Samuel Taylor 28/11/09

Does Suleiman I deserve the title 'Magnificent'?

When Sultan Suleiman I acceded to the throne in 1520, he was the latest in a succession of capable and powerful Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. He would raise the status of the Ottoman Empire from a barbarian and peripheral state to an Empire that, at its height, determined the balance of power in Europe. No major policies were made in the sixteenth century Mediterranean without considering the Ottomans. Significantly, it was the Europeans who dubbed him the Magnificent, and to the Turks he was the Lawgiver, but both titles illustrate the importance of his reign. Suleiman as a person was able, intelligent and decisive; his political ability allowed him to reign for over forty unbroken years; he was a courageous and ambitious military commander and he was sincerely religious. To many contemporaries, Suleiman seemed to deserve the title Magnificent, but there was a flaw in his persona, namely the unseemly amount of influence that his wife had over him. When he was growing up, his father, Selim, was not the heir to the sultanate, and therefore Suleiman was just another prince. Educated at court, he was taught the Quran, reading and writing, mathematics, physical exercise and music. He was well-read; certainly he read all the major works of poetry and legend as well as philosophy and history as an adult he would regularly debate with the intellectuals of his day. Having grown up in Court, he would have had experience of the intimate ceremony and functions of Court. He would have been well aware of the major factions and rivalries in the Royal Palace and could later use this knowledge when he came to power. He learnt Arabic and Persian as was standard for royalty at the time, but displayed great aptitude for languages. He is recorded as being able to converse with his subjects from the Balkans in their own tongue. All Ottoman princes were taught manual work1, and Suleiman like his father chose to learn the craft of being a goldsmith. When he was fifteen, he was made the governor of the province of Caffa, near the Crimea; then, when he was seventeen and his father had become heir to the throne, he was made governor of Istanbul and Sarukhan. These positions gave him useful experience of government and of administering a sometimes hostile and bandit-ridden province. This experience served him well in his position as Sultan. After eight years of Selims reign, Suleiman became king, and immediately ruled in a different way to his father. Suleiman re-established free trade with Iran, he recompensed merchants whose goods had been seized, and he repatriated Egyptian notables who had been deported by Selim2. This could perhaps be attributed to pragmatism rather than idealism on his part, but nevertheless the decisions he took seem to be those of a tolerant monarch. In addition, Suleiman could be merciful. When Ayas Pasha, a vizier, was found responsible for the extremely violent loss of 45,000 men during the siege of Rhodes, Suleiman arrested him, yet instead of wastefully executing him in a fit of pique, Suleiman allowed the Pasha to return as commander to redeem himself. Another aspect of his faithfulness was in his sincere promises when negotiating with a besieged enemy. His attitude towards even the Grand Master of the Knights of Saint John was one of deep respect for a skilful opponent, and Suleiman said I am really distressed to have thrown that old man out of his palace after allowing the Knights Templar Order to leave Rhodes peacefully while still militarily strong and coherent a decision that would come back to haunt him. A more ruthless ruler, given the same opportunities and upper hand in war that Suleiman had, would have crushed the Knights once and for all, but
1 2

Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 76 Halil Inalcik, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire (Bloomington 1993) pp. 75

Suleiman chose to release them. Andr Clot sees Suleiman as an ideal ruler, but he does not consider any other point of view or evidence that might contradict this, and his book on Suleiman extols Suleimans good qualities to an unreasonable and factually inaccurate extent. Suleimans compassion only went so far, as shown by how he ruthlessly made a scapegoat of his son-in-law and in the pitiless way in which he executed prisoners and criminals3 Suleiman was regarded as the Lawgiver by his own people, and this shows how high he was held in their own affections and his reputation as a just ruler. His legislation had to please the people without alienating the factions at court or away from it. But his legislation still had to be an effective means of establishing law and order and controlling his subjects4. Suleiman was concerned that those onto whom he conferred power did not abuse it5, and therefore his legislation was of an extreme severity which would achieve this6. He and his lawmakers went into minute detail in to try to achieve a perfectly just and yet functional state, for example even going so far as to stipulate the amount of butter that was to be used in cakes, and setting a minimum standard of treatment for livestock. Suleiman realised that the basis of an empire was to have a contented, productive and loyal population. Any man could theoretically come to the Sultan to demand justice, and Suleiman would listen and then judge apparently fairly7, but this was often not exercised because local courts and judges would normally deal with legal issues. Islamic law was the basis for the law of the Empire created a strong legal platform for his empire to flourish. Suleiman and his advisors interpreted the law to align secular legislation more closely with Shariah law8. However, Lybyer argues that Suleiman appears to be a great legislator only in comparison with his predecessors. Inalcik disagrees, stating that Suleiman should be regarded as a good lawmaker in his own right, but while Inalcik offers ways in which Suleimans legislation was effective, he neglects to consider any deficiences, and the relative imbalance of his arguments undermines their credibility. Suleimans laws were not absolutely ideal, and were hindered by the religious Islamic conservatism of the government and by the limited effect that centralised, despotic lawmaking has on the wider Empire9. The epithet of the Lawgiver was given, but perhaps not deserved. Suleiman inherited a functional feudal system, but using his practical experience of administration gained in the provinces, he was able to refine the system10. Suleiman and his advisors had to organise effective local and provincial administration to be co-ordinated and uniform in its legislation, taxes and policies and to create a system that could eliminate corruption and abuses of power even away from the capital. Examples of how he did this are that in the newly-captured Balkans, Suleiman needed to created provinces and impose Ottoman government, which he managed to do successfully to a positive effect, especially in Hungary11; and in addition he more than doubled the number of regional governors in existence, and issued decrees to remove corruption.12 To Inalcik, these decrees seem to have largely ended corruption in the Empire, but to historians like Lybyer they seem to have been less effective, reflecting the diminished impact of centralised authority on areas away from the capital. I agree with Lybyer in that there is always uncertainty as to how successful royal legislation was, but I do not think that they were without effect and consider Suleimans reforms to have been more than superficial. The administrative system and bureaucracy that Suleiman constructed was able to fund repeated large-scale military expeditions; build and replenish his fleet easily; and fund the building of many mosques, schools and hospitals. This
3 4

Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 221 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 27 5 Halil Inalcik, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire (Bloomington 1993) pp. 74 6 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 32 7 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 91 8 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 182 9 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 160 10 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 102 11 Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, Suleiman the Magnificent and his Age (Longman 1995) pp. 80, 83-85, 90 12 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 105, 112

would suggest that the government was competent and successful. The structure of Ottoman administration and society was that all citizens of the Ottoman Empire were slaves to the Sultan13. The Sultan owned everything, and all land and power was leased from him. This system of advancement by merit rather than by birth since birth meant nothing in a society of slaves created an efficient administration that was vibrant, effective and which created a powerful and rich Empire. The opulence and wealth of the Sultan flowed from the systems that he had created, and therefore Suleimans administrative ability laid the foundations for the height of Ottoman civilisation. Suleimans relationship with one man Ibrahim Pasha, a converted Greek who became the Grand Vizier and almost equal in power to the Sultan himself shows Suleimans personality. In 1523, Ibrahim was appointed Grand Vizier14, and soon obtained power far greater than that of his predecessors. There are signs that Ibrahim was worried about his meteoric rise to power and anxious lest Suleimans favour prove fickle. Therefore, in a situation where normally there was no guarantee of political permanence, Ibrahim managed to obtain from Suleiman a promise that no change in circumstances would lead to Ibrahims execution.15 Ibrahim continued to be the dominant political power at Court, building himself a sumptuous palace next to the royal residence. For thirteen years, Suleiman had great confidence in Ibrahim. Two examples of this are that he gave him control of armies in wartime (unusual for a Grand Vizier), and allowed him to shape foreign policy by receiving all foreign ambassadors before Suleiman. However, Ibrahim was undermined by his pride. Austrian and Venetian diplomats were struck by his vanity and confidence in the security of his position of power, as he even went so far as to nearly insult Suleiman in his boasts16. On the 15 March 1536, Ibrahim was found strangled in his bedchamber and then was buried without ceremony and without any memorial. This dramatic fall from grace shocked society, but there is no record in which Suleiman explains his motives for removing a man with whom he had been so intimate and indeed, whom he had promised never to execute. Rumours spread that Suleiman broke his promise because Ibrahim was actually a Christian and an idolater. Others claimed that Roxelane, the Sultans wife, had conspired to remove Ibrahim in her search for dominance over the sultan. Whatever the reason for Ibrahims murder, after his death no man was able to replace him in Suleimans affections. After this time, there was always a certain distance between Suleiman and other men, and he became emotionally inaccessible and aloof from his subjects. From this point onwards, the only person with whom he was intimate was his wife. Suleimans broken promise to Ibrahim shows that he could dispense with his favourites. His decision to renege on his promise was politically necessary, but the incident tarnishes his reputation as Magnificent. Suleiman had one flaw, and that was that he was perhaps too submissive to his ambitious wife, Roxelane. She was a Russian convert who managed to fight her way to the top of the harem and remained Suleimans favourite wife until her death in 1557. The influence that she exerted over him was perhaps excessive - she managed to persuade Suleiman to marry her rather than keep her as a concubine, and moved the harem to the Royal Palace, from where she was able to start directly influencing politics.17 Ibrahim Pasha was the only obstacle to Roxelane dominating Suleiman, and so she was jealous of Suleimans intimacy with his Grand Vizier. She bore Suleiman four sons, three of whom survived to adult life. However Suleimans heir Mustafa was the son of another wife, Mahidevran. The Frenchman Guillaume Postel wrote that Mustafa was prudent, marvellously well-educated and an individual with great strength18. According to Ottoman historians, Roxelane realised that Mustafa, was extremely capable in the mould of his father and she realised that if Mustafa gained power
13 14

Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Palgrave MacMillan 2002) pp. 148 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 80 15 Andr Clot, Suleiman the Magnificent (Saqi Books 2005) pp. 48-9 16 Andr Clot, Suleiman the Magnificent (Saqi Books 2005) pp. 89 17 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Palgrave MacMillan 2002) pp. 90 18 Andr Clot, Suleiman the Magnificent (Saqi Books 2005) pp. 155

he would execute her sons through the Ottoman Law of Fratricide19 and reduce her status considerably. This was the Ottoman way of preserving a dynasty without civil war. Roxelane therefore contrived to have Mustafa put to death by spreading rumours that Mustafa was leading the army in revolt against Suleiman. Colin Imber suggests that in reality, there was a factual basis for these rumours, and uses evidence such as letters from Mustafa to prove that Mustafa was actually plotting against Suleiman. His analysis is very strong, but it is likely that the truth is closer to a mixture of both views. Whatever the cause, Suleiman was sufficiently persuaded that he executed his heir20, despite Mustafas protestations and despite the fact that he was easily the most able of Suleimans sons. Suleimans precipitate and unjust action could have sparked mass mutinies and revolts in the empire but for the fact that he made a scapegoat of Roxelanes son-in-law Rustem Pasha to placate the masses. This political expedience shows Suleimans character to be calculating and cynical. Public opinion of the Sultan reached its lowest point, with popular culture lamenting the loss of Mustafa, idolising him as the supreme example of the Ottoman Prince. Since Roxelanes sons were now the only heirs, and her future was assured, Roxelane became less demanding of Suleiman, but still maintained a position of power at Court and continued to influence the politics of the nation. The execution of Mustafa was the nadir of Suleimans political fortunes. He struggled to contain the anger of the janissaries and the people. The fact that he allowed his wife to take so much part in politics and influence him as she did stains his reputation as a great monarch. Under Suleiman, Ottoman civilisation flourished. Rogers and Ward concluded that the wealth and stability of the empire created the ideal conditions for cultural development, but their study is limited to the artefacts that formed an exhibition at the British Museum. Suraiya Faroqhi offers a contrasting view, that networks of relationships allowed culture to thrive, such as those between patrons and artists, pointing to Suleiman as the head of these structures, and I am inclined to agree with her. He encouraged the arts in many forms, and the best artisans in many different fields flocked to his court and the limitless amount of funding that was available to them. Suleiman was even a poet21 himself, writing classical poetry which shows unusual humility for a ruler. He commissioned architects to embellish his empire with functional buildings, such as mosques, hospitals and schools22, but the Islamic belief in the transitory nature of human works led to his own palaces being sober and simple,23 especially when compared to those of the European kings. The architect Sinan dominated the architecture of the sixteenth century, uniting the conflicting attitudes and styles of architecture at that time into a uniquely Ottoman and Islamic mode of building. This reflected how Suleiman had expanded the Ottoman state and developed it into the powerhouse of the Mediterranean. Arts such as the stylised Ottoman ceramics, which influenced even those of China, and other disciplines such as portraiture, tapestry making and painting (somewhat surprisingly because of the Islamic indictment of making images) flourished because of Suleimans support. Suleimans conquests unified Ottoman culture, and the Turkish language became pre-eminent in the literature of that period, replacing Persian and Arabic. Many eloquent Turkish writers emerged, such as Baki24 and Fuzuli. Suleimans reign represented the height of Ottoman culture, largely because of his personal encouragement, and the quality of the arts in this time largely exceeded anything what was created before or immediately after his reign. Lastly, if Magnificence is taken purely as an aesthetic value, the Sultan was clearly rich and opulent enough to merit that title. Suleimans faith was a major influence on his decision making. He had a role as a leader of Islam, a ghazi who was required to constantly expand Islam throughout the world. He was a pious Muslim, but was not fanatical. Pragmatically, he was tolerant towards Christians provided
19 20

Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 59 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Palgrave MacMillan 2002) pp. 104 21 JM Rogers and RM Ward, Suleyman the Magnificent (British Museum Publications 1998) pp. 85 22 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 169 23 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) pp. 140 24 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) pp. 65

they carried out their feudal obligations to him such as paying taxes and obeying his laws. Andr Clot, in his biography of Suleiman, optimistically attributes this tolerance to what he sees as Suleimans genuine desire for religious equality, but in reality, as Halil Inalcik correctly suggests, it was more due to realpolitik than idealism. The religion of his non-Islamic subjects was a matter of indifference to him; however, as a Sunni the Shiite heresy that was prevalent in Persia was a source of deep annoyance throughout his reign, and was one reason why he campaigned in the East. His actions show a genuine faith eight copies of the Quran that he copied out himself still survive; he built many mosques and madrassas throughout his realm; he banned the drinking of wine25; on capturing Belgrade, Suleiman converted the main church of the city to a mosque and recited the first Friday prayer in it; and he debated points of theology with the Imams and Muftis of his day. Despite this, he respected non-Muslims and his empire guaranteed the safety and property of non-Muslims in a Europe that was increasingly anti-Muslim. With the conquest of Mecca and Baghdad, the Ottoman Sultan became recognised as the Islamic sovereign chosen by Allah to protect the whole Islamic world. He had obligations to maintain the faith and defend the Shariah law, which was followed by his administration even in wartime26. He took care to be seen as the true leader of Islam, which provided stability through popular support for him in this position. Suleimans faith shaped his personality, his policies and his attitudes. While his status as a defender of Islam27 led to intense crusading against Christian lands, in other areas the ideals of Islam made Suleiman moderate, merciful and just. Suleimans skill as a military commander is another way in which he deserves the title Magnificent. When he came to the throne, the Ottomans were powerful, but his military achievements made them the dominant force in Europe. The Ottoman army at this time was effective, but still had drawbacks. It was largely made up of approximately forty thousand cavalry: sipahis, and akinjis. The Ottoman artillery was by far the best and most effective in the world, and gave them a huge advantage when besieging cities or fortresses or even in open battle, where carefully aimed gunnery could decimate enemy ranks. In addition there was an infantry militia which could be used if necessary. However, the core of the Ottoman army were the elite troops known as the Janissaries, of which there were twelve thousand in Suleimans reign. These were the Christian children who were conscripted and then selected to convert to Islam, and, having been equipped with the most modern weapons of the day firearms were effective fighters who were the spearhead of the Ottoman army. The composition of this army, therefore, lent itself to an offensive style of fighting, which was extremely valuable to Suleimans plans for expanding his empire through invasion and military conquest. The wars of expansion were constantly hindered by the shortness of the campaigning season, the distances involved in mass conquests, and the unpredictable climate, particularly in the Danube region which was prone to flooding and prolonged wet periods. Despite these disadvantages, Suleiman extended the frontiers of his empire in all directions. In the first few years of his reign he defeated Hungary by taking Belgrade and Buda (something that his great-grandfather, Mehmed the Conqueror, had failed to do28); he removed the Knights of Saint John from their fortress at Rhodes; and he won a stunning victory at Mohacs which emphasised Ottoman dominance in the Balkans. His later campaigns were marked by logistical difficulties and increased levels of opposition spurred on by European fear of Ottoman success. It was difficult enough to transport heavy cannon and find fodder for the cavalry in the Balkans, both of which were crucial to the Ottoman war machine, without having to deal with floods, rains and the onset of winter in a short campaigning season. For example, when Suleiman decided to try to take Vienna in 1532, the march to Vienna took two months instead of one and the army had had to leave behind the heavy cannon that were the
25 26

Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) pp. 215 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 57 27 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 150 28 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) pp. 34

Ottomans only hope of breaching the walls of the Habsburg capital. Suleiman had to turn back and retreat to Istanbul. In the first six years of his reign he had already conquered those who had successfully resisted his predecessors, and, leading all his expeditions personally, he had forged the Ottoman Empire into a military world power. Yet this was to be the apogee of his military triumphs, since although he would win further victories against the Persians in particular, he would never again have the same success in the West. In 1565, Suleimans deputies were beaten at Malta while fighting the Knights of Saint John again the consequences of his decision not to crush the Knights at Rhodes. There seems to be a consensus among historians, such as Albert Howe Lybyer and Colin Imber, that the Ottoman army was simply not capable of staying in the field for the extended period of time that serious conquest required, especially not through winter29. So Suleimans ambition of striking at the heart of Christian Europe and unifying the whole world into one Islamic kingdom was foiled by mundane practicalities of armies on campaign rather than by any European efforts. Despite this, Suleiman had achieved great success in war. Later in his military career, he would lead land campaigns against the Persians with moderate success, but the preference of the enemy to cautiously retreat rather than face the Ottomans meant that few decisive battles were fought. Suleiman did not give up pursuing his goal of uniting East and West into one global empire, but instead changed the platform on which the war was fought when it became clear that wars on land were limited and unsustainable. He appointed a corsair pirate Barbarossa to be the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet (an innovation in itself30), and Suleiman personally supervised the construction of the fleet. Realising the central role that the Mediterranean was going to play, Suleiman created a substantial navy which would be able to challenge Spanish, French and Venetian domination of the Mediterranean. By giving Barbarossa the authority to use force for conquest, Suleiman gained control of the entire North African coast31. This sudden intrusion into the Spanish sphere of power made Charles V of Spain realise that the threat from the Ottomans had changed, and instead of targeting the relatively remote provinces of Eastern Europe, the Ottomans were in a position to strike at Spain itself. In addition, the nature of the relationship between Venice and the Ottomans was changed, because where before the Venetians had accommodated the Ottoman to keep the cash supply from trade coming in, now Venice became increasingly anxious at the growing naval power of the Ottomans. The Ottoman alliance with France32, excluding the Venetians, alarmed them still further, as it entailed the erosion of Venetian trade privileges through the increase of French political and economic influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Suleiman, having created a powerful fleet, now used it to extend his power in the face of new threats, and he was very effective in doing so taking Corfu from the Venetians, winning the battle of Preveza in the face of a far larger Christian navy, and ultimately controlling the Mediterranean. The Christian coalition had failed to stand up to him, and now Suleiman ruled the seas. On Suleimans death in 1566, the Ottomans mourned the loss of their Sultan, whose successors were, especially in comparison to him, not particularly able or inspirational it seemed as if a Golden Age was over for the Empire. Writers such as Clot and Lord Kinross hold that Suleimans reign was an unmitigated success, but this is not accurate and reflects the journalistic styles of these books their academic value is negligible. Inalcik, Lybyer, Kunt, Woodhead, Goffman and Aksan all take a more measured view (which I agree with) which is that the reign was largely successful, but that there was a limit to the success and there were some failures on Suleimans part. Suleiman left a legacy of Ottoman expansionism as part of the quest for a universal Islamic monarchy. At that time, the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful, the wealthiest, and by far the largest state in the world, but also it was the one in
29 30

Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913) pp. 113 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Palgrave MacMillan 2002) pp. 298 31 Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, The Early Modern Ottomans (Cambridge University Press 2007) pp. 108-9 32 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 137

which travel was easiest, was the most stable both politically and religiously, and contained huge metropolises such as Istanbul which were governed by efficient bureaucracies and in which Middle Eastern culture had reached its zenith. After Suleimans death, problems started to occur such as inflation, large-scale corruption, urbanisation and political problems caused by the aggressive independence of the military and the increased involvement of favourites and wives in politics. Without a strong-willed and talented Sultan to lead the state and control all the disparate and conflicting parts of the Ottoman juggernaut, the state slowly started to crumble. The Ottoman policies turned from expansionism to conservative maintaining of lands, and in the face of increasing opposition, the corollary of this was that the Empire lost its motivation for existing, and failed to succeed in a more modern and politically dynamic international environment. The successes of the first ten Sultans finally ended, and the Ottoman ghazi spirit became reactionary and cautious much like the European states but the loss of this ideal undermined the Empire. While he was alive, Suleiman had ruled admirably, even more so in comparison to other Sultans, but his legacy was not a successful one. Therefore, in conclusion, Suleiman I deserves the title Magnificent for many different reasons. He could be politically expedient and ruthless, he did not resolve fundamental problems in the Ottoman state such as dissatisfaction amongst landowners, he allowed urbanisation33, he allowed his mercy to overrule common sense when fighting at Rhodes, his later reign was not very successful34 and he was too influenced by his wife. However, he was still a successful Sultan. From being a minor prince in the Osman household, Suleiman I became the dominant force in Europe and in the Mediterranean. He made the Ottoman Empire an international power, but also created a stable and well-legislated state. His military ability, his personality, his intelligence and his faith all combined to make him a good monarch. The heights that Ottoman culture reached under him created an Empire that combined architecture, literature and art into one cohesive and thriving Ottoman tradition. Suleimans military successes both on land, as exemplified by the victory at Mohacs, and at sea, allowed the Ottomans to dominate sixteenth century Europe and the Mediterranean. Lastly, his administrative and law-making ability, although not exceptional, was sufficient to create a stable and lasting state, and he had genuine intentions to reform the state to make it more just. Despite his flaws, the epithet Magnificent is an appropriate one to give to Suleiman because of his overall successes in nearly all areas of his reign.

Bibliography
Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 1913)
33 34

Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) pp. 111 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) pp. 77

Halil Inalcik, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire (Bloomington 1993) Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (Phoenix Press 2002) Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, Suleiman the Magnificent and his Age (Longman 1995) Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Palgrave MacMillan 2002) Andr Clot, Suleiman the Magnificent (Saqi Books 2005) Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan (IB Tauris 2007) JM Rogers and RM Ward, Suleyman the Magnificent (British Museum Publications 1998) Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, The Early Modern Ottomans (Cambridge University Press 2007) Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press 2002) Stephen Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire 1326 1699 (Osprey Publishing 2003) Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries (Morrow Quill 1979)

Reflections
I was inspired to write this essay on the Ottomans by Roger Crowleys book Empires of the Sea, and from there decided to focus my topic on Suleiman Is reign. An important question which I had not found answered in any of the books that I was reading in my preparation of this topic was whether or not Suleiman deserved the title Magnificent, so I chose to discuss that for my essay. At first, I fell into the trap of taking for granted what these published authors had written, and not being critical enough. This led to a biased, journalistic and unhistorical first draft of the essay in which I made no effort to answer the question from any other point of view other than that Suleiman had to have been Magnificent. However, after being alerted to this, I returned to the literature around the subject, and compared and contrasted the evidence, which led me to substantially revise my opinion. In the future, I will be careful to criticise my sources, and the difficulties involved in uncomfortably changing my view and coming to terms with my mistakes has certainly been a positive learning experience. If I were to do the essay again, I would still choose this topic as it is fascinating, engaging and unusual, however I would probably limit my chosen title still further. Having to include such vastly disparate elements of study of different areas of the period in my essay limited the amount of depth to which I could go, and made it more tempting to replace rigorous historical analysis with broad statements which were perhaps inadequate to really argue my case.