POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW A. B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Article VIII, Sections 1, 4(2), 5(2), 5(5) CASE LIST: 1.

Origin of Judicial Review MARBURY V MADISON MARSHALL; February 1803 NATURE Writ of mandamus FACTS -William Marbury was appointed as Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams before the latter left his office (Jefferson defeated him). -There was sufficient proof that the appointment was signed by the President, with advice and consent of the senate, and was affixed with the seal of the United States. But Marburys commission was not delivered as required by John Marshall, Adams' Secretary of State appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. -To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right. 2. YES -Having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy. -The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury -"it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." -The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. -where a specific duty is assigned by laws and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

-When Thomas Jefferson assumed office, he made James Madison Secretary of State. Madison withheld Marbury's and several others' commissions. Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Court to force Madison to deliver the commissions. ISSUES 1. WON Marbury has a right to the commission he demands 2. WON (if he has a right, and that right has been violated) the laws of his country afford him a remedy 3. WON (If they do afford him a remedy) asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus is the correct legal remedy HELD 1. YES. -When a commission has been signed by the President the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the Secretary of State. -By signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United States appointed him a justice of peace for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment, and that the 3. Nature of the writ -"Whenever there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise, (more especially if it be in a matter of public concern, or attended with profit,) and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed or such right, and has no other specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government. - The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. -It is true that the mandamus, now moved for, is to deliver a commission; on which subject the acts of congress are silent. It has already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him. He has been appointed to an office, from which he is not removable at the will of the executive; and being so appointed, he has a right to the commission which the secretary has received from the President for his use. The act of congress does not indeed order the Secretary of State to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands

for the person entitled to it; and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him than by any other person. Power of the court -The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States. -It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. -So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. But since the Constitution is superior to any act of the legislature, the Constitution must govern -(Judicial power, in essence, is the power of a court to settle actual controversies between real conflicting parties through the application of a law. It therefore necessarily involves a search for applicable law) ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION LAUREL; July 15, 1936 NATURE Original Action by Jose Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against Angaras election as a member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas FACTS - September 17, 1935: petitioner was elected member of the national assembly for the first district of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed him on November 15, 1935. The National Assembly passed Resolution no. 8 confirming all members whose election has not been contested. - December 9, 1935: respondent Ynsua filed a protest of petitioners election, with a prayer that he be declared winner or election declared null and void. He filed on Dec. 9, 1935, which was the last day set by the electoral commission for filling election protests.

- December 20, 1935: petitioner filed a motion to dismiss protest before the Electoral Commission on the following grounds: > Res. No. 8 valid exercise of legislative powers > Resolution has the object of limiting protest period > Protest filed outside prescribed period - Ynsua argued that there exists no constitutional provision or statute prohibiting protest of election of a National Assembly member after confirmation. - January 23, 1936: Electoral Commission denied the protest on the following grounds: Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction to Electoral Commission with regards to electoral disputes under Sec 4 Art 6 This excludes the power to regulate proceedings of said election contests reserved to the National Assembly Electoral Commission can only regulate if the National Assembly has not availed of the power to do so Resolution no. 8 valid SC has jurisdiction over question; involves Constitutionality under Par 13 Sec 1, ordinance appended to constitution and Sec 1 and 2, article II of the Constitution - The Solicitor General replied: > Electoral Commission was created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Dept. invested with jurisdiction to decide all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, thus, its fixing of the deadline is a valid exercise of its powers > Res. No. 8 should and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of this jurisdiction > Electoral Commission is invested with quasi-judicial powers created by Constitution- it is not an inferior tribunal - Respondent Ynsua argued: > There was no existing law fixing the period within which protests may be filed; the Electoral Commission, by fixing the last day to file on Dec. 9, 1935, was exercising the power conferred to it by the Constitution > He filed within the set deadline > Electoral Commission has jurisdiction, not reviewable by a writ of prohibition > No law requires confirmation of National Assembly of the election of its members > Electoral Commission is an independent entity, which possesses quasi-judicial functions & whose decisions are final & unappealable > Electoral Commission is not an inferior tribunal but empowered by Sec 226 and 516 of Code of Civil Procedure The Tydings-Mcduffie Law (paragraph 6, article 7) invoked by petitioner is not applicable to case at bar.

ISSUES Procedural WON the SC has jurisdiction over the EC and the subject matter of the controversy Substantive WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of Angara, notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly HELD Procedural Yes. Ratio When there is a need to determine the scope, characteristics, and extent of a Constitutional grant of power to a particular Constitutional organ, the SC shall have jurisdiction Reasoning There is a need to determine the scope, characteristics, and extent of the Constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission under Sec 4 Art 6. Substantive No. Ratio Absent a Constitutional provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgate its judgment of election contests shall lie with the Electoral Commission. Reasoning The deliberation of the Constitutional Commissioners shows that the purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to transfer all power related to judgment on electoral disputes from the National Assembly to the independent tribunal. Absent a Constitution provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgate its judgment of election contests lies with the Electoral Commission. Thus, the resolution passed by the National Assembly cannot bar the right of Ynsua to contest the election of Angara. The argument of abuse is not relevant as everything can be actually met. Confirmation of elected officials is not necessary. Further, the Constitution abrogated the Jones Law (sec.18) and Sec 478 of Act 3387; and there is no law or constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix the time for filing of contests against the election of its members. Disposition The petition for the writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is denied, with costs against the petitioner. 2. Requisites of Judicial Review PACU V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION BENGZON; October 31, 1955

NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. FACTS - Petitioning colleges and universities assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. Petitioners' Claim 1. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; 3. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Respondents' Comments 1. The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy; 2. The petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; 3. The acts are constitutionally valid. ISSUES Procedural WON the case is justiciable Substantive WON Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 is unconstitutional HELD Procedural Ratio The court, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners did not present an actual case or controversy, and did not have standing to sue, decided to look into the matter. Reasoning - Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and section 3 of Act No. 2706 which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. - None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate, and are actually operating. They also do not assert that the Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their

permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the lawand naturally, need no relief. - Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein. - The above notwithstanding, the court decided to look into the matter, to see if there was a violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. Substantive Ratio Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 is not unconstitutional. Reasoning a. The requirement that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education is within the police power of the State. Art.XIV, sec.5 of the Constitution provides that All educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State. The power to regulate implies the power to require a permit or license. b. Petitioners contend that the statutes conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of power. - Petitioners argue that nowhere in the Act can one find any description of what constitutes general standard of efficiency, or adequate instruction to the public. Neither does it provide any statement of conditions or factors which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the efficiency of instruction. (as used in sec.1 of Act No. 2706) - Petitioners also attacked sec 6 of the same article saying that the section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. - The Court answered this by saying that despite alleged vagueness, the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, and the system of private education has been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years, which only shows that the Legislature did and could, rely upon the training and educational experience of those in the Dept of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction. - Also, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured them. c. Petitioners also contend that the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation is unconstitutional, because it is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right. This issue is not within the jurisdiction of the SC but of the CFI.

d. Petitioners questioned the validity of RA No. 139, section 1 of which allows the government, through the Board on Textbooks, to regulate what textbooks may be used by private schools. - The Court noted that no justiciable controversy has been presented regarding this matter considering that the Court has not been informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, or are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing. - The court also said that with the States power of regulation and supervision, it may prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies. TAN V MACAPAGAL FERNANDO; February 29, 1972 FACTS - Petitioners Eugene Tan, Silvestre Acejas and Rogelio Fernandez filed a five-page petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution which dealt primarily with the scope of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. They sought declaration from the Court that the said Convention is without power, under Art. XV Sec.1 of the Constitution and under R.A. 6132. They claimed that the Convention is merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution; it cannot alter its general plan. They asked the Court therefore to consider, discuss and adopt other proposals which seek to revise the Constitution by adopting a form of government other than the one outlined in the present Constitution. The Court dismissed their petition for being devoid of merit, taking exception to the no. of pages petitioners used to express a plea of utmost seriousness. - Petitioners now filed this case, a 32-page motion for reconsideration relying mainly on American jurisprudence which the Court considered as merely secondary authority. As regards the object of the petition, the Court invoked the principle of separation of powers saying that it cannot exercise the competence petitioners erroneously assumed it possesses. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners had legal standing to seek a declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention 2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication HELD 1. No. A taxpayer has standing to nullify a law providing for the disbursement of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act which would constitute a misapplication of funds, through a taxpayers suit. The Court however has the discretion as to whether or not such a suit should be entertained. In this case, the Court

held that the petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit as it held in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito and likewise in Tolentino v. Comelec. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category. 2. No. The requisite for judicial inquiry is that something must have been accomplished or performed by either branch of Govt before a court may come into the picture and even then, it may pass on the validity of what was done only when properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The Constitutional Convention is a coordinate agency whose powers are transcendent and as such not to be interfered with until the appropriate time comes. Courts are devoid of jurisdiction as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may an appropriate case be instituted. The Court here cited petitioner Gonzales (in Gonzales v. Comelec) who had the good sense to wait until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution before filing his suit, thereby making his case ripe for adjudication. Disposition MFR is denied 3. Actual Controversy Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)

Mariano v. COMELEC Facts: Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati, petitioned for prohibition and declaratory relief. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be

passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Sec 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) Issue: WON judicial review is indispensible to substantiate the constitutionality of the sections 2, 51 and 52 of the R.A. No. 7854 :An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati Held:NO Rationale: At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4 Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein,viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself.E r go, so long as the territorial jurisdiction

of a city may be reasonably ascertained,i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5 Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.14 Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, Esperon et. al., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia. This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof. REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process. Article III (Bill of Rights) Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Article II Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained. Article VII (Executive Department)

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Article X. (Local Government) Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided. Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: 1. Administrative organization; 2. Creation of sources of revenues; 3. Ancestral domain and natural resources; 4. Personal, family, and property relations; 5. Regional urban and rural planning development; 6. Economic, social, and tourism development; 7. Educational policies; 8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and 9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. The President has sole authority in the treaty-making. ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein. 4. Mootness Doctrine Alunan III v. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501, 511 (1997)

12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. [13] Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted in Alunanthat since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. AKBAYAN v. Thomas G. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).

JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. Issues: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress 2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition. 3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. Rulings: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot

and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. Legal Standing Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993) Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that 5.

serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." 2 On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. acts: KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)

Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners are suing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack of authority by entering into the contract, because: 1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity 2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecom system (public utility) can be established 3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public system 4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lotto system a. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it is a 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of gambling on the negative list Respondents answered the allegations by contending: 1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise 2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow. 3. There are no violations of laws 4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not be resolved in a legal forum 5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846, where legislative franchisees are not necessary for radio stations Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners have standing 2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169 Held: 1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality that can be set aside depending on the importance of an issue. As taxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system, petitioners have standing. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. PCSO cannot share the franchise in any way. The contracts nature can be understood to form the intent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contracting parties are determined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will be giving is the authority to operate. All risks are to be taken by the lessor; operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are: a. Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breach b. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks are borne by the lessor c. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC; business d. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is

unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is the operator and the condition an attempt to increase public benefit through public involvement. e. Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond. f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural and coordinating rules set by the lessor. g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible community between them. Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent Cruz, Concurring: The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract was intentionally crafted to appear to be a lease. PCSO cannot operate without the collaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in the success of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. The transaction is immoral insofar as the activity is fixed by the foreigners on us with government approval. Feliciano concurring: Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation of powers. The rules is that those assailing statute must show the adverse effect of its implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enough that the court invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement, as it would mean standing is dependent on a majority and is far from being intellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining standing, the guidelines are: 1. character of funds involved (is it public in nature? in this case, the funds are from the general populace); taxpayer with right to see taxes used properly. 2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with the notion of locus standi 2. 3. 4. lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest. In this case, no other government agency filed suit. wide impact or implementation; in this case, nationwide. Padilla, concurring: Gambling is immoral. Petitioner must show a clear, personal or legal right violated by the assailed law, but the requirement must be relaxed in the face of paramount national interest. The PCSO-PGMC contract is clearly a joint venture as each party contributes its share in the enterprise or project PCSO contributes the market. Melo, dissenting: The petition must be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are without a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; to invoke public interest is too broad and indeterminate. Their capacity as taxpayers does not give them standing; a taxpayer suit can arise only w\hen public funds derived from taxation are improperly disbursed. PCSO is not a revenue-collecting fund and as such no public funds are involved. The funds in question are corporate in nature and will not fo into the National Treasury. If the petition is entertained, it may give rise to nuisance suits. Puno, dissenting: The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of judicial power.

It is not merely a technical rule. Section 1, Article 8 of Consti outlines the requirements to be satisfied / complied with before coming to court: a) actual case / controversy b) question of constitutionality raised by the proper party with actual or potential injury c) question raised ASAP d) judicial decision on question raised necessarily to determine the case. Even a relaxation of the requirement of standing does not mean all cases should be heard. Petitioner has no standing because: a) not part of the contract b) petitioners are not personally injured; they wont even play c) no ordinary tax is involved or tax money used, given that PGMC assumes all risk d) an action on behalf of other parties must exhibit personal injury and a need to prevent the erosion of a third party right The invocation of constitutional rights and the allegation of vioalation are untenable. Section 1 Article 13(enhance right to dignity and equality through property regulation) is a mere policy direction for the legislative, reminding them to prioritize certain concerns. Section 11, Aticle 12 (60% Filipino ownership) violations cannot be determined by the Court as PGMC has not been proven to be foreignowned or controlled. The rulings in DE GUIA VS. COMELEC the Court treated standing as a procedural rule when in fact it is a constitutional requirement under Sec 1, Art. 8. In FLAST VS. COHEN standing was shown to focus on the party and not the issue. Standing cannot be granted simply because others cannot come to court. The taxpayer suit is without legal basis as the PCSO is a quasi-public corporation where taxpayer derivative suits cannot be recognized. The majority struck down the contract on the basis of a statute, but invoked National Importance for overlooking standing. There are no Constitutionallybased arguments. Power unused would be better than power misused. Petition denied. Vitug, Separate Opinion: Tax Payer suits are recognized only insofar as public funds from taxation are misused. Locus standi is not merely a procedural rule but the essence of jurisdiction. The petition strikes at factual issues and requires evidence. The petitioners claim that lottery being a game of chance is a crime against morals in the REVISED PENAL CODE is misplaced. The Court has not power to ignore legal mandates. RA 1169 Section 1 authorizes PCSO to conduct lotteries. Petition dismissed. Kapunan, dissenting: There is a need to comply with standards before petition can be recognized. The judiciary has power to decide on cases only when litigants with real interests at stake file complaints in accordance with law. The funds in questions are generated from sources other than taxation / public funds. The Court must respect the other branches of government; national interest is not enough reason to encroach on their powers. The judicial power is to check, not to supplant those powers of elected representatives. There is no constitutional issue involved; the question of the contracts validity should have been brough before the lower courts. Petition denied. SENATE VS. ERMITA

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FACTS:

In exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines conducted inquiries in aid of legislation which call for attendance of officials and employees of the executive departments, GOCCs, AFP and PNP. The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, Wire Tapping Activities of the ISAPF, Fertilizer Scam and Venable contract. AFP chief of Staff General Senga requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands utmost personal attention while AFP officers are attending other urgent operational matters. Executive Secretary Ermita sent a letter requesting postponement of hearing to afford officials ample time to study the issues. Even President Cortes of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requested for postponement until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on contract agreements is sent to him. Senate President Drilon wrote a letter to Ermita that Senate is unable to accede to their request for such was belated and arrangements for the hearing were already finished. The President then issued EO 464, which took effect immediately. In effect EO 464 prohibited officials from the executive department from attending the Senate hearings without first obtaining permission from the President. Senate President Drilon received a letter informing him that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464] and that said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, , informing him that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President and that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer. The investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending, who were later on relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings for disobeying the EO. Cases were then filed by several respondents alleging the constitutionality of EO464. In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of

Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL) pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional for it infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. claims that EO 464 infringes its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. In G.R. No. 169777 Petitioner Senate of the Philippines alleging that it has already sustained injury with enforcement of EO464 since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, prays that such be declared void and unconstitutional. PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition alleging that EO464 impedes their right to forward their legislative agendas.

ISSUES: Procedural: WON there the issue is ripe for judicial review? Substantive: WON EO464 is unconstitutional? HELD:

Yes, the issue is ripe for judicial review. All petitioners, except PDPLaban, have legal standing. There is also an actual case or controversy for the EO has already resulted to the absence of officials invited to the hearings. EO464 is partly unconstitutional. Section 2(b) and 3 are void. Section 1, however, is valid.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The requisite for judicial review are (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

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constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Solicitor General alleges that there is no actual case or controversy for the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464. The Court, however, held that EO464 have already resulted to absences by invited officials and it makes no sense to wait for further event to decide the case. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. All petitioners, except PDP-Laban have legal standing for all incur direct injury because of implementation of EO 464. PDP-Labans allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a generalized interest which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Article 21 of Section 6 of the Constitution expressly recognizes Congress power of inquiry in aid of legislation. In the Arnault case, the Court held that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege, which is the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 1 of EO 464 is valid for it is grounded upon Article VI Section 22 of the Constitution which contemplates the question hour and not inquires in aid of legislations. Cabinet members can decline to attend

the question hours and the President can request that such be made in executive session. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. The non-publication of EO 464 holds it ineffective, though it applies only to officials of government, it affects rights of people in general, and thus needs publication. EO464 ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

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When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order: Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President. SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied 6. Taxpayers suit Tatad v. Garcia, Jr, 243 SCRA 436 (1995)

FACTS - This is a petition to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and the Supplemental Agreement to the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease, and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA - 1989 DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA - March 3, 1990 a letter of intent was sent by the Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc. to DOTC Secretary Oscar Orbos proposing to construct the EDSA 3 on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis - March 15, 1990 Secretary Orbos invited Levin to send a technical team to discuss the project with DOTC - July 9, 1990 RA 6957 entitled An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes, was signed by President Corazon C. Aquino. Referred to as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, it took effect on October 9, 1990 - RA 6957 provides for two schemes of the financing, construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Built-Transfer (BT) - January 22. 1991 and March 14, 1991 DOTC issued Department Orders creating the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical Committee - March 21, 1991 extended to April 1, 1991 deadline for submission of prequalification documents. Five groups responded and after evaluating the prequalification bids, the PBAC issued a Resolution declaring that only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements - July 1991 Executive Secretary Orbos acting on instructions of the President, issued a directive to the DOTC to proceed with the negotiations. - July 16, 1991 EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC - March 13, 1992 Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon informed Secretary Pardo that the President could not grant the requested approval:

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1. that DOTC failed to conduct actual public bidding in compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law 2. that the law authorized public bidding as the only mode to award BOT projects and the prequalification proceedings was not the public bidding contemplated under the law 3. that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law was of doubtful legality 4. that congressional approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT or BT Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the contract was awarded - In view of the comments of Exec. Sec. Drilon, the DOTC re-negotiated the agreement - April 22, 1992 the parties entered into a Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease, and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA - May 6, 1993 President Ramos approved the said Agreement - Private respondent shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system - Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same - DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties - Private respondents capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come fro the earnings of the EDSA LRT 3 - May 5, 1994 RA 7718, amending RA 6957 was signed into law by the President Petitioners 1. The Agreement of April 22, 1992 as amended by supplemental agreement of May 6, 1993 violates the Constitution insofar as it grants EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation, ownership of EDSA LRT 3, a public utility 2. The Build-Lease-Transfer scheme provided in the agreements is not defined nor recognized in RA 6957 3. The award of the contract on a negotiated basis violates RA 6957 4. The award of the contract in favor of respondent violates the requirements provided in the implementing rules and regulations of the BOT Law 5. The agreements violate EO 380 for their failure to bear presidential approval

6. The agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government Respondent 1. Petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest and have no legal standing to institute the present petition; 2. The writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy and the petition requires ascertainment of facts 3. The scheme adopted in the Agreements is actually a buildtransfer scheme allowed by the BOT Law 4. The nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private respondent 5. The Agreements executed by and between respondents have been approved by President Ramos and are not disadvantageous to the government 6. The award of the contract to private respondent through negotiation and not public bidding is allowed by the BOT Law 7. Granting that the BOT Law requires public bidding, this has been amended by RA 7718 passed by the Legislature which provides for direct negotiation as a mode of award of infrastructure projects ISSUES 1. WON 2. WON 3. WON 4. WON 5. WON petitioners have legal standing to initiate instant action private respondent may own EDSA 3, a public utility the BLT scheme is recognized in the BOT Law the award of the contract on a negotiated basis is lawful the agreement is disadvantageous to the government

HELD 1. Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. The ruling in Kilosbayan v. Guingona on locus standi upholds the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action 2. Yes. The Constitution only prohibits operation of a public utility by a foreign-owned corporation. In this case, private respondent is only the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT 3, and it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate it as a public utility 3. Yes. There is no mention in the BOT Law that the BOT and BT schemes bar any other arrangement for the payment by the government of the project cost. The BLT scheme in the challenged agreements is but a variation of the BT scheme under the law. 4. Yes. Only one applicant passed the prequalification process. To conduct public bidding in accordance with Section 5 of the BOT Law for that lone participant will be an absurd and pointless exercise.

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5. No. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. The matter of valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to the experts and which the Court is not eager to undertake. SEPARATE OPINION FELICIANO AND DAVIDE [dissent] a.it is an ultra-vires act of the DOTC sicne under RA 6957 the DOTC has no authority to enter into a BLT contract b.even assuming that it has, the contract was entered into without complying with the mandatory requirements of public bidding. MENDOZA [concur except for locus standi] a.no infringement of legislative power did not allege unconstitutional spending of public funds PASCUAL V SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS CONCEPCION; December 29, 1960 NATURE Appeal from a judgrment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued. FACTS - On August 31, 1954 petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA 920 (An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works) contained in, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the feeder roads were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal, which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway; that the Antonio Subdivision was private property of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that respondent Zulueta addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio; that said

appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision; that, in order to give a semblance of legality to the aforementioned appropriation, respondent Zulueta executed, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation of four parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that being subject to an onerous condition said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting the members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation. Respondents' Comments - Respondents move to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue and that the petition did not state a cause of action. - In support to this motion, Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent is not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of private property; and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. - Other respondents maintained that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because there is no actual bona fide case in which the validity of RA 920 is necessarily involved and petitioner has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest in said Act and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury. -The trial court ruled: 1) since the suit involves public interest, petitioner can question the constitutionality of RA 920 2) the legislature has no power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose 3) the construction and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads were private property, would not be a public purpose 4) the donation being onerous is a contract

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5) said donation or contract is absolutely forbidden by the Constitution and consequently, illegal, for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares inexistent and void from the very beginning contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals or public policy 6) the legality of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his interests are not directly affected thereby 7) accordingly, the appropriation in question should be upheld and the case dismissed ISSUES Procedural WON the petitioner has locus standi. Substantive WON the legislature can appropriate public funds for a private purpose HELD Procedural Ratio Taxpayers have the right to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating public funds. Reasoning Although it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement, there are many decision nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public fund for an unconstitutional act amounts to a misapplication of such funds. Petitioner is not merely a taxpayer, he represents a province which bears a substantial portion of the burden of taxation. Substantive Ratio The legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. Reasoning The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum : In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. Voting Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. 7. Political Question Tanada v. Cuenco, 13 SCRA 375 (1965)

(1) The abstract meaning of Political Questions (PQ) in Taada v Cuenco: Political Questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. TANADA V CUENCO CONCEPCION February 28,1957 (maia rieza) NATURE Petition for a preliminary injunction on respondents restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and on respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of his co-respondents while action is pending, and to make injunction permanent after the hearing, ousting respondents from position in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. FACTS - The senate, after the November 1955 elections, was composed of 23 senators from the Nacionalista Party (NP) and 1 senator (Senator Tanada) from the Citizens Party (CP). The constitution provides, with regard to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET): - "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." - The NP nominated 3 senators to the SET, namely: Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez, Cipriano Primicias. Tanada nominated himself for CP. Then, Primicias, acting on behalf of the Committee of Rules, nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado (both members of NP) to fill the 5th and 6th seats in the SET, despite objections from Tanada. (Bottomline, 5 of the 6 seats allocated for senators in the SET are filled by NP, only 1 by CP). All nominations were voted upon and accepted by the senators, after which technical secretaries and private assistants were assigned to Cuenco and Delgado (no mention if the other senators were assigned such personnel, but only CUencos and Delgados are relevant).

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- Tanada now contends that Cuencos and Delgados election to the SET are null and void for they were nominated not by the party with the 2 nd largest number of votes but by a member of NP for the Committee of Rules. ISSUES 1. WON the substantial issue involved is a political question 2. WON the election of Cuenco and Delgado as members of the SET is valid and lawful HELD 1. No. Although the constitution gives the senate the exclusive power to choose the senators who will form part of the SET, it also provides for the manner in which the power is to be exercised. Judicial review is the power to determine whether the exercise of power is within the limits inherent in the delegation of power. - Citing an American commentator (Willoughby): Where discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. - Citing In re McConaughy (American case) ..What is generally meant when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. - A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. - Such is NOT the nature of the issue in this case. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate power of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. 2. No. The constitution gives the party with 2nd largest number of votes (CP in this case) the right, not a privilege, to nominate 3 senators to the SET. The provision that the SET shall be composed of 6 senators is equally mandatory with the provision that the CP shall nominate 3 members to the SET. - The main objective of the framers in providing for the establishment of the SET is to ensure judicial impartiality in the disposition of electoral contests. It is clear that the framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the electoral tribunals. The procedure prescribed in the

constitution is vital to the role of the SET, as is constitutes the essence of the tribunals. Hence, compliance to said procedure is mandatory. - Ideally, the composition of the SET should be 3-3-3 (3 SC Justices, 3 majority party senators, 3 minority party senators). With the current senate composition, it would be 3-3-1. Tanada obviously did not nominate other senators for it will further disadvantage the minority in the SET (the composition will be 3-5-1). - The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. Disposition Petition granted. SEPARATE OPINION PARAS [dissent] - There should invariably be 6 members from the senate in the SET. Fluctuations in the total membership in the SET were not and could not have been intended. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the SET, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the senate, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. - It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary. - With the provision "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent is clear and mandatory that at all times the SET shall have nine Members. Thus, the senate is justified in acting as it did. LABRADOR [dissent]

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- That there must be 6 senators in the SET is equally mandatory as the procedure such senators shall be elected to the SET. The composition of the senate (23-1) is a situation that the framers obviously did not imagine, - The majority ruling is objectionable on the ff. grounds: 1. it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine 2. it denies to the Senate the power to elect members of the SET, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision 3. it would make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the SET shall be composed of 9 members 4. the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the SET shall thereby be correspondingly reduced - That Tanada did not nominate 2 other senators amounts to a waiver of the privilege to nominate members to the SET, thus such privilege may be exercised by the other party to preserve the mandate of 9 members. While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the SET has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court. Philippine Teritory A. B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Article I (Compare to 1935 and 1973 versions) TREATIES AND LAWS TREATY OF PARIS, Article III R. A. No. 3046 as amended b RA No. 5446 - "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES" R. A. No. 9522 AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF R. A. NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY R. A. NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

C. CITIZENSHIP Article IV, Sections 1-5 CASE LIST Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990 JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents. Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private

Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the

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respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition. Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Reenter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether or not private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmena has lost his Filipino citizenship and thus he is disqualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. Held: The petition is not meritorious. the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

Fornier vs. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe Jr.424 SCRA 277 ( 2004)

The 1935 Constitution during which regime, respondent FPJ has first seen light confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens, regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Charter includes as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There is utterly no cogent justification to provide conditions or distinctions where there are clearly none provided. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a Fernando Poe, Jr. or FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the post of President of the republic of the Philippines in the May 2004 elections. In his CoC, FPJ represented himself to be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and stated his name to Fernando Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939. Victorino Fornier initiated on January 9, 2004 before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by claiming to be natural born Filipino when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners. FPJs mother Bessie Kelley was an American while his father Allan F. Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier argued, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, since the latter is an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based his allegation on two points: First, Fornier contended that Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage with certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley; second, even if no such prior marriage existed, Alan Poe married Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The Comelec dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Fornier sought reconsideration but the same was denied, hence, this petition before the SC docketed GR No. 161824. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court can directly take cognizance of FPJs disqualification case 2. Whether or not a persons legitimacy or illegitimacy is a basis for the determination of his/her citizenship HELD: First Issue: Supreme Court has No Primary Jurisdiction over Disqualification Cases against the President or Vice-President before the Elections In urging the Supreme Court to directly take cognizance of the disqualification case against FPJ, petitioners in GR Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke Article Vii Section 4 paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

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The cited provision refers to the SCs role as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. It reads:RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW The Supreme Court sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court defined by the above provision of the Charter, however, does not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a presidential or vice- presidential candidate before the elections are held. Hence, GR Nos. 161434 and 161634 are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto case which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (specifically Rules 12, 13 and 14) categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of the President or VicePresident of the Philippines and not of candidates for President or VicePresidnet: Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident of the Philippines. Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or VicePresident. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. Thus, the COMELEC properly took cognizance of the disqualification case against FPJ. Second Issue: Legitimacy/Illegitimacy not Material to the Determination of a Persons Citizenship under 1935 Charter The 1935 Constitution the fundamental law prevailing at FPJs time of birth did not consider a childs legitimacy or illegitimacy relevant to the determination of his or her citizenship.

In ascertaining, in GR 161824 whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC in favoring FPJ, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not FPJs father Allan F. Poe would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ prevented him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of FPJs paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that, having died in 1954 at 84 years of age, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence could have well been his place of residence such that Spanish subject Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That Philippine citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, FPJs father. The 1935 Constitution during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Charter includes as citizens of the Philippinesthose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided. Fornier argued that even if FPJs father Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child since he was born a year before his parents married. Fornier contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ followed the citizenship of his mother Bessie Kelley, an American citizen. Fornier based his position on the Courts ruling Morano vs. Vivo [20 SCRA 562], citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon [82 Phil 771] and Serra vs. Republic [91 Phil 914 unreported]. The Court however, noted as pointed out by amicus curiae Fr. Joaquin Bernas that petitioners thesis relied solely on pure obiter dicta in the cited cases. This being so, Forniers position must indeed fail. A pronouncement of the Court irrelevant to the lis mota of a case would be mere obiter dictum which does not establish doctrine. None of the cited cases dealt with the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Morano vs. Vivo was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinesse mother and Chinese father. Chiongbian vs. de Leon, meanwhile, involved the legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution. Lastly, Serra vs. Republic spoke of an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.

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While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his CoC in violation of Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364 (1989)

N RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent. Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner. Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner. Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents. PADILLA, J.: The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5 Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988. Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988. In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO. The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12 Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13

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and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15 Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989. Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed. While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine

citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989)

19. LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC (1992) Facts: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled. Issue 1: Does the COMELEC have the JD to inquire into Labo's citizenship? Held 1: Yes. Ratio: Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the

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COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. Issue 2: Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? Held 2: No. Ratio 2: Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He lost his Philippine citizenship by all three modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Also, he has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Issue 3: Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? Held 3: No. Ratio 3: Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected. Issue 4: If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him? Held 4: No. Ratio 4: Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC,174 SCRA 245 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)

24. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC (1996) Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was contested by Raul Lee who filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. The Second Division of Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted. Three days after, the Comelec affirmed the previous Resolution. The Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that Frivaldo garnered the largest number of votes, followed by Lee. Raul Lee then filed for another petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. His petition was granted and was declared Governor at 8:30pm on June 30, 1995. Frivaldo filed a petition with the COMLEC praying for the annulment of Lees proclamation, claiming that since he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines at 2PM on 30 Jun 1995, there was no more impediment to his being proclaimed as governor. In the alternative, he averred that it was the Vice-Governor-elect that should assume the office and not Lee. Issue: WON Frivaldo was qualified to be elected and proclaimed as Sorsogon governor? Held: Yes. Ratio: The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on 30 June 1995 the very day the term of office of governor began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities as of said date. Furthermore, Frivaldos repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on 17 Aug 1994, since laws which create new rights are given retroactive effect. And even if Frivaldo was previously declared as not a Filipino citizen by the SC, such decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality, because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, lack of citizenship is not a continuing disqualification. SC adds, And let it not be overlooked that Frivaldos demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reassume his nationality of birth despite several setbacks speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal

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technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Dissent: (Justice Davide): Section 39 of the Local Govt. Code of 1991 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. Also, it is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. Kilosbayan v. Ermita G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA AZCUNA, J.

Han Seng was naturalized, and Dy Guiok, Gregory and his siblings were included in the naturalization. Gregory, much later, obtained a Certificate from the Dept. of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Kilosbayan replied that following Ongs factual assertions, his naturalization is proof that he is not a natural-born Filipino. (Rrright!OK)

BRIEF:

From among the nominees of the Judicial and Bar Council, PGMA allegedly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong as Supreme Court Justice, per the media release of Executive Secretary Ed Ermita. Before Ong could take the oath however, Ermita stayed the release of his commission, saying that it was being reviewed as regards doubts on Ongs qualifications. Kilosbayan filed for writs of certiorari to set aside the appointment due to its patent unconstitutionality, saying that the 1987 Constitution provides that No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (7(1), Article VIII), and defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship (2 of Art. IV) while Ongs birth certificate and bar exam petition show that he is a Chinese citizen. Ong answered that: His ancestor, Maria Santos of Bulacan was a Filipino who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen, and begot Juan Santos. Since Chan Kin died, Maria reverted to Filipino citizenship, and Juan, being a minor at that time, also became a Filipino citizen. Juan Santos married Sy Siok Han, a Chinese citizen, siring Dy Guiok Santos. Dy Guiok is therefore a Filipino, following her fathers citizenship. Dy Guiok later married a Chinese, Ong Han Seng, Gregory Ongs father, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen. But when Gregory was 11, Ong

The Court held that: Taking judicial notice of Ongs petition to take the bar exam, and the attached birth certificate, it is clearly shown that he became a Filipino, not by birth, but by naturalization. The Birth Certificate is prima facie proof of the facts contained therein. Substantial correction of entries, such as those that would entail a change in citizenship may only be done via judicial order, and not through whatever administrative process Ong may have followed to secure the DOJ and BID certifications. Hence, the prima facie finding stands unless successfully rebutted by Ong through appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence, Ong is enjoined from accepting the appointment. LAWS RA 9255 (THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW) D. SUFFRAGE Article 5, Sections 1-2 CASE LIST Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 455-456 (1941) The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision in Aquino v. COMELEC, 16 as follows: . . . [T]he place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from

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taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera, 20 in which this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected." In this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of that province's Third District.1wphi1.nt Romualdez v. RTC, 226 SCRA 408, 415 (1993) ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC KAPUNAN, J. Facts: Philip Romualdez, the petitioner, is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place where he voted. After the people power, petitioner left the country and fled to America for asylum. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines in December 1991, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC on February 1, 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for May 11, 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 21, 1992, Donato Advincula, respondent, filed a petition

with the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166 alleging that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Romualdez contends that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991. After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte held in favor of the petitioner Advincula then appealed the case to the respondent court then it rendered the assailed decision that the petitioner is disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, this recourse. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Held: WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED. Akbayan v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318 (2001)

AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318 Facts: The petitioners, as representatives the youth sector, seeks to direct the COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21 because around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent under Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996). Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's Participation, conducted a hearing attended by Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner). On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted a Memorandum No. 2001027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only. Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives, and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of

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the ASD, to disapproved the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution N. 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections. On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election code. This court resolved to consolidate the two petitions. Issue: a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001. b. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. Held: Applying the foregoing, this Court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No, 3584 which, in respondent's own terms, resolved "to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001." Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18, 2001, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No., 12930 has been filed before the Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 was filed before the Senate, with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing factual circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative departments

that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration before May 14, 2001 General Elections. Ceniza v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 703 (1980)

Facts: Sometime December 199, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51, providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. The law in questions provides that any city existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than 40M at the time of the approval shall be classified as highly urbanized city and all other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. To implement the law in question, the respondent Comelec enacted Resolution no 1421, which provides the instruction of voting provincial officials from highly urbanized and component cities. The Resolution provides that registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the elction of the officials of the province of which the city is a component, if its charter provides, but in voters in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. The effect of the law in question results to inconsistencies with other city. Two of which are; City of Cebu is considered as a highly urbanized city and its charter allows that registered voters can elect provincial officials, but pursuant to the law in question, they cannot. Also the City of Mandaue is classified as a component city but cannot vote on provincial officials since their charter prohibits them to do so. Thus, a taxpayer suit was instituted by the petitioners led by Ramon Ceniza, assailing the validity of BP 51, on which uses the annual income as basis for classification arbitrary and is not germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: Whether or not annual income as basis a reasonable and valid distinction. Whether or not BP 51 is not germane to the purposes of the law.

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Held: Yes. It is a substantial distinction and it is with accordance to the purpose of the law. In the issue of its relativity to the purpose of the law, What the law in question seeks to effectuate is the constitutional provision as prescribed in the Principal and State Policies that the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, specially the barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. By enacting BP 51, it defines a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall independent from the provincial government and officials. By virtue of city classification set by BP 51, then cities, with capability of independence and self-reliance will be detached from the supervisory powers of the provincial government. Because the revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic and political unit. Also, it will show whether or not the city has a sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is located. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. Thus, if a city will have an annual income as set which is 40M, then it would be self-reliant to mange itself and the provincial will no longer lend its assistance, thus corollary to their independence, is equal to the loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs specifically in electing provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any jurisdiction and authority over these highly urbanized cities. Macalintal v. COMELEC, 405 SCRA 614 (2003) MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. / 10 JULY 2003

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. ISSUES: A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution? RA 9189 Section 5.d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad which was intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

FACTS:

R.A. No. 9189, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.

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As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit. B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution? SEC. 18.5 On-Site Counting and Canvassing. The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. Art. VII, Sec. 4. The returns of every election for President and VicePresident, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. Section 4 gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Const insofar as it totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows: the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Comelec Said powers are unconstitutional because the Congress may not intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. Comelec shall be an independent constitutional body. It should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. However, with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, is constitutional. LAWS RA 9189 (THE OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT) Changing the Constitution A. B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Article XVII, Sections 1-4 CASE LIST Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973

FACTS:

Marcos declared the Philippines under martial law on September 21, 1972. Upon its declaration, Congress was padlocked, and full legislative authority was vested upon Marcos via rule of decree. Many prominent members of the opposition, notably Benigno Aquino Jr. and Jose W. Diokno, among others, was arrested and placed in military stockades. It was also during that time that the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention were still continuing despite the declaration of martial law. Eventually, on November 29, 1972, the Convention approved the new constitution. The next day, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefore," as well as setting the

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plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973. At this instance, Charito Planas (a staunch critic and later vice-mayor of Quezon City) filed a case (known as the Plebiscite Cases, Planas v. COMELEC (1973)) before with the Supreme Court calling the stop the proposed ratification upon the grounds, among others, that the Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress..." and "there is no proper submission to the people there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." On January 15, 1973, while the Plebiscite Cases were being heard in the Supreme Court, Proclamation 1102, was signed by the President which states that the 1973 Constitution was supposedly ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines... By virtue of the said decree, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for being moot and academic, without prejudice to the filing of a case questioning the validity of Proclamation 1102. Thus, the Ratification cases came into being for the purpose of questioning such Proclamation. On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana initially filed the case questioning the said Proclamation. Similar petitions followed suit, among others, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta, Alejandro Roces, Manuel Crudo, Antonio U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M. Taada on January 23, 1973; on February 3, 1973, by Eddie Monteclaro, (as President of the National Press Club of the Philippines); and on February 12, 1973, by Napoleon V. Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., Leonardo Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M. Gonzales. Likewise, on January 23, 1973, several senators filed a case against the Executive Secretary, as well as Senate President Gil J. Puyat and enate President Pro Tempore Jose Roy, alleging that Congress must still hold session, and that they are being prevented to do so by agents of the Government, invoking Proclamation 1102, and that said Proclamation has a shadow of doubt as to its validity. The lawyers representing the petitioners included Ramon A. Gonzales, Lorenzo Taada, Jovito Salonga, Sedfrey Ordoez, Francisco Soc Rodrigo, Pablo Sanidad, Joker Arroyo and Rogelio B. Padilla, and Raul M. Gonzales. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno represented the government, as well as Arturo Tolentino for Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy. Morning and afternoon hearings were held by the Supreme Court from February 12 to 16, 1973. During the deliberations, former Senator

Lorenzo Taada occasionally rebuked the justices. After the deliberations, the parties were allowed to submit their notes and other arguments. The Supreme Court at that time consisted of Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, and Associate Justices Querube Makalintal, Calixto Zaldivar, Fred Ruiz Castro, Enrique Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio Barredo, Felix Makasiar, Felix Antonio and Salvador Esguerra. Of the members of the court, Concepcion, Makalintal and Zaldivar were the justices not initially appointed by Marcos, Concepcion being appointed in 1954 (he was later appointed Chief Justice in 1966), Makalintal in 1962 and Zaldivar in 1964. The decision of the Plebiscite Cases by the court showed the diverse opinions placed individually by the members of the court. It turned out that the said case would be a precursor to the decision of the Ratification Cases. ISSUES: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, similarly in the Plebiscite Cases, wrote the decision. In the said decision, he wrote the summary of facts, then his own dissenting opinion of the case (which he said that the 1973 Constitution has not been properly ratified according to law), then proceeded to make the summary of votes by the members of the court. The issues raised would be as follows: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a (political) question? 2. Has the 1973 Constitution been ratified validly? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution and made legitimate the rule of Marcos. In the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been ratified validly, six members of the court (the Chief Justice, and Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee), answered that the said Constitution was not validly ratified. (Barredos opinion was equivocal in its nature according to Cruz, but Joaquin Bernas, in his book on the Constitution, annotates that his opinion would be counted as concurring with the six justices). But it is unusual that of those who said that the Constitution was not validly ratified, Querube Makalintal and Fred Ruiz Castro voted to dismiss the petitions. Makalintal and Castro, in a joint opinion, justified their non-granting of relief on the basis of a case in

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relation to Luther v. Borden (48 U.S. (7 Harv.)1; 12 L.Ed. 581, 1849). It said that the inquiry was indeed a political determination and not a judicial one. It was speculated that the two Justices, being next in line for the position of Chief Justice, voted as such so as not to lose favor with Marcos. Such speculation was seen as Makalintal was subsequently appointed Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, and Castro evidently showing his support of the Marcos regime through his court decisions and public statements. The last sentence of the decision contained the following last words: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" It is disputed as to whether or not Concepcion placed the said sentence intentionally, or that someone intercalated the said words after he signed the decision. EFFECTS: The Ratification Cases erased any doubt as to the legality of the Marcos regime, thus he had absolute power as President of the Philippines until he was forced out of power in 1986. It also showed that his acts cannot be questioned, proof of such absolute power is shown by a rubberstamp legislature and a Supreme Court, which virtually under his thumb, is there to affirm or consent any government act being questioned. Chief Justice Concepcion took leave 18 days after the decision became public (50 days from his scheduled retirement) supposedly because he was disappointed on the outcome of the decision. He would later become a member of the Constitutional commission that drafted the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Drawing from his experiences in the martial law years, he introduced several new innovations designed to assure the independence of the Supreme Court, such as the Judicial and Bar Council and the express conferment on the Court the power to review any acts of government. Makalintal, when he became Chief Justice, also took a similar approach of Concepcion in deciding the case of the Habeas Corpus Cases of Benigno Aquino Jr. (Aquino Jr. v. Enrile (1973)) by summarizing the diverse votes of the members of the court. He explained the reason why there was no collegial opinion by the Court, among others, that the justices of the Supreme Court are conscious of "the future verdict of history". At the time of Chief Justices Castro and Fernando, the Supreme Court, using the legitimizing power, affirmed the legality of the Ratification Cases through several cases (see Sanidad v. COMELEC (1976) and Occena v. COMELEC (1981)). Of the four justices who voted to grant relief, Concepcion and Calixto Zaldivar left the court due to retirement. Justices Teehankee, first identified with the regime, began to show his independence by consistently

dissenting on several decisions made by the court. He was accompanied by Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma, and later, by Vicente Abad Santos, in such dissents. Fernando, though expected that he would be one to oppose the excesses of the Marcos regime, became its supporter. Fernando was later caught on camera holding an umbrella to First Lady Imelda Marcos, an act many considered inappropriate for a Chief Justice. JUSTICES OPINIONS: CONCEPCION, C.J. Only a majority of all the members of the Supreme Court is required to annul an executive proclamation. There is nothing in the Consitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of 8 justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the president. The question of the effectivity of the new Constitution should be determined by applying the provisions of the former Constitution. The validity of Proc. 1102 does not partake of the nature of a political, and hence, non-justiciable question. The consistent positions of the US courts, whose decisions have persuasive effect, say that the issue is justiciable. The issue of whether the exercise of a Constitutional power is justiciable. Judicial inquiry into such an issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the 1935 Constitution. The right to vote is conferred by the Constitution and the same may not be increased or diminished. It cannot be dispensed with, except by constitutional amendment. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age renders the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies void. The proceedings were irregular and the some participants lack the qualifications specified in Sec. 1 Art. 5 of the 1935 Constitution. Viva voce voting is void. Art. XV envisages votes cast choices made on ballots. The plebiscite, not conducted by COMELEC, is void. The procedure in the Barrio Assemblies have no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns. This is counter to Art. X of the 1935 Constitution. The Presidential proclamation of the Constitutions ratification may be inquired into. It is not also an evidence of ratification. The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all electionrelated laws. In my mind, there have been no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. The acts of the Executive department under martial law cannot be construed as am acquiescence to the proposed constitution. A department of the government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgement by a party of the acts of another.

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Individual acts of recognition by congressmen do not constitute congressional recognition. They should have done it in session duly assembled. The intimidation is there (due to martial law) and inaction or obedience of the people is not necessarily an act of conformity. The enrolled bill rule does not apply to the acts of the President in reference to the powers he does not possess. MAKALINTAL AND CASTRO, JJ. The petitions lie within the power of judicial review. No question of wisdom or of policy is involved. The manner of voting in Citizens Assemblies is not in accordance with the Constitution and related laws. The Citizens Assemblies were not limited to qualified, let alone registered, voters, but included all citizens from the age of 15, and regardless whether or not they were illiterates, feeble-minded or ex-convicts. The constitutional and statutory qualifications were not considered. No official ballots were used; a show of hands and acclamation were used. Secrecy, one of the essential features of the election process, was absent. That the Constitution should be deemed in effect because of popular acquiescence is political and beyond judicial review. The regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions restricted, we have no means of knowing to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution. BARREDO, J. Validity of a law presumed until otherwise declared unconstitutional (WON the Court is acting as an 11-man Court under the 1935 Constitution of a 15man one under the 1973 Constitution). We have to proceed on the assumption that it is a 15-man Court. To my knowledge, there is yet no country in the world that has recognized judicial supremacy. I cannot say that Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution has been complies with albeit the new Constitution is already in force. Result of referendum is as the President stated. I saw with my own eyes that people actually did gather and listen to discussions. If in fact there were substantially less than 14 million votes of approval, the real figure, in my estimate, could still be significant enough and legally sufficient. Referendum through Assemblies were not merely consultative. The people wanted greater direct participation in decision making regarding matters of vital national interest. Results of referendum valid. The times are abnormal, and prolonged dialogue and exchange of resolute action. Referendum not in strict compliance with 1935 Constitution. 1973 Constitution is already adopted by the people.

Ruling in Tolentino v. Comelec is not applicable in the circumstances surrounding this case at bar. An entirely new constitution is being proposed. We should take into consideration the forces and circumstances dictating the replacement. Congress did not convene as they were supposed to do. The people have already spoken. MAKASIAR, J. The petition is political; not justiciable. The ratification by the people cures any infirmity in its submission or any other irregularities. ESGUERRA, J. Issue is highly political; not justiciable. A case involves a political question when there would be the impossibility of undertaking independent resolutions without expressing a lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government or where there is the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. ZALDIVAR, J. A political question relates to those questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or to the executive. The courts have the power to determine whether the acts of the executive are authorized by the constitution and the laws. Courts have the power to determine the validity of means adopted to change the constitution. Proc. 1102 was issued in complete disregard or in violation of the 1935 Constitution. The rule of law must be held. Voting in the barangays was not fully exercised because of martial law. The term people must be understood in its constitutional meaning they are the ones permitted by the Constitution to exercise the elective franchise. Only a small portion of the members of Congress manifested their acceptance of the new Constitution. Congress is still in force, it may still call a plebiscite. FERNANDO, J. Political departments, in affirming constitutional supremacy, could seek the judiciarys aid. Whether there has been deference to the 1935 Constitution is a judicial question. The provisions of the 1935 Constitution have not been met. Petitions should not be dismissed. A decision in favor of the petitioners need not be immediately executory.

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TEEHANKEE, J. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Laurel said that the Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. The judiciary merely asserts its solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution. There was no valid ratification. There should be strict adherence to the constitutional requirements in amending the Constitution because the will of the people can be ascertained and recorded only with a sound constitutional policy and sheer necessity of adequate safeguards. Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971) NATURE Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court FACTS - The decision sought to be reconsidered held as null and void Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Convention which proposes the amendment of Sec. 1 of Article V of the Constitution by reducing the age requirement therein from 21 to 18 years without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and provides further that the said proposed amendment shall be submitted for ratification or rejection by the people in a plebiscite to be held coincident with the election on November 8, 1971. - The Decision was based on the reasons underlying the provisions of Sec. 1 of Article XV, from the ordinary import of which, the Court was convinced that it does not permit holding of more than one election or plebiscite for the submission to the people of any and all of the amendments. ISSUES 1. WON the Convention being at par with Congress acting as constituent assembly, can submit to a plebiscite, whether singly or together, constitutional amendments it proposed 2. WON the phrase at an election in Sec. 1 of Article XV does not necessarily mean only one plebiscite but may be construed as signifying several plebiscites 3. WON the question of WON the Convention should submit the amendments it may propose in a single plebiscite or otherwise is a matter that goes into the wisdom of the action and outside the pale of judicial review 4. WON there is no need for a frame of reference on which the voters may base judgment as to questioned amendments acceptability

HELD 1. NO. The submission by Congress of proposed amendments after each final adjournment of its joint constituent session and nor before such adjournment, is conclusive proof, not of the legal possibility of piece-meal submission of proposed amendments but, on the contrary, of the validity of the proposition that the constituent assembly has to become functus officio first before the Constitutional amendments it proposes may be submitted to the people for ratification. - No definite consensus has been reached as to whether the rest of the amendment process is exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of Congress or belongs concurrently to the Convention and Congress because some justices did not see the necessity of deciding the issue. The Court was unanimous in not seeing any reason for apprehension of failure in the funding of a separate plebiscite or of any plebiscite, even if it were held that the power belongs exclusively to Congress. 2. NO. the Court did not merely read and interpret the constitutional provision in question but went further and construed it, by going ascertaining the purpose and intent of the framers of the Constitution. Nothing in the Courts previous decision denies the possibility that the phrase an election: may comprehend more than one plebiscite. It held that between 2 possible interpretations, the one more consistent with the spirit of the provisions is that which proscribes piece-meal submission before the whole draft of the Constitution or all amendments to be proposed have been approved by the body. 3. NO. Movants confused wisdom of the questioned action taken by the Convention with the wisdom of the provision of Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution. What the Court discussed in the questioned Decision is not WON the Convention acted wisely but it simply held that there is wisom in the construction that piece-meal submission, before all the proposed Constitutional amendments as a whole have been approved, is not allowed by the Constitution. 4. NO. In the way the proposal is worded, read together with reservations tasked to it by the Convention , it is too much of a speculation to assume what exactly the amendment would really amount to in the end. Disposition The Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED. Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997)

(13) SANTIAGO V COMELEC Background: Atty Delfin filed a petition before the COMELEC, asking them to help him get the required number of signatures for a Peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.

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RD:[Procedural] The Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure when the case is of transcendental public interest [Substantive]RA 6735 is an inadequate law insofar as it provides for the implementation of the right to amend the Constitution via a peoples initiative Art XVII Sec 2 - Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Related to Art VII Sec 1 - The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. in the immunity from suit The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure but not beyond. Immunity after tenure is only for official acts. The language of the Court says that: A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit. It even suggests that a sitting President is not immune from suit for non-official acts or for wrongdoing. Related to Art VII Sec 8 (1) In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified. (2) The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President. in filling a vacancy in the presidency: To constitute a complete operative resignation of a public official, there must be: (1) intention to relinquish part of the term and (2) an act of relinquishment. Related to Art VII Sec 11 (1) Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of h

is office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. (2) Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. (3) Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. (4) If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. on jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of Estrada: political in nature and they cited: BAKER v. Carr: There is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) CARPIO, J. / OCTOBER 25, 2006 FACTS:

On February 15, 2006, petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado, with other groups and individuals (collectively referred as Lambino group), commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On August 25, 2006, the Lambino group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their inititative petition under Section 5b and c and Section 7 of RA 6735 or the inititative and Referendum Act. The Lambino group alleged that their petition had the support of 6, 327, 952 individuals constituting at least at least 12% of all

33

registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino groups petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral Presidential system to a Unicameral Parliamentary form of government. On August 30, 2006, the Lambino group filed an amended petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII of their inititative. On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution denying due course to the Lambino groups petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the Lambino groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative. Whether this court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino groups petition. HELD:

the full text of the proposed amendments, it does not comply with Sec 2, Art XVII of the Constitution. Revisions broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balances and there is also a revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when a change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. Amendment on the other hand broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces or deletes without altering the basic principles involved. The proposed shift from bicameral presidential to unicameral parliamentary is clearly substantial, it alters the principle of separation of powers between three departments to two departments; hence, it is a revision, not an amendment. The framers of the Constitution intended and wrote a clear distinction between amendments and revision. The framers intended and wrote that only Congress or a constitutional convention can propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended and wrote that a peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Therefore, the revisions cannot be proposed through an initiative.

JUDGMENT: Petition dismissed. C. LAWS: R.A. 6735: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. August 4, 1989.

The petition does not comply with Sec 2, Art XVII of the Constitution. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino groups petition.

GOVERNMENT See Bernas, S.J., pp. 35-46 CASE LIST Government of the Philippines, Defined U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, at 339 (1903)

REASONING: The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. The people must author and sign the proposal and as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition; the full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition or attached to it. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. Since the signature sheets by the Lambino group does not contain

The case presents two questions: (1) Were the headlines privileged, and (2) if they were, was there express malice in publishing them? 1. The important part of the article in question, and the only part which contained any libelous matter, was the offer to prove contained therein. This offer was actually made a part of the record of the case on trial in the Court of First Instance. Under section 7 of the libel law, the defendants had the right to publish it if they did so without malice. The Government recognized this right when it limited the charge in the complaint to the headlines of the article, and it is not and can not be claimed that the

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defendants

are

guilty

of

libel

for

publishing

the

article

itself.

the

whole

of

the

headlines

to

ascertain

this.

Nothing could be worse or more libelous that the statements contained in this offer. I do not wish to give them currency by copying them here, but it is necessary to say that it was distinctly charged in this offer, in so many words, that the complaining witness in the case "seduced" a girl living in his house. It was also distinctly charged therein that he had added to his other crimes those of treason and perjury. For the publication of these most grave and unfounded charges the defendants are not prosecuted. The are, however, prosecuted for placing over the article certain headlines. That headlines to a privileged article may be used can not be doubted. The public must be able to get some idea of what a newspaper article contains without reading it entirely through. And it is not claimed that the defendants had not a right to put a proper headlining to this report. The question is, Was the one actually used proper? If the heading is a fair index, and nothing more, of the article, it is as much privileged as the article itself. If it expresses the opinion of the editor on the statements in the article, it is not privileged as to such expressions. Such expressions of opinion are called in our law comments and remarks. The rule is well illustrated in this case. The words "Spanish reading waived "is a mere statement of what the article contains. It expresses no opinion of the editor upon any part of it. On the contrary, the word "sensational" in connection with the word "allegations" is a comment or remark and is not privileged. It says that in the opinion of the editor the allegations made in the offer are sensational. It is not an index of any statement of fact made in the article, but is an expression of opinion upon such facts. The headline "Legarda pale and nervous" can perhaps be considered as an expression of opinion, although in this respect there is a statement of fact to this effect. But this unimportant, for these words, even if not privileged, are not libelous. Neither is the word "sensational" libelous. It is claimed that the words "Traitor, seducer, perjurer" are not an index of the article, but are an expression of the opinion of the editor that the complaining witness was a traitor, seducer, and perjurer. In order to determine this question it is necessary to consider the whole of the headline and to consider it with reference to the article itself. The mechanical necessities of newspaper composition generally forbid the employment of complete grammatical sentences in headlines. They must of necessity be elliptical. The reader does not expect to find the whole thought contained in the first two or three isolated words. It is necessary to look at

The case at bar illustrates this proposition. The first line consisting of these three words of itself means nothing. The words are not spoken of any person. In order to find out to whom they refer it is necessary to go to the line below, in which, while it is learned that they refer to Seor Legarda, it is also seen at the same time that they were allegations made against him. The necessity of reading the whole of the headlines in order to get the meaning of the isolated words is illustrated by the other half of this same page. On the first line are the words "Situation in Hongkong." On the next line are the words "Health authorities fighting the Asiatic cholera epidemic." The first line does not show that feature of the situation in Hongkong is treated of in the article. The second lines does not show where the health authorities are taking action. It is only by reading them together that one learns what the article is about. Fairly construed, the headlines in question say that sensational allegations of being a traitor, seducer, and perjurer have been made against Commissioner Legarda. A person knowing nothing about the case or the parties to it, reading the whole of the headlines, could get no other idea from it. Omitting the word "sensational" which has already been considered, this statement is a fair index of the offer to prove which, as has been said before, was the principal part of the article and the only libelous part. That these crimes were plainly and distinctly, and in those very words, alleged against him is shown by a reading of the offer to prove. It is difficult to see how anyone could make a fair index of that offer without using those words. That was all there was of it rM1kn. The result upon this branch of the case is that the headlines are nothing more than a fair index of the article and are therefore privileged with exception of the words "sensational" and "Legarda pale and nervous," which are not libelous. 2. What has been said already leaves out of consideration the question of malice. By the express terms of section 7, if the defendants published this judicial record with express malice, they are guilty. The Government claims that there was express malice. It is not apparent why, with such a claim, the Government did not prosecute the defendants for publishing the article itself, for, as we have said, it is infinitely worse in its details than the headlines Ht86T.

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The article with the headlines being privileged, the burden of proving express malice was on the Government. It relied upon two kinds of evidence. It claimed that the size of type and the arrangement of the headlines proved malice. They would be some force to this claim were it not for the fact that the other headlines on the same page, to which we have referred, are in the same size of type and the arrangement of the subheads is identical with the one in question. Each one takes up one-half of the page. Any presumption of malice in the use of large type for the words, "Traitor, etc.," is to my mind conclusively rebutted by the use of the same size in printing the words "Situation in Hongkong." An examination of other numbers of this paper, offered in evidence during the trial, shows that this size of type was in frequent use for headlines of the most indifferent character. The only other evidence introduced consisted of articles in other numbers of the same paper relating to the same matter. These stated the gravity of the charges made; the condition of the law in regard to the presentation of the truth as a defense, and urged that an investigation be had for the purpose of showing whether charges were true or not. There was no other proof of express malice. It was proved at the trial that neither of the defendants knew Commissioner Legarda even by sight. There was no evidence that they had ever had dealings of any kind with him. The newspaper articles do not show any express malice, and any inference of that kind which could be drawn from them is, to my mind, overcome by the proof that the defendants did not know the person whom they are charged with having maliciously libeled. In conclusion it may be said that, while the defendants are not guilty, the person who made this offer in court is, for the reasons stated in my| concurring opinion in the case of The|United States vs. Lerma, and if prosecuted for this libel could, as far as appears from the record in this case, have been convicted. The judgment should be reversed and the defendants acquitted. . Constituent and Ministrant and Functions of Government Bacani vs. Nacoco, November 29, 1956. the

Howard Chan Site Owner Posts: 414

Two-fold Function of the Government

Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO, Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the DOJ it was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Petitioners counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers' fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity. HELD: GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of "adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products", a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. ** President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: "'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.

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'(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. '(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. '(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. '(5) The definition and punishment of crime. '(6) The administration of justice in civil cases. '(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. '(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.'" The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. Traditional Classification of Government Functions Obliterated ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 256 (1989

he Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), etc. [GR L-21484, 29 November 1969]; also The Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) vs. ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA), etc. [GR L23605] En Banc, Makalintal (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion Facts: On 4 September 1961 a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which was to be effective for a period of 1 year from 1 July 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and nonimplementation of said agreement. Finally, on 25 October 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on 26 November 1962. On 30 October 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations

against the ACCFA (Case 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the CBA in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated 25 March 1963 ordered the ACCFA (1) to cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self organization; (2) to comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on 4 September 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance; and (3) to bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated 25 April 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought the appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (GR L-21484). During the pendency of the ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844), which among other things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On 17 March 1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case 1327-MC) praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order dated 30 March 1964 directed the Manager or Officer-inCharge of the ACA to allow the posting of said order "for the information of all employees and workers thereof," and to answer the petition. In compliance therewith, the ACA, while admitting most of the allegations in the petition, denied that the Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers, respectively, in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not the proper party to be notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees and supervisors could not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation of the Unions dated 7 May 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the Agrarian Counsel in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council, it was agreed "that the union in this case represent the majority of the employees in their respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised would be submitted for the resolution of the trial Court. Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to the petition to be without merit, the trial Court in its order dated 21 May 1964 certified the

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ACCFA Workers' Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors, respectively, of ACA. Said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its resolution dated 24 August 1964. On 2 October 1964 the ACA filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to stay the CIR order (GR L-23605). In a resolution dated 6 October 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for 'lack of adequate allegations," but the dismissal was later reconsidered when the ACA complied with the formal requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, the Court ordered the CIR to stay the execution of its order of 21 May 1964. Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions. Held: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the

State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of the Court's ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the lower Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the Unions is concerned. De Facto and De Jure Government Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 113 (1946)

acts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs

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proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon

them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) (2003) Revolutionary Government Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 152154, 15 July 2003] En Banc, Corona (J): 9 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 on official leave, 1 took no part Facts: On 17 December 1991, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan (Civil Case 0141. "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos") pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; seeking the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks: (1) AzioVerso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-ScolariValamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy

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Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts; and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. On 18 October 1993, Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated 28 December 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, the Marcos children filed a motion dated 7 December 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting the Republic's request for legal assistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. On 18 October 1996, the Republic filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In its resolution dated 20 November 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment." Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on 26 May 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. Meanwhile, on 10 August 1995, the Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated 10 December 1997,

upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, the Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated 8 September 1998, granted the motion. After the pretrial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated 28 October 1999 and 21 January 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, the Republic, on 10 March 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On 24 March 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision dated 19 September 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the Republic's motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated 26 September 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated 5 October 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated 4 October 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its decision, thus denying the Republic's motion for summary judgment, holding that "the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis." The Sandiganbayan set the case for further proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the Swiss funds deposited in escrow at the PNB can be forfeited in favor of the Republic, on the basis, largely, of the Marcoses lawful income. Held: RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. Herein, the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the present case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of the Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of

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the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from 1 December 1965 to 25 February 1986. Likewise, the Marcoses admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated 27 May 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750: (1) Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President: (a) 1966-1976, at P60,000/year, P660,000; (b) 19771984, at P100,000/year, P800,000; (c) 1985, at P110,000/year, P110,000; (2) Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister: June 1976-1985, at P75,000/year, P718,000. In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of the Marcoses since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution (See Article VII, Sec. 4(2), Article VII, Sec. 11. and Article IX, Sec. 7 thereof). Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The Republic did not fail to establish a prima facie case for the

forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. The elements which must concur for the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of RA 1379 to apply are: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of the third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case. The Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. The Republic was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, the Republic presented enough evidence to convince the Court that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the Marcoses, and their total government salaries. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, were forfeited in favor of the Republic. (1916) Parens Patriae Government v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728

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Topic: G.R. No. L-9959: Government vs Monte de Piedad On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominionsthen provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury.Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried towithdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that thePhilippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against therespondent bank? HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, thisis in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of therights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people Immunity from Suit Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)

Repu bli c v. Felici ano FAC TS: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the

property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-ininterest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. ISSUE: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land RUL ING : NO RATIO NALE : A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed instrictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Addtl: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the

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submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands. Meritt v. Government of the Phil. Island, 34 Phil. 311 (1916) "All government funds deposited with PNB by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds, since such government agencies or instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of their own. They are not subject to garnishment or levy; even assuming that the funds become commingled with other funds of the bank, this does not remove the character of the fund as a credit representing government funds thus deposited." (Italics supplied.) It should be mentioned that when the State consents to be sued, it does not necessarily concede its liability. By consenting to be sued, it waives its immunity from suit, but it does not waive its lawful defenses to the action Meritt vs. Government, 31 SCRA 311, 318). Money Claims Ministerio v. CFI, 40 SCRA 464 (1971) ACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June

30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation. In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit correct? HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court decided that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1. 2. 3. MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE Article VI, Sections 2-14 ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURE Article VI, Sections 15-21, POWERS OF CONGRESS

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Article VI, Sections 1, 5, 18, 21, 25-28 Article III 4. 5. B. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS Article VI, Sections 24-29 INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM Article VI, Section 32

CASE LIST 1. MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE Article VI, Sections 2-14 a.

Residence Qualification (Section 6) Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995) ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC KAPUNAN, J. PARTIES: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo BRIEF: In the run up to the 1995 Elections, former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IMR) filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Congressperson of the 1st District of Leyte, which encompasses the city of Tacloban and the towns of the northeastern Leyte, including Tolosa, versus the incumbent Cirilo Roy Montejo (CRM for short, who btw worked for the establishment of my high schoolhes decent man). In her COC, IMR stated that she had been a resident of Tolosa for ____years and seven months prior to the election. CMR moved for her disqualification, arguing that IMRs residency fell short of the 1-year residency requirement. IMR sought to amend her COC entry to since birth (which is actually futile since she was born in San Miguel, Manila). The COMELEC refused the amendment, correctly holding that it was filed out of time, and disqualified IMR. IMR trounced CRM and appealed to the Supreme Court, on the contention that she did not lose her residency even when she went to Manila, married then Congressman Marcos, lived in Malacanang and fled to Hawaii, since she was only following the residence of her husband, who under the Civil Code then in force, had sole authority to determine the family residence.

The Court ruled that: For purposes of election, residency and domicile are synonymous to each other. It is only in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two, which is: Residence where one stays at the moment Domicile where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to retun if absent). In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her father chose Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdie did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule, change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of three elements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husbands domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her ancestral house in Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision to reestablish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency requirement. Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her. b. Term and Tenure (Section 7) Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779 (1991) Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503 (2003) Dimaporo v. Mitra FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending

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to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened: 1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. 2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4. Voluntary renunciation of office ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position HELD:N o. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service. c. Party List System (Section 5) Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 224 (2000) Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001) Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor party v. COMELEC, June 2, 2003

The Comelec en banc proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 12 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. PAG-ASA, later joined with other party-list organizations, filed with the Comelec a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution," alleging that he filling up of the 20% membership of party-list representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory; that a literal application of the 2% vote requirement & and 3-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. The Comelec 2nd Division proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, although these additional proclaimed obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives at all times. In allocating the total 52 seats, it disregarded the 2% vote requirement prescribed under 11(b) of RA 7941. Instead, it indentified 3 elements of the party-list system which would supposedly determine how the 52 seats would be filled up: (a) the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors to be representatives in the House; (b) the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society; and (c) it should encourage the multi-party system. Considering these elements but ignoring the 2% threshold requirement in RA 7941, it concluded that the party-list groups ranked No. 1 to 51 should have at least 1 representatibe. The 12 parties and organizations which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least 2% of the votes cast for the partylist system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties. Issues: 1) Whether the 20% allocation of party-list representatives mentioned in 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory or merely a ceiling. 2) WON the 2% threshold requimrent and the 3-seat limit provided in 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 3) If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? Held:

166. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC Facts: In the May 1998 elections, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of 12 parties, organizations and coalitions participated.

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1) NO. It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. A simple reading of 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. - The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the no. of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise 20% of the total no. of representatives including those under the party list.1 No. of party list representatives =

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

# districtre presentati ves .20 .80

- Applied to the facts at bar, the total no. of party list representatives would be 208/.8 x .2 = 52. - In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. It deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. 2) YES. 2% Threshold In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. Even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." 3-Seat Limit
1

3) Method of Allocating Additional Seats: The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines The core of the controversy is in determining the allocation of the additional seats. Two propositions: (a) One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment 2/4/6 formula (b) The Niemeyer Formula The Philippine party-list system has 4 inviolable parameters: First, the 20% allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the 2% threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the 3-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Step One. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the 1st party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the 1st party is

5(1), Article VI

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entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. A fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. Additional representatives of first party = #o fvo teso ffirstp a rty #o fv o teso fp a rtylistsystem

If the proportion of votes received by the 1st party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the 1st party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the 1st party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the 1st party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:

Pet.s seek the disqualification of private Resp.s as the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties. Particular attention is called to the fact that 7 of the Resp. political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, Aksyon, PDP-Lakas and LP) are actually the major political parties in the counting as determined by the Comelec and charges that the rest of private Resp.s are pseudo party-list organizations which are actually satellite of the major political parties and of big businesses.

Issues: 1) WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections 2) WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations 3) WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 Held: 1) YES. Political parties may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private Resp.s cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. 7 and 8, Article IX-C provides that political parties may be registered under the party-list system. In the ConCom deliberations, Com. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place 3rd or 4th in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 3 of RA 7941 provides that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a collation of parties. 11 of RA 7941 of the same Act leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. Indubitable, political parties even the major ones-may participate in the partylist elections. 2) YES. The party-list system cannot be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. For political parties to participate in the party-list elections their requisite character must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose of the party-list system is to give genuine power to our people in Congress. However, the constitutional provision is not selfexecutory, hence RA 7941 was enacted. Proportional representation does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. It refers to the representation of the marginalized and

addnal seats for concerned party = -

#enp vcny o ca tf e r s rt oe od #ett vfp osy tf a s r o i r

dsora aa re r dltcny i e od t anp i sc t of e n

Incidentally, if the 1st party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the 1st one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

Disposition. The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with Pet.s that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats. 167. Ang Bagong Bayani - OFW vs. COMELEC Facts: The Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC is challenged insofar as it approves the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.

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underrepresented as exemplified in 5 of the Act. The party-list organization must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies. The persons nominated to the party-list system must also belong to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, organizations and parties. Lack of well-defined constituency refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group. It points to those with disparate interests defined with the marginalized and underrepresented. In the end, the COMELECs role is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the partylist system. Not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

3) YES. The SC held that it is proper to remand the case to the COMELECT to determine whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. Guidelines: (1) The political partymust represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in 5 of RA 7941, (2) Even if major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives, (3) a party or an organization must not be disqualified under 6 of the Act which enumerates the grounds for disqualification, (4) the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the govt., (5) party must comply with the requirements of the law, (6) not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, so also must its nominees, (7) the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Disposition. Case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. MENDOZA, J., dissenting: Vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases.

The text of Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)(2) provides for a party-list system of registered, regional and sectoral parties or organizations, and not for sectoral representation. It provides for no basis for Pet.s contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for marginalized sectors. The Record of the ConCom speaks clearly against the Pet.s assertion. Two proposals for additional representation in the House of Representatives were submitted namely, sectoral representation and party-list system. These two are not the same. In the end, the ConCom chose the party-list system. In choosing this system, the ConCom did not intend to reserve the party-list system to the marginalized or underrepresented. In fact, the party-list system mandates the opposite. The majority misapprehended the meaning of Section 2 of RA 7941. The provision states that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote promotional representation in the election of representatives in the House of Representatives. To this end, a full, free and open party system is guaranteed to obtain the broadest possible representation of a party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. While the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

Major political parties are not disallowed from participating in the party-list system. The enumeration in 3 of RA 7941 was intended to qualify only sectoral parties and not the other eligible groups (political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). The real aim was to introduce the concept of party-list representation, not to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and let alone, hand it over only ot underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The party-list system is limited to 4 groups: (1) political parties, (2) sectoral parties, (3) sectoral organizations, and (4) coalitions. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

168. Banat vs. COMELEC Facts: This case involves two consolidated petitions. First Petition:

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On June 27, 2007, in connection with the May 14, 2007 national elections, BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution. BANAT filed its petition because the Chairman of the COMELEC and its Members of the have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. BANAT prayed for the following reliefs: 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed. 2. Paragraph (b), 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking. 3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic]. 5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional 11 of RA 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Dalag. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the Resolution promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the COMELEC in NBC No. 07-041. The following are intervenors in said petition: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Second Petition:

NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of 13 parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (Veterans). We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below. Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72. 9 July 2007> Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on the ground that the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of RA 7941. They criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. The COMELEC proclaimed 3 other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the PartyList System. Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both petitions.

Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, recommended to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot and academic, since the COMELEC has promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections which resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

Issues:

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1) Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling. 2) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? WON the 2% threshold prescribed in 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for 1 seat constitutional. WON the three-seat limit in 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 3) WON the Constitution prohibits the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, WON the major political parties can be barred from participating in the party-list elections? Held: Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% partylist representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in the decision. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. - However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations. 1) The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. - The Constitution, in 5(1) of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. - Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution. 5(1), Article VIi of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. - 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from

the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus: Number of seats available to legislative districts .80 This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives. 220 .80 - After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature. 2) Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the 2% Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap - The center of the controversy with respect to the allocation of seats under the Party-List system is on the numerous interpretations of the provisions of RA 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the 1st Party Rule, and Justice Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula as an alternative. - RA No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of 11 and 12 of which provide: 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions x .20 = 55 Number of seats available to party-list representatives

x .20 =

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on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied) - 11(a) of RA 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. - The first clause of 11(b) of RA 7941 guarantees a seat to the twopercenters. Applied to the case, the percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates. The result is that 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified partylist candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. - The second clause of 11(b) of RA 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the 1st party. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling under 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives, presenting an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. - New formula: In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. - In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. - The allocation of additional seats are not limited to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. - Applying the procedure of seat allocation, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats are allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party. 5) YES. Major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. - Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, RA 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is

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manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and RA 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. - Read together, RA 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor. - Under 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen. Disposition. Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as NBC No. 0760 are set aside. The 2% percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats is declared unconstitutional. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. d. Privilege from Arrest (Section 11) People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689 (2000)

of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. e. Privilege of Speech (Section 11)

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905,, August 3, 1966

FACTS: Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President. A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up; 2. There is a planned coup dtat; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication. 2. Whether or not it is libelous. HELD: 1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication: a. was an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty. 2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order appealed is confirmed. f. Prohibitions (Section 14) Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) Puyat v. De Guzman Facts: The case is a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Order of SEC (De Guzman) granting Estanislao Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC case # 1747. Fernandez, on one of the conferences of the parties, represented the ACERO group but the Puyat group objected because Fernandez is an assemblyman as prohibited by law (Section 11, Article 8 of the Constitution). Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent ACERO for the mean time. To circumvent the law, Fernandez purchased 10 shares of stock on May 15, 1979 and was notarized on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on such date.

FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress. HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement

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Being an owner of shares of stock of IPI, Fernandez filed for an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC case and it was granted by SEC. One the case, Reyes vs Excelsior et al, before a Court of First Instance, S.C. ruled that Fernandez cannot appear as counsel to the respondents because the court was one without appellate jurisdiction. SC also issued a TRO enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervenor of Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC case. Solicitor General commented for the respondent commissioner of SEC supporting the latters stand in allowing intervention. Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez may intervene in the SEC case. Held: The intervention of Fernandez is an indirect appearance as a counsel before an administrative body which is in contravention of the constitutional provisions (Section 11, Article 8): SEC. 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office.

any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an employment. ISSUE: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat? HELD: No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit. 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURE Article VI, Sections 15-21, a.

FACTS

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold

Officers (Section 16) Avelino v. Cuenco, March 4, 1949 FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum the majority required of the 24member Senate. ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

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(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. Arroyo, et al. v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious; Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted. Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed. Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. In view of what is essential Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to

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conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. In view of the Courts jurisdiction This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction". In view of House Rules No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. In view of the enrolled bill doctrine Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. b. Internal Discipline (Section 16)

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Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960) Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior. Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government. c. Journals (Section 16) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the

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duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. d. Electoral Tribunals (Section 17) Lazatin v. COMELEC, 157 SCRA 337 (1988) Lazatin v. COMELEC, 168 SCRA 391 (1988)

3.

POWERS OF CONGRESS Article VI, Sections 1, 5, 18, 21, 25-28 Article III a. Non-delegability of legislative power (Section 1) Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Issue: Whether Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under or not POEA has jurisdiction

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the

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Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 282 SCRA 337 (1997) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16 2008 [In relation to Art. VI, Sec. 5] Sema v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177597, 2008) is a court case that was heard before the Supreme Court of the Philippines. It was consolidated with Marquez v. Comelec (G.R. No. 178628, 2008). It held that the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao does not have the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, the creation of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan was unconstitutional and that province no longer exists as a political entity in the Philippines.[1] b. Commission on Appointments (Section 18)

Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)) Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court. c. Legislative Investigations (Section 21) Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950)
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned "until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith." Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation. HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee

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may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law. Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643 (2008) ACTS OF THE CASE:

On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMAs and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1. 2. 3. whether whether whether or or or not not not PGMA PGMA PGMA followed directed directed up the NBN Project. him to prioritize it. him to approve it.

invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked. - If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized. - YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates its own abuses. - Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the executive to function effectively. - The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent roving commissions. - The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o concurrence of the majority. HELD: RESPONENTS COMMITTEES MOTION 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED. 4. FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS Article VI, Sections 24-29 a. b. Appropriations (Section 25) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975) Transfer of Funds (Section 25) Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)

The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUES OF THE CASE: 1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system? 2. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? - YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution. - The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. - In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who

ACTS 1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs 2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on the ff. grounds: - it infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys - it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made - it allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations - it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and

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the Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction. 3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further contended that: - The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution - Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter s sphere of responsibility 4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance. 5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the petition moot and academic ISSUES 1. WON the case is justiciable. 2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional. HELD 1. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. - According to Pascual v Secretary of Public Works , taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. . As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not (Tan v Macapagal). - Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. - Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. - Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For

flexibility in the use of public funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified. - The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made. - It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power c. Subject and Title of Bills (Section 26) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994) Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom? Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon." The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise

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of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution. Item Veto (Section 27) Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 508 (1994) 235 SCRA 506 Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner vs. Enriquez, respondent

Facts: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for

Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. d. Tax Laws (Section 28) Commissioner of BIR v. CA, 298 SCRA 83 (1998) Doctrine: - Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. - A claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, it must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. Verba legis non est recedendum where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. - The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. It must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. - The Court cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court, given its limited constitutional authority,

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cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. Facts: Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an assessment to private respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the assessment. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. Issue: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA subject to income tax Held: Yes. Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC. Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken (Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117359, p. 15 July 23, 1998). Verba legis non est recedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. This is without merit since the exemption provided lies on the payment of property tax, and not on the income tax on the rentals of its property. The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the above provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Unfortunately for respondent, the Court noted that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted to prove that it met the said requisites. The Court appreciates the nobility of respondents cause. However, the Courts power and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. e. Expenditure of Funds (Section 29) Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331-346 (1960 Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid. HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. "In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

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Osmea v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993) FACTS P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, 7 and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive Order also authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from such placements accruing to the fund. President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution. The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." 10 Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." RULING While the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent. With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 18 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund. What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax." 19 The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what

is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State. For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform. The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no ground upon which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative functions." 5. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM Article VI, Section 32 a. Initiative and Referendum (Section 32) Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279 (1994)

In this case, AG himself averred that the advertisement in question was paid for by the organization named Friends of AG. This advertisement may be considered as a donation to AG under Section 4 of R.A. 9006 which explicitly requires that it shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC. Since the advertisement was published there arises a presumption that there was written acceptance by AG of the said advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Hence there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that he participated in the act complained of. Probable cause does not mean actual or positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. It does not require an inquiry into whether there

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is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The requirement for a written acceptance by a candidate of donated advertisements is a safeguard provided by law against the danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda beyond the required frequency, size and other limitations imposed by law without the candidates express agreement since the violation thereof results in the prosecution of the candidate for an election offense punishable by Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. Fair Elections Act (Section 6, R.A. 9006) requiring that print advertisements shall not exceed page in a broad sheet and page in a tabloid and that the same shall be published only thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publication during the campaign period. Also involved is Section 4 which requires that any published or printed political matter shall be identified by legible words political advertisement paid by followed by the true and correct name and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed and that if it is donated, it shall not be published without the written acceptance by said candidate. Hence the Information already filed in the Regional Trial Court must be allowed to take its due course. C. LAWS: RA No. 7941: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, March 3, 1995. RA No. 6735: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, August 4, 1989

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5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. The first paragraph of 11 of RA 7941 reads: 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx