Consultation Aff

7 Week Juniors

INDEX

Index ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 1 3 A2: CONSULT CP . GENERIC 2AC ........................................................................................................................................ A2: CONSULT CP - GENERIC 2AC .................................... .. ................................................................................................ 4 Hegemony Good - 2AC............................................................................................................................................................... 5 Hegen~ony Good - Exlcnsions ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 Unilat Solves Bandwagoning ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 Consuliaiion Unpopular ............................................................................................................................................................... 8 Consultation Unpopular ............................................................................................................................................................... 9 . . Lie Perm Solvency ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10 False Consultation Now ............................................................................................................................................................. 11 12 No Leaks .................................................................................................................................................................................... Leaks Help Relations ................................................................................................................................................................. 13 AT: Lying Immoral ................................................................................................................................................................... -14 Consultation Doesn't Solve-Generic ....................................................................................................................................... 15 16 NATO 2AC ............................................................................................................................................................................... NATO 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................ 17 NATO 2AC ............................................................................................................................................................................... 18 Ext: Consulting NATO Unsustainable ...................................................................................................................................... 19 Ext: NATO Bad-Leadership ................................................................................................................................................... 20 Ext: NATO Resilient.................................................................................................................................................................. 21 22 NATO Obsolete ......................................................................................................................................................................... Europc Relations Bad-Europe Counterbalancing .................................................................................................................... 23 AT: NATO Good-Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................... 24

Russia 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................ 29 30 Russia 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................ 31 Russia 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................ Russia 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................ 32 33 Ext: Russian Imperialism ........................................................................................................................................................... Ext: Commie Creep ................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Ext: Commie Crecp ................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Ext: Commie Creep-North Korea Module .............................................................................................................................. 36 Russian Relations Rcsilicnt........................................................................................................................................................ 37 Russian Relations Resilient ........................................................................................................................................................ 38 Russian Relalions Resilient ........................................................................................................................................................ 39 AIternatc Causality-Nuke Tech Kills Relations .................................................................................................................... 40 NRC Fails ..................................................................................................................................................................................41 42 NRC Kills NATO ...................................................................................................................................................................... 43 Japan 2AC .................................................................................................................................................................................. Japan 2AC .................................................................................................................................................................................. 44 Japan 2AC .................................................................................................................................................................................. 45 Ext: Japan Alliance Resilient ........................................................................................................................ . .................. 46 . No Impact to Japan Alliance ...................................................................................................................................................... 47 Ext: Regional Tension ................................................................................................................................................................ 48 . Ext: Regional Tension ................................................................................................................................................................ 49 Ext: Regional Tension ................................................................................................................................................................ 50 . Ext: Regional Tcnsion ................................................................................................................................................................ 51 Ext: Regional Tension-Scares China ....................................................................................................................................... 52 Ext: Regional Tension-Scares China ...................................................................................................................................... -53 Ext: Regional Tension-JapanIChina Brink .............................................................................................................................. 54 Ext: Regional Tension-Counterbalancing ............................................................................................................................. 55 Ext: Japan Rearm ..................................................................................................................................................................... 56 Ext: Japan Rearm ....................................................................................................................................................................... 57 Japan Alliance Bad-US Intervention ..................................................................................................................................... 58

Consultation Aff

7 Week Juniors 59 Japan Alliance B a d x h i n a War ............................................................................................................................................... Japan Alliance Bad - North Korean Conflict ............................................................................................................................ 60 Japan Alliance Bad - North Korean Conflict ............................................................................................................................ 61 Japan Alliance Unsustainable .................................................................................................................................................... 62 Japan Rcarm Defense ................................................................................................................................................................. 63 Japan Rcarm God-Regional Security .................................................................................................................................... 64 Japan Won't Rearm .................................................................................................................................................................... 65 Japan Won't Rearm .................................................................................................................................................................... 66 Brazil 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................. 67 Brazil 2AC ................................................................................................................................................................................. 68 Ext: Frcc Trade Turn .................................................................................................................................................................. 69 Free Trade Bad-Amazon Module ............................................................................................................................................ 70 Ext: Brazil Relations Resilient ................................................................................................................................................... 7 1 AT: Latin American Democracy ................................................................................................................................................ 72 China 2AC ............................................................................................................................................................................... 73 . ...................................................................................................................................................... 74 China 2AC ...................... . Ext: China Relations High ......................................................................................................................................................... 75 Ext: Relations High Now ........................................................................................................................................................... 76 77 Ext: Alternate Causality--C hina Relations Low ....................................................................................................................... 78 Ext: Alternate Causality--C hina Relations Low ....................................................................................................................... AT: China Aggression ............................................................................................................................................................... 79

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

A2: CONSULT CP - GENERIC 2AC

Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. Infinite Ground Skew -180+ nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads.

d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative over the affirmative plan. have literature advocating that the U.S. consult over the plan mandates and do the plan. Permutation - do both engage in binding consultation with The permutation does not sever or delay any part of the original plan - it guarantees says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different The negative is in a double bind - If than the counterplan. If overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the negative's net benefit. Time delay risks a massive solvency deficit - consultation is a time consuming process - the U.S. will have to wait till the next time the meets and generate a consensus for the plan by lobbying other members. This delay will trigger impacts outlined in the 1AC. Consultations and Incentives can't solve because major powers don't agree on rules, and it leads to ineffective policy Haass 99 (Richard N. Haass, Chair in International Security at the B~ooking Institutions. What to do with American Primacy? http://americanfuture.netf'?page_id=139)
Still, consultations alone-cven consultations buttressed by incentives-will nor bring about consensus in every area. Persuasion has its limits. Thc major powers may not agree on general rules; even when they do, they may not agrec on how to apply them in a particular situation. In such circumstances, it makes little sense for the United States to work in vain for thc emergence of international conscnsus, guaranteeing only inaction or a lowest common denominator and hence ineffective foreign policy

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

A2: CONSULT CP - GENERIC 2AC

I
-

DON'T READ THE NEXT ARGUMENT IF YOU ARE GOING TO IMPACT TURN THE NET BENEFIT!
Turn - Rising Expectations - one-time consultation sets a precedental hope for future consultation - but the one-time nature of the consultation in the counterplan - especially on an issue of minor importance holds the potential to undermine relations when the Bush administration returns to its unilateral policy-making of ignoring the the next time an important issues does arise.
Here is empirical support for our turn The National Journal - 9-14-2002 (Clive Crook, "One Thing That Did Not Change: How the World Sees America," voi. 34, no. 37) Sometimes, admittedly, it is tempting to accommodate critics evcn when their thinking is wrong. In international relations, smoothing things over often seems best. But failing to say what you mean is usually a bad tactic. In the end, you get found out. President Clinton's support for the Kyoto accord on global warming was a much-praised instance of international cooperation. He took foreigners' concerns seriously. He backed the agreement, knowing it was unworkable and would never be implemented, to appease critics at home and abroad and lo affirm his multilateralist outlook, Did the pretense serve America's longer-term interesls? Just the opposite. In due course, when America stepped back from its commitments under the r>lan-asit was bound to do-it was reviled all the more furiously For reneging on its promises

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
Turn - Hegemony

HEGEMONY GOOD - 2AC

A. Giving allies veto power kills effective American foreign policy

Krauthammer 04 (Charles, Washington Post columnist. "A President of Consequence," Hoovcr Digest, no. 3, http://www.hooverdigest.org/O43/krautharnmer.html)

<But the larger issue is that thc Democrats s i m ~ l v havc nothing ~osilive offer in the war on terror or the situation in Iraq. to Yes, they offer a critique of Iraq. But when you ask them what they would do otherwisc, they have nothing to say. They say "internationalize" as if that is i l panacea. Of course we would like the French and the Germans to be in Iraq-we could use their helu-but there is no formula. There are governments who opposed our policy on principle and would not suuvort us then and will not support us now. The idea that sonlehow we havc rcjected the United Nations is absurd. The wonderful Portuguese U.N. civil servant Scrgio Vieira de Mello was running an extremely successful program in Baghdad, but, when its compound was atracked by a bomb in August 2003, the United Nations ran away. Now you can defend or attack the U.N. decision, but it had nothing to do with American unilateralism. We wanled U.N. support, but it would not stay in an insecure situation. We arc now getting somc U.N. support again. and I think il is going to help us. But "internationalizinf the war on terror means nothing, or it means acquiescing to the United Nations and allowinn our policy to bc drivcn by the veto of the French or the Russians or the Chinese or others. That is not a policy. And it will never sell with Americans, who do not like the idea of American foreisn policy. tlarticularly the defense of our country in the war on terror. being handed over to the cynics at the Quai d'Orsav.>

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

HEGEMONY GOOD - EXTENSIONS

Unilateralism is key to hegemony-display of power helps create that power Krauthammer 04 (Charles, Washington Post columnist, "A President of Consequence," Hoover Digest. no. 3, http://www. hoovcrdigcst.org/043/krauthammer.html)
<Bur of course the largest issue is not domestic but the Bush Doctrine. And that is where he has truly shaken the Democrats and redirected America. Consider the contrast between the foreign policy of this administration since 911 1 and what we saw in the 1990s under Clinton. The Bush Doctrine is a radical doctrine. It believes in preemption. and it is prepared to be unilateralist. To be sure, the drumbeat of criticism about unilateralism is ovcrdonc because in fact every unilateralist wants coalitions and allies. But the issuc of unilateralism versus multilateralism hinges on what you do when vou need to act alone, when you d o not have as many allies as you want. Are you inhibited by the absence of France and Germany or not? And on that
olcourse, are issue the president spoke loud and clcar: He is not. This defines a very strong and correct orientation in foreign affairs: one that rhe Ikrnc~rats, shocked by. because their entire foreign policy consists of a kind ol~wooly internationalism where everything is punted over to the United Nations. Especially important has been the redirection of policy in the war on terror away from what it had been for 20 years: law enforcement-catching the bad guys, putting them on trial, sticking them in jail. and then becoming complacent. That ended on 911 1. If we look at what happened in thc first hundred days following 911 1,1 think it is one of the most remarkable dcrnonstrations of leadership by a president in Anierican history. George Bush developed a policy. he annunciated it in a magnificent speech 10 days dter 911 1. and then he went into a war in Afghanistan that everybody thought was going to be impossible. And we won that war in the most astonishing way. Paul Kennedy, the Yale professor who in the 1980s wrote about the decline in

American power, wrote an articlc in February 2002. shortly after the war in Afghanistan, in which he essentially recanted. He wrote a b o u ~ unbelievable display of power by the United States. which shook not only Afghanistan and the Arab world the but also capitals in China and Russia and Europe. American Dower, used audacious1y, had left cverv other power in the world But so far behind that we were entering a new era of dominance-what some call unipolarity, or American heaen~onv. such donlinance needs not only the power but also the will to use it. And the president displayed that. Now that success in foreign policy has of course been jeopardized in public perceptions by the war in Iraq. And, to a large extent, this presidency will hang on the success or lack thereof in Iraq. But Iraq again has demonstrated a president with oreat political courage and vision. Had President Bush not invaded Iracl. no one would have complained, certainly not Democrats. The world did not want him to do it. A lot of Americans did not want him to do it. No doubt many of his advisers knew that Iraq could have a huge political downside. And yet he did it because he believed it was necessary. He believed that 911 1 taught us one thing: that we had enemies in an Arab world that had become a cauldron of hatred and that, unless we changed it rapidly, we would suffer more 911 1 s in the future.>

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

UNILAT SOLVES BANDWAGONING

Unilateralism produces better coalitions through bandwagoning and more effective policy Krauthammer 01 (Charles.Washington Post columnist. Ikc. 17.
W,\SHLti(i.li)N--l.nsl month's I'alin-llosh sum~nit Crawklrtl U.:LS tlcc~ned1111 :trm control tkilul-i. kc:~nscIk nlmnrcrl dcnl--Russi;~ at agrces to Iel us perli.~llytcrl. hul nnt dtplvy. dclc~lscs that \inlnIc the 197? Anli-lh!lli~lic Missile T~c;~ly--nevrrcamc In hct. it was :I tnumph. Likr. Kcugiln a1 thc L:,l~nouh on: lVXh Kcylijnvili sumlnit. ;I! which Ix. wuuld riot g ~ \ c thc' Slr;llC!ic t)cfcow I~liti:~livc (;orh~lchci. up to

h~tp://7~.14.203.104/sear~h~?q=ca~he:Knd3RQlQQ1YJ:http~://~~~~tn~nha1I.~onI/0pini~1n/~~11~1nn~I~harIe~krauthii111mcrI2.U/ll7/161907.html)

Bush was not about to allow Putin to lock the United States into any deal that would prevent us from buildinn ABM defenses. Bush proved that on Thursday whcn he dropped the bombshell and unilaterally withdrcw the United States from the treaty. and lhus from a11 its ahsurd restrictions on ABM lechnology. This is d e p ~ significant. not jua hccausc it m;~rk.::I r t u m to strategic ~onity.fi,tm:~~~y y restlgnizing that Ihe tollistic ~nissilc will be 10the ? l a ccntury urhat the lirnk and the homher were to the 20th. hut because it unashamedly reasserts the major theme Of the Bush foreign pol icy: unilateralism. After Sept. 1 I. the critics lthr usual troika: liheml media. furcign policy establishmeel. I k m o c m t r cx-oflicilisl were clucking ahoi~thow the Dush adminislmlion has kalcn
h:~styretreat Irom rccklrss unilateralism. Prcsidcnt Btish "is slrongly sl~ppnned thc Americ:~npeople." explained lonnn. Scnatc Icddcr George Miichell. "in part because he has simply discxd~ul hy nlmnosl evcryhing he said OII forcign pc~licyprior to Sept. I I." Rush hsd w;lnled to go it done in thc world. $14 critics. llot he dare not. "It's hard to ,we the presidcnl restoring lhe unilalcralist tinge that colorcd so thc
:I

Inany or his carly foreign policy choices." wrote columnist E.J. Dionnc juw two month ago. "Winning the battle against temir required an m~d unihtel-dism: We need friends. thev said. IU We need allies. We need coalition Dartners. We cannot alienate them again and again. We cannot have a president who kills trealv, trashes the Kvolo Protocol on greenhouse gases, summarily rejects the "enforcement vrovisions" of the biowea~ons the ABM Treaty--and expect to build the coalition we need to tight the war on terrorism. We cannot? We did. Three months is all it took to make nonScnSC of these multilateralist protests. conIition'?'~.hewh(11eidea that ~ h ~\l'ph:~nwar is being ti?o%htby .'coalilkrn" ia cnmicnl. What cxa~rly c Egmr cnnlr~huted? France wnl Inlops into Mnta~:e Sharif aticr the fighting had stoppcd. nntml that renuwwd military analysl1;~yk n o . I"Their mi~~ion'!' asked Leno. "To teach tl'l'nlihan how lo surrc~~dcr.'') e r r is ;I coalilkm office so~newherc Islamabad. Can aclynne even name thc coalilion spokesman who l n a k s a ~ ~ n o u ~ ~ c c ~aboutl s war'? 'lhe "co:llirion" consisls of litllc marc than U.S. n in i i c n the
ha5

We made it plain that even i f no one followed us. we would no it alone. Surprise: Others followed. A unilateralist does not obiect to people ioining our fizht. He only objects whcn the multilateralists, like Clinton in Kosovo, give 18 countries vclo power over bombing targets. ~!zbekistan.~qjkist:ui. The Afghan war is not a war run bv committee. We made tough bilateral deals with useful nci~hb~rs:~:~~;istnn. Ku3sia. Vie Brits and thc Australin~~s added a sprinklin al'guys on the gn>sirl risking theh lives. and we will alw:~ysbc gratcfiil for tkirsoIid:rrity. 1 1 1 S Y O n e knows whose War it is. 31 The result'?The TaIiban are destroyed. A Oaeda is on the run. Pakistan has made a historic pro-American strategic pivot. as 1 have the former Sovict republics. even Russia itself. The Europeans are cooperating on prosecutions. Even the Arab states have muted their anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric. with t11c Egyptia~ifl,rcien minister tnc*e~ing .lerusalem for the r i time in three yoara. Not because to ~ they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated astonishing military power and the will to defend vital American inlcrcsls, unilaterally if necessary. Where is the great Bush retreat from unilateralism? The ABM Treaty is dead. Kyoto is dead. Thc new provisions of the totally useless biological weapons treaty are even deader: ~ I I R Isix days helol-e pulling out oTthe AHM Treaty. thc adminislraticln broke up six ).con oialwurd worcj-monpcriop over a h h trcaty so worthkss that Iraq is a d g ~ ~ d o ill g o d sti~nding.And the ry world has not risen up against US--ni, rh:te did the -.4mb street'. (over the A%Iuji wal-).as 8ncxhcr offnreign ~ I I ~ experts were wanitig jt~stweeks ago. The essence 1ncr.t. I C ~ of unilateralism is that we do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning. to deter us from pursuing the fundamental security interests of the United Stales and the free world. It is the drivine motif ol'the Bush foreign policy. And that is the reason it has been so successl'ul.
uircrali. Z1.S. spccial forces. and Afghan lriends-oFthe-mc~me~it the ground, Like the Gulf War. thc Afghan war is unilntewlism dressed op as multilateralism. on
SCt

Bandwagoning solves coalitions best-veto power is net worse for cooperation Krauthammer 02 (Charles, "Fictional Rift," Sept. 17, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer091702.asp)
Th:u Icavcs Culin Powell. suppc~srdly e p i c e n c ~ ~ o l i ~ t t c oplx,sition lo lltc hirrcl line on Inq. Wcll. this is Powell last Ss~rday oaiinoal lclevision: "It'..: been thc pnlicy of this gnvsrnmelil to insist lhal the mal on

.. And we believc thc bcst way to do lhnl is with n regime change.'' Moret~vel-.he adderl. we n l r prcparcd "to act un~btcrallyto defend nutrselvcs." Whcn Powell, the nlOSt committed multilateralist in the administration. deliberately invokes the incendiary U-word to describe the American position. W have ourselves a cOnSenSUS.fit a n <0111that the disagreement among Republicans war kss aboln going to Iraq than nhout goins to the Ilnitcd Nations. h was a vastly e nverhlnwndis;l~r~~menl.becilusc even the most commiltcd unilateralist would rather not go it alone if' possible. Of course you want allies. You iusl don't want to be held hostage to their veto. And as the first President Bush demonstrated when he declarcd that the United Stales would liberate Kuwait unilaterally i necessary. the best way to get allies is to let others know you arc prepared C to go it alone and let them ponder the cost of miss in^ the train.>
Iraq k disarmed..

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

CONSULTATION UNPOPULAR
Prior consultation will spur a backlash in Congress The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) - 2-1 1-2003 (Bruce Wallace, "First Casualty in Crisis: NATO Solidarity on Iraq.. ." p.Al)
NATO Secretary-General George Robertson agreed that Turkey would eventually get the protection it needs - though during yesterday's preferably under NATO auspices. Robertson acknowledged that therc had been "21 very heated ar_eumcntn talks, though he optimistically added "the question is when, not if, to begin thc planning." What worries many diplomats is that NATO. one of the West's most successful multilateral organizations. has taken a battering at a time when so many countries are trying to keep Washington from walking away from international institutions. Nicholas Burns. U.S. ambassador to NATO, described ycsterday's developments as a "crisis of credibility" for the alliance. Many observers said they were alarmed that thc French, Belgian and German veto was issued over what is largely a technical matter: commencing the contingency planning to protect an ally which had asked for help. "Tt should have bccn a very routine decision," sajd Canada's NATO ambassador, David Wright. "But it became politicaI," Wright added, noling that the three dissenting countries raised no objections to the substance of the military demands. just their timing. "This was the wrong issue, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." argued Jeffrey Gedrnin, head of the Berlin-based Aspen Instilutc, which aims at fostering good German-U.S. relations. "NATO was alreadv unpopular on Capitol Hill. Now the next timc a crisis comes up and someone says. 'We've go1 to go to NATO first,' lots of others are just going to sav 'Forget it. All that happens is we waste time.'" Wright agreed that such a scenario is a major concern for countries, like Canada, that are anxious to avoid sccing Washington horn turning its back on multilateral forums and acting alone. Wright said he still expected NATO to reach agreement this week. "Continuing deadlock does damage to the credibility of the alliance."

Consultation drains political capital and causes a GOP backlash Patrick '01 (Stewart, research associate at the Center on International Cooperation in NY, "Don't Fence Me In: The Pcrils of .html) Going It Alone", 9/22, World Policy Journal, http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/926718-1
The administration. for its part, disavows the label, advancing the more comforting "leadership" and underlining its commitment to "consultations" with forei,on partners. As President Bush told the press at the NATO summit, "Unilatcralists don't come around the table to listen to others .... Unilateralisls don't ask opinions of world leaders." Yet skeuticism about multilateral cooperation runs deep within this administration. A common Republican attack during the 2000 presidcnrial campaign was that the Clinton administration (and by extension Al Gore) had made a fetish of multilateralism. Condoleezza Rice, now national security adviscr, chided Democrats for subordinating U.S. national interests to "the interests of' an illusory international communitv" and for clinging to "the belief that the support of many slates--or even better, of institutions like the United Nations--is essential to the legitimate exercise of power." Republicans. in contrast, understood that "multilaleral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves." During its first year in office, the new Bush administration has moved to implement this foreign policy philosophv. walking away from a number of international treaties and commitments.

Plan doesn't link - conservatives like a unilateral approach to policy Patrick '01 (Stewart, research associate at the Center on International Cooperation in NY, "Don't Fence Me In: The Perils of Going It Alone", 9/22, World Policy Journal, http://www.allbusiness.con~/periodicals/article/9267l .html) 18-

The epithet "unilateralism" has been much in voxue during the first year of the Bush administration. During the president's June trip to Europe, transatlantic commentators discerned an American penchant for "going it alone" on issues from global warming to missile defense. Liberal internationalists have bcmoaned this alleged tendency and warned of an inevitable backlash. Conservatives have welcomed it as a dcclaration of diplomatic independence

Consultation Aff
7 Weck Juniors

CONSULTATION UNPOPULAR
GOP would backlash if the US gave veto power to another country Patrick in '01 (Stewart, research associate at the Center on International Cooperation in NY. "Don't Fence Me In: The Perils of Going It Alone". 9/22. World Policy Journal, http://www.allhusiness.comlperiodicals/artic1e/926718-l .html)

Unlike in Europe, where political leaders and publics have come to terms with some erosion and pooli in^" of national sovereignty, Americans tend to regard sovereienty as a precious substance to be icalouslv guarded. This makes thcm suspicious of attempts LO bind the United States lo li~rmal organizations and legal rules that may lack domestic standards of transparency and accountability, usurp the authority ol' ils elected representatives. or open the country to external scrutiny. Voices from across the volitical spectrum have called for vi~orous defense of the country's national sovereignty and domestic values against the encroachmenls of distant and unaccountable multilateral institutions. In autumn 1999, a largely left-wing coalition of activists took to thc streets of Seattle to protest the alleged complicity of the WTO, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. in driving down global labor and environmental standards. Some activists sought the abolition of multilateral organizations, others sweeping rcform lo incorporate social concerns in global economic regimes. Meanwhile, many conservatives and libertarians, alarmed at thc growing legalization of multilateral rules, insist that the United States not cede its taw-making authoritv to an unelected global bureaucracy

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

LIE PERM SOLVENCY

Non-binding consultation makes for the best foreign policy Krauthammer 2k1
(Charles Krauthamn~ner. won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished cornment~ary 1987. Washingon Post. June 18 2001) in

Ask yourself: If you really wanted to reassert American unilateralism, to gct rid of the cobwebs of the bipolar era and the myriad Clinton-era treaty strings tying Gulliver down. what would you do'! No need for in-your-face arropance. No necd to humiliate. No need to proclaim that you will ignore nattering allies and nervous ex-enemies. Journalists can talk like that bccause the truth is clarifying. Governments cannot talk like that because the truth is scary. The trick to unilateralism do in^ what you think is right, regardless of what others think -- is to pretend vou are not acting unilaterallv at all. Thus if you realty want to junk the ABM Treatv, and the Europeans and Russians and Chinese start screaming bloody murder, the trick is to send Colin Powell to smooth and soothe and schmooze everv f o r e i g n h t . have Condoleezza Rice talk about how much we value allied input, have President Bush in Europe stress how missile defense will help the security of everybody. And then go ahead and iunk the ABM Treatv regardless. Make nice. then carry on. Or, say, you want to kill the Kyoto protocol (which the Senarc rejected 95-0 and which not a single EU country has ratified) and the Europeans hypocritically complain. The trick is to have the president go to Europe to stress, both sincerely and correctly, that the United States wants to bc in the forefront of using science and technology to attack the problem -- but make absolutely clear that you'll accept no mandatory cuts and tolerate no treaty that penalizes the Unitcd States and lets China. India and the Third World off the hook. Be nice, but be undeterred. The best unilateralism is velvet-glove unilateralism. At the end of the dav, for all the rhetorical bows to Russian, European and liberal sensibilities, look at how Bush returns from Europe: Kvoto is dead. The ABM Treatv is historv. Missile defense is on. NATO expansion is relaunched. And just to italicize the new turn in American foreign policy, the number of those annual, vaporous US.-ELI summits has been cut from two to one.

--

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

FALSE CONSULTATION NOW

All disads are non unique- the Bush administration already engages in false consultation and none of their impacts have happens Krauthammer 2kl
(Charles Krauthamner. won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished comnientary in 1987. Washington Posl. June 18 2001)

Or, say, you want lo kill the Kyoto protocol (which the Senate rejected 45-0and which not a single EU country has ratified) and the Europeans hypocritically complain. The trick is to have the president go to Europe to strcss, both sincerely and correctly, that the United States wants lo bc in the forefront of using science and technology to attack thc problem -- but make absolutely clear thal you'll acccpt no mandatory cuts and tolerate no treaty that penalizes thc United States and lets China, India and the Third World off thc hook. Be nice, but be undeterred. The best unilalcralism is velvet-dove unilateralism. At the end of the day, for all the rhetorical bows to ~ u s s i a nEuropean and liberal sensibilities, look at how , Bush returns from Europe: Kyoto is dead. The ABM Treatv is historv. Missile defense is on. NATO expansion is relaunched. And just to italicize the new turn in American foreign policy, the number of those annual, vaporous U.S.-EU summits has been cut from two to one.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
Post 9/11, leaks are impossible INN 2kl
(Insigh1 on the News: November 2k5)

NO LEAKS

As the war on terrorism intensifies, the Bush team takes the offensive on the home front. shoring up homeland defense and reining in loose-lipped lawmakers and an overeager media TEXT: As many Americans lazily slipped into their recliners for the final regular game of thc baseball season, or spent a crisp autumn afternoon watching football, U.S. fighters and bombers continued a campaign of aerial assaults on the military infrastructure of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But, for too many, the long Columbus Day weekend was spent attending yet another memorial service for the victims of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon. One month after four planes shook the foundations of the nation a sense of normalcy was creeping back into American society. O.J. Simpson was hack in a courtroom, Bill Clinton was continuing to contort the record of his eight-year stewardship of the nation's foreign policy and actor Alec Baldwin still was refusing to honor his pledge to leave the country if Georae W. Bush were to become president of the United States. Nonetheless, one month ago a front-page story in the Washington Post would not have resulted in an executive order strictlv limiting distribution of classified war intelligence to only eight members of Congress -- the House and Senate leadership and the two senior members of the respective intelligence committees. But that is just what occurred after Bush learned classified information relaved during meetings with con~ressional leaders had been leaked to the Post, requiring the dispatch of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice lo convince the paper's editors not to run with the data. After meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Bush admonished congressional leaders for passing along sensitive material "when American forces are at risk overseas." The president said he expected "there may be some heartburn" among the lawmakers, Indeed there was. And there was some acid reflux among members of the prcss as well.
L .

The Bush Administration dispenses data with the precision of an eye dropper, they're leak proof Shafer 2k3
(Jack Shafer. editor for Slate magazine, Streaming Media. htt~:llwww.slate.codidMO89198/, October 2,1003)

The George W. Bush administration auicklv established a reputation as a leak-proof boat after taking the helm from the undisciplined Clinton blabbermouths. Instead of spraying from a fire hose, the Bush ministry of information dispenses data to the press with the parsimony and recision of an eyedropper, and throttling the voices inside the administration who trv to speak off-topic.

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LEAKS HELP RELATIONS

T/ Leaked info doesn't jack relations, it boosts it Toohey 99
(Hrian Toohey. Walkley Award winning journalist, Sun Herald (Sydner) May 3-3)

Leaked intelligence information in the past has sometimes acted as stabilsing influence, reducing unfounded fears about a ~otential enemv. In a similar vein, as part of their arms control negotiations, the US and the former Soviet Union agreed not to encrypt data transmitted during missile test. By ensuring easv access to the content of the signal, each side had less cause to wrongly susaect the other. Leaks are strategic, and help US position Chellaney 97
(Brahrna Chellaney, professor of security studics at the Center for Policy Research in New Dehlhi, International Herald Tribune. June 13)

Intelligence leaks to newspapers, and release of classified information in official testimonv to congressional panels, can be a useful tool of US. nonproliferation dir>lomacv. Such methods have been particularly cfictive against India. They usually put the Indian government on the defensive, and often help dissuade it from going ahead with moves that would openly challenge American efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Thc lalesl such intelligence leak. published recently in The Washington Post, put mc international spotlight on India's tactical Prithvi missile. which sccks to counter short-range missiles supplied by China to Pakislan. The Post, citing U.S. officials, reported that India had movcd "a handful" of medium-range Prithvis to a prospcctive launching site in the state of Punjab near the border with Pakistan. Thc disclosure was embarrassing for India, which docs not admit to deploying a single missile system, despite flight-testing several different kinds in the past dccade. India tested a nuclear explosive device 23 years ago, but il has not conducted any further tcsls. U.S. pressure has been an important deterrent. Twicc in the last 18 months India came close to carrying out another nuclear test, only to retreat at the eleventh hour. The second such move had to be aborted because of the expected fell of the then Indian government, but the first was halted in late 1995 because of an American newspaper expose relying on US. intelligence sources.

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AT: LYING IMMORAL

Lying is not immoral, it's necessary is society Mead 36
(George Herhcrl. Philosopher and Social Psychologist. The philosopher of the Revolution, http://spnnrtn.ac.brocku.ca/-lw;~rd/Mcild/pubs2/~1~ove~1~nt/Mead~ 1936-02.html)

Kant did not succeed in Ihat. He did not succeed even with reference to lying. There are manv situations in which lying is not immoral. Sornctimes it is highly moral, as in the typical case of the man who deceives an assassin trying to murder someone. We talk about morality in warfare. and, of course, warfare is a game in which you have to deceive your enemy. The general. the military strategist, succeeds by deceiving his enemy. And then we have the whole list of white ties that we always tell -- cases where. we feel we are iustified in deceiving a person who insists on knowing something he has no right to know, where we give a reason which is good but which is not the real reason, in order to save somebody's feelings. There arc all grades between the whiteness of truth and the blackness of lying. It is not ~ossible draw a hard to and fast line between (29) them. If everyone insisted on telling the truth all the time, society itself would perhaps become impossible. When Kant tried to work out other matters on the principle of the categorical imperative, such as the case of a man who wants to commit suicide in order to relieve himself from suffering from a disease and his friends from the care they will have to give him. or the case of the man who is too lazy to work although he has competence, I think the principle broke down prettv definitelv.

Empirically lies have brought good to the world, lying is not always immoral Moore 2k6
(Zachary Moore. Molcctilar Biologist. The Virtue of Honesty, htt~://noosetheantithesis.bI0~s~0~.~0m/2006I041virt~e-0f-onsthtn1. 2k6) April 10

Should one lie for a preater good ? Intelligent Design "scientists" sure do. Televangelists make it their iob of Iving. Christianity is founded on a Big Lie - the human existence of Jesus. Pious lying was widespread throughout the Dark Ages. In the Bible, Jesus outrageously lies by telline the fib that he would bring about the end of the world within a generation - a standard lie still told by cult leaders to make he fearful flock to them.
So obviously there is no strict adherence to the truth within Christianity. But everyonc acknowledges that, while these examples are clear instances of immorality, there are instances of lying that are not immoral. It is generally accepted that lying to save a life from a criminal, for examplc, is good.

Lying is acceptable if it brings good, or helps us to avoid danger. In certain instances it is immoral to not lie. Mazur 93
(Tim C. Mazur, vice president for ethics at Countrywide Financial Corp, Issues in Ethics, http:Nwww.scu.edulethicsi~ublications/iie~v6nl/lvina.html, 93) Fall

According to a third perspective. utilitarian ethics, Kant and virtue ethicists ignore the only test necessary for judging the morality of a lie balancing the benefits and harms of its consequences. Utilitarians base their reasoning on the claim that actions, including Iving, are morally acceptable when the resulting consequences maximize benefit or minimize harm. A lie, therefore. minimize harm, it mav be immoral not to lie. The challcngc in applying utilitarian ethics to everyday decision making. however. is significant: one must correctlv estimate the overall consequences of one's actions before making a decision. The following examplc illustrates what utilitarian decision makers must consider when lying is an option.

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7 Week Juniors

CONSULTATION DOESN'T SOLVE-GENERIC

Consultations and Incentives can't solve because major powers don't agree on rules, and it leads to ineffective policy Haass 99 (Richard N. Haass, Chair in International Security at Lhc Brooking Institutions. What to do with American Primacy'? http://americanfuturc.net/'?pape-id= 139)
Still. consultations alone--even consultations buttressed by incentives-will not bring about consensus in every area. Persuasion has its limits. The major powers may not agree on senera1 rulcs: even when they do. they may not agree on how to apply them in a particular situation. In such circumstances, it makes little sense for the United States to work in vain for the emergence of international consensus, guaranteeing only inaction or a lowest common denominator and hence inelkclive foreign policy

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I
1. Perm-do the plan and consult NATO

NATO 2AC

Acknowledging NATO's opinion while pursuing some policies without compromise can still facilitate an effective alliance Moravcsik 03 (Andrew, Harvard Government Prwfessor, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," Foreign Affairs, JulyIAugust, http://www.prince~on.cdu/-amoravcs/library/bargain,pd~] <The pessimists arc right to note that thc Iraq crisis highlighted thc need for a new set of arrangements, structures that can deal with global issucs but ate appropriate lo a world in which the United States and Europe possess different means, perceive different threats, and prefer different procedures. For their part, however, thc optimists are right to arguc that such crises are still manageable and that Western governments have a strong incentive to manage them. Wiser leadership on both sides. backed by solid institutional cooperation, could have avoided the transatlantic breakdown in the first place. To prevent future ruptures, both sides must recopnizc that they benefit from the active participation of the other in most ventures. Only a frank recognition of complementarv national interests and mutual dependence will elicit moderation, self-restraint, and a durable willingness to compromise. To this end, the allies could follow one of three paths. They can simply agree to disagrce about certain issues, cordoning off areas of dispute from areas of consensus; they can begin lo part ways militarily, with Europe developing its own, more autonomous force projection capabilities; or they can negotiale a new bargain, in which American military power and European civilian power are deployed together at targets of mutual concern. The first option is thc simplest and least costly solution, but the last promises the greatest returns. decent diplomacy The easiest wav to overcome the recent troubles would be for the United States and Europe to manage controversial high-stakes issues delicately while continuing to work tooether on other subiects that matter to both sides. This is how the Western alliance has functioned in for most of its history-r>rotectin,o core coo~eration European and nonmilitary matters. while disagreeing about "out of area" intervention and, sometimes, nuclear strategy. Today this lowest-common-denominator policy should still unite ncarlv all Western leaders.>

2. Delaya. Consultation results in delay from bureaucracy Grant 02 (Charles, director o the Centre for European Reform, NATO Review, f http://www.nato.int/docu/rcview/2002/issue 1/cnglish/debate.html#top)

<What has happened since 11 September has surely reinforced the long-icrm trend for NATO to become a political organisation. The Bush administration did not want to use NATO to light the war in Afghanistan. This was partly for the perfectly good reason that the Alliance did not have many of the military capabilities that would bc useful in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida . But it was also because manv people in the Pentagon see NATO as a relalively maminal, European organisation. They used it to run the air campaign over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, but thev found its manv comnlittees which enabled individual countries, such as France, to veto the bombing of' certain tarnets - tiustratinglv slow to deal with.> b. Now is a key time for our case-

3. Perm--do both-do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan-doesn't sever original plan immediacy or certainty

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7 Week Juniors

NATO 2AC
4. The negative is in a double bind - If NATO says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than the counterplan. If NATO overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that NATO says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.

5. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting i s s u e
a. Infinite Ground Skew -180+ nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult NATO over the plan.
6. Consultation ties the US down-NATO hurts US flexibility essential to global stability Cordesman 05 (Anthony, Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, NATO Revicw, http://www.nato.int/doculreview/2005/issuel/english/main~pr.html)
A NATO in which Europe focuses on Europe. and the United States focuses on thc rest of the world with contingency-driven support from individual European states may in fact be the only way in which the West can act in most out-of-area contingencies. NATO does not create common interests and oerceptions. In many cases, Alliance-widc consensus is a recipe for paralysis, and Alliance-wide force transformation of any lund will never happen at more than tokcn levels because many - if not most - European states have no clear motive to become involved and pav the cost. T CThe fact that NATO is most : uscful as a common security forum that ensures suitable dialogue and cooperation where cooperation is scen as both necessary and affordable is still success by any rational standard. The "specialisation" of Europe and the United States also refl'tecls the reality that two of the most important security priorities for the United Statcs are outsidc of Europe: the security or Korea and stability in the Taiwan Straits. Both are mililarv arenas where Euronc can at most play a token role. Even in the Gulf and Central Asia, the United Kingdom i s now thc only European power with any rcal-world prospect of deploying and sustaining serious out-of-area deployments.>

7. NATO will say no - France and Germany won't rubber stamp U.S. policies Kolko - rcsearch professor emeritus at York University in Toronto - 2-1 8-2003 (Gabriel, Counterpunch. "A Geopolitical Earthquake?'' www.counterpunch.orglkolko02 182003.htm1, Downloaded on 2-15-2005)
Today. NATO's original nison d'hre of imposing American hegemony is now the core of the cnntmversy that is now raging. Washington cannor sustain this grandiose objective hecause a reunited Germany is h r too powerful to be treated as it was a halr-century ago, and Gerniany has its own interests in the Middle East and Asia lo prolect. Gernlany and Frcmce's independence is reinforced by inept American propaganda an the rclationship of lracl to Al-Qaeda (from which the CLA and British MI6 havc openly distanced themselves), overwhelming antiwar public opinion in m n y nations. and a great deal of c>ppnsitionwithin the U.S. establishment and many senior military men to a war with h q . The furious American response to Germanv, France,

and Bcl,oiumtsrefusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would preiudee the Security Council's decision on war and peace is only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for many years. The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point has been made: some NATO members rcfusc to allow the organization to servc as a rubhcr stamp for American policv. whatever it may be.

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7 Week Juniors

NATO 2AC
8. The counterplan can't improve relations - Bush won't resume a sustained policy of genuine consultation
-

Kotko (Gabriel, -- research professor emeritus at York University in Toronto 2-18-200315-2005) CounterPunch, "A Geopolitical Earthquake?" www.counterpunch.org/ko1koO2 182003.htrnl, Downloaded on 2America still dcsircs to regain the mastery over Europc it had during the peak of the Cold War bul it is also determined not to be bound by Europcan desires--or indeed by the overwhclminp European public opposition to a war with Iraq. Genuine dialoguc or consuttation with its NATO allies is out of the qucslion. The Bush AdminisIralion. cvcn more than its predecessors. simply does nor believe in it--nor will it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division on Turkey has nothing to do with it. Washington cannot have it both ways. Its commitment to ag~ressive unilateralism is the antithesis of an alliance system that involvcs real consultation. France and Gcrmanv are now far too powerful to be treated as obsequious dependents. They also believe in sovereignty, as does every nation which is strong enough to exercise it, and thcy are now able to insist that [he United Stalcs both listen to and take their views seriously. It was precisely this danger that the U.S. sought to forestall when it created NATO ovcr 50 years ago. The controversy over NATO's future has been exacerbated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds attacks on "Old Europe" and the disdain for Germany and France that he and his adviser, Richard Perle, have repeated, but these are but a retlection of the underlying problems that have been smoldering for years. Together. the nations that oppose a preemptive American war in Iraq and the Middle East--an open-ended, destabilizing advcnturc that is likely to last years--can inlluence Europe's future development and role in Ihc world vrofoundlv. If Russia cooperates with them, even only occasionally, thcy will be much more powerful, and President Putin's support for their position on the war makes that a real possibility.

9. No impact-NATO is resilient Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the Transatlantic Relationship,'' Dclfining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer, http://hir.harvard.edu/articIes/l344/)
<The greatest misverception of the transatlantic rclationshi~ that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any is issue wilh Europe. The eminent volitical scientist Robert Kagan has poinled out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between "cowbovs" and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diamclrically opposed js completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal guvernmenl, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping etforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels-NATO's headquartcrs-to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military rolc in thc Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If ar,oument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.>

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EXT: CONSULTING NATO UNSUSTAINABLE

Transatlantic relations have been low since the end of the Cold War-tensions are inevitable due to diverging strategic perspectives and Iraq Gordon. 2004 (Philip H., Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and Europc at the Brookings Inslitution, Before lhc HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, July 15. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A POST-SUMMIT ASSESSMENT)

<The US.-Euroman split, it should be noted. did not begin or end with the current administration. Ever since the end of the Cold War removed the common enemy, American and Eurovcan strategic perspectives have diverged. During the 1990s, Europeans turned increasinnlv inward. focusing on the historic and difficult efforts to create a common currency and complete the politicaI intcrration of Europe. Accustomed to interdependence and acutely aware of the limits of their power, they sought to develop a rules-based international order built upon multilateral agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Amcricans, bv contrast, confident in their power, bepan to focus on new tvpes of threats. particularly weapons of mass deslruction, terrorism and "rogue states." An increasingly powerful United States-particularlv the Republican-held Congcss--chafed under the constraints of international treaties and institutions and sought to use the unilateral moment to fashion a new world order. President Bush's arrival added considerablv to the already .growing tensions. Key members of the new team had harshly criticized the Clinton administration for being excessively deferential to allies-fighting a "war by committee7' in Kosovo, for example-and for its willingness to accept international constraints on America's power. The Bush administration auicklv abandoned several treaties dear to the Europeans and made clear that the United Statcs would henceforth demonstrate a much more assertive stylc of leadership. But it was the American reaction to the Sept. I 1 terrorist attacks-and in particular the decision to invade Iraq-that turned gradually growing differences with Europe into a crisis of historic proportions. >

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EXT: NATO BAD-LEADERSHIP

Giving NATO a veto will undermine U.S. leadership Kolko - research professor emeritus at York University in Toronto - 2-18-2003 (Gabriel. CounterPunch, "A Geopolitical Downloaded on 2- 15-2005) Earthquake?" www.countcrpunch.org/kolko02182003.html,

NATO provided a macekccninn force in Bosnia to enforce the agreement that cndcd the internecine civil war in that part of Yugoslavia, but in 1999 it ceased being a purely defensive alliance and entered the war against the Serbs on behalf of the Albanians in Kosovo. The U. S. employed about half the aircraft it assigns for a full regional war but found the entire experience very frustrating. Targets had to be approved by all 19 members, any one of which could veto American uroposals. The Pentazon's after-action report of October 1999 conceded that America needed the cooperation of NATO countries, but "gaining,consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise." But Wesley Clark, the American who was NATO's suureme commander. regarded the whole experience as a nightmare--both in his relations with the Pentagon and NATO's members. "[Wlorking within the NATO alliancc," American generals comvlained, "unduly constrained U.S. militarv forces from getting the iob done cluickly and effectively." A war expected to last a few davs instead took 78-davs. The Yugoslav war taught the Americans a grdvc lesson.

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EXT: NATO RESILIENT

No NATO collapse-relations are empirically resilient Moravcsik 03 (Andrew, Harvard Government Professor, "Strilung a New Transatlantic Bargain." Foreign Affairs, JulylAugust, http://www.princcton.edu/-amoravcs/lib<Transatlantic optimists arc also right whcn they argue that the recent shifts need not lead inexorably to the collapse of nalo, the un, or the eu. Histc~rically, they note, transatlantic crises have been cyclical events, arising most often when conservative Republican presidents pursued assertive unilateral military policies. During the Vietnam era and the Reagan administration. as today. European polls recorded 80-95 percent onposition to U.S. intervention. millions of protesters floodsd the streets, nato was deeply splil. and Europcan politicians compared the Unilcd Slates to Nazi Germany. Washington wen1 into "opposition" at the un, where, since 1970, it has vetoed 34 Securily Council resolutions on the Middle East alone, each time casting the lone dissent. In the recent crisis. a particularly radical American policy combined with a unique confluence of Europcan domestic pressures-German Chancellor Gerhard Schriidcr7spolitical vulnerability and French President Jacques Chirac's Gaullist skepticism of American power- to trigger the crisis. Most Europeans-like most Americans-rejected the neoconservative claim that a preemptive war against Iraq without multilateral support was necessary or advisable. Sober policy analysis underlay the concerns of the doubters, who felt that the war in Iraq, unlike the one in Afghanistan. was not really connected to the "war on terrorism." Skeptics were also wary of thc difficulties and costs likely to attend postwar reconstruction. No surprise, then, that most foreign governments sought to exhaust alternatives to war before moving forward and refused to set the dangerous precedent ol'authorizing an attack simply because the United Statcs requested it. In spite of these doubts about the Bush administration's policies, however, underlying U.S. and European interests remain strikinfily convergent. It is a clichC but nonetheless accurate to assert that the Western relationship rests on shared values: democracy, human rights. open n~arkets, a measure of social iustice. No countries are more likely to aoree on basic poticy, and to and have the power to do something about it. Evcn regarding a sensitive area such as the Middle East, both sides recognize Israel's right to exist, advocate a Palestinian slate, oppose tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, seek oil security, worry about radical Islamism. and fear terrorism and the proliferation of wmd. Indced, thesc shared interests and values help explain why the trend over the past two decades has been toward transatlantic harmony. [ myopic regionalists: the recent Iraa war is the first U.S. military action since the Rearran vears to trigger significant European ooposition. In the first Gulf War, for examplc. un authorization unlocked European support, participation, and cotinancing. And the Kosovo intervention, although "prcvcntjve" and conducted without un authori~adon. unanimously hacked by was nato.>

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I
http:l/www.benadoralisociiltcs.~-ornlnrticle/ 142)

NATO OBSOLETE
NATO is dead-unilateralism is a better approach to foreign policy Krauthammer 02 (Charles, Washington Post, "The Bold Road to NATO Expansion," Novembcr 22,
<Second, NATO as a nlilitarv alliance is dead. It took ill with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then died in Afghanistan. When it demonstrated a military capabililv $0qualitatively superior to that of the allies that NATO instantly became obsolete. OAs Paul Kennedy, the Yale history professor who once was the leading proponent of the theory o l U.S. decline. wrote after the Afghan war: "The larger lesson -- and one stupefying to the Russian and Chinese military. worrying to the Indians, and disturbing to proponents of a common European dcfcnse policy -- is that in militarv terms there is only one player on the field that counts." Afghanistan made clear that NATO has no serious military role to play in any serious conflict.OThis is not to denigrate the European past. The Western Europeans had a deadly serious role countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They put the men on the plains of Central Europe to face down massive Warsaw Pact armies, and did so bravely and steadfastly for 50 years.0 ZNow, however, the Warsaw Pact is gone. With the United States having developed a unique 21stcentury military, NATO is an alliance that. having lost an (evil) empire, is in search of a role.>

NATO's worthless-cooperation serves no strategic purpose Cordesman 05 (Anthony, Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issuc1lenglish/main~pr.htm1)
Ever since the first Gulf War, the United States has s o u ~ hto transform NATO's military forces into h~gh-technology t conventional forces with as many interoperable elements as possible. At the same time, NATO has sought to develop additional out-of-area and power-proiection capabilities - many again modelled on US capabiliues. The NATO Rcs~onse Force is the svmbol of such intention. More broadlv, both efforts have reflected the feeling that NATO must find a new. postCold War rationale based on new missions and new capabilities lo match. L UNATO has made some progress alone these lines,bul much of it is more cosmetic than real. Institution building is not force transformation. Ministers may agree to L'orcc modernisalion priorities and to creating power-pro-jection capabilities, but most country defence plans and budgets reflect

national L'orces much beyond national boundarm. NATO Europe is spcnding more than US$220 billion o n military Ibrces. and has some 2.2 million active military and 2.6 million reservists. Virtually a11 defence analysts agree, however, that most of its procurement efforts arc scarcely properly coordinated and interoperable and arc not coming close to providing US levels of technology and war-fi~hting capability. More generally, only a tiny fraction of NATO's total manpower is deployable outside Alliance territory. and much of ~t is only really usable if Europe goes to war with itself'.>

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7 Week Juniors

EUROPE RELATIONS BAD--EUROPE COUNTERBALANCING

Closer relations with Europe create room for European counterbalancing Baker 05 (Gerard, US editor of The Times of London, "Bush's Grand Tour," Feb. 28. http://weeklystandard.com/Content/PubliclArticlcs/000/000/005/256~ulfo.asp?pg=2)

<All this activity i s mere prologue, of coursc, to the main event. This week, President Bush will travel overseas for the tirst tiine since his re-inauguration, with symbolic stops in Brussels, for divlomatic dinners at thc European Union and NATO, Germany, where he will praise transatlantic unity in a set-piece speech, and Slovakia. whcrc he will meet Russian president Vladimir Putin. You would have to be insensate to miss the meaning of all these semiotics. Mcssage: We care. as the president's father minht have put it. After four years in which the Bush administration has reached out to most of Europe with a sinale, raised middle Ginger, it has begun its second term with a smothering embrace. Conscious that a sullen and hostile Europe is not in America's best interests, and eager to enlist even reluctant allies in the global struggle for liberty, the Bush team has decided to do all it can to mend fences. It won't compromise on its priorities, of coursc, hut beyond that it will try to foster a productive relationship. Other than the symbolism, what does all this diplomatic outreach mcan? And how will Europeans respond? Can Europe be coaxed back into an alliance that will help the United States pursuc its broader strategic in aims? There is a dan~er, my view. that the Bush administration, in its newfound eagerness to show its kinder, less Martian, more Venusian side, will actually creatc b i ~ g e problems for itsclf. In its efforts to be di~lomaticallv r accommodating. the United States mav end up suv~ortine bolstering a vision of Europe that is directly at odds with long-term U.S. qoals and and interests. Nothing is to be gained by unnecessarily antagonizing Europeans, to be sure, and the United States is right to pursuc ways of cooperating. But ifthc earlv signs of the new ditentc are anv guide, the Bush administration may f?nd itself walkinn inl0 a trap. SINCE BUSH'S REELECTION last November. there have been welcome signs on both sides of the Atlantic of a willin~ness bury hatchets. And to
this convergence of good will has been helped along by several events outside either party's control. For starters. President Bush himself seems eager to reengage. The day aRer his reelection. he spoke with European leaders, including the once-despised Gerhard Schrijder in Berlin, and emphasized his willingness to start afrcsh Rice's transition to State was accompanied by some other personnel moves that looked like conciliatory gestures in Ruropcan eyes--the nomination ofthe Europeati expen Rohert Zoellick as Ihc number two. n~ost notably. Europcans, too. have a p ~ a r e d inorc interested in holding up their side of this fragile but grand alliance. The successful elections in Iraq last month have heen greeted with sorne softcning in hostility lo the US.-led war. A nurnbcr of governments h 1 t had shunned thc initial coalition--France and Germany, notably--have now pledged to to increase their contribution to the stabilization et'fort with money for debt relief and evcn some limited military assistance for the training of Irnqi forces. More importi~nt this cautious rapprochement than anything either side has done or said have been the effects of outside events. The death of Yasser Arafat has created an opening in the Middle East ~ that was unimaginable while the old terrorist was a figure of sympathy in most of Eurtlpe. That both sides can now s i down with a Pelestinian leader thcy trust is bound to producr rnore cornmot1 gmund than has existed in the last four years. Thc Ukraine election--at least in its second go-around--provided a concrete example to hack up the abstract bromide that Alrericans and Europeans share the same values. We can all unite against the ballot-riggers and the opponent-poisowrs and rejoice when these tyrants fail. And the India11 Ocean tsunami concentrated r~iinds both sides of the Atlantic on the unique capabilities wealthy countries share to reliere suffering in beni~hted on pans of the world. President Bush will seek to build on all this when he visits next week. He will prornisc closcr coopention and may even signal some U.S. movement on contentious issues such as Middle East pcacc and global warming. Yet hard chullenges have made a nnlckery of friendly gestures and warm rhetoric in the past. And there are plenty of reasons besides to think thiit thcse latcst good intentions will go the way of previous ones. Iran remains a tTashpoiiit. Huropcnns simply acknowledge no nlternalive lo their carrots-only approach of encouraging Tehran into nuclear concessions. They certainly don't share the administration's view, properly and firmly restated by Rice in one of the few evide~itly discordant mnonieols of her trip. that h n is simply 1101 to hc trusted. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister. insisted in Munich that. despite all evidcnce to the contrary. there is a re:~lchance the Iranians will a p e to disarmament. Then there is the E.U.'s imminent decision to lift its embarso on arm5 si~les China. in place since the Tiananmn Square massacre in 1989. to The Europans are currently engaped in increasingly comical efforts to justify the move--the latcst being the claim that lifting the embargo is actually thc only way to ensure China doesn't get the technology it wants. This nonsense only shows how determined Europe is t~ sell China arms again. But thc m j o r point of contention re~miinsIraq, and the hroader strategy it represents. of dcnmcntic transformlion in the Muslim world. Behind Europe's offers of limited support lies deep skepticism about the whole effort. In Paris. Berlin. and Bmssels, there is still an undinlinishcd conviction that the war was a colossal and inm~oral error that will result in lurrnoil and suffering for all concerned. On Febrwary 14, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the fornxr lebalaseprime minister, while the Unites States was tingering Syria and recalling its ambassador. the European Union was insisting there relations with Dam3scus. These differences are not Just awkward. inconvenient hlots on an otherwise pleasant landscape of Atlantic was no w e d for a change in its diplon~atic u~iity. They are grcat, ugly cleavages in hasic perccptio~is. strategy, and policy. The Rush ad~~inistration remains committed to revolutionary change thruughnut thc world and, just

Europcans, meanwhile, cver more staunch in their defense of the status quo, however unfree that may leave people. Stability, not liberty, is their aim. THESE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS are familiar enough now, ofcourse. What is new is a growinn commitment bv the lcaders of Europe to implement a global strategy that will actively block the United States from pursuing its goal of combating tvrannv. Specifically. thc European Union is now being driven steadily toward a global role that would counterbalance what the principal architects of European policy, Jacques Chirac especially, see as the pernicious influence of U.S. power.>
as the Reagan administration did, believes Anlerica's security is inextricably tied up with the advance of liberty well heyond its borders.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

AT: NATO GOOD-TERRORISM

NATO is a poor mechanism for dealing with terrorism-unilateral approach solves best Asmus 02 (Ronald. senior fellow for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. NATO Review, http:l/www.nato.in~docu/review/2002/issuel/english/debate.html#top)
<Finally. you want the Alliance to focus on thc new security threats, like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course NATO should do what it can against such threats. but how well suited is it to play a lending role? The fight against terrorism surely requires the sharing of intelligence and smedy decision-taking. A large multinational bureaucracy with soon, perhaps - 25 members may not be well sui~cd such a strungle. The same argument applies to WMD. Is not NATO to too leaky and slow-moving to manage an offensive operation that would, for example, destroy biolo~ical weapons factories'? trustcd to keep a secret, provide skilled forces and accept US command. >

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

1. Perm-do the plan and consult the EU 2. Delaya. The EU takes forever to make collective decisions. Crook, 1996 (John R, Board of Editors at the American Society of International Law, "Current Development: Thc Filly-First
Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, American Journal of International Law, January, accessed at Lexis) In general, the enhanced EU role is welcome and ~ositive. However, it inevitablv lcads to difficulties to which Union members and their presidency must be alert. The demands of intra-European coordination can result in disregard of the concerns of other traditional partners (likc the United States and other non-EU Wcstern countries) in formulating [*I381 kev policies. Once set, EU negotiatin~ positions are not easilv changed. And. for EU delegations, vast amounts of time are consumed in coordinaling positions.]

b. Now is a key time-

3. The negative is in a double bind - If the EU says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than the counterplan. If the EU overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that the EU says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.
4. P e r m - d o both--do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan-doesn't sever original plan immediacy or certainty

5. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. infinite Ground Skew -180+ nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult Japan over the plan.
6. Consultation does absolutely nothing to improve or enhance US-EU relations. Haass, 2002 (Richard N, Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department, "Remarks to the Ccntre for European Reform", June 10, http://www.state.gov/s/p/renI/l0968.htm)
[Given the rapid pacc of c h a n ~ e the comolexitv oflhc challenges, it's not surprisin~ there are frictions in the and that transatlantic relationship. From Eompe. we hear rumblin$s nhnut unilatcralisrn, even a m l p n c a k o m our sidc uf the pond. there arc complaints aix~ulE~~ropean sclf-ahsorplion. a b o p with
open irritalion wilh Europmns who cornplilin ahoul American prcdo~ninance. are unwilling to spend Inore to close the gsp in mililary capabilities or to exercise grealer plnhal lendership. Bolh Eumpcms hul and ,Imerirnan find fnalt with the orha's tl.:~deplicics. Silch Sfidions arc hnrdlg so~prisinp. p~nicular this juncture in history. Withoul the exblc~~tial in at Ihcat p o d by the Soviet Union. differenors over

olhcris~~~ecnrenuari~lly rnoreexpnscd. But these frictions are not due to lack of consultation. The Bush Administration has tried to consult fully and lo bridge differences. We have consulted intensively with Europe - the EU. NATO, and bilaterally - on the global war on terrorism, environmental policies. missile defense and weapons of mass destruction, peace in the Balkans, and the situation in the Middle East. W k r c rhu United Stales ctlold not go nlonp wilh s pmpoad approach. such u the K ~ I IPrutoccll. we put fulward alternative p r o l x l s : ~to ~ I ~ ~ address Ihr
u~xk.rlyinp conccrn. The same will he lruc vilh respEc1 tn our position rill thc Inrcrntionnl Criminal Collfl. On some social issues. like the dmlh Fnelty. thc Unilcd SI:~lcsilrtd Europe will simply hxve to agree li~ disagree. As lhe LJnircd Statcr and liarope ~r)olinuc coopcrnlc in ~ri~asfnrrning 10 Eurupc and colhhorue incrasingly o s glohnl ishocs of mutual cnncern. they will inevitably. a s in the pnsl. have lo mallage disnpwements l a g e and smell. Someluncs diflcrences are just lhal - dilrerc~res over priorities. ~>licics. phpectives and evcn \?11ucs. Sumelimes, lhesc diUicrenccs rcquux thal Ihe Ilniled Stillec xt on i own. w It would k wrong lo l a k l such dil~lc~'?nces A r n e 1 . i ~ ~ as "unila~er;llism."Illst as Eumpans can disilgree among themselves wilhl,r~lIhreatcnmg thc riahilily of the tll. we can d~sa$recwilh s u m or d l
IIIC tmnsaltantic IXMI~. The hottom line is that there is virtuallv nothinfi we can do alone that we cannot do better together with our allies and partners in Europe.]

Eunjpcans without weittening

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

7. China arms e m b a r g e
a. Stronger EU-US relations would allow the EU to lift the arms embargo against China. Austin, 2005 (Dr. Greg, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Center, "Testing the Transatlantic Alliance", The Globalist, June 16. http:NSpc.org.uklarticles/333)
JThe EU plans to lift the arms ban imposed on China and the U.S. Congress has reacted in disbelief. The U.S. lenislators are outraged at what they see as the willinnness of European allies to provide arms lo a country that U.S. forces would have to tight in thc event of a China-Taiwan war. This article examines the tensc relations belwcen the transatlantic alliance. During his European tour in February 2005, President Bush bluntly warned European leaders that they must "sell" the lifting of the arms ban to Congress or face retaliation in the form of restrictions on lucrative European defense contracts in the U.S. market. That warning was repeated lo Brussels by Deputy Secretary of Stalc, Bob Zodlick.]

b. Lifting the arms embargo would allow China to use those weapons and attack Taiwan. Austin, 2005 (Dr. Greg, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Center, "Testing the Transatlantic Alliance". The Globalist, June 16, http:l/fpc.org.uk./articles/333)
[The Pentagon also assesses that self-sufficiency, not foreign im~orts. remain the main stratem of China's military will industries and procurement planning. The anti-secession resolution passed in March 2005 by China's legislative body, which authorizes the use of force a~ai nst Taiwan in certain circumstances, appeared as a strong vindication of Congressional opposition to lifting the EU ban.1

c. These conflicts will destroy the planet Straits Times - 2000 ["Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan," Jun 25, LN] THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cruss-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washin,oton were to concludc that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries Far and near and -- horror of horrors --raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beiiing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support &any US forces attacking China as bclligcrcnt parties open to its retaliation. In the mgion, this means South Korea, J a p n , the Philippines and, to a lesser extent. Singapore. If' China wcre to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try lo overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redetine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be sirnilarlv upset by the likes of Inq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According lo
General Matthew Ridgeway, conmlmnder of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the tinl(: thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the nulitcuy and political aspects of the conflict and its in~plications future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korca -- truce or a on broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to rcsort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a si~nilmcapability,there is little how of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclcar warhcads that can destrov ma-ior American cities. Beiiinn also seems ~rcpared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinesc military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Mqjor-General Pan Zhangqiang. president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies. told a gathering at thc Woodrow Wilson hlemaiional Ccntrc for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to vass. we would see the destruction of civilisation. Them wotlld be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armangedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable. it cannot be ruled out entirely. for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Consultation Aff
7 Wcck Juniors

8. Russian westernizationa. An enhanced US-EU relationship would put greater pressure on Russia to westernize its economy. Haass, 2002 (Richard N, Director of Policy Planning at thc US State Department, "Remarks to the Centre for European Rcform", June 10, http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/l09h8.htm)
[The U.S.-European relationship also remains vital to the political and economic integration of Russia into lhc West. America and Europe share a common intcrest in working with Russia to encourage continued progress on human rights, religious and press freedom, rule of law, and political and economic reform.]

b. Westernization collapses Russia's economy. Kagarlitsky, 2002 (Boris, contributing editor of Links, "'Political capitalism' and corruption in Russia",
http://www.dsp.org.auflinks/back/issue21/itsky.htm~

[Until 1998, in line with the neo-liberal ideology that prevailed in the Wcst, the commentators viewed privatisation, the liberalisation of prices, and other "liberal reforms" as indisputable successes. setting Russia on the road to uros~eritv only problem seen was the resistance of "conservative forces" trying to maintain Cornrnunisl ways of doing things Only a few writers, such as Stephen Cohen, Janin Wedel and Peter Reddaway 1 saw fit to dispute this interpretation. Their voices, however, were drowned in the general chorus. In fact, most of the pcovle who ovposed the neo-liberal course had in no way been supporters of the Comn~unist regime, iust as most of the neo-liberals of the 1990s had been former Communist functionaries. Resistance to the reforms was crushed in 1993 by force of arms, with Western leaders finding nothing contrary lo the principles of'dcmocracy either in the disbanding of representative organs (starting at the regional level), or in the abrogation of the constitution, or in the shelling of parliament, or even in the introduction of prior censorship in the autumn of 1993. After the "resistance to the reforms" had becn broken, one might have expected Russia to make a rapid breakthroueh into the future. The period between 1994 and 1998, however. ended in an unprecedented financial crash, and in a full-scale economic and socio-political crisis out of which the countrv was led onlv bv a team of "conservatives" applyinsz a Keynesian approach to the economy. It was in this period that the Russia experts, whose forecasts had proven catastrophically wrong, began trying to explain why the course that had hccn pursued had failcd. If the experts declared that from the very beginning this coursc had been mistaken, even in parl, they would discredit themselves. Consequently, the most popular theory was thal the Russian reforms were not working because of corruption. Meanwhile, corruption was presented exclusively as a continuation of the old Soviet order, or as the result of specific errors by the reformers. Ultimately, the attempt to explain corruption as the rcsult of "Soviet to survivals" a~nountcd reinvoking the original myth of conservative resislancc, only on a new level. In the earlier case, Soviet bureaucrats had been accused of unwillingness to "oin in the market"; now, they were accused of joining in the market in the wrong fashion and, in the process, ruining it. the The aurhors of such articles studiously i ~ n o r e fact that a significant proportion of these scandals, if not most of Ihem, broke out among members of the s o u p of "vounn reformers"? the bearers of vrogressive Western values. In just thc same way, the involvement of Western experts, business entrepreneurs and entire companies in Russian corruption scandals has been ignored or, at least, not incorporated into the analyses. This is despite the fact that the Swiss prosecutor's office in the late 1990s cited a whole list of names and organisations.]

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

c. Russia's economy is precarious--economic decline below current levels would cause terrorism, secessionism and nuclear conflict. David, 1999 (Steven R. Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. "Saving America horn the Coming Civil Wars". Foreign Affairs, JanIFeb, Vol, 78, Iss. 1, accessed at Lexis)
[If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 lo the present, the GDP has fallen by 5 0 pcrcent. In a society where. ten years ago, uncrnployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true iigure to be much hiphcr. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below thc official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-dcfined property rights or contract law and whcre subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-stylc capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysls feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragilc foundation-personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the moralc of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadcqualc pay, housing. and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between thc old and ncw guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disguntlcd generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict lo emerEe between a regional power and Moscow. it is not at all clear which side the military would sumort. Divining thc military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure ot'the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 rcpublics, krais. and oblasts grow cver more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to forcc its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, rcpublics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes lo Moscow when they receive so little in return. Threequarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which makc some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If thcse rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the conseauences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A maior Dower like Russia-even though in declinedocs not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from encmics such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed strugales in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting. varticularlv attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environmcnt of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be cven worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid thc basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a sccond civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disinlcnration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much maleriel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sitcs will slacken. making weapons and sup~lies available to a wide range of anti-American noups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now laces. And it is hard to think of anythin0 that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.1

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

RUSSIA 2AC
1. Perm-do the plan and consult Russia through the NATO-Russia Council 2. The negative is in a double bind - If Russia says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than the counterplan. If Russia overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that Russia says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.
3. Perm--do both-do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan-doesn't sever original plan immediacy or certainty

4. Russian Imperialisma. Ceding a veto to Russia facilitates regional hegemony Financial Times 06 (London, England) 3- 10"Adinner date with Putin is no excuse to keep your mouth shut" L/N
None of the above says that Mr Putin's colleagues in the G8 should seek to isolate Russia. What it does demand, to borrow a phrase. is much greater realism in framing the terms of the relationship. Rhetoric about nand strategic partnerships should give wav to open acknowledaement of the differences and an unapologetic defence o democratic principles. There is no need for animus; there is an obligation on western K governments to uphold their values. That is where thcir interests lie. The G7 nations should be clear that they will not be com~licit the in re-establishment of Russian hegemony over its neighbours; or accept hat the former Soviet republics of central Asla are off-limits to the spread of democracy and the rule of law. A bipartisan panel convened by the US Council on Foreign Relations got it right when it said this week that

US "should cede no veto or undue deference to Russia over American relations with the states of the Russian periphery". Quite the reverse. American, and for that matter Eurouean. interests lie in s u ~ ~ o r t i n g nations such as Ukraine and Georgia in their efforts to ioin a wider international communitv.
b. That causes global instability and WMD conflict Cohen in 96 (Ariel, Senior policy analyst @ the Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #1064, "The New Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia", January 25, http://www.heritage.org/Rcscarch/RussiaandEurasiG 1065.cfm
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracv and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, il has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian enipirc would prove much more costlv not iust for Russia and the region, but for peace. world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts rnav escalatc to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian cmpirc would become a maior destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would cndanpcr not only Russia's neiohbors. but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-irnpcrialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian ~u1f.l'Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to lhc Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Occan. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south. the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security scrvices, in addition to which Russian he~emonv would make Western polilical and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

RUSSIA 2AC
5. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. Infinite Ground Skew -180-k nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult Russia over the plan.
6. Commie Creep-

a. Strong relations put us off our guard - Russia woould take advantage and attack Lunev 00 (Stanislav, ",Former Russian Colonel who defected to the US, also a writer for NewsMax, August 9, 2000, "Putin's Dangerous Militaristic Views" http://www.newsmax.codarticles/?a=2000/8/8/2O3250)
Neither Sergecv nor Kvashnin is a member of his team. They cane to Putin's administration from former President Yeltsin's cabinet. Anlong the possible candidates for new Defense Minister named in the Moscow prcss are such Putin allies as Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, who looks after the dcfcnse industly. Sergei Ivanov, Security Council Secretary, and some others. An interesting point: at a time when the Army's top generals are still discussing future reforms, the Navy has already begun implementation of its Naval Conccpt, also approved hy Mr.Putin last spring As the Moscow press reported, Russia

since will send its aircraft carriers and several other ships to the Mediterranean in the fall in Lhc largest such de~loyrnent Soviet times. The prcss quoted Russian Navy Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, as saying that this fleet will be more powerful than the Soviet-era Mediterranean squadron. In the admiral's words, the navy will try to maintain its presence in different ocean areas. There is no doubt that during his presidency. Putin will do evcrvthinp possible to strenmhen Russia's military esatblishment and restorc the "old glory" of the former Red Army. But the question remains: against what threats would this beefed up army be directed? It makes no sense to talk about using this huge up-to-date militarv machine solely for the war in Chechnya or other limitcd military conflicts and operations, or for fighting ~crrorism. which can be handled by the special services alone. There is only one answer: the proposed modernized Russian military machine is aimed at the U.S., which according to the government-controlled press, is "seekine unilalcral militarv and security advantages."And of course, against those American friends and allies, whose politicians like their colleagues in Washington. D.C.. prefer to close their eves to the real danger to their countries in the favor of a wishful cooperation with Moscow.
b. China gets drawn in - Russian alliance and suspicians over NMD Lunev 00 (Stanislav, ", Former Russian Colonel who defected to the US, also a writer for NewsMax, July 14, 2000, "Putin Goes East to Advance International Goals" http://www.newsrnax.com/articles/?a=2000/7/13/212816)
China There is no doubt that his visit to Beijing would be a central palt of his trip. and could become a new and important Step in development

of

strategic alliance between "democratic" Russia and totalitarian Red China. As NewsMax.com already reported, at a time e when American politicians arc t everything possiblc to transfer its strategic alliance with Beiiing into a military bloc. In this connection future talks between Putin and Chinese leaders will provide oossibilities for both sides to strengthen their tics and coo~eration. First of all, in such sensitive areas as cooperation between the two countries' military, military industries. intelligence. counterintelligence,foreign affairs,
weapons proliferalion, arms sales abroad and others. Putjn alrcady met Chinese leader Jiang Zemin on July 5 during a mccting of the Shanghai Five (renamed Shanghai Forum). when both side once more underscored the anti-American direction 01thc Russo-Chinese alliance by

standing close together against the U.S. plan to build National Missile Defense (NMD). Russian and Chinese presidents said the proposed shicld, aimed at blocking missile attacks by rogue states, would threaten existing arms control agreements by violating the ABM treaty.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
THI: high-in~cnqiryscetxuio pos~u~titcscrtiss-s~roitwsresalaling ioto ;I a
IXIIL'I serve

RUSSIA 2AC

c. Sino-Russian war causes extinction Straits Times in '00 (The Straits Times (Singapore), "No onc gains in war over Taiwan", June 25,2000. L/N)
fu~l-~cale between the US and China. If Washi~~gtc)~~ w co~rludc splilling I'hi~i;~ war wrc that would
ils nallonal interests. lhcn a h1I1-sadc war hccolnes unavo~dahle.Conflict on soch a scak would cmbroil othcr countries far and near and -horror nt ho1111r.s -r;~i.scthc possihilily of a nuclwr wxr. Heijing h;ls ~IwatdyIOU lhc US and Japan priutclg thu it considcrs any country prnvi<lmgb;~hcs logislics wlpporl In any U S Corcc.s auacking China as brllipercnt pulics open lo and niay not end there as

east Asia will be Set on fire. And thu conk~pn~lion opportunistic powers elsewhere mav try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted. Russia may seek to redefine Europe's polilical landsca~e. balance of power in thc Middle East may be similarly upsct by the The likes of Iraq. In south Asia. hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous ahase. Will a full-scale Sino-US ww lead lo a nuclenr waf! According lo (icncr:~lMalthew Ridgeway. cornmnnder of thr US Eighth Ar~tlywhich f o u ~ hagainst the l
irs rtfali:~lmn.In Ihr region. thir n m n s Sooth Korea. 1ap:ln thc Philippines 3rd. t a a lesscr.cx~mt.Sjnp;~pore.1fChini1were ((1 re1:llialc.

Chu~ese ~ h Korean W;u. Ihc US had at t k time thought of using nuclear weapons against China 11) saw t l r US tinm mililary dcfeat. In Ins bot~k h Kore.u~W r a pcrsonal account oflhe ~nilitaryand in c Te a. polirical apecls of the conflict and its implicatictns on future US fclrrign policy. Cien Klugeway said that 1IS was confronted wirh two choices in Korea -trucc or a broadened war. whichcoi~ld havc I d to thc usc of nuclear wcnpons. If lhe US had tn resun to nuclcm wcaponry to ~lefeal China lo~il: hefi~re laller acquired a siniilarcapahility. l k r c is Little hope of winning n war ngainsl China 50 yrsrs laler. shon of the using nuclear wrapuns. T l r US cstiniates that China gossmses atwul 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy ni:~jor American cicies. Deijing aL%iwems prcpnred ro pn Tor the nuclexr option. A Chirlcsc military oftker dixloscd recently t h a I3eijing was cunsidering a review of its "nun t h l usc" prmlple rrgwding nuclear weaptms. .K?jor-Gcncml Pa11Zhangqinng. president of the mililnry-funded lnstitulc b r Slntcpic Sludies. lold I ythering 31 the Womirnw Viilson hicrnntional Centre h r Schnlars in Wsshington {hat although the ~overnnwnt iibided by thal principle, there werc slmng prcssuucs fro111 military lo . srill Ihe dron it. He said ~nilitarvleaders considered the use of nucle:u weawm mandatory ilthc countnrrisked dismemhern~ent11so resull ofli>rehlt intervention. Gen Kideewav said that ~hnuld coine In Dass. wc th11 -

Whilc the IXoSpeCt of a nuclear Armiggcdon over ~ a i w a nmight Seem inconceivable, il caonot be r u l d nut cntuely, for China DUt sovereignty above evervthina else. (;en Ridpewny recillled thal he biggest mistake the US made during the Korean wa as to S
W W I ~ see

the dcstructioo ofciuiiisalion. T h ~ r e o ~ l d no viulors f~ sllch a war. w hc

asses5 Chincsc acrions according to rhe American way of tl~inkinp."rust when evcryone believed rhal nn sensible commander wiruld marc11 south of the Yalu. thc Chinese Irilops suddenly app?wxi." hc reci~lled. (Thc Yah is lhe river which borders China imd North Korea. and thc crossine ul the river niarkcd Chins's entry inlo the war against lhe ..\merieans). "I feel awasy d now sumebody wcrc lo tcll mc thd they be1 China would no1 do thii or that." he said in a r e c a ~ interview given lo thc Chi~tesc t press.

7. Prolifa. Russia woujd use strong relations to proliferate Lunev 02 (Stanislav, ", Former Russian Colonel who del'ected to the USI also a writer for NewsMax, August "America's Worst Foes Are Moscow's Best Friends" http://www.newsmax.~omlar~icles/?a=1999/12/13/35505)
Recently. it became known that durinz the "new partnership" with the West. Russia is secretlv sclling modem missile tcchnolo,oies and components to North Korea, which radically incrcascs Pvon~vanc's nuclear missile capabilities. According to U.S. intelligence cstirnates, Russia is clandestinelv sellinz spccial aluminum alloys, laser gyroscopes and other components used in missile guidance as well as connectors and relays used in missile electronics.

b. Proliferation causes massive nuclear wars Utgoff in '02 (Victor, Deputy Director for Stralegy, Forces and Resources at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Survival, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions", Volume 44, Number 2, Summer, p. 87-90)
First, Ihedynamlcsofgettlngtoa hlgh~y praiiferated w o could be verydangerous Proliferating states will feel great pressures to ohtain nuclear wcapons and ~ dclivew svstems before any potential oononent does. Those who succeed in outracin~ opponent may consider preemptive an nuclear war before the opnonent becomes capable of nuelcar retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's

nuclear pngrarnme or defeat the opponcnt using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may st111 be able to join in this arms race by building other lypes of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete prolifemtion. the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more narions capable of launching nuclear weapons means that thc nsk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious tiamage no1 only to their own populations and environments. but those oj others. is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the numbcr of nations activities. I n m s e d prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worsc still, in a highlv carrying out hazardous manufacturingand sto~ilge

proliferated world there would be more freauent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent i>pportunjtiesmeans shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at
any opportunity is actually zero.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
8. Terrorism-

RUSSIA 2AC

a. Russia leverages support of US policies to give materials and aid to terrorists Lunev 00 (Stanislav, ". Forrncr Russian Colonel who dcI'ected to the US, also a wriler for NewsMax, August 30. Moscow's Two-Faced Strategy" http://www.ncwsmax.con1/articles/?a=1999/~2/13/35505)

The latcst developments connected with Russia's ties with Iraq, Iran and North Korea - President Bush's "axis of evil" - very clearly demonstrate the real nature of the Kremlin's two-faced strategy. While officially supporting the US.-led anti-terrorist relations with thesc maior sponsors of coalition, Moscow has been speeding up the establishment of alliance-tv~e international terrorism. On Aug. 21, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that if Russia decides to do business with nations that are sponsorinu international terrorism, companies around thc world might shy away from doing business with Moscow. "To the extent thal Russia decides that it wants to parade its relationship with countries like Iraq and Libya and Syria and Cuba and North Korea, it sends a signal out across the globe that thal is what Russia thinks is a good thing to do, to deal with the he terrorist states, to have them as their relationship develo~crs," said in Fort Hood, Texas, after meeting with President Bush.

b. The impact is extinction Al Ahram Weekly in '04

("Extinction!" August 26-September I, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/7O5/op5.htm)

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nanazaki, even if
- - a n d t ~ ~ ~ t a r f r o m c e r ~ a i n - - weaDons thc used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, wlh no knowledge of nuclear technology,had no choice but lo caulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody.

Iuve So Br. crccpt fbr lhc two h m h s dropped on lapan. nacleia v~eaprl~ls hcen used only lo threillen. Uow we are at a s t a g where they can be detonated. This complctcly changes the rules {if the game. We linve ~rachcd poilll where anlicipalory in&?sbrcs can dctcrmine the coluae of evenls. ,411egalic1nsof a lerrorisl mnmctiol~ n he nsed to justify ;~nliaip;~tory ;I w menslires. including the invasion of a svrcrcigu slate likc Iraq. As il rllmed out. these allecatiations. as well &? thu ;~llqnlion Saddam was hwhc)urin$ &%ID. proved lo k onfoonded. lhat

if it fails. it would further exacerbate the negative fcatures of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies wc~uld close in on themselves. police measures would be s t e ~ p e d at thc expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would up proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead lo a third world war. from which no one will emeree victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over anofier, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects thc whole planet. we will all be losers.

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists'?Even

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

Tough line is key - a veto allows Russian geopolitical domination The Guardian, 3- 16-06 ("World Briefing: Colour revolutions M e in Russia's Shadow, L/N)
If a backlash is under way against the populist revolulions that shook thc post-Soviet space, a much-distracted US and EU bear some blame. The benefits of ')joining the west" have not proved impressive so far.

But hanging over the heads of all these countries is the increasingly baleful influence of President Vladimir Putin's Russia, says a new report by the independent US Council on Foreign Relations. "At the samc time as President Bush has made democracy a goal of American foreign policv. Russia's political system is becoming steadilv more authoritarian," the report said. Regressive trends inside Russia were impacting on its neighbours, as seen in Moscow's use of oil and gas as a "foreign policy weapon" against Ukraine, and in its planned revival of a political and economic community linking Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kamkhstan. The Russian bear was back on the prowl, intent on regaining lost geovolitical influence, and tougher responses were reauired. "The US should cede no veto or undue deference to Russia over American relations with states of the Russian periphery." the report said. "There is nothing legitimate about limiting the opportunity of neighbours . . . to choose security allies or pursue democratic political transformation. Post-Soviet states that share America's approach should bc ablc to count on greater support."

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: COMMIE CREEP

Russias policy is all about preparing for a full scale global and even nuclear war - they just need an opportunity Lunev 99 (Stanislav, ", Former Russian Colonel who defected LO the US, also a writer for NewsMax, December 13. 1999, "The 'New Russia' Is No Friend" http://www.newsmax.com/articlc~~?a=l999/12/13/35505) From the time Putin was head of the NSC and during his tenure as prime minister, Russian militarv spending has increased fifty perccnt. And arenarations for war have been inlcnsiljed - not iust for limited warfare such as in Chechnya but also for full-scale, global war. Chcchnya has served as a useful testing ground for the Russian military. It learned much from its humiliating defeat in 1994 during the previous Chechen conflict, both militarily and in preparations planning and funding. At the same time the vovernment bevan to adopt a more aggressive militarv policy. it also decided to incrcslse its rcliancc on tactical nuclear weapons in view of its weaknesses in conventional systems. In support of this, Pres. Ycltsin has ordered an across-the-board upgrade of research and development as well. Testing of the new tactical weapons has already begun at the nuclear-test facility on Novaia Zemlya Island. As the military newspaper Krasnaia Zvesda reported, a new nuclear-deterrence policy has also been anproved by the president which gives the go-ahead to the use of nuclear weapons when all other measures have failed in a given conflict. What we consider to be partnership and relations with Russia will be a mask for Russia to attack us over their suspicions of American encroachment and treachery Lunev 99 (Stanislav, ", Former Russian Colonel who defected to the US, also a writer for NewsMax. December t 3. 1999, "The 'New Russia' Is No Friend" http://www.newsmax.comlarticlesI'?a=1999/12/13/35505) According to a statement by Russian Federation Defense Minister Igor Sergeev (on Russian TV, channel ORT, Nov. 12) the successful Russian military campaign in Chechnya is a serious blow to secret American plans to destabilize conditions there. Serzeev accused the United States of provokinr the war as part of a plot to weaken Russia and to "take full control of the North Caucasus." Sergeev spoke these words at a meeting with the Russian generals, which was attended also by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Given the high-level occasion and the rank of those present, it's evident that Sergeev wasn'tjust expressing a ~ersonal opinion. This view is, in fact. the official position of Boris Yeltsin and his regime not only about Chechnya but also about the underlying dynamics of Russian-American relations in general. From the Russian perspective this is the true nature of what eternal optimists in Washington naively regard as a "strategic partnership" between the two nations. Of course, Sergeev's remarks came as a surmise to the US Dress and to some Washington politicians who are trying LO sell Americans on the idea that the new. "democratict' Russian is no longer a threat to world peace. But the remarks were no surprise to the Russians, who have been the targel of onpoing anti-American propaganda for some time. For the last several years the Russian military has been conducting field exercises for the army, navy, air force. and strategic forces. The largest of these since 1985 was "West-99," a maior exercise designed as preparation for war against the US and the other NATO countries. Russian militarv documents reveal that the US and NATO are considered Russia's "main potential militarv advcrsarv," requirine the preparation of large-scale militarv counter-measures. As under the USSR, defense against "American aggression" continues to be the cornerstone of all Russian military preparations. The main focus of Russian military-training manuals. for example. is on the armed forces of the United States and the military structures of American allies. their weapons systems, chains of command, and t heir tactics and strategies. Kremlin propaganda tells the Russian people that their living conditions are bad not because of the corrupt regime in Moscow but because of America, the destroyer of the former USSR. The US, they say, is now trying to destroy Yugoslavia as well, Russia's only friend in the Balkans. It has occupied Kosovo @opposes Russia's friends around the world. And now it is tryinz to destroy "Mother Russia" by provoking the conflict in the North Caucasus.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: COMMIE CREEP

Even though American media downplays the threat, Putin is determined Lunev 00 (Stanislav, ", Former Russian Colonel who dd'ccted lo the US, also a writer for NewsMax, August 9,2000, "Putin's Dangerous Militaristic Views" http://www.newsmax.comlartic1e~~~a=2000/8/81203250)

It is no wonder that last week the mainstream American media paid no serious attention to the very irnpor~ant militaristic statements of Russia's President Vladimir At a time when some Amcrican politicians are talking about the alleged "new image" of the Kremlin's insiders. Putin made some very serious poinls about the future of Russia's mjlilary machine. As the Moscow press reported, on July 25 Putin said that development of the armed lorces should be a kev government p l He instabilitvicatcd that the Russian military must be prepared to handle domestic threats, such as the Chechens drive for independence, and external ones, such as perceived threat from the West. and from international terrorism. On that day Putin met in in the Kremlin with his top brass to reward many of them with promotions to higher military rank and once again plcdge his sympathy and support for the armed forces and security services. In his words "today the factor of military stren~th of great imuortance." This is even morc irnaortant when efforts arc being made to reshape the aeopolitical is map of the world, touching directly on Russian interests. Putin stressed that the nation is facing numerous jntcrnal and external threats that only the military and security forces are able to match. "Today, the military factor is vital above all for preserving stability in the country. for ensuring its peaceful and progressive development." he said. "The defense capability should be a priority of our state." He also alluded to U.S. plans to build a limited national missile defense system, s a v i n ~ "the main international ~ r o b l e m that today is the plan to dcslrov the strategic balance in thc world." Putin also assured thc generals that the government would provide them with new weapons, will increase salaries, and extend other benei'i~s,etc. An initiator and firm advocate of the war in Chechnya, Putin enioved strong backina from the military and security services in his presidential election hid.

m.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
n u t olcoursc,lJoin.s visit

EXT: COMMIE CREEP-NORTH

KOREA MODULE
2000."Putin Goes East l o Advance I n t e r n a t i o n a l G o a l s "

North Korea gets drawn in-long history of cooperation LuIlev 00 ( S t a n i s b v , ", F o r m r R u s s i a n C o l o n c l who defected t o the US. a l s o a writer Tor N c w s M a x , July 14.
http://www.newsn1ax.~ominrticlesl'?a=2Oon/l3/213816 1
lJyiln$y:ng
W L ~ U he the I~

1nuh1i~~tcrcstio* (>!'his E:lslcrn trip. pilrt

For a long time, Soviet and later Russian leaders were careful in

their official relations with North Korea.

k c a u s c ol.lhis country's suspicic~~us intcrnalil~nal pc~sitillo.and d e w h p c d rrk~tionswill1 ~ ~ y n n p y cxc~usivclyon secret and lop-seclct a~~g

~ . I s ~ .N .O l o m r Soviet. let aionr Russian, lcildsr hils vis~lcd s ryo112y;lng. AS it was anoounced in MOSCOW.

the Russian president's visit to North Korea had been initiated by MOSCOW.dPt~rink i d r c c c i v d an invi1:llion. The visir would prohahly take phcc July 19 or 20. sandwiched k l w e e n I'ulin's trips to k d China :tnd the .lapan summit o f t k Gmup o f i~n

S e w n 1r:ldinp il~duwrial n:ninns plus Russia. The Moscow llewspiiper Vrzmya Noroatei quotcd Gcorgy Toloraya, deputy head of thc Russkln Foreiga Ministry's Fkst Asia Ikpdnmznt, who said. "Vladi~nir

Putin will becomc the first world leader to receive an invitation sent by Kim Song 11, the leader of North Korea, and to meet him in PyoTIfl~an~." TV channel ORT on June 9 reulindcd 11~91f a a long rilne Norlh Korea was one from the most reliible friellds or fnt11er Sovicl Ilninn. which assisled Norther11 Koreans in their war Russian "
irrr ~ndependencc hot11 Amna'ican ilnpcriallsm. Hundred.$ of Soviet mihtiq pilcis took p l in K w s n War. whur they shot down ahout one and a half 1hous;mdA m m m annhal aircraft." From 1Vh.Russian TV said rhc L~rnlu U.S.S.R. and N~orth n a dewlq7ed cooptation in sucll sen~itivc c a as nuclear researdl and former KGR Illrecfor (tenaal Vladin~irKruchkov in 19%) reported lo I l r Coe~n~unisln y k'olilburo tllat Pymgyanp K x h crullrl is o ~ % ~ n weapon. N ~ m h nuclar Korea's nlilitary is xnltxl by Sovjct reaptnlls systems. which could MI he considered up to dale lo pmicular. North Kona's xniy h?s In ils W n e l Sovie1 tactical nlissiles, produced in 1970s and 1980s and Im\jing only shun and ~nalium range. The Russian press also q~irrine r r s e ~ S Ivanos. sccravy of Russian Security Council. n,hn helines that suntegic or lonedisnnce missiles could appear in thc hands of f l ~ Nrmll Kluem nlilitnry n a earlier thm ?015. Rusqiall specialists ctm$ilterthe cumcm tnissile Ihreal from Nwlll Korea as "zero." and helievc thal Pyongyang's military huildup a ~ 0 i fca ~ prcllecliunolNonh KWGIfrom c n Ihc plssihle Soul11 Korean and A~t~urican intervention. All tlpse worrls frwl Rusian prvmnn~cnl-runrnedia clearly explain the Krmlln's vleas d Ihc silualior on lltz Kwmn Peninsula. On 11"s pohlem

the new Russian government, like its Russian and former Sovict predecessors, is standing strongly on the side of Pyongyan~. Also, the Kremlin is considerina the North Korean totalitarian regime as a potential supporter of the strategic alliance between Moscow and Beiiing. as well as a possible member of the global anti-American coalition. In this connection there is no survrise that "democratic" Russia continue arms sales to the Pyongyang communists, who recently accused the U.S. of C raising the danger of new war on the Korean Peninsula wit11 I ~ announcemen1 in Washinpron thitt it has no plans lo withdraw its r r o o p ~from South K O ~kr. Rodon& Sinrnun. anofficial paperorNorth Korean communists said, "the U.S. imperialists pretended to be interested in peace and ditenle," but "all their acts only result in increasing the danger of war and escalating thc tensions." We know that North Korea's militaw is armed by originally Russian and Chinese weapons Systems, including tanks. APCS.combat aircrafl. helicu[itcrs, ships srd others. Contrary to the view of r<u.ussian Sccurily Coulsiys secretary. these weapons systems are not old. and could be used by the Pvong~ang; military machine M only r 1 N ~ I I IK ~ X W ~
defense. hut also lo inmde Soulh Kntra. Rul {mly d lisliied nutnher (fspwialias know Illat hvelopmg ~nissllc progrant. Pyongynn@ mating 11s own alr and anri-~~ussili: is dclknu hy deploying Kussi:ln-nmdr S-3tX) anli-air and ~ I I - m i s s i larllplexes. Ris weapon capable to @In nol only a$ansl tlaslile cn~l~har c airplanes, hut also lo l k l r a y lacllcal and operahonal ~ r n s s l l q in sunlr cascs SWIQIC nuclm llissiies. arxl

Korean war goes nuclear "Africa-at-Irge; Third World W r Watch the Koreas," October 25, p.lexis) a: Africa News 1999 (Pat Fungamwango. Times of Zln~hio,

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easilv c r u ~and probably reduce earth to a huge t
smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in FWE ~ S h i l l . Evcr sinec the t n d ~ f t h a:lvagc t h r e e - y r Korcan war in I ~ early 1950s. military tension I c C between the hard-line communist north and Lhe American backed South Korea has rcrnained dangerously high. r n f a c ~ t ~ tui m w l
lechnic;~llyslill ar nnr. A fcrcign vls~tci toeilher Pp,n;yon; in lllc NLMII~sSw~ul South Korca will quickly ncrice tllal the dividcd counlry is illways on rll;lxinunl nlcrr for any eventualjlg. Nonh Kwra cf Illc I)enlw~alic ill People's Rqwhlic of Korea (UPRKI hns never forgi~en Z1S lor co~ning the aid of South Korw during rlie Koran war. SIK slill repards l l r US ;ISan uccuplion lbrcc in Snuth lioreo and wholly l blan~e thc nonItu tn o lor reunification of Ule cuunlry. Nor111Kcrean m d i a constanrly churns our a rindc of attacks on '"is~perialisl" Amenc;~ ils "runnins clog'' Soi~th 3rd Kum. 'l'llc DL'KK is one of tllr lntsl s ~ r e l i r muntrics in the world w h a e a vis~tur e is given the ill~pression lllc people's hatred for the US IS absc~lute tlmt wliile tile love for t h i r povmur~~em toial. NIn.lhcr lhis is rmlly so. 11 is extremely dlfficull lo conclude. In Ihr. DPRIC. a visitor is never givcn 11cllnlreto is sprak ro onllnarg Korans ok,ul lhe lxllitics of their m n t r y . No visilw Ino\es xcmnd a l m r aillwut gnvannhsnt escort. The Amwcnn government x p u n that 11spresence in .South Korca was hrcluse of the conslat11 danger nf aninr-&ion Pol11 l l ~ norlll. AnlcriW h s vast econolluc ifuerest~ Soutll Kcaar S l r poiilrr out lhal Ihe nodl Ins dug numerous tunnels along Ihr deiliurised ;..one az, pxt of lhc invasion plans. She also accuses tlle north of e in viol;~lingSoulh Koran tmilorial waters. h l g this ?a. Norll~K~xcln a solall subnmr~nc aught in South Korean wlers a&r getting enrmylcd ill fisllillgnas. Rorh the Atnaicans and Soul11 K u m s dairn tlie suhmari~~e was was on 3 rnililary spylng nlission. tlowcwr. dlc idcnbion ol'lllr alleged intrusion will pmbahly m\vu be known hrc~usc crafi's crew w a c all lo~nred Ihc nllh lalel unshol wounds to their buds in wila has heen dcvcrihed as suicicic ppa~ liidc hmrll ofthe ~nirsiun.The US nlislnrsl d t h u ntmlis intentions is w tkq, Illat it is no secret thal ~ t a a y IO

Washington has the largest concentratioil of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywherc clse in the World, ;1,l;u1 tiom Arncricn itscIL Somc t r i ~ h earmade th:tt ws deployed In t h leurnt ~

bolnbing oCIn~q in Opcr;~tion nnJ Descrl Slolnl against thc s:nnc coonrry lollo~:iog i ~ ~ v n s i o o Kuwait was from lhc lleel psrnm~rntlysl:~lioncdon Ihc Korea11 I'~llinsu~a. is trrlc 10~1h at the m o ~ m l l l its nS 11 Ia

the North/South Korean border is the most fortiiied in the world.

wtcaires.

T~C boldel. line is liltfled with anti-t:~nkand anti-pcrwnnrl landmines. sursacc-to-sm.rxc aud sarfacc-to-air miuiles nod is co~lslantly ~ l t r o l l ~ ! w:lrplalrs from h>lh sides. 11is common knowlcdgc that America also keeps nncye [rn :lny mililmy r n o v c n r ~ do r build-up in thc norlhlhrouph spy p hy

The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a hugc arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK xpxa hrrselfss n devcbpinp coontry. she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. L L YCW. IOI exampie, she test-fired n medium mngc misailc over Japan. ru~a n i o n t h ; greatly shook ,UKI a~-ed I ~
<he[IS. h p a n and South Korea. The DPRK s:~ysthe prcljcctile was a s;~lcllite.There have aL\o k e n fcws t h t she was planning

m test a n o l b r hllislic

missilc capable of reaching Nolth America. Nnlurally, ~ r h ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~

the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. 11 i
signilical~tthat the American govemlnenl annciulvcd a h w days ago that it %as rnovln: towards nomalising lelations with N n n h Korca .

Consultation Aff
7 Weck Juniors

RUSSIAN RELATIONS RESILIENT

Relations resilient - we have a stable partnership with Russia in the status quo, and Bush is making things better prefer our evidence because it takes the 6 - 8 summit their arguments about partnership into account Affairs, "After the G-8: Thc Future Orbit Kramer 7 / 24 / 06 (David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and ~urasinn ol' US.-Russian Relations". Remarks at the Hciitage Foundation, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WOO607/S004l3.htm)
There has been a loud debate for months about U.S.-Russian policy with concerns of folks on democracy backsliding, the problems encountered by NGOs. worrying jnternal trends, and Russian policy towards its neighbors. These concerns are balanced with Russia's potential as a partner with the United States and Europe, as well as Asia, in dealing with a whole hosl of challcnges from Iran to the Middle East to North Korea. It is fair to sav. oTcourse, that the uromise of strategic partnership post 91 11 has not been fulfilled, but imporlant work, nevertheless, has been accomulished between our two countries and our two governments. We, to state the obvious, kc1 that Russia cannot be ignored or isolated or treated as an adversary. On the contrary, we seek to work with Russia on the manv areas where we sharc common interests and to push back, strongly if i~ necessary, on issues where we disagree. What we have with the Russians is a realistic ~ a r t n e r s hand relationship. President Bush has stressed the importance he places on keeoine lines of communication open with President Putin, and if our relationship is to move ahead productively he needs to keep those lines open. Thepresident went to St. Petcrsburn a day early last week so he could suend more time with President Putin, both formallv and informally, in advance of the full G-8 program. The President used those ouuortunities to Promote our interests and express our concerns including over the traiectory of Russian democracy and civil societv and its relations with its neighbors. The President d s o discussed wavs we can work together on manv problems that require our cooperation.

Our plan is irrelevant to relations, two reasons - first, Iran, North Korea, and Lebanon overwhelm the scope of USRussia policy - second, relations are strong and resilient now because of co-operation on terrorism and trade. Prefer this ev for the same reasons as above. Kramer 7 / 24 / 06 (David, Deputy Assistant Sccretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, "After the G-8: The Future Orbit of US.-Russian Relations", Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, http://www.scoop.co.nz/storie~/W006071S00413.htm)
The St. Petersburg G-8 Summit provided an ou~ortunitv the Resident to raise all of' these, as well as other issues with for President Putin and the other (3-8 leaders. We feel we made significant promess on some areas but of course less than hoped we For in other areas, and in uarticular on the WTO bilateral negotiations. But there is no doub~. would argue, that going to St. Petersburg was the right decision. We knew that Iran and North Korea would overshadow much of the agenda o rhc G-8 meeting, but the fighting in Lebanon, f which was not anticipated. became a signillcant focus of discussion among the lcadcrs and for the world's media. Nevertheless, important work was done to advance our mutual interests. In addition lo the various G-8agreements on energy security. health, and education, President Bush and President Putin announced the cxtremely important Global Initiatives to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. an important step in our counter-terrorism cooperation with Russia that has been a pillar of our relationship since 911 1. Through this initiative, we join together to prcvenl terrorists and dangerous regimes from threatening us with the world's most deadly weapons. Our cooperation will include the physical protection of nuclear materials, suppressing illicit trafficking of thosc materials. responding and mitigating the consequences of any acts of nuclear terrorism, and cooperating on the development of the technical means to combat nuclear terrorism, denying safk haven to terrorists. and strengthening our national legal frameworks to ensure the prosecution of such terrorists and their supporters. This initiative serves U.S. national security interests.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

RUSSIAN RELATIONS RESILIENT

Consultation can't solve for US dislike of Russian policies - that hurts relationsjust as much Crawley 06 (May 2. Vincc. Washington File Staff Writer, "No Reason for Tense Relatioins between U.S.. Russia. Fried Says".
hup://www.cdi.orglmssi~iohnson/7-00h-l03-9.cfm)

Fried acknowledged numcrous international disagreements. U.S. officials "verv much regret" Russia's relations with separatists in the Republic of Georgia, Fried said. "The notion that Geortria constitutes a threat with Russia is rather fanciful," that he said, adding that a much larger threat would be caused bv a destabilized Geor~ia harbored terrorist fighters in ungoverned areas. U.S. officials also regret that Russia has not done more to solve the Transnistria problem, Fried said. Relations resilient - nuclear co-operation Bush and Putin 06 (July 15, http:1lmoscow.usembassy.gc~v1bilatera11jointstatment.php4?recordid=58, Statement by Join President George Bush and Vladamir Putin, released by the US State Department) The United States and the Russian Federation believe that strengthening their cooveration in civil nuclear energy is in ~ h c strategic interests of both our countries. It will serve as an additional assurance of access for other nations to economical and environmentally safe peaceful nuclear energy. The United States and the Russian Federation are workine together to meet the challenaes posed bv the combination of proliferation of weapons of mass destruclion &international terrorism. Werecugnhc thcdevasmtion that could c~urpeoplcs the workiccummunity if and
nuclew wenpons or materials or other wc;lponc of mass desrnxtion were to fall into the hands of temrists. We x e closely coopcr:~tingto Icssen that unn~repli~blr dange~. including by strengthening the nonprolifemlioo regbnc and ensuing the security of nucleiu weapons and fissile materials.

And, this subsumes their arguments - post cold war, nuclear issues are the lynchpin of all aspects of US-Russia relations - nuclear co-operation now means all is well The Nation 2000 (v. 270 no1 (January 3 2000) p. 3, Proquest)
SIIC~ aclions Gin O I I I ~ gene~'iltefurlher tensions hemeen the ~ w nuclear powers. Yell~in's o nuke-rattling was partly bluster for home ~0n~tImation. it is a but reminder that thc threat of nuclear annihilation-the sinister heart of Lhe cold war-is still alive. Indeed. thenuclear&lnger inday is g r ~ i t a . ~ ~ of u s e ~ Russia's grnwing inslahilily. ~h:tt8 why US nuclear policy and relations with Russia should be Topic A in the uresidcntial debates. Thus fu. only

Bill Dndlvy has h;~dIhc realism to

will11of

Ihc potc~~tial destilhilizing cflccls of missile deli-nse. which, aside from irs highly dubi(~ua eflicacy. will itwvilably provoke dangerous Russian countermeasures.

The United States Should pcrrnnnenlly freelr NATO rxpansion. and, :ls Brndley has also S U ~ ~ S I C J . it S I I O I I I ~beein neg~liati~ns Start 111, leading to dccper on missile cuts than does the still unratified Start 11. US is treating Russia as a democratic partner - relations are solid Crawley 06 (May 2, Vince, Washington Fiic Staff Writer, "No Reason for Tense Relatioins between US., Russia, Fried Says"
http:llwww.cdi.orgImssia/johnson/~O06103-9.cfm)

"Obiectively speaking. there is no reason for the United States and Russia to have tcnse relations," Daniel Fricd, assistant SecRtary of State for European affairs. said M:ly I dorio: a discussic~nat the Brooliigs Institution. a policy rcscmh center io Washingmn. Thr collntnes have ..every re;tnln ro have coopmlirc rclations: Fried said during a pawl discaasicm thc tbmc: "Is Kussia I.o.sl? The R t u r c of Russian 1)cmocrncy and Relalions with the W e ~ : " w e do not bclieve that Russian democracv is lost," Fried said. "The United Slates does not look at Russia as anything but a potential partner."
IWII 01)

Democracy agreements are more important to Russia than national service and The Kramer 7 / 24 / 06 (David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for E a r o p ~ n Eurasian Affairs. "After thc G-8: Future Orbit of US.-Russian
Relations". Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, httprllwww.scoop.co.nzl~torie~IWOffi07/SO04l.l.htm)

Russia will focus its attention on uucoming elections fixthe numa and forthe m w I'residenr in 2007 :lnd ?OOX mspectirely. Dcmocracies, of course. consist of more than iust rood elections, but the run-up L these elections o a c m s i o r a ~ ~ m l d c r l d i J a l e s u l h r p r % . a r u r l l a s a l o v d p l a y n p t i C l d a l d U l e e l ~ civil society during that period h all olthis will be a telling gauge by which ~s h of measure to iudge whether Russia's moving away from we can measure Russia's dcrnocratic progress. ~t wiaala) give us a ~ o o d personalitv-based politics and to embracing the institutions that characterize political and economic modernity.
NlmlllntIhc(i-~lenlersba~crl'pctd~1. Rlu.rhrg.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

RUSSIAN RELATIONS RESILIENT

Agreements on nuclear energy use and the promotion of civil society in Russia solve for relations in all areas. Once again our ev is sweet. Kramer 7 124 1 06 (David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. "After the G-8: The Future Orbit of U.S.-Russian Relations", Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, http://www.scoop.co.nz/storie~/W00607/S00413.htm)

The two presidents also announced new initiatives on thc peaceful uses of nuclcar energy and countcrina nuclear proliferation, cxpanding on initiativcs that were already underway and which will include other nations. There are areas where our two presidents obviously don't see eye-to-eye, including on Russia's dcmocratic development. President Bush has a regular dialoguc with President Putin on the internal dynamics in Russia. Concerns we expressed, for examplc, about the o recent NGO legislation led in part L its being modified somewhat, though, of course, we remain concerned about the im~lernentation this legislation, a point we have made very clcar to our Russian interlocutors. Many Russians, I would of add, also share concerns about how thc law will be implemented. Promoting civil societv in Russia is key and will over the long run help transform Russia into a country where our values converge, which will make it easier and more productive for us to work together. We know that nations that share values also share interests. A Russia that embraces pluralistic political institutions, personal liberty. and a transparent, empowering economic approach would be a Russia that shares European and American A- and I believe universal A- values. Such a strong Russia would be a partner with whom we could cooperate on range of issues. Whether in Eurasia or the broader Middle East, democracy provides the basis, ultimately, the widest ~ossiblc for stability in the world. Democracy promotion and economic trust ties solves all their relations arguments now - relations are high and getting better on every area in the squo (Unrelated to this. I find it frightening that CondoleczaRice has n Russian counterparl. One Condi is already too much for the world to
cope with).

Kramer 7 124 106 (David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europcan and Eurasian Affairs, "After the G-8: The Future Orbit o1.U.S.-Russian Relations", Remarks at the Herilage Foundation, http://www.scoop.co.nzlstories/WOO6O7/SOO413.htm) Because promoting democracy is central to thc foreign policy of the Bush administration. Lhe President has raiscd it with President Putin in private meetings, which we believe is the most effective approach. Sectctary of State Condolcezza has done the same thing with her Russian counterpart. Where necessary, w e s ~ e a k publicly on this issue as thc Secretary out did at the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting. bur we do so as a fricnd who raises concerns in a way designed to steer development in Russia in a positive direction. The President underscored our concern by meeting with a group of young representatives of Russian civil society in order to get their vicws on developments in their country. He met with a diverse, outspoken group of Russian civil society activists representing the democracy, human rights, environmental, and health communities in Russia. The President's mcetinp came after a meeting that was called "Other Russia" in Moscow that Assistant Secretaries Daniel Fried and Barry Lowenkron attended for the U.S. government. And Fried and Lowenkron attended out of respcct for the work that NGOs and civil societies do in Russia A- that dcrnocracy activists do in Russia. They did not go as an unfriendly gesture, as one Russian official suggested. A vibrant civil society also requires a vibrant entrepreneurial scctor rooted in the rulc of law. which can contribute to the modernization of the Russian economy. And to support one of the underpinnings of dcrnocracy A- a strong and independent middlc class A- the President announced our intention to create the "U.S.-Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law", which stands as a successor to the successful US.-Russia Investment Fund, known as TUSRIF. which was established in 1995 to promote the G growth of the Russian independent entrepreneurship and improve the climate for private investment. T ~ two Presidents also aareed on several other coo~erative efforts, as I mentioned, including security, counter-terrorism, health, and science issues. These initiatives will help our two governments move forward on many common tasks.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

ALTERNATE CAUSALITY-NUKE TECH KILLS RELATIONS

Nuclear technology disagreements hurt relations - consultation won't solve them Wailander 05 (Celeste A., Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, and Trustee Fellow Center for Strategic and International Studies, Testimony hefore Lhc Subcommittee on Euroope and Emerging Threats House Committee on International Relations. March 9, "Dcvelopments in U.S.-Russia Relations" htlp://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9087-24.cfm)
Russia's approach to the foreign policy challenges of terrorism, proliferation, inlcrnational criminal networks, and other aspects of "emerging threats" is gcopolitical and filtered through the leader-ship's great power objectives. This means that while Russia's concern about transnational tcrrorism is genuine, the concern is not only lo prevent 911 1-type or Beslan-type attacks. but also to maintain Russia's prerogatives to act with a high degree of autonomy in regions around its borders, and with full autonomy within its borders. It means thal while the Russian leadership b n o interest in seeing Iran obtain WMD capabilities, it does have a very strong interest in both profitinn from sales of technologv to Iran and maintaining strong political relations with its leadership. It means that while Russia has little to gain from China's rise as a military power with potential designs on Russian territory or with the capacity to counterbalance Russian influencc in Asia, it does have a very strong interest in sellin9 enerrv and arms to the Chinese Icadership, and in joining with China to try to balance U.S. influence in Asia and to insist that the U.S. live within the rules and constraints of international law. In this context, the Russian leadership unlortunatclv sees U.S. policies as part of the problem it faces in its obiectives to establish itself as a greal power. the Because the Putin leadership views emerging threats such as transnational terrorism and proliferation throu~h lcns of geopolitical and traditional 19th century ,oreat power concerns, it irnputes that perspective to what. in the Russian view, must be the true basis for U.S. policies and actions. This is why, for example, the Putin leadership does not see the establishmcnt of U.S. political-military relationships in Eurasia as an effort lo respond to transnational terrorist and criminal networks that intersect with proliferation vulnerabilities. Russian leaders assume a meat Dower and geopolitical framework in U.S. policv, so sec the net of U.S. relationships in Eurasia as a form of neo-containment meant to restrict Russian power and -insteadinfluence.

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7 Week Juniors

NATO-Russia Council is the death of NATO Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at Thc Heritagc Foundation, "Answering Senate 1154.cfm) Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2, http://www.heritage,orp/rt:~earch/inlcmationaloranizaiions/BG
Too Many Concessions'?DTo date. the real danger associated with NATO enlareement has been not that it will provoke Russia. but that it will involve eranting too many concessions. Thc Clinton Administration has sought to reassure Moscow by stressing the defensive nature of NATO enlargement. Washin9on insists it has Bven Moscow a "voice, not a veto" in NATO decisions. But in attemvtina to assuage Russian concerns, the Clinton Administration has set a worrisome precedent for future rounds of expansion. As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick warns, "We do not help Russian democrats by appeasing their ooponents." 19 Thc importance of preserving NATO's integrity has generated much discussion ahout the 1997 Founding Act with Russia, an agreement Lhal created a Permanent Joint Council. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissin~er cautions that this council might l corrupt NATO from within. Similarly, Harvey Sicherman, president of'the Foreign Policy Research Institute, argues that "J should not surprise anyone if MOSCOW the new Council as an instrument to divide or hamper NATO, especially if uses Washington becomes confused about its purnoses."20 In light of these knowledgeable warnings, an expanded NATO must inoculate itself against Russian efforts to weaken the alliance from within.>

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
1. P e r m - d o the plan and consult Japan

JAPAN 2AC

2. The negative is in a double bind - If Japan says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than the counterplan. If Japan overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that Japan says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.

3. No solvency-Japan will say no Kazuhisa '99 (Opawa, Analyst of International Politics, Japan Quarterly, 7-19)
The current Japanese discourse, however, is far from sufficient. If we compare the policy-making process to a twin-engine aircraft, Japan is lumbering along with a failed engine. Even though Japan and the United States are allies. their national interests are not always identical. For example, they can clash over China policy. In such a situation, one or both of the allies may repeat "We don't think so" to the other, In the worst case, they would be throwing no's back and forth.

4. P e r m - d o both-do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan--doesn't sever original plan immediacy or certainty

5. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. Infinite Ground Skew -1801- nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult Japan over the plan.

6. Regional Cooperation-

a. The alliance discourages countries like Japan and South Korea from establishing mutually beneficial military cooperation - that is necessary to deter North Korea Carpenter - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute - I 1 - 1 -1995 (Ted Galen, CAT0 Policy Analysis No. 244, "Paternalism and Dependence: thc US.-Japanese Security Relationship," www.cato.org/pubs/pas/paa244.htrnl)
U.S. Policy E ~ r c l u ~ ~[lasls Astall Puslur~ng gc Nc\~cnhelcs.;.thcrc is litllc douht r h t the smaller ix~tinns ol'I:asI Asia woukf prcfer the comnt :urangcltaln. wirh lhe Illlited St:~lcrn?i rngio~kilprotrcror. But Ihe pninenr qeeslicrn fi-omthe slundpoial nf L1.S. loreign policy sla~old hc whclkr the st;~tas is lncirc cranfi~n-ahli:lilr lhc rc$ion:~lbt;ars h111whcrhcr it is in t h hrsr iotercsls oTthe America11people. It is dirricull lo jusli-Cy P I L " S L ' ~ Y ~eI x~p e ~ l ~ i v t nut quo I ~nilitory c~~mmirmesls ii~delinitcly merely to spare J i ~ p iandl ils ne~ghhorr diIficultks ofcunironlin~ I I J ~~ the ~ overcoming old n~iilnosilies. Washingloll camiot permit its policy in tinst Asis 10 hc held hostllfr: by the ghosts nf World W;u 11. Thc srnolherir~p stratcgy no1 onl), fails to serve Arncri-can inlercsts in thc pusr-Cold Wnr era. it is unhe:llthy for .lapan and its ncighhors. lapui's rt.luctance 10 play u mgion:~lszccurity r o b com~l~cnsuralc its with economic strcngih and thc cxlent of its intcresls is only niir example of t k Jelrleriour eifeecls oi Washingloa's policy. Anorller. more subtle sign of excessive reliance on America as liasl Asia's hqemon is the lack oCsecurity lies among the dcmo-cratic nntiu~~s ~1I'~hat region. T\rr cxamplc. it was 1101until November 1994 thnr [he first hiph-lcvel secluily di:~lo$nchetweun Japan and So~rth Korea twlh phse. Yet hoth

numerous crucial inrcrcsts in C O ~ ~ ~ I I - a n d fact. haw had fix SCVCKII decades. Current mutual itlter-ests include such high-priority matters 3s in . discouraging North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and balancing China's mowing vower. True, the legacy of Japan's brutal
I ~ ~ I K I have II~

colonial rulc of the Korean peninsula earlier in the century left severe emotion-al scars that mnke cooperation difficult. Rut history is replete wilh examples of countries that have cc>ll;lboratedon security matters despite bitter animosities. If capiralist Britain and Stalinist Russia could cooperate to help defeat Hitlcr, it should no1 bc too much to expect Japan and South Korea. two democratic capitalist nations. to cooperate to detcr

North Korea. The U.S. securitv blanket. however, has enabled both governments to adopt apathetic policies and engagc in beneficial military cooperation. domestic uolitical posturing rather than forge ties of n~utuaIlv

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7 Week Juniors

JAPAN 2AC

b. Japan is key to an Asian balance-of-power system necessary to check Chinese aggression Carpenter - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute - I 1- 1- 1995 (Ted Galen, C A T 0 Policy Analysis No. 244, "Paternalism and Dependence: the US.-Japanese Security Relationship." www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.htmI ,Downloaded on 2-15-2005)
The Danger of UN Distractions Instead of persisting in its smothering strategy, Washington should encourage Japan to assume a more active and assertive security role. America's overall objective should be a reasonably stable balance oTpower among the principal East Asian nations. An activist Japan is an cssential part, indeed the single most important component, of that balance-of-power system. For example, Japan is the only ~ower--otherthan the United Stales-that will be capable of being a strategic counterweiehl to China in the coming decades (barring an unexpectedly rapid Russian recov-ery).

7. Alliance causes Japanese rearm, triggering China and North Korea military response Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, 77ze Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military An-a~igernent: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing Inten~utional Eizvironment, pg. 129-130
Given its aggression in Asia in the past, many of Japan's neighbors also do not want to see it rearm. For many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan's security alliance with the United States prevents the reemergence of a Japanese military threat. Even though China and North Korea oppose the continued existence of the bilateral security relationship. there is an unstated Japanese military restraint is a possible outcome of the alliance. But Beiiine and Pvonnvangalso understanding t h a ~ recognize that the alliance has been encouraging incrcmcntal Japanese rearmament and that it is conceivable that at some point Japan could choose to break from the security alliance with the United States. An independent and rearmed Japan would be unacceptable to Beijing and Pyongyang, since to them it would portend serious security problems in East Asia. What matters almost as much as whether a militarized Japan would break from the security alliance is thc perception that it is rearming. Tokyo's recent efforts to renew its commitment to thesecurity alliance with the United States &already alarmed China and North Korea. Lurking in the background is the dialogue that is being advanced by Japanese nationalists about considering constitulional revision that would alter Article 9-the war-renouncing clause. But concern about a Japanese military buildup is not peculiar only to Beijing and Pyongyang. TheAsia-Pacific area as a whole would become very uncomfortable if it were clear that Japan was attempting once again t o i o n a l mililarv power. even if allied with the United States. Russia, for example, would have to rethink its improved relationship with Japan. Moscow would be unwilline to accept Japan as a growing regional power, since its relatively strong technology &used Tor military development would pose a threat to its neighbors, including Russia. Moscow would be sure to reason that unrestrained military development by Japan would precipitate an arms race. Given its current economic problems, an arms race is definitely something that Moscow wants to avoid. While there is strong sentiment in the United States and in the AsiaPacific region that &bilateral security alliance servcs to check Japan's military ambitions, ironically it is no1 restraining Japanese rearmament. Ralher, the alliance has been encouraginu increased Japanese involvement in regional sccuritv affairs and helping to advance the position of nationalists in Japan who have long sought a stronger military apparatus tor their country. The more Japan commits itself to the security dliancc with the United States, the more it will become involved in developing its military. Incrcasing involvement in &bilateral security alliance will make it difficult for Japan lo convince Beiiing, and certainly Pvonnvang, that its military efforts are innocuous. Creating much angst in North Korea is Tokyo's recent effort to raise the status of the Japanese Defcnsc Agency to a ministry, something that Pyongyang sees as inconsistent with Japan's commitment to the renunciation of war. A deeper Japanese involvement in the bilateral security alliance is likelv to engender additional military response by Beiiing and Pyongyang.

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7 Week Juniors

JAPAN 2AC
8. Alliance is resilient-lack of consultation doesn't matter Brad Glosserman, Director o i Research for the Pacific Forum CSIS, January-March 2004, Pacific Forum CSIS, Comparative Connections, "Staying the Course", http:/lwww.csis.orglpacforlc~lO4OIQusjapan.hlml
A fcw clouds spotted this sunny horizon. Reports that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsl'eld decidcd to abandon plans ro movc the Fulenma Air Station to Nago City in northern Okinawa and instead rclocatc it in Kadena Air Base ruffled feathers in Japan. While the move might have appealed to pcacc and environmental activisls, @seemingly arbitrarv fashion in which it was announced - the product of a helicopter flight that opened the secretary's eyes to the danger of continuing operation of the air station - madc a mockery of Japanese claims that it was being consulted on alliance matters. rt also scared Okinawans who
look to the relocation to provide political cover for a healthy infusion of funds from Tokyo. The repons were denied by U.S. md Japanese government sources. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee at the end of the quarter, commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific Adm. Thomas Fago said the U.S. remains committed to the Special Action Committee Okinawa (SACO) process. A second "hiccup" occumed when Japan reportedly turned down a U.S. request to move the U.S. ArmylCorps HQ from Washington State to Kanagawa Prefecture.

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I
SOLUTIONS TO ANY PRORLEM.

EXT: JAPAN ALLIANCE RESILIENT

AGREEMENTS ABOUT US SOLDIERS WHO VIOLATE JAPANESE LAW PROVES THE TWO NATIONS WILL WORK TO FIND
Brad Glosserman,Director of Research li>rthe Pacific Forum CSIS, April-June 2004, Pacilic Forum CSIS. Comparative Connections, "Mr. Koizumi's Payback", http://www.csis.org/pr\cCor/cc/0402vusjapan.html As the quarter began, alliance officials were focused on legal issues. In early April, the two governments reached agreement on revising the Status of Forces Agreemenl (SOFA). The treatment of U.S. soldiers accused of committing crimes in Japan has long bedeviled the hilatcral relationship: Officials must balancc constitutional protections afforded U.S. citiaens serving in the nation's military with rcspcct for domestic legal procedures in Japan. (The problem is not restricted to Japan: it occurs in evcry country where the U.S. has deployed forces.) Accordinv to the new agreement, which followed nine months of negotiations, suspects will be handed over to the Japanese police; previously only individuals charged with serious offenses were subject to this provision. The U.S. continues to reserve the right lo decide whether to hand over the suspects. Japan aarccd to allow U.S. officials to be present during informal questioning prior to handover. During interrogation, suspects will be given an interpreter and can be accompanied by a representative of thc U.S. military and an additional oflicial. J & aarccments should help soothc bruised feelings brought about by U.S. rcrusal to hand over suspects. It is unlikely to placate Okinawans opposed to the U.S. presence under any circumstances. Some Okinawa newspapers protested the new agreement, saying it would "guarantee" another "special privilege" for the U.S. military, violating equality before the law.

THERAPE OF A TEENAGE OKINAWAN WOMAN PROVES THE ALLIANCE WILL WITHSTAND MAJOR TESTS. Brad Glosserman,Director ol'Research for the Pacific Forum CSIS, April-June 2004, Pacific Forum CSIS, Comparative Connections, "Mr. Koizurni's Payback", http:llwww.csis.orglpacfor/cc/0402Qus_japan.hlml
Moves to increase the U.S. presence are ever more striking considering the crimes committed by U.S. service personnel this quarter. In one casc. a soldier driving while drunk had a headon collision that killed a woman and iniured her daughter. another, a U.S. serviceman allegedly raped a teenage Okinawan woman. That incident occurred just before the Bush-Koizumi summit and was kept quiet until after their meeting. Ambassador Baker promptly apologized for the incident and pledged full cooperation. To head off the calls for revision of the Status of Forces Agreement that inevitably accompany any such crimes, the U.S. uuickly handed over the suspect to the Japanese authorities. Even though the latter crime appeared to include every element of a maior crisis for the alliance - Okinawa, rape. and a teenager - thc lallout was minimized and the damage contained. The two governments have learned valuable lessons in alliance crisis management.

There is huge public support for the alliance in Japan. Brad Glosserman,Director of Research for the Pacific Forum CSIS, April-June 2004, Paciiic Forum CSIS, Comparative Connections, "Mr. Koizumi's Payback", http:l/www.csis.orglpacf~~r/cc/0402Qusjaan.html
There is another clcmcnt in the prime minister's thinking, and this one does not reflect well on thc alliance. Quite simply, it is the fear of abandonment. Many Japanese are increasingly concerned about the threat posed by North Korea and they worrv that if Tokyo docs not give the U.S. complete support in Iraq, [he U.S. won't come to Japan's defense in the event of a crisis.
Pyongyang's willingness to clinlb the escalation ladder has set off alar~ns Japan. Missile launches. the intercept of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, and the in North's bellicose rhetoric have reminded many Japanese that they live in a dangerous neighborhocld. A Yonliuri Shirnbun poll indicates that 92 percent of Japanesc are "very" or "slightly" anxious about North Korcan missile launches. In a Cabinet Officc survcy. 75 percent of respondents identified the Korean

Peninsula as the likeliest source of conflict involving Japan. Accordingly, the same survey showed that 73.4 percent said the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is helpful for the nation's peace and security, and 72.1 percent think the current bilateral security arrangements should be maintained. Both ligures are historic highs.

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7 Week Juniors

NO IMPACT TO JAPAN ALLIANCE

EMPIRICALLY ALLIANCE HAS UEEN INCAPARI,E OF PRESERVING STARII.ITY IN THE REGION. THE
Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology a1 Lincoln University, 2002, The Challrnges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Trarrsitiorzs irz a Clzanging Interi~atiorialEnvironment, pg. 13 One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty ycars that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing f'orces have appeared despite the continued existence of the hilalcral alliance. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the US.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into nuclear weapons-hardly a stabilizing event in the region. effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from devclopin~ &U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, &U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic Peoplc's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from beginning a nuclear wcavons aroeram in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a proicctile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclcar powers.

THEALLIANCE HAS NOT PREVENTED DESTABILIZING MOVES BY CHINA NORTHKOREA AND Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln Universily, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Comnpeting Security Trunsitiolzs iit a Changing Internutional Environmeizt, pg. 154
There is also no evidence that the East Asia-Pacific area would de~encrate regional chaos without the Japan-US. security into alliance. Despite the strengthening of the Japan-U .S. security alliance. Pvonavang refuses to abandon indelinitcly what it secs as &right to maintain an active missile-development program, and Beiiin~ currently plans to utili~e more science and technology to bolster the nation's militan capabilities. 95These two current issues alone provide poor testimony to thc regional stability created by the bilateral security alliance.

EMPIRICALLY ALLIANCE HAS NOT BROUGHT STABILITY. THE

Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Clzallenges ofthe US.-Japan Milituv Arrun~ernent:Competing Security Transitions in a Clzangirzg Irrtcrtzatioaal Environment, pg. 73 Beijjng also emphasizes that historicallv the Japan-US. security alliance has not brought stability to the Asia-Pacific area. China points to the Vietnam War and the Cambodian conflict as two specific cxamples of serious problems in the past that created regional instability. 58 Similarly, it is diflicult to make a strong case that the US.-Japan Security Treaty, which took shape during the Korean War, at the time created rcgional stability. Recent problems on the Korean Peninsula, moreover, do not appear to havc been mitigated in anyway by thc Japan-US. security alliancc in fact, as will be discussed below, the bilateral security relationship has arguably cxaccrbated regional problems.

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7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION

THEALLIANCE CAUSES EVEN TINY DISTURBANCESIN THE REGION TO SNOWBALL INTO LARGER CONFLICTS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002?The CI7allenges ofthe U.S.-Jupan Military Arrangement: Competing Securily Transitions in a Changing Internatioriul Environnzent, pg. 48
It must be stressed that @U.S.-Japan sccurity alliance, a remnant of the Cold War security paradigm, is built on mistrust and suspicion. This 'means that virtually any regional issue can be misundcrslood and spun out of control as l o n ~ U.S.-Japan the sccurity arrangement still &and some countrics perceive that it targets them in any way. It also means that thc existence of normal bilateral relations, while an optimal condition, is not a panacea for regional stability. Despite having established normaI bilateral relations in 1978, mistrust and tension still exist between Japan and China. For example, some observers in Beijing believe that once relations on the Korean Peninsula started to improve, Tokyo began to shift its claims of a regional military threat away from the DPRK and toward China. Chinese concerns center on the Japanese Defense Agency 2000 white paper, which, unlike that of the previous year, spccifically calls attention lo China's missile threat to Japan-a claim that Bcijing says further helps to justify Tokyo's involvement in TMD research. So in a situation reminiscent of the Cold War atmosphere, generally improving relations between Russia and Japan turncd abruptly sour for a short time in September 2000 when Tokyo accused a Russian diplomat of illicitly gaining access to classificd defense information. Moscow responded to the espionage allegation by maintaining that some in Japan want to undo the improvements in Russo-Japanese relations. Like Bciiina and Pvonayan~. Moscow had already expressed much anxiety over the US.-Japan decision to begin research on TMD. So, the alleged spying incident-to the extent that it is true-will only aggravate remaining tension and suspicion in the Russo-Japanese relationship and in this way add to regional instability.

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7 Weck Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION

THEALLIANCE DESTROYS JAPANESE RJ3GIONAIARELATIONS. Anlhony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002. The Challenges qf the U.S.-Japa?1 Militclty Arra~r~ernent: Conlpetirtg Securig Transitions in a Char~ging Itltenlariotral Environnrent, pg. 119
Second. &bilateral security alliance makes it exceedingly difficult for Japan to develop close and enduring relationships m a l l of its Asian neiehbors. The threat structure svmbolized in thc Japan-U.S. security alliance means that distrust and uncertainty continue to pervade parts of theAsia-Pacikic region. The Japan-U.S. sccurity relationship is a military alliance that is perceived as a threat by China. North Korea, and increasingly, Russia. m s c c u r i t y alliance is obviously exclusionary and assumes the existence of oppositional parties that wrongly perceive and interpret regional affairs. B s c c u r i t y alliance between Tokyo and Washington appears formidable to the opposition. Japan's defense spending in 1998amoun1ed to $36.99 billion. This was about the same as China's military spending in 1998,86which was $36.71 billion and well above North Korea's $6 billion military budget. That only a part of the United States' $266 billion military budget is directly invested in Northeast Asia does not address the fact that more could be easily transferred to this region.87Typically ignored by those supporting the continuation of the bilateral security alliance is that both Beiiine and Pyonavann feel threatencd when looking at the reality ol' Japanese and U.S. powcr, a force that is augmented. at least in some scenarios, by South Korea's $14 billion military budget. This final perspective discussed in this chapter emphasizes the immediate need to end the Japan-U.S. sccurity alliance. This perspective has not been created out of thin air. Rather, it is based on existing Japanese antimilitarist and antinuclear sentiments and positions on defense and foreign policy sans the security alliance with the United States. This perspective seeks the effective activation of international and regional security institutions, such as the United Nations and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), to promote security. Paradigmatically, therefore, this Perspective moves security up thc evolutionary scale, sincc it eliminates hegemonic ambitions and the inclinations of states to settle disputes by utilizing realist responses.
ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE CREATE FEAR IN OTHER STATES IN THE KEGION. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges ($the U.S.-Japan Militap Arruirgnnetzt: Conrpeting S e c u r i ~ Tralzsitiotzs in a Changing International E?zvironment,pg. 91

Slcps taken by Tokyo in the last few years-the1995 National Defense Program Outline, the Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the Twenty first Century, the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. and the decisions to study TMD and lo develop survcillance ~atellilcs have been viewed bv Bciiing and Pyongvang as potentially serious sources of regional instabilitv. However, the worst-case scenario from the perspective of Beijing and Pyongyang is a remilitarized Japan. There is certainly no guarantee that the incremental growth of Japanese security responsibilities will remain contained by the alliance with the United States.

THEALLIANCE PREVENTS JAPAN FROM ESTABLISHING NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002. The Challenges of the US.-Japan Military Arrangenzent: Conlpetirtg S e c u r i ~ Tratzsitian.~ a Changing Internatioltul Environment, pg. 9 1 in
What Tokvo is now ignoring is thc opportunily L develop solid bilateral relations with all of its neighbors, most especially o policies in East Asia, which some countries view as China and North Korea. BYcontinuing to align Japan with Washin~ton's manifestly ethnocentric, Tokyo is forcing uncertainty and suspicion to rcmain embedded in the region's sccurity environment. Japan's security alliance with the United States impedes the establishment of genuinely "normal" relations with China. Because Beiiing remains skeptical of Tokyo's military ambitions and intentions, it has been very difficult to scttlc the history issue between China and Japan. The amount of distrust that still exists betwccn Japan and North Korea is even greater than tirmly suspects that the Uniled States wants to see the dernisc of that in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Pvon~vang communism in North Korea. Pyongvane sees Japan as a country that supports this U.S. objective. In addition to permitting American bases and troops on its soil, Japan's recent security initiatives have greatly worried Pyongyang, making it even more distrustfuI of' Tokyo's intentions.

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7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION

THE AI,LIANCE CREATES REGIONAL TENSION AN11 AN ARMS RACE. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challrirge.~ the U.S.-Japan Militury of Arrangenrent: Coi?~petiirg Secztri~ Trailsitions in a Cllangi~lg lilteri~utionalEnvirontnent, pg. 128-129
To argue that the stabilitv of the Asia-Pacific area depends on the Japan-US. security alliance, as most analysts do, 33 dignifies the military horse but iznores the cartload of political problems that have beset the region since the 1950s. Today. by unnecessarily exacerbating mistrust between nations, k J a p a n - U S security alliance compounds regional problems. Since China and North Korea feel that each has been targeted by thc sccurity arrangement, the alliance itself is resnonsiblc for rcgional instability. Military spending in the East Asia-Pacitic area has been hizh. There has been much concern about China's growing militarv budget and North Korea's missile development. The uossible introduction of a US.-Japan TMD system into the East Asia-Pacific area has been interpreted by China and North Korea _as a catalyst for a regional arms race. TMD will not make Beijing and Pyongyang politically docile; rather. thev will become even more inclined than they are prcscntly to seek ways to circumvent what they perceive as an arms buildup by the United States and Japan. Although Moscow did not make much of a fuss about the continuation of the Japan-US. security alliance after the end of the Cold War, thc strengthened military arrangement and especially TMD have made it highly suspicious of Washington and Tokyo's obiectives in East Asia. .

THEALLIANCE CREATES INSTABILITY AS STATES REACT TO PERCEIVED THREATS. Anthony DiFiIippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Chall~nges the US.-Japan Military of Arrangement: Competing S e c u r i ~ Transitions in a Clzartging International Envimnment, pg. 164
of the security alliance between the United States and Japan sets in motion a self-fultilling prophecy: the Today, -existence repeated su~ncstion the Asia-Pacific region is not stable and that the bilatcral security arrangement brings about some that stability actually creates an observable arnounl oi'instabilitv. Just in the last Sew years, desuite the U.S.-Japan alliance, China tested nuclear weapons in 1995 and fired missiles near Taiwan in 1996; North Korea launched a Taepo Dong satellite missile, the spring of which flew over Japanese territory in late August 1998, &both India and Palustan conducted nuclear =in 1998. Because China and North Korea interprcl the renewed interest of Washington and Tokyo in the bilateral security alliance as problematic and promise to work to counteract the resulting perceived threats, even more instability kinds its way into the region.

THEALLIANCE URGES OTHER NATIONS TO COMPETE, DESTABILIZING THE REGION, AND DESTROYING ANY ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE REGIONAL REI.ATIONS.
Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, Tlze Challerrges of rite U.S.-Jupan Military Arrang~ment:Compeiing Sfcurit;)! Transitions in a Changing International Enviroizment, pg. 55 Thus. Washington and Tokyo have found reasons to rationalize the continuation ol'tfiebilateral security arrangement. The centerpiece of this rationalization is the putative instability of East Asia and theretore the continuing need for America's military presence and a strengthened bilateral alliancc to forestall regional problems. However, this enduring and strengthened security arrangement is problematic fbr two reasons. First, because it is a Cold War alliance, it still presupposes that the behavior of sonie nations is blatantly hostile, surreptitious, and intended to upset the stability of East Asia and perhaps even usurp regional power. In other words, it is built on distrust and suspicion. Second, bccause it is built on distrust regional tension. The existence of the US.-Japan security alliance does this bccause of its purpose and suspicion. it ~roduccs and because of the reciprocation that it prompts from other countries. These enduring problems even causc he genuine efforts by Washington and Tokyo to improve regional relations to be minimized, since their overall obiectivc is intemreted as hcncmonjc.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION

THEALLIANCE CREATES DESTABILIZING FEAR AND SUSPICION IN THE REGION. Anthony DiFiiippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002. The Challenges ofthe U.S.-Japan Military Arru~lgement: Cornpcting Security Transitions in a Changing Z~verrtationalEnvirortnzer~t, 13-14 pg.
Itincrcasingly difficult today to convince Bciiing. Pvonevang, and. most recently. even Moscow that thc U.S.-Japan security alliance does not represent a regional threat. Since the US.-Japan security alliancc is a bipolar rather than a multipolar structure-which is now being advocated by China, Russia, and North Korea-it represents a real or at lcast a potential threat to them. Becausc the ~ . ~ . - ~ a security relationship is an alliance between the two biggest economies in [he pan world with a combined military power that would be difficult lo challenge, it is increasingly being perceived by China, North Korea, and Russia =a destabilizing or at least threatening, regional force. Moreover, there is growing re,aional concern about Tokyo's military intentions. For example. Beijing hns recently expressed apprchcnsion ahout Tapn's five year dclense plan for thc pcrickl2001-2005. Tokyo proposes to mifie
Inpane* dcknse spending by morc thanYY30 billion ($8 billion) fro111the previous five-yen period (1906 to 2000). Of piuticular concern to Beijing is the more "offensivr" hoking militay that Japan wanls to dcvelnp. with the intndnclion. ti>rexamplc, of in-fliphl rt.fuclin_rplanes. Perplexing lo Beijit~g the unanswered queslion of why Japan is .planning to increase its military spending in light of the fact that its is econumv has heen lethargic for the nast decdde.17ln brier. what oflicials in Beiiine ;ls well as in some other countrics in East Asia now f c x is that Jaflm is movinc awav tiurn senshu hoei tan exclusively <
~

The irirnary causc of the instability produced by the U.S.-Japan security alliance'is the susoicio" and mistrust that il harbors. Perceptions do matter, parlicularlv when focused on a strengthened security alliance between the world's two most advanced counlries. I8 Although thc LInited States has heen working for a decade to shed the imagc ofthr glohal policeman. it has been onsuccessful. This label ha<
defensooricnted poticy!.u. k e n diflicult tn pet rid nfbecause in East Asia. Wi~shington.wilh Tokyo's assistance. has liken steps that mn counrcr ro shedding lhis perceivd ri~k. 1996 joint security agwntent for the twenty-first The ccntury between the Unitzd States and Japan was meant lo create the perception of anily, since Washington and Tokyo hnd hecome cvncer~~rd thc hilatm~l that securily arranFemcnt had losl its meaning srmn after the Cold WY ended. The 1047 Comphlion of the Review of the Guidelines for US.-Japan Defense Cocsprainn have ppul the hilaera1 m m p m e n t an an entirely new1path one !hilt unnrces.&ly m i e s ~rginnal suspicions and distrust. In mldiiion to symboliwlly sllr~lpthening bilateral security alliance. thc new euidelines legitimae rcgiond s ~ u r i t y thc responsibilities for I ~ p i nThe cnlnrgcmcnr of the . bilateral sec~lrily mxnpetnent has been perceived u (hc il~cootrnvmihle pt~ference Washington and Tokyo for itlliance solutions tu regional security problems. LLlrklng not to0 far of background is the suspicion that Japan is readying itself for remilitarization, sontcthing many countrit~in Asiadonotrcall)~want m think ahour. TOSUIIE cxtent. the expcdilioos possagr oranti-terrnrist legislation by thc Japanesc nict in the fall of 20111 has added 11 lhis suspsion. 1

The alliance creates mistrust and tension. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002, Tile Challmges of rlze U.S.-JapanMilitary Arrangement: Competitlg S e c u r i ~ Tratlsitions in a Changing lnferrtational Enviro~zmeizt, 185 pg.
=continuation of the security alliancc between the United Stalcs and Japan, the world's ton two economically, scientificaIly, and technologically advanced nations, is threatenina to otlrrcnuaries. NO mntcr how benign 3 military aivi~ncenwntmayhe ktween j a p n an~ythe Unitell States. it will not hc perceived in this way otheront~tltrius.A Cold War security alliance perpetuates Cold War anxieties. TOrcduce tension in East Asia, &Japan-U.S. security alliance must end. This is the first important step that Japan can take to create a new security trajectory.

THE ALLIANCE SOURS ANY EFFORT!5TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND ITS NEIGHRORS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln Universily, 2002. The Challenges of the US.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Clzangirig Intel-national Environment, pg. 170
Without the security alliance with the United States, Japan will be in the ~osition dcsign disarmament initiatives that will to add consistency to its bilalcral relationship with China and Russia and. perhaps very soon, with North Korea. m i i n g hils recently drawn
attention to the cc~nll-adictory nllltlre of thc Sino-Japanese relatirmship, emphasizing that dcspite bilateral cooper:~liol~ social and economic ;mas. Jqu~'s approach lo security and polittcs follows U.S. policies in
S t ~ closely. This. S:IYS 13eijing. m k e s Tokyo :tn nccompliue in secretly workinz ro contain China.27 Although therc is an obvious compatibility between the I o fortheir positions of Japan and China regarding the existence or nuclear weauons that is. both n:itions lwve officialty ~ J I ~ C ~ I C L I :1bolitiun28and have even jointly stress4 thenecd wcliminilte t h r m ? ~ - - d i ~ on ~ ~ f f ~ security issues is still very evident in the bilateral relationship. To dissociate much of distrust and the accompanying tension from Japan's securily alliance with the United States is to miss thc significance of Beiiing's ogvosition to hegemony. Similarly, Moscow and Pvongvane have to be cognizant of the potential for this beins offset by rhc concerns they havc L I ~ U L Ithe 11,s.~ contradiction to exist in their bilateral relationships with ~oky,. specifically, coupcration in social and economic

.lapsn searrity aliiance.

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7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION-SCARES

CHINA

THEALLIANCE ENCOURAGES CHINA MODERNIZE MILITARILY TO CHALLENGETHE US AND JAPAN. TO Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002, The Challenges o the U.S.-Japan Militarq. f Armngrment: Con~pering SecuriQ Trarrsifionsin a Clzunging Interrlatiorral Envil-onment, pg. 54-55
Tokyo has accepted thcsc U.S. assumptions, concluding that it is easier to continue with the security paradigm thnr has presumably maintained rcgional stability for decadcs than to change it. Tokyo his felt that it is in Japan's best interests to work with the United States, no1just to maintain thc bilateral security alliance but also to strengthen it. While doing this since 1996, Washington and Tokyo have been constantly evoking the theme of regional instability. Washington maintains that North Korea is still an unpredictable security threat, and because Russia and China are the nations most likely to challenge the military power of the United States in the future, they too are suspect. Washington maintains that China is aspiring to be the dominant regional power in East Asia. while Beiiina believes that the U.S. obiective is to contain China.97 Washington recognizes that the strengthened U.S.-Japan security relationshiv has created angst in Beiiinp and that Chinese leaders are work in^ to counter this alliance, while expressing o~nosition what they see as a resurgence of Javanese rnilitarism.98 to Tokyo continues to assert that be- sides the missile threat that it poses to Japan, North Korea has "rekindled suspicions over nuclear weapons."99 The Japanese Defense k e n c y ' s 2000 white vaoer suggests that China i s a latent security threat to Japan and to East Asia. The white paper makes specific reference to China's new efforts in the development of intercontinental land and subrnarinc ballistic missiles and stresses that Chinesc naval vessels have more frequently been observed near Japanese waters. 100 For Tokyo, exacerbating its frustration relating to Russian reluctance to settle the northern islands disagreement was the alleged September 2000 spying incident, since it helped to justify lingering suspicions ol'Moscow's intentions.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION-SCARES

CHINA

CHINA FEEIS THREATENED BY THE ALLIANCE. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Art-ange~itent: Competing Security Tt-ansitions in a CIzangirzg lnfernafiot~ul Environment, pg. 33-34
Thc realization that Japan and the United Statcs wcrc workinn to stren~then their security relationship has been especially disturbinn to both North Korea and China. Exaspcrating Bcijing was the phrase in the new guidelines, "areas surrounding Japan,"3 l which, according to the public statements issued by Tokyo and Washington. refers not to a geographical area, but rather "situations" that will affect Japanese security. Beiiing feels that this apparcnt strengthening of &U.S.-Japan security arrangement, which broadens Japan's regional responsibilities, would effectively give America, with Japanese support, discretionary power to intervene in China-Taiwan problems. Spealung to this issue, Chinese president Jiang Zemin said, "Taiwan should not bc covered by the new guidelines." From China's vantage point, the U.S.-Japan security ailiance has been evolving beyond just the protection of Japan and in the direction of establishing regional security. Because Beijing harbors the view that the United States is a hegemon,32which runs counter to China's staled foreign policy,33from the Chinese perspective the new bilateral guidelines reinforce this posilion.34

STRENGTHENING ALLIANCE CREATES FEAR AND RESENTMENT FROM CHINA. THE Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the V.S.-Japan Military Arrangenzent: Competing Securily Transitions in a Changing International Etzvironment, pg. 68-69
The recent Japan-U.S. reaffirmation of the bilateral security relationship is very disturbinu lo China. While America's claim of maintaining a "comprchensive engagementn36rather than a containment37policy toward China sounds politically benign, Beiiing remains convinced that the United States is working to maintain regional hegemony.38~eijing therefore is very suspiciousof Japan's continued military alliance with the United States. Despite recent efforts among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing to improve bilateral and even trilateral relations,39 the fact that the United States and Japan arc on one side of the security wall while is China is on the other is fundamentally problematic. Beiiin~ very mindful of the nlilitarv spending differential between C h ~ n a and the United States allied with Japan.Chlna devotcd an est~mated Sh3.5 billion to mililary expenditures in 1995: in this same year, U.S. military spnding amounted to $277.8 billion. whilc Japan allotted $50.2, billion to defense. Thus. U.S. and Japanese military spending-Japan'salone amounted to almost 80 percent of China's in 1985-togthcr totaled over $328 billion.40It is true that thc United States has military commitments allover the world. Nonetheless, it is clear that America's military vower, when supported by Japan's defense resources, creates a very uneasv feeling in Bciiinq.

CHINA FEELS THREATENED BY PERCEIVED ATTEMPTS BY WASHINGTON AM) TOKYO CONTAIN IT. TO Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges o rhe U.S.-Japan Military f Arrangement: Cr~mnpeting Security Transitions in a Changing Infernatiorral Environment, pg. 69-70
In the back of thc minds of at least some observers in Bejing is the suspicion that the ultimate obiective of the United States i s u n d e r m i n e and destroy China's communist wav of life, since Washington has established the precedent of inducing both political and economic compliance in its strategic policy relations with foreign nations. Most immediately worrisome to Beijing is that it believes that W n i t e d States wants to establish indisputable regional hegemony via what China calls "power politics."43From Beijing's perspective, under current conditions the growing importance of the Asian economies to the United States makes it imperative for Washington to maintain unequivocal hegemony in the Asia-Pacilic region.44Tokyots reaffirmation of the security alliance with thc United States increases Chinese angst by bestirring bad memories in Beijing of Japan's militarist past and, specifically. its military aggression against China. Tied to Beijing's concerns about Tokyo's taking significant steps to develop its military IS the issue of Senkaku Diaoyu Islands, the subject of a tenitorial dispute between Japan and China.45111 short. Beiiing has to entertain seriously the possibility that Japan. allied with the United States, is determined to contain China and =some of &economic. political, and even territorial benelits of America's regional hegemony. While Bciiinp favors a multipolar regional and global structure, it sees Washington, with Tokyo's support, working to establish a uninolar or bipolar conlrol.

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7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION-JAPAN/CHINA

BRINK

THECHINAIJAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS FRAGILE- EW'N SMALI, ACTIONS COULD COMPLETELY DESTROY PROGRESS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof, Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Cl?allenges of the U.S.-Japan Militag Arrangemer~t:Cot?ipeting S e c u i i t ~ Tra~z.sitiorzs u Changirzg Intenzutional E~~vironment. 7 6 L z pg.
Although there are safeguards thal make a serious conflict between China and Japan unlikely today, because of Tokyo's security alliance with Washington, by no means do they completely protect against a deterioration of the Sino-Japanese relationship that could lead to military action. Despite the seeming improvement in Sino-Japanese ties recently, a solid bilateral relationship between Tokyo and Beiiinr does not cxist. This means [hat rclations bctween Beijing and Tokyo could change quickly because of action taken bv either Japan or China. The use of military force by Beijing against Taiwan. a renegade province in Beljing's eyes, would in all probability precipitate a military response from the United States, which, like Japan. also maintains a "one China" policy. That Tokyo has not specifically ruled out Taiwan as a "situational" problem causes much disquietude in Beiiing. Japan's supporting role in an American military response involving Taiwan would, in the best-case scenario, immediately neutralize improvements in the Sino-Japanese relations that have evolved over the past twoand a- half decades or, in the worse case, destroy the relationship altogether.69 Equally problematic for Sino-Japanese relations is the realization of what has already been suggested as a possibility: that Taiwan would be protected by TMD.

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7 Week Juniors

EXT: REGIONAL TENSION-COUNTERBALANCING

THEALLIANCE LEADS TO COUNTERBALANCING THAT WILL ULTIMATELY DESTROY IT. Anthony DiFilippo. Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002, The Challenges of tl.ze U.S.-Japan Military Arrurrgement: Competing S e c u r i ~ Transitic~ns a Churzgirzg lrzternalional Etzvirojrment, pg. 6-7 in
Beyond Ihcsc domcslic concerns, not China or Russia or North Korea is going to sit back indetinitely and watch the United States and Japan continue to strengthen thcir security relationship. In the twenty-first century. attempting to maintain security by relying on an alliance structure and undiluted military power supported by sophisticated technologics is not a particularly safecourse to follow. Developments in science and technology have driven societies to change and adapt for centuries. W J y Russia. China. and North Korea will not consider or even implement changes that will permit them to resist Lhe perceived hegemony associated with the maturing military U.S.-Japan security arrangement is left completely unexplained by advocates of the alliance. Although winning the Cold War resulted at least in part because the United States outspent the Soviet Union, this strategy is unlikely to work in the East Asia- Pacific region during thc twenty-tlrst century. Already thcre is evidence that China. North Korea, and Russia are considering cooperative ways to offset thc perceived challenge represented by the U.S.Japan security alliance. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in the Cold War, individual or cooperative strategies to thwart the bilateral alliance do not necessarily have to rely on spending to the point of depletion. Rather. these countries can find more cost-effective ways to undermine and circumvent thebilateral security alliance by developing niche strategies, if the need arises.

US~JAPAN COOPERATION CAUSES REGIONAL BALANCING. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangemefit: Conlpeting S e c u r i ~ Transitions in a Changing It~terrzatiot?al Enviro~lment, 89-90 pg.
Although Moscow had little reason to move closer to Beiiing and Pyongyang prior to 1hc beginning of TMD joint research by the United States and Japan, Lrcally had no other viable alternative once it took place. F a c i n ~ two wealthiest countries on the earth. Moscow had to make conciliatory ncsturcs to both Beijing and Pyongyang. What is problematic for East Asia is that thesc eestures have a military foundation and therefore with the Japan-U.S. security alliancc have the potential to unsettle rathcr than enhance regional stability.

EVEN TINY DISTURBANCES CAUSE EFFORTS TO COIJNTERBALANCE. Anthony DiFilippo, ProT. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002, The Challenges o the U.S.-Japat~ i l i t a ~ f M Arrangement: Cornyetirag Sec~trityTransitions in a Changing It~ternationalEn~~ironme~zt, 167- 168 pg.
Since the end of thc Cold War, Beiiing and Pyongyang have increasingly w e d tLU.S.-Japan security alliance as having enionic designs. Moreover, since the Yugoslav War in 1999, Russia has reconsidered its security threats, now seeing the United States aspotcntially more aggressive than it had earlicr.21Just how a strengthened American- Japanese security alliance in the East Asia-Pacific region can prevent apprchcnsion in Moscow, particularly in light of Tokyo's decision to participalc in TMD (theater missile defense) rescarch with the United States, is unclear. -recent sinning on February 9, 2000, of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neiehborlincss, and Cooperation between Russia and thc Dcmocratic People's Republic of Korea isquite possibly a harbinger of increased tension in Northeast Asia. Although Pyongyang wanted the treaty to include a clause that specified mutual military support. Moscow prudently chose to reject the anachronism associated with such an alliance. In its current form. the treaty stipulates that in the cvenl of a sccurity problem. imn~ediate contact will take place between Russia and North Korca.22Any increased tension in Northcast Asia could casily p & Moscow to ratchet u p its current treaty with Pyongyang lo the mint of solidifving a bilateral military alliance.

Consultation Aff
7 Wcck Juniors

EXT: JAPAN REARM

THEALLIANCE CREATES GRADUAL ANI) MORE DESTABILIZING REARM. Anthony DiFilippo. Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrungenlent: Cornpetirtg Security Transitions in a Changing Intenzutiona~Enviro?rn~e~zt, 159- 160 pg.
Another form of remilitarization-and the one that is currently the most problematic-relates to the policy stcps taken by Tokyo since 1996 when, working with Washington to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. it committed the nation to the Joint Declaration on Security. China, North Korea. and more recently even Russia have categorically perceived thcsc initiatives as destabilizing because of Japan's expanded involvement in regional dcfense.4The prospect that Japan might undertake more areoccasionally reminded of past security responsibilities, however. also troubles other people in the Asia- Pacific -who Japanese aggression in the region. While some may see Tokyo's security relationship with Washington as a restraint on Japan's potential for military aggression, more worrisome to Bcijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow is that a strengthened bilateral alliance establishes, or at least portends, Japanese support Tor an American-instigated regional arms races Any critically forthright evaluation of this trajectory cannot avoid emphasizing that Japan's alliance with the United States leaves little room for the development of a relatively independent securitv policy that specifically draws on Japanese norms relating to the renunciation' of war and opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons. To argue the contrary would be to overlook the fact that these norms arc slill very evident in Japan. Tokyo's reluctance to develop regional and international security policies corresponding to these norms and to work so that they can infuse other political cultures suggests that it is not prepared to assume a dynamic leadership role and that it is ignoring public sentiment that has been shaped by these norms.

THEALLIANCE RESULTS IN INCREMENTAL REARM WHICH SNOWBALLS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The ChaEEenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Cornpetin8 Securif?' Trui.r.sition.sin a Changing International Eni!ironment, pg. 1 18-1 19
Another problem is that because the United states continues to prod Japan to strengthen ils commitment to the bilateral security alliance, Japanese remililarization continues to evolve. Especially in the last few years, this :lncremcntal remilitarization has given some momentum 10 nationalist forces, which would prefer the development of Japancsc military power independent of the United States. Thus, the longer the bilateral security alliance remains in place. the more difficult it will bc to dissipate Japanese nationalism. Incremental remilitarization combined with nationalist forces attempting lo persuade the Japanese public of the need for constitutional revision portends the prospect of a substantial alteration in the Japan's antimilitaristic and antinuclear culture. Protestation by nationalists appeared, of all places. on norms sustaininr~ August 6,200 1. at the memorial service commemorating the fifty-sixth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: JAPAN REARM

THEALLIANCE CREATES INCENTIVES FOR JAPAN WILL REARM. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002. The Challenges o f t l ~ e U.S.-JapanMi/itaqi Arrangement: Cornpetirzg SecuriQ Transitions in a Changing Ir~tenlational Environment. pg. 12
Because Japan has maintained normal diplomatic ties with China since 1975.because it may be moving in this direction with North Korea, and since the settlement of the Northern Territories disagreement is the only visible and serious bilateral problem remaining in Russo- Japanese relations. the rationalization for the Tokyo-Washington sccurity alliance is wearing w . coniunction with a relatively large defense budget, themaintenancc of the security alliance with thc United States In lcaves Japan wide own to the criticism that at least some Japanese policy makcrs are seeking remilitarization. Some critics also argue that current Japanese discussions on conslitudonal change, which began in both houses of the Diet in early 2000, are linked directly to emergent interests in remililarization and are therefore largeIy aimed at revising Articlc 9. the warrenouncing clause of the Japanese constitution. While ultraconservative forccs support a stronger and more independent (of thc United States) military for Japan, today this is a minority position. However, when combined with domestic discussions on constitutional change, recent efforts to present the bilateral alliance as still necessary to stabilize East Asia crcate the foundation upon which remilitarization can actually take place in the future, eswcially since today what is demanded of Japan is more regional resvonsibilitv. Presently, a prominent, though not necessarily dominant, position in Tokyo is to continue to strengthen the security alliance with Washington, and after having exposed the public to an extended discussion oS why Article 9 needs to bc changed. to do so within five to ten years. Thus, political efforts to maintain a security alliance that is more difficult than evcr to justify are being undertaken by Tokyo policy makers who are determined to make Japan a "credible" international power that is directly and strongly linked militarily to the United States. To accomplish this, howcver. they must ignore the serious contradictions in Japan's security policy and constantly promulgate an exagecrated version of the prospwts of rcgional threats to the public.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN ALLIANCE BAD-US

INTERVENTION

The alliance threatens to embroil the U.S. in every East Asian crisis and undermines the incentive for Japan to promote regional security Carpenter - vicc president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute - 7-1-1999 (Ted Galen, The Baltimore Sun, p. 17A) AMERICAN AND Japanese oflicials contend that new defense guidelines announced last month will redefine and reinvigorate thc alliance between the two countries. The guidelines actually preserve long-standing inequities in the security relationship and create lhe illusion rather than the reality of meaningful change. Japan will remain America's military welfare dependent. The principal revision authorizes Japanese logistical support for U.S. military operations in "areas surrounding Japan" -- a phrase that is never defined -- that are relevant to Japan's own sccurity. Until now, Japanese officials have argued that Articlc 9 of Japan's constitution precludes such involvement unless Japan itself is under attack. Despite lhe hype on both sides of the Pacific, the reforms fall far short of establishing an eaual securilv partnership between Japan and the United Stales . In the event of an East Asian conflict that does not involve an attack on Japanese territory, Japan will merely provide lo.gistical supoort for U.S. troops and allow U.S. forces to use facilities in Japan for their operations. Japanesc forces There is no suggestion that Japan's Self-Defense Forces will participate in combat missions alongside their U.S. allies. Such a one-sided relationship ought to be unacceptable to American political leaders. Perhaps more important, it will be unacccptable to the American people if there is a crisis in East Asia. Therc is something grotesquely unfair about expecting U.S. militarv personnel to risk their lives to rcuel an act of aggression that threatens the security of East Asia while Japan merelv provides such things as fuel, spare parts, medical supplies, and bodv bags for American casualties. Howcver imwortant the freedom and stability of East Asia may be to [he United States, they should be far more imvortant to Japan. Therefore, Japan needs to act like a normal great power and take primary responsibility for defending its interests and mainraininn the stabilitv of its region. The new defense guidelines do nothing to end Japan's status as a U.S. military dependent; they merely allow Japan to be a more active and helpful dependent. Incredibly, the anemic reforms contained in the new guidelines havc attracted ferocious opposition. The changes are "really nothing," admits former ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, one of Japan's leading foreign policy thinkers. yet he warns that "there will be a tremendous fight" to win the Diet's approval. Washington's international military welfare programs foster a dependcnl mentality on the part of U.S.allies. Japan is a o prime example. An entirely new approach is required. Japan does not need L do more to support a U.S.-directed security strategy in East Asia. Japan needs to determine its own destiny and do whatever the Japanese people belicve is necessarv to protect Lhc country's interests. has That means that J a ~ a n to become a serious, independent factor in East Asia's security equation. Whatever the virtue of' Articlc 9 may have been when the United States pressed Japanese political leaders to adopt it after World War 11, the article & now an obstacle to a worthwhile and equitable U.S.-Japanese relationship. The impetus for meaningful change will probably have to come from Washington. Japan benefits too much financially from its reliance on thc U.S. security shield to relinquish that lucrative subsidy willinglv. (Japanese officials have admitted that the loss of the U.S. alliance would require Japan to spend an additional $25 billion to $50 billion a year on defense.) Rclyina on the United States to nuarankee the stability of East Asia also spares the Japanese political elite and population from a serious domestic debate about Japan's regional role. Finally, Japan's security dependcncc eliminates the need to confront the diplomatic difficulties with its neighbors that would arise if Tokvo decided to adopt an activist policy. Given those incentives. it is not surprising that Japan would resist anything more than marginal changes in the US.-Japanese alliance. Although the status quo might be in Japan's best interest. it unfairly places the United States on the front lines~virtually every East Asian crisis. The US.-Japan alliance is a wholly one-sided arrangement, and that defect will not bc remedied by the cosmetic changes embodied in the new dcfense guidelines.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN ALLIANCE BAD-CHINA

WAR

The close alliance with Japan will embroil the US in a war with China - without assistance from other countries .. Carpenter - vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute - 6-29-2001 (Ted Galen, The Washington Post, p.A21)
Critics of the Bush administration's diplomatic compronzise with China over the spy plane incident worry that Washington conveyed weakness and damaged its credibility with East Asian friends and allies. Rut if anything. it is the credibility of those countries as friends and allies that has been damaged, given the statements and actions of East Asian leaders in response to the crisis. Vocal support for thc U.S. position was notably absent. Even Washington's treaty allies in Ihe region -- including Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines -- declined to say that a U.S. apology to Beijing was unwarranted. Only Singapore's elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew unequivocally supported the U.S. position. Japan's tepid, ambiguous stance epitomized the reaction of America's so-called friends and allies. Kazuhiko Koshikawa, a spokesman for Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, said, "We strongly hopc this case will be settled in an appropriate and acceptable manner." Beijing could take as much comfort as Washington from such a comment. This is not the first time America's East Asian allies have abandoned the United States in the midst of a crisis. Indeed, that sort of behavior has become a pattern. The motto of the East Asian governments appears to be that they will always stand behind the United States -- about as far behind as they can get. Their behavior in this episode is disturbingly reminiscent of their actions during the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait. As China conducted provocative missilc tests in the strait, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battlc groups to waters near Taiwan. The reactions of the allies were most revealing. South Korea and the Philippines emphasized that their mutual security treaties with the United States did not cover contingencies involving Taiwan. Other countries contented themselves with the banal response of urging restraint on both sides. Japan went no further than to express "understanding" of the reasons for the naval deployment. The incidents underscore a ~otentially dangerous flaw in U.S. East Asia strategy. Throughout the Cold War, Washington could operate with confidence thal its security clients would not form close economic ties with America's strategic adversaries. In other words, there would be no serious tension between the economic interests of those allies and their security relationship with thc United States. Tht: siluation today is much more ambiguous. A chilly relationship (to say nothing of an armed confrontation) between the United States and China would put the East Asian countries in a difficult position. Most of them have exlcnsive investments in China and maintain lucrative trade ties. That accounts for their repeated ambivalence. In essence, the East Asian allies seek the best of both worlds. They view the or United Stales as an insurance policy to urotect them from Chinese ag~ression intimidation. if that problcm should arise. But thev don't want to incur Beiiinds wrath -- or even ieopardize their commerce with China -- by cndorsin~ hard-line U.S. a policy on any issue. That may be a smart (albeit cynical) strategy for them, but it puts the United States in a most unappealing position. As East militarv confrontation with China over Asia's protector. the United States might find itself involved someday in a ~erilous Taiwan or some other issue. Even worsc, it might have to wage the ensuing struggle virtually alone. American lcaders would be wise to rethink a strategy that puts all the burdens and obligations for East Asia's security on the United States while the countries that benefit from U.S. protection seem inclined to stand on the sidelines whenever a crisis erupts.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN ALLIANCE BAD - NORTH KOREAN CONFLICT

THEALLIANCE CAUSES NORTH KOREATO LASH OUT, AND GUARANTEES A PERMANENT CHILL IN RE1,ATIONS. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challen~es ofrhe U.S.-Japan Military Arrangenlent: Conzpetirzg Security Tran.sitiorisin a Changing Internutional Environment, pg. 87-88
What must be emphasized is that there are self-fulfilling prophecies at work on both sides of the political equation. North is Korea is economically depressed, has a starving popula~ion, politically isolated (though less so than in the past), and feels enormously rhreatened bv regional military alliances, especially the arrangement between the United Stalcs and Japan. As Pyongyang sees it, u n i t e d States is a hegemon determined to establish control over the entire Asia-Pacific area. Tokvo's continuing security alliancc with Washington keeps open the possibilitv of a Japanese- supported American strike on North Korca, which is why Pyongyang continues to denounce statements leveled at thc DPRK by what it calls "right-wing Japanese rcactionaries." Still fresh in the minds of officials in Pyongyang is Tokvo's December 1998 suggestion that the U.S. military strike on Iras should servc as a warning to North Korea.116 Tokyo is very mindful of the historical resentment that Pyongyang holds toward Japan. Tokyo is also very aware of the fact that Pyongyang detests Japan's security alliance with the United States. For these reasons, anv threat identified bv Tokvo or Pvongyanrr is likely to be exaggerated and will scrve to maintain the chill in Japanese-DPRK relations. Moreover, far too many in Tokyo and Washington still see the potential of malevolence and regional instability coming out of North Korea. Symbolizing U.S. and Japanese suspicions of North Korean volatility is TMD, which Washington and Tokyo continue to support as overall regional relations improve. Thus, -as a consequence of almost any regional event, the continued development of TMD could easily cause Pyongyang to threaten or actually use some military action to bolster North Korea's national image. Japan appears to be especially sensitive to the North Korean situation and, under present conditions. it has good reason to be. Tokyo knows that Pyongyang has the technological capability to strike Japan. In the event of a military crisis involving thc United States and North Korea, with the Lcchnology Pyongyang now possesses, Japan would be a target of a missile strike simply because of its security arrangement with Washington. Thus, the argument that the United States would have a reason to end the bilateral security alliance if Japan did not suft'iciently support an American military contiontation on the Korean Peninsula 1 17 is not Tokyo's major security concern.

THEALLIANCE CREATES THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF A NORTHKOREAN STRIKE ON JAPAN. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The C/zullenges of the US.-Japan Military Transitions in a Changing International Enviro~zment, 124-125 pg. Arrangement: Competing S e c u r i ~
policv blindly supports U.S. hegemonic obiectives. This makes Tokyo, like Washington with which it is aligned in a security alliance-a potential aggressor that intends to undermine DPRK socialism. 15 Not only does North Korea perceive itself as vulnerable to military aggression from the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it is also consumcd by the belief that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea have made thc DPRK susceptible to nuclear attack for many years.16Pyongyang has also emphasized recentty the "double standard" evidcnt in the American-led security policy in the East Asia-Pacific region, a policy it sees as fully acceptable to Japan. Pyongyang has argued that while the United States complained loudly in August 1998 when North Korea launched a missile that flew over Japanese territory, it failed to rebuke South Korea when it fired off a Hyonmu missile in April 1999. 17 The major - threat that Japan faces from North Korca today stems from the fact that Pyongyang believes that Japanese defense

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN ALLIANCE BAD - NORTH KOREAN CONFLICT

THEALLIANCI', PROVOKES NORTHKOREAN FEARS AND CAUSES AN ARMS BUI1,DUP. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof: Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002. The Challenges qf the US.-Japan Militag Arrailgenlent: Coi?lpeting Security Trailsitions in a Changing Inten~ationalEnvirn~tment, 125 pg.
However, becausc of both thesccurity alliance between Tokyo and Washington and the strained Japanese-DPRK rehionship, Pvon~vanc largely dismisses Japan's pacifism, seeing it mercly as a wav to deflect attention from its rcal obiective: to rearm and reinvade the Korcan Peninsula. From Pyongyang's perspective, Wexistencc of the bilateral sccurity alliance hardlv makes Japan a pacifist nation, given the size of its defense budget and its command of advanced technologies. Adding even more lo Pyongyang's uneasiness with the security alliance. since it presumably has strenglhened Japan's military responsibilities in the East Asia-Pacific region, is the memory of the atrocities committed in Korea by Japanese troops in the pasi.20 Bv remaininn under America's nuclear shield, Japan is arguably prodding North Korea to develou advanced weapons svstcms. specificallv those that will enablc it to counteract TMD (theater missile defense). Thus, like Beijing, Pyongyang remains suspicious of Japanese pacifism and maintains that thc U.S.-Japan security alliance has no placc in the post-Cold War world, save to promote regional hegemony.

Consultation Aff
7 Wcck Juniors

JAPAN ALLIANCE UNSUSTAINABLE

A transition away from the alliance in the short term is the best option - it avoids an inevitable and nasty breakup in the future that wiH spark a dangerous power vacuum Carpenter - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute - 1 1-1- 1995 (Tcd Galcn, CAT0 Policy Analysis No. 244, "Paternalism and Dependence: the US.-Japanese Security Relationship," www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html)

Avoiding an Ugly Divorce By persisting in their smothering strategy toward Japan, U.S. policymakers ignorc a growing number of warning signals in both countries that a security relationship between America as patron and Japan as dependent is not sustainable jn the long term. Even Robert Manning, an advocatc of "revalidating" the alliance, concedes that " there are centrifugal economic and political forces in both countries that could easily lead Washington and Tokyo lo gradually drift apart. Both nations give evidence of rising tcchno-nationalism, inward looking domestic political trends, and a growth of single-issue politics pursued by interest groups amid weak leadership. Mixed together and ignited, such forces could be a potent brew. "(42) Storm Signals There are indeed an amplc number of storm signals in both countries. The reliably pro-U.S sentiments of the "Yoshida faction," which still dominales Japan's foreign policy bureaucracy, are not necessarily rcflected in the attitudes of the Japanese people or even the younger genera-tion of political leaders.-The emergence of Ryutaro Hashi-moto, minister for international trade and industry and a prominent advocate of hard-line positions toward the United Stales (espccially on economic issues), as the leader of the LDP and a serious candidate to become the next prime minis-ter is only the latest indication of shifting sentiment. Public annoyance at the Uniled States is rising and is manifested in a variety of ways-.(43) Anger about escalating U.S. demands on the trade liont is the mosl obvious, but there are others. There is. for example, a growing aware-ncss of the implicit anti-Japan motives underlying Washing-ton's smothering strategy and the U.S. insistence on main-taining a large military presence in East Asia despite rhc end of the Cold War. That awareness and the resentment it produccs are no longer confined to an ultranationalist political fringe in Japan.(44) Public sentiment in the United States toward Japan has likewise become more critical, if not negative, in rcccnt years. Again the trade issue is at the forefront. A Jour-nal of Commcrcc survey taken in September 1995 revealed impressive public support for President Clinton's "confron-tational" strategy to open up Japan's markets. Moreover, those who expressed dissatisfaction with the administra-tion's handling of US.-Japanese trade relations were likely to favor even more hard-line initiatives.(45) An especially lethal potential for an acrimonious disruption in the US.-Japanese relationship exists if Americans who are angry about trade matters begin to link trade lo Japanese free riding on defense. There are indica-tions that such a linkage is already taking place. Rep. Patricia Schroeder's proposal in the late 1980s for a spe-cia1 tax on Japanese imports to olTset the expense of Ameri-ca's dei'ense subsidy to Japan and presidential candidate Ross Perot's vague but ominous call in 1992 to send Ameri-ca's allies a hill for the cost of U.S. security protection were early signs of that connection. A more recent and detailed example is the articlc by Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, and E. B. Keehn, University Leclurer in Japanese Politics at Cambridge University, in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Noting that when the U.S.Japanese security treaty was signed in 1951, Japan had "a devastated economy." John-son and Keehn emphasize how much the economic equation has changed. Today, Japan has the most modern industrial struc-ture in the world, it has not run a trade deficit with the United States Tor almost three decades, the dollar has lost nearly 80 percent of its original postwar value against the yen. and Japan faces no known external military threat. [The Article Continues.. .I The existing U.S.-Japanese security relationship is simply not sustainable in the long term. By clinging tena-ciously to the status quo, American policymakers risk an abrupt and nasty rupture in the alliance that could poison thc entirc range of American-Japanese relations and create the dangerous powcr vacuum in East Asia that Washington has tried so hard to prevent.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN REARM DEFENSE

Japanese rearmament will not alarm Asian countries or spark resurgence in Japanese imperialism - Japan will take careful steps to prevent instability Carpenter - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute - 11-1-1995 (Ted Galen, CAT0 Policy Analysis No. 244. "Paternalism and Dependence: the U.S.-Japanese Sccurity Relationship," www.calo.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html)

U.S. officials and foreign policy experts who insist on keeping Japan militarily dependent rarely admil publicly that the United States simply does not trust Japan. In-stead, they contend that any signiiicant Japanese rearmament or a more assertive policy by Tokyo would alarm Japan's East Asian neighbors, thereby producing a rcgional arms race and dangerous instability. President Ronald Reagan's first national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, summarized that attitude when he noted that the nations of East Asia "have painful, vivid memories of Japanese military prowess in the 1930s and 1940s." Allen concluded, "If the United States disengages, or is seen to be disengaging, albeit slowly, from Asia, and if Japan continues its dynamic regional expansion, the effect may be either that of a vacuum to be filled or a simple lateral replacement of one influence by another. I cannot see how this will benefit U.S. interests. or that of our non-Japanese allies and friends in the re-gion."(32) East Asian Paranoia It is true, of course. that the other East Asian na-tions fear a militarily resurgcnt Japan. Former Singapore prime minister Lee Kuan Yew was only a little more candid than the other regional leaders when he urged the United Statcs to maintain a large military presence in the region to contain Japanese power. Ohscrving that the Japanese were oncc even greater warriors than they are now merchants, Lee concluded, "I do not think they have lost those qualities." The United States and other nations. he said, should pressure Japan to abidc by its Peace Constitution. "It's al-ready breached by thc self-defense force, but let's not breach it further."(33) A similar attitude is evident in South Korea. A Minis-try of Defense white paper issued in October 1991 warned of a military buildup in Japan, which the paper said was shift-ing from a "defense only" orientation. Cha Young Koo, director of policy planning for the ROK government's Insti-tute for Defense Analyses, even expressed the vicw that Japan was ultimately a more dangerous threat than China, even though China invadcd South Korea during the Korean War.(34) When asked whether the ROK would be willing to ac-cept Japanese assistance in Lhc event of a North Korean attack, an official of South Korea's Defcnse Ministry stated that his government would be "cxlremely reluctant" to do so. The most he would concede was that the ROK "might" seek such help if the North Koreans scored decisive early victories and s e e m d poised to push South Korean and U.S. forces into the sea. as they were in the summer of l950.(35)WI-lyEast Asian Fears Are Exaggerated Although it would be unwise to discount thc apprehen-sion with which Japan is still regarded throughout East Asia, the specter of a larpcr Japanese military role may be less traumatic for thc nations of East Asia than it might at first appear. Japanese leaders are mindful of the continu-ing suspicions harbored by their neighbors. It is no acci-dent that a large portion of Tokyo's forcign aid budget has been given to the countries occupicd hy Japanese forces during World War 11, and the Japanese are taking other steps to alleviate concerns and mend relations with neighboring states. Most notably, Prime Minister Murayama finally issued a folmal apology for the aggession and atrocities committed by Japan in World War II.(36) The attitudes of East Asian societies toward Japan are also hardly monolithic. Ivan P. Hall, a long-lime student of Japanese and East Asian affairs, notes. "Prottssed atti-tudes toward Japan depend a great deal on whcther one has been talking to customers and economic planners eager for goods and investment, to politicians still playing the old 'aggression card,' to an elder generation with bitter memories, or lo younger intellectuals."(37) He adds that atti-tudes also vary dramatically from country to country. Thus, South Korean opinion leaders are noticeably more apprehen-sive and suspicious of greater Japanese political and cco-nomic activities in East Asia than are, for cxample, opinion leaders in Malaysia.(38) Moreover, with the collapse ol' the Soviet Union, Japan can probably protect its security interests without a mas-sive rearmament effort. A modest increase in military spending, say to 1.5 percent of GDP. might well be suffi-cient-and only the most paranoid would be alarmed by a buildup of that magnitude.(39) Such an increasc would produce decidedly more potent air and naval capabilities sufficient for a more credible, wide-ranging Japanese security role. But it would hardly be enough for a ncw wave of imperi-alism-espcially if Japan was careful not to greatly expand its ground forces. Without a potential army of occupation, Tokyo would clearly lack the ability to subjugate its neigh-bors, and the existing ground Self-Defensc Forcc. some 150,000 active duty personnel, is obviously far from being such a forcc.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN REARM GOOD-REGIONAL

SECURITY

An increased security role by Japan is key to regional security - there is no risk of aggressive militarism Carpenter - vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute - 9- 1-2000 (Ted Galen, Los Angeles Times, p.B9) Japancse Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's comment earlier this year that his nation is "a divine country with the emperor at its center" triggered a surge of apprehension in East Asia and the United States that aggressive Japanese nationalism is making a comeback, Although Mori's remarks were imprudent, Japan is simply beginning to behave like a normal country again after a U.3.-encouraged political and strategic slumber lasting more than half a century. to Instead of always relying on the United States to take care or security problems in East Asia, Tokyo is be~inning show some independent initiative. That change is long overdue and should be accepted--indeed, encouraged--bv the United Statcs and Japan's democratic neighbors in the region. A strong, more assertive Japan is an essential component of East Asian security. Several events during the mid- and late-1990s forced Japan to begin taking security issues more seriously: Beijing's attcmpted bullying of Taiwan in 1995-96, North Korea's missile launch in August 1998 and Washington's flirtation with a US.-China "strategic partnershipH--anaive venture that peaked during President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998. Tokyo's actions, thouzh, have been modest and cautious. After the lepid U.S. reaction to the North Korean missile launch, Japan decided to create a robusl, independent intelligence gathering and evaluation capability, including a network of spy satellites. Japanese officials also began to take more interest generally in developments on the Korean peninsula, as evidenced by Tokyo's active diplomatic posture in the months leading up to the recent summit between North Korea and South Korea. Potentially more signitjcant, Japan is on the verge of deciding to Ict its naval Self-Defense Forccs participate in multilateral governing efforts to eradicate piracy in the Strait of Malacca. The Liberal Democratic Party. the dominant party in Ja~an's coalition, has indicated for the first time that it is willing to discuss modifying Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution . As generally interpreted, that articlc prohibits Japan from using military force except in response to an attack on its own terrjtory. These developments suggest that Japan wishes to begin playing a strategic role commensurate with its status as an economic great power . Other actions. though. convey a continuing hesitation. For example. Tokyo declined to contribute military personnel to the
international pcacckeeping force in East Tinlor. despite the obvious .lapanese stake in promoting stability in Indonesia. Worse. Japan appears content with perpetuating its subordinate status under the revised defense guidelines for the U.S.-Japanalliance adopted in 1997. The revisions authorize Japan. for the first time, to provide logistical support for U.S. military opera~ions involving a crisis in East Asia that does not include an attack on Japan. Despite considerable propiiganda on both sides of the Pacific. however, that change is relatively modest. The revised guidelines in no way counterpartsin responding to a crisis in, say. the Taiwan Stnil--much less that Japan can take suggest that Japanese combat forces will join their A~txrican the initiative in repelling an act of aggression directed against a neighbor.

Unfortunately, Washington prefers such an anemic security role for Japan. The U.S. desire to keep Japan on a short leash was evident in the comments of Clinton administration officials Sollowing the preliminary negotiations on the revised guidelines. Those senior officials stresscd that they did not expect Japanese forces to fight alongside U.S. I'orccs in an East Asian crisis, nor did they desire such a commitment. Such reflexive distrust of Japan is unhcalthv for all concerned. Both the United States and Japan's East Asian nei~hbors need to recognize that the Japan or thc early 21 st century hears almost no resemblance to the aezrcssive, militaristic Japan of thc 1930s. Today's Japan is a stable, democratic country yith an enormous economic stake in the regional and global status -Those who fear the rebirth of Japanese militarism are chasing ghosts. on Japan needs to become a normal grcat power in every respect. Develo~ments the Korean peninsula ought to matter more to Japan than to the United States. Likewise. discouraging Beiiing from forcibly absorbing Taiwan should be a high priority for Japanese leaders, since such an act of aggression would change the entire balance of power in the region. Contrary to those who warn of resurgent Japanese nationalism. the danger is not that Japan will seek to do too much too soon in Lhe security arena. Given the orowing signs of turmoil in East Asia, the real danger is that Japan will do too little too late.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

JAPAN WON'T REARM

EVEN WITHOIJT THE ALLIANCX JAPAN WOULD NOT REARM. Anthony DiFilippo,Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002. The Challenges of the U.S.-JapanMilita? Arrawgement: Competing Security Transitions in a Chalzgirig Iuterrzational Environment, pg. 174-175
Some analysts speculate that without the security alliancc wilh the United States, Japan may very well be inclined to abandon its nuclear allergy and develop nuclear weapons 47 What analvsts minimize is the manifestly stronp antinuclear sentiment that pervades Japan. In addition to the fact that antimilitan norms are easily ascertainable in Japan, theJapanese people overwhelmingly believe that their country should not possess nuclear wcapons. While it is true that the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki show an especially heightened disdain for the existence of nuclear wcapons and nuclear testing, including the subcritical nuclear testing still performed by the United States and Russia48 strong antinuclear sentiment continues to suffuse the Jauancse culture.49 As we have seen, this strong antinuclear scntimcnt quickly became evident when the public overwhelmingly rejeclcd the suggestion made by Shingo Nishimura, parliamenlary vice minister for defense, when he declared in October 1999 that Japan should consider developing nuclear weapons. Japanese outrage at Nishimura's comment was so intense that he had little choice but to resign from the Obuchi government.50 Despite substantial economic development over the years and even the realist prediction that this growth would persuade it to become a military power that possesses nuclear weapons3 1 Japan has thus far largely retained its aversion to excessive militarism, its strong antinuclear Sentiment, nlul its suppoll lor the United Xations. The Japanese public wilnts a! scc thc United Nations becume a slrnng and viahle force in intrmlional security. Both the laiiaoese public and Tokycr
have also drmonstntwl a continoin; iateresl in Tapan's kcomin$ e pmmimenl nieinber of the UN security council. Tliere is irlcrensatg liustnlinn in Japan relating to the disparily between Japan's financial soppun of tlic United Naiuns and the irmurlnl of ~nfluenceILI has within this institutioo. il

LEFTON THEIR OWN, JAPAN WOULD PUSH FOR NUCLEAR DISARM. Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University. 2002. The Challenges of the U.S.-JapanMiIitary Arrangei?~ent: Competing S e c u r i ~ Transitions in a Chaiiging International Environment, pg. 186-187
Japanese supgort for the three nonnuclear principles-which disallow the possession, manufacture, or inlroduction of nuclear Weapons into the ~o~ntry-remains Strong. The resignation in Octc~ber199'1 olpxliamentxy vice minister Shinpo Nishimura of thc Defense Agncy hecause of his quite
cmnmerils relains ro the acqirisition olmclear weiipons by Inpan testifies o the entillring antinuclear sentiment in Japan. Kbhimura crrirted quitc a stu 111 J;~paoanti throughout the entire Asia- Pacific region when. during an interview with Wee.kly Playboy. hc st;rtcd that Ihr hpamse pnvellimnl "should consider tk fact that Japan niay bc brtlcr off iT il had armed itsclf wilh nllclrii we;rpons."85 Not only does thc Inpan's possession orouclear wcaponr. ~ l l e n . i s ni~ccompnnyi~>g widespread scntimcnt in Japan that supports the comulete elimination of nuclear weapons. The problem is that while both government and aouular support for the nonnuclear principles remains very strong, Tokyo's official policy on nuclear weapons, in addition to being manifestly contradictory (proclaiming the nced to abolish all nuclear weapons as Japan remains protected by America's nuclear shield), & especially enthusiastic. As indicated ahove, the three rion~~uclcx principles *main policy ntherrhi~n Toky, has m:rintai~ted irlcrcnie~~taliat law. ail policy on the abolition of nucle:rr wcapons. public civcrwhrlmlr~~ly wanling to scc thcm gradually reduced civur time. For example. 81the 2000 rcviea conference on thc N~skar Nonprul'it.ration Treaty (KPT). ldpane~e nmbasshlor lor disnrmamcnt isslrcs Sciichio Nohon~ stmed. "It is no use tn irppeal only to the &elism of nuclear aboliliorl und mnke nncl&?r-weaponstairs isolated. Alpan shvnld lekc [a] gndual and redistic approoch."8hTokyci maintains this incrcment:rlisl posiliun not brcnusc it docs nor dcsirc to i o l a l ~ nuclear weapons slates bul becuusc it docs not Rant to nlicnnle Inpan from thcm. cspccially the United Slaler. the

Japan will not be forced to develop nuclear weapons to protect itself - conventional weapons would be sufficient Carpenter - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato lnstitutc - 11-1-1995 (Ted Galen, CAT0 Policy Analysis No. 244, "Paternalism and Dependence: the U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html)

The most worrisome development would be a decision by Tokyo to acquire nuclear weapons. That possibility cannot be ruled out in the long term--especially if North Korea or other aggressive or unstable regimes develop nuclear arse-nals-but it is not inevitable. Thc Japanese public has a pronounccd dislike ol'nuclear weapons, and the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not likely to fade soon. In addition, given the tcchnological sophistication that Japan can bring to bear on the development of its military forces, Tokyo might conclude that an arsenal of precision-guided weapons, together with air appropriate aircraft and missile delivery systems (and con~prehensive and missile defens-es), would be sufficient to counter the nuclear arsenals of its neighbors. As the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, preci-sion-guided conventional weapons can be extremely effective.

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7 Week Juniors

JAPAN WON'T REARM

JAPAN'S CURRENT MIIJTARY FORCES ARE ENOUGH TO PROVIDE DEFENSE- IT WOU1.D NOT REARM.

Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, Tlte Challenges of the US.-Japan Militat?! Arrarrgentmt: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing Interi7atiortaE Envirunntenf,pg. 163- 164
Reminiscent of the Cold War, the most commonly used justilication Tor the continuation of the bilateral security alliance is that instability slill exists in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, Washington and Tokyo identify Nodh Korea and China as the principal sources of potential instability in the region.12The justification for thc existence of the alliance is that it provides some assurance to Japan that it will not have to contend alone with foreign thrcals that .jeopardize its national securi~y. Moreover, it is often said that Japan's neighbors would he enornlously uneasy if the bilateral scci~rity allianccdid not exist. for, sans the U.S. restraint. they would fear inlpending Japnnese reamlament. After weaving together these diverse threads, ohscrvcrs typically draw the specious conclusion h a t the US.-Japan security alliance is ncccssary to stahilize the Asia- Pacific region. Howcvcr, there is no valid reason for Japan lo maintain Lhc Cold War security alliance with the United States. To assume that Japan needs the protection afforded by the United States is erroneous. as is the reasoning that without the bilateral alliance Japanese rearmament would he imminent. Japan's military capabilities are good enough to

provide the nation with an adequate defense during most times. Moreover, multilateral security, especially over time, could develop into the chief form of defense for Japan and other nations as well. An effective multilateral security system, when combined with bolh regional and international mechanisms, would eliminate the need for Japanese rearmament. Such a system would also eliminate any need for revising: or recklessly reinterpreting Article 9-Japan's war-renouncing constitutional clause-and with the dissolution of the bilateral security alliance, would markedly reduce regional tension and threats. But Tokyo insists that multilateral security cannot sufficiently provide for the real-world security threats that Japan currently faces.
JAPAN WOULD NOT REARM- THE CULTURE IS TOO ANTI-MILITAKISTIC.

Anthony DiFilippo, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, 2002, The Clzaller~ges the US.-Japan Militaiy of Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing lnternatinnal Environment, pg. 103 The problem here is not with the conclusion, but rather that it is drawn from faully assumptions. To assume that the dissolution of the existing U.S.-Japan security alliance can lead only &Japanese rearmament is faully, for lhcre is clearly another viable alternative. Since the cnd of the Pacific War Japan has maintained a culrurc of antimilitarism. Specifically, in addition to renouncing war. Japan has repeatedly stressed the need for the realization of global disarmament, thetotal elimination of all nuclear weapons. and the strengthening of the United Nations. Because the revisionist perspective completely ignores
thL' emergence of multilateral security systems. both global and regional. ~ t focus is entirely on shifting ~nilitary s responsibility to Japan to rcplace the end of the security alliance with the United States.

Japanese public o p i n i o n will prevent an a g g r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y buildup by the g o v e r n m e n t C a r p e n t e r - dircctor of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute - 1 1- 1- 1995 (Ted Galen, CAT0 Policy Analysis No. 244, "Paternalism and Dependcncc: the US.-Japanese Security Relationship," www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html)
Domestic Constraints Finally, Japan's neighbors should realize that Japanese public opinion will help restrain any aggressive ambitions that might be harbored by a future political leader. A public that for five decades has resisted not only milita-rism but even modest expansions of Japan's military role is not likely to countenance a huge military buildup and an expansionist binge. Indeed, the opposite problem is a more legitimate concern: public opposition may continue to inhib-it Japan from doing enough to protect its own security interests. The regional apprehension about Japan's "aggressive tendencies" parallels the attitudes in some European circles about Germany. But the Japanese are not congenital aggres-sors, any more than arc the Germans. ImperiaI Japan's expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of condilions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable situation. Both East Asian and U.S. oflicials must move beyond the simplistic assumption that Japan's military role must inevitably be one of extremes--either the rampant imperialism of a half century ago or the selfeffacing dependence of the post-World War I1 era. It is not only possible but probable that, left to its own devices, modern Japan would play a reasonably prudent role somewhere between those two extremes. In other words, Japan would act as a typical prosperous. conservative great power in the interna-tional system

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
1. Perm--do the plan and consult Brazil

BRAZIL 2AC

2. The negative is in a double bind - If Brazil says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than
the counterplan. If Brazil overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that Brazil says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.

3. Perm--do both--do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan--doesn't sever original plan immediacy or certainty
4. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. Infinite Ground Skew -180+ nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude aH consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult Brazil over the plan. 5. FTAAa. Better relations with Brazil will lead to the ratification of the FTAA. BBC Monitoring in 04 (October 6, "AMORIM ON POWELL'S VISIT: RELATIONS WITH US "VERY IMPORTANT," Nov 3, Lcxis)
The Brazilian minister said that he believes that even the Free Trade Arca or thc Americas (FTAA) could have been concluded if the two countries had dedicated the same level of ministerial atlcntion to it that was dedicated to the WTO in thc first quarter this year. "You can't do everything at once. Zoellick (Robcrl Zocllick, the US trade representative) and I agreed that thc WTO was the priority," he revealed. (Another report by this news agcncy (in Portuguese, 1954 gmt 4 Oct 04) added: "Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said today that he believes that Brazil will just wait for the presidential elections in the United States before resuming the FTAA negotiations. He considered Mercosur's negotiations with the European Union to be an apprenticeship for future negotiations. "'The process with the European Union allowed us to see a lor of things that we had not seen before. which the negotiators had not seen in detail. We have a clearer idea todav about how we can carry out more productive negotiations.' he revealed. "Amorim emphasized that one cannot attempt to 'invade the territory' of the WTO, but that 'four plus one' negotiations, that is, betwcen Mercosur and the United Stales, is fundamcnlal. 'In rcality, it's very nice to consider 34 countries in the hemisphere. Afterwards, we can reconcile this somehow. Bul wc have lo recognize that there are differences in size and situation in relation to the nenotiations with thc United Stales and that these differences complicate matters,' he said. 'We have to move forward with this "four plus one" negotiation as we did with the European Union, even though we ended up not reaching a conclusion.'

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

BRAZIL 2AC
b. Free trade agreements lead to global ecological crisis-the result is extinction Menotti 05 (Victor, Director of the Environment Program at the international Forum on Globalization, "GLOBALIZATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FOREST DESTRUCTION SlNCE RIO," http:Nwww.ifg.orglprograrns/forest.htm 6/25)

During Rio. few uuestioncd the inherent contradictions between the iiee trade agenda and planetary ecolo~ical limits; in fact those who warned that thc two were on an inevitable collision course, were largely ignored (I). It was entirely predictable, expanded international environmentalists said, that. without any new safepuards, intensifying economic activities throu~h tradc and investment would only magnify the negative environmental effects of the very development model the world was supposed to be abandoning. From the outset, this paradox undermined Rio's hope. But if Rio's conceptual framework was not contradictory enough, government actions on behalf of global corporate interests has subverted any remaining hope. governments have demonstrated enormous energy and political will to forge new free trade agreements that Since KO, increase corvorate access to and control over natural resources and consumer markets. whilst letting treaties which might protect the planet languish. Rio's strategic vision that free trade would stabilise global climate, protect endan~ered species, and slow deforestation has proven catastrophicallv wrong. As evidence mounts of economic globalization's role in accelerating the ecological crisis, government and industry leaders arc finding free trade's failurcs increasindv difficult to @. At the United Nation's five year review of Rio's progress, there was near consensus that not only had governments h failed to achieve their modest targets but significant backsliding had occurred. Indeed, one of L e chief advocates of Rio's global free trade rhetoric, the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD, formerly BCSD, which was has founded by some of the world's largest corporations to influence the Rio prc~css) since admitted that its strategic vision is backfiring. In a recent "scenarios report" WBCSD explains that, "Globalization and liberalization of markets alone with the pressures of r a ~ i d urbanization have raised the degree of social inequity and unrest to a level that threatens basic survival of both human and environmental ecosvstems." Bur if Rio's conceptual framework was not contradictory enough, government actions on (2)
behalf of global coqmrate interests has subverted any remaining hope. Globali7~1ion shifted control over planetary health from cottununities to has corporationsthat operate in a global mnarketplacr with no government oversight. Fierce competition forces firms to shove ecological costs onlo society in order to satisfy the demands of global financial markets. The result is a new political structure where no one is in control or accountable for the accclcrating destruction. Captured by cornorate interests. governments have taken action in at least Ibur kev areas that have combined to

create a global economy that svstemicallv punishes ecoloeicallv-sustainable practices while rewarding. environmcntallvdestructive ones. Those four areas of government action include: 1) Forging Free Tradc Agreements: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the GATT (now administered by the powerful World Trade Organization, the Asia-Paciiic Economic Community (APEC), the European Union, and other initiatives to intcgratc markets have established sweeping new rules for trade and investment that, consequentlyredefining the terms of economic conlpetition everywhere. Where such rrgreenients
traditionally aimed at only reducing tariffs (import taxes). they now extend into new areas like buying land. dismantling supports for small producers. protection foreign investors' property, and eliminating so-called nontariff barriers. such m environmental laws. Free trade pacls provide an

enforceable international legal framework that transfers access and control over natural resources out of local hands and into those of the highest bidder in the global market~lace.
6. Relations are resilient-consultation on other issues BBC Monitoring 04 (October 6, "AMORIM ON POWELL'S VISIT: RELATIONS WITH US "VERY IMPORTANT," Nov 3, Lexis)

Foreign Minister Celso Amorirn today described the current stage in Brazil-US relations as being very important when commenting on US Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Brazil. Amorim emphasized that the two countries have maintained a constant dialogue and have sought to work together on countless issues. "We have ageed on manv issues. Sometimes we disagree on nuances but we have always sought ro work together." he said. Celso Anlorim noted that Colin Powell personally helped Brazil to press forward with the task of the Group of Friends of Venezuela. Other examples of ioint efforts, according to Amorim, are issues of interest to the UN Security Council, such as the Sudan question. In Haiti's case, Brazil and the United States have also maintained a constant dialogue. according to the minister.

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7 Week Juniors

69
EXT: FREE TRADE TURN

Better relations between the US and Brazil will lead to the advancement of free trade Johnson 02 (Stephen, Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studics at The Heritage Foundation. "A New Agenda for US-Brazilian Relations," hltp:llwww.heritage.orglRcscarch/LatinAmericem841 .dm, November 20) Toward Commonsense Relations. Although w s campaign rhetoric may be part bluster, hc should still be engaged with caution. He is untested in high office, and his lingering admiration for Castro and Chavez could portend aid to those rcgimes. To kccp Brazil's ship of state afloat, he should be encouraged to continue his predecessor's market-oriented reforms. In his upcoming nleetinp. with Lula, President Bush should promote U.S. interests and good relations with Brazil bv makin. clear that the United States will: Condition continued U.S. support for emergency assistance to Brazil, such as IMF loans, on its adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; restraint from directly aiding non-democratic or authoritarian regimes, such as those in Cuba or Venezuela; and continued progress on efforts to establish the rule of law and open its markets; Support Brazil's leadership on regional security priorities if it forgoes nuclear pretensions to help the region's democracies counter the threats of international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism; and Work with Brazil to lower global trade barriers as well as to develop a common position before the World Trade Organization (WTO) on steel and agricultura1products, to establish a mutually beneficial bilateral trade accord, and to advance the FTAA. Stronger relations used to pass FTAA Langevin 06. (Mark, "Bringing Civil Society into US.-Brazil Relations," Foreign Policy in Focus, Albuquerque: Feb 7. pg. 1, 8 pgs, Proquest) For over a decade united States-Brazil relations have been tancled UD in deliberations for a Free Trade in the Americas Agreement (FTAA). Last year's Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina did little to unravel the knots. Instead, the mectinp confinned the limits of the Bush administration's "competitive liberalization" months after the troubled ratification ol'CAFTA-DR in a close and questioned vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.1 The U.S. government could only watch as Brazil and its Mercosur partners, along with Venezuela, shunned the FTAA in favor of continued efforts to deepen South American economic and political integration. Given the demise of the FTAA, the future of US.-Brazil relations mav increasinglv depend upon the participation of many of those sectors of civil socicly marginalized from the free trade talks.2 Increased relations let the US push FTAA on Brazil Bandeira 06 (Luis Alberto Moniz, professor emeritus of the history of Brazilian foreign policy at the University of Brasilia, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 48, Vol. 33 No. 3, May) Under any administration, BraziI should cooperate with the United States, but has not accepted and will not accept the FTAA such as proposed by Washin~ton. And without Brazil, South America's largest economy and political key player, @ FTAA would become irrelevant from the point of view of the United States. Brazil has the most diversified cconomic structure of all the South American countries: its industrial structure is more integrated and compctitive. as is reflected in the proportion of the GDP represented by manufacturing and in its exports of manufactures (more than 50 percent). establishment of thc FTAA, if Brazil were to participate in it, would affect Brazilian exvortinp of manufactures to other head of the South American countries (Pinheiro Guimarses, 1992). Not without reason, in 2002 Luiz Inacio Lula da left-of-centcr Workers' party and presidential candidate, leading in the opinion polls before the October election, said that the FTAA "isn't really a free-trade pact. Rather. it's a policy of annexation of Latin America by the United Statcs." His view reflected rhc mainstream opinion in Brazil.

m,

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

FREE TRADE BAD-AMAZON

MODULE

Free Trade allows corporations to dominate the Brazilian Economy. The Nation 02 (Marc Cooper, "Many oppose the deal," http:Ilwww.thenation.com/docl20020225/cooper20020211. February I)
Lula's characterization of lhc agreement is at sharp cxlds with that of the Bush Administration. which clairns that thc proposcd agreement would help the hemisphere's poor by encouraging a fmr flow of goods anlung all 34 countries stretching between Canada and Argontina. The Administration hopes a pact can bc approved and imnple~ilentcd 2005. So. why such a sour V ~ C W by from Lula and othcr Latin Americans--the very people President

Bush says this agreement would benetit? Critics of the FTAA say it would allow powerful countries like the United States to force smaller countries to open their markets, which would then be quickly absorbed. Underdeveloped countries couldn't hope to commtc with giants like the United Slatcs. which would. in the end, gobble up an even seater piece of the economic ~le. Even some lcading free-trade defenders conccde the same point. Jose Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs. chief trade advisor to the -Organization of American States (OAS 1. acknowled,oesthat, while he remains hopeful, thcrc has been no substantial reduction in Latin American poverty after a decadc of trade liberalization encouraged by Washington. "Liberalization was not the miracle or thc magic formula that many expected," he said. Obiections to the FTAA center on the same point: the pact would diminish the power of nation-states to regulate their own economies and protect thcir own citizens. Like the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico. the new pact would allow corporations to sue individual governments over any law that miszht diminish private protil, including legislation that protects
consumers, comnmunities, labor and the environment. Already, under Chapter 1 I of NAPTA, hlexico has been successfully sued by a US company for trying 10 protect itself against toxic dumping by blocking the company's expansion plans. And a Canadian firm has sued the United States, claiming a California anti-air pollution law interferes with profit-making.

Corporate domination of the Brazilian economy collapses the Amazon Menotti in 05 (Victor, Director of the Environment Program at the International Forum on Globalization, "GLOBALIZATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FOREST DESTRUCTION SINCE RIO?" http://www.if,a.or.~/prc~~rams/forcsl.htm 6/25)
Indeed, one of the most important factors driving the destruction of the Brazilian Amazon is the expansion of industrial agriculture. A recent pariiamentary investigation identified soy bean plantations as one of the four "belts of destruction" Mowanlo. tnr~led p lnst~rr~tc or advancing north-eastward into the Vast tropical rainf~re~t.(zs~ thc che~nic:~l-m:lker bioicch behemoth. IS teamed t ~ with Brirzil.~N;~ticrnol
Agricr~l!i~r:~l Kcsearch (EMBRAPA) to crt'alr a aleclion a~gunctic~lly-motlilicd hean seeds taihil'td lo va~iolls soy growin$ tepmns.(26) Seedb m ~ be ~nodficdin i~rdcrrn y cnahlc crops 11) rolcriile r h erenrcr c ~ r n o ~ al'pcslicides reqorrcd lor n p d ~ ~ ~ I [inrthe cm';do or cenlral r:lv:~nnaholsoulhei~slA~nazo~lia. ~n~s u e Within n few y c m prowrrc should kaow if large scale produclion on rhc Ihin topsoils of its lnrgiwl tilrsslsis. ill r ~ l\iablc.l?7) Export agriculture also exerts great pressure on the Amazon becausc the best farmlands inevitably fall into . the hands of a few giant producers. leavinz small, family farmers, roaming the countryside in search of land on which to grow their Food. Tens of thousands of landless Brazilians have already ~ r o u ~ tosther to form a movement that is ed committed lo taking over unoccupied farmland. To diffuse this explosive situation. Prcsident Cardoso has set in motion an an~hitious plan to settle thousands ofjeople every year on such land. However, a recent parliamentary study found that ~h nearly 90% of them were being settled in Amaxonia, which sclells doom for its belcaauered forests.~s) e ~ a s a n t scoursc llsuili~p the

bbmc lor st:ming Ibrcst fu.cs. Lhougb in ~ m l i t y should rert wiih Ihe glnhal econcrmic syslcl~i it ilscll wi~ich forces thcnl off t k land is nl.eas shore they arc a hinclr:~~~ce de\%lopmcol ofvi~st lo the export-oCio!ltcd pbn~aclons e:uil Blreig~~ that crchange - such as !he sugar pl:&nlath~~sI k Rccirc area or rhc sop hcan fieliis iilhc ccnlral ccrmdo. ol.Ihr or;mge g m w ui'thc snulh. :mJ mu) remole and usl~allyvery inlbrtile 01

In the meantime Brazil's I'orestry sector is boominp, larzelv as a rcsult of the vigorous attempts made by Cardoso's government to attract foreign investmcnt and promote exports. Since 1996 Brazil has succcssfullv lured several Asian logging companies to purchase millions of acres of concessions.(29)Thcsc logging companies have acquired fini~ncial.technological m d management skills while clear-cutting t h e i ~ own forests, which will be exhausted in a matter of years. They are now investing world-wide in order to be ablc to satisfy the timber requircrnents of their. until recently, insatiable markcts. and Brazil is an obvious country to invest in. American krgpiug etlmpnnics are alw moving imr, Bm7.il cn masse. Champion lolern;ltioni~l.for inslancc. rcccnlly sold 11%degraded 1c111din New Engl:!nd :md is now expanding operations in Rraril.(.lOl AS thplieix~tc~C:IISop in ~ h r l o e ~ ~cntnmercial logging on public lands. Brazil is moving quickly to privatize thirtv-nine of its national forests US ci to make sure that it is to that country that the American longing companies will have to move.(31) Not surprisingly Brazil, and indeed South America's last remaining untouched forests are now under serious threat.
arcas which inctsilr ~ ) S oIr Am:leooi:~.

Consultation Aff
7 Wcck Juniors

EXT: BRAZIL RELATIONS RESILIENT

No impact-Brazil knows the importance of the United States. Bandeira in 06 (Luis Alberto Moniz, professor emeritus of the history of Brazilian foreign policy at the University of Brasdin, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 148, Vol. 33 No. 3. May)
Over the past 20 years, Brazil has steadily improved its ties with other South American countries beyond the Plata Basin and continued to place a high priority on the development of intracontinental relations. All its efforts have been aimed at the greatest possible diversification of economic and political ties as a means of expanding its room for mancuver and increasing policy is lo ensure the international its bargaining power. The goal of its forei~n conditions for economic growth and the recognition of its current status as a mid-level power and the legitimacy of its ambition to consolidate Mercosul and obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This goal is accompanied bv the perception that the United Bales can be either a prime support or a prime obstacle to its pursuit and the suspicion that it is not really prepared to accept a truly independent and strong Brazil as a new member of the world's powerful and influential states and will do anything to prevent the consolidation of Mercosul. Bush is pledging to consult Brazil on issues with mutual interests. Langevin 06. (Mark, "Bringing Civil Society into US.-Brazil Relations," Foreign Policy in Focus, Albuquerque: Feb 7. pg. 1, 8 pgs, Proqucst) U.S.-Brazil relations unexpectedly gushed after the election of President Luiz Inacio da Silva in October of 2002.20 Presidents Bush and Lula quickly gravitated to presidential diplomacy, setting up an unprecedented cabinet level summit in to June of 2003. Bush and Lula pled~cd "deepen the US.-Brazilian partnership in mutually positive ways, always seizing, o~~ortunities advance the divcrsified interests we have in common. always seeking to reconcile differences through to dialogue and cngagement."2 1 Both governments claimed thar Lhc two countries were "crossing a new threshold into a higher stage in lthel relationship," even though they could only settle on a joint venture to improve HIV/AIDS lrcatment and prevention in Portuguese-speaking Africa at the summit.22 The US and Brazil set up consultation mechanisms and use it for better trade. Oxford Analytica 06 (Jun 21, ''BRAZILAJS: Bilateral relations emphasise pragmatism," Proquest) On his live-day visit to Brazil in early June, US Secretary of Commerce Carlos Guticrrcz was seeking to add an economic component to the tighlening political relations that marked Under Sccrctary of State for Latin America Thomas Shannon's January trip to Brazil ( see LATIN AMERICAIUS: Shannon visit marked by pragmatism - January 17,2006 ). Although the United States is Brazil's second largest trading partner after the EU, commercial exchange is not growing as quickly as elsewhere. Over the last year Brazil's exports to the United States prcw by only 1.9%. a rate that stands in contrast to the 20.2% rise in sales LO Latin America and 5.4% to Europe. The central device to address lhis situation. agreed during Gutierrez's visit to Brazil, is an informal consultation mechanism that will seek to facilitate bilateral commercial flows by clearing, away bureaucratic obstacles. Informal consultation mechanism Thc centre point of Gutierrez's five-day visit was a meeting with his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Fernando Furlan. where thcy signed an agreement to launch an informal consultation mechanism. Under this instrument, officials from both countries will meet to discuss issues affecting bilateral relations raised by business and civil society groups within Brazil and the United Slates. The agreement is built around the advancement of four main areas of conccrn: facilitation of cooperation in negotiations; cooperation in the area of standards and technical barriers to trade; the protection of intellectual property; and the promotion of increased bilateral trade and investment.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

AT: LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

No impact-Democracy will endure in Latin America. Nuiiez 02 (Joseph R.. A 21 st CENTURY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR THE AMERICAS: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, LIBERAL PEACE, AND SOFT POWER, colonel in the U.S. Army, Professor in the Departmcnr of National Security and Stratcgy of the U.S. Army War College, htt~:llwww.i~p.ornlmisc~ubs/archivelnuncz.~df August)
The fourth trend is that dcrnocracv will endure and strengthen throughout the Wcstcrn Hemisphere. Even so, backsliding will occur and complicalc polilical analysis of the region. Many countries will take scveral stcps forward in their maturity as democratic stalcs, and then move one step backward. In some cases, backsliding mav exceed forward movement, vet that should not distort the overall picture of the region's dedication to dcmocracv. Democracy has been strengthened already in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, to name a few. Others like Venezuela, are moving backward, although the pro-democracy movement against President Hugo ChAvez, truly an "elected dictator," grows stronger each day. The challenge is to go beyond democratic elections to achieve democratic and legitimate governance.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
1. P e r m - d o the plan and consult China
07/22/content-647049.hlm)

CHINA 2AC

m l f ("China lo Become Responsible Stakesholder", http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006While assertins the China-U.S. relationship "really a quite good one," Rice said the two countries do not alrrcc on everything. "We do not agree about cverything. That is not sur~risinq," said. The United Sates will raise its concerns to China "in a she
pahhlvbtelae ho nls i1 h;rrlalicms. In ~~g-le cdr i u tew 1 i cl.tee wn s c r l l d ih e e > l~ c ; ddcldlllon to Chinesc PRlcecsidenl Hi1 hrni~o's rJisn lo the Unitcd S l a w in April and rhc otigolng L1.S. v~sil Gcncral Gail Huxionp. v ~ c e hy chairlnan al(:hlna8, Central Military Commission. Rice said I ~ ; IPrcsidenl I

High-level visits are all that's needed to increase relations, not genuine consultation

r e s D e c f t u l
11" linrnc~aiul U.S. Prcsidenl (imrgu W. Bush also me, during (he lil.oop of Eight Sulnmir just c o ~ h d c d St. k7e~ersbug. in Ruxsii~ earlier this rntrnlh.

vst i i s Rice saRiced. .

"We are having a lot of high-level

2. The negative is in a double bind - If China says yes to the plan it proves that our permutation is no different than the counterplan. If China overwhelmingly likes the plan, they won't care that they are not being given a veto in the consultation. However, any risk that China says no to the plan proves that the counterplan has a solvency deficit. Even a small solvency deficit outweighs and turns the net benefit.

3. Perm--do both--do the plan and engage in prior binding consultation over the plan--doesn't sever original plan immediacy o r certainty
4. Consultation counterplans that are not advocated in the literature are a voting issuea. Infinite Ground Skew -180+ nations and a massive number of NGOs and international organizations that the negative can consult make it impossible for the aff to prepare b. Implementation questions are infinite - they decrease education and critical focus on the topic areas, decreasing topic specific clash and research. c. Artificially inflates the net benefit - advantages to the counterplan aren't intrinsic to the plan. Germane net benefits should be disads. d. Preempt - our theoretical position does not exclude all consultation counterplans - it only requires that the negative have literature advocating that the U.S. consult China over the plan.

5. No net-benefita. Sanctioning North Korea kills US-China relations Mercurv News in '06 ("US Pushing for Sanctions against Nonh Korea", 7/5.
h1~p://www.mer~urynews.con1/ddimercurynews/news/wld/l4972988.htn~~

States and Britain. messed Wednesdav for U.N. Securirv Council sanctions against North JaDan . backed hv the Un~ted ' Korea's weaDons nmar.ams in relalintion tbr n h:llrery of missile tests 1hal.sJ ~ I ! I Lm:~rkelaanrund tie wurl~i.The push fbr sanctions could test U.S.-Chinq ~ relations. China has leverage as communisl North Korea's onlv allv and a maior sunvlicr of its food and cnerov. China also could protect North K o m because. as one of five perrrianent Security Council rnernhers. China has the power to veto resolutions. Beiiing has declined jn the past to ~ u n i s h neighbor for urovocalive acts. lareelv hecause it doesn't wan1 to see North Korea break apart and send its millions of refugees across its border. Beiiinr also wants to nrotect orowing Chinese investments in North Korea. The United States, which has no diplomatic or economic ties with North Korea that it could use as leverage, made it clear that it ex~ected China to hack a meanin(rfu1response to the test-firings.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

CHINA 2AC

b. That's the defining issue of US-China relations-it outweighs consultation C News '06 ("McCain on Nodh K o m . Lraq and hnmigation". 7110, hnp://www.ahoncws.go.com/GMA/storyY?id=2173172&page=1 )
In the current issue of Time magazine, which is featuring an articlc called "The End of Cowboy Diplomacy." President Clinton's forrner Defcnsc Sccrotary William Perrv argues President Bush has been loo soft on North Korea. " ~ o r l h e1l.s..IIIC I-M0 1inocthln will prow I:~sgn.;~ccr.'~IOIJIIIC s~.~gazioc. IIC

McCain said that he didn't think that the United Slates had a lot of lcverarre with the North Korcan leader. Kim Jone 11. China, North Korea's closest ally, needs to put pressure on the nation. he said. McCain said thal the North Korea nroblem was a defining issue in U.S.-China relationsd

6. Relations are high now and we're already consulting - both countries are embracing bilateral cooperation VietNamNet 7/u("Chinese, US presidents meet in St. Petersburg", http://english.vietnamnet.vn/internationa1/2006/7/51852/)
According to Chinese officials, the two leaders exchanged views on a wide range of issues like the Sino-U.S. relations, Iranian nuclear issue. the Korean Peninsula nudcar issue and the Middle East crisis. Hu, who arrived at St. Petersburg to attend the oulreach session of the G8 summit, said that recentlv the Sino-U.S. rclations have seen slcadv dcvelo~ment. the consensus on uromoting the Sino-U.S. constructive coonerative tics has bccn and im~lementcd slep by step. said Hu. He also said lhal China is willing to make ioint efforts with the U.S. to enhance cooueratjon in trade and economic development, cncrgy, military affairs, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. resuect each other's concerns and ~ronerlv handle the sensitive issues in bilateral ties. Bush said thal Hu'svisit to the United States in April this year was very successl'ul and fruitful. The U.S. side attaches meat im~ortance the US.-China relations. said Bush, addine that the U.S. is willino to enhance to bilateral cooperation and nromote the relations between the two countries.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
Washington
--

EXT: CHINA RELATIONS HIGH

Relations are high: the US and China are cooperating now worse '06 (Jane, Washington File Staff Writer, "U.S., China Continue Cooperation on Worker Protection", 7/24, http://usinSo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html'?p=washlileenglish&y=2006&m=July&x=20060724 172459ajcsrom0.8154261)

1 according to the U.S. Department of Labor. ,

"Over the past two vears. thc Labor Denartrnent has worked with the Peoule's Republic of China to strengthen several straterric areas of worker ~rolcction:employment standards, migrant workers. pensions, and health and safety -- especially mine safety," Deputy Secrciary of Labor Steven Law said in a July 21 press release. U . S S coo~eration. a follow-up, the two countries have exchanged delegations of experts, best practices and information. As Relations are the highest in 10 years; largely from American and Chinese leaders frequently discussing issues related to the plan BelIv '03 (James, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacilic Affairs, "US-China Relations", 9/11, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/24004.htm) President Bush, Secretary Powell, and all of us in the adrninistra~ionhave worked hard over the last two-and-a-half years to t forge a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship with China. In the s ~ i r iof dealing straiohtforwardlv with our d l takinrr oflice. He visited China twice in his first 13 months in ofilce, hosted President Jiang Zemin in Crawford last October, and met the new Chinese President Hu Jintao in Evian, France this June. While not rninimizi the a d m i n i s t r a l , on sonae fronts, the best it has been in m.It i s m a r k e d -- and sometimes common -- policies o n a broad range of issues that arc critical to U.S. national interests: the war on terrorism and critical resional securitv issues are just two examples. Both China and America understand that what we need -- what is in both of our interests -- is a relationship that is pragmatic, based on mutual respect, and focuscd on furthering veace and stabilitv in the world,

Chinese workers are eniovincr imnrovcd ~rotections fewer iniurics thanks to intensivc coo~erative and efforts

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: RELATIONS HIGH NOW

The US and China are consulting now on security issues Xinhua 7/30 ("Chinese State Councilor calls for enhanced cooperation with U.S.". http://english.~ople.com.cn/200607/3O/eng2~~73OO288222.htn~l)
Visiting Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Zhou Yonrrkang. ending a Ibur-dav visit to the United States on Saturdav. has called for cnhanced cooueration between the two countrics in law enforcenlent when meeting top U.S. officials. During his stay in Washington, Zhou held scnarate talks with U.S. Attornev General Alberto R. Gonzales, Sccretarv of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and Secretarv of Trcasury Henry M. Paulson. China and the U.S. should alwavs handle the bilateral relations hit^ from a strateeic heinht and a lone-term ncrsuectivc, bear in^ in mind their common interests and rcsnectino each other's concerns. Zhou told the U.S. officials. The two countrics should enhance dialoeue and cooueration so as to push forward the develonment of constructive coo~erativc relations between them In an all-mund way, said Zhou, who began his visit on Wednesday.

This cooperation on security issues is the linchpin of relations Xinhua 7/30 ("Chinese State Councilor calls for enhanced cooperation with U.S.", http://english.people.com.cnl200607/3O/eng20060730~288222.h~ml)
China-U.S. cooneration in securitv and law enforcement has deenened stcadilv in recent vears. Zhou said, adding that enhanced cooneration in the areas not onlv conforms to the common stratenic interests of the two countries. but is also conducive t o ncace. stabilitv and develo~ment the region and the world as a whole. in The U.S. and China share important common interests in security and law enforcement, U.S. officials said, noting that & China cooncration in the areas is an indis~ensable cornDonent of the whole bilateral relationshiu. The U.S. covcrnmcnt highly values the countrv's cooneration with China in securitv and law enforcement, they said, voicing satisfaction over the steady development of U.S.-China cooperation in the areas. and The U.S. eovernment annreciates China's active efforts in this renard and is look in^ forward to a dee~eninlr further exnansion of such cooneration with China, the officials said. At the talks. the two sides aereed to measures to nromote exchanges of law enforcement nersonnel, imwrove the consultation mechanisms between the countries, establish hot-line contacts between the two countries' departments concerned and ensure timely sharing of information. They also vowed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in man-hunting and repatriating criminal suspects and in the tight against terrorism, cross-border crimes, drug trafficking. money-laundering, cyber crinie and intelligence property infringement.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: ALTERNATE CAUSALITY-CHINA

RELATIONS LOW

a) China's non-compliancewith WTO Kellv '03 (Jamcs. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "US-China Relations", 911 1,

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rlslrnII2OO3/24004.h~m)
We havc serious concerns with China's WTO comoliance in certain areas -- particularly in agriculture, intcllcctual property rights, the services sector, and the cross-cutting issue of transparency -- and are insist in^ that the Chinese address these concerns. I want to emphasize that monitoring and enforcing China's im~le~nentation its WTO commitmcnls arc tov of priorilics for the U.S. Government. Wc also look forward to working with the P.R.C. on key econo~lliclssues in the current Doha Round. including
a move to reduce agricultural subsidies. which inhibit the trade of g o d s in which thc Unitcd States and China are both competitive.

b) Intentional undervaluing of currency Kellv '03 (James, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "US-China Relations", 911 1, http://www.sta~e.g0~/p/eaplrl~lrIT1/2003/24004. htm)

anunfair Treasury Secrctarv Snow, in his recent visit to Beijing,

thts Issue in more detail.

I know that many members of Congress arc concerned that China is deliberatelv rnaintainine an undervalued currency 10 gain

that the best international economic svstern is onc based on free trade. free caoital flows. and market-determined exchange rates. We arc cncouraning China to accelerate trade liberalization, vermit the free flow of cauital. and take stens to establish a tloatine exchange rate. I understand that you will havc many questions about the currency issue and I d e f r to my colleagues at the Trcasury to address

Citizen rights, the legal system, and human rights abuses C) Kellv '03 (James: Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "US-China Relations", 9/11, htm) http://~~~.~~ate.povlp/eap/rls/rm/2003/24004.
f Some o f policies. Although access to inlonnation
1

liti

em nd its internal and who

from outside China and the imperatives of economic reform have nlade it increasingly difficult for the Cotnmunist Parry to control social and political thought or activities, China remains a one-nartv svstem where the oeoole who rule

in China's lack of resnect for the richts of its citizens. Anv individual o r croup the regime sees as threateninq -- whether they be churches, Tibetans. Muslim Uighors. journalists investigating democracy activisls, Falun Gong practitioners. Christians worshiping in home or unregiste~xd corruption. laid-off workers protesting. or even university students venting on the internet --any of these people run the risk of detention or worse it' thev cross an ill-defined line. Despite rcform, China's Ieeal svstem remains seriouslv flawed. and often ~rovides little or no political crimcs. Thcrc is simply no other way to put it -- ongoinc. erosg due process to those accused of crimes, ~articularlv violations of human rights are a serious impediment to better relations and undermine the rroodwill generated by individual rclcases or other steos.

d) Proliferation Kellv '03 (James, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "US-China Relations", 911 1,

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/24004.htm)
There are also stem that need to be taken with regard to nonoroliferation, ~
h Chinese have expressed their desire to svni the proliferation of c missiles and WMD. and wc are heartened by recent steps taken In thc right direction. Under Secretary for Arms Conlml and lnternationnl Security John Bolton was mcently i n Beijing for the second mund of a semi-annual security dialogue aimed ar -- among othcr key issues -- halting the spread of these deadly weapons and technologies. Although

China rcccntlv issued undated reoulations on the exoort of chcmical and bioloeical agents. as well as missile-related exwort controls, full imnlemenlation and effective enforcement arc still lacking. Wc continue to see disturbing cases of proliferation activities bv certain Chinese firms. As you know, the Administration has not shicd kom sanctioning such activities. as reuuired bv U.S. law. China must realize that this kind of proliferation not only damages its relalionshin with the U.S., but also ultimatcly hurts its own interests and security.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

EXT: ALTERNATE CAUSALITY-CHINA

RELATIONS LOW

"Military Catch-all Rule" kills US-Chinese relations - they won't improve until trade imbalance is corrected Alford 813 (Donald, International lawyer and expert in trade controls and China trade, "Turning the Screws on US-Chinese exporters", http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China~Business/HHOCbOl .html)

WASHINGTON - T Q ominous turn on July 6 when the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) nublished for ~ u b l i c comment the hichlv problematic "China Militarv Catch-all Rule". which, ii. made final, will dramaticallv and advcrsclv imvact trade and finance between China and the Unilcd States and its allies.

o r in 47 fairly expansive categories (from machine tools to medical chemicals, from microprocessors to music cquipmcnt) for potential "military use" in China. Heretofore, these commodities had freely flowed to China without a license. [continued later in the article] Chinese reaction to the proposed rule has been muted but advcrsc, as could be expected. Citing previous agreements to enhance trade, MOFCOM spokesman Chons Ouan noted that the vrouosal "was unfavorable for benefits of enternrises ... and the healthv develo~rnent Sino-US trade and economic relations". He also cxpressed his des~re the US "could give up of that its Cold War mentality". Sadly, thc administration of President George W Bush is committed to imoosine: this flawed uiece of regulation on exuorters l o of thc White House and Congress. But the Chinese some quarters
and until the Washington vermits China to ~urchase hish-value euui~ment. sector where the US still maintains some a comparative advantage, but an area on which the government is turning the export screws.

Consultation Aff
7 Week Juniors

I
-

AT: CHINA AGGRESSION

China isn't a threat their military is far behind ours -on '99 (David, Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center, Managing US.-China Relations in the Twcnty-First Century". http://www.nixoncenter.org/publjcations/mono,oraphs/managing.htmf)
Misconception # I : China will soon be a supcrpower. The realitv is that China's militarv remains placued by wcaknesscs. and These deficiencies include outdated eaui~ment a force structure that will imuair Beiiine's abilitv to nroicct significant power at ereat distances from its shores for many years to come, though the PRC's capacity to affect U.S. interests closer to its borders (includins Taiwan) is growing. The PRC is modernizing its nuclear weapons and missiles, but jts nuclear cauabilitv remains small. es~eciallv comnarison with that of the United States. and continuation of its minimal deterrence in strateav is very much in U.S. interests. If it grows too preoccupied with China's very mcasured military modernization, America risks overcompensating with containment-oriented policies that would fuel a regional arms race. reduce China's incentives to integrate itself into the international system, and prevent Washington and Bcijing from cooperating in areas of mutual interest.