A.

Krsnyi: Political Representation in Leader Democracy

Political Representation in Leader Democracy1

Andrs Krsnyi
Institute of Political Science Faculty of Law and Government Lornd Etvs University of Budapest Budapest, Egyetem tr 1-3. 1053 Hungary Email: korosen@axelero.hu

Paper prepared for the workshop on Political Representation, ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh 2003

In recent years new challenges have emerged undermining our traditional views on representation and other key concepts of modern representative democracy. The political literature of the past ten to fifteen years, and works of political science proper, have raised the advent of a new era in the history of European democracies. If the 19th century was characterised by liberal parliamentarism and the 20th by party-based democracy, at the turn of the millennium commentators could observe phenomena in ever increasing numbers which do not in any way fit the picture that had evolved in respect of party-based democracy. These new phenomena, including the mediatization of politics, the emergence of political marketing, the appearance of cartel parties (Katz-Mair 1995), the professionalization of the political class and the presidentialization of governance (Foley 1993; Frhlich 1997; Heffernan 2000; Poguntke 2000; Webb 2000) have changed the operation and the nature of representative democracies in Europe (Hennessy 1998; 1999; James 1995; Kavanagh-Seldon 1999; Rhodes/Dunleavz 1995). The impact of European integration on parliamentary governments in the European countries also implies the erosion of parliamentary control over executive office holders. Many traits of representative democracy, as well as the very meaning of representation have changed (Mair 2000; Manin 1994; Manin 1997). Major elements of these changes include the following: 1. First and perhaps the most striking element may be the fact that the institutional arena of politicization has shifted: from parliament, which was earlier regarded the principal political arena, to the media where political players today tend to project themselves. Leading politicians, such as prime ministers now make their major announcements not in parliament but at mediatised events. 2. The character of politics has also altered, to some extent in connection with this process. Ideological politics and pragmatic interest conciliation are being replaced by

Prepared for the workshop Political Representation, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Edinburgh, 28 March-2 April 2003. The paper is prepared as a part of a Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) research project.

A. Krsnyi: Political Representation in Leader Democracy

political marketing and carefully designed media messages. Rhetoric and planned image creation have taken the foreground. 3. Likewise, the character of parties has changed: the caucus type of parties of liberal parliamentarism have been replaced by class parties, and later by catch-all parties. By now class parties have disappeared while cartel parties have appeared alongside catch-all parties. 4. The political establishment has also metamorphosed. The amateur politicizing of liberal parliament was succeeded by the activities of the political elites of party democracies, representing various social groups and classes, while a professional political class with an increasingly homogeneous social background emerged in the late 20th century. 5. Each historical phase of parliamentary governance is characterized by a different type of government: the place of cabinet government typical under liberal parliamentarism was taken by prime ministerial government by the mid-20th century, while the end of the century saw the appearance of presidentialized governance. The prime minister is the first not only in the cabinet but his/her person dominates the whole of political life. 6. Accordingly, parliamentary support for government and the character of parliamentary factions have also changed. The cabinet government of liberal parliament had only an unruly, heterogeneous faction to rely on, in other words the party was not self-evidently supportive of government. In the party-based democracy typical in the 20th century, prime ministerial government could already rely on a disciplined and politically homogeneous faction in parliament, that is to say it had a solid party backing. And the prime minister of the end of the 20th century, building a presidential image, can now count on a politically homogeneous, disciplined faction in parliament, while the extra-parliamentary party (party organization and party members) is now but an electoral machine. 7. Thus the relationship between citizen and government just as the role of parties as mediators have changed. Under liberal parliamentarism both the relationship between citizen and government, and the selection of political leaders were indirect. Franchise was limited and constituencies were mostly represented in the legislature by local notabilities.2 Party democracy, however, already created an institutional relationship between citizens and government through the extension of franchise and through emerging mass parties. The relationship and the selection of leaders remained indirect, even if with a difference. In the new era which started at the end of the 20th century a direct, if virtual, relationship emerged between the electorate and political leaders through the electronic mass media. The presidentialisation of governance means precisely that top political leaders, including prime ministers (e.g. Berlusconi, Blair, Orbn, Schrder), no longer appeal primarily to mediator institutions, such as their own parties, interest groups or parliament, but directly to the electorate. Due to the personal appearance of political leaders in the media and the decline of the role of parties as mediators,3 politics and the electoral race are becoming greatly personalized. The metaphor of presidentialisation refers, in part, precisely to the personalized nature of American politics which already existed earlier owing to the direct system of presidential elections. In this sense, the selection of leaders becomes direct in parliamentary systems too, the elbowroom and political responsibility of prime ministers increase while they become directly accountable.

In the constituencies the relationship between constituents and their representatives was direct, because only a limited number of individuals had the right to vote. This is the consequence of the fading mass party character since this formerly key party function is no longer needed for political mobilisation.
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There is no consensus about whether such a new era exists at all. And even less about how it should be called or assessed. These processes are not nearly as clear as the rough presentation given above, in fact, the emergence of the above phenomena is widely disputed. Yet I am inclined to believe that the nature of parliamentary democracies and representative governments has undergone a considerable change. It is different compared to how it was fifty, or even twenty or thirty years ago. In this short introduction I will try to demonstrate how the character of the three consecutive empirical/historical types of democracy differ. The characteristic of todays mediatised and personalised democracies is precisely that elections are no longer about individual candidates from single-member constituencies, nor about parties, but about rival political leaders. Party leaders appeal directly to the electorate and they, in turn, vote (quasi) directly for leaders. It is no longer parties that have leaders, but political leaders have parties. The independent role of parties has diminished. As a result, prime ministers, who are constitutionally accountable to parliament, increasingly bear direct responsibility to the electorate through personalised elections. Elections are tantamount to calling to direct account the government and the prime minister, while they were earlier indirectly called to account through parliament. (Empirically this is manifest most patently in the dual, two-party or two-block rivalry.) Therefore, parliamentary elections today do not involve the local selection of notabilities, nor the parliamentary representation of social interest groups (including a selection between party programmes), but the selection and bringing to book of leaders directly by citizens. There are three theories of representative democracy that more or less correspond to the three historical epochs/types of representative government. The theory of deliberative democracy corresponds to the image of liberal parliamentarism. The theory of pluralist democracy corresponds to the era of party-based democracy. The new period following party-based democracy might be called mediatised or personalised democracy for some of its empirical properties, although in my view on the theoretical level the concept of leader democracy (the Fhrerdemokratie of Max Weber) is more appropriate for it. In my paper I will seek to elaborate the concept of leader democracy and compare it with liberal parliamentarism / the theory of deliberative democracy on one hand, and with party-based / pluralist democracy on the other hand. The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I would like to integrate the problem of political representation into a broader concept of democratic theory. I assume that the nature of political representation depends largely on the specific concept of democracy. Second, I would like to analyse the changes of the meaning of political representation in the different models of representative democracy. My focus, however, is the concept of leader democracy. I will analyse its main characteristics, comparing it with the two other models. The model of leader democracy is based especially on the political theory of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Joseph Schumpeter, Michael Oakeshott and Giovanni Sartori. In the following I will first summarise the meaning of representation in the three different models of democracy. Secondly, I will describe the characteristics of representation in leader democracy. At the end of the paper Table 2 gives an overview on the meaning of representation in the three models of democracy.

A. Krsnyi: Political Representation in Leader Democracy

Changes in the meaning of political representation

In liberal parliamentarism and in the model of deliberative democracy political representation might be characterised either by the concept of personal representation (J.S. Mill), or by the concept of a transcendental type of representation (Eric Voegelin). In this model the participants of the debate are not limited by private or segmental interests.4 Members of parliament are in an ideal speech situation (Habermas 1990): they have free mandates, and in the parliamentary debate they represent no territorial, social or religious interest groups, but their own personal opinion. Participants of the parliamentary debate are impartial and rational individuals whose purpose is to find truth, the right opinion to serve the public good. The rational quality of the debate is the guarantee to lead to truth whereupon political consensus rests. For truth will be the basis of decision and political action. The discussion transcends the prior views of the participants and leads to the recognition of truth which has been arrived at through the discussion.5 A representative in this model "stands for" the whole nation. Representation, as search for truth, has a substantive meaning. The image of party-based democracy is founded on the pluralism of interests inherent in society and on the key role of parties.6 In this regime political players are no longer unbiased individuals but interest organizations and parties which represent the particular interests of social classes and groups. The party composition of parliament reflects the cleavages of classes and interests in society. All major social interest groups are represented and none of them becomes dominant. The purpose of parties in parliament is to represent the interests of the social groups behind them as efficiently as possible. Politicians represent their own party and class. Politics is an instrumental activity; the fundamental logic of democracy here is utilitarian. Parliament is not the forum of rational debate in search of truth but it is the forum of rational bargaining and interest conciliation. Consequently, politics based on interests does not result in consensus but in compromise. Political action is based on interests, and the public good consists in the compromise reached between the interests in the political process. A compromise is always established, for the battle of interests eventually creates equilibrium. In the model of the party-based / pluralist democracy the political representation in the legislature aims at an accurate depiction of the political groupings in the society. The proper composition of the legislature is the guarantee of the representativeness of the system. Proportional representation is an appropriate electoral system to reflect the political composition of the whole nation. The pluralist theory does not regard politics as an autonomous sphere: representation means the mirroring of social groupings and diversity. It is representation in a descriptive sense. The underlying hypothesis behind this view is the assumption (the mandate view) that if an assembly is descriptively representative then it will act (and so will the government) in the interest of the represented (Manin-Przeworski-Stokes 1999, 31-32).

See the role of the original position and the veil of ignorance in John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971).

As Jon Elster formulated it in the language of social choices, there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences (Elster 1997, 11-12).
6

This was the mainstream view on representation for decades in the second half of the 20th century. Classic authors representing this approach are Harold Laski, Robert Dahl (1956; 1989), Anthony Downs (1957), for critical interpretation see e.g. Carl Schmitt (1991) and Jrgen Habermas (1962).

A. Krsnyi: Political Representation in Leader Democracy

The theory of leader democracy is based on an image of democracy which is not satisfied with a rival image that claims that politics is less and less about content and policy issues while it is more and more personalised and focused on image creation. The image underlying leader democracy accepts that in the world of mediatised politics the efficient communication of planned media messages to the electorate becomes the principal means of obtaining political support, instead of the mass party membership and party organisations of old. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the packaging should become more important than the product. Principal players of the political process are not rational individuals or political parties representing social groups as under liberal parliamentarism and party-based pluralism, nor are they advertising or PR professionals, as another, rival image of this third historical era supposes7; they are political leaders. The political process is not generated by the political preferences of the electorate or the interests of social groups but rather by the aspirations and ambitions of politicians. And the objective of politicians is not to reach consensus or compromise but to obtain and maintain political support (Jouvenel). Rival politicians attempt to obtain greater support not by accommodating the political preferences of the electorate but by trying to manipulate and produce electoral preferences themselves. The active players of politics are not the constituents but the politicians. Constituents are reactive. This is because in the model of leader democracy political action is based not on truth or interests but on opinion and resolve. Therefore, the means to acquire political support will be persuasion and rhetoric. The theory of leader democracy to be elaborated below is built on this image. The meaning of political representation in the theory of leader democracy, therefore, is quite different from the two other models. It is not deliberation or mirroring, but leadership: i.e. it involved selecting leaders, acting and supplying new policies: creating a new quality. I will try to make this clear below.

Political representation in leader democracy

In the following description of the characteristics of representation in leader democracy I will focus on the questions of (1) the relationship between representatives and the represented, (2) the subject of the representative, (3) the concept of knowledge and the role of discussion, (4) the role of political action, and finally (5) the notion of politics which might facilitate an understanding of a new concept of representation. 1. The changing relationship between representatives and the represented

The relationship between representatives and the represented has changed to the reverse of what it was usually assumed in other models of democracy. Under the utilitarian notion of democracy the political process is nothing else but the aggregation of existing preferences of rational individuals. To Jeremy Bentham or in the model of Anthony Downs this is what democratic elections are for. Public opinion is the mechanical aggregate of ex ante individual opinions. The party pluralist model is based on the same premises with the difference that its sources are not individuals but social groups. These group interests are channelled into the political process by interest organisations and parties. The function of pluralism of interest groups and parties is primarily the articulation and reflection of these interests of the
This rival image might be called the populist concept of democracy. On the level of democratic theory it can be constructed as the personalised and mediatised adaptation of the utilitarian democratic model and of the Downsian democratic, respectively.
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represented, while the political process is nothing but the conciliation of these interests and the creation of a compromise, on which public policy is based.8 In this case public opinion also rests, although in a more complicated way, on the ex ante group opinion of the represented. Whereas in a leader democracy (as in the ancient polis) public opinion is not a priori given, it does not exist before the political process: the objective of rival politicians is precisely to convince the public or rather to generate public opinion which suits them. They are involved in the generation of public opinion or the manipulation of preferences. Thus public opinion is produced not as a result of the integration of a priori preferences existing dispersedly in individuals or groups (as such a priori political preferences do not exist) but it is produced and manipulated especially by political leaders, orators, i.e. political players, beside other actors, during the political process. As Schumpeter put it, the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process (Shumpeter 1987, 263). Consequently, the nature of public opinion is not ex ante but ex post as it is the outcome of political action and is in permanent change. Public opinion is constructed by the political process, i.e. it is the politicians (the representatives themselves) who have a major, although not exclusive role in the construction of the political views of the represented (see e.g. agenda-setting). That is why the analogy of the antique orator/rhetor is appropriate to characterise the relationship between politicians and citizens in a leader democracy. This also means that the theories of collective choice (public choice) which aggregates individual preferences are not suitable to reflect the basic logic of the political process of leader democracy. The assumption of these theories that citizens have a priori preferences is unrealistic. Therefore, collective choices, i.e. government actions cannot be deduced / explained from ex ante / a priori individual preferences. Collective choices are also choices of certain individuals or groups, whose choice will be supported later by a larger number of followers or accepted by the majority of citizens. Perhaps two analogies might shed light on the role of the political leader who is the representative in leader democracy. The first is the analogy of the antic orator, and the second is the analogy of the entrepreneur in the economy. The antique concept of rhetoric explores the relationship between politicians (orators) and citizens, focusing on the role of opinions that keep the entire democratic political process in motion, as well as the mechanism of shaping public opinion.9 We saw that public opinion is not a priori given and that politicians, among other actors, have a major role in constructing public opinion. The orator, or rhetor, however, is not identical with the demagogue, or the populist mobocrat seeking the favour of public opinion. For one thing, their attitude to public opinion is different. The orator is not the servant of the moods of the masses, not a parasite of public opinion as the demagogue is, but the orator is a political leader, in both the polis and leader democracy, who oversees and rules, or even produces public opinion. While a demagogue accommodates public opinion, an orator shapes it. While to a demagogue public opinion is a given, to an orator it is a challenge to create public opinion that supports the orators political ideas or will. While a demagogue emerges by closely sensing the moods of the masses, the orator by having more convincing arguments in the political debate. A demagogue may become a mobocrat while the orator has
Manin, Przeworski and Stokes make the point that politicians do have goals, interests and values of their own. And once they are elected, they may want to pursue their own endeavours, i.e. to do things other than represent the public (Manin-Przeworski-Stokes 1999, 29). The concept of rhetoric exhibits the fact that democracy as a political process (or politics) is in the first place not the rule of but the rule over public opinion.
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the chance to become a statesman. In leader democracy the political leader is an orator, a public opinion leader as well. I have taken my second analogy from Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter used the analogy of the entrepreneur to illuminate the role of political leaders in the process of political willmaking. In the Schumpeterian model of democracy, which shows many affinities with the concept of Max Weber, the figure of the politician is not simply a political manufacturer who reacts to existing demand but a political entrepreneur who does not cater to existing demands but creates new demand by supplying new policies (Schumpeter 1987). He fulfills a similar role in the political process than an orator or a statesman in the Aristotelian and Sophistic notion of Greek democracy.10 According to the concept of the political entrepreneur, politicians in Downs's rational (utilitarian) model of democracy are simple manufacturers who satisfy the existing demand.11 From public choice theory we could learn not only that (a) even a priori given individual preferences are not possible to be aggregated into a single and unambiguous collective choice (moreover, the assumption of such preferences is completely unrealistic), but also (b) that democratic political competition takes place in an arena where agenda-setting is controlled first of all by the political leaders. The nature of the political market is quite the opposite that the aggregative theories of democracy assume. The focus on the demand-side, on the aggregation of individual preferences prevents this approach from grasping the political process and makes it incompatible with the more realistic assumptions of the model of leader democracy, where the emphasis is on the supply side of the political market.12 Therefore the primary actors of politics in leader democracy are not the voters, but the political leaders whom the citizens have the possibility to vote for. The analogies of the orator and of the entrepreneur also highlight that politicians in a leader democracy are active actors of the political process, while the electorate, the public is a reactive actor. They are political leaders who keep the political process in motion, they define its direction, they form public policy, and they appeal to the citizens to rally followers (and voters) for themselves and/or for their policy. What democratic procedures ensure is first that citizens (and interest groups) have a chance to influence this policy, and, second, that they have a chance to select among rival political leaders.

The notions of democracy of Aristotle and of the Sophists looking through the lens of Socrates and Plato are very close on certain crucial points. One of their common traits is that rhetorical truth has no other final criterion than winning public opinion, or the success of persuasion. Another common trait is that Sophist philosophers, just like Aristotle, distinguished the parasite of public opinion, the demagogue, from the real orator, the statesman (see e.g. the dialogue of Platos Gorgias). A third common trait is that to the Sophists and Aristotle, Themistocles and Pericles are not only good speakers but great statesmen, while they were considered by Socrates (Plato) speakers accommodating the desires of the people, or demagogues. In other words, to the Sophists and Aristotle rhetoric, rightfully, is a part of the political while Socrates (Plato) denied that politics is an independent form of activity.
11

10

Or a craftsman according to Aristotle, who produces something familiar (and does not create anything new). His knowledge is a tekhn type of knowledge. About the manipulation of citizen preferences by the politicians or by government, see e.g. Riker 1982; 1986; Maravall 1999.

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2. The subject of the representative: the personalization of politics and the role of charisma One of the important traits of leader democracy is the personalization of politics. Political leaders dominate the scene, they (and not political parties) embody (and form) the political views of the electorate. In the model of leader democracy the principal political actors, whose aspirations launch and keep in motion the political process, are the political leaders (e.g. candidates for premiership) themselves, and not political groups / parties as in the model of party-based / pluralist democracy, nor notables or individuals as in liberal parliamentarism or in the model of deliberative democracy. These political leaders have more room for political manoeuvre, they have a wider autonomy for action than political parties of the pluralist model, representing sectional interests. The personalization of politics in leader democracy has changed the subject of the representative. Usually, in the parliamentary, but even in the presidential system of government, the legislature is regarded as the major institution of representation. The legislative assembly is the representative body, while the executive is usually excluded from representation, being a non-representative institution. In the legislature, which is an elected assembly, a multitude of views / groups is represented. Its function is to reflect the diversity of the nation. A representative assembly institutionalises representation in a descriptive sense. It is for discussion, debate and deliberation, but not for action, which is reserved for the executive, namely for the government. The head of state, however, is an exception in two respects. First, (s)he embodies symbolic representation in the state. Second, in a presidential form of government, the head of state is at the same time the chief executive which is far from being a symbolic position: the role of the head of state here is to embody effective leadership. Both the presidentialization of government in many European states on the empirical level and the model of leader democracy on the theoretical level have changed our approach to the issue of representation. The decline of parliament in general, and the crisis of representation (in a descriptive sense) in particular, directs our attention to the question whether we may or should apply the concept of representation to the executive, i.e. to the government. In my view, the answer can be only affirmative. Therefore, both the government (or prime minister) of a parliamentary system and the head of state of the presidential form of government are to be considered as the subject of representation, i.e. representatives of the political community as a whole. Let us first take a look at the role of the head of state, then at that of the prime minister. The head of state is usually regarded as a figure of symbolic representation; (s)he embodies the unity of the whole nation. Hannah Pitkin emphasized that symbolic representation in politics is not an activity, but a state of affairs. A king can retain and fill his position as symbol only at the price of abstaining from "real" political activity. The US president, in contrast, is the head of state in a symbolic sense, but also the working head of the government: he is the chief executive. Even in his case we can distinguish between his expressive and/or ceremonial duties and his non-ceremonial (real) activities. He symbolises the nation only in his first function (Pitkin 1967, 103). In this regard, the head of state stands for, and not acts for the nation. However, he represents the nation in his second function: he acts for it in a substantive sense. A king/queen of a monarchy, or a president of a republic represents the nation in a symbolic sense. But what about the chief executive of the government? Does not he represent the

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nation? Nobody would say that in politics the Queen represented Britain more than Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s or Tony Blair since he was appointed prime minister. The US or the French president represent their nations not only in their symbolic role, but also when they act as statesmen, as political leaders of their nations. They are regarded as the political leaders of their nations on both the international and the domestic scene. The prime minister of a parliamentary government or the president in a presidential form of government is a person authorised to act as the chief executive (or as head of the chief executive body in a cabinet government). He represents his nation and/or his country in international talks, negotiations and conferences and also when issuing rules or decrees, or giving orders to civil or military servants under his supervision or to executive bodies. He acts for his nation, as well as in the name of his nation on both scenes but not reflecting the diversity of the nation through his acts, i.e. he does not represent it in a descriptive sense. Table 1. Three roles of representation Representative Assembly
1. Representative role 2. Activity 3. Accountability descriptive (reflecting diversity) deliberating accountable, responsive

Head of State
symbolic symbolising not accountable

Chief Executive
acting governing / acting accountable, responsible

The chief executive in a leader democracy is accountable for his activity to both the electorate and to parliament. The principal means of accountability are the elections (or the vote of nonconfidence in parliament). A direct or quasi-direct election of the chief executive, like in presidential systems or in presidentialized parliamentary governments, strengthens the role of personality in leadership. It means vesting authority in, giving trust to a single person to govern, to give a mandate to act for the nation and in the name of the nation. Representation becomes identified with effective leadership (Pitkin 1967, 107). To summarise the above argument, the representative assembly, the head of state and the chief executive each has a representative role in a different sense: it reflects, symbolises and acts, respectively (see Table 1). The personalization of politics enlarges the role of non-rational elements, such as the belief and trust in the charismatic power of leaders. A political leader can make himself an accepted leader through his personal appeal, through his image and through his activity (Pitkin 1967, 107).13 Max Weber used his concept of charismatic leadership to analyse democratic legitimacy. He differentiated between democracy with and without leadership. Democracy with leadership is established through the transformation of charismatic leadership14 to
13

In leader democracy the activity of a political leader includes image-making, an activity to foster confidence, loyalty, satisfaction among the people. Leadership also includes personal appearance before the public (through the electronic media). Charismatic leadership, in its pure form, is an answer to extraordinary challenges.

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everyday demands. One way of routinization of charismatic leadership is the election of leaders by the electorate. It solves the crucial problem of succession, but changes the ground of legitimacy and produces a mixture of legal and charismatic domination. The legal procedure of election as well as the recognition of and allegiance to a charismatic personality has its role under legitimate democratic rule. This is plebiscitary democracy, democracy with leadership.15 The concept of Weber is important for us, because it shows that charisma is a significant element in both plebiscitary and leader democracy. Presidents and prime ministers are elected because of their personal appeal, their image and their ability to inspire loyalty, as well as for their ability to gain support and rally followers, and not necessarily because of their political stand. Their followers trust them for their personal image, qualities and attraction i.e. because of subjective emotions and feelings which cannot be explained by rational arguments.16 Persons are more important than issues (interests). Leader democracy is a routinized version of charismatic leadership. 3. The concept of political knowledge and the role of discussion In leader democracy the political actors have a different motivation and stimulus for political action than the actors in the two other models of democracy. In the theory of liberal parliamentarism / deliberative democracy the basis (motivation, stimulus) for political action is truth, right judgement, or knowledge. It is sought by the players in rational parliamentary debate and it also becomes the basis of their judgement and political decision. In the theory of party pluralism, on the other hand, the motivation for political action is interest. Parties are driven by interests, in particular the group interests of society.17 In the theory of leader democracy the basis for political action is not truth or interest but simply opinion and/or volition. The motivation for action is thus subjective. It has no objective basis such as an
15

Democracy without leadership is a pure form of the legal / bureaucratic domination (bureaucratic Rechtstaat) where instead of people norms rule: in this type they "attempt to minimise the domination of man over man" (Weber 1978, 269). This is very close to the liberal approach to politics. Carl Schmitt highlighted the antipolitical character of this approach in his Der Begriff des Politischen (Schmitt 1932). In my view, a democratic and /or representative government without leadership (i.e. a purely legal domination in Weber's typology) has three basic assumptions which are false: (1) political conflicts can be neutralised and political consensus may be reached; (2) norms can rule everything and in every situation (subsumption is always possible); and that (3) no one has the will / intention for political action or a concept what to do in public affairs. For contemporary criticism on the political neutralisation impact of liberalism see e.g. Honig 1993; Mouffe 1993; 2000; Newey 2001. The routinization of charismatic leadership through regular elections modified the principle of legitimacy. The legitimacy of charismatic domination in its pure form is based on the extraordinary quality possessed by a charismatic leader who emerges in a crisis situation. He is recognised as a legitimate leader as long as he is able to demonstrate his ability. When the followers feel that his magic power left him, he loses his charisma and then his ruling position (he leaves or is expelled). In the case of democratic legitimacy, the recognition of a leader is not a consequence, but the basis (precondition) of the legitimacy of his rule. The recognition is expressed through election, and winning the elections is the way to gain legitimacy. The leader obtains a chance to prove his capacity for efficient leadership after winning the elections, and if he is not successful, he may lose power at the next elections. (Weber 1978, pp. 266-271) In the utilitarian democratic theory, which can be regarded as the intellectual preliminary to party pluralism, where the individuals are the principal actors, motivation for action is provided by individual utility, i.e. individual interests. This is reproduced on group level in the theory of pluralist democracy.

16

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understanding of truth, knowledge, or individual or group interests as the two other democratic theories assume. The difference in motivation for political action also means that each democratic theory has a different concept of the substance of political knowledge; they regard different types of knowledge as a ground / pre-condition for political action. I will try to highlight this difference through the Aristotelian theory of the three types of knowledge. Aristotle distinguished three types of knowledge which he designated as tekhn, epistem, and praxis. In the theory of liberal parliamentarism / deliberative democracy the basis of political action is theoretical knowledge (epistem), in the theory of pluralist democracy it is productive knowledge (tekhn) while the theory of leader democracy is built on practical knowledge (praxis). The principal players of the political process carrying these types of knowledge are the philosopher (scientist), the technician (craftsman) and the politician (statesman), respectively. The premise of the theory of leader democracy is that the motivation for political action is provided not by theoretical knowledge, nor interest but opinion and will/volition. Opinion is about things subject to change, therefore the object of reflection or discussion. There is no absolute certainty in this realm, in other words there is no, and there can be no, knowledge in the sense Plato understood it, or as the philosophers of the Enlightenment assumed. This is the realm of deliberation and decision about action, about the future, and the nature of political decision and action is of the exact same kind. We will see later that political action is subject to conditions of contingency, therefore political leaders have to choose, they have to take the risk of decisions and their consequences. They have room for action. The subject of this sort of practical knowledge, or praxis, is the politician or the statesman. The politician of a leader democracy is thus equally different from the political technocrat18 of pluralist democracy and the philosopher leaders in quest of truth of liberal parliamentarism /deliberative democracy. The concept of political knowledge highlights the role of discussion which is an important factor in the concept of representation from the works of J.S. Mill to the works of B. Manin. Discussion has also a role in each of our three models of democracy. It is a method which helps us to acquire knowledge. But the role of discussion is very different in each case: it corresponds to the type of knowledge that is assumed by each model as a basis for political action. We have seen that in the theory of liberal parliamentarism (deliberative democracy), the basis of political action is theoretical knowledge (epistem). The role of discussion is to select the true statement, therefore, it is similar to the role of discussion in a learned society, or in the academy of sciences. It is not just that a better argument convinces everybody, but that there is a single best answer which is accepted by everybody.19 In the theory of pluralist democracy, the basis of political action is productive knowledge (tekhn). The role of discussion is similar to that in an expert committee: it is to select a useful technique, the most appropriate means to solve a given problem. The aggregation of knowledge may produce a better solution, and discussion is a useful means to achieve this
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A craftsman, to use Aristotle's term.

In reality, it is methodology and not discussion which produces real scientific results. The role of discussion is only to review the propositions and to select the best and make it public: to prove the quality of the best statements vis-a-vis the others. It is a scientific and not a political model.

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aim. Through aggregation of knowledge (interests), there exists a single best solution in this model and it is accepted by everybody. The role of discussion is to review and aggregate the knowledge (propositions) and find the single best solution for the problem. This is a utilitarian / technocratic model. In the theory of leader democracy, political action is based on practical knowledge (praxis). The role of discussion is partly similar to that in a military council or in a political advisory board. The role of discussion is to qualify and select the alternatives, to deliberate arguments pro- and contra, and to convince others. There is no single best solution. A compromise might be reached among the rival views, but not necessarily. The contingency of the political situation makes it necessary to decide, at least to a certain extent, arbitrarily among rival proposals.20 Since there is no single best solution, which would be necessarily accepted by each participant of the discussion, discussion is also a means of justifying propositions, convincing others and gaining support. (It is also an arena for rivalry, or struggle among political actors.) The role of discussion as a justification of decisions and / or actions is especially important, since, unlike the decisions of military councils, political decisions are to be defended / justified before the public; and the aim of politicians is to gain support for their political actions. In this sense, discussion in a leader democracy is often similar to a discussion in a forum or in a peoples assembly.21 It is an arena for orators. It is not a scientific/deliberative or an utilitarian/technocratic, but a political concept of discussion. 4. The theory of political action If representing means acting in leader democracy, it is important to analyse the theory of political action. I would like to refer to the concept of Michael Oakeshott to unfold the nature of political action. According to Oakeshott, political activity is concerned with making a response to political situations.22 A political situation has three structural components which highlight the circumstances of political activity (Oakeshott 1991, 70-72). The first one is a contingent situation. It is a condition of things recognised to have sprung, not from natural necessity, but from human choices or actions, and to which more than one response is possible. (Oakeshott 1991, 70). The second ingredient is response, i.e. a situation to which a ruler or a government, or other political actors are expected to respond. The third component is reflection, interpretation, which aims to choose the most appropriate answer to the political situation. Deliberation is needed, because there is no necessary response to any political situation. Political actors consider first the expected consequences of a proposed response, since each political decision aims to achieve or avoid a specific condition of things. Secondly, they consider the relationship of these expected consequences with their beliefs

20

Decision is a result of deliberation and volition. It is an arbitrary decision, even if it is taken by an elected assembly. Regarding contingency, the arbitrariness of a decision does not depend on who decides: a single person, a small committee or a large assembly. The speakers try to persuade the audience rather than each other (Elster 1998, 2) if the discussion takes place in a forum/assembly, and not in a committee room. It is not accidential that for John Rawls the ideal site for deliberation is not a forum or a political assembly, but the Supreme Court (Rawls 1993, 231-239). For other deliberative theorists the ideal sites for deliberation are also not formal representative institutions, but informal ones like associations, focus groups, citizens' juries or deliberative opinion polls (Saward 2000, 71).

21

22

Politics may be identified, in the first place, as a practical activity concerned with making a response to situations of a certain sort: political situations (Oakeshott 1991, 70).

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about the better or worse conditions of things (evaluation). That means that reflection is based on normative value-commitments. The political process, however, cannot be described as the pattern of situation-reflectionresponse might apparently suggest. A political situation is not an objective thing, it is not an ex ante given condition for politics. It is not an endogenous factor for politics, mirroring the result of social processes, to which political actors react. A political situation is a product of the activity of political actors (their activities are products of deliberation, responses to former political situations) who have different aims and endeavours for the future, which are often incompatible with each other. Therefore political situations emerge spontaneously, as the non-intended results of the activity of rival political actors. But a political situation is not an objective thing in yet another sense: which would be a non-intended, yet objective state of affairs that would mean the same for everybody. In reality, it is not. A political situation is a reflection, a conclusion from subjective deliberation in a way in which reflection is prior to the situation. I.e. it is not only that a response of a political actor to a political situation is subjective, but the situation itself is but a subjective perception and evaluation of the state of affairs. The perception of the political situation is therefore different, and depends on the political endeavour and will of the political actors. Evaluating the political situation means to reveal the potentialities of the situation. Namely, the perception and evaluation of the political situation depends partly on our will concerning what we would like to bring into existence. Therefore reflection and the perception of a political situation depends on our ideas, normative goals and value-commitments. In addition to deliberation and decision, political action includes the component of volition. Man himself is the moving principle / mover of his actions; ...the source of our action is our will, as Aristotle wrote in the Nicomachean Ethics.23 This is the ground, the reason why we are responsible for our actions. Max Weber called a social relationship conflict (Kampf) insofar as action is oriented intentionally to carrying out the actors own will against the resistance of the other party or parties , or competition if it is fought by peaceful means (Weber 1978, 38). Economic relations can be characterised by competition. Politics is always struggle, fight, to enforce our will vis-a-vis others (Weber 1994, 330). To have or to enforce ones own will is not self-evident at all: it has a political character. Officials or clerks if contrasted with politicians can be described by the lack of their own (political) will. E.g. civil servants administer, execute the laws and regulations impartially and indifferently, and they are obedient to the instructions of their superiors. Obedience and the lack of will and objectives belong to their profile. In contrast, politicians have their own ends and will. Emotion, passion, taking sides, making decisions by their own conviction or belief these are the peculiarities of the behaviour of politicians.24 Karl Mannheim, who carried further Webers

23

"... a human being is a first principle or the begetter of his actions as he is of his children. But if it is clear that he is, and we cannot refer back to any other first principles beyond those within us, the actions whose first principles are within us will themselves also be in our power and voluntary." (1113b) (Aristotle 2000, 45).

Weber wrote in his essay The Profession and Vocation of Politics: "...the true official .... should not engage in politics but should 'administer', and above all he should do so impartially.... The official should carry out the duties of his office sine ira et studio, 'without anger and prejudice'. ..... Partisanship, fighting, passion - ira et studium - all this is the very element in which the politician, and above all the political leader, thrives. His

24

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argument, contrasted politicians, who act, with the behaviour of officials and defined the latter as non-activity (Mannheim 1991, 100-104).25 5. A new concept of representation The emergence of the chief executive, the personalization and presidentialization of politics and the reappearance of charismatic leadership in European politics make the concept of leader democracy relevant. The (directly or quasi-directly) elected chief executive becomes a popular political leader whose representative role is very different from the representative role of the legislature (see Table 1). The meaning of representation has changed. The chief executive is free to act in many respects. For example the growing power of the British prime minister is reflected in the literature on British government by the shift first from the concept of cabinet government to prime ministerial government, then from the latter to the concept of presidentialization of governance. The notion of descriptive representation (Pitkin 1967), which may be appropriate for the model of pluralist democracy, seems to be irrelevant in respect of leader democracy. Instead of quantitative representation the notion of qualitative representation might be used. The concept of representation in leader democracy has five major elements: (1) Qualitative representation The notion of descriptive representation (Hanna F. Pitkin) as well as the notion of quantitative representation (Carl Schmitt), which may be appropriate for the model of pluralist democracy, seem to be irrelevant for leader democracy. Instead, the notion of qualitative representation is more appropriate. Carl Schmitt differentiated between the modern quantitative and the traditional qualitative concept of representation. Quantitative representation was, according to Schmitt, the concept of 19th century Liberalism (and Protestantism). It is a mechanistic-positivistic (mathematical) concept of political representation where representation means re-presentation, i.e. the reproduction of an already existing material reality. Representation, in this view, is a mirroring of components, a mechanical re-presentation or technological reproduction. In this concept quantity is represented which reflects the functional approach of the mechanistic-positivistic view of the world and of the technological and economic thought. (Schmitt 1923) Qualitative representation is a traditionally Catholic concept of representation which has its origin in Christian theology. It is not a mechanistic-mathematical, but an auratic-substantive concept of representation. Qualitative representation has a substantive, invisible idea and / or a metaphysical essence. In contrast with the quantitative-technological concept, qualitative representation is a personalistic ideal of representation (cf. McCormick 1997, 157-206). In contrast with the naturalism of positivism, it has its origin in spiritualism. It is not a functional, but a normative concept. It is not quantity, but quality that is represented, which
actions are subject to a quite different principle of responsibility, one diametrically opposed to that of the official" (Weber 1994, 330). See also Weber 1918, 335.
25

Contingency, as Max Weber, Bertrand de Jouvenel and Michael Oakeshott emphasised, has a crucial role in the nature of political decision and action (Weber 1919; Jouvenel ; Oakeshott 1991). The room for decision, however, is also a ground of responsibility of the political actors. If there is room for action, one can be held responsible for his action, and for the consequences of his action.

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may be greater or different than the sum of its particular parts. In politics, representation means not re-presentation or the mirroring of something existing, like a limited mandate, but innovation, a free mandate for leadership. Schmitt regarded liberal parliamentarism as a typical political institution for quantitative representation, and contrasted it with an executivecentred, plebiscitary democracy as a form of qualitative representation (Schmitt 1923). While refusing the metaphysical essence of the Schmittian concept, the notion of qualitative representation is useful for us to emphasise the non-mechanical, non-quantitative character of representation in leader democracy. Qualitative representation means: (1) acting (and not reflecting) or, to put it differently, leadership with a free mandate (and not mirroring with a limited mandate); (2) innovation (and not re-production); (3) the subject of qualitative representation is the chief executive and not the assembly. The emphasis here is on the second characteristic, innovation. Qualitative representation is not re-production, but creation, not re-presentation but a presentation of something new, a creation of something which has not existed before. Political leadership, using the term of Max Weber, or political entrepreneurship, using the term of Joseph Schumpeter, always has a qualitative character. (2) Representation as acting: representation through leadership If representation means not only formal authorisation and/or the descriptive mirroring of the diverse composition of a political community but acting, or acting for (on its behalf), the model of leader democracy reveals the role of politicians and especially the role of the chief executive in political representation. We have seen that in a leader democracy representation is not re-presentation, or mirroring, in a descriptive sense but the autonomous action of political leaders. Max Weber contrasted in his political writings the Kaiserliche Germany with a Reichstag, dominated by class-parties, with Victorian Britain where parliament was the institution for selecting political leaders (Weber 1918; Weber 1919). In his political ethics Weber emphasised the political responsibility of a leader who acts with a free mandate (not determined by sectional interests) in contingent political situations (Weber 1919). According to Weber real political leadership is not possible in an assembly, which is dominated by sectional interests and class-parties, i.e. it is not possible, using our term, in the model of party-pluralism. An assembly with class-parties and interest groups is an example for quantitative representation, to use Carl Schmitt's term. Joseph Schumpeter focused on the innovative character of economic as well as political entrepreneurship, vis-a-vis pure (re)producers in the economy or populist politicians (mobocrats) of classical democracy. The logic of Weber's contrasting the German Reichstag with British Parliament appears in the work of Douglas Verney who differentiated between assembly and parliament (Verney 1992). While an assembly remains a purely representative body in a descriptive sense, which stands vis-a-vis the executive, parliament, as assembly, mirrors the political composition of the society, but also includes government. An assembly excludes, while a parliament includes government; the first is purely for representation in a descriptive sense, the second is for governing, for leadership. That was a reason why Max Weber regarded the British parliament as a desirable institutional pattern for Germany. (3) Representation as a personalistic idea Representation in leader democracy is a personalistic idea. Assemblies, mirroring the composition of their constituencies, cannot represent: they can re-present a state of affairs or the composition of a constituency, but they cannot act. Carl Schmitts personalistic idea of

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representation and Webers concept of charismatic leadership applied to democratic legitimacy express the personalised character of leader democracy. A leader himself represents; as a person a leader is authorised to act, and he himself is responsible for the performance of the government and accountable to the electorate. (4) Representation as a dynamic concept I would like to use the threefold typology of policy-polity-politics to highlight the dynamic character of representation in leader democracy. The two main trends of conventional concepts of political representation put the emphasis either on the election of representatives (authorisation and accountability view) or on representative assembly, or, more precisely, on the composition of the assembly (descriptive representation). The first stresses the formalistic element: authorisation either took place or did not; the institutions of the polity are in this sense representative or not (POLITY). The second focuses on the quantitative elements: on the composition of the representative assembly, i.e. on representativeness. Therefore, the proportionality of the electoral system becomes crucial, because it has to provide a fair aggregation of the political preferences of individual citizens and their fair re-presentation in the representative assembly. Beside the accountability of the members of the legislature and the leaders of the executive, this is the precondition to make government responsive to citizens political preferences. The substantive content of the issue-preferences of the citizens and of the policy of the government does not matter; what matters is that the second should correspond to the first. The focus is on representativeness and responsiveness, and not on the substantive content of policy. The stress is on the techniques of preference-aggregation and on electoral and representative institutions (legislative assembly and government). It is assumed that representative government should be responsive to the ex ante policy preferences of the citizens, therefore their focus is on the institutions and on the question to what extent it is possible to achieve this condition. Both the authorisation / accountability and the descriptive views, i.e. both the formal and the quantitative approaches focus on the POLITY dimension. They are static and institutional. The substantive concepts of representation (acting for) focuses on the policy dimension. Representation is acting for others, not in a virtual or metaphorical, but in a substantive sense. Representation is for the public good which is more and different than the sum of the components of the whole, and cannot be aggregated out of private interest. It is a normative approach. The concept of the general will by Rousseau, the qualitative representation of Carl Scmitt26 (in part), and the transcendental representation of Eric Voegelin are classic examples of this approach. Their common feature is that representation has a strong substantive, nearly metaphysical meaning, and their approach remains in the POLICY dimension. Representation in leader democracy is not a static, but a dynamic concept. It is set at the core of the political process, since the representatives are political leaders with a free mandate for leadership. As we have seen above, the political leaders themselves formulate the policy alternatives, acting in contingent political situations. Representation has neither a standing for nor an acting for meaning; political representation is leadership. Government policy cannot be aggregated from citizens preferences as the descriptive theory assumed. Neither can it be deduced from the metaphysical dimension as the substantive approach assumed, even if politicians usually do believe in Gods or Demons, as Weber formulated, and take into
26

As we have seen Carl Schmitts concept allows a different interpretation as well.

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consideration, to a certain extent, the citizens opinion. Normative political aims of political leaders have their origin in the autonomous political sphere. There is a substantive meaning of the political actions of the chief executive, but it is not a reflection of the spirit of the political community or that of the Volksgeist or of a metaphysical world. On the contrary, it is the innovation of the political leaders. The substance of the policy in leader democracy is formulated and re-formulated by political leaders in the political process. Political leaders are political entrepreneurs as Schumpeter defined them: the policy they follow is their own innovation, and cannot be deduced either from the empirical or from the spiritual/metaphysical world. It has a qualitative character, it cannot be directly deduced either from the quantitative nor from the metaphysical world. Action in a contingent political situation always has an arbitrary and subjective element; it might be regarded as acting for only as a metaphor. Representation in leader democracy is essentially a part of the process of POLITICS. (5) Political representation It is necessary to differentiate among various concepts of representation concerning the question to what extent they embody political or other (non-political) forms or representation. The concept of representation in leader democracy is a political concept; it is not something to be derived from science or ethics, or from society, as it is supposed by the theories of liberal parliamentarism and pluralist democracy, respectively. Therefore representation in leader democracy is political representation. In leader democracy the political sphere is an independent, autonomous dimension where the political process is self-evident, not subject to any other sphere.27

27

Beside Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt see the contemporary repoliticization literature (Honig, Mouffe, Newey).

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Table 2: Representation in the three theoretical models of democracy Type of democracy

1. Imago / historical pattern 2. Principal actors of politics 3. Political action - Motivation for political action - The aim of political action 4. Political knowledge - Institutional analogy 5. Political process and discussion means: It aims:

Deliberative democracy
liberal parliamentarism notables (rational individuals) truth (ethics) consensus Epistem Academy deliberation (rational debate) rational debate to find truth learned society

Pluralist democracy
party-based democracy parties

Leader democracy
presidentialization political leaders

interest (sociology) compromise tekhn market bargaining (interest conciliation) aggregate citizens preferences28 expert committee

will/opinion (politics) acquisition of support praxis Forum persuasion (rhetoric) persuasion of citizens, manufacturing of citizen preferences29 military council / political advisory board

Institutional analogy where discussion takes place: 6. Type of representation Representation means:

transcendental (ethical) deliberation

quantitative / descriptive (mechanical) mirroring aggregate citizens preferences responsive quasi-political (sociological)

qualitative (personal) leadership selection of leaders responsible political

7. Function of democracy search for truth Leaders are: 8. Nature of theory authorised / accountable anti-political (ethical)

28 29

Citizen preferences are of ex ante nature. Citizen preferences are of an ex post nature as a result of the political process.

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