2005-05-06 SECRET SUBJECT: BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security

Classified by Ambassador John J. Danilovich Ambassador hosted General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security, for lunch at the residence on 4 May 2005. While General Felix has much less influence than his predecessor from the previous government, he is still the country's most senior intelligence official and the rough equivalent of national security advisor to the president. Veja verso traduzida de documento sobre Brasil vazado pelo WikiLeaks Acompanhe a Folha Poder no Twitter Comente reportagens em nossa pgina no Facebook The Tri-Border Region: The Ambassador asked General Felix for an assessment of the transnational crime situation in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. General Felix admitted that there were serious problems in the region and that the illegal movement of arms, money, drugs and the like through the region was of concern to the Brazilian Government. Felix said that both ABIN and the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) were devoting additional personnel and resources to the problem and noted that ABIN even had some joint programs with RMAS that were focused on these issues. This led to a discussion on terrorism issues/operations in the tri-border region and throughout Brazil. General Felix said that ABIN worked closely with RMAS in jointly targeting individuals of interest, and the Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this assistance. General Felix said that in addition to the joint operations that we were working together, the Brazilian government was also appealing to moderate, second generation Arabs, many of whom were successful businessmen in Brazil, to keep a close eye on fellow Arabs who may be influenced by Arab extremists and/or terrorist groups. General Felix said that it was in the interest of these moderate, Arabs to keep potential firebrands in line and keep the microscope off of the Arab community in Brazil. General Felix said that it was important that counterterrorism operations were packaged properly so as not to negatively reflect on the proud and successful Arab community in Brazil. The Ambassador asked General Felix if there were any areas where the USG could better assist the GSI and/or ABIN. Felix said that he was very happy with the assistance currently being provided by the USG. One area where he claimed that the Brazilian Government was falling behind was in protecting its own classified and unclassified computer systems. Felix said that he would welcome any assistance (courses, visitors, etc.) in this area. Felix also said that he was trying to beef up the GSI and ABIN's SIGINT capabilities and could always use some assistance along those lines.

General Felix has always been a straightforward interlocutor, and his term at GSI has been highlighted by very cooperative, joint CT operations between RMAS and ABIN. All in all, his continued presence at GSI bodes well for U.S. interests. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX 2008-01-08 SECRET SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: LOOKING BEYOND THE TRIBORDER AREA Clifford Sobel The Government of Brazil remains highly sensitive to public claims suggesting that terrorist or extremist organizations have a presence or are undertaking activities in Brazil--a sensitivity that appears to be the rise and is resulting in more than symbolic reactions. At an operational level and away from the public spotlight, however, the GOB is a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and terrorist-related activities. Even though the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area (TBA) exclusively dominates headlines, the primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. The Brazilian government is a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and terrorist-related activity in Brazil--to include investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity--that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere. Nonetheless, the highest levels of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Relations, are extremely sensitive to any public claims that terrorists have a presence in Brazil--whether to raise funds, arrange logistics, or even transit through the country--and will vigorously reject any statements implying otherwise. This sensitivity results, in part, from their fear of stigmatizing the large Muslim community of Brazil (estimated, but unconfirmed, by some sources at over 1 million) or prejudicing the area's image as a tourist destination. It is also a public posture designed to avoid being too closely linked to what is seen as the US's overly aggressive War on Terrorism. This sensitivity manifests itself in various symbolic and concrete ways. The GOB participates reluctantly in the "3 1 Mechanism on Security in the Triborder Area," which annually gathers diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence representatives of the three Triborder (TBA) countries together with the U.S. to deliberate strategies to deter a host of transnational criminal activities that could be exploited by potential terrorists to facilitate attacks. At the conferences, the Brazilian delegations often decry statements made by U.S. officials claiming that the TBA is a hotbed of terrorist activity and challenge U.S.

participants to present the evidence on which U.S. officials base those statements. Itamaraty officials repeatedly question the value of this four-way cooperation, insisting that "bilateral concerns should be addressed bilaterally" (reftel). The GOB refuses to legally or even rhetorically label U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as HAMAS, Hizballah or the FARC as terrorist groups--the former two being considered by Brazil as legitimate political parties. As a result, their threshold for accepting evidence of terrorism financing activity in the region, at least publicly, is very high and any information indicating that individuals in the TBA send funds to the groups in Lebanon, in their view, does not necessarily constitute an activity supporting terrorism. Despite negative rhetoric in Itamaraty and at higher levels of the GOB, Brazilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies--principally the Federal Police, Customs, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), and others--are aware of the potential threat from terrorists exploiting the favorable conditions existing in Brazil to operate and actively track and monitor suspected terrorist activity and follow all leads passed to them. The Federal Police will often arrest individuals with links to terrorism, but will charge them on a variety of non-terrorism related crimes to avoid calling attention of the media and the higher levels of the government. Over the past year the Federal Police has arrested various individuals engaged in suspected terrorism financing activity but have based their arrests on narcotics and customs charges. The primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. The Federal Police, and to a lesser extent ABIN, monitor the activities of these suspected extremists who may be tied to terrorist groups abroad and share this information with their U.S. counterparts. Brazilian law enforcement officials actively monitor the presence of several suspected Sunni extremists with possible ties to terrorist groups abroad who may be capable of lending logistical support--through financing, safehaven, false travel documents-- for terrorist attacks in the region or abroad. In 2007, the Federal Police arrested a potential Sunni extremist terrorist facilitator operating primarily in Santa Catarina state for failure to declare funds entering the country and is in the process of deporting him. Also in 2007, Brazilian Federal Police took down a Rio de Janeiro-based false document ring that was supplying falsified Brazilian documents to non-Brazilians, among them suspected international drug traffickers. To a lesser extent, the TBA remains a concern for the U.S. Mission and Brazilian counterparts, primarily for the potential that terrorists may exploit the favorable conditions there--lax border controls, smuggling, drug trafficking, easy access to false documents and weapons, movement of pirated goods,

uncontrolled cash flows--to raise funds or arrange logistics for operations. While there are some individuals suspected of having links to Hizballah and HAMAS, there is little evidence these groups have an operational terrorist presence in the region. The GOB pursues CT investigations in the TBA and shares the results of their investigations, but their principal concern remains the array of other transnational criminal activity that takes place in the region. The area is a major entry point for drug traffickers into Brazil. In addition, it is a focus of concern for Brazil in other areas such as arms trafficking, smuggling of pirated and counterfeit goods, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing. To cover this range of transnational criminal activity, the GOB's police and intelligence services have an extensive presence in the region and liaison relationships with Argentine, Paraguayan, and other national intelligence services, including USG agencies. Furthermore, the GOB has attempted to institutionalize some of this cross-border cooperation, although with mixed success. For example, Brazilian Customs completed a new inspection station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA. This should enable the GOB to intensify its crack down on contraband crossing the bridge, though law enforcement officials expect that traffickers will respond to the tough controls by trying to move their goods clandestinely across the border elsewhere via boat. Post will focus over the coming year on keeping the higher levels of the Brazilian government engaged politically and diplomatically on this issue, and on seeking to ensure that they do not undermine the work being done at the operational level. End Comment. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX UNCLASSIFIED 2009-12-31 SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM LISA KUBISKE The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to include investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of the Brazilian government responsible for combating terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, work effectively with their U.S. counterparts most of the time and pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. There are two separate discourses in the government of Brazil on counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny the presence and

potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in Brazil, while law enforcement and intelligence monitor and cooperate to counter the threat. The head of the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) intelligence division in July went on record during a Brazilian Chamber of Deputies hearing on terrorism and admitted that an individual arrested in April was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ). Despite the statement, most GOB officials continue to toe the party line and deny any evidence that terrorists have, or would be, interested in establishing a presence in Brazil. Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of External Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to terrorism-related activities and instead focus more heavily on threats from transnational crimes. In October 2009, the MRE did admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become interested in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that could raise the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department level. Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, detection of travel document fraud, container security, and international organized crime. In 2009 the USG again hosted a Major Crimes Conference that successfully brought together Brazil and neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement communities and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and receive practical training. Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. Through COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN terror-finance lists. Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen specialized money laundering courts have been established, including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who receives specialized training in national money laundering legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a working group with money laundering judges to share best practices and training needs.

A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the federal police established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia) and the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In addition, the Ministry of Justice funded the creation of technology center to combat money laundering in the federal district and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public Ministry and one with the State Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goiais, and Rio Grande do Sul. The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to facilitate attacks or raise funds, along with monitoring and suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through actions between its law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United States and other partners in the region. For example, in 2009 Brazilian authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned nations (particularly the U.S.) in combating the significant and largely unchecked document fraud problem in the country. During the year, multiple regional and international joint operations with U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking infrastructures. This included one of the largest visa fraud cases of its type in U.S. law enforcement history. The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from recent investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure that were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian customs agency (Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take effective action to reduce the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along the border with Paraguay. According to Receita Federal, from January to July 2009 the agency seized more than USD 400 million in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons, and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result of the effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu and some have migrated to other sections of the border, such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police has special maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that patrol the maritime border areas, but because of the scale and complexity of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities through the waterways, Brazil is considering using an unmanned aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border, a development that could further improve border security.

Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism is undermined by the GOB's failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework significantly. Although terrorist financing is an established predicate offense for money laundering, Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing as autonomous offenses. The 2005 National Strategy against Money Laundering (ENCLA) created a working group (composed of representatives of ministries involved in CFT, the judiciary, and the federal prosecutor's office) charged with drafting legislation to criminalize terrorism and its financing. The draft legislation was never forwarded from the executive branch to the Brazilian Congress. A long-delayed anti-money laundering bill is still pending before the Brazilian Congress. The bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous offense. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX 2008-04-11 CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE BACK Ambassador Clifford Sobel Summary: In November of last year the Government of Brazil announced that it was backtracking on its effort to introduce counterterrorism (CT) legislation after a years-long effort by a working group within the Presidency's Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) to coordinate the drafting of the initiative within the government. Although they now seek to downplay the importance of having such legislation, prior to the reversal GOB officials claimed that new anti-terrorism legislation was necessary to improve its legal regime--which currently does not treat terrorist activities, terrorism financing, or support of terrorism as crimes. Some news reports have suggested that President Lula's powerful chief of staff quashed the proposed legislation, which had been attacked by some social activists and advocacy groups who feared it could be used against them and compared it to military era repression. The media and political silence that greeted the government's reversal has exposed a vacuum on matters pertaining to terrorism among the elites whose support would be required to overcome GOB resistance. As a result, our efforts to put this legislation back on Brazil's agenda will be an uphill climb. No Crime Without a Law to Define It In 2004, the GOB formed a working group within GSI, the Presidency's office in charge of coordinating intelligence, counternarcotics and national security, charged with examining Brazilian laws related to terrorism, as well as the way the government was structured to deal with the challenges posed by international terrorists (ref A). Prior to this effort, Brazilian government officials

and outside observers had concluded that Brazilian laws dealing with terrorism were ambiguous and needed updating to account for modern realities (refs B and C). Under Brazilian law, terrorist acts, their financing, and activities supporting terrorist acts are not considered crimes. Both the Brazilian constitution and the National Security Act (Public Law 7.170 of 1983), which defines crimes against national security, criminalize acts of terrorism in general. However, because the National Security Act harkens back to the military regime, Embassy contacts have indicated that it is highly unlikely the government would ever use it to charge someone with a crime related to a terrorist activity (Ref B). In addition, because terrorism under that law is proscribed without being typified, even in the unlikely case someone attempted to test the prevailing wisdom on the applicability of a military-era national security law to charge someone with the crime of attempting to commit an act of terrorism, they probably would be unable to do so. The Act specifically proscribes criminal acts that could be considered acts of terrorism, such as sabotage and bombings, but only as distinct crimes from terrorism. Because of this, terrorist activities consisting of defined crimes under the law could not be charged explicitly as terrorism. Domestic Politics to Blame As soon as news reports started surfacing in early 2007 that GSI was about to wrap up its work, the government started coming under fire from opponents of the bill. The BRASILIA 00000504 002 OF 004 influential Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB, the Brazilian bar association) criticized the government for pushing legislation that was, according to OAB's president Cezar Britto, in reality a thinly veiled move to criminalize the actions of social movements and those fighting for equality. Forced on the defensive, several high-ranking GSI officials publicly suggested that any anti-terrorism legislation would be rarely used and that judges would have discretion in applying it. Then in late November 2007, the government unceremoniously announced that it would not introduce the legislation to Congress. In a meeting with Poloff, Assistant Secretary Jose Antonio de Macedo Soares of the Secretariat for Monitoring and Institutional Studies, at GSI (and Ministry of External Relations representative to GSI, where he holds the rank of minister) and GSI advisor Janer Tesch Hosken Alvarenga explained that it was impossible to reach consensus within the government on how to define terrorism. Asked to confirm a news item in the daily newspaper Correio Braziliense noting that Minister Dilma Rousseff (chief of staff to President Lula in the Casa Civil) had quashed the proposal, Alvarenga equivocated, suggested that several "clients" had weighed in, including the Ministry of Justice. In the end, he did not deny the news report, stating that the decision had been a "political" one. A Brazilian War College analyst on strategic intelligence and author of numerous articles on counterterrorism topics, Andre Luis Soloszyn, went farther, asserting to poloff that the Correio story sounded very credible to him, and that the GSI working group was a smokescreen for the government to demonstrate to the US and the international community that it was taking the issue of counterterrorism seriously. Soloszyn noted that there was little chance

that this particular government, stacked with leftist militants who had been the object of military dictatorship-era laws designed to repress politically-motivated violence, was going to put forth a bill that would criminalize the actions of groups it sympathizes with, such as the Landless Movement (MST), for "there is no a way to write an anti-terrorism legislation that excludes the actions of the MST". An Idea Whose Time Has Come(and Gone) Asked if there was a possibility the legislation could come back some time in the future, both Soares and Alvarenga were pessimistic. Commenting on the enormously complex nature of the issue, Alvarenga noted that discussions of terrorism within Brazilian society remain at an immature stage, with few experts on the topic and very few people interested. Soares added that people within and outside the government find the possibility of a terrorist attack taking place on Brazilian soil so improbable that they are incapable of giving the issue much attention. 8. (SBU) Soloszyn echoed these comments, indicating that he is one of the few individuals to focus on the issue of terrorism outside the government. Within the government, the story is not much different, he added, and virtually no one in Congress was focused on the issue. Most legislators and general public are so in the grip of the "it can't happen here" mentality that they lack any idea of terrorist tactics, the concept of support networks, the threat of homegrown terrorism, and exploitation of soft targets. According to Soloszyn, the issue of potential pockets of Islamic extremism among segments of Brazil's large Muslim community is likewise an unstudied subject among specialists, and unthinkable as a proposition among the public at large. The Brazilian mind even among the highest echelons of the government, he added, can't get past its own cliches about the multicultural paradise that is Brazil. According to him, the only factor that could change this indifference is another wave of violence like that unleashed by the First Capital Command (PCC) in Sao Paulo in 2006 (ref D). Terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists is too remote for Brazilians to worry about. The only way they are going to move on this, he added, is when it affects them on a daily basis. (Comment: In the immediate aftermath of the PCC's violence in 2006, President Lula called their actions terrorism, and made noises about finally getting some anti-terrorism legislation on the books. End comment.) "We have to Stop this Farce" In his conversation with poloff, Soares dismissed the importance of the government's reversal, arguing that the success of any potential terrorist attack against the Israeli Embassy in Brasilia is not going to be determined by whether there is a law on the books outlawing terrorism. Brazil, according to him, has excellent working relationships with other countries, he noted, including with the US and Israel. Soares added that he hoped to continue cooperating with the US, despite what he described as the "farcical" elements within the bilateral CT dialogue: Soares did not miss the opportunity to repeat the oft-heard complaint by GOB officials about comments on the part of USG officials suggesting the

Triborder Area (TBA) remains a top concern with regard to potential terrorist activity, which then prompt the obligatory Brazilian demands for evidence of such activity. He called the exercise pointless, since, in his words, "we all know that your officials based their statements on information we provide the US". Soares also criticized Argentine officials for their comments linking the TBA to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, calling their accusations "silly" and "baseless". Comment: After various Brazilian government officials had warned of the flawed nature of the Brazilian legal system, it is unfortunate, though not surprising, to hear GSI officials now argue that there is no need for the GOB to improve Brazil's legal regime to make it illegal to commit, finance, plan, or support terrorist acts. Although we cannot confirm definitively that the Casa Civil quashed the initiative for political or ideological reasons, it is certainly plausible. Outside of some agencies focused on security issues, this government evinces very little interest in terrorism issues, much less on legislation its base has no interest in seeing enacted and that would require significant political capital to push through Congress. Likewise, with little knowledge or enthusiasm within Congress, there is no one to take up the mantle there either. As a result, the initiative has become an orphan of Brazil's current political realities. For the moment, any effort to suppress terrorism, its financing, or activities supporting terrorist activities will have to continue for the foreseeable future to follow the "Al Capone" approach of taking down terrorists based on customs violations, tax fraud, and other crimes that unfortunately also carry less jail time. While this approach can work, it is not a substitute for giving police and judges the additional legal tools that the international community has agreed are necessary in the fight against terrorism and nor is it a substitute for institutionalizing counterterrorism within the Brazilian legal system. Taking Brazil's reform of its CT structure (ref A) together with its backtracking CT legislation once again shows a mixed picture of Brazil's overall CT effort at the policy level. Furthermore, the low standing CT holds as an issue among Brazil's elite casts some doubt as to whether the potentially useful reform of ABIN will actually materialize. Over the next months, Mission will consult with Washington agencies as we review our strategy for increasing Brazilian attention to counter-terrorism. BRASILIA 00000504 004 OF 004 Comment, cont: On a separate note, we found Soares' admission that Brazil provides the bulk of the intelligence on matters related to CT to be highly atypical, although it sheds some light on a question that has long-puzzled the Mission. That is, whether policy-level officials, particularly at Itamaraty, where they tend to be most disinclined to accept the suggestion that there may be terrorist elements active in their territory, receive the same information from Brazil's intelligence elements as the U.S. receives. Although we cannot answer definitively, Soares comments would suggest that to be the case and that, despite their denials, they recognize the potential problems Brazil faces. Another possibility is that they have access to the same information but, either because the information would be inadmissible in a Brazilian court or because it does not meet a presumed higher threshold of what constitutes terrori st-

related activity, they technically do not consider it evidence of such activity. This means they are either playing games or they are defining terrorism out of Brazil. Neither interpretation presents a flattering picture of the seriousness with which the senior levels of the Brazilian government treat the issue of terrorism, but both are consistent with what we have seen over the last several years from a government that considers CT a low priority. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX 20-11-2009 CONFIDENTIAL Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims Thomas White Post is delighted to host Special Representative (SR) Farah Pandith's first visit to Latin America, November 22-23. Brazil offers a unique context for engaging the local Muslim communities. Statistics on Brazil's Muslim population vary widely. A year 2000 census lists only 27,000 Muslims in the country. Spokesmen for the country's Muslim community have sometimes put this figure as high as 1-2 million. Most knowledgeable observers calculate that there are 400-500 thousand Muslims in Brazil. (Muslim community members universally lament the lack of hard data on their own numbers, due, in part, they say to flaws in the Brazilian census methodology.) The majority are Sunnis of Lebanese descent. Many of these immigrants' families arrived decades ago and have set strong roots in Brazil. A more recent group of immigrants has complemented these earlier flows. The new immigrants are frequently also from Lebanon, but they are poorer and far more Shiite. Their politics is more radical and they frequently look to Hezbollah for leadership. The Consulate does not have contact with this latter group, which tends to keep its distance from us. For several years, the Consulate has sought greater engagement with Sao Paulo's various Muslim groups (Refs A-E). Working closely with the Lebanese Consul General, Joseph Sayah, we have developed an increasing network of friends among Sheiks and community leaders in the Sunni community, including an ability to dialogue with some Sunni Fundamentalists who hold highly critical views of the United States. We continue to try to make inroads into women and youth groups, but this is difficult in an essentially conservative, hierarchical community where even friendly Sheiks tend to guard their flocks closely, youth often enter family businesses and, as yet, women do not play overt leadership roles. What follows is a description of broad trends in Brazil's Muslim communities built around data points developed from our own experiences. This account includes data from only two trips outside Sao Paulo, a gap we intend to close in

the coming year as we promote Muslim engagement as part of our normal political travel in our district. The Lebanese Connection Heavy Lebanese immigration to Brazil, most of which was Maronite Christian, has shaped Brazil's Muslim community in important ways. Most of the Lebanese who are here are descended from earlier generation immigrants who extol the virtues of a tolerant Lebanon where Christians, Jews and Muslims mixed with ease. This is a cornerstone of this community and has only been reinforced by Brazil's own broad traditions of cultural tolerance. Many Lebanese Brazilians would like to see this spirit brought back to the country of their ancestors/their country of origin. A key figure in this effort is Lebanon's Sao Paulo-based Consul General, Joseph Sayah. A Maronite Christian with fluent Arabic and an intimate understanding of Islam, he actively maintains contacts with a wide range of actors in the Brazil's Islamic communities, promoting moderation. The social events he sponsors put this tolerance on remarkable display. In his hands, Lebanese National Day becomes a virtual celebration of religious comity, with Lebanese Jews, Christians and Muslims all hugging and conversing in fluent Arabic. Sayah is a close friend of the Consulate and a key interlocutor in reaching out to disaffected Muslims who would rather keep their distance from us. America at Arms-Length: the Sunnis of San Bernardo The San Bernardo suburb of Sao Paulo is home to a Sunni mosque that is run by Jihad Hammadeh, a Lebanese Sheik who speaks excellent Portuguese. For this reason, he frequently appears in local media speaking out on Islamic or Middle Eastern issues (often criticizing what he sees as unfair stereotyping of Muslims in global media). Hammadeh also works for two organizations that are dedicated to the spread of Islam in Latin America: the Center for the Propagation of Islam in Latin America (CDIAL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The latter was originally financed by the Saudi Monarchy, but sources indicate that that funding has dried up in recent years. The San Bernardo Mosque gives classes in both Islam and Arabic language to those interested and makes strong efforts to convert Brazilians to Islam. Hammadeh meets with us, but never attends our events and keeps us at arm'slength. When we have suggested visiting his Arabic language classes, he has demurred. When during a recent visit SP's Jared Cohen talked about creating cyber-linkages between Brazilian Muslims and U.S. Muslims, Hammadeh said that this should take place through individual Sheiks (Ref B). Hammadeh is generally moderate in his public pronouncements, but various sources indicate that the Islamic line he promotes among followers is strongly fundamentalist. Modern Islam: Sheik Houssam Al-Boustani Sheik Al-Boustani teaches a class for young Brazilians interested in learning Arabic and learning about Islam under the auspices of the Lebanese Future Movement. Boustani studied Islam in India and has lived in Brazil for nine years. He is an extremely enthusiastic and energetic teacher who peppers his lessons on the Koran and on Arabic language with self-deprecating humor. His students, which he says number seventy-five at any one time, are generally young Brazilian professionals who are attracted to what Boustani calls his

version of "modern" Islam. Boustani is most welcoming to us and has had Poloff as a guest in his classes. He has also worked on a number of inter-faith initiatives, including the Abraham Path Project, consulting for a Brazilian TV movie (a fictional romance) about a Jewish Holocaust survivor and an Arab woman who marry in Brazil after World War II, and co-teaching a course on religion with a Rabbi and a Catholic Priest. Finally, he has recently published a book about Mohammed in Portuguese and is working on a book on Islam in Brazil. Boustani's openness is sincere, but did not necessarily come naturally to him. According to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, it is the product of a long process. Boustani has a tough-hewn past. He is a former amateur boxer, and he fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. When he arrived here nine years ago, according to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, he was quite extreme in his views. Over time, he has moderated considerably. His teaching style, as witnessed by Conoff, is expertly pitched for young Brazilians attracted to Islam but who also dress stylishly and require/respond to a highly entertaining presentation of religious ideas. Boustani himself has said that Islamic outreach in Brazil has to engage other religious traditions. He also admires some aspects of Brazil's Evangelical Christian communities, which he says have become experts at reaching humble folk with a mass message. (Note: Boustani is presently in Lebanon, but we are attempting to arrange a meeting with his students. End Note.) Anti-American Attitudes While Brazil's Islamic community is peaceful and has many friendly elements, it also contains reservoirs of strong suspicion of the U.S. In an August meeting, Sheik Yamani of the Mosque in Londrina (an interior city in Parana State) told Poloff that Bin Laden's involvement in the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers had never been proven. (When Poloff pointed out that Bin Laden had bragged about the same on television, Sheik Yamani replied, "Such things can be doctored.") The Sheik, a 31 year old of Portuguese descent, proved otherwise quite friendly, inviting Poloff to attend Friday services at his Londrina Mosque. He appeared to represent a conservative strain of Euro-Islam, evidenced by his and his wife's highly conservative dress. Poloff has also taken pains to correct other myths that abound among some Muslim contacts, such as the story that former President Bush is the grandson of a U.S.-based Pastor Bu sh, who wrote a book condemning Islam in the 19th century. The Radicals While the majority of Brazil's Muslims are moderate in orientation and the overwhelming majority is moderate in deed and action, genuine radical elements do exist here, some in the Tri-Border area of Foz de Iguacu and others among Sao Paulo's estimated 20,000-strong, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population. Muslims at the moderate, Sunni-oriented Future Institute charge that Shia immigrants sometimes come to Brazil with Hezbollah support (allegedly USD 50,000 is a typical sum) to found businesses to support Hezbollah in Lebanon. Reasons to Engage The Brazilian-Lebanese context provides an excellent double background of tolerance that already promotes a high degree of mixing between Brazil's Muslims and the rest of the society. Engaging moderate Muslims puts radicals on the defensive and opens conduits of communication that could lead to greater information about more distant elements of the community given over

to greater radicalism. Work with friendly moderates should not be seen as separate from monitoring more threatening elements. While Brazil's tiny, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population is a legitimate concern, Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah also told Poloff to "not lose sight of the Sunnis." (Note. Sunnis outnumber Shiites in Brazil by about ten to one. End Note.) Sayah described how some young Brazilians, either of Arab background or not, have become attracted to fundamentalist versions of Islam. While beliefs do not translate directly into action, such conversions can create a climate for the growth of fanaticism. Al-Boustani's version of "modern Islam" is tailored to counter that. "By expressing a willingness to engage all groups, we make it more difficult for extremists to try to create the kind of closed atmosphere that enables their recruiting". Toward this end, Post has suggested several possible programs, including a campaign to provide consular information to Muslim contacts, a series of outreach presentations on President Obama, and, most important, our desire to bring down a visiting U.S. Sheik who can explain how Islam is now a vital part of American society and build ties with local religious leaders. Given its size, diversity and traditions of cultural tolerance, Brazil could be an excellent testing ground for programs that might be useful to other WHA posts with similar Muslim minority populations. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX CONFIDENTIAL 2009-12-08 SUBJECT: Engaging Sao Paulo's Muslim Communities CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas J. White, Consul General, Sao Paulo Summary: Sao Paulo offers unique possibilities for Muslim engagement, many of which were evident throughout Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC) Farah Pandith's November 22-23 visit. The major Sunni and politically moderate Muslims were delighted to receive SMRC Pandith and eagerly shared with her several of their flagship institutions, including the elaborate Santo Amaro Mosque, a Muslim School that serves a 60 percent nonMuslim student body (Islam is an elective course), and a vigorous interfaith group supporting the Abraham Path Initiative. Sao Paulo's Muslim moderates worry about the rise of fundamentalism and Hezbollah influence among more recent waves of largely Shia Lebanese immigrants, as they promote a broadly tolerant vision of "modern Islam". Their own community remains quite traditional, with women's and youth organizations limited. Even so, the traditional leadership's eagerness to engage, acute awareness of the dangers of radicalism, and their solid achievements in integrating Muslim and Brazilian identities make them an excellent example of how a unique MMC (Muslim Minority Community) has, by and large, carved out a positive space within a diverse Latin American country. Post will seek Washington support to bring down a U.S. Sheik to help reinforce our

engagement efforts as a concrete follow-up to SMRC Pandith's highly successful visit. End Summary. Special Representative Farah Pandith's Visits Sao Paulo Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SMRC) Farah Pandith visited Sao Paulo November 22-23. During the visit, she met with a number of representatives of the city's Muslim Communities, visited the Santo Amaro Mosque (the largest mosque in the city) and visited an attached Muslim school, and attended a reception organized by the Muslim Federation in her honor where Pandith spoke about the USG's engagement plans and took questions. SMRC Pandith also gave a press interview to the major Sao Paulo daily "Folha de Sao Paulo" in which she told her story as an American Muslim. The Sao Paulo Muslims who received SMRC Pandith, the bulk of them moderate Sunnis, reacted enthusiastically to her visit and expressed eagerness about future engagement opportunities. Working the Lebanon Connection Pandith began her visit by attending the Lebanon National Day reception, a 1500-person gala organized by the Lebanese Consulate and held at Sao Paulo's prestigious Lebanese Club on November 22. The majority of Arab and Muslim immigrants to Brazil are of Lebanese background and this event offered wide ranging opportunities to interact with various members of the community, including Sunni, Druze and Shia Sheiks as well as Muslims working in business, politics and law enforcement. The Santo Amaro Muslim Community SMRC Pandith visited the Santo Amaro Mosque and associated school November 23. The local Muslim community built the Mosque, usually attracts 300-350 worshippers on any given Friday, with assistance from Saudi Arabia. The community also has an Egyptian cleric who helps with the Mosque's ministry. The mosque is the spiritual centerpiece of a complex of institutions, including a Muslim high school and a soon-to-be opened nursing school. The high school houses 600 students, sixty percent of whom are non-Muslim (many on scholarships) and the study of Islam is an elective. Mohammed el Zoghbi, President of the Muslim Federation that sponsors the school spoke with particular pride of the Santo Amaro Muslim Community's efforts to do good works that benefit all Brazilians. (Note: The Muslim Federation is a moderate Sunni group. It is one of several such groups that vie to become an umbrella organization for all of Brazil's Muslims. End Note) El Zoghbi noted that the school provides a strong, affordable educational alternative for young Brazilians living in a "peripheral" area of the city. (Note: The Santo Amaro Mosque and Muslim School are located in a middling to poor neighborhood in a highly socially polarized city. End Note.) The Federation is now also constructing a brand new nursing school on the same grounds. It will have a 1200-student capacity and is programmed to open in January. A Direct Dialogue with Youth.

SMRC Pandith met with a cross-section of Muslim students, both male and female, from the high school. The young people reported no real difficulties with anti-Islamist sentiments in Brazil. Instead, they said that frequently other Brazilians simply do not understand Islam and are puzzled by the students' religious affiliation. A number of the young women lamented how stricter Islamic customs - the prohibition on drinking, for example - made it difficult for them to socialize with non-Muslim Brazilian teenagers. Overall, the group was friendly and highly accessible. The kids evinced interest in learning English and showed obvious knowledge of U.S. pop culture. None had ever been to the United States. The Abraham Path The Lebanese Consul General, Joseph Sayah, hosted a coffee for SMRC Pandith where she met Muslim, Christian and Jewish leaders who are all behind the Abraham Path Initiative in Brazil. Founded by Harvard Professor William Ury, the Path program promotes a unique kind of Middle Eastern tourism. It encourages Muslims, Christians and Jews to re-trace Abraham's journey in an effort at encouraging contemporary reconciliation between the world's three great Abrahamic faiths. While the Brazilians behind this initiative help facilitate Middle Eastern travel, they also undertake activities in Sao Paulo. They told SMRC Pandith about a recent "Friendship Run" they had sponsored that brought together Muslims, Christians and Jews together into one very positive public event. Joseph Sayah was incredibly interested in being useful to our mission. He saw the value of the new position of the Special Representative and provided SRMC with many ideas about engagement with Brazil's communities but also more broadly how USG can make an impact using the President's Cairo Speech. He was enthusiastic about the focus on youth and took SRMC aside to personally present his dedication to helping the US government take advantage "of this moment in time" and the "goodwill" out there for the President and our efforts to engage with Muslims. Brazil's Abraham Path sponsors share the overall global goals of the initiative, but they are also impelled by strongly local concerns. As Salim Saheen, a Lebanese Brazilian banker and Maronite Christian, told SMRC Pandith, "Hezbollah is gaining [adherents]," particularly with more recent Shia Lebanese immigrants. Consequently, the moderates want to "push back against the radicals" by promoting popular interfaith activities. Muslim Federation Reception The Muslim Federation organized a 40-person reception for SMRC Pandith at her hotel on November 23. The SMRC spoke to the group about Secretary Clinton's vision for the US Department of State and the way she has asked us to engage with Muslims. SRMC talked about the new paradigm of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. She spoke about the focus on the next generation (which was met with great enthusiasm) and she mentioned the upcoming entrepreneurial summit -- to urge guests to suggest names to post of dynamic and successful young entrepreneurs to be considered. SRMC also highlighted post plans to educate Brazilian Muslim applicants about our consular procedures and our desire to bring down an American Sheik. Attendees

responded very favorably to Pandith's remarks and several speakers suggested that both Brazilian Muslim business persons and students would welcome greater travel opportunities to the U.S. Comment: Beginning a Relationship Post's Muslim engagement remains a work-in-progress. Sao Paulo's SunniLebanese Muslim majority is generally a very conservative traditional community in terms of family structure and both youth and women's groups remain nascent. At the same time, Sao Paulo's Sunni Muslim leaders are well aware of the dangers of radicalization, which they have seen grow among the more recent flows of poorer, Shia Lebanese immigrants. In response, they are actively promoting a tolerant "modern" Islam that highlights good works to benefit all Brazilians, regardless of faith. In this, they are reproducing patterns of inter-faith comity from Lebanese history prior to the 1970s and leveraging Brazil's own home-grown tendency to broad cultural tolerance. This results in an overall series of Islamic communities that - while not entirely insulated from radicalization - have strong interfaith connections and live-and-let-live traditions. Engaging Sao Paulo's Muslims with follow-up programs (like a visit from a U.S. Sheik) would help bolster mainstream Islam in Brazil, highlight the importance of freedom of religion in America, the diversity of Islam in America and debunk the myths that exist about Islam in America. Moreover, such engagement would reinforce the Sao Paulo Muslim community's efforts to share its experience in interfaith relations and general good works with other Muslim communities around the world. For this reason, Brazil merits its own MMC strategy (a Muslim Minority Country strategy) that builds on the efforts of a generation of Brazilian Muslims who have become adept at forming a Brazilian Muslim identity and founding successful institutions that are at once thoroughly Muslim and genuinely Brazilian. END COMMENT.
Editoria de Arte/Folhapress

+ NOTCIAS SOBRE WIKILEAKS

EUA criticam novo vazamento de dados secretos pelo WikiLeaks; veja principais revelaes EUA rejeitam negociao com Wikileaks sobre divulgao de novos documentos Revelaes do WikiLeaks geram problemas de segurana, diz chefe militar dos EUA EUA alertam aliados sobre novos vazamentos do WikiLeaks

+ NOTCIAS EM PODER
Alencar poder ter alta em at dez dias, afirmam mdicos Na ditadura, Dilma deu aulas de poltica a trabalhadores Campanha tenta salvar escola do MST Alckmin j sinaliza mudanas na educao Dilma decide criar pasta para aviao civil Licitao de R$ 120 milhes apresenta indcio de fraude 'PT mudou a ponto de ficar quase irreconhecvel', diz cientista poltica

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Joseph Campbell Por: 69,90 Comprar Incremente seus tutes com aforismos sarcsticos de Honor de Balzac Biografia mostra como Jos Alencar montou imprio e virou vice de Lula; leia captulo Menino Jesus era traquinas e at fazia malvadezas, mostra livro de padre Estresse pode liberar o "lado negro" da fora, alerta "O Complexo de Atlas" Ingls e mais 6 lnguas em lies de 15 min, com livro e CD. Desconto de 20% Dicionrio Houaiss na nova ortografia de R$ 250,00 por R$ 175; economize 30%! Comentar esta reportagemVer todos os comentrios (10)

1. Alexandre Rocha (45)

em 29/11 s 08h46

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O blog do Passarinho Pentelho tambm quer colaborar com a organizao sueca propondo novos focos de investigao para os gringos. Que tal o post de hoje: "Ser que a falta de regulamentao da imprensa brasileira pode ser considerado um assunto sensvel para o site WikiLeaks???" Ele comenta que a justia no julga mais nada com relao a imprensa desde que a Lei de imprensa foi revogada sem que colocassem nada em seu lugar. A imprensa gosta assim.

2. Luiz Fernando Kehl (9)

em 29/11 s 08h53

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Agora que o Sr. Franklin Martins ficar desempregado - coitadinho, ex-terrorista desamparado talvez ele funde alguma ONG para arrecadar fundos destinados caa implacvel de Julian Assange - fundador do Wikileaks - e censurar queles que publicam inverdades ( ... ) na Internet. Al D. Dilma, ajude o cumpanhero Franklin.

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Eu pensava que os documentos eram exclusivos, conforme publicado na notcia anterior. No! Todos esto disponiveis no Cablegate. No saiu nada demais, os EUA querem impor sua poltica e.s.c.r.o.t.a, sim, sua poltica que ofende todos os lideres internacionais. Ficaram bravinhos pq o Brasil no quis seguir sua cartilha anti-terror. Aqui no tem terrorista, ningum explode nada, no precisamos de uma lei para isso. Isso acontece pq no somos os exploradores, e sim, fomos os explorado. PAZ