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  • Gottlob Frege

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    Zagor Tenay
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    Frege held the view that most of the apparent proper names in English are in fact "disguised definite descriptions" if Frege's view was "descriptivist", then he effectively agrees with Russell on most apparent "proper names" of ordinary language.

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    Frege held the view that most of the apparent proper names in English are in fact "disguised definite descriptions" if Frege's view was "descriptivist", then he effectively agrees with Russell on most apparent "proper names" of ordinary language.

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    33 visualizações1 página

    Gottlob Frege

    Enviado por

    Zagor Tenay
    Frege held the view that most of the apparent proper names in English are in fact "disguised definite descriptions" if Frege's view was "descriptivist", then he effectively agrees with Russell on most apparent "proper names" of ordinary language.

    Direitos autorais:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Baixe no formato PDF, TXT ou leia online no Scribd
    Sinalizar o conteúdo como inadequado
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    FregeandRussell Propositionsandsenses BertrandRussellfamouslyrejectedFrege'ssensereferencedistinction,thoughthereissome possibilitythatthetwoweremisinterpretingandarguingpastoneanother:Fregetalksabout(for example)sentences,whichhavebothasense(aproposition)andareference(atruthvalue); Russellontheotherhanddealsdirectlywithpropositions,butconstruesthesenotasabstract paralinguisticitemsbutastuples,orsets,ofobjectsandconcepts. ForRussell,senseiswhollysemantic.Referencebycontrastisintimatelyconnectedwiththe namedobject.MontBlancisthereferentofthename"MontBlanc."Fregearguesthatthethought "MontBlanc'withitssnowfields'"cannotbeacomponentofthethoughtthat"MontBlancismore than4,000metershigh".[3]Ifthesameexpression"MontBlanc"isinbothsentencesthenthereis somethingcommontoeachthought,andthereforesomethingcorrespondingtothename"Mont Blanc."Thiscommonelement,whichcannotbethereferent,mustbethemeaningor"sense.

    ." Sensesanddescriptions RussellheldtheviewthatmostoftheapparentpropernamesinEnglishareinfact"disguised definitedescriptions".So"Aristotle"isunderstoodas"ThepupilofPlatoandteacherof Alexander",orbysomeotheruniquedescription.AlthoughRussellexplicitlyrejectedFrege's notionofsense,herejecteditjustforpropernames.ButRussellalsoheldtheview(notevidentin theMontBlancexample)thatmostofthe"propernames"inEnglisharenotnamesatall,but descriptionsindisguise.Possiblytheonlyrealpropernamesweredemonstrativepronounslike thisandthat(directedatanobjectthatcanbeimmediatelyperceived).SoinfactifFrege'sview was"descriptivist",thenheeffectivelyagreeswithRussellonmostoftheapparent"proper names"ofordinarylanguage:Fregethinksthat"Aristotle"isaname,withasense,whichis equivalenttosomedescription.RussellthinksthatAristotleisnotreallyaname,butis(in disguisedform)justsuchadescription. Thusformostofthetwentiethcenturythe"FregeRussell"descriptivistviewwastakenas somethingofanorthodoxy.InSaulKripke'sfamousNamingandNecessitylectures,whichlargely turnedthetideagainstdescriptivism,hetreatsbothRussellandFregeasopposedtoMill'sviewin thesameway.ThusKripke'sargumentthatnamesarenotequivalenttodescriptionswaswidely construedastheviewthatnamesdonothavesenses;orasarejectionofthesensereference distinction.(Tellingly,allofthethreeproblemsthedistinctionaimedtosolvehavesubsequently reemergedasimportantproblemsinthephilosophyoflanguage.) ThisreadingofFregehasbeenrejectedbymanyscholars,moststronglybyGarethEvansinThe VarietiesofReferenceandbyJohnMcDowellin"TheSenseandReferenceofaProperName", followinglinesdevelopedbyMichaelDummett.DummettarguesthatFrege'snotionofsense shouldnotbeequatedwithadescription.Evansfurtherdevelopedthisline,arguingthatasense withoutareferentwasnotpossible.HeandMcDowellbothtakethelinethatFrege'sdiscussionof emptynames,andoftheideaofsensewithoutreference,areinconsistent,andthathisapparent endorsementofdescriptivismrestsonlyonasmallnumberofimpreciseandperhapsoffhand remarks.Andbothpointtothepowerthatthesensereferencedistinction'does'have(i.e.,to solveatleastthefirsttwoproblems),evenifitisnotgivenadescriptivistreading.'

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