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Frga 1. But what if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given culture, did possess a well-defined regularity?

If the very possibility of recording facts, of allowing oneself to be convinced by them, of distorting them in traditions or of making purely speculative use of them, if even this was not at the mercy of chance? If errors (and truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also the most naive notions, obeyed, at a given moment, the laws of a certain code of knowledge? If, in short, the history of non-formal knowledge had itself a system? That was my initial hypothesis ... the first risk I took. S hr str det i Nationalencyklopedin under begreppet empirisk: empirisk (jfr empiri), grundad p erfarenheten. En verksamhet sgs vara empirisk nr den inte r underbyggd av teoretiska vervganden utan endast bygger p erfarenhet. Ursprungligen anvndes termen ofta nedsttande, srskilt inom medicinen om behandlingar som inte hade ngot std i medicinsk teori. Numera r det vanligt att beteckna en vetenskap som empirisk fr att framhlla att den vsentligen bygger p iakttagelser av verkligheten i motsats till t.ex. matematiken och filosofin empirisk str drvid i motsats till bestmningar sdana som formell, deduktiv, begreppsutredande och spekulativ. Nr man sger att en lag r empirisk avser man dremot vanligen endast att den handlar om iakttagbara storheter, oavsett om den r teoretiskt hrledd eller bekrftad genom observation Nr F talar om den empiriska kunskapen allts den kunskap som uppstr i en praktik och som stlls emot kunskap som r abstrakt och teoretisk i sin natur p samma stt som vi vanligtvis talar om den abstrakta och formella kunskapen, ja, d bryter han snder den binra konstruktion som vanligtvis dominerar vsterlndsk epistemologi (kunskapsteori). Inom kunskapsteorin skiljer man p kunskap som r erfarenhetsgrundad och kunskap som produceras rationellt och abstrakt (matematik r ett ofta anfrt exempel p det sistnmnda). Det finns en hel rcka motsatspar som beskriver denna tudelning: Materialism Idealism; Rationalism Empirism; A posteriori kunskap A priori kunskap; Syntetiska pstenden Analytiska pstenden. Andra stt att tala om denna skillnad r t.ex. indelningen i normativ och deskriptiv kunskap inom samhllsvetenskaperna. S hr str det t.ex. om beslutsteori i Nationalencyklopedin: beslutsteori. Teorier om beslut och beslutsfattande kan indelas i normativa och deskriptiva. En normativ teori syftar till att ange hur en person eller en organisation br fatta beslut fr att handla rationellt. En deskriptiv teori har som mlsttning att beskriva och frklara hur mnniskor faktiskt fattar beslut.

Om reglerna fr kunskap grundad p erfarenheten inte skiljer sig ifrn den teoretiska kunskapen faller distinktionen mellan det som r erfarenhetsgrundat och den kunskap som r teoretiskt hrledd. Den empiriska kunskapen blir inte lngre en vg ut ur idealismens och rationalismens problematik. Ett svar jag vill framhlla: Utgngspunkten kan formuleras [...] som en typ av struktur eller ordning som uppstr i de praktiker som [strukturen/ordningen] reglerar. Denna ordning existerar allts inte innan eller utanfr [...] den praktik den reglerar. Det handlar om omedvetna strukturer, som uppstr individuellt men r del av en strre diskurs, som reglerar alla praktiker, i detta fallet all kunskapsproduktion, och ven mjligheterna till dessa, mjligheterna att uppfatta sanning och att beg misstag etc. Det r sociala koder som kan jmfras med Butlers teori om performativa normer, som r regleringar vilka bestr i utvandet och upprepandet av bde reglerade/reglerande praktiker och det som undflyr eller inte lyckas utfra dessa praktiker. P liknande stt finns regleringarna Foucault skriver om lika mycket i det som undflyr de vetenskapliga diskurserna och studierna om dessa, i den icke-formella kunskapen, som i det som ryms inom diskurserna. Frga 2. Denna frga vckte ett vist motstnd. Vad jag ville frmedla hr var en knsla fr hur problematiken framstlls av Foucault. F. positionerar sig mot vissa frestllningar som han beskriver som dominerande inom de discipliner han verkar (historia, idhistoria, filosofi, politisk teori) och gr det genom att frammana olika motsatsfrhllanden. Foucault skapar sin egen position genom att stlla saker mot varandra. Ungefr s hr: I was led to abandon the great divisions that are now familiar to us all. I did not look in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the beginnings of nineteenth-century biology (or philosophy or economics) kontinuitet (detta r en viktig hermeneutisk princip och helt dominerande inom mnet historia) vs diskontinuitet, brott. Hr trampar F. p en av historievetenskapernas heligaste kor. Tnk p fljande teori om historisk frndring av den brittiske marxisten och idhistorikern/ litteraturvetaren Raymond Williams [frn A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory]: dominant / residual / emergent Raymond Williams defined and discussed these concepts dominant / residual / emergent explicitly in Marxism and Literature (1977), though similar ideas about cultural power relationships and the processes of change can be traced back to Culture and Society (1958). His argument that a culture is composed of a set of relations between dominant, residual, and emergent forms is a way of emphasizing the uneven and dynamic quality of any particular moment. It

represents a shift away from more monumental epochal analyses of history in the manner of Hegel and Lukcs, where periods or stages of history succeed one another and each epoch is characterized by a dominant mode or spirit of the times. Williams argued that it is possible to make general distinctions between different periods of history based on modes of production between feudal and bourgeois, for example, or capitalist and late capitalist. However, he pointed out that these dominant formations are in themselves too broad and need to be further broken down into differentiated moments. Moreover, each epoch not only consists of different variations and stages, but at every point is also composed of a process of dynamic, contradictory relationships in the interplay of dominant, residual, and emergent forms. This opens up a space to analyze the role that subversive and oppositional identities and movements play within the dominant culture, and how effective they might be in shifting it. Neither residual nor emergent forms simply exist within or alongside the dominant culture. They operate in a process of continual tension, which can take the form of both incorporation and opposition within it. Residual forms are different from archaic ones in that they are still alive, they have use and relevance within contemporary culture. They represent a previous institution or tradition which is still active as a memory in the present, and thus can both bolster the dominant culture or provide the resources for an alternative or opposition to it. In Britain the monarchy could be seen as a residual institution that is gradually being perceived as archaic within popular discourse as it loses its cultural legitimacy. Conversely, the current ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Republics can be seen as an example of residual identities challenging and overturning former dominant ones, though not in progressive ways. The rise of religious extremism in various parts of the world is another instance of residual forms challenging the Hegemony of liberal Western capitalism. Indeed, it could be argued that all ethnic and religious identities are constructed through the process of keeping residual forms alive, expressing Structures of feeling which the dominant culture denies or represses. Emergent cultures also develop in relation to dominant formations, and in practice it can be difficult to draw a clear line between residual and emergent forms, for both often consist of private or marginalized spheres of experience which the dominant culture initially fails to acknowledge or recognize. For example, new social forces in contemporary Western society feminism, the peace movement, and green politics challenge both the dominant culture and residual oppositional forms such as the traditional labour movement, yet may themselves base their identities on selective traditions, or on residual notions of nature. Williams stresses that the dominant culture is itself dependent on incorporating aspects of emergent forms to maintain its legitimacy and hegemony, and that it is often difficult to distinguish between what is genuinely emergent and what is merely novel. The assimilation of subcultural and subversive styles and fashions into mainstream culture is one example of such incorporation. Another is the way in which critical movements, such as

poststructuralism, initially an emergent trend in opposition to a residual/ dominant literary Canon, have now become a new dominant literary institution.

Och d mste man nd betnka att Raymond Williams talar om dominant/ residual/emergent som en kritik av den Hegelianska tanken p epok som en frkroppsligad Weltgeist [It represents a shift away from more monumental epochal analyses of history in the manner of Hegel and Lukcs, where periods or stages of history succeed one another and each epoch is characterized by a dominant mode or spirit of the times.]. Inom den hermeneutiska historievetenskapen handlar vldigt mycket om begrepp som frfrestllning, begreppshorisont och historiemedvetande. Olika freteelse banar vg fr andra freteelser i en succession som kan rekonstrueras. Epoken blir p s stt freml fr en kausalitet p begreppens och de enskilda hndelsernas niv: det ena ger det andra, o.s.v. What I saw was the appearance of figures peculiar to the Classical age: a 'taxonomy' or 'natural history' that was relatively unaffected by the knowledge that then existed in animal or plant physiology; an 'analysis of wealth' that took little account of the assumptions of the 'political arithmetic' that was contemporary with it; and a 'general grammar' that was quite alien to the historical analyses and works of exegesis then being carried out. Epistemological figures, that is, that were not superimposed on the sciences as they were individualized and named in the nineteenth century. substantiella ider som successivt utvecklas organiskt inom varje vetenskap vs. tankefigurer som medverkar till vetandet Moreover, I saw the emergence, between these different figures, of a network of analogies that transcended the traditional proximities: between the classification of plants and the theory of coinage, between the notion of generic character and the analysis of trade, one finds in the Classical sciences isomorphisms that appear to ignore the extreme diversity of the objects under consideration. enskildheternas substantiella natur vs. formmssiga analogier som flyter in i varandra och gr att en vetenskap kan likna en annan utan att det finns ngon verklig nrhet enskildheter, singulariteter, vetenskapernas separation och individuella utveckling vs. isomorfier, strukturlikheter mellan vetenskaper Nationalencyklopedin: isomorfi (av iso- och grekiska morph 'form', 'gestalt'), strukturlikhet. Tv freteelser eller domner sges vara isomorfa om de trots materiella olikheter uppvisar samma struktur i relevanta avseenden. T.ex. r sjlva pongen med en karta ver ett landskap att en isomorfi mellan de bda freligger, vilket innebr att orter i landskapet avbildats med tecken p kartan p s stt att det till relevanta relationer mellan orterna finns en motsvarande relation mellan karttecknen ('norr om' i landskapet svarar mot

relationen 'ovanfr' p kartan osv.). [...] ven sjlva tillordningen (eller avbildningen) kallas ibland fr en isomorfi men benmns hellre isomorfism. En isomorfism r sledes en inverterbar avbildning, som liksom sin invers bevarar en given struktur. Vad som r relevant struktur lmnas ibland underfrsttt och fr framg av sammanhanget. [...].

The space of knowledge was then arranged in a totally different way from that systematized in the nineteenth century by Comte or Spencer. [...] kontinuitet vs. diskontinuitet I did not operate, therefore, at the level that is usually that of the historian of science ... I should say at the two levels that are usually his. For, on the one hand, the history of science traces the progress of discovery, the formulation of problems, and the clash of controversy; it also analyses theories in their internal economy; in short, it describes the processes and products of the scientific consciousness. logiska framsteg, kontinuitet i tnkandet vs. ... But, on the other hand, it tries to restore what eluded that consciousness: the influences that affected it, the implicit philosophies that were subjacent to it, the unformulated thematics, the unseen obstacles; it describes the unconscious of science. den tankemssiga ramen (religion, gudsbegreppet, etc.) som dikterar kunskapens fortskridande och som r oknd fr vetenskapsmnnen nr de gr sina upptckter vs. ... This unconscious is always the negative side of science ... that which resists it, deflects it, or disturbs it. det vetenskapligt omedvetna som en negativitet, ngot som pverkar vetenskapsmnnen utan att de vet om det, ngot som frvrnger deras egna ider om det de gr vs. ... What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature. ... vs. det positivt omedvetna i vetenskapen, en niv som mjliggr vetenskap utan att vetenskapsmannen vet om det What was common to the natural history, the economics, and the grammar of the Classical period was certainly not present to the consciousness of the scientist; or that part of it that was conscious was superficial, limited, and almost fanciful (Adanson, for example, wished to draw up an artificial

denomination for plants; Turgot compared coinage with language); but, unknown to themselves, the naturalists, economists, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. ... vs. omedvetna regler som kan verfras frn en vetenskap till en annan, produktiva regler som bygger p isomorfier och analogier av olika slag It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological. ... vs. oformulerade, omedvetna regler; ...vs. arkeologi Taking as an example the period covered in this book, I have tried to determine the basis or archaeological system common to a whole series of scientific 'representations' or 'products' dispersed throughout the natural history, economics, and philosophy of the Classical period. [vetenskapshistoria & idhistoria som upptckternas historia (blockerat av den negativa omedvetenhet som uppstr nr vetenskapsmannen r influerad av vidskepelse, religion, klassamhlle, knsmaktsordningar, etc.) vs. det arkeologiska systemet av omedvetna analogier, regler, isomorfier fr hur kunskapen kan formuleras/produceras

Jag vill ocks lyfta fram tv av era svar: --1. Social kontext vs. Forskaren "...the history of science [...] describes the processes and products of the scientific consciousness." I arkeologin har inte forskaren och dennes medvetande kontroll ver kunskap, utan det r en social (diskursiv och icke-diskursiv) kontext som producerar ramverk fr inhmtning och produktion av kunskap. Forskarens "scientific consciousness" och dennes roll som subjekt i kunskapsproduktionen r en "produkt av en social ordning" (Nilsson 2008:60). 2. Diskursiva system vs. Fri kunskap "What was common to the natural history, the economics, and the grammar of the Classical period was certainly not present to the consciousness of the scientist"

Det verkar som att Foucault indikerar att forskarens medvetande inte agerar fritt i produktionen av kunskap. Regler och system fr grammatik och andra diskursiva produkter begrnsar friheten i forskarens undermedvetna.

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Traditionell idhistoria - Arkeologisk metod: kausalitet ickelinjaritet/regionalitet (?)

I did not look in the seventeenth and eightteenth centuries for the beginnings of nineteenth-century biology (x)

centrum - periferi If errors (and truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also he most nave notions, obeyed, at a given moment, the laws of a certain code of knowledge? If, in short, the history of non-formal knowledge had itself a system? (ix)

inomdiskursivitet - grnsverskridande I saw the emergence, between these different figures, of a network of analogies that transcended the traditional proximities:(xi)

det medvetenna - det omedvetna What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconcious of knowledge: a level that eludes the conciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seking to diminish its scientific nature. (xi)

intelletuella biografier.. -

determinerande, subjektiverande strukturer

I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them. (xiv) ---

Frga 3-6. Hr tnkte jag egentligen inte sga s mycket. Frgorna 3, 4 och 5 r varianter och specifikationer av frga 2. Frga 6 besvaras i frelsningen om Las Meninas.

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