filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order. Private respondent Rolando Asis opposed the Motion for Leave to Intervene contending that it was too late as the questioned order of 30 March 1988 had long become final as no appeal was taken therefrom. On 30 January 1989 the trial court denied the motion to intervene for lack of merit. It declared at the same time that the Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order was "inutile without the movants having been allowed to intervene." Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was similarly rejected. On appeal petitioners prayed for the liberal interpretation of procedural rules contending that they were indispensable parties and that there were events and circumstances which warranted their intervention in Civil Case No. Q-52319. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that the plea for liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court was not well taken More facts, from the SC ratio: Prior to PD No. 1315, Francisco Mago, the brother of petitioner Antonio Mago, was in continuous and actual possession and occupation of the disputed land consisting of eighty (80) square meters, more or less, having purchased the right over the lot and the structure thereon sometime in September 1976. Subsequently, the Mago brothers constructed a 3-door apartment and leased it to several tenants among whom was petitioner DaniloMacasinag. Respondent Rolando Asis, on the other hand, occupied the southern portion thereof by mere tolerance, constructing a shanty thereon covering an area of approximately eighteen (18) square meters. Subsequently, on 11 June 1977 Letters of Instruction Nos. 555 and 557 were issued by the President declaring as a national policy that slum improvement, otherwise known as upgrading of sites and services, is an acceptable approach to meeting the

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,1994 and February 10, 1995, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Mago v CA GR No. 115624 February 25, 1999 On 19 November 1987 private respondent Rolando Asis filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition(for: Injunction and Prohibition with Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order) against public respondent NHA to prevent it from "acting upon the recommendation for cancellation of the award" in his favor set forth in its Resolution-

housing needs of the country and the primary strategy for dealing with slums, squatter areas and other blighted communities in urban areas. On 21 July 1977 Executive Order No. 6-77 was also issued by the Governor of Metro Manila adopting a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which addressed the problem of all 415 identified slums and other blighted communities in Metro Manila. On 26 March 1978[24 the President further issued PD No. 1315 designating the National Housing Authority as Administrator of the Urban Land Reform in behalf of the National Government. On 11 June 1978 the President promulgated PD No. 1517 declaring the entire Metro Manila as an Urban Land Reform Zone. A "census of occupants" was conducted along with a tagging of structures in the entire Bagong Barrio to determine the qualified beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the Project. The structures owned by Francisco Mago and the shanty occupied by Asis on the land owned by Mago were among those given ZIP Tag Numbers. On 7 May 1980 Francisco Mago executed in favor of his brother, petitioner Antonio Mago, a Deed of Conveyance transferring all his rights, interests and participation over the structure. A reblocking plan was made by the NHA for Bagong Barrio and the area occupied by the structure of Francisco Mago, later conveyed to Antonio Mago, was marked. This also included the area occupied by private respondent Asis. But unknown to Mago and Macasinag, the awarding of lots to qualified structure owners started in 1980 and the NHA, by mistake, awarded the whole lot to private respondent. Upon discovery of the erroneous award, Francisco Mago complained to the NHA BagongBarrio which readily acknowledged its mistake. This was how the "KasunduanngPaghahatingLote" came about, which was drawn and signed by private respondent Asis agreeing to the division of the lot equally between him and petitioners. Ironically, on 30 October 1980 the NHA-Main Office in Quezon City executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage of the entire lot in favor of Asis and issued TCT No. C-39786 on 27 November 1980. On 15 October 1981 Antonio Mago filed a complaint before the NHA assailing this transaction. On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan received a complaint from private respondent Asis captioned "Rolando Asis v. Antonio Mago and DaniloMacasinag" for recovery of possession, damages and preliminary injunction despite the pendency of the action before the NHA.

As for the Petition for Relief from Judgment, the Rules of Court provides for its time frame A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceedings was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The Court of Appeals ruled that the time of filing of the petition must satisfy both periods as indicated in the Rule within sixty (60) days after knowledge of order and not more than six (6) months after entry. However, a few days in excess of the 60-day requirement is not fatal as long as it is filed within six (6) months from issuance of the order. In this case, the petition was filed nine (9) days after the 60-day period but it was still well within the 6-month period. As to the issue of failure to demonstrate the presence of fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence in the affidavits of merit, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that even the absence of an affidavit of merit in itself is not a fatal defect to warrant denial of the petition so long as the facts required to be set out also appear in the verified petition.Furthermore, a petition for relief without a separate affidavit of merit is sufficient where facts constituting petitioners substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be, are alleged. The oath elevates the petition to the same category as a separate affidavit. In this case, the allegations of accident and excusable negligence, although not expounded on the affidavits of merit, were nevertheless substantiated on the verified petition.Therefore, there was substantial compliance. In disposing of petitioners' motion to intervene, both the trial court and the appellate court confined themselves to the discussion of timeliness (which was not even disputed) and chose to ignore the bigger, far more important picture, i.e., the substantial rights of petitioners which were never passed upon for the simple reason that they were not impleaded by private respondent in his petition for prohibition. The facts (See SC Ratio facts) should have convinced the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a less stringent application of the Rules of Court was the more prudent recourse. Indeed, the exercise of discretion has often been characterized as odious; but where the necessity exists for its exercise, a judge is bound not to shirk from the responsibility devolving in him. For it is in relaxing the rules that we ultimately serve the ends of equity and justice based not on folly grounds but on substance and merit. Dispositive Portion WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 23 July 1993 affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City dated 30 January 1989 and 6 June 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court a quo is ordered to GRANT the motion to intervene of petitioners Antonio Mago and DaniloMacasinag and proceed to hear with dispatch their Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order in Civil Case No. Q-52319.

Issue Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment should be allowed despite failure to file despite failure to file within the period Held: Yes, the circumstances are meritorious enough to allow a liberal application of the rules.

Ratio: