14 October 2010 AFGHANISTAN Justice and Reconciliation Reconciliation Talks with the Taliban and Other Insurgent Groups

s Anne-Catherine Claude - Governance and Justice Knowledge Manager (anne-catherine.claude@cimicweb.org) (www.cimicweb.org)

CLICK HERE The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief explanation and history of reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. More comprehensive information is available at www.cimicweb.org.1 Hyperlinks to original source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.
Both Al Jazeera and The Washington Post recently reported that talks have begun between the Afghan government and the Taliban behind closed doors, with a view to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Almost 10 years after the beginning of the conflict it is more important than ever to bring insurgent groups to the negotiation table to put an end to violence and reach a political settlement. The news of the talks came after the announcement by Hamid Karzai of the launch of the High Peace Council and the nomination of its 70 members on 28 September 2010. The High Peace Council was initially established at the June National Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul (for more information on the High Peace Council, see the 09 September CFC Weekly Afghanistan Review, Justice and Reconciliation section). The final resolution of the Peace Jirga stated that a High Peace Council or Commission should be created to follow-up on the recommendations made by the Jirga and the Peace Process.

Inaugural session of the High Peace Council, 07 October 2010 Associated Press Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe
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This is not the first attempt to convince the Taliban and other insurgent groups to lay down their weapons and join the negotiation process. According to a 2008 report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Hamid Karzai announced plans for a reconciliation policy in a speech before a gathering of the Ulema Council (Religious Scholars Council) in Kabul in April 2003. During this meeting he explained that there was a distinction between the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of Afghanistan and those who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country. Then in May 2005, a Presidential decree established the Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission (PTS). The PTS has the mandate to put an end to inter-group armed hostilities, resolve unsettled national issues, facilitate healing of the wounds caused by past injustices and take all necessary measures to prevent a repeat of the countrys civil war and the destruction it caused. By the end of 2008, the PTS announced that 6,215 militants had joined the peace process, with the majority of them coming from Kandahar, Paktiya, Khost, Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan, Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar. The PTS also claimed to have organised confidential visits for Taliban representatives to Kabul. In December 2005, the Afghan Cabinet formally adopted the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Afghanistan. According to the above-mentioned USIP report, the action plan focused mainly on the past and not on how to end the violence. Robert Crews of Stanford University, quoted in Amin Tarzis article: Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program explained that between 2001 and 2007, no clear legal or political guidelines were offered to differentiate between moderates and extremists when it came to reconciliation or reintegration agendas. In addition, Amin Tarzi, the Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, claims that there has been a lack of coordinated strategy between the Afghan government and the international community. It is only since 2009 that the major players have started to consider the necessity of having a viable, broad-based reintegration and reconciliation plan. Saudi Arabia had previously initiated direct talks between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban in 2008. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) also took an active role in supporting Afghan-led reconciliation and is currently exploring opportunities for engagement with senior Taliban members. According to a report published by the Heritage Foundation, former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Kai Eide, met with a group of Taliban leaders in Dubai shortly before the London International Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010. The international community reiterated its support to the Afghan governments reconciliation initiative at the January 2010 London International Conference on Afghanistan. The international community also committed to establish a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to finance the Afghanled Peace and Reintegration Programme.2 Following President Karzais visit to Washington DC in May 2010, the White House issued a joint statement in which the two presidents recognised the importance of Afghan-led peace and reconciliation efforts. According to the statement, President Obama supports reconciliation with those who cut ties with al-Qaeda, cease violence against the Afghan state, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including its protection of human rights and womens equality. Furthermore, the July 2010 Kabul Conference Communiqu noted that participants (at the Conference) endorsed in principle the Afghan Governments Peace and
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The Trust Fund was to be administered jointly by the Afghan government and foreign backers. So far, Japan has contributed USD 50 million, Estonia has contributed USD 64.000 and Germany and Britain have pledged USD 64 million and USD 7.5 million, respectively.

Reintegration Programme, which is open to all Afghan members of the armed opposition and their communities who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organisations, respect the Constitution and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan. Aside from initiatives at the national level, attempts at outreach and reconciliation on a more local level have been initiated with modest success. Among others, the Afghan Independent Department of Local Governance (IDLG) began to reach out to community leaders, commanders and mullahs (religious leaders). In addition, the Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization (ACSFo) and a number of national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including Oxfam, The Liaison Office and Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) are also engaged in reconciliation efforts. As underlined by Lisa Curtis in The Heritage Foundation article, local reconciliation is a way to counter the insurgents ability to capitalize on grievances held by the civilian population and the lack of governance in some districts. She also argues that government outreach can also help in preventing Taliban influence from taking root. If the reconciliation process is to be successful, it is essential that it encompasses the national, community and individual levels. British Army Major General Philip Jones, director of the reintegration cell at NATO Headquarters in Kabul, is quoted by Associated Press as saying that peace and reconciliation councils have already been set up in at least two of Afghanistans 34 provinces. Since the announcement of the launch of the High Peace Council, many reports have highlighted that there is renewed momentum for re-launching talks. General David Petraeus, the Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, declared in late September 2010 that some Taliban leaders have started talks at the highest levels of the Afghan government, which was later confirmed by presidential spokesman Waheed Omar (for more information, see 29 September CFC Weekly Afghanistan Review, Justice and Reconciliation section). Furthermore, according to General Petraeus, around 20% of low to medium-level insurgents have expressed interest in joining the peace process and reintegrating into Afghan society.

The Guardian also reports that the Afghan government had some contact, during the summer of

2010, with the Haqqani Network, which allegedly has close links to Al Qaeda. At the same time the US government reportedly had indirect contact through a Western intermediary. However, no further details were given on the talks as a way to preserve the communication channel3.

Dean Pruitt, in the article, Back-channel Communication in the Settlement of Conflict (International Negotiation Journal of Theory and Practice Vol. 13 No. 1 2008) explained that secret back-channel communication is often employed in severe conflicts to explore the feasibility of front-channel negotiation. It can also be used as an adjunct to negotiation when talks become deadlocked or as a substitute for front-channel negotiation. General David Petraeus discusses the use of such back -channel strategies in his book, The US Army/Marine Corps Manual on Counterinsurgency Warfare (2007), acknowledging a critical reality of warfare in todays conflicts: it is frequently difficult to know who the enemy is, and to distinguish between civilians and combatants. The importance of keeping talks secret was extensively discussed, following the talks between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1993. According to Daniel Lieberfeld, in the article Secrecy and two-level games in the Oslo Accord: what the primary sources tell us, official talks confer de facto recognition on the adversary whereas recognition of the other conflicting party is not a precondition for closed door negotiations. Moreover, secrecy also provides a tranquil environment for talks outside the media glare.

The latest information available4 is that some talks are, indeed, happening behind closed doors involving Afghan, Pakistani and former Taliban leaders under the mediation of the United Arab Emirates; however at this stage they do not seem to involve insurgents. Various reports underscore that even if the Taliban have said publicly they wont negotiate until a timeline for the withdrawal of foreign troops is agreed, many Taliban leaders have reached out either directly or indirectly to the highest levels of the Afghan government. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Afghan government seems to be ready to make concessions to kick-start talks. Nematullag Shahrani, Karzais Islamic affairs adviser, declared that peace means that all the conditions of one side cannot be accepted, and both sides must compromise. The government is expecting the same approach from the Taliban, according to the article. In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations back in July 2010, Matt Waldman, an Independent Afghan Analyst, explained that the conditions set by the Afghan government and the international community as preconditions for reconciliation are not sustainable and would not lead to peace. According to Waldman, the Afghan government is asking for surrender, and surrender is not reconciliation and if we insist on those preconditions, I can guarantee you there will be no meaningful reconciliation process. In another article published by the Inter Press Service, Gareth Porter pointed out that the US government is still pushing demands on the Taliban that it knows are not realistic. Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell declared that it is yet premature to see a complete shift towards reconciliation coming from the Taliban and it is necessary to continue applying military pressure on insurgents. He argues, We need to take the fight more aggressively and for a greater duration to the Taliban and other extremists in Afghanistan for them to feel the kind of pressures necessary for there ... to spark a movement of reintegration and reconciliation. NATOs Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Mark Sedwill, underlined that talks are still at an embryonic stage but the channels of communication are open. However, he also expressed caution that it is highly unlikely that the Taliban would enter into a major political negotiation. Additionally, various NGOs have expressed concern regarding reconciliation talks. For instance, back in July 2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW), in its report The Ten-Dollar Talib and Womens Rights, warned that as the prospect of negotiations draws closer, many women fear that they may pay a heavy price for peace. The Taliban and other insurgent groups were well known for their antiwomens rights position and many still continue to threaten gains made in this area. The author of the report, Rachel Reid, HRWs Afghanistan researcher, interviewed many women whose lives had been impacted by the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami and who continue to be threatened. These women fear that the reconciliation process will further impact their lives in a negative way. Many women who speak up for their rights, including female Members of Parliament (MPs), regularly come under threat. Women candidates in the 18 September parliamentary elections particularly experienced violence and threats (see 01 September CFC Weekly Afghanistan Review, Governance and Participation section). Moreover, Karzais government has a track record of sacrificing womens rights to satisfy hard line religious factions for political gains. For instance, President Karzai signed in March 2009 the Shia Personal Status Law (which regulates marriage, divorce and inheritance for the countrys Shia population and requires women to ask permission to leave the house, among other things), which is in contradiction to some provisions of the Afghan Constitution (for more
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At the time this report was written

information on Women, Afghan law and Sharia, see CFC Social Well-Being Report 3/10). Little reassurances have been given to women who are concerned about the risks of reintegration and reconciliation. Rachel Reid further explains that in April 2010 the Minister of Economy, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, told female leaders discussing reconciliation that women would have to sacrifice their interests for the sake of peace. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has frequently pledged to Afghan women that their rights would not be sacrificed in any settlement or political agreement. She also promised Afghan women leaders, when they visited Washington DC in May 2010: We will not abandon you. Nevertheless, the women of Afghanistan fear that the US State Department will not be able to prevail against pressures to reach a peace agreement swiftly. It is critical, according to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), for women to participate in processes that will allow for justice and reconciliation to include both men and women, and allow for victims to record attacks and crimes committed (see CFC Social Well-Being Report 2/10: Women and the Reconciliation Process). In its report, Human Rights Watch also expressed concerns that, despite the mechanisms in place to ensure women representation and participation, there were no guarantee that, in reality, women would be included in the decision-making process. For instance, women do not have much representation in the government departments and ministries where the most significant decisions are being made. In addition, the fact that only eight women are members of the High Peace Council (out of 70) reveals that the Afghan government does not feel concerned about protecting womens rights or giving women a voice in the reconciliation process. According to the Associated Press, not all Afghans support the governments initiative to open talks with the Taliban. Some leaders of ethnic minorities remain concerned that negotiating with the Taliban will open a path for the hard line fundamentalist group to regain power. Civil society activists are also worried about the lack of representation of Afghan civil society in the newly-established High Peace Council. In the past couple of weeks, things seem to have been moving towards more contact between the Afghan government and insurgent groups. However, it is premature to assess the success of these talks. Despite these gains, it is necessary for the Afghan government to ensure a broad representation of the Afghan civil society and women to safeguard the rights of the Afghan population.

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