Steven Michael WOODS, a/k/a Halo, Appellant, v. The..., 2004 WL 3142094...

2004 WL 3142094 (Tex.Crim.App.) (Appellate Brief) Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Steven Michael WOODS, a/k/a Halo, Appellant, v. The State of Texas, Appellee. No. 74,430. July 23, 2004. Appealing the Trial Courts Judgment on Plea of not Guilty Before Jury Assessing Death Sentence Based on Jury Verdict of Guilty and Answers to Special Issues in Cause Number F-2002-0541-E from the 367th Judicial District Court of Denton County, Texas Honorable Lee Gabriel, Presiding Appellants Post-Submission Brief WM. Reagan Wynn, SBN: 00797708, The Kearney Law Firm, Wells Fargo Building, 505 Main Street, Suite 220, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, (817) 336-5600, (817) 336-5610 (fax), Attorney for Appellant. *2 COMES NOW STEVEN MICHAEL WOODS, Appellant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through his appointed attorney of record, WM. REAGAN WYNN, and files this POST-SUBMISSION BRIEF, and would show this Court as follows: I. In his first, second, and third points of error, Appellant argues that article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional because it fails to place the burden upon the State of proving a negative answer to the mitigation special issue beyond a reasonable doubt, and accordingly, that the trial court erred by overruling his Motion to Hold Unconstitutional V.A.C.C.P. Article 37.071 sec. 2(3) and (f) - Burden of Proof and by failing to instruct the jury during the punishment phase that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a negative answer to the mitigation issue. Appellants contention is based on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). On June 23, 2004, this case was submitted to this Court with oral argument. On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Accordingly, at the time of the original briefing and oral argument in this matter, Blakely was unavailable as authority in this matter. In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that the Apprendi/Ring line of cases requires the prosecuting authority to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that is legally essential to imposition of a sentence. Id. at 2534-43. *3 The Failure to Place the Burden on the State of Proving a Negative Answer to the Mitigation Special Issue Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as Interpreted in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely. This Courts reasoning with regard to Appellants argument in this regard has been as follows: once the jury convicts the defendant of capital murder, the death penalty is within the statutory range of punishment and, accordingly, a negative answer to the mitigation special issue is not an eletnent that is Constitutionally required to be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi and Ring. E.g., Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The United States Supreme Courts decision in Blakely resolves this issue contrary to this Courts prior precedents. In Blakely, the defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted by a Washington trial court of the offense of second-degree 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Steven Michael WOODS, a/k/a Halo, Appellant, v. The..., 2004 WL 3142094...

kidnaping. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534-35. Under the applicable Washington statute, the statutory range of punishment was confinement not to exceed a term of ten years (120 months). Id. at 2535. However, under Washingtons Sentencing Reform Act, the defendants offense carried a standard range of 49 to 53 months. Id. The judge could only impose a sentence outside of that standard range, which was clearly within the statutory range of punishment, upon making certain findings of fact. Id. After a hearing, the trial judge entered various findings of fact, detennined that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, and imposed a sentence of 90 months-within the statutory range of 120 months, but significantly longer than the standard range of 49 to 53 months. Id. at 2535-36. *4 The defendant appealed, claiming that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. Id. at 2536 (emphasis added). The State argued, that there was no Apprendi violation because the relevant statutory maximum is not 53 months, but the 10-year maximum .... [and] no exceptional sentence may exceed that limit. Id. at 2537. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia held that: Our precedents make clear, however, that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.... In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jurys verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, .. .and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Under the Texas death penalty scheme, Appellant could only receive a death sentence if all twelve jurors unanimously agreed that the answer to the mitigation issue was no. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, 2(f)(2), 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (jury must unanimously agree to answer mitigation question no and death sentence can only be imposed if they do so). Put another way, the jurys fact findings up to the point that they were instructed to address the mitigation issue, i.e., the jurys finding of guilt and affirmative finding on the future dangerousness special issue, could only result in a life sentence. See *5 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (life sentence shall be imposed unless jury unanimously answers first two questions yes and third question no). Thus, after the jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder and answered the future dangerousness special issue yes, the maximum sentence that could be imposed without any additional findings, Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537, was a life sentence. Further, the only way death could be imposed was after an additional finding of a negative answer to the mitigation issue. Id. Accordingly, the statutory maximum for Apprendi/Ring/Blakely purposes in this situation is the life sentence that was authorized by the jurys findings up to the point that they were instructed to consider the mitigation issue rather than the death sentence that was possible under the statute if the jury answered the mitigation issue in the negative. Id.; see also, Id. at 2538 (The maximum sentence is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator).). Because the negative answer to the mitigation issue was a fact finding that was required to impose a death sentence on Appellant, the lack of mitigating circumstances was a fact which the law makes essential to the punishment. Id. Accordingly, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely require that the negative answer to the mitigation question be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. *6 E.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542 (every clement the prosecutor can allege to enhance punishment is an element that a defendant can threaten to contest at trial and make the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment.); Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2339 (If a State makes an increase in a defendants authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact - no matter how the State labels it - must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.); United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 663 (5th Cir. 2002) (The import of Apprendi is inescapable: If a fact increases the statutory maximum penalty, it must be ... found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether [the legislature] intended the fact to be a sentencing factor or an element of a separate offense.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1604 (2003). 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

Steven Michael WOODS, a/k/a Halo, Appellant, v. The..., 2004 WL 3142094...

Based on Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, this Court should sustain Appellants First, Second, and Third Points of Error, reverse Appellants sentence, and remand this cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
End of Document 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.