Rule 65

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 150793 November 19, 2004
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner assails the Decision,1 dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also challenged by herein petitioner is the CA Resolution,2 dated November 20, 2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 1723 in relation to Article 1714 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge reads: That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his Notarial Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public document, by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April 30, 1994 and neither has participated in the proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed. CONTRARY TO LAW.5 Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2857216 for falsification of public document, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua. Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter. During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first witness. After Hao's testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainant's counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chua's motion and ordered the complainant's counsels to be excluded from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-94846, 7 entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is ordered to allow the intervention of the private prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively participate in the proceedings. SO ORDERED.8
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied. Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846 although it was not a party to the criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3) effectively amending the information against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights. On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision denying the petition, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.9 Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit. For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit. Respondent maintained that when the directors or trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a demand from stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed. The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and made it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and a director of the corporation. According to the appellate court, the corporation was a necessary party to the petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the Corporation of its right to be a party and present its own claim for damages. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001. Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors: I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAO'S FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-94846] III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNA'S DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA HAO'S COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR BEING A SHAM PLEADING.10 The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721. On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when (1) it sustained the lower court in giving due course to respondent's petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was not the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was in the nature of a derivative suit. Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-corporate proceedings and cannot be made part of a criminal action. He cites the case of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas, 11 where the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the private complainant. Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case, we said: Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document. Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a
quo nor in the instant petition which, in part, merely states that "this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098" since the trial court's judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit.12 Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot be treated as a derivative suit because the appeal lacked the basic requirement that it must be alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join. Under Section 3613 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23,14 where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees.15 An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest.16 A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the corporation.17 Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.19 In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action. However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action against petitioner. Private respondent was the one who instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. 20 It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.21 In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit. We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note that the case was titled "Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila." Petitioner before us now claims that the corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and thus cannot be included as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846. Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Dev't. Corporation v. Court of Appeals.22 In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the petition for certiorari, even though it was not a party-in-interest in the civil case before the lower court. In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in her personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all remedies available to her before she instituted the case, not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover the damages caused to the company. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 when a trial court commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the private offended party or complainant.24 In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file special civil action of prohibition and certiorari.25
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join said petition for certiorari, despite the finality of the trial court's denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff. Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 26 we held that if aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene in the probate of her father-in-law's estate.27 In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was brought in her own name and in behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's project and the falsified documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation. We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721? Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,28 holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. 29 The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.30 Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner's alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis. When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.32 In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION G. R. No. 120014 November 26, 2002
FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., petitioner, vs. NOEL RABI, and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9, Tacloban City, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: On January 10, 1995, Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (possession of unlicensed firearm). The matter was docketed as I.S. No. 95-043. Public Prosecutor Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest investigation of the case and issued a resolution on January 11, 1995, recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause on her findings that the material averments of the Joint Affidavit1 executed by the arresting police officers were hearsay due to the absence of any affidavit of the complainant Rodolfo Cabaluna; and that the knife, gun and the live ammunitions referred to in said affidavit were not found under the chair occupied by Rabi. However, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. of Region VIII decided to assume jurisdiction over the case and to order the conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. On January 12, 1995, he issued a Regional Memorandum Order2 to the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City directing him to elevate to his office the complete records of I.S. No. 95-043 within 24 hours from receipt thereof, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1275 in relation to Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice. Aurillo designated the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct the new preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. On January 20, 1995, Aurillo issued another Memorandum Order3 to the City Prosecutor directing him to elevate the affidavit of Rodolfo Cabaluna as well as the subject firearm and knife to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor with the information that it had taken over the preliminary investigation of the said complaint pursuant to PD 1275 and existing rules.4 The City Prosecutor of Tacloban complied with the order of Aurillo and on January 23, 1995, the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 at 9:00 a.m. on February 2, 1995, not only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of "Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned) [sic], Batas Pambansa Bilang 9" (possession of deadly weapon) and "Malicious Mischief."5 When served with the subpoena on January 27, 1995, Rabi was aghast at the sudden turn of events. On the same date and barely a week before the scheduled preliminary investigation, his counsel forthwith filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. Rabi alleged that under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code and PD 1275 as implemented by Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice, a regional state prosecutor was vested only with administrative supervision over the city prosecutor and had no power to motu proprio review, revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor on the latters conduct of a preliminary or inquest investigation of a criminal complaint filed directly therewith. Rabi contended that by taking over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and conducting a new preliminary investigation of said case, Aurillo acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed that, pending resolution of his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin Aurillo from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043.6 Acting on the petition, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order7 dated January 30, 1995, enjoining and prohibiting Aurillo and all others acting for and in his behalf from taking over and conducting a new preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 until the court shall have resolved the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the other issues raised in the petition. Aurillo received said order on January 30, 1995.8 In answer to the petition, Aurillo alleged that the same was premature as Rabi failed to exhaust all administrative remedies from the Secretary of Justice before filing the petition. He explained that he took over and ordered a new preliminary investigation by virtue of his prosecutorial powers under PD 1275, in relation to Department Order No. 318, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Book No. IV of the Revised Administrative Code, vesting on him supervision and control over field prosecution officers in the region. He averred that such powers included the authority for him to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Aurillo also claimed that he was not liable for damages for performing an ordinary and routinary function, the regularity of which is presumed.9 He further argued that claims for damages and attorneys fees under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is proscribed. During the February 15, 1995 hearing on Rabis motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties marked in evidence their documentary evidence and orally argued their respective positions. Rabi did not testify to prove his claim for damages and attorneys fees. On the same date, the RTC issued an order declaring that the issue of whether or not the court will issue a writ of preliminary injunction was submitted for resolution and that it will issue a resolution thereon in five days time. However, the RTC failed to do so. Instead, on March 29, 1995, the RTC issued an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda within five days from receipt thereof after which the petition will be deemed submitted for resolution. 10 The parties did not object to the order. Nevertheless, on March 24, 1995, the assistant regional state prosecutor continued with his preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Thereafter, with Aurillos approval, he filed with the RTC on April 4, 1995 an Information against Rabi for violation of PD 1866.11
On April 12, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi. The trial court nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor and the Information filed with the RTC against Rabi. It also ordered Aurillo to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.12 The RTC declared that under Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice, the power of a regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation was confined solely to specific criminal cases and only when the Secretary of Justice directs him to do so. The trial court further held that without any order from the Secretary of Justice, Aurillo cannot motu proprio take over the preliminary investigation of a case already investigated by the city prosecutor or conduct a new one. The RTC awarded damages and attorneys fees to Rabi for Aurillos wanton disregard of the courts authority as shown by his filing of an Information against Rabi without authority from the Secretary of Justice. The trial court also nullified the Information filed by Aurillo against Rodolfo Cabaluna, Jr. and held that the filing thereof was made in utter disregard of simple demands of courtesy to the RTC, thereby preempting said courts resolution of the issues raised in the petition. Aurillo thereafter filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, on questions of law, against Rabi and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City. When required by the Court to file his comment on the petition, Rabi failed to do so. The petition shall thus be resolved by the Court on the basis of the petition and the annexes thereof. The issues posed in this case, as synthesized by the Court, are whether or not (a) the petition filed by Rabi with the RTC was premature; (b) Aurillo is empowered to motu proprio take over and conduct a preliminary investigation of I.S No. 95-043, after the inquest investigation thereof had already been terminated and approved by city prosecutor; (c) the Information filed by Aurillo against Rabi with the RTC for violation of PD 1866 may be nullified by said court, and (d) Aurillo is liable for damages and attorneys fees to Rabi. On the first issue, the general rule is that an aggrieved party is mandated to first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a judicial action for redress from acts of administrative bodies or offices in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions; otherwise, said action may be dismissed for prematurity.13 However, the principle is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party may validly resort to immediate judicial action where the (a) question raised is purely legal; (b) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (c) when there is an urgent need for judicial intervention;14 (d) when the disputed act is performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (e) the administrative remedy does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (f) when due process is disregarded.15 In this case, the Investigating Prosecutor terminated the inquest investigation and came out with her resolution dismissing the case as approved by the City Prosecutor. On January 11, 1995, barely a day thereafter, Aurillo decided to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. 95-043 and ordered the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of said case to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. Rabi was completely unaware of the takeover by Aurillo of the preliminary investigation of the case or the reasons therefor. Rabi learned about Aurillos action for the first time when he received the subpoena from the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor on January 27, 1995 setting the preliminary investigation of the case anew on February 2, 1995. Being a resident of Tacloban City, Rabi did not have adequate time to seek redress from the Secretary of Justice whose offices is located in Manila and request that the scheduled investigation be forestalled. Given this factual milieu, time was of the essence. Inaction was not an option; it was, in fact, sheer folly. Judicial intervention was imperative. There was no need for Rabi to still wait for Aurillo to complete his preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043, find probable cause against Rabi for violation of PD 1866 and file an Information against him for said crime nor wait for the issuance by the trial court of a warrant for his arrest. If Rabi tarried, the acts sought to be assailed by him would by then have been a fait accompli to his gross prejudice, and his prayer for a writ of prohibition and for injunctive relief, an exercise in utter futility. Aurillo acted without authority and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when he took over motu proprio the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and ordered a new preliminary investigation thereof; hence, his actuations were a nullity. Aurillos reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD 1275 is misplaced. Said law provides that a regional state prosecutor exercises immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his region and prosecutes any case arising within his region.16 The "administrative supervision" which shall govern the administration relationship between a department or its equivalent and an agency under its jurisdiction is limited to the authority of such department to generally oversee the operation of the agency under it to insure that the same is managed effectively and economically, without interfering with its day-to-day activities; and to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including the rectification of violations, abuses or other forms of maladministration.17 It bears stressing that in administrative law, administrative supervision is not synonymous with control. The Court distinguished supervision from control in Jose Mondano vs. Francisco Silvosa,18 thus: "x x x In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. x x x." "Supervision and control," on the other hand, includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; todirect the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.19 In Hon. Franklin Drilon, et al. vs. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, et al., 20 the Court declared that an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinates or he may even decide to do it himself. The Court, likewise, decreed in an avuncular case that "control" means the power of an official to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.21 In this case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case, he exercised not only administrative supervision but control over the city prosecutor in the performance of the latters quasi-judicial functions .. By doing so, Aurillo nullified the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in I.S. 95-043 of his right to file a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the inquest prosecutor under Section 2 of Department Circular No. 7 of the Department of Justice, as amended by Department Order No. 223, 22 and if said motion were denied to appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice. Aurillo threw a monkey wrench to the appeal process and deprived the Secretary of Justice of the authority to resolve any appeal by the losing party from the resolution of the city prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043. What is so palpable and condemnable is that, Aurillo decided to conduct a preliminary investigation of the crimes for malicious mischief, violation of the Omnibus Election Code and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 9 without any complaint for said cases filed directly with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. There is no inconsistency between Department Order No. 318 of the Secretary of Justice, PD 1275 and Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended; nor is Department Order No. 318 a surplusage. Section 2, Rule 112 provides that regional state prosecutors are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of crimes committed in their territorial jurisdiction:23 "SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. The following may conduct a preliminary investigation: xxx (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law. Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdiction." As a practical matter, however, criminal complaints are filed in a proper case for preliminary investigation with the municipal trial court or with the office of the city or provincial prosecutor which has territorial jurisdiction over the offense complained of and not with the office of the regional state prosecutor. Hence, the office of the regional state prosecutor does not conduct any preliminary investigation or prosecute any criminal case in court at all. The bulk of the work of the office of the regional state prosecutor consists of administrative supervision over city or provincial or city fiscals and their assistants. The Secretary of Justice thus opted to harness the services of regional state prosecutors and help out in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases not filed with their offices. Hence, pursuant to his power under Section 4, Chapter 1, Book IV of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, 24 and of his power of supervision and control over regional state prosecutors and provincial and city prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 318 authorizing regional state prosecutors to investigate and/or prosecute, upon his directives, special criminal cases within the region.25 In fine, the duty of the regional state prosecutors to prosecute or investigate specific criminal cases pursuant to Department Order No. 318 is not an abridgment or curtailment of their duties or functions under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, but is an additional duty specifically delegated to them by the Secretary of Justice to enhance the administration of justice. Therefore, petitioners contention that Department Order No. 318 is inconsistent with PD 1275 and that Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is merely a surplusage has no legal basis. We now resolve the third issue. Aurillo contends that the RTC erred when it nullified the Information filed by him charging private respondent with violation of PD 1866 after the requisite preliminary investigation by the office of regional state prosecutor. He argues
that although the RTC had issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 30, 1995, the same had lapsed without the court issuing any preliminary injunction. There was thus no legal bar for the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor to proceed with and terminate the preliminary investigation and thereafter to file the Information against private respondent even while the petition for prohibition was still pending before the RTC. He further asserts that the remedy of Rabi was to file with the trial court a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the office of the regional state prosecutor had no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the same. The pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043. 26 It goes without saying, however, that in proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case, the RTC granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as well as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.27 Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete relief not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. The Court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings of the parties: Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is governed by the nature of the grievance proved and the situation at the time of judgment. Although the general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already performed, where anything remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although prohibition is requested only as to a particular matter, the court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make such incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.28 Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only the preliminary investigation by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for want of authority but also the Information approved by Aurillo and filed with the Regional Trial Court. On the last issue, the RTC awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees to Rabi on its finding that Aurillo wantonly disregarded the authority of the court by filing the information against Rabi despite the pendency of the latters petition for prohibition with said court and even without any authority from the Secretary of Justice. Aurillo asserts that the awards are bereft of legal basis because the RTC did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining him from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and filing the Information against Rabi. He insists that the pendency of the petition for prohibition was no impediment for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation. He claims that he proceeded in good faith, without malice. Hence, the RTC is not allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules to award moral and exemplary damages to Rabi. We agree with Aurillo. The awards by the RTC of damages and attorneys fees are barren of legal basis. The fact is that the RTC did not issue any writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Aurillo from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Although the RTC promised to resolve private respondents plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on or before February 20, 1995, it did not. Aurillos act of proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and of filing the Information were not in disregard of the authority of the RTC, but were done in the belief that, absent any temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, he was authorized to do so. For Rabi to be entitled as a matter or law to moral damages, he must adduce evidence that he suffered injury and establish that such injury sprung from any of the instances listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code.29 He is burdened to show proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.30 In this case, Rabi failed to discharge his burden. The records show that he even failed to testify before the RTC to prove his claim for moral damages. Hence, the RTC erred in awarding moral damages to Rabi. Neither is Rabi entitled to exemplary damages. In National Steel Corporation vs. RTC, et al.,31 the Court held that: xxx (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Rabi did not claim in his petition with the RTC any compensatory damages. Hence, he is not entitled to exemplary damages.
10
Finally, since Rabi is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, he is not entitled to attorneys fees.32 IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court granting the petition for prohibition of Rabi is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are DELETED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
11
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 122728 February 13, 1997 CASIANO A. ANGCHANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ZALDY TAMAYO, GILDA NAVARRA, ODELIA LEGASPI, SALVADOR TAMAYO, GASPAR ABORQUE, ROEL ABAS, REMEDIOS OLITA, ET AL., TEODORO TORREON, ET AL., JIMMY MARTIN, MENRADO ALLAWAN, MARGARITO ESCORIAL, NORBERTO OCAT and ALEJANDRO ERNA,respondents.
MELO, J.: Before us is a petition for mandamus seeking to: a) compel the Ombudsman to dismiss Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN- 90-0191, and MIN-90-0192; and b) direct the Ombudsman to issue a clearance in favor of petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco. The facts are as follows: Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X) rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients. In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. The regional trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise fled before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in a Memorandum dated July 31, 1992, recommended its dismissal for lack of merit. Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that petitioner illegally deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative aspect of the complaints which was docketed hereat as A.M. No. 93-10-385-OMB. The Court in an En BancResolution dated November 25, 1993 dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case. Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution. When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied. With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R.No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988). Sad to say, even this motion to dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Hence, the instant petition. Acting on the petition, the Court issued a resolution dated December 20, 1995 requiring respondents to comment thereon. In compliance therewith, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (in lieu of Comment.), which is its way of saying it agreed with the views of petitioner. On July 22, 1996, we issued another resolution requiring the Ombudsman to file his own comment on the petition if he so desires, otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for resolution without such comment. After several extensions, respondent Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a comment dated October 7, 1996. The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.
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Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988]), wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Yap, said: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the board umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True--but the absence of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty mandated by the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof." Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume III by Martin, 4th Edition, page 233). It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222, 232 [1987]). Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to GRANT the same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-390-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90 0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
13
EN BANC G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents. Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner. Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy. Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents. RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.: Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof. The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus: 1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1 3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam DefensorSantiago," 2 which pertinently states in part: xxx xxx xxx 3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . . 4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident. Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled. xxx xxx xxx
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4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4 5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5 6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991. 6 7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7 8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency. 9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8 10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992. 11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows: Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court. 10 The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption. In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that: 1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. 2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court.
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3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case. 4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution. 5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes. 11 I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable. It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13 In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond. We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein. It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice. Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence. II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it. It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit. Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or
16
during the pendency of an appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. 15 It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power. 20 The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit: . . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . . Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . . 21 This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage: The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22 On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992. Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios. The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action. III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech. First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of justice; 27 or are
17
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29 Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances.31 Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935): . . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held: Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
18
The submission is not well taken. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court). xxx xxx xxx . . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. 33 One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein. WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
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THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988 ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESIDENTS OF BAESA, CALOOCAN CITY, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court which denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondent's appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion and the subsequent order which denied the motion to reconsider the earlier order. Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation (Eternal Gardens) applied for a certificate of clearance from the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), to operate a memorial park at the former site of the Philippine Union College in Baesa, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. The private respondents, "Residents of Baesa" opposed the application on the ground that the project would cause pollution of water resources in the area. While hearings were being conducted by the NPCC, the petitioner allowed an interment to take place in its cemetery. The private respondents filed a telegram complaint with the NPCC requesting the latter to investigate and look into the legality of the said interment, The complaint was incorporated with the original application for clearance filed by the petitioner. Upon a finding that the objections raised by the respondents were not without remedy and that the project had been approved by the Metro Manila Commission, the Regional Health Office No. 4 and the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, the NPCC issued an order granting the petitioner a certificate of clearance to operate a memorial park at Baesa, Caloocan City subject to the condition that it submit the following: (1) A design of its interment vaults duly certified by a registered structural engineer that such vaults will not crack from earthquakes with intensity No. 7 and above on the Richter Scale; and (2) A certification covering each interment vault to be used that the same has passed a rigid quality control test according to the latest concept of interment to the effect that it is structurally sound, free from the tiniest crack, and waterproof The said order was received by the respondents on April 20, 1978. On May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 22, 1978, the NPCC denied the motion. However, it imposed a fine of P1,000.00 on the petitioner for causing an interment to take place without any prior permit from the NPCC. On September 8, 1978, the respondents filed a notice of appeal and an ex-parte urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal or petition for review with the appellate court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days to perfect the appeal. The docket fee, however, was paid only on October 2, 1978. In a resolution dated October 4, 1978, the appellate court granted the respondents' motion, subject to the conditions that the same is filed within the reglementary period and that the decision sought to be reviewed is appealable. Thereafter, the respondents filed the corresponding appeal. On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time. According to the petitioner, since the respondents received the NPCC's order on April 20, 1978, they had up to May 5, 1978 or 15 days within which to perfect their appeal, pursuant to section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. However, on May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, assumming that the said motion interrupted the period for filing their notice of appeal, respondents had only one (1) day left within which to appeal, which was on August 26, 1978, one day after the respondents received the denial of their motion. Therefore, since the respondents filed their appeal only on October 2, 1978, the same was filed out of time being 37 days late. The respondents filed a motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the latter failed to state the time and place for hearing in violation of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court granted the respondents' motion on January 10, 1979. The petitioner moved to reconsider the court's order but the same was denied on February 8, 1979. Consequently, it filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, alleging that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its motion on the ground that said motion did not contain any notice of hearing for such notice is not required in motions or pleadings filed with the appellate court. While the petition was pending before this Court, the appellate court, on March 27,1979, issued motu proprio a resolution recalling its order granting the respondents' motion to expunge petitioner's motion to dismiss. It considered the motion submitted for resolution.
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On April 5, 1979, the appellate court issued another resolution granting the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondents' appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. In view of the aforementioned dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the petition for certiorari filed before this Court on the ground that it had become moot and academic. On September 10, 1979, this Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents to comment on petitioner's manifestation and motion to withdraw the petition. The Court of Appeals and the Division Clerk of said Court were also directed to explain why the appellate court issued motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979, respectively, notwithstanding the said matters were no longer within its jurisdiction by virtue of the pendency of the present petition in this Court wherein the petitioner has raised precisely the same issues for determination, and to comment on the timeliness of respondents' appeal. In their comment, the respondents averred that the petition should not be dismissed for being moot and academic because the resolutions in question were not only violative of the respondents' right to due process of law but were also null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondent appellate court, through its division clerk, filed a compliance contending that the present petition did not divest the said court of jurisdiction to correct its processes and orders and, therefore, the questioned resolutions were issued within its lawful jurisdiction. It stated that the petition filed with this Court was under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under Rule 45 thereof because there is as yet no final determination and judgment of the case pending with the respondent court and what was actually elevated to this Court were only interlocutory orders. Therefore, the main case still remaining with the appellate court, the latter had jurisdiction to correct such orders unless restrained by this Court. On the matter of the timeliness of respondents' appeal, the appellate court contended that although the respondents filed by registered mail their ex parte motion for extension of time to file an appeal or petition for review on September 8, 1978, the Court did not consider such motion as filed until after October 2, 1978 when respondents paid the docketing fee. Furthermore, even granting that the latter filed their notice of appeal on September 8,1978, still, the same was filed outside the reglementary period to appeal because after the denial of respondents motion for reconsideration on August 25, 1978, they had only two days left to perfect their appeal which was on August 27, 1978. On November 16, 1979, this court issued a resolution dated November 14, 1979, giving due course to the petition and requiring both parties to submit their respective memoranda on the basic issues of (1) whether or not respondents' appeal was timely submitted to the appellate court and should be resolved on the merits and (2) whether the said court had jurisdiction to issue motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 notwithstanding the pendency of the present petition filed with this Court on March 5, 1979. With regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate court in issuing the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 respectively, the petitioner argues that since it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which means that such a petition is a special civil action, the appellate court did not lose its jurisdiction to correct interlocutory orders that may have been issued erroneously. On the other hand, the respondents maintain that while under the Rules of Court, courts may amend, modify or revoke any decision or order promulgated by them, such power of authority is not absolute. They state that among the limitations thereof are when a judgment has become final and when an appeal has been interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is pending in the present case is neither a final judgment nor an appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same. Therefore, out of respect and courtesy for the higher court, the lower court should have suspended all pending proceedings in the elevated case as even without any restraining order, the lower court had lost jurisdiction to further act on the case. We agree with the respondents on this point. Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to discuss and denying the latter's motion to reconsider such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court. As we have ruled in the case of People v. Court of Appeals, (101 SCRA 450, 463 and 466): ... Thirdly, the statement that whatever rights the movants were allowed to exercise in the Supreme Court could be exercised by them in the Court of Appeals' is clearly misplaced. It implies concurrence of jurisdiction between this Tribunal and respondent Court, which is totally unacceptable. It would lead to the absurd situation where within the reglementary period from finality of a Decision or Resolution, a party can simultaneously file a Petition for Review before this Tribunal as well as a Motion for Reconsideration before respondent Court. This interpretation does havoc
21
to the rules on orderly procedure. A party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx We find the foregoing without merit. The Writ of certiorari is intended to keep a tribunal within the limits of its jurisdiction. As explained above, respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it passed upon private respondents Fourth Motion for Reconsideration considering that its judgment of conviction had already become final. And what is even more glaring, respondent Court acted on said Fourth Motion for Reconsideration after this Tribunal had already denied private respondents' petition for Review on Certiorari, as well as the reconsideration thereof. The attention of respondent Court, as explained heretofore, was called to such development. It paid no heed. Although now, it is claimed that had it known, it would have stopped action or desisted from taking any at any stage in which the fourth (4th) motion for reconsideration was found. Applying the foregoing precedent, we rule that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 correcting its earlier erroneous orders which were already before us. On the second issue of whether or not respondents perfected their appeal on time, the petitioner argues that clearly, the respondents appeal was filed out of time since by their own admission, respondents filed their notice of appeal only on September 8, 1978, when they had only up to August 27, 1978 to file the same. Conversely, the respondents maintain that the period should be reckoned from August 25, 1978, the date when they received the second order of the NPCC because said order amended or modified the order of August 18, 1978 and, therefore, since there was such an amendment, the period to perfect the appeal commenced to again start from August 25, 1978. We find the petitioner's contention well-taken. It should be noted that when the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issued by the NPCC dated August 18, 1978, the same was denied by the latter on August 22, 1978, Notice of the denial was received by the respondents on August 25, 1978. The dispositive portion of the order of denial states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration of Complainants Oppositors is hereby denied. Applicant-Respondent, through its President or managing head, is hereby Ordered to pay to the Government through this Commission a fine of One Thousand (Pl,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Section 9 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 984 for violation of Section 8 of the same decree. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 75) It is clear from the above-quoted order that as far as the respondents are concemed there was no amendment of the NPCC's previous orders which would justify the running anew of the period to appeal. The only modification found in the order did not pertain to the respondents but to the petitioner which was fined for allowing an illegal interment. The respondents cannot allege that the order of August 22, 1978 was more adverse to them since it was the petitioner which was fined. After the denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration, they only had one day to perfect their appeal which was on August 26, 1978. Therefore, their filing of an appeal on September 8, 1978 was definitely out of time. We ruled in the case of Garcia v. Echiverri, (132 SCRA 631, 638): Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. (Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 309; Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. v. CA, 118 SCRA 49; Santos v. CA, 125 SCRA 22). Even assuming arguendo that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal started anew on August 25, 1978, the day when respondents received the order of August 22, 1978, still their appeal was perfected out of time since the perfection of the same should be reckoned not from the filing of the notice of appeal but from the payment of docketing fees. The respondents paid the docket fees only on October 2, 1978. We stated in the case of Aranas v. Endona, (117 SCRA 753, 758): As early as November 16, 1932 this Court rendered a decision in Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres (57 Phil, 552) that full payment of docket fees within the required period is an 'indispensable step' for the perfection of an appeal. ... xxx xxx xxx
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Payment of the full amount within the reglementary period was declared jurisdictional. The jurisdictional nature of this requirement continues to the present ... xxx xxx xxx Inasmuch as the respondents' appeal was perfected out of time, the appellate court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Consequently, its appealed orders before this Court and all other orders it issued with regard to the present case are null and void. We have carefully examined the records for any substantial considerations of equity which might warrant different conclusions on the basic merits of the main case. We have found none. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the appellate court dated January 10, 1979, February 8, 1979, March 27, 1979 and April 5, 1979 are annulled and set aside. Considering that the respondents' appeal was perfected long after the due date, the order of the National Pollution Control Commission dated April 18, 1978 is hereby declared FINAL. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
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FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 88705 June 11, 1992 JOY MART CONSOLIDATED CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PHOENIX OMEGA DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Does a trial court possess jurisdiction to dissolve a writ of preliminary injunction which is pending review oncertiorari in the Court of Appeals? In 1978-79, the government planned the Light Rail Transit (LRT) system to service the transportation requirements of the commuting public from Baclaran to Balintawak Monument and vice versa. The property of Joy Mart at Carriedo Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where the Isetann Department Store is located, and three (3) other adjoining parcels of land (with a total area of 1,611 sq. m., on which stands the Presidente Hotel leased by Joy Mart) was among the properties that would be needed for the LRT system and were being considered for expropriation should negotiations for their acquisition fail. As a gesture of cooperation with the government, Joy Mart consented to sell the property and give up its leasehold rights over the adjacent properties, provided, it would be given the first option to redevelop the entire area denominated as the consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station encompassing Joy Mart's properties. On September 8, 1982, while negotiations for the purchase of the properties were ongoing between Joy Mart and the Special Committee on Land and Property Acquisition of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), the latter entered into a contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation Inc. which had been granted the right, authority, and license to develop the areas adjacent to the LRT stations and to manage and operate the concessions to be established in Caloocan, Manila, and Pasay, with the right to sublease, assign, and transfer any of its rights and interests therein. On February 22, 1983, Joy Mart conveyed its property and waived its leasehold rights on the adjacent lots in favor of the government, through the LRTA, under a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Deed provided, among other things, that "upon recommendation of the special panel created by the LRTA Committee on Land and Property Acquisition. LRTA agreed that Joy Mart, the owner of Isetann and lessee of the Presidente Hotel, should be given the first option in the redevelopment of the consolidated block, notwithstanding their compensation for the property." As partial compliance with the aforestated first option, the PGH Foundation subleased to Joy Mart the LRT Carriedo station covering the consolidated block for the purpose of constructing a multi-storey building of first class materials. Subsequently, Joy Mart submitted to LRTA its plans for the construction of the building occupying the consolidated block. However, LRTA informed Joy Mart that the proposed building should occupy only an area of 1,141.20 square meters as the rest of the areas within the consolidated block would be used by the LRT station and as set-back area or open space for the benefit of the commuting public. When Joy Mart reminded LRTA of the contract provisions over the consolidated block, the former was assured that, in the event any area in the consolidated block was to be released for redevelopment, the first option of Joy Mart would be respected and implemented. On August 30, 1984, an Addendum to the Sublease Agreement was executed between Joy Mart and the PGH Foundation increasing the area to be used and occupied by Joy Mart. Aside from the increase of monthly rental and provision for an escalation clause, Joy Mart was made to pay "goodwill" in the sum of P3.0 Million. Pursuant to its understanding with, and the assurances of, LRTA, Joy Mart constructed an eight-storey building with ten levels fully airconditioned in the subject area. Joy Mart had to borrow P50.0 Million for this project. The feasibility study on the viability of this project was conditioned upon Joy Mart serving the business requirements in the LRT Carriedo station and maintaining its first option to redevelop and occupy any available area therein. On November 28, 1986, LRTA entered into Commercial Stalls Concession Contract with the Phoenix Omega Development and Management Corporation ("Phoenix" for brevity) awarding to it all the areas and commercial spaces within the three LRT terminals and the fifteen (15) on-line stations. In the third quarter of 1987, Joy Mart learned of the contract between LRTA and Phoenix when construction activities commenced within the consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station.
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Joy Mart made representations with the LRTA and reiterated its first option to redevelop the subject area, but to no avail. Joy Mart filed a complaint for specific performance of contract and damages for breach of contract with injunction against the LRTA and Phoenix on August 21, 1987. The case entitled "Joy Mart vs. LRTA and Phoenix," was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-41731 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Branch XXXII. Joy Mart asked that LRTA be ordered to award to it, either by sale, or lease, the redevelopment of the area known as the consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station which is part of the area subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 22, 1983, executed by Joy Mart in favor of the Government or LRTA. Joy Mart also asked the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order "commanding the respondents (LRTA and Phoenix) individually and collectively, their officers and employees, to cease and desist from the construction being had in the property adjacent to the leased premises." On September 25, 1987, the trial court, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Artemon D. Luna, after hearing the parties and considering their respective memorandums in amplification of oral arguments, issued a writ of preliminary injunction "commanding the defendant Phoenix to cease and desist from continuing with the construction going on adjacent to the property on lease to the plaintiff by LRTA, until further orders from this court, upon posting by the plaintiff of a P10,000.00 bond approved by the court, which may answer for any damages that the defendants may sustain by reason of the issuance of this writ" (p. 41. Rollo). Phoenix sought relief in the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) praying the appellate court: (1) to require the trial court to immediately lift the writ of injunction and/or to refrain from further carrying out or implementing it; and (2) after due hearing: (a) reverse and set aside the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction; (b) dissolve the writ of injunction dated September 23, 1987; and (c) prohibit the trial judge from taking cognizance of the case and to remand it to Branch IX of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which had first taken cognizance of the case. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 12998 and raffled to the Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals which gave due course to the petition but did not issue a restraining order against the trial court. Meanwhile, in the trial court, the LRTA and Phoenix filed separate answers to Joy Mart's complaint in Civil Case No. 87-41731. The pre-trial of the case was set on November 13, 1987. As Phoenix and Joy Mart were, exploring avenues for an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was re-set on December 11, 1987, January 14, 1988, and lastly on March 2, 1988 when it was declared terminated. On May 30, 1988, while their certiorari petition to review the writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Luna (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) was still pending in the Court of Appeals, the LRTA and Phoenix filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the said Writ of Preliminary Injunction, offering to post a counterbond for that purpose. They alleged that the writ of preliminary injunction was causing tremendous losses to LRTA and Phoenix because they have been unable to use the commercial stalls in the consolidated block while Joy Mart could be compensated for any loss it may suffer if the injunction were lifted; "that at a rate of P1,000.00 monthly rental per square meter, the 28 stalls would earn P305,800.00 a month (tsn, idem), that since September 21, 1987 when the injunction was issued up to the present, Phoenix should have earned P2,752.200.00 and suffered as much in damages which it will continue to suffer if the injunction is not lifted" (p. 80. Rollo). They pleaded that they "are as much entitled to the protection of their rights as plaintiff, that if fair play gives the plaintiff a right to prolong the litigation, fairness also demands that defendants be relieved of the thousands of pesos in damages that they suffer for every day of delay in this case occasioned by the imposition of the injunction" (p. 69. Rollo). Joy Mart opposed the petition to dissolve the injunction. The petition was heard on June 17, 1988 with the parties orally arguing their respective sides of the question. On July 6, 1988, the trial court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that its continuance would cause great damage to the respondents, while the petitioner's claim for damages, which was yet to be proven, can be fully compensated. Joy Mart filed a motion for reconsideration. LRTA and Phoenix opposed it. The trial court denied Joy Mart's Motion for Reconsideration on August 9, 1988, stating thus: The petition for dissolution is based on pertinent portion of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, that the continuance of the injunction would cause great and irreparable damage to defendants while plaintiff can be fully compensated for whatever damages that it may suffer. The evidence adduced during the hearing of the petition for dissolution of the writ showed that the continuance of the writ would cause great damages to defendants and plaintiff's claim for damages, if any and which it has yet to prove, can be fully compensated. The order of dissolution expressed in no uncertain terms that this Court may not be ascribed as having pre-empted the authority and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the certiorariproceedings. The authority of this Court to dissolve the writ is inferable in Section 6, Rule 58, Rules of Court that it may dissolve the writ if it appears during the hearing that although plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, its continuance would cause great damage to the defendants while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as it may suffer (Cf. Tiaoqui and Imperial vs. Horilleno, 63 Phil. 116, 120). (pp. 70-71, Rollo.) On August 17, 1988, the Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals upon being apprised by Phoenix of the trial court's action, dismissed Phoenix's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) for having become moot and academic.
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On September 14, 1989, Joy Mart sought relief in the Court of Appeals from Judge Luna's order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction. In its petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 15618, assigned to the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals), Joy Mart prayed that: . . . a temporary restraining order be forthwith issued commanding the Honorable respondent Court to refrain from further proceeding in the matter sought to be reviewed . . . ; (c) the application for a writ of preliminary injunction be granted restraining respondent Phoenix from continuing its subleasing and construction activities adjacent to the premises leased to petitioner by respondent LRTA until the main case is finally decided; and (d) a judgment be rendered declaring the order of 6 July 1988, as well as the order of 9 August 1988, of the Honorable respondent Court to be null and void, and upholding the order of 21 September 1987 to be valid and binding. (pp. 39-40, Rollo.) The Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, gave due course to the petition and required the respondents to answer within ten (10) days from notice. The Court temporarily restrained the respondents "from implementing the questioned orders of 6 July 1988 and 9 August 1988, and for private respondent Phoenix to refrain from engaging in subleasing and construction activities in the questioned premises, and from implementing the sublease contracts if already signed, or the occupancy of the commercial stalls if already constructed, until further orders from this court" (pp. 17-18, Rollo). It set the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on September 29, 1988. Despite the temporary restraining order which it received on September 19, 1988, Phoenix continued its construction activities and allowed its tenants to occupy the finished stalls. Whereupon Joy Mart filed a motion praying the Court of Appeals to declare Phoenix in contempt of court. After hearing the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the opposition and answers of the LRTA and Phoenix, and the memoranda of the parties, the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, on February 28, 1989, dismissed Joy Mart's petition. Hence, this petition for review in which Joy Mart alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. in not finding that the trial court lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction, after the said writ had been elevated to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, for review; 2. in not finding that Phoenix is guilty of forum-shopping; and 3. in not finding Phoenix guilty of contempt, of court, and in not issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. These assignments of error are reducible to the lone issue of whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary injunction even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review. The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review. The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998), the trial court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ of preliminary injunction whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves had brought up to the Court of Appeals for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter. By seeking from the trial court an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction to review the writ. They improperly tried to moot their own petition in the Court of Appeals a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court. In Prudential Bank vs. Castro, 142 SCRA 223, 231 where the trial judge issued an order changing or correcting his previous order which had been elevated to the Supreme Court for review, the judge's actuation was deemed to be "disrespectful of this Court." (e) Respondent Judge, in his Order of March 13, 1985, gave course to the appeal of Complainant Bank although he had already ruled that the latter had lost the right of appeal. That Order of March 13, 1985 was issued after Complainant Bank had instituted G.R. No. 69907 on February 19, 1985, asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the summary judgment. The order of March 13, 1985 was clearly intended to render G.R. No. 69907 moot and academic. Said Order was disrespectful of this Court. If at all, Respondent Judge should have come to this Court in said G.R. No. 69907, to ask for leave to allow the appeal of Complainant Bank with admission that he had realized that his previous denial of the appeal was erroneous.
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The actuation of Judge Luna in Civil Case No. 87-41731 can be categorized as such. It is not excused by the fact that Phoenix and LRTA were presenting evidence of losses and damages in support of their motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction, for that could as easily have been done by them in the Court of Appeals which possesses "the power to try cases and conduct hearing, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings" (Sec. 9, par. [3], 2nd par.. B.P. Blg. 129). The trial judge played into the hands of Phoenix and the LRTA, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting their motion to dissolve the writ of injunction. Judicial courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ of preliminary injunction and defer to the better judgment of the Court of Appeals the determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued. The non-issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals upon receipt of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 12998 simply meant that the trial court could proceed to hear and decide the main complaint of Joy Mart for specific performance of contract and damages against the LRTA and Phoenix. It did not give the lower court a license to interfere with the appellate court's disposition of the writ of preliminary injunction. By simply "noting" that the trial court's order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction had mooted the case before it, the Court of Appeals displayed regrettable indifference toward the lower court's interference with the exercise of the appellate court's jurisdiction to decide and dispose of the petition for certiorari pending before it. Instead of being jealous of its jurisdiction, the Appellate Court was simply glad to be rid of the case. The Court of Appeals' reasoning that the trial court did not overlap or encroach upon its (the Court of Appeals') jurisdiction because the trial court "was actually delving into a new matter the propriety of the continuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in view of developments and circumstances occurring after the issuance of the injunction" (pp. 51-52, Rollo), is unconvincing, for the issue of the impropriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction was inseparable from the issue of whether the writ should be maintained or not. By lifting the writ of injunction before the Court of Appeals could rule on whether or not it was properly issued, the trial court in effect preempted the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and flouted its authority. The private respondents' application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction that was pending review in the Court of Appeals was a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower court's proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and the petition to annul the writ (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping as provided in Rule No. 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Rules of Court. 17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc. No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. The dismissal of Phoenix and LRTA's petition in G.R. No. SP 12998 by the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) was correct, but it should be for violation of Rule 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (forum-shopping), not because the petition had become moot and academic. The dismissal of Joy Mart's petition for certiorari in. CA-G.R. SP No. 15618 by the Court of Appeals (Ninth Division) is annulled and set aside for grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision dated February 28, 1989 in CA G.R. SP No. 115618, dismissing Joy Mart's petition for certiorari and upholding the dissolution by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, of the preliminary writ of injunction in Civil Case No. 87-41731, is hereby annulled and set aside and the preliminary writ of injunction issued by the trial court on September 23, 1987 in Civil Case No. 87-41731 is reinstated. However, if in the meantime the construction and occupancy of the private respondents' commercial stalls sought to be stopped by the injunction have been completed, the rentals received by the private respondents after the finality of this decision shall be deposited by them, or the lessees, in the Regional Trial Court to await the final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41731. Costs against the private respondents. The Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, is ordered to hear and decide Joy Mart's petition to declare Phoenix in contempt of court for having allegedly defied and disobeyed the Court's temporary restraining order of September 15, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115618. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
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SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759 February 27, 2003
JIMMY T. GO and ATTY. GREGORIO D. CAEDA JR., complainants, vs. JUDGE ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 150, Makati City, respondent. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE for Gross Ignorance of the Law involves the execution of the 7 October 1999Decision of respondent Judge Zeus C. Abrogar as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 150, Makati City, in "International Exchange Bank v. Alberto T. Looyuko, doing business under the name and style of Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, Noah's Ark Sugar Holdings, Noah's Ark Merchandising, and Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano," Civil Case No. 98-791, an action for a sum of money where complainant Jimmy T. Go was adjudged solidarily liable with Alberto T. Looyuko to pay plaintiff therein the amount of P96,000,000.00 representing their total unpaid principal obligation and interest, penalty of 12% per annum on the total principal obligation plus interest, and the cost of suit. Complainants Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caeda Jr., his lawyer of record, question respondent judge's order dismissing their appeal from the Decision in the civil case. They allege that respondent Judge did not possess the authority to do so nor rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the same being reserved in the Court of Appeals. Complainants also challenge the sale on execution of the shares of stock purportedly co-owned by complainant Go and defendant Alberto T. Looyuko. They assert that the judgment against Go was not yet final and executory in view of the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition assailing the dismissal of their appeal. In support of their claim, they cite the principle of "judicial courtesy" as explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. v. Court of Appeals,1 and Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals.2 Complainants further aver that respondent Judge was so incompetent a judge that he merely relied upon the"opinion" of Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora when the former gave the go-signal to proceed with the auction sale of Go's supposed properties, as they were in fact sold. Finally, they fault respondent Judge for not postponing the auction sale despite the pendency then of their motion to quash the writ of execution and their third-party adverse claim. The record shows that complainant Jimmy T. Go received copy of the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 on 20 October 1999, and on 5 November 1999 moved for its reconsideration and/or for new trial. Respondent Judge denied the motion in his Order of 17 December 1999 for lack of merit. On 3 January 2000, alleging that the fifteen (15) - day reglementary period to perfect appeal had already expired on 4 November 1999, or a day before the filing of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, International Exchange Bank as plaintiff in the civil case moved for the execution of the judgment against Go. On 5 January 2000 complainant Go filed his notice of appeal from the Decision, and at the same time opposed the motion for execution. In the meantime, Go's co-defendant Alberto T. Looyuko who appealed the Decision on 4 November 1999, withdrew his notice of appeal on 8 February 2000 prior to the transmittal of the original record of the civil case to the Court of Appeals and expressed conformity to the execution of the judgment against his properties. On 8 February 2000 respondent Judge dismissed the appeal taken by Jimmy T. Go for having been taken out of time. Respondent Judge found that copy of the Decision was served upon Go's counsel of record on 20 October 1999 and that the period to appeal expired on 4 November 1999 a working day. This fact rendered the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial filed on 5 November 1999 already a day late. On 14 February 2000 respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of plaintiff bank to implement the Decision of 7 October 1999 against the "goods and chattels of the defendants" and in case of insufficiency thereof against "the real property of the said defendants and to sell the same or so much thereof in the manner provided for by law for the satisfaction of said judgment." As a result of the enforcement of the writ, 81,566 shares in China Banking Corporation registered in the name of Alberto T. Looyuko were levied upon. On 15 February 2000 Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora issued a notice of sale scheduling the public auction of the shares on 21 February 2000. On 18 February 2000 complainant Go moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the Decision was not final and executory as to him and that the writ of execution was issued without the benefit of any hearing. Curiously, for an allegedly urgent motion to quash
28
a standing writ of execution and to stop the auction of the properties he claimed to be his, complainant Go set the hearing thereof on 3 March 2000, a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of its filing. Not content with the motion to quash, complainants also filed a third-party adverse claim under Sec. 16, Rule 39,1997 Rules of Civil Procedure3 over one-half () of the 81,566 shares of stock that had been calendared for public sale. On 21 February 1999 the sale on execution took place as scheduled with plaintiff bank buying the shares of stock for P64,000,000.00. Atty. Gregorio D. Caeda Jr., as new counsel of record of complainant Go, did not attend the 3 March 2000 hearing of his client's motion to quash. In the interest of justice, respondent Judge reset the hearing to 8 March 2000, although this setting was again aborted by complainants on 7 March 2000 when they filed a Manifestationrequesting the cancellation of the hearing. Complainants argued that their motion had become moot with the sale of the 81,566 shares of stock. Meanwhile, while their third-party adverse claim and motion to quash the writ of execution were pending, complainants filed a complaint for the annulment of the auction sale with damages and injunction with RTC-Br. 154, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 67806, entitled "Jimmy T. Go v. The Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati, Sheriff IV Renato C. Flora and/or any of his representatives." This action was allegedly based on Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.4 On 4 March 2000 complainants also filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57572. As in their pending complaint for annulment, they assailed the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge in favor of plaintiff International Exchange Bank as well as the former's prior orders denying Go's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; dismissing his notice of appeal; and authorizing the issuance of a writ of execution. On 19 April 2000 respondent Judge issued a second writ of execution directing Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora to levy on the properties of complainant Jimmy Go and to sell the properties to satisfy the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 in full. On 15 May 2000 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 denying Go's petition for lack of merit and affirming in toto the orders of respondent Judge, most notably the declaration of respondent'sDecision in the civil case as final and executory, and the validity of the writ of execution.5 The motion for reconsideration of this Decision is said to be still pending in the appellate court. In his Comment on the instant complaint, Judge Zeus C. Abrogar asserts that the 14 February 2000 writ of execution in Civil Case No. 98-791 was directed only against defendant Alberto T. Looyuko who had withdrawn his notice of appeal and conveyed his acquiescence to the execution of the Decision against his properties. Judge Abrogar claims that the reference of the writ to "defendants" was a mere clerical mistake, as it should have read"defendant," that was not corrected when the writ was issued. Respondent Judge also alleges that, as he honestly intended it to be, the writ of execution was enforced to cover only the 81,566 shares registered in the name of Albrto T. Looyuko, not upon any property of complainant Go. Finally, to absolve himself of the charge, Judge Abrogar refers to the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 which affirmed in toto the orders being assailed in the instant complaint. We are not impressed by complainants' allegations. Firstly, prior to the transmittal of the original record of Civil Case No. 98-791 to the appellate court, Judge Abrogar possessed the authority under Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an appeal for having been taken out of time. In the instant case, there is no question that respondent Judge dismissed the appeal on 8 February 2000 within the period reserved to him by our rules of procedure. Secondly, as far as Judge Abrogar is concerned, the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 was already final and executory when he authorized the execution of the judgment and issued the writ of execution. To recall the case antecedents, the appeal of complainants was already dismissed on 8 February 2000 even before the issuance of the order and the writ of execution on 14 February 2000 and the conduct of the execution sale on 21 February 2000. It must also be stressed that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 affirmed the final and executory character of the judgment as well as the validity of the orders of respondent Judge now complained of. Thirdly, the principle of "judicial courtesy" could not have prevented respondent Judge from authorizing the execution of the judgment and issuing the writ of execution. Obviously, at the time these processes were made available, no petition was then pending in the Court of Appeals. The petition in the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 was filed only on 4 March 2000. Moreover, the precept of "judicial courtesy" should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that "the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."So construed, in Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. v. Court of Appeals,6 the
29
rule of "judicial courtesy" would apply only if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Unfortunately for complainants, this circumstance is not present in the decision of respondent Judge to issue on 19 April 2000 a second writ of execution. Clearly, the ill-effects of this writ of execution, if any, would have been remedied by restitution or reparation under Sec. 5, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Evidently, too, the proceedings in the Court of Appeals were not interrupted by respondent Judge's action as shown by the promulgation of its Decision on complainant Go's petition without any hint of interference from respondent Judge's exercise of discretion. If any party in this case has violated the rule of "judicial courtesy," it appears to be complainants. They were the ones who have apparently misapplied Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure8 and violated the rules against forum shopping. This was so when they instituted a separate action for annulment of the auction sale with prayer for injunction before RTC-Br. 154, Pasig City, simultaneously with their third-party adverse claim and motion to quash the writ of execution, and their petition for certiorari, mandamus andprohibition with the Court of Appeals. All these cases and incidents sought substantially the same relief, i.e., to reverse and set aside the orders of respondent Judge regarding the execution of his Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791. Moreover, complainants could not have availed of the remedies under Sec. 16, Rule 39, specifically the filing of a "terceria" and an independent action to vindicate Go's claim of ownership. Certainly, they are not"strangers" or "third persons" as regards Civil Case No. 98-791 who would have been otherwise entitled to seek recourse under the rule. Fourthly, there is no substantial evidence to prove that respondent Judge was so incompetent as not to be acquainted with the rules on the execution of a final and executory judgment. It is not established that he had to ask for the advice or opinion of Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora when he decided to proceed with the auction sale of the 81,566 shares of stock in China Banking Corporation. Examined from every angle, no incriminating detail can be found from the only evidence bearing upon this allegation, i.e., the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimony of Sheriff Flora taken during the trial of Civil Case No. 67806 before the RTC-Br. 154 of Pasig City. Indeed, nothing in these recorded testimonies evinces the ineptitude and lack of common sense attributed by complainants to respondent Judge. All that the transcripts reveal is that Sheriff Flora and respondent Judge talked about and discussed the execution sale, which is to be expected as part of their common duty to coordinate the discharge of each other's tasks. In any event, the effort of a judge to ask for an advice or opinion upon a non-confidential matter from his own staff is not a badge of judicial incompetence and infirmity. The information that could be offered, as the words "advice" and "opinion" connote, would only be recommendatory in nature while the final decision on the subject remains the prerogative of the judge himself. Lastly, under the facts of this case, the mere filing of a "terceria," or an affidavit stating complainant Go's alleged title, under Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,9 or a motion to quash the writ of execution does not stay the auction sale scheduled by the sheriff. For one, as stated above, complainants are not "strangers" or "third persons" with respect to Civil Case No. 98-791 within the meaning of Sec. 16, Rule 39. Hence, they have no requisite standing to file a "terceria," much less a separate complaint to annul the execution sale which they inopportunely instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. A "stranger" or "third person" is any person other than the judgment debtor or his agent,10 a class of parties that indubitably excludes complainant Go. In Tillson v. Court of Appeals11 we held that a party to the action has "no business filing a third-party claim over property involved in that action and which he himself claims to belong to him." 12 The remedy of complainants is "to ask the court for relief against any alleged errors, excesses or irregularities of the sheriff x x x which the court itself could as easily and expeditiously grant."13 Furthermore, the grounds adduced by complainants to quash the writ of execution, i.e., that the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 has not yet attained finality; that there was no opportunity given to complainant Go to oppose the motion for execution; and that a new trial should be conducted to determine the true amount of complainant Go's liability, are matters that have already been resolved and found to be unmeritorious. They also involve allegations that are easily proved as unmistakably false by a straightforward examination of the record of the civil case, i.e., complainant Go was given several opportunities to contest the motion for execution against him. Plainly, complainant's arguments do not justify a deferment of the execution of the trial court's Decision.14 At any rate, if the motion to quash did not produce its desired effect of putting the execution of the judgment on hold, it was complainants' own doing. Irresponsibly, they set the hearing thereof a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of its filing, and thereafter postponed their own setting to a date seven (7) days later. Eventually, after their self-induced delay of twenty-one (21) days, complainants moved for the cancellation of the scheduled hearing upon a measly one (1) day's notice. For a supposedly pressing and imperative motion, the hearings set by complainants do not indicate a bona fide intention to correct an earnest injustice as the dates were calendared simply far apart until finally the hearing of their motion was called off unceremoniously.
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Obviously, on the basis of the foregoing case scrutiny, there is no basis to hold respondent Judge liable for "Gross Ignorance of the Law." The allegations of complainants and the proffered evidence thereof do not prove the elements of this administrative offense, i.e., that the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but more importantly must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 It may even be said confidently that respondent Judge did not deviate from established rules on the execution of judgments. We are aware of respondent's admission that he committed an error in good faith when he failed to correct the supposed clerical error in his 14 February 2000 writ of execution wherein the word "defendants" instead of"defendant" was entered despite his avowed intention to execute the Decision only against defendant Alberto T. Looyuko. Under the circumstances, however, this declaration does not matter. Considering the absence of errors in the actions of respondent Judge, more so the nonattendance of fraud or dishonesty in his assailed orders and processes, we are extending to him the benefit of the doubt that he was not negligent in the performance of his official duties to warrant the imposition of an administrative penalty. This case should of course remind respondent Judge to be at all times firm and adept in the discharge of his tasks as judge and supervisor of the execution of his decisions so that he is not easily swayed by complaints and arguments of disgruntled litigants which upon careful examination have no basis in fact and law. WHEREFORE, the instant complaint against JUDGE ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

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Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 150793 November 19, 2004

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

SECOND DIVISION G. R. No. 120014 November 26, 2002

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759 February 27, 2003

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

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