OSCE Physical Security of Stockpiles of Conventional Ammo

39
Best Practice Guide on

Physical Security of Stockpiles of
Conventional Ammunition
40
41
Te aim of this Best Practice Guide (BPG) is to provide guidance on the following safety and security requirement
for the management of conventional ammunition stockpiles:
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION IN
MILITARY AMMUNITION DEPOTS
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLDERS DUTY OF CARE
Every holder of ammunition has a legal and moral duty of care to those it employs in the management of the ammu-
nition and the general public that may be afected by the theft and potential use of ammunition stolen from ammuni-
tion storage facilities and from an explosive event within an ammunition storage site. It is anticipated that this guide
will contribute to and facilitate the development and application of high common standards to provide the required
levels of public safety and stock protection.
42
Table of Contents
I. PHYSICAL SECURITY OF STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL
AMMUNITION IN MILITARY AMMUNITION DEPOTS 43
1. Aim 43
2. Scope 43
3. Introduction 43
4. Securitycategories 43
5. Protectionmodesingress/egress 44
6. Intergratedsecuritysystems 45
7. IntrusionDetectionSystems(IDS) 45
8. Restrictedareaposting 47
9. Explosivestorehousephysicalsecurity 47
10. Drainageculvertsandutilityopeningsunderfences 47
11. Securitylighting 47
12. Doorlocksandpadlocks 48
13. Securitybreaches 49
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLDERS
DUTY OF CARE 49
1. Introduction 49
2. Scope 49
3. Defnitions 50
4. UNClassifcationofDangerousGoods 54
5. ExplosionEffects 56
6. HazardandRiskAnalysis 57
7. HazardMitigation 59
8. SafeGuardingofExplosiveSites 62
9. WaiversandExemptions 63
10. FirePreventionandFirefghting 64
11. EnvironmentalImpactonAmmunition 67
12. AmmunitionSurveillance 68
Annexes
A. UNHazardDivisions 70
B. UNCompatibilityGroups 71
C. ExplosiveLimitLicence 72
D. QuantityDistanceTables 74
Te Guide was drafted by the government of Sweden.
FSC.DEL/56/08/Rev.2
2 June 2008
43
Best Practice Guide on Physical Security of Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
I.PHYSICALSECURITYOFSTOCKPILESOFCONVENTIONALAMMUNITION
INMILITARYAMMUNITIONDEPOTS
I. PHYSICAL SECURITY OF STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION IN MILITARY
AMMUNITION DEPOTS
1. Aim
Te aim of this Best Practice Guide (BPG) is to provide
guidance for the efective management and security of
national conventional ammunition stockpiles in military
ammunition depots. It is anticipated that this guide will
contribute to and facilitate the development and applica-
tion of high common standards in this feld.
2. Scope
Tis BPG deals with conventional ammunition except
those specifcally excluded by the OSCE Document on
Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (OSCE, 2003).
Te scope of the guide is to elaborate a methodology
for the development of policy and general operational
guidelines and procedures on all aspects of conven-
tional ammunition security. It outlines the various
requirements to ensure that the responsible ammuni-
tion stockpile managers provide the appropriate duty
of care.
3. Introduction
Every holder of ammunition has a legal and moral duty
of care to those it employs in the management of the
ammunition and the general public that may be afected
by the theft and potential use of ammunition stolen from
ammunition storage facilities.
Where these practices cannot all be implemented, par-
ticipating States should implement those practices for
which they have the capability, and work on implement-
ing further practices with the aim of creating a compre-
hensive stockpile management program.
RESPONSIBILITIES with regard to CONVENTIONAL
AMMUNITION
Responsible ministries and governmental agencies pos-
sessing conventional ammunition should:
Plan, program, and budget resources to ensure that
ammunition in their custody is secure;
Establish procedures to review all military ammuni-
tion storage construction and installation modifica-
tion projects prior to contract award to ensure that
they meet the required security criteria;
Consolidate ammunition stocks within operational,
safety, and mission requirements to reduce security
costs.
If required, the security of existing facilities should be
upgraded. Such facilities shall be prioritized for security
upgrade
1
as follows:
Facilities storing Category I items;
Facilities storing Category II items;
Facilities storing Category III and IV items.
4. Security categories
On the basis of their use, attractiveness, and availability
to subversive and criminal elements, ammunition is
categorized according to the risks involved. As a general
rule, only arms, missiles, rockets, explosives rounds,
1 See paragraph V.
44
mines, and projectiles that have an unpacked unit weight
of 45 kilograms or less shall be categorized as sensi-
tive for purposes of this BPG. Any single container that
contains a sufcient amount of components that, when
assembled, will perform the basic function of the end
item shall be categorized the same as the end item. Te
following provides guidance based on commonly ac-
cepted security applicability:
Category I
Man portable missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire
configuration.
Category II
Missiles and rockets requiring a crew-served
platform mounted launcher or other equipment to
function.
Category III
Missiles and rockets requiring a crew-served plat-
form mounted launcher or other equipment to func-
tion and complex hardware and software equipment
to function;
Launch tube and grip stock for the Man Portable Air
Defence Systems missile;
Ammunition, .50 calibre and larger, with explosive
filled projectile with an unpacked weight of 45 kilo-
grams or less;
Incendiary grenades and fuses for high explosive
grenades;
Blasting caps;
Supplementary charges;
Bulk explosives;
Detonating cord.
Category IV
Hand or rifle grenades (high explosive and white
phosphorous);
Antitank or antipersonnel mines with an unpacked
weight of 22 kilograms or less;
Explosives used in demolition operations, C-4,
military dynamite, and TNT with an unpacked
weight of 45 kilograms or less;
Ammunition with non-explosive projectile
(unpacked weight of 45 kilograms or less);
Fuses (other than those for high explosive grenades);
Illumination, smoke, and CS grenades;
Incendiary destroyers;
Riot control agents with an unpacked weight of 45
kilograms or less;
Explosive compounds of sensitive missiles and
rockets (except warheads);
Warheads for precision-guided munitions with an
unpacked weight of more than 45 kilograms.
5. Protection modes
ingress/egress
Modes of operation
An integrated real-time security system can be designed
to operate in the following modes of operation:
Ingress Prevention.
Unauthorized persons (or weapons effects) are
prevented from entering (or destroying) the denial
zone containing the assets at risk.
Egress Prevention.
Unauthorized persons are prevented from exiting
with the assets.
Depending upon the assets and the threat, one or both
of the above security modes may be used. For example,
security for arms, ammunition, and explosives-type
assets may require ingress prevention to assure that an
intruder never gains access to the weapons because of
45
potential engagement advantages against the guards of-
fered by the weapons, or because of political embarrass-
ment, or other considerations. On the other hand, egress
prevention may be more appropriate for property assets
when the objective is theft and not sabotage. In this case
allowance can be made in the timeline calculations and
design for intruder ingress and egress from the installa-
tion. When both of the above operating modes are com-
bined into one integrated system, it can be considered to
be in-depth security capability.
6. Integrated security systems
The security elements associated with the
installation to ensure the effectiveness of an
integrated security system design are:
Barrier layout and construction to delay the intruder;
Access control at points of entry to protect against
covert entry threats;
Intrusion detection sensors and alarms to detect an
attack on or within the installation, and/or unauthor-
ized insiders after hours;
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to assess whether
an alarm is actually a threat;
Guards to respond to the location of a real threat.
All these elements are important. None of them can
be eliminated or compromised if an efective security
system is to be achieved but an optimal combination of
them should be strived for. Also, without detection, the
response force would not be alerted. In addition, the
delay ofered by the physical protection must provide
sufcient time after detection for threat assessment and
guard force response.
7. Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS)
Applicability
Ammunition storehouses storing Categories I and II
missiles and rockets, Category I and II explosives should
be protected by an IDS unless the areas where they are
located are continuously manned or under constant sur-
veillance in such a manner that unauthorized entry into
and around the structures can be detected.
IDS Suitability
Te detection of an intruder can be accomplished using
on-site guards, IDS, or combinations of both. Locating
guards in towers or deploying sensors along extended
fence lines adds to the intruders ingress/egress time to
cover the distance from the fence to the stockpiles. Tis
option involves operating costs for guards or, if sensors
are used, initial purchase, installation, and maintenance
costs. Te cost efectiveness of using exterior detec-
tion along extended perimeters to gain added intruder
ingress/egress time must be weighed against the cost of
physical protection and installing IDS in a smaller area
or on building(s). Te time to penetrate or climb over a
perimeter fence is often only a few seconds and that the
ingress time for an intruder carrying cutting tools and
covering a hundred metres between the fence and stock-
pile is less than a minute. Given the nominal amount of
time gained relative to the expense involved, the use of
guards or IDS on extended fence perimeter may not be
mandatory unless specifed by the appropriate national
security and explosive safety regulators. For security
guards to respond to an intrusion, threat detection either
by security personnel or remote systems IDS is required.
Te function of an exterior perimeter IDS is to detect a
threat and initiate the security system response timeline
at the exterior perimeter of the site. IDS performance
parameters of concern include:
Completeness of coverage;
46
False and nuisance alarm rates;
Probability of detection;
Zone at which the alarm occurred;
Detection at the installation perimeter.
Guards or sensors may be located to ensure deployment
before the physical protection is penetrated by intrud-
ers. For a barrier to be efective in delaying an intruder,
detection must occur before penetration of the barrier
has occurred. Surface sensor systems, such as vibration
sensors, are usually more cost-efective than stationing
guards.
Contractual Service Agreements
An IDS should be installed by reputable security sup-
pliers with proven relevant experience. Te contract
should include a robust service agreement to ensure the
continuous efectiveness of the system. Service/mainte-
nance must be provided as required by the specifcs for
the installation.
Interior IDS systems
Amongst the many available IDSs the following are most
common:
Fence-mounted strain-sensitive cable on the fence
fabric in combination with a Y taut wire on the
fence outriggers;
Ported coaxial cable clear zone sensor;
Microwave fence sensor.
Closed circuit television (CCTV)
A properly designed CCTV assessment system provides
a rapid and cost-efective supplement to guards for
determining the cause of intrusion alarms and assessing
a potential threat. CCTV enables evaluations to be made
from remote locations. Using video event recorders,
events can also be viewed later when multiple alarms or
delayed guard force attention occurs. In general, CCTVs
increase the efciency and efectiveness of security
personnel and security response timelines. Tey can be a
cost-efective alternative to human on-the-spot assess-
ment, which typically involves extended time delays for
guards to respond, or the use of costly on-site guards.
IDS Integrity
To ensure the integrity, reliability and serviceability of
IDS the responsible authority must ensure that:
All IDSs must be approved by the responsible secu-
rity authority;
All alarm signals will enunciate at a central control
or monitoring station from which a response force
can be dispatched. The reaction time of the response
force must allow action before the physical protec-
tion is penetrated;
Where an IDS is installed in a installation outside
a military installation, arrangements shall be made
to connect to local police or commercial monitor-
ing companies from which immediate response to
activated alarms can be directed.
A daily log shall be maintained of all alarms received.
Logs shall be maintained for a minimum of 90 days and
shall be reviewed to identify and correct IDS reliability
problems. Te log shall refect the following:
Nature of the alarm (nuisance, system failure, illegal
entry);
Date, time, and location of alarm;
Action taken in response to the alarm.
IDS transmission lines shall have line security elec-
tronically monitored to detect evidence of tampering
or attempted compromise. Upon loss of either com-
munication path, the system shall immediately initiate
notifcation to the monitoring installation via the other
communication link. Additionally, a protected backup
independent power source of four-hour minimum dura-
47
tion shall be provided. Systems shall be tested quarterly
to ensure the proper functioning of the alarm sensors.
8. Restricted area posting
An installation containing explosives shall be designated
as a military RESTRICTED AREA and be managed ac-
cording to national requirements as applicable.
9. Explosive store house
physical security
Security fences
In general, security fences are made of either taut wire or
standard chain link metal fabric with various enhance-
ments. Fence enhancements include diferent confgura-
tions of barbed wire outriggers. In general, fences (both
with and without enhancements) ofer delays of less
than 1 minute against low-level threats to as little as 3
to 8 seconds against trained and dedicated high-level
intruder teams. Te height of the fence or the degree of
enhancements used makes little diference on this time.
In general, fence material can be easily cut, or climbed
over. Tis includes barbed wire which can easily be
climbed over with the aid of blankets, etc. However,
fences do ofer some advantage in limiting the amount of
tools and equipment that an intruder can readily carry
into the site. In general the delay time ofered is not a
signifcant factor in selecting a fence. A simple fence
without enhancements will be adequate in most cases
to defne the installation boundary, deter the casual
intruder, or support an exterior IDS system. Te use of
fence enhancements ofers the increased appearance of
impregnability, but this should be weighted in terms of
the increased material and maintenance costs.
10. Drainage culverts and utility
openings under fences
Special protective measures must be designed for cul-
verts, storm drains, sewers, air intakes, exhaust tunnels
and utility openings that pass through cleared areas,
traverse under or through security fences.
11. Security lighting
Security lighting aids threat detection, assessment, and
interdiction. Lighting may also have value as a deterrent.
Security lighting increases the efectiveness of guards
and CCTV by increasing the visual range during periods
of darkness or by illuminating an area where natural
light is insufcient. Exterior security lighting is typically
located along exterior perimeters and entry points to
the installation. Each installation presents its particular
deployment problems based on physical layout, terrain,
weather conditions, and security requirements.
Lighting may operate continuously or on a standby
basis. Continuous lighting is the most common security
lighting system. It consists of a series of fxed luminaries
arranged to food a given area continuously during the
hours of darkness with overlapping cones of light. Te
two primary methods of using continuous lighting are
glare projection and controlled lighting:
Glare lighting uses luminaries slightly inside a secu-
rity perimeter and directed outward. It is considered
a deterrent to a potential intruder because it makes it
difficult for him to see inside the area being protect-
ed. It also facilitates for a guard inside the installation
to observe intruders by keeping him in comparative
darkness.
Controlled lighting is used when it is necessary
to limit the width of the lighted strip outside the
perimeter because of adjoining property or nearby
highways, railroads, navigable waters, airports and
like facilities.
48
Switches for exterior lights shall be installed in such a
manner that they are accessible only to authorized
personnel.
12. Door locks and padlocks
Each explosives storehouse door should have either:
A single mortise lock requiring two separate unique
keys;
Two mortise locks each requiring its own unique key;
Two padlocks and hasps to the required national
security standard each with its own unique key.
Te padlock is commonly used as it is applicable on
all door assemblies. Preferably the padlock body has
an extension shielding over the shackle of at least 9,5
millimetres above the top and on three sides that will
allow close onto the associated hasps the hasps. Tese
padlocks and special hasps are highly resistant to forced
and surreptitious entry and should meet the following
resistance criteria:
Defeat the use of devices, equipment and methods
such as picking, shimming, bypassing, impression-
ing, and other methods used by locksmiths to open
padlocks without harm to the padlock or clearly vis-
ible evidence of attempts to open, for not less than 15
minutes.
Defeat the use of saws and drills (manual or bat-
ter powered), hammers, chisels, punches, jimmies,
wrecking bars, torque levers, common hand tools
chemicals (excluding explosives) for not less than five
minutes accumulated work time.
Key control
Te following control requirements are an imperative
part of the overall security strategy:
Keys to explosives storage areas, buildings, rooms,
racks, containers, and IDS shall be maintained sepa-
rately from other keys;
They shall be accessible only to personnel whose of-
ficial duties require access to them;
A current roster of personnel authorized key access
shall be maintained and kept from public view;
The number of keys shall be held to the absolute
minimum;
Master keying of locks and the use of a master key
system is prohibited for explosives exterior access
doors;
Keys shall not be left unsecured or unattended at any
time;
In the event of lost, stolen, or misplaced keys, the affect-
ed locks or lock cores shall be replaced immediately;
When not attended or in use, operational keys to
Category I and II explosives shall be secured in ap-
proved high security containers;
Keys to Category III and IV explosives may be stored
in secure containers with an-approved built-in three
position changeable combination lock;
Reserve or replacement locks, cores, and keys shall
also be secured as prescribed above;
Keys shall not be removed from the explosives site
except for operational necessity;
installation Commanders, or their designees, shall
appoint in writing explosives lock and key custodians;
Key custodians shall not be unit armourers or other
persons responsible for the explosives storage
facilities;
Key control registers shall be maintained to reflect
continuous key accountability;
Key registers shall contain the following information:
Name and signature of individuals receiving keys;
Date and hour of issuance;
Key serial numbers or other identifying information;
Signature of individuals issuing keys;
Keys return date and hour;
Name and signature of individual receiving returned
keys.
49
Key Rotation
In-use keys should be rotated on a regular basis with
reserve and replacement keys to ensure even wear and
tear.
13. Security breaches
Documented and practiced procedures should be in
place to undertake a suitable and timely response to
incidents involving the loss or theft of ammunition, and
any other breaches of security, which can be considered
to result in an ammunition security threat. Tis process
should include coordination with other police and na-
tional security organisations. Efective lines of communi-
cation should be in place to ensure that any incident can
be immediately reported to the appropriate senior staf.
Any such incidents should be fully investigated to de-
termine any failings in existing procedures and identify
practicable and reasonable remediation. Whilst the spe-
cifc mechanisms will be determined by internal national
organisations and structures the reporting procedure
should follow the following general process:
Depot level investigation to verify the facts and sub-
sequent Command level reporting;
Command level assessment and coordination with
other responsible authorities;
If appropriate Ministerial response and action;
Initial remediation response;
Formal enquiry, report and implementation of
recommendations;
Continued related oversight.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLDERS
DUTY OF CARE
1. Introduction
Te handling, maintenance, transport and storage of
munition are an inherently hazardous and risky proc-
ess. Whilst ammunition is designed and manufactured
to be safe in storage and transport, the signifcant
number of recent catastrophic ammunition stor-
age accidents starkly confrms that these are not the
result of credible accidents, but the result of stockpile
management failings. Every holder of ammunition has
a legal and moral duty of care to those it employs in the
management of the ammunition and the general public
that may be afected by an explosive event within the
explosive area.
Te correct compliance with agreed norms of ammu-
nition stockpile management will ensure, as far as is
reasonable and practical, that adequate protection will
be provided; the management of ammunition cannot,
nor seeks to, provide absolute protection. Where these
practices cannot all be implemented, participating States
should implement those practices for which they have
the capability, and work on implementing further prac-
tices with the aim of creating a comprehensive stockpile
management program.
2. Scope
Tis best practice guide covers the various requirements
for ammunition stockpile managers to follow. It is based
on the requirement for above ground storage, although
certain sections are relevant to all ammunition storage
modes.
II.IMPLEMENTATIONOFTHESTOCKHOLDERSDUTYOFCARE
50
2 Te term ammunition in its restricted meaning is used throughout this Manual in the same sense as explosive article is used by UN
and IMO in the Orange Book and IMDG Code respectively to mean an article containing one or more explosive substances.
Tese requirements are designed to manage risks and
hazards associated with the storage and handling of
ammunition and explosives by providing protection
criteria to minimize loss of life, serious injury and dam-
age to property, both military and civilian. Tey are not
intended to be so rigid as to prevent the Services from
accomplishing their assigned missions.
Te steps required to ensure the duty of care will aford a
high degree stock protection.
Tis Guide covers the following general requirements:
UN Classification of Dangerous Goods;
Explosion Effects;
Hazard and Risk Analysis;
Hazard Mitigation;
Explosives Quantity Distances;
Safe Guarding of Explosive Sites;
Waivers and Exemptions.
3. Defnition
Aboveground Storage
Storage in magazines with or without earth-cover or in
open stacks at surface level. An accidental explosion at
the storage site may result in blast, fre and projections.
Ammunition
2
General: An item which, in order to perform its func-
tion, requires to contain energetic materials.
Specifc: A complete device charged with explosives,
propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating compositions, or
nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in mili-
tary operations.
Note 1: In logistic confguration, the logistic packaging
of the munition is included.
Assembly Place
A building or place where it is customary for people to
assemble (e.g. church, school, sports stadium).
Barricade
A natural ground feature, artifcial mound, traverse or
wall which for storage purposes is capable of prevent-
ing the direct communication of explosion from one
quantity of explosives to another although it may be
destroyed in the process.
Buried Storage
Storage in chambers or magazines below surface level.
In case of an accidental explosion at the storage site, the
hazard of low-angle, high velocity projections is reduced
signifcantly. Te other hazardous efects are similar to
those in aboveground storage, but are gradually reduced
as the cover is increased.
Classifcation Code
Te alpha-numeric symbol which denotes the complete
hazard classifcation for a particular type of ammunition.
Te code comprises two digits, indicating the hazard
division, followed by a letter corresponding to the com-
patibility group.
Compatibility Classifcation
Ammunition and explosives are considered to be com-
patible if they may be stored or carried together without
signifcantly increasing either the probability of an acci-
dent or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the efects
of such an accident.
51
3 Te term explosive is used throughout this Manual in the same sense as explosive substance is used by UN and IMO in the Orange
Book and IMDG Code.
Debris
Any portion of the natural ground or of a structure
(rocks, structural materials, fttings, equipment, bar-
ricade materials etc.) which is propelled from the site of
an explosion.
Defagration
Chemical explosion in which the zone of chemical reac-
tion propagates through the initial medium at a subsonic
velocity, mainly by thermal conduction.
Defagrating Explosive
A secondary explosive which reacts by defagration
rather than detonation when used in its intended role.
Detonation
Decomposition reaction in which the zone of chemi-
cal reaction propagates through the initial medium at a
supersonic velocity behind a shock front.
Detonating Explosive
An explosive which reacts by detonation rather than
defagration when used in its intended role.
Explosion
A nuclear, chemical or physical process leading to the
sudden release of energy.
Explosive
3
Material
A substance (or a mixture of substances), which is
capable by chemical reaction of producing gas at such
a temperature and pressure as to cause damage to the
surroundings.
Note 1: Te term explosive material includes solid and
liquid high explosives, propellants and pyrotechnics.
Note 2: It also includes pyrotechnic substances even
when they do not evolve gases.
Note 3: Te term explosive is often used in short for
explosive material.
Explosives Area
An area used for the handling, processing and storing of
ammunition and explosives. Where there is no fence it is
taken as being the area within a radius of 50 m from any
building or stack containing explosives.
Explosives Workshop
Any structure used for the inspection, maintenance and
renovation of ammunition and explosives.
Exposed Site
A magazine, cell, stack, truck or trailer loaded with
ammunition, explosives workshop, inhabited building,
assembly place or public trafc route, which is exposed
to the efects of an explosion (or fre) at the Potential
Explosion Site under consideration.
Exterior Quantity-Distance
Te minimum permissible distance between a PES and
an ES outside the explosives area.
Fragment
Any metal portion of the ammunition or its package
which is propelled from the site of an explosion.
52
Hazard Classifcation or
Classifcation
Te assignment of a type of ammunition to the correct
hazard division, according to tests or other assessment,
and the appropriate compatibility group. Tus there are
two components in the complete classifcation.
Heavy-Walled Building
A building of non-combustible construction used for
explosives storage with walls of at least 45 cm rein-
forced concrete (70 cm brick) or equivalent penetration
resistance of other materials, with or without a protec-
tive roof. Te door is barricaded if it faces a PES.
High Velocity Projections
Debris or fragments at high velocity as the result of an
explosion and with sufcient remaining energy to propa-
gate an explosion to another stack.
Inhabited Building Distance
Te separation between potential explosive sites and
non-associated exposed sites requiring a high degree of
protection from an accidental explosion.
Igloo
A magazine - normally built at ground level - earth-cov-
ered, and constructed in corrugated steel or reinforced
concrete, provided with a strong headwall and door(s).
Te earth covers the roof, the sides and the rear. Te
magazine and its earth-cover are designed to stringent
criteria for resistance to external blast loading and attack
by high velocity projections. Te cross-section of the
igloo may be semi-circular, elliptical, rectangular or a
combination of these.
Initiation
Action by means of a suitable pyrotechnic device leading
to a detonation, defagration or combustion.
Initiation system
System to initiate an explosive train or component in a
munition.
Interior Quantity-Distance
Te minimum permissible distance between a PES and
an ES inside the explosives area.
Light Structure
A structure erected to protect a stack against weather.
Lobbed Ammunition
Unexploded ammunition projected from an exploding
stack. It may explode on impact.
Mass Explosion
An explosion which afects virtually the entire quantity
of explosives under consideration practically instantane-
ously. Te term usually relates to detonation but also
applies to defagration when the practical efects are
similar, for example the mass defagration of propellants
under very strong confnement so as to produce a burst-
ing efect and a serious hazard from debris.
Mass Fire
A defagration of the entire quantity of explosives un-
der consideration in circumstances that avoid a burst-
ing efect and a serious hazard from debris. A typical
mass fre occurs in a few seconds at most and produces
extensive fame, intense radiant heat and minor projec-
tion efects.
Means of Initiation
Any device used to cause a detonation of an explosive.
Moderate Fire
A fre comparable with that involving an ordinary com-
mercial warehouse which burns comparatively slowly
53
and with a moderate fame radius. Some items may be
thrown out of such a fre for a short distance.
Net Explosives Quantity
Te total explosives contents of an ammunition item.
Potential Explosion Site
Te location of a quantity of explosives that will create a
blast, fragment, thermal or debris hazard in the event of
an accidental explosion of its content.
Primary Explosive
Substance, or mixture of substances, used to initiate a
detonation or a burning reaction.
Note 1 : In their intended role, these materials are sensi-
tive to a range of thermal, mechanical and electrical
stimuli, like for instance heat, impact, friction, electric-
ity, and undergo a rapid reaction upon initiation.
Note 2 : Primary explosives are used in initial or inter-
mediary charges in devices such as primers, detonators,
caps, relays, electric matches, etc.
Projections
Overarching term for debris, fragments, non-metallic
portions of the ammunition or its package, and lobbed
ammunition.
Protective Roof
A 15 cm reinforced concrete roof or its equivalent de-
signed to protect the contents of a building from debris,
fragments and lobbed ammunition. Te roof should not
collapse if the walls are damaged, except in the case of
earth-covered structures.
Public Traffc Route
A road used for general public trafc; a railway outside
the explosives area which is used for public passenger
trafc; a waterway, such as a river having tidal water and
a canal, used by passenger vessels.
Pyrotechnic Composition
Substance or mixture of substances which when ignited,
undergoes an energetic chemical reaction at a control-
led rate intended to produce on demand and in various
combinations, specifc time delays or quantities of heat,
noise, smoke, light, or infrared radiation.
Note 1 : Pyrotechnic compositions may be used to initi-
ate burning reactions such as in igniters.
Note 2 : Pyrotechnics, in most of their applications, are
required not to undergo a defagration-to-detonation
transition.
Note 3 : Te term excludes propellants and (high)
explosives.
Secondary Explosive
A substance or mixture of substances which will deto-
nate when initiated by a shock wave but which normally
does not detonate when heated or ignited.
Note 1 : As opposed to primary explosive.
Serious Structural Damage
Damage that renders buildings uninhabitable and is not
readily repairable. For example: serious weakening or
displacement of foundation, supporting walls, interior
supports, side walls, foors or ceiling structures, breaking
numerous rafters or other important supporting mem-
bers of roofs or foors.
54
Spall
Material, especially small pieces of rock, detached from
a surface by passage of a shock.
Static Pressure
Te pressure due to the increased mass and temperature
of gases inside a structure aftershock efects from an
explosion have ceased.
Vulnerable Buildings
Large building constructed with external non loadbear-
ing panels or with more than 50% of its wall area glazed.
Note : Tese buildings are sited at two times inhabited
building distance because they are expected to be heav-
ily damaged from an explosion at inhabited building
distance (i.e., 22.2 Q
1/3
).
With a Propelling Charge
Te propelling charge is assembled to the projectile or
packed with the projectile in the same package or pal-
letized with the projectile on the same pallet.
4. UN Classifcation of
Dangerous Goods
UN Dangerous Goods Class 1
In order to promote the safe transport of dangerous
goods, an International System for Classifcation has
been devised
4
.
Te system consists of 9 classes of which Class 1 com-
prises ammunition and explosives. Class 1 is divided into
divisions. Te Hazard Division indicates the type of haz-
ard to be expected primarily in the event of an accident
involving a stack of ammunition. Class 1 ammunition is
further divided into 14 Compatibility Groups designed
to minimise the risk of storing items together that will
either increase the signifcantly increasing either the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the
magnitude of the efects of such an accident. Whilst
initially produced for the transport of dangerous goods
the principles have been applied by many nations as
the basis for a simplifed consequential hazard and risk
assessment for the storage of ammunition. Tis process
does not take into account the probability of an incident.
It assumes that if it can happen it will, and when it does,
it identifes the extent of the hazards. Te associated UN
Hazard Divisions and Compatibility Groups for ammu-
nition defnitions are at Annexes A and B respectively.
UN Hazard Divisions
Te UN Recommendations for the Transport of Danger-
ous Goods sub-divides dangerous goods into separates
groups according to their Hazard Class. Explosive sub-
stances and articles are Hazard Class 1. Te 6 HDs are
fully defned at Annex A. Te following is a simplifed
description for the purposes of this Section:
Division 1.1. Ammunition that has a mass explo-
sion hazard.
Division 1.2. Ammunition that has a projection
hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3. Ammunition that has a fire hazard
and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection
hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.4. Ammunition that presents no signifi-
cant hazard.
Division 1.5. Very insensitive substances which
have a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.6. Extremely insensitive articles which
do not have a mass explosion hazard.
4 Te UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (ISBN: 92-1-139057-5).
55
5 OSCE Best Practice Guide on the Transportation of Ammunition (FSC.DEL/554/85/Rev 2).
6 OSCE Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Package Markings and Record Keeping (FSC.DEL/73/07/Rev 1).
HDs can be mixed within the guidance provided in An-
nex A of the OSCE Best Practice Guides on Procedures
for Management of Stockpiles of Conventional Ammu-
nition. In general such combinations are aggregated and
assessed as the worst case. A combination of HD 1.1 and
HD 1.2 will be considered to be HD 1.1.
UN Classifcation Code
Te UN Classifcation Code is an integral part of am-
munition management for both transport
5
and storage;
for many OSCE participating States it is a mandatory
package marking
6
requirement. Te classifcation code is
composed of the number of the Hazard Division and the
letter of the Compatibility Group, for example 1.1 B.
Compatibility
Group A C D G L S
A X
C X
1)
X
1)
X
3)
X
D X
1)
X
1)
X
3)
X
G X
3)
X
3)
X X
L X
2)
Mixing of UN Compatibility Groups for
Ammunition Storage
It must be noted that due to the difering risks associated
with ammunition storage and transport many national
competent authorities apply modifed mixing rules for
the storage of ammunition. Te following table is based
on storage mixing rules that have been adopted by many
OSCE participating States:
Effect of Package on Classifcation
As the packaging may have a decisive efect on the clas-
sifcation, particular care must be taken to ensure that
the correct classifcation is determined for each confgu-
ration in which ammunition and explosives are stored or
transported. Terefore, every signifcant change in the
packaging (e.g. degradation) may well afect the classif-
cation awarded.
1) Mixing permitted provided substances have all passed UN Test Series 3.
2) Compatibility Group L substances must always be stored separately from all substances
of other compatibility groups as well from all other substances of Compatibillity Group L.
3) Te mixing of Compatibility Group G substances with other compatibility groups
is at the discretion of the National Competent Authority.
56
5. Explosion Effects
Hazard Division 1.1 Explosion Effects
In an incident involving the mass detonation of explo-
sives (HD 1.1), the violent release of energy creates a
sudden and intense pressure disturbance termed the
blast wave. Te blast wave is characterized by an
almost instantaneous rise from ambient pressure to a
peak incident pressure. Tis pressure increase, or shock
front, travels radially outward from the detonation
point. Gas molecules making up the front move at lower
velocities. Tis velocity, which is called the particle
velocity, is associated with the dynamic pressure, or
the pressure formed by the winds produced by the shock
front. As the shock front expands into increasingly larger
volumes of the medium the incident pressure decreases
whilst the duration of the pressure-pulse increases. If the
shock wave impinges on a rigid surface (e.g., a building)
at an angle to the direction of the waves propagation, a
refected pressure is instantly developed on the surface
and this pressure rises to a value that exceeds the inci-
dent pressure. Tis refected pressure has the propensity
to infict considerable damage.
When an explosion occurs within a structure, the peak
pressure associated with the initial shock front will both
be high and amplifed by refections within the structure.
In addition, the accumulation of gases from the explo-
sion will exert additional pressure and increase the load
duration within the structure. Tis efect may damage
or destroy the structure unless the structure is designed
to either withstand or vent the gas and shock pres-
sures. Structures that have one or more strengthened
walls may be vented for relief of excessive gas by either
frangible construction of the remaining walls or roof or
through the use of openings.

An important consideration in the analysis of the
hazards associated with an explosion is the efect of
any fragments produced. Depending on their origin,
fragments are referred to as primary or secondary
fragments. Primary fragments result from the shattering
of the ammunition in direct contact with the explosive.
Tese fragments usually are small, initially travel at thou-
sands of metres per second and may be lethal at long
distances from an explosion. Secondary fragments are
debris from structures and other items in close proxim-
ity to the explosion. Tese fragments, which are some-
what larger in size than primary fragments and initially
travel at hundreds of metres per second, do not normally
travel as far as primary fragments.
Hazard Division 1.2 Explosion Effects
In an incident involving ammunition that has a projec-
tion hazard but not a mass explosion hazard (HD 1.2)
can be expected to both explode sporadically and burn.
Fire will propagate through the mass of the ammuni-
tion over time. Some ammunition may neither explode
nor burn. Blast efects from the incident are limited to
the immediate vicinity and are not considered to be a
signifcant hazard.
PRESSURETIMECURVE
PRESSURE(psi)
TIME(msec)
Peak Reflected Pressure
Peak Incident Pressure
NEGATIVE PHASE
DURATION
POSITIVE
PHASE
DURATION
57
HD 1.2 events may occur over a prolonged period of
time. Generally, the frst reactions are relatively non-
violent and, typically, begin a few minutes after fames
engulf the ammunition. Later reactions tend to be more
violent. Reactions can continue for some time, even
after a fre is efectively out. Generally, smaller ammu-
nition tends to react earlier in an incident than larger
ammunition.
Te primary hazard from a HD 1.2 event is fragmenta-
tion. Fragmentation may include primary fragments
from ammunition casings or secondary fragments from
containers and structures. At longer ranges, primary
fragments are the major contributors to fragment haz-
ards. During a HD 1.2 event, fragmentation may exten-
sively damage exposed facilities. However, less fragmen-
tation damage can be expected from a given quantity of
HD 1.2 than would be expected from the corresponding
quantity of HD 1.1 because not all the HD 1.2 will react.
Hazard Division 1.3 Explosive Effects
In an incident involving ammunition that has a fre haz-
ard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projec-
tion hazard (HD 1.3) the heat fux presents the greatest
hazard to personnel and assets. Internal gas pressures
may produce fragments from the bursting of contain-
ers or the rupture of containment facilities. In general,
such fragments will be large and of low velocity. Tese
fragments are considerably less hazardous than those
produced by HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 events.
Hazard Division 1.4 Explosive Effects
As the products of this ammunition are contained within
the package it does not present a signifcant hazard.
Hazard Division 1.5 and 1.6 Explosive Effects
Tese two division comprise of very insensitive sub-
stances (HD 1.5) and extremely insensitive articles (HD
1.6) which will require special consideration if held
within the inventory.
6. Hazard and Risk Analysis
Objectives
Any explosives safety management system must care
for risks associated with the activities. Te storage of
ammunition aims to provide a reasonable and practi-
cal level of protection; it does not guarantee absolute
protection.
Hazard and Risk Assessment
In the event that the prescriptive ammunition stor-
age regulations are unable to meet the required levels
of stockpile and personnel safety the explosives safety
authority may consider the application of a Risk and
Explosive Safety Hazard assessment. Tis may require
expert guidance from suitably qualifed Hazard and Risk
Assessors, or suitable publications. Te following guid-
ance outlines the processes and procedures.
58
Hazard
A hazard can be defned as any real or potential condi-
tion that can cause mission degradation, injury, illness,
death to personnel or damage to or loss equipment or
property.
Risk
An expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap
in terms of severity and the likelihood of occurrence.
Te relationship between the two can be shown by the
following graphic:
HAZARDPROBABILITY
frequent likley occasional seldom unlikely
catastrophic
critical
moderate
negligible
extremely high
high
medium
low
1. Identify
the Hazards
2. Assess
the Risk
3. Analyze
Risk Control
Measures
4. Make
Control
Decisions
5. Implement
Risk Control
6. Supervise
and Review
Te combinations of probability and consequence in red
in the picture, extremely high, must be dealt with frst
hand.
Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is the application of quantitative or quali-
tative measures to determine the level of risk associated
with a specifc hazard. Te process defnes the prob-
ability and severity of a mishap that could result from
the exposure of personnel or assets to that hazard. Te
associated steps are:
Identify the hazards;
Analyze risk control measures;
Make control decisions;
Implement risk controls;
Implementation requires commitment of time and
resources;
Supervise and review.
59
7. Hazard Mitigation
Defnition
Explosive hazard mitigation can be defned as:
Any cost-efective action taken to eliminate or reduce
the long-term risk to life and property from an explosive
event.
Hazard Principles and Objectives
Te efect of explosive hazards and the problems related
to inter-magazine propagation can be mitigated by the
construction of the explosive storehouse and associated
barricades. It is the lack of efective hazard mitigation
that invariably results in the catastrophic loss of ammu-
nition facilities due to a single explosive event.
Protective Construction
Construction features and location are important safety
considerations in planning facilities. Te efects of
potential explosions may be signifcantly modifed by
construction features that limit the amount of explo-
sives involved, attenuate blast overpressure or thermal
radiation, and reduce the quantity and range of hazard-
ous fragments and debris. Te location of Exposed
Sites (ES) in relation to Potential Explosion Sites (PES)
also helps to minimize unacceptable damage and inju-
ries in the event of an incident. Te major objectives in
installation planning are to:
Protect against explosion propagation between adja-
cent bays or buildings.
Protect personnel, within and outside the Explosives
Area, against death or serious injury from incidents
in adjacent bays or buildings.
The construction of separate buildings to limit
explosion propagation, rather than the use of either
protective construction or separation of explosives
within a single building should be considered when
safety would be greatly enhanced.
Reduced Distances
Hardening an ES or constructing a PES to suppress ex-
plosion efects to provide an appropriate degree of pro-
tection, or the use of efective container traverses, may
allow a reduction of the separation distances required by
Quantity Distance (QD) tables.
Barricades
Properly constructed and sited barricades and undis-
turbed natural earth have explosives safety applications
for both protecting against low-angle fragments and
reducing shock overpressure loads very near the bar-
ricade. Barricades provide no protection against high
angle fragments or lobbed ammunition. If the traverse
is destroyed in the process of providing protection, then
secondary fragments from the destroyed barricade must
also be considered as part of any hazards analysis.
To reduce hazards from high-velocity, low-angle frag-
ments, the barricade must be placed between the PES
and the ES so that the fragments of concern impact
the barricade before the ES. Te barricade must both
be thick enough so that it reduces fragment velocities
to acceptable levels and high enough to intercept high
velocity, low trajectory fragments. Te recommended
norm is 0.3 metres.
EXPLOSIVESQUANTITYDISTANCES.
60
Application of Quantity Distance Criteria
To ensure that an explosive event within an ammuni-
tion storage location does not result in the propagation
of other locations, potentially resulting in a catastrophic
event, and at the same time ensure reasonable protec-
tion to facilities outside the explosives area, ammunition
locations are suitably separated from each other and
external at-risk facilities. Te resulting separation dis-
tances, referred to as Quantity Distances (QD) are based
on a matrix of the following criteria:
The associated United Nations (UN) Hazard Division
(HD).
The net explosive quantity of the storage location.
The building design and construction.
The aspect of the building relative to other storage
locations.
Quantity-distances are generated by distance functions
subject, in certain cases, to fxed minimum or maximum
distances.
Degree of Protection
Tere are varying levels of inter-magazine protection
based on the QD separation. Tey are:
Virtually complete protection against instantaneous
propagation.
High degree of protection against instantaneous
propagation.
Moderate degree of protection against instantaneous
propagation.
Application of Storage Criteria
Te application of storage principles, as accepted by
many OSCE participating States, will provide the fol-
lowing levels of personal protection at the Inhabited
Building distance:
The peak incident (side-on) overpressure will not
exceed 5 kPa; the accepted threshold level of pressure
for ear damage is 35 kPa.
Un-strengthened buildings will suffer minor damage,
particularly to parts such as windows, door frames
and chimneys. In general, damage is unlikely to
exceed approximately 5% of the replacement cost but
some buildings may suffer serious damage. The de-
bris will not exceed one lethal fragment (energy > 80
J) per 56 m at the Inhabited Building Distance. They
are not sufficiently large enough to prevent breakage
of glass and other frangible materials.
Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct re-
sult of the blast effects. Injuries that do occur will be
caused principally by glass breakage and flying/falling
debris.
UN Hazard Divisions
See Section IV and Annex A.
Net Explosive Quantity
Te Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) is the total explo-
sives contents of ammunition unless it has been deter-
mined that the efective quantity is signifcantly difer-
ent from the actual quantity. It does not include such
substances as white phosphorus, war gases or smoke and
incendiary compositions unless these substances con-
tribute signifcantly to the dominant hazard of the hazard
division concerned.
Building Design and Construction
Te efects of an event within an ESH for any HD, and
the resulting damage to other ESHs, can be mitigated by
design features (Section. VII - Hazard Mitigation).
Scaled Distances
Te propagation relationship between a Potential
Explosion Site (PES) and the Exposed Site (ES) can be
expressed as a mathematical relationship between the
NEQ and a derived function (f ). Tis relationship is
61
based on known blast wave and fragmentation throw
data. Te blast overpressure efects at a given scaled dis-
tance can be predicted with a high degree of confdence.
For example the inhabited distance is derived using the
formula D=22.2Q
1/3
. Tus the distance at which the blast
over pressure will be 5 kPa the Inhabited Building Dis-
tance, (IBD) is D = 22.2 x 1.000
1/3
= 222 metres.
Te following scaled distances are generally accepted to
predict HD 1.1 efects for any given NEQ:
Tis methodology is well developed and the efects of
blast may be treated deterministically, however, the
techniques for determining the hazards from projections
are considerably less developed and the efects require a
probabilistic approach.
Te following scaled distances are generally accepted to
predict the distance at which HD 1.2 efects are acceptable
for any given NEQ to meet a required degree of protection:
D1 =0 53 Q
0.18
(high degree of protection).
D2 =0 68 Q
0.18
(limited degree of protection).
HD 1.3 utilises a fxed separation distance of 2 metres
between protected buildings and scaled distances for
inhabited buildings and public trafc routes.
Structural Relationship between ES and PES
Te construction of an ammunition store may result in
relatively weaker sections, for example the access end of
an earth covered bunker and therefore not provide the
same degree of all-round containment and protection.
Such buildings with the doors facing each other will
require a larger QD that a back to front confguration.
Te following is an example of separation distances for
standard earth covered bunker where the roof and face
wall are not designed to withstand the same side-on and
rear over pressure.
REQUIREDQUANTITYDISTANCESFOR50.000KILOGRAMS
OFHD1.1AMMUNITION
ScaledDistance
(Qinkg,distance
inm)
PeakIncident
(Side-on)
Overpressure
Expected(kPa) ExposedSite
44.4 Q
1/3
to
33.3 Q
1/3
2 to 3 Vulnerable Building
distance
22.2 Q
1/3
5 Inhabited Building
Distance
14.8 Q
1/3
9 Inter-magazine
Distance
9.6 Q
1/3
16 Inter-magazine
Distance
8.0 Q
1/3
21 Ammunition Process
Building Distance
7

(APB)
7.2 Q
1/3
24 Inter-magazine
Distance
3.6 Q
1/3
70 Inter-magazine
Distance
2.4 Q
1/3
180 Inter-magazine
Distance
7 APBs are used for the inspection and repair of ammunition. Tey are therefore continuously manned and are required to provide
increased protection to the process workers. Tey also represent a greater PES risk.
PES(PotentialExposedSite)
ES
(Exposed
Site)
30 metres 30 metres 30 metres
62
Explosives Storehouse Licence
In order to provide documentary evidence that an ex-
plosive hazard assessment of explosives in an explosive
storehouse has been undertaken, an Explosive Limit
Licence (ELL) is prepared and approved by the appropri-
ate explosive licensing authority. An example of a licence
for an earth covered 700 kPa Igloo
8
containing 10.000
kilograms of HD 1.1 ammunition, based on the factors
outlined above, is at Annex C. It is a visual matrix of
the explosives NEQ, the associated HDs, the structural
relationships between PES and ES and the associated
scaled functions.
Te required data can either be derived from known
scaled distance functions or by the use of available tables
based on the functions.
A licence should be prepared for each explosives store-
house and ammunition process building in an explosive
site. Tis process will require appropriately trained prac-
titioners; this guide does not provide sufcient informa-
tion to efectively complete an ELL. Further advice can
be sought from the OSCE or other member nations who
have the required expertise.
8. Safe Guarding of Explosive Sites
The Yellow Line
Any efective explosive licensing methodology will de-
termine the Outside Quantity Distances (OQD) between
the explosives storehouses and the limit of the explosive
hazard. Te OQD defnes the distance at which the
public and inhabited buildings are ensured reasonable
protection from an explosive event within the explosive
site. Te OQD may extend beyond the secure explosives
area. Te demarcation between the hazard zone and the
safe zone is commonly known as the Yellow Line
9
.
If unrestricted development is subsequently permitted
within the Yellow Line the explosives capacity of the area
may be seriously prejudiced or any development unduly
hazarded.
It is therefore necessary to have a consultative proce-
dure agreed by central and local government, prefera-
bly enforceable by law, whereby all development within
the OQD of an explosive area, known as the safeguard
area, are referred through the local planning authority
and the appropriate Central Government Ministries for
consideration.
Preparing the Yellow Line
Te following example is base on an explosive site with
5 ESHs.
8 An earth covered building with at least 0,6 m depth of earth cover. Te head-walls and the doors (single sliding door) are designed to
resist an external blast loading of 7 bar and an impulse of 14 kPas.
9 Te Yellow Line takes its name from the common practice of marking the separation zone with a yellow marker on associated plans
and maps.
63
A circle radius the IBD is drawn around each ESH IBD
A yellow line is drawn on all external arcs of the circles
Te red area inside the yellow line defnes the hazardous
area and the yellow line the limit of the risk to the public.
Existing Explosive Sites
Te Yellow Line will identify the hazard area for the
PESs within the explosives site and delineate the consoli-
dated Inhabited Building Distances. Any encroachment
within the Yellow line will require either:
The remediation of the hazard.
The reduction of explosives held in the offending
explosive stores.
The improvement of the store houses to remediate
the hazard.
The issuance of a Waiver or Exemption.
New Developments
New developments will need to be planned within the
limitations of the Yellow line.
Purple Line
Te Purple Line is a continuous line encircling the
explosives area delineating a distance twice the IBD to
buildings of vulnerable construction
10
.
9. Waivers and Exemption
Compelling Justifcation
Ammunition and explosives safety standards are
designed to protect against serious injury, loss of life,
and damage to property, but are not intended to be so
rigid as to prevent the Services from accomplishing its
assigned mission. When deviating from the accepted
national ammunition storage regulations there must be
compelling strategic or operational reasons to justify the
added risk to personnel and property. Formal approval
of any deviation is the issue of an authorized waiver or
exemption. It must acknowledge and accept the added
risk to personnel or property.
10 Buildings that are of curtain wall construction with four storeys or more, of largely glass construction or employs non load-bearing
cladding panels. For a fuller explanation see Section III. Defnitions.
64
Waiver
A waiver is written authority that permits temporary
deviation from accepted national ammunition storage
regulations for strategic or other compelling reasons.
Waivers are generally granted for a short period of time
pending the remediation of the cause of the waiver
requirement. Waivers should:
Only be granted for periods not exceeding 5 years.
Exceptional situations may require time for complet-
ing corrective action or actions that exceed 5 years, in
which case the waived conditions must be reviewed
and approved by the next higher approval authority.
Only be granted by officials assigned responsibilities
consistent with the level of risk identified, the author-
ity to control the resources required to accomplish
corrective actions, and the type of deviation.
Be reviewed at least annually for relevancy and ap-
plicability of control measures.
Exemptions
An exemption is written authority that permits long-
term non-compliance with these standards for strategic
or other compelling reasons. Exemptions require statu-
tory approval. Exemptions should be reviewed for ap-
plicability at intervals not to exceed 5 years. Exemptions
must meet all the following conditions:
Be required by a strategic or compelling need.
Required for a long-term (exceeding 5 years) or
permanent departure from the accepted National
ammunition storage regulations.
Risk Analysis
Any exemption request should be supported by a Hazard
Risk Analysis.
References:
On safety principles for the storage of ammunition
NATO AASTP-1.
On Risk Analysis NATO AASTP-4.
10. Fire Prevention and Firefghting
Fire prevention
Te spread of fre is the most common cause of cata-
strophic ammunition events. Te following outline
requirements are included to provide guidance on the
preparation of specifc fre fghting response.
Responsible fire officer
The installation Commanding Officer will nominate
a suitably trained member of the installation staff as
the responsible Depot Fire Officer.
Fire orders.
Fire orders are to be published in accordance with
national MOD regulations.
Fires and naked lights.
Ideally, the use of fires and naked lights within an
explosives area should be completely prohibited;
however such an absolute ban is not practical. Fire
and naked lights may be authorized subject to the
conditions laid down in the following paragraphs.
Hot water heating.
Boiler houses are to be located outside any build-
ing used for the storage, processing or handling of
ammunition. The use of open fires, including slow
combustion stoves, for heating or cooking anywhere
in the explosives area is totally prohibited. When
practicable, fires in boiler houses are to be extin-
guished before close of work each day. When this
is not possible, arrangements are to be made for a
competent boiler attendant to visit the boiler house
during silent hours.
Chimneys.
Installation chimneys, within and without the explo-
sives area, are to be cleaned on a regular basis. Those
which could be a potential hazard are to be fitted
with spark arresters.
Incinerators.
Domestic incinerators for the disposal of non-sal-
vageable material, rubbish, classified waste paper etc
65
are to be sited outside the explosives area. Incinera-
tors for the disposal of explosive items and waste will
be constructed and operated in accordance with the
national MOD rules.
Smoking.
Smoking is to be strictly prohibited within the explo-
sives area except in places and at the times specially
authorized by the Commanding Officer in consulta-
tion with the depot fire officer. Control measures are
to be laid down in depot standing orders.
Conveyance of controlled articles.
All smoking materials and means of producing a
flame are regarded as controlled articles. Where
smoking areas or fires are authorized, special ar-
rangements are to be made for the conveyance of the
required articles through the explosives area. Lock-
able containers are to be used for the conveyance and
the keys are to be held by a responsible person.
Dangerous articles and spontaneously combustible
materials.
Te introduction into an explosives area of any arti-
cle, which is likely to increase the risk of an explosion
or fre, is to be strictly controlled. Bulk stocks of oils,
paints and solvents are not to be stored within the
explosives area. Quantities of oils, paints and solvents
sufcient and essential for the normal day to day
maintenance of ammunition, not exceeding a fve
day supply, may be held in a non-combustible store.
Each item is to be held in a secure metal container.
Only limited quantities sufcient for one day use are
to be taken into buildings containing ammunition
or explosives. All oils, paints and solvents are to be
removed before close of work each day and returned
to the store. Articles liable to spontaneous combus-
tion, such as oily rags, are only to be taken into build-
ings when required for immediate use. Tey are to
be removed from buildings containing ammunition
and held in closed metal or other non-combustible
containers every time the building is vacated and
disposed of daily in a designated place outside the
explosives area.
Temporary use of flame producing equipment.
All flame and spark producing equipment, fires and
naked lights required to be used in the explosives area
on a temporary basis by depot personnel or contrac-
tors are to be considered as prohibited articles and
controlled in accordance with national regulations.
Grass and undergrowth.
All undergrowth and flammable vegetation is to be
cleared or kept short for at least 15 m around open
stacks and buildings containing ammunition. This
does not apply to ground ivy or similar vegetation
used to bind traverses, although excessive growth
should be cleared as necessary.
Cut vegetation.
Cut vegetation is to be removed immediately and
stacked beyond a distance of 50 m from any building
containing ammunition. It is to be removed from the
explosives area for burning, but where this is imprac-
ticable burning within the explosives area may be
permitted provided that:
o Burning is carried out in the open at a safe distance
from any building on a site approved by the Com-
manding Officer on the advice of the Depot Fire
Officer.
o The fire is kept under close supervision and at-
tended by trained fire-fighting personnel with
adequate equipment and supply of water ready for
immediate use to prevent any spread of fire.
o The fire is extinguished and thoroughly wetted at
least one hour before close of work and at least one
hour before sunset.
Refuelling of grass cutting equipment.
Petrol driven grass cutters, strimmers and similar
vegetation control machinery may be used within an
explosives area. Refuelling may be carried out within
the explosives area. However the refuelling point
must be 25 m from any explosives and fire extin-
66
guishers are to be readily available.
Use of weed killers.
Only chlorate-free approved weed killers are to be
used in explosives areas and in fire breaks established
at the explosives area perimeter.
Fire breaks.
Fire breaks are to be maintained in the explosives
area and at the perimeter of the areas as advised by
the local fire adviser. The following minimum widths
of fire breaks are to be observed in areas which are
heavily wooded with coniferous trees:
o Perimeter. 30 m.
o Internal Roads. 5 m clearance either side.
o Internal Sections. 30 to 50 m clearance.
Fire extinguishers on vehicles.
No mechanically propelled vehicle is to be allowed
to enter the explosives area unless it is equipped
with a fire extinguisher of a suitable size and type to
extinguish any fire originating in a vehicle when not
containing explosives. Types and sizes of extinguish-
ers are to be approved by the Depot Fire Officer.
FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES
Efective fre-fghting is achieved by a combination of the
following:
First aid fire-fighting.
Additional fire-fighting measures.
Liaison with civil authorities.
Speed.
Speed
Speed is the essence of successful frst aid fre-fghting.
Attack the fre before it can develop. When persons are
present at the actual outbreak of a fre, provided that the
outbreak is not already overwhelming, much can be done
by immediately dousing the fre with large quantities of
water, except where this is specifcally forbidden. Where
practicable the burning object should be removed or iso-
lated by the removal of other infammable objects nearby.
Fire Divisions
Te fre divisions are synonymous with the storage and
transport Hazard Divisions 1.1 through 1.4 for am-
munition and explosives. Tey are serially numbered
by Arabic fgures from 1 to 4. Te four fre divisions
correspond to the UN and NATO hazard divisions as
follows:
FireDivision HazardDivision
1 1.1
2 1.2
3 1.3
4 1.4
Fire Division 1 indicates the greatest hazard. Te hazard
decreases with ascending fre division numbers as fol-
lows:
FireDivision Hazardinvolved
1 Mass explosion
2 Successive explosions with projections
3 Mass fre, or fre with minor blast or
projections
4 No signifcant hazard
For details of hazards, see Annex A.
Te four fre divisions have been assigned distinctive
symbols for easy recognition by fre-fghting personnel
approaching the scene of fre.
1 2 3 4
Fire
Division 1
Fire
Division 2
Fire
Division 3
Fire
Division 4
67
Training
A proportion of the depot personnel are to be trained
in fre-fghting duties. All personnel working within the
explosives area are to be instructed in frst aid fre-fght-
ing. All personnel employed on ammunition duties are
to be trained in the action to be taken with the diferent
divisions and to be able to judge whether or not the fre
can be controlled. Te following general requirements
apply to all fre divisions:
Hand Held Fire Extinguishers
In the outbreak of fire, the prompt application of fire-
fighting first aid measures to prevent the develop-
ment of a serious fire. This will normally be affected
by the use of hand held fire extinguishers.
Fire Alarm
The fire alarm is to be sounded immediately and the
appropriate first aid measures vigorously applied. All
non-essential personnel are to be evacuated to a safe
predetermined position.
Prevent Spread
When ammunition is not involved, action should be
directed to preventing the extension of the fire to
adjacent buildings containing ammunition or other
inflammable material.
Substantial Cover
The fire-fighting of ammunition should be fought
from behind substantial cover.
Water supply
Provision is to be made for adequate water supplies
to be available throughout the explosives area. The
number, size and siting of the static water tanks and
the number of hydrants and volume of water to be
provided will be advised by the appropriate Defence
Fire Service.
Water supply maps
Water Supply Maps showing details are to be main-
tained in each depot.
Fire alarm system
An efficient fire alarm system including adequate
telephonic communication is to be maintained. Tel-
ephone test calls are to be made frequently. At least
one test call in three should be made outside normal
working hours.
11. Environmental Impact
on Ammunition
General Requirements
Ammunition may deteriorate or become damaged unless
it is correctly stored, handled and transported, with the
resultant efect that it may fail to function as designed
and may become dangerous in storage, handling, trans-
port and use. Te factors which cause deterioration or
damage are:
Damp.
Heat.
Careless and rough handling.
Good storage, handling and the use of ammunition re-
quires that the above factors are kept constantly in mind.
It is essential that ammunition be:
Kept dry and well ventilated.
Kept as cool as possible and free from excessive or
frequent changes of temperature.
Protected from the direct rays of the sun.
Handled with care.
Protection from Moisture
Rain, snow and damp quickly cause irremediable
damage to ammunition. Exceptional eforts are often
necessary to ensure dry conditions during storage and in
transportation. Providing an ammunition store is given
adequate protection against the access of moisture, good
ventilation of the ammunition will not only keep it cool
but prevent condensation in and around the containers
and the ammunition therein. Te efects of moisture on
various types of ammunition and associated materials
are as follows:
68
Unboxed ammunition
The most harmful effect is corrosion. In the early
stages basic cover and stencil markings (essential for
identification) are obliterated. Later, pitting of the
ammunition may occur to such an extent as to make
it unserviceable.
Steel containers
Steel containers not only lose their basic colour
and markings, but eventually become perforated
with rapid deterioration of the contents following.
Substances particularly subject to decay under damp
conditions in steel containers are components made
from certain alloys and paper cylinders.
Explosive compositions
Some substances used in explosive compositions
attract and hold moisture with the consequent falling
off or even total loss of the explosive properties. They
can also become unserviceable and sometimes dan-
gerous after short periods in damp conditions.
Non-explosive materials
The decay of soft woods through moisture is not a
common source of trouble with ammunition contain-
ers. However, fabrics, felt and paper materials, by
absorbing moisture, create conditions favourable to
corrosion and decay in other materials in the same
container.
All sites are inspected periodically to ascertain if the
conditions of storage are having a deleterious efect on
the contents. Tese inspections are to be carried out at
least once every four months and at the times when the
storage conditions are likely to be most adverse, for ex-
ample, at times of excessive damp or heat. Dampness on
surfaces within buildings is generally due to one or both
of the following causes:
Condensation of moisture on the comparatively
cold surfaces of walls, ammunition and ammunition
containers from the warm, damp air admitted, when
buildings are opened.
Free moisture may penetrate inadequately drained or
badly constructed roofs, or walls having unsatisfactory
damp courses. Ground moisture may penetrate walls
which abut on to native rock/soil or earth traverses.
Temperature Considerations
Extremes of temperature may afect the performance
of solid propellants such as rocket motors. Tey also
can cause rapid deterioration in explosives, whether the
explosives are the fllings of rounds and components
or are held in bulk. Very low temperatures are not as
objectionable as high ones, but it must be borne in mind
that explosives containing Nitroglycerine can become
dangerous at very low temperatures.
Careless Handling
Careless or rough handling may not only cause visual
damage to ammunition but can also afect the internal
mechanisms of components which cannot be detected.
Such damage may render the ammunition unserviceable
or unsafe to use. Ammunition containers are specif-
cally designed to protect ammunition during storage and
transportation. Damage to a container through careless
handling may directly afect the contents. It may also
reduce the efectiveness of the protection provided to the
contents which could consequently deteriorate. Identif-
cation markings may also become obliterated or difcult
to decipher.
12. Ammunition Surveillance
Methods
Ammunition surveillance can be carried out in any of
the following ways:
In-Service Proof.
Component Proof.
Surveillance of Ammunition Performance at Training
(SOAPAT).
69
Performance Failure, Accident and Defect Reporting
(PAD).
Inspection.
Repair.
Inspection
An Inspection is a type of surveillance which involves
the physical examination of the ammunition and or
its container in order to assess its condition. Types of
inspection tasks may include:
Initial Acceptance.
Preparation of ammunition for ISP.
Pre-issue, including fractioning.
Ex-unit Inspection, Returned Ammunition Group
(RAG).
Special Inspection, e.g. confirmation of condition or
quantity.
Repair
Repair is defned as the maintenance or modifcation of
ammunition in order to maintain or improve its condi-
tion. Types of repair tasks include:
Modification of ammunition.
Maintenance of ammunition.
Special, e.g. de-fuze or re-fuze.
Ammunition Defects
During inspection or repair, ammunition may be found,
which is defective in some way. All defects will fall into
one of the following categories:
Critical
Defects affecting safety in storage, handling, trans-
portation or use.
Major
Defects that affect the performance of the ammuni-
tion and that require remedial action to be taken.
Minor
Defects that do not affect the safety or performance
of the ammunition, but are of such a nature that the
ammunition should not be issued prior to remedial
action having been taken.
Insignificant
Any defect that does not fall into any of these catego-
ries, but which could conceivably deteriorate into one
of them if no remedial action is taken.
Technical
Any defect that requires further technical investigation.
Ammunition Conditions
Based on the identifed serviceability of the ammunition
is given an Ammunition Condition. Te Ammunition
Condition is used to defne the degree of serviceability
of the ammunition and the degree of any constraints
imposed.
In general these conditions designate the ammunition as:
Serviceable stocks available for use.
Stocks banned from use pending technical
investigation.
Stocks in suspension pending technical inspection,
repair, modification or test.
Stocks for disposal.
70
Annex A
UN Hazard Divisions
Tese HDs are used commonly for the process for deter-
mining safe separation distances (Quantity Distances)
between storage locations and other facilities outside the
explosive perimeter. Te 6 UN Hazard Divisions are:
Hazard Division 1.1:
Tere is a mass explosion hazard; a mass explosion is
one which afects the entire load virtually instantane-
ously.
Te major hazards of this division are blast, high velocity
projections and other projections of relatively low veloc-
ity. Te explosion results in severe structural damage,
the severity and range being determined by the amount
of high explosives involved. Tere may be a risk from
heavy debris propelled from the structure in which the
explosion occurs or from the crater.
Substances and articles which have a projection hazard
but not a mass explosion hazard.
11

Te explosion results in items burning and exploding
progressively, a few at a time. Furthermore fragments,
frebrands and unexploded items may be projected in
considerable numbers; some of these may explode on
impact and cause fres or explosions. Blast efects are
limited to the immediate vicinity.
For the purpose of determining quantity-distances a
distinction, depending on the size and range of frag-
ments, is made between those items which give small
fragments of moderate range (for instance, projectiles
and cartridges from 20 to 60 mm) and those which give
large fragments with a considerable range (for instance
projectiles and cartridges exceeding 60 mm, rockets and
rocket motors in a propulsive state which do not have a
mass explosion hazard).
Substances and articles which have a fre hazard and
either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard
or both, but not a mass explosion hazard
12
.
Tis division comprises substances and articles:
which give rise to considerable radiant heat;
which burn one after another, producing minor blast
or projection effects or both.
Tis division includes some items which burn with great
violence and intense heat emitting considerable ther-
mal radiation (mass fre hazard) and others which burn
sporadically. Items in this division may explode but do
not usually form dangerous fragments. Firebrands and
burning containers may be projected.
Tis division includes items which have primarily a
moderate fre hazard. Tey do not contribute exces-
11 In order to diferentiate between the two associated hazards some nations apply the following sub-divisions that are not part of the UN
system:
HD 1.21 - the more hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2
HD 1.22 - the less hazardous part of Hazard Division 1.2
12 In order to diferentiate between the two associated hazards some nations apply the following sub-divisions that are not part of the UN
system:
HD 1.33 - propellants
HD 1.34 - other than propellants
71
sively to a fre. Te efects are largely confned to the
package. No fragments of appreciable size or range are
to be expected. An external fre does not cause the si-
multaneous explosion of the total contents of a package
of such items.
Some but not all of the above items are assigned to
Compatibility Group S. Tese items are so packed or
designed that any explosive efect during storage and
transportation is confned within the package unless the
package has been degraded by fre.
Very insensitive substances which have a mass explosion
hazard.
Tis division comprises substances which have a mass
explosion hazard but are so insensitive that there is very
little probability of initiation or of transition from burn-
ing to detonation under normal conditions.
Te probability of transition from burning to detonation
is greater when large bulk quantities are transported or
stored.
For storage purposes, such substances are treated as
Hazard Division 1.1 since, if an explosion should occur,
the hazard is the same as for items formally assigned to
Hazard Division 1.1 (i.e. blast).
Extremely insensitive articles without a mass explosion
hazard.
Tis division comprises articles which contain only
extremely insensitive detonating substances and which
demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initia-
tion or propagation.
Te risk from articles of Hazard Division 1.6 is limited to
the explosion of a single article.
Annex B
Compatibility Groups
Te 14 UN Compatibility Groups are:
13
Group A
Primary explosive substance.
Group B
Article containing a primary explosive substance and not
containing two or more efective protective features.
Group C
Propellant explosive substance.
Group D
Secondary detonating article containing a secondary
detonating explosive substance without means of initia-
tion and without a propelling charge.
13 Te CG defnitions have been simplifed. Te full defnitions can be found in the UN Orange Book.
AnnexAAnnexB
72
Group E
Article containing a secondary detonating explosive
substance without means of initiation, with propelling
charge.
Group F
Article containing a secondary detonating explosive sub-
stance with its own means of initiation, with a propelling
charge.
Group G
Pyrotechnic substance, or article containing a pyrotech-
nic substance, or article.
Group H
Article containing both explosive substance and white
phosphorus.
Group J
Article containing both an explosive substance and a
fammable liquid or gel.
Group K
Article containing both an explosive substance and a
toxic chemical agent.
Group L
An explosive substance or item containing an explosive
substance and presenting a special risk (e.g. due
to water-activation or presence of hypergolic liquids,
phosphides or a pyrophoric substance) requiring
isolation of each type.
Group N
Articles which contain only extremely insensitive deto-
nating substances.
Group S
Substances or articles so packed or designed that any
hazardous efects arising from accidental functioning are
confned within the package.
Annex C
EXPLOSIVE LIMIT LICENCE
Te following is an example of an Explosive Limit Li-
cence between a 7-bar earth covered ESH (the PES) and
2 Exposed Sites; a second 7-bar earth covered ESH and
an Inhabited Building (the ES). Te separation distance
between the ESHs is <11 metres and 480 metres to the
Inhabited Building. Based on the appropriated QD tables
the fxed separation distance will allow an NEQ of up
to 10.000 kilograms of HD 1.1 and unlimited NEQs for
HDs 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
73
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AnnexC
74
Annex D
QUANTITY DISTANCE TABLE FOR
HD 1.1 AMMUNITION
Te following tables are provided as an example of the
methodology used by NATO to determine storage quan-
tity distances. Te various HD 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 refect the
difering hazards and protective requirements. HD 1.4
ammunition has fxed separation distances.
Each HD table comprises of 2 parts. Te frst provides
a matrix in which each cell represents a combination of
a PES and an ES and refers to one or more D-distances
or constant values of distance. Te second provides col-
umns of tabulated values of D-distances generated from
the distance function shown at the foot of each column,
subject to any overriding minimum or maximum fxed
distances. Where a cell in the matrix shows more than
one option the selection is made on the basis of special
conditions and the desired level of protection.
It must be emphasised that the application of these
tables should only be undertaken by a suitably trained
practitioner. Tey are provided to enable ammunition
stockholders to undertake an initial hazard assessment.
75
AnnexD
76
Quantity-Distances in metres
Net
Explosives
Quantity in kg D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12
500
600
700
800
900
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
7
7
8
8
8
9
10
10
11
11
15
16
16
17
18
20
21
22
23
24
29
31
32
34
35
39
41
43
45
47
64
68
72
75
78
180
180
180
180
180
180
190
200
210
215
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
1 800
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
8
9
9
10
10
11
12
13
13
14
18
20
21
22
22
24
26
27
29
30
36
39
41
43
44
48
52
54
57
59
80
86
90
94
98
180
180
180
180
180
225
240
250
260
270
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
8
8
8
11
11
12
13
13
14
15
16
17
18
23
25
26
28
29
31
33
35
37
39
46
49
52
55
58
61
66
70
73
77
105
110
120
125
130
180
185
205
220
235
280
305
325
340
355
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
6
7
7
7
8
9
10
10
10
11
14
15
16
16
17
19
20
22
22
23
31
33
35
36
38
42
44
46
48
50
62
66
69
72
75
83
88
92
96
100
140
150
155
160
170
255
270
285
300
310
380
405
425
445
465
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
18 000
8
9
9
9
10
11
12
13
13
14
18
19
20
21
21
24
26
27
28
29
39
42
44
46
48
52
55
58
61
63
78
83
87
91
95
105
110
120
125
130
175
185
195
205
210
320
340
360
375
390
480
510
540
560
590
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
10
11
11
15
16
14
15
16
17
18
22
24
25
27
28
30
33
35
36
38
49
53
56
59
62
66
71
75
79
83
98
110
115
120
125
135
145
150
160
165
220
235
250
265
275
405
435
460
485
510
610
650
690
730
760
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
17
18
19
19
20
19
20
21
22
23
30
32
33
35
36
41
44
46
48
50
67
71
75
78
81
89
94
99
105
110
135
145
150
160
165
180
190
200
210
220
295
315
330
345
360
550
580
610
640
670
820
870
920
960
1000
100 000
120 000
140 000
160 000
180 000
21
22
24
25
26
28
29
38
40
42
44
46
52
55
58
60
63
84
89
94
98
105
115
120
125
135
140
170
180
190
200
205
225
240
250
265
275
375
395
420
435
455
690
730
770
810
840
1040
1100
1160
1220
1260
200 000
250 000
30
32
47
51
65
70
110
115
145
155
215
230
285
305
470
510
870
940
1300
1400
Distance
Functions
D1=
0.35
Q
1/3
D2=0.
44Q
1/3
D3=0.
5Q
1/3
D4=
0,8Q
1/3
D5=1.
1Q
1/3
D6=1
.8Q
1/
3
D7=2.
4Q
1/3
D8=3
.6Q
1/3
D9=4.
8Q
1/3
D10=8
.0Q
1/3
D11=3.6Q
1/2
for
Q<4500
D11=14.8
Q
1/3
for
Q 4500
D12=22.2
Q
1/3
a. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)1) - virtually complete protection against instan-ta-
neous propagation
h. see 1.4.5.3. - excluding items at the ES vulnerable to attack
by heavy spalling
b. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)2) - high degree of protection against instantaneous
propagation
i. see 1.4.3.1. - modular storage of bombs in open stacks
c. see 1.4.1.9.a)&1.4.1.9.b)3) - moderate degree of protection against in-
stantaneous propagation
j. see 1.4.3.3. - untraversed stacks of robust shell
d. see 1.4.5.6.a)1) - effect of high velocity projections k. see 1.4.1.14.b) - reaction of drivers on busy roads
e. see 1.4.5.6.a)2) - effect of lobbed ammunition l. see 1.4.1.15.b) - flying and falling glass, etc.
f. see 1.4.1.8.c) - degree of protection depends on structure at ES
and sensitiveness of its contents
m. see 1.4.1.15.c) - 400 m minimum to built up areas
g. see 1.4.3.6. - excluding very sensitive explosive substances n. see 1.4.6.7.b) - reduced Q-D for large earth-covered buildings
containing NEQ<45 000kg
o. see 1.4.1.13. - serious fragment hazard
Tab|e 1 (Page 2} - Q-D Tab|e for Hazard Division 1.1
77
AnnexD
78
TABLE 2 - Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.2
Quantity-Distances in metres Net
Explosives
Quantity Q in
kg
D1 D2
500
600
700
800
900
180
180
180
180
185
270
270
270
270
270
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
1 800
185
190
195
200
205
270
270
270
270
270
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
210
220
225
230
235
270
280
290
300
310
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
245
255
260
270
275
320
330
340
345
355
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
18 000
280
290
300
305
310
360
370
385
390
400
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
320
330
345
350
360
410
425
440
450
460
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
375
390
400
410
410
480
500
520
530
540
100 000
120 000
140 000
160 000
180 000
410
410
410
410
410
560
560
560
560
560
200 000
250 000
410
410
560
560
Distance
Functions
D1 = 53 Q
0.18
D2 = 68 Q
0.18
a. see 1.4.1.10.1) - virtually complete protection g. see 1.4.1.5.b) - PES contains rounds above 60 mm, etc.
b. see 1.4.1.10.2) - high degree of protection h. see 1.4.1.5.c) - PES contains rounds up to 60 mm, etc.
c. see 1.4.1.10.3) - limited degree of protection i. see 1.4.5.1.c) - practical considerations may require a greater
distance
d. see 1.4.5.6.b) - resistance of headwalls and
doors at ES
j. see 1.4.1.15.d) - buildings are isolated and are evacuated
promptly
e. - (reserved) k. see 1.4.1.14.c) - traffic is stopped promptly to avoid worst attack
f. - (reserved)
79
AnnexD
80
TABLE 3A - Q-D TABLE FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.3
Quantity-Distances in metres Net
Explosives
Quantity Q
in kg
D1 D2 D3 D4
500
600
700
800
900
25
25
25
25
25
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
62
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
1 800
25
25
25
25
25
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
64
69
72
75
78
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
25
25
25
25
25
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
62
65
68
81
87
93
98
105
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
25
25
25
25
25
60
60
62
64
67
73
78
82
86
89
110
120
125
130
135
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
18 000
25
25
27
28
30
68
74
78
81
84
92
98
105
110
115
140
150
155
165
170
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
32
35
39
42
44
87
94
100
105
110
120
125
135
140
150
175
190
200
210
220
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
50
54
59
63
66
120
130
135
140
145
160
170
180
185
195
240
255
265
280
290
100 000
120 000
140 000
160 000
180 000
70
77
83
88
94
150
160
170
175
185
200
215
225
235
245
300
320
335
350
365
200 000
250 000
99
110
190
205
250
270
375
405
Distance
Functions
D1 = 0.22 Q
1/3
D2 = 3.2 Q
1/3
D3 = 4.3 Q
1/3
D4 = 6.4 Q
1/3
a. see 1.4.1.11.1) - virtually complete protection e. - (reserved)
b. see 1.4.1.11.2) - high/limited degree of protection f. see 1.4.6.6.a) - door barricade at PES
c. - (reserved) g. see 1.4.5.1.c) - practical considerations may require a
greater distance
d. see 1.4.5.6.b) - resistance of headwall and door(s) at ES h. see 1.4.1.14.b) - reaction of drivers on busy roads

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