ΔΛΠ12 Αναβαλ Φορολογία

&
&

: MAF 2909
:
2009

.
.
.
,

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,
.
................................................................................................................ 8
1: ....................................................................................... 11
2 : ..................................................... 13
2.1 - (
) ............................................................................. 13
2.2 . 3697/2008 ............................................... 16
3: 12 ........ 18
3.1 12 ................................................................................... 18
3.2 ............................................................... 18
3.3 ................................... 21
3.3.1 .................................. 21
3.3.2 ............................... 22
3.4 ...................... 31
.............................................. 31
................................................................. 34
, ...... 39
......................................................................... 41
................................................................................................... 42
3.5 ......................................................... 43
3.6
........................................................................................................... 44
3.7 ... 45
3.8 12 ............. 46
3.9 ............. 50
4: ........................................................... 55
4.1 Earnings Management............................................ 55
4.2 Earnings Management ............................................................ 58
4.3 Earnings Management .................................... 60
5: Earnings management
......................................................................................... 66
5.1 ......................................................................................................... 66
5.2 ..................................................................................... 67
5.3 ............................................................................................ 69
5.3.1 ................................................................................... 69
5.3.2 ................................... 75
5.3.3 ................................................................................. 77
5.3.4 ................................................... 91
5.4 ............................................................................................... 114
...................................................................................................... 119
...................................................................................................... 121

: ) )
.
2005-2008
. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997)

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(2002)
accruals
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(accrualbased manipulation)
(real activities manipulation).
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1:

(IAS - IFRS)

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31/12/2008 1/1/2009.
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()
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24.000
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72.000
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&

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2000+1
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100.000
100.000
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25

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+1
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200+2
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&
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100.000
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28
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200
2000+1
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200
2000+1
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7.500
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IASB, 2009
4.
IASB 31
2009
Income taxes.5
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12 US GAAP (FAS 109).
2009 :
Income Tax Accounting under IFRS: A look ahead, Exploring the IASBs proposal Exposure Draft
Income Tax
5
International Accounting Standards Board, Press Release 31 2009
52

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FAS 109. 12
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53
54
4:
4.1 Earnings Management

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management),
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earnings management

(Messod Beneish).
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stakeholders (, )
(Healy, Wahlen
1999).
240,
,
55
,
(misrepresentation) .6
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987)7

(Schipper
1989).
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(Burgstahler, Eames 2006).
,

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(accrual-based
earnings management) (real activities manipulation).
6
., ...,
, , 570 2002
56
Skipper K. (1989)

(accrual-based) (Healy,
Wahlen 1999).
.

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cookie-jar reserve. accrual based

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8
McGregor S., Earnings Management and Manipulation

Shih Michael S. H., National University of Singapore, Shareholder Characteristics and Accruals
Manipulation to Meet Earnings Targets
57
expenses),
.10 ,

(
).
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(Healy, Wahlen 1999).
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(Graham et al. 2005),

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earnings management.
:
1. :

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58
McKee T.E., 2005, Earnings Management: An Executive Perspective
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2. :
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(non-recurring) .
:
1. Accrual-Based EM:
.

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2. Real Activities Manipulation: Roychowdhury (2006)11

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11
Cohen A. D.-Zarowin P., Accrual Based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned
equity offerings, New York University, Stern School of Business, June 2008
59
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EM. Dhaliwal et al. (2003),

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61

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big bath

(Christensen et al).
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and Wahlen 1999). , ,
valuation
allowances (Visvanathan 1998). ,

. (,
EM, .)
big bath,

, .
valuation allowances

,
valuation
allowances.
Chao et al. (2004),

big bath
.
62
,
, ,
. , Phillips
et al. (2002)
EM ,
,
accruals
. ,

.

.
Noor et al.(2007),
Phillips et al.,

. , Mahenthiran et al.(2008)

, ,
EM,
.

(

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63
64
65
5: Earnings management
.
5.1

()
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66
( 3).

(/)

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-
- /.
Healy & Wahlen (1999)

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5.2
,

.

. (Holland 2004,
2007) Hayn (1995)
(pooled cross-sectional analysis)

Burgstahler & Dichev (1997)

.
DeGeorge et al. (1999) Burgstahler & Dichev12

.
,

12
EPS, EPS EPS

EPSanalysts ( ).
67
(Deferred tax expense DTE)

earnings management.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
Phillips et al. (2002)

earnings management Noor
et al. (2003) Phillips et al.
.

. Phillips et al. (2002)
- (DTE)
(total accruals)
earnings management
. , (abnormal accruals)
earnings management
.
Noor et al.
- (DTE),

.
Bursthaler & Eames (2006), ,

,

( ) .

.
68
,
(2007) Burgstalher & Dichev

13 (scaled earnings)
, Friedman
& Diaconis,
, ,
.
(Durtschi and
Easton, 2005)

, ..
,

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.
5.3
5.3.1
Burgstahler & Dichev

(1997)
.
earnings
management
.

13
Scaled arnings change(NIt NIt-1)/ MVEt-2

Scaled Earnings NIt/ MVEt-1
69
. Burgstahler & Dichev

.

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) ,
.
:
H1:
.
H2:
.
pooled cross-sectional
probit (Phillips et
al. 2002):

70
(1)
: 1
t-2 0 0,01, 0 (
EM ).
: - i t,
t-1.
: - (accruals) t, (
).
:
t t-1, t-1.
: .
, ( ),
,
Burgstahler & Dichev Scaled Earnings
Changes (SEC) :
!" #!"
$% & %' (

)'
!" #!"
$* & *' (

14
* '
NIt: t
t-1: t-1
MVEt-2: t-2
EPSt: t
EPSt-1: t-1
Pricet-2: t-2, t-1
14
Hayn (1995) .
71
,
.
:
0 . / 0.0115
EM1 = 1 (
), EM1 =
0 ( ).

( Burgstahler & Dichev )
SEC Holland
(1995)
.
,
, Burgstahler & Dichev
Scaled Earnings (SEar) :
!"
$% (
)'
!"
$* (
16
* '
,
:
0 . / 0.0217
15
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) (0-0,005 , 00,01 , 0-0,015)

earnings management .
16
Hayn (1995) .
17
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) (0-0,01 , 00,02 , 0-0,03)
earnings management .
72
EM2 = 1 (
),
EM2 = 0 (
).

,
(Holland 1995).
,
Burgstahler & Dichev,
, Holland (1995)
(2007) (
):
) Scott (1979) : 3.5n
-1/3
(1)
)Friedman & Diaconis (1981): 2(IQR)n

) Silverman (1986): 1.06n
-1/3
(2)
-1/5
) Silverman (1986): 0.79(IQR)n
(3)
-1/5
)Silverman (1986): 0.9(min(,IQR/1.34))n
(4)
-1/5
(5)
,
IQR: (x75 x25)
:
n:

earnings management EM
, .

73
earnings management total accruals abnormal accruals

(1)

.
Total Accruals ( )

Phillips et al (2002) Healy (1985)
total accruals :
5 & $ &
(
:
: t,
5 : t,
$ &
(: t-1
Abnormal Accruals ( )
abnormal accruals

Jones (1991)
Dechow et al. (2002). ,
( EMit=0)
,
,

.
" **
(2)
(
=1) (2):
$" & 6 ( ** $3)
74
:
" : t-1 t,
** : i t-1,
6 : t-1 t,
: ,
.
(
t-1.)
5.3.2
XAA 2005 2008

2005 .

Hellastat. (
stock split)
. ,
(DTE) -
/
,

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2005. , ,
2005,
,
2004,
2005
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75
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/ (DTE).
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12
&
30
&
26
&
24
&
30
10
&
10
19
194
5.1:
76
5.3.3

,
,

.
Earnings Management
5.1 Scaled
Earnings Changes. , , 194
2005-2008
.
, (-0,01 0),
(0 0,01)
(0,01 0,02) (Scaled Earnings
Changes) (0 0,01)
(-0,01 -
0). (
5.1 5.1.) , ,

( ).

Scaled Earnings Changes 0 0,01 (
).
77
Number of Firms (740)
60
40
20
0
- 2,0000
0,0000
2,0000
4,0000
Scale d Ea rnings Changes
5.1: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Burgstahler & Dichev . ( 0,01 -3,79 5,2609)
Number of firms (740)
60
40
20
0
- 0,0900
- 0,0700
- 0,0500
- 0,0300
- 0,0100
0,0100
0,0300
0,0500
0,0700
0,0900
- 0,0800
- 0,0600
- 0,0400
- 0,0200
0,0000
0,0200
0,0400
0,0600
0,0800

Burgstahler & Dichev (1995). ( 0,01 -0,1 - 0,1)
78
Scott

(1) 0
. ,

.
400
300
200
100
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
4,000

Scott (1979). ( 0,17 -3,79 5,2609)
Friedman & Diaconis

Friedman & Diaconis (1981),
740 (firm-years)
(2)

5.3.

5.3.
.
79
125
Number of firms(740)
100
75
50
25
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
4,000

Friedman & Diaconis (1981). ( 0,022 -3,792 - 5,261)
125
100
75
50
25
- 0,198 - 0,176 - 0,154 - 0,132 - 0,110 - 0,088 - 0,066 - 0,044 - 0,022 0,000
0,022
0,044
0,066
0,088
0,110
0,132
0,154
0,176
0,198

80
Silverman
(3) Silverman (1986)
5.4.
400
300
200
100
- 0,762
- 0,635
- 0,508
- 0,381
- 0,254
- 0,127
0,000
0,127
0,254
0,381
0,508
0,635
0,762

Silverman (1986). ( 0,127 -3,792 - 5,261)
, (4) Silverman (1986)

5.5

.
5.5
5.5 (-0,18 -, 0,180).
81
100
75
50
25
0
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
4,000

Silverman (1986). ( 0,02099 -3,792 - 5,261)
100
75
50
25
0
- 0,180 - 0,160 - 0,140 - 0,120 - 0,100 - 0,080 - 0,060 - 0,040 - 0,020 0,000 0,020 0,040 0,060 0,080 0,100 0,120 0,140 0,160 0,180
Scsled Earnings Cha nges

Silverman (1986). ( 0,02099 -0,2 - 0,2)
82
, ( (5))
.

.
100
75
50
25
0
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
4,000

Silverman (1986). ( 0,01784 -3,792 - 5,261)
100
75
50
25
0
- 0,187
- 0,153
- 0,119
- 0,085
- 0,051
- 0,017
0,017
0,051
0,085
0,119
0,153
0,187
- 0,170
- 0,136
- 0,102
- 0,068
- 0,034
0,000
0,034
0,068
0,102
0,136
0,170

Silverman (1986). ( 0,01784 -0,2 - 0,2)
83
, ,
(Scaled Earnings Changes) .
,
.

18,
.
(
Scott Silverman)

..
Earnings Management

Scaled Earnings. , , 194
2005-2008

.
(Scaled Earnings)
.

, 5.7
5.7
Scaled Earnings (-0,1 - 0,1).
18
84
50
40
30
20
10
- 4,000
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
Scale d Ea rnings

Burgstahler & Dichev (1995). ( 0,01 -5,261 3,546)
50
40
30
20
10
- 0,090 - 0,080 - 0,070 - 0,060 - 0,050 - 0,040 - 0,030 - 0,020 - 0,010 0,000 0,010 0,020 0,030 0,040 0,050 0,060 0,070 0,080 0,090
Scale d Ea rnings
5.7: (Scaled Earnings)

Burgstahler & Dichev (1995).( 0,01 -0,1 - 0,1)
85
Scott

Scott (1986) 5.8
(0 - 0,1513) firm years

.
400
300
200
100
- 4,00
- 2,00
0,00
2,00
Scale d Ea rnings

Scott (1986). ( 0,1513 -5,261 3,546)
Friedman & Diaconis

5.9 5.9 Scaled Earnings
Friedman & Diaconis (1981).

((0 - 0,02282) (0,02282 - 0,4564)),

.
86
100
75
50
25
0
- 4,000
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
Scale d Ea rnings

Friedman & Diaconis (1981). ( 0,02282 -5,261 3,546)
100
75
50
25
0
- 0,198 - 0,176 - 0,154 - 0,132 - 0,110 - 0,088 - 0,066 - 0,044 - 0,022 0,000
0,022
0,044
0,066
0,088
0,110
0,132
0,154
0,176
0,198
Scale d Ea rnings

87
Silverman
Scaled Earnings
(3)

(0 ,
0,1108)
( 5.10).
( 5.11 5.12)
(5) (6)

.
300
200
100
0
- 4,000
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
Scale d Ea rnings

Silverman (1986). ( 0,1108 -5,261 3,546)
88
75
50
25
0
- 4,000
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
Scale d Ea rnings

Silverman (1986). ( 0,02179 -5,261 3,546)
100
75
50
25
0
- 0,189 - 0,168 - 0,147 - 0,126 - 0,105 - 0,084 - 0,063 - 0,042 - 0,021 0,000 0,021
0,042 0,063 0,084 0,105 0,126 0,147 0,168 0,189
Scale d Ea rnings

Silverman (1986). ( 0,02179 -0,2 - 0,2)
89
75
50
25
0
- 4,000
- 2,000
0,000
2,000
Scale d Ea rnings

Silverman (1986). ( 0,01852 -5,261 3,546)
75
50
25
0
- 0,162 - 0,144 - 0,126 - 0,108 - 0,090 - 0,072 - 0,054 - 0,036 - 0,018 0,000 0,018 0,036 0,054 0,072 0,090 0,108 0,126 0,144 0,162
Scale d Ea rnings

Silverman (1986). ( 0,01852 -0,2 - 0,2)
90
, ,

accruals .
5.3.4

(firm-years)
(=1) (firm-years)

(=0). 5.1
Burgstahler & Dichev.
- (DTE)
(firm years) =0,
,
-0,0001319 0,013% (firm-years)
=1,
,
-0,00051 0,051% .
(accruals), DTE
(abnormal) . , TAcc
=1. ,
=0
(-0,01049) =1 (0,014973).
19
91
EM=0
DTE
600
-0,0001
0,031
-0,707
0,068
TAcc
600
-0,008
0,118
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
590
-0,0009
0,122
-0,496
1,499
CFO
600
-0,010
0,188
-3,665
0,419
DTE
59
-0,0005
0,016
-0,111
0,016
TAcc
59
-0,004
0,086
-0,281
0,208
AbAcc
59
-0,0006
0,102
-0,389
0,218
CFO
59
0,015
0,141
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.1:
- Burgstahler & Dichev
Scott (1986)

.
, 5.2 =0
=1
.

=0 =1.
92
EM=0
DTE
388
-0,0008
0,0379
-0,707
0,067
TAcc
388
-0,013
0,137
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
380
0,0005
0,138
-0,497
1,463
CFO
388
-0,022
0,224
-3,665
0,419
DTE
271
0,0007
0,010
-0,111
0,026
TAcc
271
-0,0001
0,075
-0,339
0,255
AbAcc
269
-0,003
0,088
-0,367
0,311
CFO
271
0,012
0,102
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.2:
- Scott

Friedman & Diaconis (1987)

=1 .
EM=0
DTE
538
-0,0004
0,033
-0,707
0,067
TAcc
538
-0,009
0,123
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
529
-0,0009
0,126
-0,494
1,462
CFO
538
-0,013
0,197
-3,665
0,419
DTE
121
0,0006
0,011
-0,111
0,016
TAcc
121
0,0001
0,073
-0,280
0,208
AbAcc
120
-0,0018
0,087
-0,352
0,211
CFO
121
0,013
0,113
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.3:
- Friedman & Diaconis
93
Silvermann (3)
DTE CFO
=0 =1.
,
( ) =1
=0 =1.
EM=0
DTE
412
-0,0008
0,037
-0,70697
0,067539
TAcc
412
-0,012
0,135
-0,945
0,93367
AbAcc
404
0,0004
0,136
-0,5017
1,461347
CFO
412
-0,021
0,218
-3,66497
0,419696
DTE
247
0,000907
0,009
-0,111
0,026
TAcc
247
0,000469
0,073
-0,339
0,255
AbAcc
245
-0,00321
0,088
-0,370
0,309
CFO
247
0,012775
0,104
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.4:
Silverman (3)
5.5
DTE CFO =0
=1.
TAcc =1 AbAcc
=0 (
).
5.6.
94
EM=0
DTE
543
-0,0003
0,032
-0,707
0,067
TAcc
543
-0,009
0,123
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
534
-0,0008
0,125
-0,494
1,463
CFO
543
-0,018
0,196
-3,665
0,419
DTE
116
0,0006
0,012
-0,111
0,016
TAcc
116
-0,0002
0,074
-0,281
0,208
AbAcc
115
-0,002
0,088
-0,353
0,212
CFO
116
0,012
0,115
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.5:
Silverman (4)
EM=0
DTE
558
-0,0003
0,032
-0,707
0,068
TAcc
558
-0,0088
0,122
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
549
-0,0008
0,124
-0,494
1,460
CFO
558
-0,012
0,194
-3,665
0,419
DTE
101
0,0004
0,012
-0,111
0,016
TAcc
101
-0,0008
0,076
-0,281
0,208
AbAcc
100
-0,003
0,092
-0,353
0,213
CFO
101
0,015
0,121
-0,556
0,384
EM=1
5.6:
Silverman (5)
,

=0 =1 (DTE)
() =0 ()
( ) =1.

95
,
=1
.
( )
. , ,
=1
=0. ,

=0
=1. CFO
,
.
.

(firm-years)
(=1) (firm-years)
(=0).
5.7 Burgstahler &
Dichev. , DTE -0,00034 () 0,034%
=0 =1
() 0,13% .

=1 -0,01115 =0
0,017314 =1.
96
EM=0
DTE
591
-0,0003
0,031
-0,707
0,068
TAcc
591
-0,008
0,120
-0,945
0,933
AbAcc
582
-0,001
0,125
-0,501
1,499
CFO
591
-0,011
0,192
-3,665
0,419
DTE
68
0,001
0,005
-0,012
0,016
TAcc
68
-0,0003
0,063
-0,143
0,182
AbAcc
67
-0,0003
0,068
-0,169
0,218
CFO
68
0,017
0,089
-0,226
0,299
EM=1
5.7:
- Burgstahler & Dichev
5.8 Scott,
()
=1,
AbAcc EM=0.
EM=0
DTE
269
-0,003
0,046
-0,707
0,067
TAcc
269
-0,026
0,155
-0,945
0,933
AbAcc
260
0,00001
0,157
-0,501
1,459
CFO
269
-0,026
0,259
-3,665
0,384
DTE
390
0,002
0,006
-0,032
0,038
TAcc
390
0,005
0,076
-0,366
0,255
AbAcc
389
-0,002
0,084
-0,377
0,303
CFO
390
0,004
0,103
-0,556
0,41
EM=1
5.8:
Scott
97
Friedman & Diaconis

5.9 Burgstahler & Dichev
TAcc =1
. ,
=1
=0.
EM=0
DTE
586
-0,0004
0,032
-0,707
0,068
TAcc
586
-0,00861
0,121
-0,945
0,933
AbAcc
577
-0,00121
0,125
-0,499
1,499
CFO
586
-0,011
0,193
-3,66
0,419
DTE
73
0,001
0,005
-0,01263
0,017
TAcc
73
0,0002
0,061
-0,14382
0,182
AbAcc
72
-0,0005
0,067
-0,16748
0,218
CFO
73
0,014
0,088
-0,22618
0,299
EM=1
5.9:
Friedman & Diaconis
(Silverman)
Scott

=1. ,
=1 AbAcc
=0.
98
EM=0
DTE
314
-0,002
0,043
-0,706
0,068
TAcc
314
-0,019
0,147
-0,945
0,934
AbAcc
305
-0,0006
0,149
-0,498
1,454
CFO
314
-0,024
0,243
-3,665
0,384
DTE
345
0,0017
0,005
-0,032
0,022
TAcc
345
0,003
0,076
-0,366
0,255
AbAcc
344
-0,002
0,085
-0,373
0,307
CFO
345
0,006
0,105
-0,556
0,419
EM=1
5.10:
Silverman (3)
5.11 (Silverman)
=1
=0.
Silverman (5)
5.12.
EM=0
DTE
588
-0,00035
0,031528
-0,70697
0,067539
TAcc
588
-0,00858
0,120703
-0,945
0,93367
AbAcc
579
-0,00124
0,125158
-0,50034
1,499407
CFO
588
-0,01106
0,192853
-3,66497
0,419696
DTE
71
0,001376
0,005131
-0,01263
0,016866
TAcc
71
0,000191
0,062408
-0,14382
0,182477
AbAcc
70
-0,00022
0,067824
-0,1674
0,217833
CFO
71
0,015392
0,088463
-0,22618
0,298594
EM=1
5.11:
Silverman (4)
99
EM=0
DTE
599
-0,0003
0,031
-0,707
0,067
TAcc
599
-0,008
0,119
-0,945
0,933
AbAcc
590
-0,001
0,124
-0,499
1,500
CFO
599
-0,011
0,191
-3,66
0,419
DTE
60
0,001
0,005
-0,012
0,016
TAcc
60
0,0004
0,064
-0,144
0,182
AbAcc
59
-0,0004
0,071
-0,165
0,219
CFO
60
0,019
0,089
-0,226
0,298
EM=1
5.12:
Silverman (5)
,

=0
=1
. ,
=1
=0
AbAcc Scott Silverman (3)
. ,
=0
=1.

pooled
cross-sectional (1) probit .
100
Holland (2004)

(firm-years)
(=1)
(=0).
, (1)
.
(avoid
an earnings decline)
(avoid a loss). ,
, , accruals.
, (Total Accruals)
(bnormal Accruals).

.

(1)
DTE
.20
accruals
CFO
( accruals).
20
(deferred tax expense)

/

.

(real earnings management).
101
1) Burgstahler & Dichev
5.13 TAcc.

(-1,345918) (p = 0).

.

(-1,271661) (p = 0)
(CFO)
(1,372043) ( p = 0.0277).
5.14
AbAcc.

(-1,339430) (p = 0).

.

(-1.275577) (p
= 0) (CFO)
(1.501287) ( p = 0.0243).
102
: 21
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance
Avoid an earnings decline
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-1,345918
0,0000**22
-1,271661
0,0000**
DTE
-0,828537
0,5533
2,515336
0,3603
TAcc
0,297536
0,6052
0,676746
0,1547
CFO
0,829735
0,2960
1,372043
0,0277**
=0
600
591
=1
59
68
5.13: probit Total Accruals

.

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Variable
Avoid a loss
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-1,339430
**
-1,275577
0,0000**
DTE
-0,850013
0,5459
3,406098
0,2834
AbAcc
0,485322
0,3981
0,672392
0,1498
CFO
0,924268
0,2966
1,501287
0,0243**
0,0000
=0
590
582
=1
59
67
5.14: probit Abnormal Accruals

.
21
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997)

Phillips et al.(2002) .
22
*: 10%.
**: 5%.
103
2) Scott
5.15 TAcc.

(-0,222445) (p
= 0).
TAcc (1,169578 p = 0,0340)
CFO (1,869791 p = 0,0011).

(0,234711) (p = 0)
DTE , TAcc
CFO (9,808054 p = 0.0003, 1,936693 p = 0.0064 2,067489 p =
0,0001, ).
5.16
AbAcc.
(-0,215896)
(p = 0).
CFO (1,652838 p =
0,0045).

(0,253380) (p = 0)
DTE CFO (6,212911 p =
0,0078, 1,569121 p = 0,0017, ).
104
: 23
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0,222445
0,0000**
0,234711
0,0000**
DTE
0,743278
0,5303
9,808054
0,0003**
TAcc
1,169578
0,0340**
1,936693
0,0064**
CFO
1,869791
0,0011**
2,067489
0,0001**
=0
388
269
=1
271
390

.

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0,215896
0,0000**
0,253380
0,0000**
DTE
0,995497
0,4011
6,212911
0,0078**
AbAcc
0,565561
0,2473
0,502833
0,3127
CFO
1,652838
0,0045**
1,569121
0,0017**
=0
380
260
=1
269
389

.
23
Scott
(1).
105
3) Friedman & Diaconis
5.17
TAcc.
(-0,903808)
(p = 0).
,
,
CFO (1,2589631 p = 0,0451).

(-1,228710) (p = 0)
(CFO)
(1,372043) ( p = 0,0418).
5.18
AbAcc.
(-0,900620
p = 0) 5% CFO (1,270340 p= 0.0570).

(-1,121143)
(p = 0) (CFO)
(1,296090) ( p = 0,0338).
106
24
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0,903808
0,0000**
-1,228710
0,0000**
DTE
0,089235
0,9477
2,832998
0,3296
TAcc
0,750852
0,1232
0,636322
0,1653
CFO
1,2589631
0,0451**
1,214137
0,0418**
=0
538
586
=1
121
73

.

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0,900620
0,0000**
-1,121143
0,0000**
DTE
0,189004
0,8900
3,678098
0,1839
AbAcc
0,564419
0,2389
0,565379
0,1949
CFO
1,270340
0,0570**
1,296090
0,0338**
=0
529
577
=1
120
72

.
24
Friedman & Diaconis

(2).
107
4) Silverman (3)
5.19 TAcc.

(-0,318560)
(p = 0).

TAcc (1,131332 p = 0,0356) CFO (1,823454 p = 0,0014).

DTE , TAcc CFO (8,126343 p = 0.0013, 1,555816 p = 0.0097
1,887256 p = 0,0001, ).
5.20
AbAcc.
(-0,312970)
(p = 0).
CFO (1,619039 p =
0,0057).

DTE CFO (5,857504 p = 0,0084, 1,555050 p =
0,0014, ).
108
25
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0.318560
0.0000**
0.058591
0.2333
DTE
0.854175
0.4874
8.126343
0.0013**
TAcc
1.131332
0.0356**
1.555816
0.0097**
CFO
1.823454
0.0014**
1.887256
0.0001**
=0
412
314
=1
247
345

.

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0.312970
0.0000**
0.075171
0.1291
DTE
1.126241
0.3755
5.857504
0.0084**
AbAcc
0.545344
0.2570
0.543827
0.2502
CFO
1.619039
0.0057**
1.555050
0.0014**
=0
404
305
=1
245
344

.
25
Silverman
(3).
109
5) Silverman (4)
,
5.21, TAcc. ,

(-0,932283 p=0)
CFO 10% (1,174531 p=0.0624).

,
(-1,245549) (p=0)
CFO (1,277196)
5% (p=0,0359),
5.22
(1) AbAcc.

(-0.929266 p=0 -1.248532 p=0,
).
CFO.
(1.170937)
10% (p=0.0813)
(1,374157) 5% (p=0.0320).
110
26
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0.932283
0.0000**
-1.245549
0.0000**
DTE
0.027033
0.9842
2.676702
0.3485
TAcc
0.699255
0.1495
0.665729
0.1531
CFO
1.174531
0.0624*
1.277196
0.0359**
=0
543
588
=1
116
71

.

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-0.929266
0.0000**
-1.248532
0.0000**
DTE
0.125913
0.9267
3.573227
0.2454
AbAcc
0.493114
0.3024
0.616629
0.1727
CFO
1.170937
0.0813*
1.374157
0.0320**
=0
534
579
=1
115
70

.
26
Silverman
(4).
111
6) Silverman (5)
5.23
(TAcc)
(-1,025237 p=0 -1,3443948
p=0) CFO,
10% (1.219117 p=0.0703),
5%
(1.490399 p=0.0216).
5.24
(AbAcc). ,

CFO (
).
27
: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 659
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-1.025237
0.0000**
-1.343948
0.0000**
DTE
-0.131746
0.9234
1.866750
0.3968
TAcc
0.688544
0.1677
0.769069
0.1212
CFO
1.219117
0.0703*
1.490399
0.0216**
=0
558
599
=1
101
60

.
27
Silverman
(5).
112

: ML-Binary Probit
2005-2008
: 649
Avoid a loss
Variable
Coefficient
P-Value
Coefficient
P-Value
Intercept
-1.023605
0.0000**
-1.349045
0.0000**
DTE
-0.046714
0.9728
2.673681
0.3590
AbAcc
0.527069
0.2887
0.735990
0.1269
CFO
1.251561
0.0808*
1.623330
0.0182**
=0
549
590
=1
100
59

.
,

(
TAcc AbAcc). DTE

. , TAcc
Scott Silverman (3),
=1
Scaled Earnings Changes
1, AbAcc
. ,
CFO ( 5% 10% ),
113
Burgstahler & Dichev,

.

( TAcc AbAcc)
Silverman ( 3).
DTE
Scott Silverman ( 3). TAcc,
,

Scott Silverman ( 3) AbAcc . ,
CFO
5%
.
5.4

.
.
, Burgstahler & Dichev28,

,
probit
.

.
28
114
Phillips et al. (2002).

(Scaled Earnings Changes)
1,

( Scott Silverman 3),
,
firm-years
.

. , (Scaled Earnings)
2,
.

, .

,
. ,
Burgstahler & Dichev, Scott Silverman
( 3) earnings management
.

.
, ,
, (1),
Phillips et al. (2002),
. ,

( ) .
115

,

DTE.
,
,

.

DTE.

Phillips et al. (2002).
,

(

)
.
, (Phillips et al. 2002)
CFO,
, TAcc.
(CFO) (
Burgstahler & Dichev)

116
(earnings manipulation)
.

,
, . ,

earnings management

.

. ,
. ,

.. .
real activities manipulation

accruals .
CFO
=0,
(.. )
, =1,
,
.


(DTE, TAcc, AbAcc, CFO)
. ,

DTE TAcc
117
Scott Silverman ( 3),

CFO 29. AbAcc
.
.

accrual-based
.
,
,
( ..
..)
. ,

. ,
( / )
(..
, deferred tax asset valuation allowance,
)

Phillips et al (2004).
29
12
.
118

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&

5.000 ((120.000-100.000) x 25%).

(Spathis, Georgakopoulou 2007). , ..

4.1 Earnings Management

McGregor S., Earnings Management and Manipulation

4.2 Earnings Management

McKee T.E., 2005, Earnings Management: An Executive Perspective

4.3 Earnings Management

EPS, EPS EPS

(Deferred tax expense DTE)

Burgstahler & Dichev

Scaled arnings change(NIt NIt-1)/ MVEt-2

. Burgstahler & Dichev

$% & %' (

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$* & *' (

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Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) (0-0,005 , 00,01 , 0-0,015)

)Friedman & Diaconis (1981): 2(IQR)n

) Silverman (1986): 0.79(IQR)n

)Silverman (1986): 0.9(min(,IQR/1.34))n

earnings management total accruals abnormal accruals

XAA 2005 2008

Number of Firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.1: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.1: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.2: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Friedman & Diaconis

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.3: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.3: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.4: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

, (4) Silverman (1986)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.5: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scsled Earnings Cha nges

5.5: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.6: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (740)

Scale d Ea rnings Changes

5.6: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (751)

5.7: (Scaled Earnings Changes)

Number of firms (751)

5.7: (Scaled Earnings)

Number of firms (751)

5.8: (Scaled Earnings)

Friedman & Diaconis

Number of firms (751)

5.9: (Scaled Earnings)

$% & %' (

!" #!"

$ & ' (

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