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PROFILE
NAMES OF MEMBERS Roll No.

Jyoti Dhumal Nilam Ghatkar Anup Kumbhar Pravinkumar Misal Vipul Sinha STANDARD SUBJECT ENVIRONMENTAL NAGEMENT TOPIC MUMBAI : : :

11 12 21 26 34 F.Y.B.M.S.

MA FLOOD IN

COLLEGE NAME AND ADDRESS Gokhale Education Socieys Shri Bhausaheb Vartak Arts, Com & Sci College And Sheth Kanji V. Parekh Arts & Com Junior College Near MHB Colony, Borivali (w), Mumbai 400 091.

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF Prof. Zanake

We are happy & satisfied at this movement to represent this project. This was not just due to efforts made by us but also due to the proper guidance & requisite facilities provided by our supporter. Many people contribute to this project & we would like to thank them all. We are also thankful to them for being so committed to this project. The knowledge & experience that we have gained at Shri Bhauaheb Vertak Arts, Commerce & Science College has helped us a lot in developing this project.
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Flood In Mumbai Nature Of Monsoon Mumbai Flooding Forecasting of Urban Flooding Disasters And Development

Press Releases Death Rate Toll People Misusing Flood Situation Effect On Transport

System

Conclusion And Bibiliography

FLOOD IN MUMBAI

The death toll nears 1,000.The city is the financial capital of India and the place where many companies based in Europe and the US have moved software development teams as well as call and support centers in a bid to cut costs. The floods have caused havoc in the city, with meteorologists recording 949mm of rain on 26 July. Bloomberg reported Indian officials estimate the disaster will cost the city $1bn in restructuring and loss of business. Despite the closure of banks and exchanges on Friday the city did its best to open for business today but reports suggest that infrastructure and workforces are still struggling. The local trains are cut off and most of the roads are underwater. The emergency services were not able to respond and the administration has failed to anticipate and respond. "Many of the bigger businesses, especially outsourcing centers, have been affected. Many of the financial centers... have been affected and their business continuity has come under pressure. Even though the damage is not that high, some people cannot turn up to work. In addition to the general chaos that surrounds natural disasters, some companies have failed to prepare for flood scenarios and this is testing their disaster recovery plans. "One of the main

issues is the large number of buildings with basements - water has flooded these basements where the control systems are, so you can't have power and you can't even get in there," he said. "Mobile networks were affected and large parts of landlines too. Internet backbone services went down for three days. Even people in Delhi have reported being unable to withdraw cash from ATMs as a result of systems failures in Mumbai. The Citibank, ICICI, HSBC and the Reserve Bank of India is all reported to have experienced problems with ATM networks. In an emailed statement to silicon.com, Citibank admitted it had suffered difficulties: "The impact of Mumbai rains was limited to a few ATMs that had to be shutdown on account of power shutdown, loss of connectivity or water logging in the buildings/complexes housing the ATMs. The majority of our ATMs in Mumbai are functional and there has been absolutely no impact to ATMs in other parts of the country. The company failed to respond to requests for comment on how its backend systems and call centers had dealt with the floods, as did HSBC, which had been reported in the Indian press as having problems. But Mark Kobayashi-Hillary, global research director for the Commonwealth Business Council Technologies, said most outsourcing centers are based far enough away from the disaster zone for them not to be affected. It can imagine that anyone who has business [near the area] will have problems - even just shifting staff around will be a problem. But most of the financial buildings are quite a way out of Mumbai. They are in Navi Mumbai. They are quite removed." More than 15 million people live in Mumbai. Add comment Print By definition, an extreme weather event is one which does not commonly occur at a given place and in a given season, and it is 'extreme' only in a relative sense. A temperature of 45 C on a summer afternoon in Jaisalmer would not be categorized as an extreme event, but it would certainly be regarded as one if Shimla recorded that temperature. When long-period climate normal are computed, extreme values get averaged out, losing the attention they deserve. It is only when an extreme event assumes the nature of a disaster, with heavy loss of life and property, that it becomes a matter of importance, examination, discussion and of course, controversy. Whatever the nature of the disaster, the following questions are commonly asked: ?? Can the natural phenomenon be scientifically explained? ?? Could it have been predicted? ?? Could the disaster have been averted?
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?? Was the response adequate? ?? Who or what was responsible for the loss of life and destruction? ?? How can a similar tragedy be avoided in future? The answers to some of these questions can be found in the way we live. Human beings generally adapt themselves to their surroundings. They tune their lives to the mean values of rainfall, temperature, river levels or ground water in their vicinity. They do not live in a constant fear of the unknown or highly improbable events. Imagine how miserable life would be, if one were to think all the time of dying, which, incidentally, is an event of the highest certainty! The other human trait is to encroach upon the surroundings, exploit natural resources, cut corners, build new pathways, and make life easier and more convenient. Actually all living creatures exploit nature in their own ways, but human interference with the environment is unmatched in both extent and ingenuity. Nature tolerates it, but only up to a certain point. Once that threshold is crossed, both natural and human systems cannot take it any more, and we are into what is termed as a disaster situation.

The Nature of Monsoon Rains


We are indeed fortunate that while the impacts of global warming and climate change are being increasingly felt all around us, the Indian southwest monsoon is one phenomenon that stands out for its annual regularity. It is often said that life in India revolves around the monsoons. The monsoon brings prosperity, music, dance and romance. But like many other things in life, the monsoon too carries a price tag: 'variability'. While the monsoon comes with a reassuring regularity, it exhibits a wide range of variability on the spatial, temporal, intra-seasonal, inter-annual and decadal scale. This makes all the difference between floods and droughts, between Cherrapunji and Jaisalmer, between Mumbai and Ahmednagar. When the monsoon rains are timely and equitable, we do not bother, but when they are not, reality dawns once again. The monsoon has always had its vagaries and it is going to show them in future too. The Western Ghats run parallel to the west coast about 50 km inland at an average height of 1.2 km. The strong winds of the southwest monsoon, carrying the moisture-laden clouds from the Arabian Sea, get pushed up on encountering the Ghats. When the clouds reach a height where they can no longer hold the moisture, they precipitate heavily.
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The normal annual rainfall of the meteorological sub-division of Konkan and Goa is 298 cm, more than the normal annual rainfall of 279 cm over the Assam and Meghalaya sub-division which includes Cherrapunji, and a little less than the normal annual rainfall of 306 cm over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The normal annual rainfall of the Madhya Maharashtra sub-division is just 85 cm, which is only a little better than that of 68 cm over East Rajasthan (IMD, 2005a) On the time scale of a day, there are many past instances of Indian stations having recorded as much as half of their annual rainfall, and some times even more than their annual rainfall, in one single day (Dharetal, 1981). Rainfall of 50 cm or more in a 24-hour period is not an uncommon phenomenon at all (Rakhecha et al, 1980). Mumbai Rains of 26 July 2005. The observatory at Santa Cruz in north Mumbai recorded a rainfall of 94.4 cm during the 24 hours ending at 8:30 am on 27 July 2005, while the Colaba observatory in Mumbai's southern tip recorded barely 7.3 cm in the same period. Rainfall over Vihar Lake was 105 cm, even higher than Santa Cruz. The previous record of heaviest 24-hour rainfall over Mumbai was 58 cm for Santa Cruz and 37 cm for Colaba on 5 July 1974 (IMD, 2005b). Comparatively speaking, only Santa Cruz broke the previous record. For Colaba, the rainfall was in no way unusual. Heavy rainfall (more than 20 cm) is quite common for Mumbai during the onset phase of the monsoon. It is caused by a convergence of the dry winds blowing at that time from the north with the advancing moist southwesterly winds of the monsoon, coupled with the development of an onset vortex either over the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal. However, after the monsoon has set in and goes into its active phase, the synoptic situation is conducive to the occurrence of very heavy rains over Mumbai when it has the following features collectively: (1) development of a low pressure area over the northwest Bay of Bengal, (2) intensification of the monsoon trough and development of embedded convective vortices over central India, (3) strengthening of the Arabian Sea current of the monsoon, and (4) super positioning of a meso-scale off-shore vortex over northeast Arabian Sea and its northward movement. All these conditions were met on 26 July 2005 (Shyamala, 2005). The Mumbai downpour was the result of a combination of synoptic scale weather systems which have a span of 1000-2000 km, with mesa-scale systems which are localized and extend over 20-30 km only.
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Mumbai Flooding
An analysis of the probability of such extreme events and their expected return period based on historical data going back to 1886 for Colaba and 1957 for Santa Cruz reveals that in any year, the probability of 24-hr rainfall exceeding 20 cm is 50% for Santa Cruz and 33% for Colaba. The return period for a 20 cm rainfall over Mumbai is 2 to 3 years (Shyamala, 2005). [Return period, see box in the article by A C Tyagi. - Ed.] On 5 July 1974, Mumbai had received 58 cm in a single monsoon day and the city had taken it in its stride. Just five years ago, on 13 July 2000, Mumbai had recorded exceptionally heavy rains: Vasai 49, Thane 45, Santa Cruz 37 and Colaba 25 cm. This makes it clear that it was not the rainfall, but the inundation, that was truly unprecedented. Never before perhaps had the metropolis experienced anything like it. Suburban trains normally. Came to a grinding halt and 150,000 commuters including schoolchildren got instantly stranded at railway stations. Buses were unable to ply and the roads were bursting to capacity with stagnant northbound traffic. Land lines, mobile phone services and power supply went dead in many areas. Highways connecting the city got blocked and the airport had to be closed. The island city was really marooned. Had Mumbai received the rainfall of 94.4 cm in a day a century ago, the severity of problems would surely have been much less. The population of Greater Bombay, now called Brihan Mumbai, was less than a million at the beginning of the last century. The mid-century figure was around 3 million. By 2001, the population had grown to almost 12 million. The city has risen vertically, open spaces have dwindled, the arterial roads cannot be widened any further, smaller roads have become car parks, and the drainage systems cannot keep pace with the ever-increasing needs of the metropolis. Many people are literally living on the edge, in areas that are known to be prone to landslides. Many different reasons have been ascribed to the Mumbai flooding of 26 July 2005. The two main causes cited are: (1) the uncontrolled urbanization of north Mumbai and the destruction of mangroves, and (2) the inadequacy of the existing drainage system. Some of the arguments, and opinions expressed in the media, are qualitative in nature and based on what has been seen to happen.
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They may even be valid, but they need a critical and objective examination by experts before firm conclusions can be drawn. It is evident that in the process of housing construction and setting up of industries, the waterways that allow the accumulated rain water to drain out have been drastically reduced. Large slum colonies have encroached upon the storm water drains and the Mithi River, which is Mumbai's main river. What is, however, debatable is the destruction of mangroves being made out as one of the factors responsible for flooding. There is no doubt that mangroves serve as a vital link in the ecological chain, acting as a buffer between land and ocean, and that destruction of mangroves will disturb the ecological balance. What needs to be considered in detail is the question whether mangroves, while protecting the coastal belts from the impact of waves, could as well impede the outflow of water from the land.

Forecasting of Urban Flooding


With rivers of central and peninsular regions of the country, flooding is an annual feature, caused by heavy monsoon rainfall over the catchments areas. Flooding in the Himalayan rivers is caused by heavy precipitation in the upper catchments and is aggravated by factors such as rivers changing their course, increase in the silt load, construction of embankments, etc. There is a well-organized system in this country for forecasting of river floods, which is run by the Central Water Commission with the active involvement of the Flood Meteorological Offices of the India Meteorological Department. However, the type of flooding that occurred in Mumbai on 26 July is a very different matter. In fact, here, the term flooding is a misnomer, as it is not the result of water spilling over from a flooded river, but an inundation caused by accumulation of heavy local rainfall. In technical parlance, it is drainage congestion or the inability of the drainage process to match the rainfall rate. Providing protection from drainage congestion is the responsibility of civic bodies or local authorities. Besides the characteristics of the rain storm, many other factors like proximity to rivers and ocean, local

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topography, traffic patterns, drainage design, housing, population density, all influence the severity of drainage congestion. A vital but tricky consideration in the design of drainage systems is the return period of the most extreme rainfall events. Usually an optimum balance has to be struck between over-estimating and underestimating the risks involved and a major deciding factor is the cost. Population growth and urban development over say the next 100 years are also not easy to visualize and the choice of future projections will have its own impact on the design and cost. River floods can be predicted because there is considerable time lag between the occurrence of heavy rainfall in the upper catchments and the consequent build-up of the flood flow in the river, and its travel to a downstream area. Such a lead time is not available in case of drainage congestion caused by local rainfall. Also, the propagation of a flood wave in a river channel is easier to compute. Mathematical or physical modeling of city drainage is, from a hydraulics point of view, a far more complex problem. Also required is a parallel system for quantitative prediction of the rainfall amount and rate on a scale that will match the scale of the hydraulic model. As of today, the state of art in these areas is rather primitive.

Disasters and Development


Two thousand years ago, a great Teacher narrated a parable which made a comparison between wise and foolish builders. The wise person built his house upon a rock while the foolish one built his house on sand. Then the rains came down and the floods went up. The house on the rock firmly withstood the torrents, while the house on the sand came crashing down. In today's world, there can be no argument against development. No one can be denied the right to a better living. But urban growth has to be controlled and planned on the strong foundations of wisdom, foresight and discipline. Otherwise more disasters may be just waiting to happen.

References

1. Dhar O.N. and Mandal B.N, 1981, Greatest observed one-day point and area rainfall of India, Pune applied vol. 119, pp. 922-933 2. India Meteorological Department, Pune, 2005a, Annual Climate Summary 2004 3. India Meteorological Department, Pune, 2005b, Climate Diagnostics Bulletin July 2005

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4. Rakhecha P.R. et al, 1990, Homogeneous zones of heavy rainfall of 1-day duration over India, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, vol. 41, pp. 213-219 5. Shyamala B, 2005, Personal communication complete collapse of Governance in Maharashtra. The deluge in Mumbai and its environs on July 25 and 26 may have been an act of nature. But the shocking incompetence of the state government and the total lack of coordination among the administration, civic and police officials alone is to be blamed for the incalculable loss of precious human lives and property. To draw public attention to these measures that are crying to be undertaken, Citizens for Justice and Peace organized a press conference on Tuesday, August 2, 2005 at the Mumbai Marathi Patrakar Sangh in Mumbai. The well-attended press conference was addressed by Mr. Cyrus Guzder (Trustee, CJP), Mr. D.M. Sukhthankar (former Municipal Commissioner, Mumbai and former chief secretary, Government of Maharashtra), Mr. Titoo Ahluwalia (Trustee, CJP), Rahul Bose (Film Actor), Teesta Setalvad (Secretary, CJP), Dolphy DSouza (President, Bombay Catholic Sabha), Sumita Kulkarni (Sr. Manager, Child Relief and You-- CRY), and Chayyabehn Megear (President, All India Human Rights Citizens Option).

The following is the press release issued at the press conference

PRESS RELEASE
Mumbai city, Raigad District, many other parts of the Konkan and now other parts of Maharashtra have received exceptional rainfall on 26 July 05 and for almost a week there after. Since the last two days the overflow of the Koyna and other dam have plunged other areas of the state into crises. However, within a few hours of the initial cloudburst on 26 July, when the first 20-25 cms. May have fallen, large parts of the city, including its major street arteries, railway corridors, the Airport and large tracts of residential areas, became severely waterlogged. Not only was there large damage to property, dislocation of civic life and unimaginable loss of life. The water logging of the city and its

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environs, the interruption of power supply and telecommunication and the loss of life continued well into the 6th day after the first downpour. Several questions need to be posed to government. Citizens across the city, at all income levels and cutting across all professions and occupations, are outraged at the governments indifference and callousness in its failure to answer them, as also at the incompetence and lack of coordination in dealing with the effects of the citys flooding

The questions are:


1. Why does the city become waterlogged to the extent of completely dislocating all civic life within the first few hours of a heavy downpour? (Such downpours will occur in every monsoon. The government is deluding itself by saying that this is a once in a century disaster. 2. Why, when for 24 hours, citizens had to endure danger and hardship of wading through 45 feets of water much of it filthy- was no policemen, fire brigade officials or man of the city administration visible to guide ordinary mumbaikars? 3. Surronding areas of Mumbai like Mumbra, Kalyan, Ambernath and Badlapur apart from villages in Raigad, Roha and other Konkabn districts have homes of peoples under water for over a week. Why Army has has not been sought to airlift marooned persons and/or reach food packets, water and medicines to persons under distress in these areas? 4. Why has the government, which includes all wings and agencies of the state and central governments and the municipal corporations, done so little to relieve the hardships of the citizens during this period? (Garbage not cleared: drains not de-clogged; animal carcasses not removed; traffic police absent or helpless; electricity not available in large parts of Greater Mumbai for four-six days after the initial blackout, etc.) 5. Why were the sluice State of dams at Badlapur/Kalyan opened twice on Wednesday night (July 27th, 2005) and thereafter without evacuation of residents at Diva, Kusa, and Mumbra? (Over 150 are fear dead because of this lapse) (Chiplun town on the Konkan coast has been submerged in 15 feet of water since last night after the Konkan dam overflow)

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6. Why was the Maharashtra Governments well-publicised Disaster Management Plan not put into action immediately, i.e., on 26th evening when a crisis group had apparently met with the C.M. to discuss the alarming situation in Raigad? 7. Why did neither the State Government, nor the Municipal Corporation, set up a Disaster Management Team, headed by a single empowered individual (Chief Secretary, Municipal Commissioner, or even a Cabinet Minister) to take charge of the situation, coordinate all relief activities, brief the press frequently everyday and use all channels of the media to communicate directly with citizens? This Press Conference is being convened to place the issues before the public and to propose a series of immediate, as well as medium to long term, actions steps requires to be taken urgently, to prevent a recurrence of such a disaster.

Among the demands of our Group are the following:


1. Government must take IMMEDIATE steps to bring relief to the doorstep of those who have lost their homes, their means of livelihood and who are now without drinking water and food; and are exposed to sickness and disease. Where areas continue to be underwater, why has the government not taken action to drop relief and food packets by air? 2. There is an immediate danger of epidemics and water-borne diseases spreading, as access is denied and animal carcasses and garbage remain uncleared. An immediate operation clean-up should be carried out; and medical and para-medical teams must be deployed to carry out mass inoculation and distribution of basic drugs and medicine. By now government should have pro-actively mobilised all NGOs to team up with municipal workers in the badly affected areas. 3. The Chief Minister should, without delay, nominate a senior person (whether senior bureaucrat or political leader of cabinet rank) to coordinate and lead the work of relief and rehabilitation;

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and restoration of all services. He should brief the press twice a day; and address the public at large day by day on the action being taken. He should also be available to interact with group of citizens everyday, at fixed times, so as to receive direct feedback and ideas for better execution of the operations. 4. Less urgent but of absolutely critical importance are two further actions in the matter of projects: 4.1 An urgent study to be carried out by expert professionals on the citys Drainage System; and the Maharashtra Government to revive long pending projects proposed by the World Bank to give Mumbai an effective Storm Water Drainage System (Known as Project Brims toward). Such a study will undoubtedly reveal that all the unplanned and illplanned construction activities of the last two decades has severely interfered with, and reduced the effectiveness of, the citys drainage system.

Citizens will also have to exert every possible pressure on the BMC early next year to undertake a massive and effective operation to unclog the current drains of the city before the next monsoon. 4.2 A number of pending proposals to upgrade equipment and improve the technical facilities and manpower in the India Meteorology Department at the Colaba Observatory must be implemented. The State Government must pressure the Government of India into sanction this expenditure so as to improve to predictive capability of the I.M.D. 5. Finally, we propose that a number of NGOs in the city join hands to prepare a WHITE PAPER / CITIZENS REPORT on Mumbais Disaster Management Crises. For this a series of public hearing will be held before a panel of independent experts/retired judges of unimpeachable integrity. The hearings will be held in public with the media present. The evidence taken on record will form a document that will serve as a Citizens Agenda for the City and State Government to act for the future improvement of the civic infrastructure of Mumbai.
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Death toll mounts to 142 in Mumbai, Thane


August 14, 2005 15:13 IST
With 18 more deaths in the metropolis since Saturday night, the death toll due to high fever or suspected leptospirosis and other rain-related ailments in Mumbai and adjoining Thane district has increased to 142, official sources said. A total of 107 persons died of fever in Mumbai till date following the July 26 deluge, sources said.

Maharashtra Fever toll 93

Altogether 700 persons with complaints of fever were admitted to various hospitals in the city in the last 24 hours ending 8 am on Sunday compared to around 1,000 on Saturday, the sources added.

Mumbai disease alert: FAQ

With this, the total number of persons getting admitted to hospitals due to fever since July 27 has gone up to 5,010, the sources said adding, many of them have been discharged.

Terrible Tuesday: Mumbai copes with a calamity

The figure of fresh admissions in Thane district was not available, official sources said. Congress president Sonia Gandhi had visited V N Desai hospital on Saturday and interacted with patients while urging the state government to take all possible efforts to tackle the situation. A central team headed by Director General (Health), Dr S K Agrawal had also visited Mumbai on August 12 and toured the affected regions, besides holding a meeting with the chief minister. The team also brought along diagnostic kits for leptospirosis as there was no such facility available in Mumbai. The inefficiency of the Flood Control Department in Monsoon In most of the districts in the state of Maharashtra, a Flood Control Department is formed during the monsoon season, after the advent of rains. In some districts, this department is formed even before the advent of the monsoons, but is never functional. There are various faults in these departments. The Flood Control Departments set up in
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Government Officials and Authorities in charge display neglect in responsibilities The Government Officials and authorities seemed to display an attitude of neglect in performing their duties. In Mumbai, Raigad, Panvel and Thane districts, instead of helping the needy, the officials were getting ready to leave their offices for their homes at 5 p.m., sharp. In the beginning, they worked quite hard, but later on refused to work extra hours and did not extend any support to the needy. Thus the needy were left helpless and had to suffer. Cheating citizens by increasing prices of basic necessities Prices of milk, oil and milk products increased steeply. For selfish vendors, this was an opportunity to make money by squeezing the pockets of the masses. In Mumbai a litre of milk was sold for 40 Rupees during the floods, whereas in Sangli it was sold for 30 Rupees a litre. Authorities in Mumbai kept a strict vigil on milk vending outlets and urged citizens to complain to the police, against those vendors who increase prices. On the other hand, private transport companies increased their prices, cashing in on this opportunity to make money. Since people were stranded in villages and cities, they had an urgent need to reach their destinations and had to pay the demanded price for tickets. Private transport agents, knowing that the railway lines were closed and government buses not running to all destinations, took advantage of and cashed in on the opportunity to make money by the minute. The government authorities took no action against these private transport companies. Citizens threw stones on trains causing damage to their own transport system! Due to railway tracks being under water and the high level of flooding, it was inevitable that the trains were cancelled for long distance as well as to flood-prone areas. Citizens were not in a position to understand this simple situation, and they resorted to throwing stones at the trains! Incidents of such vandalism occurred on two occasions. In times of calamities, people should behave in a balanced and understanding manner. It is so plainly obvious if the railway tracks are under water how will the trains run? The people who did not bother to think rationally and opted to vandalize to display their frustration, fall in the category of anti-national; deshdrohis. Such travellers should be subjected to strict punishment by the authorities.

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People misusing the flood situation There is flood water everywhere in Sangli, Maharashtra. People have moved to safer places, leaving their homes. Thieves are misusing this situation and are robbing the locked houses in broad daylight. People are robbing others instead of helping each other in this flood situation how will they help each other in situations like battles, riots etc.

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Working on the project was a wonderful experience. The opportunity to work on this project has been fully utilized by us. Not only we gained a lot more knowledge but also understood the importance, need and principles of Environmental Management Through this project we got the chance to test our abilities and while working on this project, with each other we come to know the meaning of organizational structure. We are very thankful of our respected professor Mr. Zanake for granting us this opportunity.
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