2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval

lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

56 Sec. 1, Art. III No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual. A. DUE PROCESS OF LAW That which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Applies to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or nationality Artificial personscovered but only insofar as their property is concerned. Extends to aliens Includes the means of livelihood Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849) Lifeincludes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable. Libertyincludes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. x x x It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660) Propertyis anything that come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them. Public office is not a property which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right. (Bince vs. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782) Scope/Aspects of Due Process: 1. Procedural Due e Processthe method or manner by which the law is enforced. It serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the government. Requisites: (non-criminal cases) a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine matter before it; b. Jurisdiction properly acquired over person of defendant and over property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; c. Opportunity to be heard; and d. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence adduced. Impartial Court or TribunalJudges must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. In Anzaldo vs. ClaveJacobo Clave, acting as Chairman of CSC, rendered a decision against petitioner. When petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, the same Jacobo Clave, but this time acting as Presidential Executive Assistant, upheld his own earlier decision. The SC held that this violates fundamental fairness required by due process. A public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge. People vs. Mendenilla (2001), judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses and address the points overlooked by counsel. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are within the prerogative of a judge to ask. Sec. 14 (1), Art. IIINo person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. ---This is procedural due process in criminal cases Requisites of Criminal Due Process: a. Accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction; b. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law; c. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard; d. Judgment rendered within authority of constitutional law If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. (Mejia vs. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988) 2. Substantive Due Processit requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just. This serves as a restriction on the governments law and rule-making powers; a prohibition of arbitrary laws. The heart to substantive due process is the reasonableness, or the absence of exercise of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of every case. As a general rule, when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty, or property, the presumption is that the action is valid. In rare cases, as in prior restraint, there is a presumption of invalidity. Requisites: a. Interest of the public; b. Means employed are reasonably necessary for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly oppressive. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.

Void-for-vagueness Rulea criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. A law is vague as not to satisfy the due process need for notice when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. It is injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 aspects: 1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and 2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either saving clause or by construction. (People vs. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, January 24, 2001) Overbreadth Doctrinedecrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Facial Challengea facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. On its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), Motion for reconsideration. xxx [T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-- The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of Pres. Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Coverage: Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. in the exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the PD, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. It is imperative to the validity of laws, PDs, EOs, Administrative rules and regulations except interpretative legislations. (Taada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986) Notes: In the original case Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), the SC ruled that as a matter of substantive due process, any law must be published before the people can be expected to observe them. But, according to a split decision, publication need not be made in the Official Gazette. It is enough that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation. After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the original judgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in the

Official Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise" that is, a different mode of publication. What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not of general application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislative grant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of a substantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith, that is, immediately. Where? Only in the Official Gazette Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000), an extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. During the evaluation stage, right to know is withheld to accommodate the more compelling interest of the Stateto prevent escape of potential extradite which may be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. Roxas vs. Vasquez (2001), lack of notice to, participation of complainants at the REINVESTIGATION does not render the resolution of the Ombudsman null and void. (But in preliminary investigation, their participation is needed.) Exceptions to Notice and Hearing Requirements Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz (1989)without conducting any hearing, NTC ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT challenged the validity of the order on the ground that it is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power without the required hearing. NTC replied that the order was merely interlocutory. The SC held that fixing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period covered. BUT, in Radio Communications vs. NTC (1990)the Court upheld the temporary rates granted by the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTC to approve temporary rate requested by public service agency provided hearings are held within 30 days thereafter. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its QUASIJUDICIAL function. In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or LEGISLATIVE functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Suntay vs. People (1957)the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime may be cancelled without notice and hearing. Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004, the Sc ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Banks dishonor of Calderons credit card, inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which provided that the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card privilege would be automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder. Appeal and due process Appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process; generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion. But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of due process. Where there is statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes a denial of due process. Preliminary Investigation and due process Preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003). It may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it (Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001). The right may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal (People vs. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8, 1997). Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138, when there is statutory grant of the right to preliminary investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process clause. The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. (Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001) Prejudicial Publicity To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity because these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. (Webb vs. De Leon, 1995) Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on

such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintain the dignity of government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125) Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court? Both on statutory and constitutional grounds, the answer is no. In Government of USA vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002: 1. On the basis of Extradition Law Sec. 6 of PD 1069Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant or arrest should be issued. By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such an early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impressiona prima facie findingsufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. 2. On the basis of the Constitution Even Sec. 2 of Article III does not require a notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only examination--under oath or affirmationof complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrant of arrest. B. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE The equal protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Section 1 of Article III to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. It simply requires that all persons or things, similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. (Philippine Judges Who are protectedall persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is concerned. Scope: Political, Economic and Social Equality In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national interest. But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they are admitted to the country as immigrants. Valid Classification: Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are: 1. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; 2. The distinction must be germane to the purpose of the lawthe distinctions which are the bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law; 3. Not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It must apply to all members of the same class. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, The withdrawal of franking privileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained with the executive and legislative departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situated. Villegas vs. Hui Chiong, the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon all aliens desirous of obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declared unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and it

failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who were required to pay it. Sexual Discrimination Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, female domestic working abroad were in a class by themselves because of the special risks to which their class was exposed. Administration of Justice Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1988, Special grant of exemption in favor of the Marcoses as contained in the agreement entered into by PCGG with Marcos Family to compromise the ill-gotten wealth cases (exempt from all taxes) filed by the former against the latter is a CLASS LEGISLATION, vilative of the equal protection clause. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, petitioners and intervenors right to equal protection was not violated by the enactment of RA 8249 because the law was not directed only to Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. Public Policy Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, The law excluding residents of Mandaue City from voting for provincial candidates was justified as a matter of legislative discretion and that equal protection would be violated only if group within the city were allowed to vote while others were not. Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700, when the mayor issued permit in favor of unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon Baclaran Credit Cooperatives, he violated the equal protection clause when failed to show that the two were not similarly situated. Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, the executive order granting tax and duty incentives only to business and residents within the secured area of Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the zone but outside such fenced in territory is VALID. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. Classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, there were no reasonable distinctions between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to those teachers. Relative Constitutionality: Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions of the Constitution since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government. In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection. Sec. 2, Article III Searches and Seizures The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Scope: The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may be required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of police and taxing powers. The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383). As such, the right may be waived either expressly or impliedly, but the waiver must be made by the person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver. (People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457) SEARCH WARRANTmay be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant

officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. WARRANT OFARRESTsaid to particularly describe the person to be seized if it contains the name of the person to be arrested. Requisites of a valid warrant: 1. It must be based upon probable causesuch facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof. It consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense. For a search warrantsuch facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800) For a warrant of arrestsuch facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995) In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this, how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant. 2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. The judge shall: a. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the public prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or b. If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been removed. Search warrant Warrant of arrest The judge must personally examined in the form of searching Q&As, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them. The determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who It is not necessary that the judge should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses; the judge would simply personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. Judge determines the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused conducted the required examination of the applicant and the witnesses. and, in so doing, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. 3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions. The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else, like the clerk of court. So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he issued the search warrant in question. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, the warrant is void. Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based on investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were

held to be not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid. 4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Search warrant Warrant of arrest The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise, and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern; the description is General warrants are proscribed and unconstitutional. However, a John Doe Warrant (a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown) satisfies the constitutional requireme3nt of particularity if there is some descriptio required to be specific only insofar as the circumstances will allow. personae which will enable the officer to identify the accused. Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read "subversive documents, leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions, thus making the warrant a general warrant. In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the description was not at all particular or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants. When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out in full. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide; no unfettered discretion must be granted to him. The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression. Properties subject to Seizure: 1. Property subject of the offense; 2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and 3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Permissible Area of Search In People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2002, the warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence. The rule has been constitutionally affirmed in Section 3(2), Article III, which provides that such evidence shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Such evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree. However, it is submitted that it may nonetheless be used in the judicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible for its illegal seizure. It has also been held that where the accused did not raise the issue of the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized, such omission constitutes a waiver of the protection granted by Section 3, and the illegally seized evidence could then be admitted against him. (People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494) WARRANTLESS ARREST 1. When a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; 2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and 3. When the person to be arrested is an escapee or a detention prisoner. (Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure) The Rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003)

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (a) When search is made of moving vehicles The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant. Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside the car). There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community, the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them. (b) When search is an incident to a valid arrest. Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest-- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest. In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985), Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m., having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away, was searched and some documents seized. The SC at first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized, because it was an incident of a valid arrest. But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest, i.e., not separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search. The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (1) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his captor and (2) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge. If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if the documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents, having been arrested already. In People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, while a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. In the case of People vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338 (2001), the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which, was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearms was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidenced against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence. In People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001), to constitute a valid in flagrante delito arrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003, the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latters person that which: 1. Was used in the commission of the crime; 2. Was the fruit of the crime; 3. May provide the person arrested with the means of committing violence or escaping; 4. May be used in evidence in the trial of the case. The search, however, must be contemporaneous to the arrest and made within a permissible area of search. Requisite: the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting the arrest which could be considered as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrest enumerated in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. In the case of People vs. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, the officer could reasonably assumesince the informant was by their side and had so informed them and pointed out the culpritthat the drugs were in the appellants luggage, and it would have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd, for them to adopt a wait-and-see attitude at the risk of eventually losing their quarry. (c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party People vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003, whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of the case. Plain View Doctrinefinds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain view of the police officer. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668) Requisites: 1. Valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; 3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and 4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (d) Stop-and-Frisk It is defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk 1. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make the initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. 2. The apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle of stop-and-frisk to apply. (e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently. Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to the search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. The waiver must be expressly made. It must be given by the person whose right is violated.

In People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in the baggage of the accused was found by (private) security officers of the interisland passenger vessel who then reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. The search and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out without government intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked. (f) Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs law (g) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation of immigration and smuggling laws (h) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations (i) Conduct of areal target zoning and saturation drive in the exercise of military powers of the President (j) Visual search at checkpoints Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings"; doctrine of exigent circumstances The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right and can be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. There is no need for checkpoints to be announced. Not only it would be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. (People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754) Knock and Announce Principle General Rule: Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when: 1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; 2. When such person already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; 3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; 4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside, are then engaged in an activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. (People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004) In People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. Do the ordinary right against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to searches conducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security procedures? In the case of People vs. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000, persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage, are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protection against warrantless searches and se izures d o not apply to routine airport procedures.

People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, a search made pursuant to a routine airport security procedure is allowed under RA 6235, which provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried luggage, etc., shall be subject to search, and this condition shall form part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing the passenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by the appellant), and thereby depriving the security personnel of ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be sanctioned impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of the society. The strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances. Procedure for Seizure of Pornographic Materials: To justify a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must be on account of a crime having been committed; 1. There must be a criminal charge against the person for purveying the porno materials; 2. Application for search warrant must be obtained from the judge; 3. Materials must be brought to court in the prosecution of the accused for the crime charged; 4. Determination whether the items confiscated are pornographic materials; 5. Judgment rendered by the court. (Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362) Sec. 3, Article III (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well as intangible objects. (See RA 4200 below) Exceptions to inviolability: 1. Lawful order of the court; 2. When public safety or orders requires otherwise, as may be provided by law. Is there a constitutional right to privacy? Yes. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of Article III. Other facts of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Sections 1 (right to due process clause), 2 (right against unreasonable searches and seizures), 6 (right to liberty of abode and of changing the same, as well as the right to travel), 8 (freedom of association) and 17 (right against self-incrimination). (Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1988) Zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws: 1. The Civil Code provides that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 2. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. 3. Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200)invasion of privacy. 4. S ecrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 1405) 5. I ntellectual Property Law (RA 8293) 6. R ules of Courton privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information [Sec. 24, Rule 130(c), Revised Rules on Evidence] RA 4200 Anti-Wire Tapping Act It prohibits any person not being authorized by all parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or record the same, or to communicate the content thereof to any person. The use of said record may be permitted in the following instances: 1. In civil or criminal proceedings involving certain specified offenses principally affecting national security; and 2. When authorized by the court which may be issued under the following conditions: a. The constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant should be complied with; and b. The authority shall be effective only for sixty (60) days. Any evidence obtained in violation of this law is not admissible in any proceeding. RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make any distinction. A telephone extension is not among the devices covered by this law. (Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112) Navarro vs. CA, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999, two local media men in Lucena City went to the police station to report alleged indecent show in one night establishment in the City. At the station, there was a heated argument between police officer Navarro and Lingan, one of the two media men, which led to fisticuffs. Lingan fell and his head hit the pavement which caused his death. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two. The SC held that Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice

recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Exempted acts: A. Use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned below: [Secs. 1, par. 2] B. Any peace officer, who is authorized by the written order of the Court (RTC within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed), to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the crimes of: [Sec. 3, par. 1] 1. treason 2. espionage 3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of war 4. piracy 5. mutiny in the high seas 6. rebellion 7. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion 8. inciting rebellion 9. sedition 10. conspiracy to commit sedition 11. inciting to sedition 12 kidnapping as defined by the RPC 13.violations of CA 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security The WRITTEN ORDER shall only be issued or granted upon written application with the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and must show: a) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated herein has been committed or is being committed provided, that in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; Page 827/12/2008 say 82 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos b) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence may be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; c) That there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. Contents: 1. The identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line and the telephone number involved and its location; 2. The identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; 3. The offense or offenses sought to be committed or prevented; and 4. The period of the authorization. Effectivity: The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed 60 days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest. Procedure: All recordings made under court authorization within 48 hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order: 1. Shall be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package; 2. shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit and certifying that no duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court; 3. shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversations or communications have been recorded. PENALTY Any person who violates the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction, be punished by: 1. imprisonment for not less than 6 months or more than 6 years; and 2. with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense; and Page 837/12/2008 say 83 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

3. If the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings. ADMISSIBILITY Any communication or spoken word, or the existence contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing or investigation. Exclusionary Rule Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of Sections 2 and 3 (1), Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding." The evidence is absolutely useless. This has not always been the case. In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired. It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969, when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment, resistance), especially in the Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights. The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, depending on whether it is contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be returned, and only its suppression can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its return, even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case. Page 847/12/2008 say 84 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Civil Action for Damages A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code. In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended, the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590, RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make a distinction. Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699, the right may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour. Should in camera inspection of bank accounts be allowed? Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In Union Bank vs. CA, Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposit to be absolutely confidential except: 1. In an examination made in the course of special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity; 2. In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank; 3. Upon written permission of the depositor; 4. In case of impeachment; 5. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; or 6. In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. In the case of Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, there is Page 857/12/2008 say 85 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R

review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. Human Security Act of 2007 Section 3, HAS of 2007, provides that the authorities may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of terrorist group. Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctor and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. Sec. 4, Article III No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The rule on privileged communications has its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in US vs. Caete, 38 Phil 253, the SC ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libel. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1) The freedom to speak includes the right to be silent. This freedom includes also includes the right to an audience, in the sense that the State cannot prohibit the people from hearing what a person has to say, whatever be the quality of his thoughts. This right, however, is not demandable against those unwilling to listen, who may not be herded by the government into a captive audience. Types of Privileged Communications: 1. Absolutely privileged communicationsthose which are not actionable even if the author acted in bad faith. An example is found in Article VI, Section 11 which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in Page 867/12/2008 say 86 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos the Congress or in any Committee thereof. 2. Qualifiedly privileged communicationsthose contained defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong private communications and fair and true report without any comments or remarks. Freedom of Expression Aspect: 1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and 2. Freedom from subsequent punishment. Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. (Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008) Restrictions on Free Speech: 1. Content-based Restrictionsare imposed because of the content of the speech itself; distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear how people will react to a particular speech. Subject to the Clear-and-Present danger Rule Test In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, a rule prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional validity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness. 2. Content-neutral Restrictionsare those which are not concerned with the content of the speech. The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws. Tests for a valid Governmental Interference: Page 877/12/2008 say 87 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos 1. Clear and Present Danger Rulewhen words are used in such circumstance

and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about substantive evil that state has the right to prevent. 2. Dangerous Tendency Rulewords uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which State has the right to prevent. 3. Balancing of Interest Testwhen particular conduct is regulated in interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. In the case of Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 713, the SC held that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizens becomes crucial in this kind of propaganda, not the financial resources of the candidate. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. Doctrine of Fair Comment Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. It means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the facts. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1) Right to Assemble and Petition Government The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint and may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities. However, the right must be exercised in such a way as will not prejudice the public welfare. If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, and Page 887/12/2008 say 88 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos not for the assembly itself may be validly required. Power of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition. (Primicias vs. Fugoso, L-1800, January 27, 1948) Permit for public assembly is not necessary if meeting is to be held in: a. A private place; b. The campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution; or c. A freedom park. The provisions of BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985) are not absolute ban on public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. The Court referred to it as content-neutral regulation. Test for Lawful Assembly: 1. Purpose Testthe purpose for which the assembly is held regardless of the auspices under which it is organized; and 2. Auspices Test. In the case of Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) serves no valid purpose if it means the something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in dispersal of the same. Sec. 5, Article III No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Religionany specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code of ethics and a philosophy It is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201) Freedom of Religion 1. Non-Establishment Clause Scope: a. State cannot set-up church; b. Cannot pass laws which aid one religion, all religions or prefer one over another; c. Nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will; nor Page 897/12/2008 say 89 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)

Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos d. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. 2. Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship Dual aspect of Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship: a. Freedom to believeabsolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought; and b. Freedom to act on ones beliefsubject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Ecclesiastical Affairit involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation to which the state cannot meddle. Benevolent Neutralityrecognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interest but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. T hree (3)-Step process of the compelling State Interest Test 1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion? 2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty? 3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state? (Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-021651, June 22, 2006) Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent, 219 SCRA 256, to compel students to take part in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious freedom. Petitioners have the right to refuse to salute to the Philippine flag on account of their religious freedom. Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529, the INCs postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond review of the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and Page 907/12/2008 say 90 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of a man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still. Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005, expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of the religious institution/organization to conform to just church regulations. Religious Tests The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against clandestine attempts on the part of the government to prevent a person from exercising his civil or political rights because of his religious beliefs. Sec. 6, Article III The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Liberty of Abode and Travel The purpose of the guaranty is to further emphasize the individuals liberty as safeguarded in general terms by the due process clause. Liberty under that clause includes the right to choose ones residence, to leave it whenever he pleases, and to travel where he wills. Limitation on Liberty of Abode: upon Lawful order of the court Restrictions on Right to Travel: 1. Interest of national security; 2. Public safety; 3. Public health; or 4. Any person on bail. In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation from the province by an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her. 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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the Mayor of Manila was not sustained by the SC when he deported some 170 women of ill-repute to Davao, for the admittedly commendable purpose of ridding the city for serious moral and health problems. These women are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizensto change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660, the respondents were justified in requiring the members of certain non-Christian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better education, advancement and protection. The measure was held to be a legitimate exercise of police power. Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil 595, health officers may restrict access to contaminated areas and also quarantine those already exposed to the disease sought to be contained. Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of State may regulate or even prohibit the travel of citizens to hostile countries to prevent possible international misunderstanding and conflict. Section 26 of HAS of 2007cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and if granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right to travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. Sec. 7, Article III The right of the people to information on matters of public concerned shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern The citizen has a right to know what is going on in the country and in his Page 927/12/2008 say 92 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos government so he can express his views thereon knowledgeably and intelligently. One cannot question the extravagance of the government, for example, if is denied examination of official vouchers. A citizen may not expose anomaly if those responsible for it may validly prevent him from investigating their activities. In the interest of truth and fairness, the citizen should not be made to guess only at what is being done by public functionaries and to base his views and conclusions on mere rumors, half-truths, conjectures and even canards. Recognized restrictions: 1. National security matters and intelligence informationthis jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters; 2. Trade or industrial secrets(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code, RA 8293 and other related laws and banking transactionspursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, RA 1405); 3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution; and 4. Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential or classified information to the public. [Section 7 (c), RA 6713] Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either House of congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744) Rights guaranteed: 1. Right to information on matters of public concern; and 2. Corollary right of access to official records and documents BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007, the right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. The peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRa 256the information sought must be matters of public concern, access to which may be limited by law. The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasan Pambansa Page 937/12/2008 say 93 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos belonging to the opposition were able to secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady Imelda Marcos. x x x The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of

public interest and concern. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the SC affirmed the right of the petitioner to secure from the Civil Service Commission information regarding the civil service eligibility of certain persons employed in the health department of the Cebu City government. Sec. 8, Article III The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Right to Form associationsshall not be impaired without due process of law; guarantees the right not to join an association. (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002) This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by nature gregarious. His disposition to mix with others of the same persuasions, interests or objectives is guaranteed by this provision. It also expressly guarantees to those employed in the public and private sectors the right to form unions. This right is available also to those in the government sectors. It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sectors do not enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and up to present is that the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. x x x. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1) In the case of Jacinto vs. CA, 281 SCRA 657, the SC held that petitioners were Page 947/12/2008 say 94 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their school during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the nonholding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free timerecess, after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC or even the SCcould have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable. GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, it was against the backdrop of the provisions of the Constitution that the Court resolved that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It may be, as the appellate court urged, that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Sec. 9, Article III Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. (See discussions Under Eminent Domain) Sec. 10, Article III No law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of Page 957/12/2008 say 95 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not

be impaired. However, the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute. There are instances when contracts valid at the time of their conclusion may become invalid, or some of their provisions may be rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of supervening legislation. Limitations: 1. Police powerprevails over contracts; 2. Eminent domainmay impair obligation of contracts; and 3. Taxationcannot impair obligation of contracts. Impairmentanything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract There is impairment when there is change in the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922) Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006, in unequivocal terms, the SC have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. Sec. 11, Article III Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Inspired by t social justice policy and covered by the equal protection clause, this rule has been implemented by several provisions of the Rules of Court in favor of the pauper litigant. The IBP provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, including representation in court, and similar services available from the DOJ to litigants who cannot afford retained counsel, like the accused in a criminal case who can ask for the assistance of counsel de officio. There are also private legal assistance organizations now functioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable to resort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune of being poor. This provision makes them the equal of the rich before the law. Sec. 12, Article III (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a Page 967/12/2008 say 96 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Rights of an Accused under Custodial Investigation Exist only in custodial interrogation Available when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that tend to elicit incriminating statements. Custodial Investigation Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It shall include the practice of issuing invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of the law. (RA 7438) People vs. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21, 2001, the accused should have been entitled to Miranda rights, because even assuming that he was not yet under interrogation at the time he was brought to the police station, his confession was elicited by a police officer who promised to help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when he allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was highly intimidating and not conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole police force and nearly 100 townspeople escorted him there. Not having the benefit of counsel and not having been informed of his rights, the confession is inadmissible. Miranda rights (Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436) x x x The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of Page 977/12/2008 say 97 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminations. By custodial interrogation, it means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to informed accused-persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuations of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused. People vs. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002, it was held that this guarantee does not apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admitted having committed the offense. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect before he was placed under custodial investigation. In this case, the narration before the Barangay Captain prior to custodial investigation was admissible in evidence, but not the admissions made before Judge Dicon, inasmuch as the questioning by the judge was done after the suspect had been arrested and such questioning already constituted custodial investigation. Rights guaranteed: 1. Right to remain silent; 2. Right to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice at all stages of the investigation; Independent and competent counselwilling to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused 3. Right to be informed of such rights; Rationale: a. to make him aware of it; b. to overcome the inherent pressure o the interrogating atmosphere; and c. to show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke it. 4. Right to be provided with counsel, if the person cannot afford one; These rights cannot be waives except in writing and in the presence of counsel; it is not required in a police-line up as the latter is not part of a custodial inquest. Page 987/12/2008 say 98 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos 5. No torture, force, etc. which vitiate free will shall be used; 6. Secret detention places are prohibited; and 7. Confession/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence. Ways of identifying the suspects During Custodial Investigation: 1. Show-ups (out-of-court identification)where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification; People vs. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002, the accused, having become the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, it was held that when the out-of-court identification was conducted by the police, the accused was already under custodial investigation. 2. Mug shotswhere photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect; and 3. Police Line upswhere a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. It is not considered a part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached (People vs. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999). The process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory stage, and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up (People vs. Amestuzo, July 12, 2001). Factors in Resolving the Admissibility of and Relying on Out-of-Court Identification of Suspects: TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 1. The witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2. The witness degree of attention at that time; 3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Two (2) kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confessions: 1. Those which are the product of 3rd degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12; and 2. Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Extrajudicial Confessionsare presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of

conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained. To be admissible, it must be: 1. Voluntary; 2. Made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; Page 997/12/2008 say 99 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos 3. Express; and 4. In writing. Investigations not considered custodial interrogation 1. Those conducted by an audit examiner 2. Those conducted by the Court Administrator 3. Those conducted by the employer For the reason that these people are not law enforcement officers However, in the case of People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001, after an audit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant of MetroBank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued the subject cashiers checks without any legitimate transaction, the written confession was held admissible in evidence inasmuch as the interview did not constitute custodial investigation. Ladiana vs. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 24, 2002, the counter-affidavit submitted by the respondent during preliminary investigation is admissible because preliminary investigation is not part of custodial investigation. The interrogation by the police, if any would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court or in the public prosecutors office. Spontaneous statementsthose elicited through questioning by law enforcement officers, but given in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense, are admissible. (People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004) WAIVER It must be in writing and made in the presence of the counsel. The burden of proving that there was a valid waiver rests on the prosecution. The presumption of official duty has been regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence. What may be waived? 1. Right to remain silent 2. Right to counsel Exclusionary Rule Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sections 12 and 17 of Article III shall be inadmissible in evidence. Fruit of the poisonous treeonce the primary source is shown to have been lawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is inadmissible. Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other Page 1007/12/2008 say 100 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos evidence because the originally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Sec. 13, Article III All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released or recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Right to Bail Bailthe security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required. The right to bail may be invoked by any person once detention commences even if no formal charges have yet to be filed; It can availed of by a person who is in custody of law or otherwise deprived of his liberty; Suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus does not suspend the right to bail; Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail before conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy is to increase the amount of bail; Right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the military. Standards for fixing amount of bail: 1. Financial ability of the accused; 2. Nature and circumstances of the offense; 3. Penalty for the offense charged; 4. Character and reputation of the accused; 5. Age and health of the accused; 6. Weight of evidence against the accused; 7. Probability of appearance at trial;

8. Forfeiture of other bonds by him; 9. He was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and 10.Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail. Bail as a matter of right All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law: Page 1017/12/2008 say 101 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos 1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and 2. Before convictio n by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 3. The evidence of guilt is not strong. Bail when discretionary 1. U pon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. 2. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty after the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. 3. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon showing by the following or other similar circumstances: a. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion; b. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; c. That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; d. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicates the probability of flight if released on bail; or e. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretionreasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors. When bail shall be denied No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall be admitted to bail if: a. Charged with capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; and b. Evidence of guilt is strong. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Page 1027/12/2008 say 102 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Without a hearing, the judge could not possibly asses the weight of the evidence against the accused before granting the latters application for bail. (See the cases of Government of USA vs. Hon. Purganan and Government of Hongkong vs. Judge Olalia) Sec. 14, Article III (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Rights of the Accused: 1. Criminal due process: a. Opportunity to be heard in court of competent jurisdiction; b. The accused must proceed against under orderly processes of law; c. He must be given notice and opportunity to be heard; and d. The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law. 2. Presumption of innocence Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account. The proof against him must not be permitted to sway judgment and the presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. 3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel

4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him Objectives: a. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; b. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and c. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. Page 1037/12/2008 say 103 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Description, not designation, of the offense is controlling. Void-for-Vagueness Rulethe accused is denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and, hence, shall be avoided. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, every legislative measure is presumed constitutional. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. 5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial Impartialthe judge must not be bias and not motivated by malice or bad faith 6. Right to meet witness face to face Witnesses not submitted for cross-examination are not admissible as evidence. However, right to cross-examination may be waived. 7. Right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of evidence 8. Trial in Absentia After arraignment; Due notice; and Absence is unjustified. Plea of guilt to a capital offense 1. There must be searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof; 2. Presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; 3. The accused must be asked if he desire to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. Sec. 15, Article III The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires. (Relate this to Section 18, Article VII) Page 1047/12/2008 say 104 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Writ of habeas corpus A writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever court or judge awarding writ shall consider in his behalf. It lies only where the restraint of a persons liberty has been judicially adjudged to be illegal or unlawful. A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. (SP02 Manalo vs. PNP Chief Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007) Sec. 16, Article III All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174902-06, February 15, 2008, this right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whether the right to a speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: 1. The length of delay; 2. The reasons for the delay; 3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and 4. The prejudice caused by the delay. (Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165975, September 13, 2007) Sec. 17, Article III No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Right against self-incrimination Availability:

Not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, Page 1057/12/2008 say 105 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations May be claimed not only by accused but by any witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed. Scope: It applies only against testimonial compulsion and production of documents, papers and chattels in court except when books of account are to be examined in exercise of power of taxation and police power. Two (2) types of Immunity Statutes: 1. Transactional Immunity Statutetestimony of any person or whose possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates; and 2. Use Immunity Statuteprohibits the use of a witness compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. Sec. 18, Article III (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Right against Involuntary Servitude It is a condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not. General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall exist. Exceptions: 1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted; 2. Service in defense of the State; 3. Naval enlistment; 4. Posse commitatus; 5. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest; and 6. Patria potestas. Sec. 19, Article III (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter Page 1067/12/2008 say 106 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Prohibited Punishments Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To violate constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive, disproportionate to nature of offense as to shock senses of community. Sec. 20, Article III No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Coverage: 1. Debtany civil obligation arising from contract 2. Poll taxa specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or occupation. A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law hence, its non-payment may be validly punished with imprisonment. Sec. 21, Article III No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Right against Double Jeopardy Requisites: 1. A valid complaint or information; 2. Filed before competent court; 3. To which defendant has pleaded; and 4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Two (2) types: 1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense; 2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: 1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; 2. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first

Page 1077/12/2008 say 107 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. Legal Jeopardy Attaches Only: 1. Upon a valid indictment; 2. Before a competent court; 3. After arraignment; 4. When a valid plea has been entered and 5. The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. General Rule: Dismissal of action, when made at the instance of the accused, does not put the accused in first jeopardy. Exceptions: 1. When ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence; or 2. When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused of a speedy trial. Crimes covered: 1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or frustration thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in original complaint or information; and 2. When an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall bar another prosecution for the same act. Doctrine of Supervening Eventprosecution for another offense if subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted. Conviction of accused shall not bar another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense originally charged when: 1. Graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission; 2. Facts constituting graver offense arose or discovered only after filing of former complaint or information; and 3. Plea of guilty to lesser offense was made without the consent of prosecutor or offended party. Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169509, June 16, 2006, for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the said charge. Page 1087/12/2008 say 108 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos People vs. Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, et al., G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006, after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. Sec. 22, Article III No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Right against Ex-Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder Ex-Post Facto Law The equivalent of the impairment clause in criminal matters is the prohibition against the passage of the ex post facto law. This is because the ex post facto law, like the law impairing the obligation of the contracts, operates retroactively to affect antecedent acts. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its structures would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment. Basically, an ex post facto law is one that would make a previous act criminal although it was not so at the time it was committed. Kinds: 1. Law criminalizing act done before its passage; Example: A law passed in 1990 raising the age of seduction from 18 to 25 years, effective 1980 2. Law aggravating penalty for crime committed before passage; Example: A law passed in 2000 designating the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence as murder, effective 1990 3. Law that changes punishment, and inflicts greater or more severe punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; Example: A law passed in 2000 increasing the penalty for libel from prision correccional to prision mayor, effective 1990 4. Law altering legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than law required at the time of commission, in order to convict accused; Example: A law passed in 2000 requiring for conviction merely preponderance of evidence instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt, effective 1990 5. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful; and Example: A law passed in 2000 depriving professionals of the right to practice for failure or refusal to vote, effective 1990. 6. Law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled,

such a protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation of amnesty. Page 1097/12/2008 say 109 2008 Political Law and Public International Law Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.) Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Example: A law passed in 2000 lengthening the period for prescription of blackmail from 5 to 10 years, effective 1990. Characteristics: 1. It refers to criminal matters; 2. It is retroactive in application; and 3. It works to the prejudice of the accused. In the case of US vs. Gomez Colonel, 12 Phil 279, an information for adultery filed by the prosecutor was dismissed by the SC on the ground that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, prosecution could be commenced only on complaint of the offended spouse. It was held that the amendatory law permitting the prosecutor to initiate the charge was ex post facto. Bill of Attainder It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial It is a legislative declaration of guilt Essential: 1. Specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals; 2. The imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise; and 3. Lack of judicial trial. It substitute legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder.