Why Comunism Didn't Collapse

WHY COMMUNISM DIDN’T COLLAPSE:
EXPLORING REGIME RESILIENCE IN CHINA, VIETNAM, LAOS,

NORTH KOREA AND CUBA
Martin Dimitrov
Assistant Professor of Government, Dartmouth College
An Wang Post-Doctoral Fellow, Fairbank Center, Harvard University
martin.k.dimitrov@dartmouth.edu
dimitrov@fas.harvard.edu
November 1, 2005
Abstract: Almost two decades after the momentous events of 1989, political science has not provided clear
answers to a key question: why Communism collapsed in some countries but survived in others. Of the 15
Communist countries that existed prior to 1989, 10 experienced regime collapse. However, China,
Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba managed to maintain regime stability. While numerous studies of
individual cases of both collapse and survival exist, currently we do not possess a unified theory of the
factors that lead to Communist regime collapse and resilience. This paper argues that two variables explain
the collapse of Communism: lack of economic growth and ideological vacuum. In turn, Communist
regimes that survived were able to do so by providing either high economic growth or by appealing to the
masses with a coherent ideology (or both). As Marxism-Leninism became bankrupt in the mid-1980s, the
only regime-sustaining ideology Communist countries could develop was externally-oriented nationalism.
This paper explains why this type of nationalism was not available to the countries that collapsed but was
successfully mobilized by the countries that survived. On a theoretical level this paper argues that in
Communist countries both economic conditions and ideas contribute to regime stability. The paper also
argues against theories that stress that Communism fell due to contagion, leadership unwillingness to
repress opponents, or inherent flaws in communist institutions.
I would like to thank Lisa Baldez, Mark Beissinger, John Carey, Jorge Domínguez, Linda Fowler, Yoshiko
Herrera, Nahomi Ichino, Nelson Kasfir, Ned Lebow, Misagh Parsa, Elizabeth Perry, Philip Roeder, Robert
Ross, Anne Sa’adah, and William Wohlforth for useful conversations about this project. Participants in a
joint Davis Center-Fairbank Center seminar and a Post-Communist Politics and Economics Workshop
seminar (both at Harvard) provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this argument. All errors are
my own.
Dimitrov Why Communism Didn’t Collapse Page 2
Almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, social scientists have not provided
satisfactory answers to the question why Communism collapsed in some countries but
survived in others. In 1988, there were 15 Communist regimes in the world. Over the
next couple of years, 10 of them collapsed, yet 5 remain in power until the current day.1
In terms of population size, the 5 surviving communist countries constituted 74% of the
former Communist world.2 Even if the remaining 5 Communist regimes were all to
collapse tomorrow, it would still be important to understand why they have survived
when 10 other regimes of the same type collapsed. The answer to this question can shed
more light on the conditions that enhance the durability of different regime types. In
addition, a comprehensive explanation of the collapse and non-collapse of Communist
regimes has implications for our approach to theory building in comparative politics.
The literature on the collapse of communism is immense. One might expect, then,
that it will have already answered the question that motivates this paper. Yet, despite the
presence of some excellent studies of collapse and non-collapse, prior research does not
help us to understand what accounts for the resilience of Communist regimes. Most of the
literature is devoted to single-country studies, usually of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia or of one of four well-known Eastern European countries (the German
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland).3 Single-country studies of
collapse in more obscure places like Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania are much rarer.4
1
In chronological order, the regimes that collapsed are Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Mongolia, Albania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The resilient communist
regimes include China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba. There are some borderline cases which I
have decided do not merit inclusion in the group: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau, Tanzania, Benin, and Nicaragua (more on definitions and case selection in Section I below).
2
Calculations based on population data obtained from the World Development Indicators (various years).
The total population of all 15 Communist countries in 1988 was 1.625 billion, while the 10 that collapsed
had a population of 428 million.
3
For excellent examples of single-country studies, see a) on the Soviet Union: Philip Roeder, Red Sunset:
The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ronald Suny, The
Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Mobilization, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993); Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Symposium in the Slavic Review 63: 3 (Fall 2004): 459-
554; Yoshiko Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); b) on the GDR: Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the
East European Revolution of 1989”, World Politics 44: 1 (October 1991), 7-48; Suzanne Lohmann, “The
Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991”,
World Politics 47: 1 (October 1994), 42-101; Charles Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and
the End of East Germany (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Anne Sa’adah, Germany’s
Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); c)
on Poland: Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New York: Vintage Books, 1985);
Josep Colomer and Margot Pascal, “The Polish Games of Transition”, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 27: 3 (1994) 275-294; Wiktor Osiatynski, “The Roundtable Talks in Poland” in Jon Elster, ed. The
Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996),
pp. 21-68; d) on Hungary: O’Neil, Patrick, “Revolutions from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions
from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary”, World Politics 48:4 (July 1996): 579-603, András Sajó,
“The Roundtable Talks in Hungary” in Elster, ed. (op. cit.), pp. 68-98; d) on Czechoslovakia: Bernard
Wheater and Zdeněk Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991 (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1992); Miloš Calda, “The Roundtable Talks in Czechoslovakia” in Elster, ed. (op. cit.), pp. 135-177.
4
Of the three countries, Romania has received the most sustained attention thanks to the investment
scholars like Ken Jowitt and Vladimir Tismaneanu have with it. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for
Finally, the reasons for regime collapse in faraway Mongolia are virtually ignored.5
When it comes to cases of non-collapse, while scholars have explored the reasons for the
durability of Communism in China, North Korea, or Cuba, the cases of Vietnam and
especially Laos have received much less attention. In short, important lacunae exist in
those single-country studies. Similarly, the small number of explicitly comparative
studies that exist examine a few cases of communist regime collapse6 or, much less often,
compare two cases of regime resilience,7 but they never examine all 10 cases of collapse
or all 5 cases of non-collapse. Moreover, there is as yet no comprehensive theory that can
account for both collapse and non-collapse in all 15 communist countries.
What explanations for the collapse of communism are provided by the existing
theories? The extensive literature centers around two different questions. A number of
studies explain how Communism collapsed. Those explanations usually focus on the
period immediately preceding the collapse of the regime and outline three different
dynamics: the regime can fall due to elite splits and pacts, because of a push from below,
All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
Also see a very thorough account of the 1989 events in Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of
December 1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). No book length studies of the revolutions in
Bulgaria and Albania exist in English, though some monographs and edited volumes devote individual
chapters to them. On Albania, see Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) and Nicholas J. Costa, Albania: A European Enigma (Boulder: East
European Monographs, 1995). On Bulgaria, see Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to post-Communist
Bulgaria: Political, Economic, and Social Transformation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002)
and R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
5
Morris Rossabi’s Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005) is the first book by an established Mongolia specialist that devotes a chapter to the
transition in 1989-1990. Prior studies in English have been confined to journal articles: Richard Pomfret,
“Transition and Democracy in Mongolia”, Europe-Asia Studies 52:1 (January 2000), 149-160, Verena
Fritz, “Mongolia: Dependent Democratization”, Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics 18:4
(2002), 75-100.
6
Among the best comparative studies of collapse are: Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The
Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Grzegorz Ekiert,
The State Against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1996), Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The Soviet Union and the
Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), Vladimir Tismaneanu, The
Revolutions of 1989 (New York: Routledge, 1999), and Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design
and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also
the Schmitter/Karl-Bunce Slavic Review debate on transitology, reprinted in Archie Brown, ed.
Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 459-498. While
written contemporaneously with the events, Timothy Garton Ash’s The Magic Lantern: The Revolutions of
’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (New York: Random House, 1999), Misha
Glenny’s The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy (New York: Viking, 1990), and
Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) have not
lost their value as the finest examples of journalistic writing on the subject.
7
Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, and Jonathan Unger, eds., Transforming Asian Socialism: China
and Vietnam Compared (St. Leonard, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999); John Weeks, “A Tale of Two
Transitions: Vietnam and Cuba” in Claes Brundenius and John Weeks, eds. Globalization and Third World
Socialism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 18-40.
or due to a combination of a push from below and splits above.8 While often illuminating,
those studies do not address the analytically prior question why Communist regimes got
to the point where they were ripe and ready for collapse. In other words, what longer-
term conditions were conducive to the regime’s decline? Studies concerned with why
communism collapsed highlight several variables. Most explanations stress the
“Gorbachev factor”, arguing that were it not for him and his revolutionary ideas of
glasnost (openness or political reform) and perestroika (restructuring or economic
reform), communism would not have collapsed.9 When it comes to how specifically
Gorbachev’s ideas undermined communism in individual countries, several versions of a
contagion argument are given. A different set of explanations argues that communism fell
because governments were unwilling to use repression against regime opponents. Finally,
some stress that the moribund state of communist institutions led to the collapse of
communist regimes.
This paper takes issue with most arguments offered about the reasons for the
collapse of communism. Contagion theories do not specify the conditions under which
some countries become immune to contagion. A further limitation of contagion theories
is that due to their excessive vagueness and refusal to elaborate a clear mechanism for
how contagion works, they cannot explain why there were at least 5 different modes of
regime collapse in the 10 countries where communism ended (see Table 1 in Section IV
below). Repression theories also have limited applicability to understanding regime
resilience, as we have contradictory examples of the effects of use of repression:
sometimes it seems to prop up the government (e.g. China), while other times it leads to
either imminent regime collapse (Romania) or to more protracted but irreversible regime
decay (Albania). In addition, claims that Communist regimes continue to rule through the
fear of repression have no credibility in 2005, given that repression has been falling down
across all remaining communist countries. Finally, institutional rigidity theories have
some appeal, but they cannot explain why identical institutions proved reformable in
some communist countries, but not in others.
The argument that ideas mattered (“Gorbachev factor”) has the most appeal.
However, I maintain that while ideas were important, they didn’t matter in the way that
Gorbachev factor theories suggest they did. Some claim that Gorbachev’s ideas led to the
collapse of the Soviet Union by creating a space within which orthodox (doxic) and
heterodox interpretations of communism could compete, and, over time, the power
advantage that supporters of heterodox ideas got over the doxic interpreters of
communism led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.10 I see the role of ideas somewhat
differently. I argue that to stay in power, communist regimes need a unifying ideology.
What regime opponents in the Soviet Union and elsewhere could offer to potential
8
For a good review of that literature, see Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and
Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World”, World Politics vol. 54 (January
2002): 212-244.
9
Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988, 1991); Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002).
10
Herrera (fn. 3), ch. 3.
followers was not an ideology, but rather the diffuse idea of being anti-Communist, anti-
regime, and anti-establishment. As appealing as it might have been, anti-Communism
was not an ideology in 1988-1992; it was just an option for expressing protest, a
subversive idea. Thus, this paper argues that Communism ended, in part, because
Gorbachev’s ideas exposed the bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism and did not offer a
constructive ideology that could supplant it.
In brief, this paper makes the following claims as to why communism collapsed in
some countries but survived in others. Communist regimes were able to ensure their
survival in two ways. First, like all authoritarian regimes, they had to deliver high growth.
Second, unlike other authoritarian regimes, they had a strong ideological basis.
Ideological indoctrination and ideologically-derived legitimacy were key ingredients in
their unusually long lifespan.11 When economic growth faltered and Marxism-Leninism
became bankrupt as an ideology, communist countries found themselves in a precarious
position. They had to devise a strategy for regaining economic growth and creating a new
ideology that could appeal to the masses. The only constructive ideology that could be
used was externally-oriented nationalism. Yet, US-Soviet rapprochement and the Sinatra
Doctrine made both the US and the Soviet Union look much less intimidating enemies for
9 out of the 10 countries where communism fell.12 Some of the regimes that did collapse
engaged in destructive ethnic nationalism, pitting minorities against majorities; this type
of nationalism only sped up their demise, as it further eroded the possibility of creating a
unified ideology that could elicit broad regime support.13 All regimes that survived
managed to develop externally-oriented nationalism that could supplant the bankrupt
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Some of the surviving regimes (China, Vietnam, and Laos)
also delivered high economic growth but others didn’t (Cuba and North Korea), thus
testifying the importance of both objective economic factors as well as ideas in
communist societies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I defines what communism was,

outlines a mechanism for Communist single-party rule, and enumerates the universe of
cases where it existed. Section II provides case studies of Communist collapse. Section
III focuses on case studies of Communist survival. Section IV offers alternative
explanations for collapse, such as contagion, repression, and institutional failure. Section
V concludes and provides two possible extensions of the argument.
11
Single-party Communist regimes have the longest lifespan of any type of authoritarian regime. Barbara
Geddes identifies this phenomenon, but excludes most Communist countries from her analysis of the
factors that lead to regime survival, arguing that those regimes were “foreign maintained”. See Barbara
Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
12
For the Soviet Union itself the only external enemy was the US. When the enemy became a friend,
externally-oriented nationalism was no longer available as an ideological option.
13
See Beissinger (fn. 3), Philip Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization”, World Politics 43:2
(Jan. 1991), pp. 196-232, and Suny (fn. 3) on the Soviet Union and Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism:
The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) and V. P. Gagnon, Jr.,
The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) on
Yugoslavia.
Section I: Mechanism for Single-Party Communist Rule and the Universe of Cases
In this section, I will define two contested concepts that will be used repeatedly in the
study: what makes a regime communist and how do we know that it has collapsed. By
strictly defining the terms of the study, we can then turn our attention to sketching out a
mechanism for communist rule. Finally, this section defines the universe of cases to
which this argument applies.
Definitions
Communism: What makes a regime communist? The literature on communism is

extensive, and like all social scientific concepts, the term is contested. In this paper, I
adopt a minimal definition: communist regimes are special types of single-party regimes,
where the single party in power adopts Marxism-Leninism and governs through non-
competitive elections. Thus, it is important to understand that communism is a distinct
subtype of totalitarianism (which includes fascist, communist, and, potentially, theocratic
regimes) but differs from authoritarianism (which has semi-competitive elections and
allows for opposition parties to be present in parliament).14 Also, communist regimes
should be distinguished from sultanistic regimes, which center around the charisma or
suppressive ability of the leader, yet are not necessarily ideologically driven.15
What makes a party Communist? At a minimum, to be classified as Communist a

party has to have consolidated its power over the entire country16 based on a doctrine that
has several classical building blocks: land collectivization and nationalization of
industrial property, class equality (usually demonstrated by the lack of wide pay
differentials), deep penetration within society (mass inclusion and exclusion of civil
society), and some commitment to international socialism. In short, communist regimes
have a well-articulated, messianic vision of the present and the bright future of developed
socialism. While some differences existed amongst individual communist countries on
those dimensions,17 they all exhibited each one of them. A further requirement is that the
party should not be the tool of an individual dictator, but should rather have some control
over the person at the top.18 This is a key distinguishing feature of the 15 communist
regimes examined in this paper, which is absent in Africa, where the late creation of a
communist party allowed those regimes to evolve into personalistic military
dictatorships, with the top man ruling by wielding the power of the gun and distributing
14
Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2000).
15
H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1998).
16
Countries like Cambodia where Communists ruled over only part of the country between 1975 and 1993
cannot be classified as communist. See Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study (1990); Ben
Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-
1979 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare
(London: John Murray, 2004).
17
An important difference among communist countries is the degree of private property that they allowed
prior to the 1980s.
18
This rule was violated by Stalin, Mao, Kim Il-sung, and Ceauşescu. However, those deviations
(especially in the Soviet Union and Russia) were temporary and the party eventually exercised control over
the individual.
patronage rather than by party-led ideologically-based mass mobilization.19 A final

requirement for classifying a regime as communist is that it should rule through
mobilization (voluntary compliance) rather than through coercion. As coercion is very
costly, it can be sustained only temporarily by Stalinist regimes (a subtype of communist
regimes). Thus, in the end a resilient communist regime can only govern by relying
predominantly on mobilization and only occasionally on coercion.20
While a regime needs to implement a Communist doctrine at the point of

consolidating power, over time it can evolve almost unrecognizably from its initial form.
To illustrate this point we need not look any further than contemporary China. In 2005,
the only thing that is communist about China is the fact that it is ruled by a party which
calls itself communist and wins uncontested elections. The commitment to a communist
ideology is largely gone –land has been de-collectivized, private property is now
constitutionally protected, class inequality is rising, civil society has re-emerged, and
international socialism has collapsed. In addition, the Chinese and Vietnamese
communist parties decided in 2002 to admit private entrepreneurs in their ranks.
Strikingly, the Cuban Communist Party decided to accommodate religious devotees,
going against some classical Marxist notions on the relationship between socialism and
religion. While those parties may be communist in name only, the regimes are
nevertheless usefully classified as Communist (rather than authoritarian), as they still do
not allow competitive multiparty elections and have not ceased to attempt to make
ideological appeals to the masses (with an ideological mix of market socialism and
externally-oriented nationalism).
Collapse: When can we say that a communist regime has collapsed? As the minimal
definition of a communist regime hinges only on the existence of a single communist
party that wins uncontested elections and bases its rule on an ideology, I argue that the a
decision to strike down constitutional language proclaiming the communist party the
leading party in society and the introduction of contested multi-party elections represent
the end of the communist regime. Analytically, it makes sense to distinguish between the
19
This is a main reason for excluding Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique from the universe of communist
countries. Ethiopia’s first political party (the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia) was not founded until 1984, a full
decade after the start of the revolution (Marina and David Ottaway, Afrocommunism (Second Edition),
(New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 233-234; Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Rasprostranenie
marksizma-leninizma v Afrike: voprosy istorii, teorii i praktiki (Moskva: Nauka, 1987), pp. 211-214). The
Angolan Communist party (MPLA Workers’ Party or MPLA-PT) was not founded until 1977 (Branko
Lazitch, Angola 1974-1977: Un échec du communisme en Afrique (Paris: Est & Ouest, 1988), p. 17). While
Mozambique’s FRELIMO had more of a claim to approximate a political party prior to decolonization, it
also transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist party only as late as 1977 (Ottaway & Ottaway,
Afrocommunism, 76-81; Bertil Egero, “People’s Power: The Case of Mozambique”, in Barry Munslow, ed.
Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987), p. 125).
20
The reliance of the Pol Pot regime entirely on coercion and terror to maintain power is one of the reasons
I don’t classify it as Communist. Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 458. Kiernan
estimates that 21% of Cambodia’s total population of 7.89 million perished between 1975 and 1979. On
genocide in Cambodia, see also Benjamin Valentino, Mass Solutions (2004), Alexander Laban Hinton, Why
Did they Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (2005), and Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a
Nightmare (2004). For a harrowing first-hand account of life and survival at a Khmer Rouge prison, see
François Bizot, Le Portail (Paris: La Table Ronde, 2000).
beginning and the end of collapse. The beginning is a point when there is even a minimal
uncertainty as to whether the communist party will continue to stay in power. The precise
event that defines this beginning moment varies –in Poland it was a decision by General
Jaruzelski to hold talks with the opposition and form a Round Table, in Bulgaria it was a
bloodless palace coup, in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia it was the introduction of
republican competitive multiparty elections.21 The end of regime collapse is the point at
which there is great uncertainty about the ability of the communist party to stay in power.
In most countries this moment was the holding of the first competitive multiparty
elections; in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia the dissolution of the federation signified
the end point of collapse. While judgments of the start and end of collapse are somewhat
subjective, I have attempted to identify those moments as clearly as possible. Specific
beginning and end point for individual countries are presented in Table 1 in Section IV
below.
A Theory of Communist-Party Rule
In an important article, Stathis Kalyvas laments the lack of a theory of single-party rule.22
While it may be correct that we don’t have a general theory of single-party rule, we have
accumulated enough data about the communist subtype of single-party regimes to be able
to have a theory of how they stay in power. We have known for a long time that
Communist regimes are ideologically driven,23 and are therefore quite distinct from
authoritarian regimes. We have also recently become aware that authoritarian regimes are
very good at delivering economic growth. The two building blocks of economic growth
and ideological legitimacy have not, however, been linked in a theoretically coherent
explanation as the basis of communist rule.
Classic communist regimes rule differently from reformed communist regimes.24

A classic (unreformed) communist regime (e.g. the Soviet Union under Stalin, North
Korea under Kim Il-Sung, China under Mao) rules through a mix of ideology and sticks
(repression). By contrast, a reformed communist regime (e.g. the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev, China under Hu Juntao) stays in power through a mix of ideology and carrots
(political freedoms). Under both regimes, economic growth is a paramount goal, as the
21
The justification for designating competitive republican multiparty elections as the beginning rather than
the end of collapse is the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is that in the absence of competitive federal
multiparty elections there was not sufficient uncertainty as to whether the communist party would step
away from power.
22
Stathis Kalyvas. 1999. The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems. Annual Review of
Political Science 2: 323-343.
23
Carl Friedrich and Zbiniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1956). While others have noted that ideological crisis was a contributing factor
to the collapse of communism (see especially Daniel Chirot, ed. The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of
the Left: The Revolutions of 1989 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991) and Stephen Hanson,
Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1997), the comparative angle of ideological crisis has not been explored. Also, the literature
has not theorized what ideology could supplant Marxism-Leninism when it is bankrupt.
24
Linz (fn 14), Mark R. Thompson, “To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern
Europe”, Comparative Politics 34:1 (October 2001), 63-83, Mark R. Thompson, Democratic Revolutions:
Asia and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge, 2004).
bread riots in Poland in the 1950s and 1970s and much more recent ongoing contention in
China demonstrate.25 When there is an economic and ideological crisis, the regime is
threatened by collapse, as it cannot mobilize popular support. However, classic and
reformed communist regimes have very different possible solutions to the impending
collapse. A classic communist regime is more likely to try to suppress the opposition,
while a reformed regime is much less likely to be able to do so (due to its weaker
repressive ability). Thus, reformed communist regimes are much more fragile than
unreformed communist regimes. For examples, when Ceauşescu tried to suppress the
protesters in the square, he failed because he had miscalculated how much control he had
over the security apparatus (Securitate).26 Ramiz Alia suppressed the demonstrators and
managed to stay in power for several months after the first competitive multiparty
elections because Albania was much farther from reformed socialism than was Romania,
and because he maintained full control over the feared Segurimi.27 However, the
repressive ability of all remaining communist regimes is weakening (see details in
Section III), and a repeat of Tiananmen is unlikely, as it will be politically too costly. The
regimes that stay in power do so through a mix of lots of carrots (economic growth and
an appealing nationalist ideology, and, increasingly, greater personal freedom) and only
occasionally have to wield their sticks against particularly irksome political activists.
Why do ideology and economic growth matter so much? The reason has to do
with the way in which communist regimes originally derived legitimacy: ideology
reigned supreme at the time when they were established and high growth was just one
necessary condition for reaching the utopian socialist-communist bright future of mass
equality. Although the utopian element disappeared from communism rather quickly, the
importance of high economic growth remained. Similarly, when economic growth falters
or ideological legitimacy is lost, the regime has to make both up or else risk losing power,
as its foundations will be undermined.
This paper advances the argument that the five resilient communist regimes have
found in nationalism a new ideology through which they can appeal to the masses (see
details in Section III). Nationalism, however, is not sufficient to supplant Marxism-
Leninism. With the exception of North Korea, the remaining communist regimes have
engaged in two additional measures –restraining the reign of government officials and
increasing the political rights of ordinary citizens.
The Universe of Cases
With those criteria in mind, what cases should we examine? The core of the universe is
well-established: the six Eastern Bloc countries (German Democratic Republic, Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania), the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
Albania, Mongolia, China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. In addition, I count Laos
25
William Hurst and Kevin O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners”, The China Quarterly 170 (June
2002): 345-360; Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York:
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2006).
26
Siani-Davies (fn 4).
27
Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
among the cases of communist regimes, even though the regime was foreign-maintained
until the late 1980s; as explained in section III, Laos is not different enough from other
Communist countries to merit exclusion from the group. Similarly, while I do think there
are important differences between groups of communist countries, they are not sufficient
enough to classify Asian communism as different in kind from European communism.28
Section II: Explaining Regime Collapse
Why did 10 communist regimes collapse between 1988 and 1992? There were two
factors at work: low economic growth and inability to articulate a new ideology to
supplant communism, which was bankrupt as a belief system by the mid-1980s.
Economic Performance in Collapsed and Resilient Regimes: Why Only Some Can Grow?
Why can some regimes deliver growth while others cannot? Apart from the debilitating
effects of military expenditures (see Wohlforth and Books 2003), there are two very
important differences between the regimes that fell and those that survived. With the
exception of Albania, the other 9 communist countries where collapse occurred had
urbanization levels higher than 50% and had achieved high levels of industrialization.
North Korea and Cuba looked much more similar to those 9 countries in terms of their
levels of urbanization (58% and 73%), industrialization, and per capita GDP than to
agricultural states of China, Vietnam and Laos, none of which had an urbanization rate
higher than 20% in the year that they undertook reforms. Economists have established
that growth is easier to achieve in agricultural economies than in heavily industrialized
economies. Thus, unlike China, the Soviet Union could not achieve economic growth by
modernizing agriculture first; it had to begin reform by tackling the messier and
politically more explosive industrial sector first.
Growth Rates among the 10 Regimes that Collapsed
Statistical analysis reveals that all regimes that collapsed experienced either negative
economic growth or had growth rates close to 0% in the year(s) when collapse began and
ended (see Figure 1 below). Negative growth rates ranged from relatively benign in
Bulgaria (-0.5% in 1989) to severe in the Soviet Union (-12% in 1990; -17% in 1991) to
disastrous in Yugoslavia (-7.5% in 1990 and -29% in 1991). The countries with positive
growth rates during the period of collapse were Poland (0.2% GDP growth rate in 1989),
Czechoslovakia (1% GDP growth rate in 1989) and Germany (1.2% GDP growth rate in
1989). Many may take issue with the fact that some Eastern European countries were
growing (albeit at close to 0%). However, the growth registered by those Eastern
European countries was negligible in comparison with what they were used to
historically: East German GDP grew at rates well over 5% for most of the 1949-1985
28
The classic formulations of the difference are in Donald W. Treadgold, ed. Soviet and Chinese
Communism: Similarities and Differences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967) and Stuart R.
Schram, comp. Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings (London: Allen Lane, 1969). For
precursors, see Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957).
period, after which it began to precipitously slow down in every successive year.29
Another factor that made even smaller economic declines more palpable in the GDR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary is that their citizens were allowed to travel to
Western Europe much more freely than citizens of other communist countries (with the
exception of Yugoslavia) and were therefore aware of the disparities in income between
people in the East and the West. This was especially true for East German citizens, who
could travel to West Germany or West Berlin and see how much better the Wessies
lives.30 More important, most East Germans could get West German TV and even if they
never got to West Germany could still see how different the two halves of the ein Volk
had become over the previous four decades.31 Thus, for countries with easy external
reference points, relative declines in growth rates mattered more than absolute declines.
Figure 2 below presents aggregate data for the growth rate of all regimes that collapsed
and all regimes that proved resilient for the period from 1985 to 1991; it is clear that
resilient regimes outperformed those that collapsed in terms of GDP growth.
Figure 1: Collapsed Communist Regimes GDP Growth Rates (1980-1991)
15
10
0
Albania
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Growth Rate (Percentage)
Bulgaria
-5 Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
-10
Mongolia
Poland
-15 Romania
Soviet Union
Yugoslavia
-20
-25
-30
-35
Year
29
Klaus Schröder, Der SED-Staat: Partei, Staat, und Gesellschaft 1949-1990 (München: Hanser, 1998);
see also Maier (fn. 3) and Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany (Chapel
Hill: University of California Press, 1997).
30
West German per capita GDP in 1989 was 3.5 times higher than that in East Germany. See Won Bae
Kim, “Inter-Korean Cooperation in Infrastructure Development and Territorial Integration” in E. Kwan
Choi, E. Han Kim and Yesook Merrill, North Korea in the World Economy (London: Routledge Curzon,
2003), p. 119.
31
A number of sources make this point, but it is perhaps most eloquently stated in Wolfgang Becker’s film
Good-Bye, Lenin! (2003).
Figure 2: Average GDP Growth Rate, Collapsed v Resilient Communist Regimes (1985-1991)
15
10
5
Growth Rate (Percentage)
0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 collapsed
resilient
-5
-10
-15
-20
Year
The Role of Ideology
The other pillar of a communist regime is ideology. Communism as an economic and

political ideology was bankrupt by the early 1980s throughout all countries that were
formally governed according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Economically,
countries like Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China had all abandoned the doctrines of
Marxism by 1980 and were implementing something that could best be described as
“market socialism”.32 With the rise of Gorbachev and his ideas of perestroika (economic
restructuring), it became clear that the socialist economic model was no longer viable.
Politically, too, communism was in crisis. Prior to Gorbachev’s articulation of the idea of
glasnost (political openness), there already had been signs that civil society existed in
Czechoslovakia (Charter 77),33 Poland (Solidarity), and Hungary (various informal
movements) despite violent repression in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. With the advent of
glasnost, magazines like Novy Mir and Ogonyok were running story upon story of the
excesses of communism; in addition, Rybakov’s Deti Arbata and Solzhenytsin’s writings
were published in the Soviet Union, sensitizing the public to the excesses of Stalinism
and the current problems with communism. Civil society movements like Memorial and
Pamyat began to emerge as well. What glasnost and perestroika did was to expose to the
public that communism was moribund both as an economic and as a political system. All
of a sudden, ideology was dead. There was a vacuum that had to be filled.
32
The Chinese official term (“socialism with Chinese characteristics” 有中国特色的社会主义) eschews
the word “market”.
33
John Keane, ed. The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in East-Central Europe
(Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985).
Why were the 10 regimes that collapsed unable to supplant communism with a
new ideology? After all, for much of the post-WWII period in all of those countries
nationalism existed alongside communism and was a very powerful legitimating force for
the national government. For most of the 10 regimes, there were two convenient external
enemies: the West (usually personified by the US, but with local variations: West
Germany for the East Germans, Turkey and Greece for the Bulgarians34, etc) and the
Soviet Union (especially for the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Albania).35 One may think that elites scrambling to stay in power would
attempt to ensure popular support by mobilizing nationalism and thus filling the
ideological vacuum. However, due to Gorbachev’s new thinking and his pro-active
policy of rapprochement with Western countries, the US could no longer be portrayed as
an external enemy to the Soviet Union and to the other communist countries.36 Similarly,
while during the era of the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union was a convenient
external enemy in Eastern Europe, with the advent of the Sinatra Doctrine (let each
country go its own way) this particular trope was no longer believable either. The 10
regimes thus found themselves without an external enemy that could serve as a focal
point around which the pro-regime forces could rally and demonstrate their support for
the leadership.
A different solution came to the mind of the leaders of some countries with
ethnically heterogeneous populations, like Bulgaria, Romania, the Soviet Union, and
Yugoslavia.37 They either actively fomented internally-directed anti-minority nationalism
or (in the Soviet case) did not try to prevent the emergence of nationalist mobilization in
the peripheral republics.38 In Bulgaria, the regime undertook a destructive “Regeneration
Process” in 1985-1989, changing the Turkish-Arabic names of members of the Turkish
minority to Bulgarian names and, finally, expelling ethnic Turks from the country;39 in
Romania, Ceauşescu limited the religious freedom of ethnic Hungarians. This tactic was
suicidal in terms of regime resilience: ethnic unrest sped up regime collapse in all
countries that engage in anti-minority nationalism. As we will see in the next section,
three of the surviving five communist regimes (China, Vietnam, and Laos) all can face
potential challenges in interethnic relations.40
34
Vurban Angelov, Gurtsiia i Turtsiia v lagera na imperialistite: politiko-stopanski ocherk (Sofia: BAN,
1964).
35
Bulgaria and Mongolia were exceptionally friendly to the Soviet Union, both having applied to become a
16th Soviet republic and having been turned down by the “big brother”. See Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn i
reformy (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), vol. 2.
36
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira (Moskva: Izd-vo
polit. lit-ry, 1987). See also Gorbachev (fn. 35), vol. 2.
37
Of the cases of collapse, only the GDR, Poland, and Albania were ethnically homogeneous;
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia were quite heterogeneous, yet did not attempt to pit ethnic
majorities and minorities against each other.
38
On the Soviet case, see Beissinger (fn 3), Roeder (fn. 13), Suny (fn 3); on Yugoslavia, see Denitch (fn
13) and Gagnon (fn 14).
39
For details see Martin Dimitrov, Ethnic Parties as Guarantors of Minority Rights: The Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria, 1989-2005 (Mimeo, 2005).
40
Of the three countries, China has done the most to integrate minorities into a vision of a great Chinese
nation that is not ethnically based. On minorities in China, see Katherine Kaup, “Regionalism versus Ethnic
Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China”, The China Quarterly 172 (December 2002): 863-884;
Section III: Explaining Regime Resilience: China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and
Cuba
Why did some communist countries survive while others failed? Two factors are at work:
high economic growth and successful mobilization of externally-oriented nationalism as a
substitute for Marxism-Leninism. Some countries with stunningly levels of development
and large peasant majorities succeeded in achieving both high levels of growth and
nationalist mobilization (China, Vietnam, and Laos). Highly industrialized and urbanized
countries like Cuba and North Korea weathered very bad economic times (several
successive year of negative economic growth in the 1990s) thanks to their successful
mobilization of very potent “anti-imperialist” nationalism. Thus, the experience of the
surviving communist countries shows that while having both economic growth and
nationalism make a regime more stable, a coherent ideology that can ensure mass support
for the regime may be more important for survival than economic growth. Long-term,
however, no regime can survive with negative economic growth; even Cuba and North
Korea have slowly begun implementing economic reform measures that will, one hopes,
lead to growth higher than the modest 2-3% GDP increases that both countries have
registered since 2000. Specific data on GDP growth in all five countries for 1985-2004
are presented in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Resilient Communist Countries GDP Annual Growth Rate (1985-2003)
20
15
10
Growth Rate (percentage)
5
China
Cuba
0 Nkorea
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Lao PDR
Vietnam
-5
-10
-15
-20
Year
Dru Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (2004), as well as the
China Quarterly June 2003 special issue on religious freedom in China. China implements a type of
affirmative action towards members of ethnic minorities, giving them preferential access to higher
education and jobs, as well as relaxed (and laxly enforced) family planning quotas. Minorities are also
overrepresented in the National People’s Congress, constituting 13.9% of the 2002 NPC, while they only
make up 6-8% of the overall population (中国统计年鉴2004, p. 873).
Economic Reform
Of all remaining communist regimes, China has gone the farthest in terms of economic
reform. In the aftermath of the political and economic chaos engendered by the Cultural
Revolution, Deng Xiaoping decided to initiate a series of “economic reform and opening”
(改革开放 gaige kaifang) policies. Prior to Tiananmen, the reforms focused on
agricultural de-collectivization, re-invigorating markets, and legalizing private
entrepreneurial activity.41 After 1989, the much more sensitive activity of restructuring
inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs)42, helping banks eliminate the bad loan
problem,43 and introducing some competition in government monopoly sectors, such as
telecommunications began. After China’s entry to the WTO in 2001, the economic
reforms have been revitalized thanks to WTO-compatibility requirements for various
industries, most importantly services and manufacturing. A retrospective look at the last
quarter century of reform shows they have been very successful, with GDP growth rate
averaging 9.5% during 1978-2004.44 However, the reform period brought about a number
of problems, such as rising urban-rural and inter- and intra-provincial inequality,45 a crisis
of the social insurance system,46 a disenfranchised mass of at least 100 million rural
migrants, and rising crime.
Vietnam’s reform experience shows many similarities to that of China. The

reform era in Vietnam began with the 1986 doi moi (renovation) policy.47 Initially, doi
moi went through many setbacks. The pace of reforms seems to have quickened in the
late 1990s and especially after the 2001 election of reform-minded Nong Duc Manh to
the post of General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Though Vietnam has
enjoyed average GDP growth rates of 6.8% for the 1986-2004 period,48 reform has
brought about many of the same problems as in China: rising inter- and intra-provincial
inequality,49 a growing number of migrants,50 daunting difficulty of state-owned
41
Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China (1989), Terry Sicular, “Redefining State, Plan, and
Market: China’s Reforms in Agricultural Commerce”, China Quarterly 144 (Dec. 1995): 1020-1046, Barry
Naughton, Growing out of the Plan (1995).
42
Edward Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China (1998).
43
Nicholas Lardy, China’s Unfinished Revolution (1998)
44
中国统计年鉴 2004, p. 55.
45
Angang Hu and Shaoguang Wang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development (1999).
46
Elizabeth J. Croll, “Social Welfare Reform: Trends and Tensions”, The China Quarterly 159 (September
1999), 684-699; Jane Duckett, “State, Collectivism, and Worker Privilege: A Study of Urban Health
Insurance Reform”, The China Quarterly 177 (March 2004), pp. 155-173.
47
Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
48
Calculation based on World Development Indicators Online. We should stress that were it not for oil
exports, Vietnam’s growth rate might have been a lot less impressive, especially during stages when there
were setbacks to doi moi. Oil is Vietnam’s biggest export (21% of exports in 2004) and the biggest single
source of revenue for the central government (27.4% of revenue in 2002). EIU, Vietnam Country Profile
2005, pp. 37, 55.
49
Tuong Lai, “The Issues of Social Change after Ten Years of Doi Moi” in Adam Fforde, ed. Doi Moi Ten
Years after the 1986 Party Congress (Canberra : Department of Political and Social Change, Research
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, 1997), pp. 181-199; Melanie
enterprise (SOE) restructuring, and inefficient banks mired in bad debt. Social problems,
such as increased numbers of migrants, rise in prostitution and crime are by-products of
the reform experience that plague the regime. Despite some problems, however, the
reform period in Vietnam has been a success, as demonstrated among other indicators by
the very high FDI per capita that the country has received,51 its ability to amass $7 billion
in foreign reserves and to keep its foreign debt/GDP ratio at 40%.52 Were it not for
economic reform, the regime would find itself in a much shakier position than it is now.
Laos, a country alternatively labeled a “feudal-criminal narco-communist state”53

and a “Buddhist kingdom-Marxist state”,54 has also undertaken economic reform. While
not an unquestionable success story like China or Vietnam, this landlocked country with
a population of only 6 million has managed to withstand various challenges to regime
stability and to achieve an average GDP growth rate of 5.6% over the last two decades
(1986-2004). How was this possible? As soon as the Marxist-Leninist Lao People’s
Revolutionary Army came to power in 1975, it attempted to carry out land
collectivization. After achieving a collectivization rate of 25% by 1979, the regime
abandoned the project amidst a falling harvest, threat of internal unrest, and a growing
realization that it was impossible to get popular acceptance of the idea.55 By 1986, when
Vietnam undertook doi moi, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party decided at its congress
that it would implement pean pang mai (New Economic Mechanism) policy as well. In
addition to encouraging greater freedom in agricultural production, the regime allowed
foreign direct investment and private ownership of small businesses. Tourism also slowly
became a major source of foreign currency.56 While achievements have been reached,
especially keeping in mind the extremely low level of development of the country in
1975, the Laotian leadership’s lack of resolute embrace of the reforms has led to
consistent problems: high inflation, currency devaluation, an external debt representing
Beresford, “Economic Transition, Uneven Development, and the Impact of Reform on Regional
Inequality” in Hy V. Luong, ed. Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 55-80.
50
Andrew Hardy, “State Vision, Migrant Decisions: Popular Movements since the End of the Vietnam
War” in Luong, ed. (fn 49), pp. 107-137.
51
Vietnam’s 2004 per capita implemented (v. contracted) FDI was US$32, while China’s per capita
implemented FDI was $37. Calculation based on EIU and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004 data.
52
China’s foreign reserves were estimated at $412 billion in 2003; its external debt in 2002 was 13.2% of
GDP. EIU, China Country Profile 2005, p. 57.
53
Massimo Lensi and Bruno Mellano, Indocina libera: Il caso Laos trent’anni dopo dove la democrazia è
reato (Firence: Liberal Libri, 2002). According to Zasloff, Laos was the third biggest producer of opium in
the world in the late 1980s (Joseph J. Zasloff, American Political Research on Laos, 1954-1993, In
Jacqueline Butler-Diaz, ed. New Laos, New Challenges (Tempe, AZ: Program for Southeast Asian Studies
Arizona State University, 1998), p. 228. Opium acreage has dropped dramatically in recent year (EIU, Laos
Country Report 2005, p. 14.)
54
Martin Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos (Bangkok: White
Lotus, 1996). Post-1975 Laos initially had “red” prince Souphanouvong as president, yet the real power
even then lay with Kaysone Phomvihane, the Secretary General of Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.
55
Grant Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). See also Martin
Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996),
pp. 109-127.
56
Laos welcomed 894,806 foreign tourists in 2004 (Economist Intelligence Unit, Laos Country Report
August 2005, p. 20).
165.2% of GDP,57 and dwindling foreign direct investment.58 Those are danger signs for
the continued economic legitimacy of the regime.
North Korea and Cuba are laggards in economic reform when compared to
successful cases like China and Vietnam and even to moderately successful cases such as
Laos. Nonetheless, both countries have initiated halting economic reforms. North Korea
began establishing the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zone in 1991, the Mt. Kumgang
resort in 1998, the Kaesong industrial zone in 2000, and the Sinuiju Special
Administrative Region (SAR) in 2002.59 Other strategies of economic reform included
resolving the ideological conflict over farmers markets,60 as well as allowing the won to
float. Finally, the regime sought foreign aid and courted foreign governments to establish
diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and bring in businesses from their native countries
to North Korea.61 Those measures seem to have produced some moderate gains, with
North Korea registering an average GDP growth of 2.8% for the 1998-2003, a marked
advance over the -4.5% growth for 1991-1994 and the -3.8% growth for 1995-1998.62 For
an internationally isolated country that has had to deal with a string of natural disasters
and has been unwilling to implement rapid economic reform, such growth figures are
signs of a modest achievement.
In Cuba, too, there have been cautious attempts at economic reform in the late
1990’s and early 2000’s.63 Cuba has gone much further than North Korea in diversifying
its economy away from state ownership, effectively having three different economies: the
old state economy, the export-oriented state-foreign sector (consisting mostly of joint
ventures, with some wholly foreign-owned enterprises), and the private sector economy
57
Economist Intelligence Unit, Laos Country Profile 2005, p. 44.
58
2003 FDI was $69 million, twice lower than in 1996. EIU, Laos Country Profile 2005, p. 29.
59
The Koreans hired the Chinese-Dutch chrysanthemum millionaire Yang Bin to manage it. Yang Bin’s
arrest in China for tax evasion, as well as poor planning, dashed the grand designs for the SAR, which was
supposed to operate outside North Korean law, enjoy great economic and political freedoms (including the
issuance of special passports) and serve as a laboratory for the introduction of capitalism to the DPRK. See
Marcus Noland, Korea after Kim Jong-il, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004),
pp. 46-57.
60
Farmers markets had been sanctioned by Kim Il-sung in 1969, but Kim Jong-il attacked them as
unsocialist in 1996. See Andre Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington, DC: US Institute of
Peace, 2001), pp. 98-99.
61
For many years, the Swedish embassy had been the only Western embassy in Pyongyang (Eric Cornell,
North Korea under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). In
2001, Germany established an embassy as well (Wolfgang Röhr, “Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between Germany and North Korea”, in Choi, E. Han Kim and Yesook Merrill, eds. North Korea in the
World Economy, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 16-17). On attempts to court EU countries, see
Alain Destexhe, Corée du Nord: voyage en dynastie totalitaire, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). Currently, the
EU, Australia, and Canada have all normalized relations with the DPRK.
62
Economist Intelligence Unit, North Korea Country Profile 2005, p. 18. North Korea seems to be
establishing itself as niche producer of magnesia clinker and inexpensive business suits for the Japanese
market (Myong Chol Kim, “Significance of Chinese Economic Success to North Korea”, in Choi and
Merrill, eds, op. cit., pp. 18-23).
63
Cuba’s cautious economic reforms have been labeled “segmented marketization”, due to the fact that
only some sectors like exports and tourism were marketized. See Consuelo Cruz and Anna Seleny,
“Reform and Counterreform: The Path to Market in Hungary and Cuba”, Comparative Politics 34: 2
(January 2002), 211-231.
(small businesses, such as private restaurants known as paladares).64 As a result of

economic reform, state employment accounted for 73.2% in 2003, down from 95% in
1989.65 Agricultural reform centered on the introduction of cooperatives in 1993
(Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa (UBPC), which supplanted the typical
communist agricultural collectives. As a consequence, state farm land ownership has
been reduced from 78% in 1989 to 33% in 1998.66 Another consequential measure was
legalizing the possession of foreign currency in 1993. Unlike North Korea, Cuba now has
two large and ready sources of foreign currency, which can cushion the hardship created
by economic recession: extensive tourism and foreign remittances.67 Although Cuba
hasn’t pursued economic reform with China’s zeal (wide-ranging reform measures in
1993-1995 were followed by retrenchment),68 it has been much bolder than North Korea.
Overall, Cuba experienced a much shorter (though more severe) period of negative
economic growth (1990-1993) than North Korea (1990-1998). Overall, Cubans enjoy a
higher standard of living and greater political freedoms than North Koreans.69
As we can see, economic performance has fluctuated across the remaining 5

communist countries. Nonetheless, all of them are currently implementing some version
of the Chinese model of piecemeal economic reform that can deliver growth and thus
bring much-needed legitimacy to the regime. However, economic growth is not a
sufficient basis on which regime legitimacy can be established. In societies where
individuals are born and bred among ideology, the regime has to be able to base its
legitimacy on a certain widely-accepted belief system; in 2005, the only remaining
ideology that communist countries can mobilize is externally-oriented nationalism.
Externally-Oriented Nationalism
Section II if this paper argued that Marxism-Leninism was bankrupt in the entire
communist camp by the early 1980s and that the countries that eventually collapsed were
unable to articulate a new ideology to fill the void created by the demise of Marxism-
Leninism. By contrast, the 5 communist countries that endure to this day successfully
substituted externally-oriented nationalism for Marxism-Leninism. Why didn’t all 15
countries resort to this type of nationalism and thus avert regime collapse? The main
difference between the two groups of communist states is that the countries that collapsed
had no credible external target for their nationalism after 1985, while for the remaining 5
countries credible targets existed. Although nationalism varied in intensity from country
to country, it was a credible ideological platform in all 5 remaining communist states,
thus providing an important source of legitimacy for the regime.
64
Javier Corrales, “The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reform and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1982-
2002”, Latin American Research Review 39: 2 (June 2004): 35-65.
65
Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba Country Profile 2005, p. 15.
66
Ibid., p. 29.
67
Susan Eckstein, “Dollarization and the Its Discontents: Remittances and the Remaking of Cuba in the
Post-Soviet Era” Comparative Politics 36: 3 (April 2004): 313-330.
68
Carmela Mesa-Lago, “Economic and Ideological Cycles in Cuba” in Archibald R. M. Miller, ed. The
Cuban Economy (2004), pp. 25-41.
69
Per capita GDP in 2003 was $2699 in Cuba (EIU, Cuba Country Profile 2005, p. 23) and $818 in North
Korea (EIU, North Korea Profile 2005, p. 16).
Nationalism is strongest in Cuba and North Korea, the two remaining countries
that face the highest probability of external attack.70 In North Korea, the memory of
Japanese colonialism and the horrible suffering of ordinary civilians at American hands
during the Korean War (1950-1953) are carefully preserved and exploited by the
regime.71 In an information-poor environment (the internet is tightly controlled, as are
foreign media), the regime has found it possible to ensure continued mass support for
resistance to the “isolate-and-stifle policy against socialism and the DPRK” of
“imperialists and their stooges”.72 Similarly, the misjudged US blockade against Castro
has served as a focal point for rallying popular support for his regime.73 The passage of
the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996 Helms-Burton Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act have done much more to solidify the regime
than can be achieved by repression and control of information. Nationalist anti-American
discourse has always been quite believable in Cuba, as the US has historically been cast
in a very negative light as a colonizer and supporter of the brutal Batista regime.
However, the continued blockade, the invasion of Iraq and the human rights abuses in
Guantánamo only increase popular support for Castro, who is seen to be leading a
Manichean struggle with the evil forces of imperialism.74
In Vietnam and Laos nationalism is less strong, as the likelihood of external

attack is lower than in North Korean and Cuba. Nonetheless, nationalism is quite
powerful in Vietnam. The historic enemy is China, which ruled Vietnam until AD939
and then treated it as a tributary state until the establishment of the Nguyen dynasty in the
late 18th century. The two countries fought a brief border war in 1979 (which Vietnam
won), and have engaged in occasional later spats over outlying islands like the Spratleys
and the Paracels. Similarly, anti-American feelings run deep and can be easily reinforced,
especially given recent US anti-dumping measures taken against Vietnam (catfish and
shrimp). It should be noted, however, that in 2004, China was Vietnam’s biggest source
of imports, and the US was its biggest export destination, thus making the government
wary of spontaneous anti-Chinese or anti-American popular mobilization.
In Laos, in the words of a Vientiane intellectual, “Marxism-Leninism, while still

officially retained, is being replaced by nationalist rhetoric as the party’s source of
legitimacy. This is evident in seminars and oral lessons, rather than in written
documents.”75 Over time, the external target of nationalism changed. In the mid-1970s
70
As of 2005, the Bush administration considers North Korea part of the “axis of evil” and Cuba “an
outpost of tyranny” and is committed to regime change in both.
71
Glorious 50 Years (Pyongyang: Korea Pictorial, 1995).
72
Jo Am and An Chol Gang, Korea in the 20th Century: 100 Significant Events (Pyongyang: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 2002), p. 196. Also see America: The King of Terrorism (Pyongyang:
Foreign Languages Press, 2003) (金哲明.恐怖大王--美国.平壤:外文出版社,主体92年(2003年).
73
Darío L. Machado, Cuba: Ideología revolucionaria (La Habana: Editora Política, 2000).
74
Fidel Castro, Cuba es una prueba de que los pueblos pueden luchar, resistir y vencer (La Habana:
Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 2004).
75
Joseph J. Zasloff, The Foreign Policy of Laos in the 1990’s, in Jacqueline Butler-Diaz, ed. New Laos,
New Challenges (Tempe, AZ: Program for Southeast Asian Studies Arizona State University, 1998), p.
142.
and the 1980s, Laos was effectively a puppet state of Vietnam, which meant that it took
Vietnam’s side in international relations and declared itself pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese.
As the 40,000-strong Vietnamese army withdrew from Laos in the late 1980s76 and the
Soviet Union collapsed, Laos found new external enemies. Thailand proved to be a good
choice, as the two countries had fought a brief border war in 1988, and Thailand harbored
anti-regime insurgents and remnants of the Lao royal family.77
Unlike North Korean or Cuban nationalism, modern-day Chinese nationalism is

not a reaction to the possibility of external attack, but is rather driven by a victimization
narrative (“century of national humiliation”) and a desire to restore China to its former
glory.78 The main tropes used by regime-sponsored think tanks to stoke nationalist
passions in the wake of Tiananmen were the Japanese atrocities in the 1930s and 1940s,
Taiwanese moves towards independence, and American hegemony. With government
encouragement, blockbuster publications like China Can Say No appeared.79 Individuals
were also allowed to engage in organized anti-Japanese or anti-American protests.80 From
the government’s perspective, this was a win-win strategy, as people were allowed to
vent off, yet they were not protesting against the regime. When it comes to the 2000s,
there is some contention among China specialists on the ability of the regime to control
mass nationalism: some see the government as creating and manipulating nationalist
sentiments,81 while others argue that from the mid-1990’s onwards, the regime has been
more reactive to mass nationalism, rather than pro-actively encouraging it.82 While we do
have evidence that the regime did initiate and manipulate the rise of anti-Japanese
rhetoric by sponsoring research on the Nanjing massacre, creating the Beijing War of
Resistance Museum,83 and by sensitizing the public to the Japanese textbook issue,84
China-based academics seem to agree that the most recent round of anti-Japanese protests
was not regime-organized and the government saw it more as a nuisance than as
76
To put the size of Vietnamese troops in perspective, we should note that the Laotian army currently
consists of 29,100 troops (EIU, Laos Country Profile 2005, p. 8).
77
Gerald W. Fry, “The Future of the Lao PDR”, in Butler-Diaz, ed. (fn 75), pp. 147-179.
78
For a careful assessment of the realpolitik elements in Chinese nationalism see Thomas Christensen,
“Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing’s Worldview”, Foreign Affairs 75: 5 (1996), pp. 37-52.
79
宋强,张藏藏,乔边等著中国可以说不:冷战后时代的政治与情感抉择(北京 :
中华工商联合出版社,1996).
80
While Japan and the US are the main targets of externally-oriented nationalism in China, anti-Japanese
feelings run much deeper than anti-American feelings amongst the Chinese population. See Alastair Iain
Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?”, The
China Quarterly 179 (September 2004), pp. 603-628. See Zhao Dingxing on the 1999 student protests.
81
Suisheng Zhao, Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2004).
82
Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004). See also Peter Hays Gries, “Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, in Yong
Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
83
Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War
of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997”, The China Quarterly 161 (1), pp. 279-293. A later example of the role
of museums in spurring nationalist sentiment is the creation of the Unit 731 museum in Harbin in 2001.
84
Yinan He, “The Clash of Memories: National Myth-Making and the Sino-Japanese “History Issue”.
Mimeo: Fairbank Center for East Asian Research Harvard University, 2005.
something that was desirable.85 In April 2005, there was palpable potential that anti-
Japanese protests might turn into anti-government protests, which led to quick and
successful moves by the regime to check them.
The Chinese experience illustrates the two main potential pitfalls in the
instrumental use of nationalism. First, nationalist activity not controlled by the regime
can backfire and turn into anti-regime protests thus serving to undermine government
legitimacy rather than supporting it. Second, though externally-oriented nationalism can
be the glue that keeps people together and ensures greater regime support, as the
experience of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia shows, it can easily evolve into anti-
minority nationalism. This is not a serious concern in Cuba and North Korea, which each
have about 1% ethnic minorities, yet in China (6-8% geographically concentrated
minorities), Vietnam (15% minorities), and Laos (40% minorities), efforts have to be
made to avoid the time bomb triggered by anti-minority nationalism in the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia. So far, China seems to have been quite successful in minority
integration, incorporating all ethnic groups into a notion of a great non-Han-Chinese anti-
Japanese anti-American China.
Therefore, while a useful short-term measure to fill the ideological vacuum left
after the demise of Marxism-Leninism, nationalism can be a dangerous strategy for
gaining long-term regime legitimacy. At best, nationalism is a stopgap measure that has
to be supplanted by another ideological trope. In China, where the process of replacing
nationalism is most advanced, the discourse of choice is that of civil and political rights.
Chinese citizens can now elect local officials (at the village level, but also in some
townships), create NGOs and other organizations (but not political parties), practice
religion (with the exception of unauthorized religions and cults like Falun Gong), have
access to a range of relatively free media, and, most importantly, sue government
officials for abuse of discretion. The putatively non-litigious Chinese have embraced their
rights to legal protection enthusiastically, bringing 89,919 cases against government
officials in 200386 and winning at a rate greater than that in the US.87 Realizing that a
more accountable government is a more legitimate government, the CCP has encouraged
both vertical and horizontal accountability of its officials. Vertical accountability is
accomplished through local elections, administrative litigation, and government-tolerated
riots.88 In terms of horizontal accountability, a number of agencies exist tasked with
identifying, prosecuting, and sentencing corrupt officials.89 While China is clearly not a
democracy, there is no basis for the classical conception of a regime that rules through
85
Personal interviews in Beijing with Gao Hong (April 28, 2005), Jin Xide (April 28, 2005), and Pan Wei
(May 5, 2005).
86
中国统计年鉴 2004, p. 889.
87
Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependence and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law
Reform and the Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China”, Berkeley Journal of International Law,
vol. 19:2 (2001), fn. 301 (on p. 217).
88
O’Brien and Li (fn 25).
89
Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Yan Sun,
Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Andrew
Wedeman, “The Intensification of Corruption in China”, The China Quarterly 180 (December 2004), pp.
895-921.
coercion rather than through mass mobilization. Recent survey research shows that while
Chinese citizens may be dissatisfied with specific actions of government officials, there is
widespread diffuse support for the regime, indicating that it has managed to regain
sufficient legitimacy post-Tiananmen.90
Some seedlings of a civil society, such as NGOs, religious organizations, and a

semi-free press have been allowed to operate in Vietnam as well.91 As of 2004, direct
elections were held for commune, district and provincial officials, with non-communist
party members making up 40% of the 500,000 candidates.92 In addition, attempts to
prosecute corruption have been made (Thai Binh province protests, sentencing of Truong
Van Cam, and spectacular sacking of agriculture minister Le Huy Ngo in 2004). Finally,
there has been a debate over legalization, with laws supplanting bureaucratic fiat.93 By
contrast, in Laos political rights seem to be in their infancy, civil society is non-existent,
and elections do not represent any meaningful choice. In Cuba, regime support is aided
by increased religious freedom,94 attempts to tackle corruption,95 toleration of some
opposition activities,96 and the 1993 introduction of direct elections to the National
Assembly (Asamblea Nacional de Poder Popular) and to provincial and municipal
assemblies.97 While some have attributed regime resilience to repression and tight control
of information,98 various opinion polls demonstrate that the Cuban regime enjoys
significant genuine support and does not have to rule through coercion.99 No information
of increased human and political rights in the DPRK is available at this time.
The trend, however, is clear: over time, the regime has to expand political and
civil rights. Still, as with nationalism, the question whether a single-party regime with a
90
Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
2004).
91
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Authorities and the People: An Analysis of State-Society Relations in
Vietnam” in Luong, ed. (fn 49), pp. 27-53; Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past: The Dynamics
of Contemporary Religious and Ritual Transformation” in Luong, ed. (fn 49), pp. 225-256; David G. Marr,
“A Passion for Modernity: Intellectuals and the Media” in Luong, ed. (fn 49), pp. 257-295.
92
Economist Intelligence Unit, Vietnam Country Profile 2005, p. 9.
93
Zachary Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (2001), pp. 75-130; John Gillespie,
“Concept of Law in Vietnam: Transforming Statist Socialism” in Randall Peerenboom, ed. Asian
Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries,
France, and the US (New York: Routledge, 2004).
94
Restrictions on religious organizations have been relaxed. Also, religious worshippers are now allowed to
become members of the Communist Party. See Mark Falcoff, Cuba the Morning after: Confronting
Castro’s Legacy (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2003), pp. 181-216.
95
Jorge F. Pérez-López, “Corruption and the Cuban Transition” in Archibald R. M. Miller, ed. The Cuban
Economy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), pp. 195-217.
96
The decision of the Cuban government to allow the organization of a major dissident congress on May
20-21, 2005 may signal an important advance in freedom of expression on the island (Economist
Intelligence Unit, Cuba Country Report August 2005, p. 12).
97
There is only one candidate per seat (usually but not always a Communist Party member) and
constituents vote either for or against him. Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba Country Profile 2005, p. 7.
98
Taylor Boas, “The Dictator’s Dilemma? The Internet and US Policy toward Cuba”, Washington
Quarterly 23: 3 (2000): 57-67.
99
Jorge Domínguez, “The Secrets of Castro’s Staying in Power”, Foreign Affairs 72: 2 (Spring 1993), 97-
107. See also Darren Hawkins, “Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights from Cuba”,
Comparative Politics 33:4 (July 2001), 441-461.
ruling party whose members are not fully accountable to law can guarantee civil right for
the broad public will eventually arise and may thus undermine this strategy for regime
survival as well.
Section IV: Rival Explanations: Contagion, Repression, and Institutional Failure
Several rival theories of the collapse of communism have been articulated. In the main,
those are contagion theories, repression theories, and institutional failure theories. As I
explain below, those theories do not help us understand why communism collapsed in
some countries but not in others.
Contagion
Theories of contagion have limited usefulness, as they tend to be underspecified. There

are two problems with those theories. First, they are factually incorrect: only some
countries seem to have been stricken by contagion, while others have resisted it. This
goes contrary to contagion theories, which assume the universality of infection.100
Second, contagion theories do not specify the nature of the infection, its transmission
mechanism, and its target. More specifically, contagion theories fail to distinguish
between the contagiousness of Gorbachev’s ideas of glasnost and perestroika and the
contagiousness of regime collapse. While Gorbachev ideas might have had a contagious
quality to them (at least in the 10 countries that collapsed),101 there is no evidence that
regime collapse operated on a contagious basis. As Table 1 below demonstrates, the 10
regimes collapsed in 5 different ways: a) leadership change without street protests
(Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria), b) leadership change with non-violent street protests
(GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia), c) leadership change with violent street protests
(Romania) d) street protest without leadership change (Albania), and e) exit of countries
from the federal union (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).102 As there is no universal
mode of regime collapse, contagion theories in their current state of development cannot
be used to understand why communism collapsed.
100
Barbara Wejnert, “Diffusion, Development, and Democracy, 1800-1999”, American Sociological
Review 70 (February 2005), pp. 53-81.
101
Some of Gorbachev’s ideas were not new. For example, economic reform (perestroika) took place in
Hungary and China long before Gorbachev began talking about it, thus raising the possibility that
Gorbachev himself was “infected” by processes unfolding elsewhere. On the China-Hungary comparison,
see the contributions to Andrew Walder, ed., The Waning of the Communist State (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1995), and the work of David Stark, Lazslo Brust, Victor Nee, and Anna Seleny.
102
If we think of the Chinese case as a failed collapse, then we have a sixth mode: violent suppression of
non-violent protests without leadership change and without regime collapse.
Table 1: Chronology of Communist Collapse

Country Collapse Start Start Event Collapse End Event
End
Hungary May 1988 leadership change; no protests March 25, Multiparty elections
1990
Poland Summer 1988 Round Table talks decision; no June 4, 1989 multiparty elections
protests
China (non- April-June no leadership change; large- June 4, violent protest
collpse) 1989 scale non-violent protests 1989 suppression
GDR October 18, leadership change; large- March 18, multiparty elections
1989 scale non-violent protests 1990
Bulgaria Nov 10, 1989 leadership change; no protests June 10, multiparty elections
1990
Czechoslovakia Nov 17, 1989 leadership change; large June 8-9, multiparty elections
scale non-violent protests 1989
Romania December leadership change; large- May 20, multiparty elections
1989 scale violent protests 1990
Mongolia December leadership change; limited July 29, multiparty elections
1989 non-violent protests (rock 1990
bands)
Albania Winter – no leadership change; large- March 31, multiparty elections
Spring 1990 scale violent protests 1991
USSR Spring 1990 republican Supreme Soviet December dissolution of the
multiparty elections; non- 25, 1991 Soviet Union
Russian republics protest
Yugoslavia Spring, republican multiparty June 1991 Slovenia & Croatia
Summer, Fall elections; non-Serbian exit the federation
1990 republics protest
Sources: Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era
(2002), Elster, The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (1996), EIU country database.
A variant of contagion theory argues that the regimes that collapsed were part of
the Soviet empire and were thus susceptible to “change radiating from the core”.103 As
the center of the empire began to wither away, this argument goes, its periphery
collapsed; the countries that remained communist were not part of empire and were thus
immune from the centripetal forces unleashed by the waning of the center. The empire
was held together by force (the Warsaw Pact) and by complicated economic exchanges
between the periphery and the core carried out through the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA or Comecon).104 Yet, what were the members of the Soviet empire?
Strict membership criteria (a country has to belong to both the Warsaw Pact and to
Comecon) would limit it to 5 European countries;105 more relaxed criteria (not a member
103
Valerie Bunce, correspondence with the author, September 17, 2005. Also see Renée de Nevers,
Comrades No More: The Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
104
The standard wisdom on Comecon was that the Soviet Union imposed strict restraints on the actions of
the other CMEA members. A recent study of the Eastern European CMEA member-countries argues that
those 6 countries were a lot more independent of the USSR than was previously thought (Randall Stone,
Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict on the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996). Stone’s excellent study does not include the non-European CMEA
members (Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam).
105
The 5 countries that were simultaneously members of the Warsaw Pact and of Comecon include the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria (Romania did not participate in Warsaw Pact
activities after 1968).
of the Warsaw Pact but a member of Comecon) would expand the periphery of the
empire to 9 countries (adding Romania, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam). However, this
variant of contagion theory is also unable to account for some inconvenient facts: while
not members of the Soviet empire, Albania and Yugoslavia collapsed; Cuba and Vietnam
survived despite being members; and North Korea, though not a member was
economically much more dependent on the USSR than most members, yet it survived
nonetheless. As Table 2 below demonstrates, there was a range of integration with the
Soviet Union across members of Comecon (e.g. Romania and East Germany traded more
with the West than with the Soviet Union), yet there is no clear link between level of
dependence on the Soviet Union and regime collapse.
Table 2: Level of Economic Dependence on the Soviet Union (None, Low, Medium, High)
Country Year CMEA Imports Imports CMEA Exports Exports CMEA
Member USSR (minus USSR) USSR (minus USSR)
Albania (N) 1987 No 0% 29.8% 0% 30.7%
Bulgaria (H) 1988 Yes 53.5% 23.2% 62.5% 22.1%
Czechosl (M) 1979 Yes 35.7% 30.6% 35.8% 29.3%
GDR (L) 1989 Yes 22% 17.4% 23.8% 19.4%
Hungary (M) 1986 Yes 30.9% 19.9% 33.9% 20.1%
Mongolia (H) 1986 Yes N/A 96.7% (incl. USSR) N/A 94.2% (incl. USSR)
Poland (L) 1988 Yes 23.3% 11.4% (GDR/CSSR) 24.5% 10.4% (GDR/CSSR)
Romania (L) 1980 Yes N/A 33.7% (incl. USSR) N/A 33.7% (incl. USSR)
USSR 1989 Yes N/A 56.3% N/A 55.2%
Yugoslavia (L) 1988 Associate 13.3% 6.7% (Czechsl&Pol) 18.7% 8.1% (Czechsl&Pol)
Member
China (L) 1986 No 3.4% --- 4% 1.5% (Poland only)
Cuba (H) 1983 Yes 68.3% 15.5% 70% 11.6.%
Laos (L) 1988 No N/A 36.3% (incl. USSR) N/A 51.9% (incl. USSR)
North Korea (H) 1988 No 60.7% 2.5% 49.6% 4.8%
Vietnam (H) 1986 Yes 70.8% 70.8%
Sources: See Appendix to this paper.
A sub-version of the empire thesis is the argument that communism survived in

countries where it was indigenous, yet it failed in countries where it was imposed.106
There are two further versions of this argument: a) Soviet troops guaranteed communism
in countries where it was imposed (such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the
GDR), and, once they left, it fell; and b) communism survived in places where first
generation leaders (who either have more charisma/legitimacy or are more willing to use
repression) were in command. As Table 3 below demonstrates, while communism
survived in all places where it was indigenous, it fell both in countries where it was
imposed and in countries where it was indigenous, thus making us doubt there is a strong
relationship between indigenousness and regime durability. Similarly, Soviet troop size
presence was immaterial: Gorbachev’s December 7, 1988 UN General Assembly promise
to withdraw 2% of the over 500,000 Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary was never realized prior the collapse of those regimes. Counterintuitively,
106
Adam Przeworski, correspondence with the author, August 24, 2005. For a related argument on the
cultural affinity of some countries for Communism, see Jacques Rupnik, “On Two Models of Exit from
Communism: Central Europe and the Balkans” in Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu, eds. Between
Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath (2000), pp. 14-24.
many IR theorists seem to believe that despite the lack of troop withdrawal this decision
had the greatest causal impact on the collapse of communism, as it made it harder for
those regimes to issue credible threats of suppressing dissent.107 We should note,
however, that the role of Soviet troops tends to be exaggerated. Some regimes where no
promise was made to withdraw Soviet troops (e.g. Poland) were already well on their
way of undoing the communism by 1988 and it was quite doubtful that troops could have
been used to suppress protest there anyway. Similarly, with or without Soviet troops, by
the end of summer 1988, the Hungarian regime was evolving in a democratic direction.
This argument only makes some sense for non-reformers like the GDR and
Czechoslovakia, but it would be significantly strengthened had the even miniscule 2%
planned Soviet troop withdrawal taken place there before collapse began. Table 3 below
contains numerical data on the size of Soviet troops in different countries.
Table 3: Indigenous v. Imposed Communist Regimes

Country Regime Warsaw Regime Number of Indigenousness
Beginning Pact Imposed Soviet Check: Did
Year Member v. Indigenous Troops in Communists
1989 Win the First
Democratic
Elections?
Albania 1944 Inactive 1961 Indigenous None Yes
Withdrew 1968
Bulgaria 1946 Yes Semi-indigenous None Yes
Czechoslovakia 1948 Yes Imposed 75,000 No
GDR 1949 Yes Imposed 370,000 No
Hungary 1948 Yes Imposed 50,000 No
Mongolia 1924 No Semi-indigenous 55,000 Yes
Poland 1948 Yes Imposed 30,000 No
Romania 1947 Distanced itself 1968 Semi-indigenous None Yes
USSR 1917 Yes Indigenous N/A Yes (1990)
Yugoslavia 1945 No Indigenous None Yes (Milosevic)
China 1949 No Indigenous None N/A
Cuba 1960 No Indigenous 11,000 N/A
Laos 1975 No Indigenous 40,000 N/A
Vietnamese
North Korea 1948 No Indigenous None N/A
Vietnam 1956/1975 No Indigenous 15,000 advisers N/A
Source: Library of Congress Country Study series; Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989 (1997).
Finally, let’s address the argument that Communism was more durable in
countries with first generation leaders. As Table 4 below shows, communism collapsed in
countries with first generation leaders (Bulgaria, GDR, and Romania), countries with
first-second generation leaders (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), countries with second
generation leaders (Albania and Yugoslavia), and even those with second-third
generation leaders (Poland) and third generation leaders (Mongolia and the Soviet
Union). This range in the values of the independent variable cautions against making
generalizations about the relationship between regime survival and leader generation.
107
Jacques Lévesque, “The Emancipation of Eastern Europe” in Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned
Lebow, eds. Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations
(2004), 107-129 (at p. 114). See also Lévesque (fn. 6).
Similarly, while in 1989 all of the resilient regimes except Vietnam had first generation
leaders, Castro currently stands as the only remaining first generation leader of a
communist country in the world; the other remaining communist country have gone
moved to second, third, and fourth generation leaders without ensuing systemic collapse.
We therefore have no clear evidence that the generation of the leader has any effect on
the survival of a communist regime. Theoretically, too, we should be skeptical of such an
argument, as the longevity of communist regimes is based on structural, institutional, and
ideological variables, rather than on the charisma or repressive abilities of an individual
leader.
Table 4: Leadership Generation and Regime Survival

Country Leader in Generation New Generation Leader
1989
Albania Ramiz Alia Second 1st Generation: Enver Hoxha (1945-1985)
(1985-)
Bulgaria Todor First Other 1st Generation Leaders: Dimitrov (1946-1949),
Zhivkov Kolarov (1949-1950). Chervenkov (1950-1954)
(1954-)
CzechSl Miloš Jakeš First/Second 1st: Gottwald (1948-1953), Novotny (1953-1968) 2nd:
(1987-) Dubček (1968-1969) 1st: Husák (1969-1987); Jakeš
hardliner (1987-1989), so best classified as 1st/2nd gen.
GDR E. Honecker First Other 1st Generation: Wilhelm Pieck (1946-1950), Walter
(1971-) Ulbricht (1950-1971)
Hungary Grósz (1988-) Second/Third 1st: Rákosi (1945-1956) 2nd: Nagy (53-56) Kádár (56-88)
Mongolia Jambyn Third First: Choybalsan (d. 1952); Second: Tsedenbal (d. 1984)
Batmonkh
Poland W. Jaruzelski Second/Third First: Bierut (1948-1956) Second: Gomułka (1956-1970)
and Gierek (1970-1980)
Romania N. Ceauşescu First Gheorghiu-Dej (1948-1965)
USSR M. Gorbachev Third 1st: Lenin/Stalin 2nd:
Khrushchev/Brezhnev/Andropov/Chernenko
Yugoslavia Sl. Milosevic Second First: Tito
rd
China Deng First/Second 3 : Jiang Zemin (1989/1996-2002/2004) 4th: Hu Jintao
Xiaoping
Cuba Fidel Castro First Castro still alive and in power
Laos Kaysone First Nouhak Phomsavane (1992)/ Gen. Khamtay Siphandone
Phomvihane (1998)
DPRKorea Kim Il-sung First Kim Jong-il (1994/1997)
Vietnam Nguyen Van Second 1st: Le Duan (1976-1986) 2nd: Truong Chinh (1986),
Linh (1986- Nguyen Van Linh (1986-1991), Do Muoi (1991-1997), Le
1991) Kha Phieu (1997-2001) 3rd: Nong Duc Manh (2001-)
Source: Multiple encyclopedias (especially Wikipedia); Economist Intelligence Unit database.
Repression
A different type of explanation concerns the willingness of the regime to suppress

dissent.108 The dilemma a dictator faces –to shoot or not to shoot—is seen as an important
108
Some may argue that the important factor is not just the willingness of Communist regimes to suppress
dissent, but also their ability to do so. I do, however, believe that all Communist regimes had sufficiently
strong repressive machineries to suppress dissent; over time, however, their willingness to use repression
factor in understanding the collapse of some regimes and not of others.109 In short, those
that shot, stayed; those that didn’t, failed. Normally, two cases are given as examples of
this logic: China’s suppression of the student rebellion at Tiananmen and the
unwillingness of the East German regime to use a “Chinese scenario” against the Leipzig
protesters. As we see from Table 1 above, data from other countries challenge this
argument: Ceauşescu shot and was later himself shot dead, yet Ramiz Alia shot and
stayed in power (though he did allow multiparty election and the regime still eventually
collapsed). Gorbachev authorized the use of force in some union republics without
preventing the dissolution of the USSR; Milosevic waged a war with Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Yugoslavia still collapsed. In short, there is no clear
relationship between the decision to use force and the longevity of the regime.
We should stress that as coercion is very costly, governments would prefer to

elicit voluntary compliance with their policies through mass mobilization. By 1989, the
use of coercion was declining across the communist camp.110 There is mounting evidence
that the use of repression is declining in North Korea111 and Cuba112 as well, let alone in
much less repressive regimes such as Laos,113 Vietnam, and, especially, China.114
Institutional Failure
A final set of arguments stresses the institutional rigidity of Communist countries. As

those institutions were no longer useful, the argument goes, communism collapsed.115 As
the term “institutions” can be applied to virtually anything, this argument sounds
eroded. As repression is costly in terms of political legitimacy, only regimes with large legitimacy reserves
can afford to use it.
109
Mark R. Thompson, “To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe”,
Comparative Politics 34:1 (October 2001), 63-83.
110
J. C. Sharman, Repression and Resistance in Communist Europe (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
111
An Amnesty International report on North Korea covering the January-December 2004 period mentions
that the number of executions has dropped.
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/94B92E5315A7C0FA80256FE1005CF5A0 (accessed October 3,
2005). Reliable statistics on the number of people detained in prison camps don’t exist. Bruce Cumings
estimates them at 100,000 to 150,000 (Cumings, North Korea, p. 174). 150,000 prison camp inmates
account for .65% of North Korea’s 23 million-strong population. A comparison with the US reveals that
this country had 2.131 million prisoners in 2004, accounting for .72% of the population
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm accessed October 3, 2005).
112
Cuba is estimated to have had 306 political prisoners in 2003 by dissident leader Elizardo Sánchez from
the Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional
(http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20030715elpepiint_11&type=Tes&d_date=&anchor=elpepiint ,
accessed October 3, 2005). The number of political prisoners during the first decade of Castro’s rule was
estimated to be between 2,000 and 20,000 (EIU, Cuba Country Profile 2005, p. 10).
113
The numbers of political prisoners and re-education camp (samana) inmates reached peaks of 30,000
and 40,000 respectively in the late 1970s, but have fallen to much lower levels since then. See Economist
Intelligence Unit, Laos Country Profile 2005, p. 5.
114
The Laogai Research foundation estimates China’s prison and labor camp population in 2004 at 4 to 6
million people (http://www.laogai.org/news/newsdetail.php?id=1880 accessed October 3, 2005). The upper
estimate equals .46% of China’s population. See, however, recent reports of China’s progress in tackling
prisoner rights abuses and illegal extended detention (Congressional Executive Commission of China
Annual Report 2004, www.cecc.gov, accessed October 3, 2005).
115
Roeder (fn 3), Solnick, Stealing the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), O’Neill (fn 3).
plausible. On some level, economic crisis and ideological vacuum are also testaments to
the crisis of institutions of economic growth, societal organization and ideological
indoctrination. However, those arguments do not explain why Communist institutions
survived in some places while they failed in others. For example, institutional theories
fail to provide a clear explanation to the key question why the Communist Party
apparatus disintegrated in some countries but managed to adapt and continue to wield
extreme power in others.116 By extension, then, if communist institutions can evolve and
adapt, they are not necessarily as moribund as those theories argue. Yet, by failing to
examine systematically cases of collapse and non-collapse institutional theories as they
currently exist do not help us understand the conditions under which this adaptation is
possible.
In short, contagion, repression, and institutional theories in their current

formulation do not address the question why communism collapsed.
Section V: Conclusion
This paper addresses a question that has not previously received scholarly attention: why
communism collapsed in some countries but survived in others. Existing studies of the
collapse and resilience of communist regimes have focused on single countries but have
never examined either the entire group or collapsed regimes or the entire group of
resilient regimes. By contrast, this paper is centered on an analysis of the universe of
communist countries, examining both all cases of collapse and all cases of resilience. I
have argued that two factors explain the collapse of communist regimes: poor economic
growth and the absence of a unifying ideology in the wake of the moral bankruptcy of
Marxism-Leninism. Regimes that survived were able to do so by providing either high
economic growth or supplanting Marxism-Leninism with externally-oriented nationalism
as a unifying mass ideology. Regimes that have provided both high economic growth and
nationalism (China, Vietnam, and Laos) may turn out to be more durable than regimes
that have focused mostly on nationalism (Cuba and North Korea) and have only recently
undertaken economic reforms. The Cuban and North Korean experience, however, is a
powerful reminder that ideas are quite consequential in Communist regimes, enabling the
leadership to enjoy mass support even in tough economic times.
There are two possible extensions of this work. First, the ideas in this paper may
be applicable to understanding the operation of fascist regimes.117 They are single-party
regimes, which, like communist regimes, initially base their legitimacy on a coherent
ideology and are able to deliver ideologically-justified growth (e.g. the Reich can only
become powerful and able to implement its ideology if there is growth). Also, similar to
communist regimes, fascist regimes seem to be able to endure temporary economic
setbacks as long as they can wield ideological appeals to the masses. However, unlike
communist regimes, they tend to engage in wars of aggression and find their demise in
116
On the adaptation of the Chinese Communist Party, see Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian,
eds., Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004).
117
I owe this insight to Anne Sa’adah.
war (Germany, Italy, and Japan).118 Also, unlike Communist regimes, the individual
leader normally dominates the party rather than the party dominating the leader. Franco’s
Spain, as the only fascist regime that has peacefully evolved into a democratic state
presents a case that may be applicable to studying the current evolution underway in the
remaining five communist regimes. They are all changing, and, like Spain, some (China
and Vietnam) are instituting fairly wide-ranging rule of law in the economic sphere,
while carefully limiting the political freedoms that they are willing to allow. It may well
be that China one day reaches a point beyond which it can no longer function as a single-
party system with economic rule of law and lack of political rule of law.119
Another possible extension of this paper is to the wider group of authoritarian

states. I have argued that Communist states are quite distinct from authoritarian states, as
they rule through ideologically-based mass mobilization rather than through coercion and
repression. As coercion is costly, we would expect authoritarian states to either collapse
or develop an ideology at some point in their lifespan. Some authoritarian states seem to
have been quite durable (e.g. Mexico under the PRI, which lasted longer than the Soviet
Union), thus providing important lessons for the future trajectory of the remaining five
communist regimes. It may very well be that some day China’s political arrangement will
be best described as authoritarian (no coherent ideology, some limited legal opposition in
the National People’s Congress, the theoretical possibility for a loss at the polls for the
Communist party). In this light, the evolution of authoritarian regimes into democracies
can also be of interest to those who study the various pathways of transitioning away
from communism.
118
However, not all fascist regimes engage in colonial expansion –Spain, Hungary, and Croatia present
interesting variation on this dimension within the group.
119
In other words, China may democratize. Bruce Gilley’s China’s Democratic Future (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003) goes as far as specifying a date when this transformation will occur.
Appendix: Data Sources
Data Sources for Table 2: Level of Economic Dependence on the Soviet Union (None, Low, Medium,
High):
Albania: Albania: A Country Study 1994 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/albania/al_appen.html, accessed

October 8, 2005);
Bulgaria: Bulgaria: A Country Study 1993 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/bulgaria/bg_appen.html , accessed
October 8, 2005);
Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovakia: A Country Study 1985
GDR data: Statistisches Amt der DDR, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutscen Demokratischen Republic ’90
(Berlin: Rudolf Haufe Verlag, 1990), p. 277.
Hungary: Hungary: A Country Study 1990 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/hungary/hu_appen.html accessed
October 8, 2005);
Mongolia: Mongolia: A Country Study 1990 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mntoc.html accessed October 8,
2005);
Poland: Poland: A Country Study 1994 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/poland/pl_appen.html accessed
October 8, 2005);
Romania: Romania: A Country Study 1990 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/romania/ro_appen.html#table6
accessed October 8, 2005);
USSR: Goskomstat SSSR, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990)
Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia: A Country Study 1992, p. 300.
China: China: A Country Study 1988, p. 615;
Cuba: Cuba: A Country Guide 1987, p. 306
Laos: Laos: A Country Study 1995 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/laos/la_appen.html accessed October 8,
2005);
North Korea: North Korea: A Country Study 1994
(http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/korea_north/kp_appen.html#table6 accessed October 8, 2005);
Vietnam: Vietnam: A Country Study 1989 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vietnam/vn_appen.html accessed
October 8, 2005);
Notes:
1. Different data on GDR given in Statistisches Bundesamt, DDR 1990: Zahlen und Fakten
(Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel Verlag, 1990), p. 56. For 1988, the BRD Statistical Service estimates
USSR trade to be 38.6% and non-USSR CMEA to be 27.8%, which is significantly higher than
the DDR Statistical Service estimate of 24.5% and 18.8% respectively.
2. Laos data only list “nonconvertible currency” trade, which will include USSR, CMEA, and non-
CMEA countries like China, North Korea, Yugoslavia
3. North Korea data has USSR, China, and “other communist” countries together, which I assume is
equal to CMEA, though it might include Laos, Yugoslavia, and Albania –but those 3 would have
had a very miniscule amount of trade with North Korea.
4. Vietnam data gives total trade, not import and export
5. Polish data does not report countries with import or export share lower than 5%.

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WHY COMMUNISM DIDN’T COLLAPSE:

EXPLORING REGIME RESILIENCE IN CHINA, VIETNAM, LAOS,

This paper is organized as follows. Section I defines what communism was,

Communism: What makes a regime communist? The literature on communism is

What makes a party Communist? At a minimum, to be classified as Communist a

patronage rather than by party-led ideologically-based mass mobilization.19 A final

While a regime needs to implement a Communist doctrine at the point of

A Theory of Communist-Party Rule

Classic communist regimes rule differently from reformed communist regimes.24

The Universe of Cases

Section II: Explaining Regime Collapse

Growth Rates among the 10 Regimes that Collapsed

The Role of Ideology

The other pillar of a communist regime is ideology. Communism as an economic and

Vietnam’s reform experience shows many similarities to that of China. The

Laos, a country alternatively labeled a “feudal-criminal narco-communist state”53

(small businesses, such as private restaurants known as paladares).64 As a result of

As we can see, economic performance has fluctuated across the remaining 5

In Vietnam and Laos nationalism is less strong, as the likelihood of external

In Laos, in the words of a Vientiane intellectual, “Marxism-Leninism, while still

Unlike North Korean or Cuban nationalism, modern-day Chinese nationalism is

Some seedlings of a civil society, such as NGOs, religious organizations, and a

Section IV: Rival Explanations: Contagion, Repression, and Institutional Failure

Theories of contagion have limited usefulness, as they tend to be underspecified. There

Table 1: Chronology of Communist Collapse

A sub-version of the empire thesis is the argument that communism survived in

Table 3: Indigenous v. Imposed Communist Regimes

Table 4: Leadership Generation and Regime Survival

A different type of explanation concerns the willingness of the regime to suppress

We should stress that as coercion is very costly, governments would prefer to

A final set of arguments stresses the institutional rigidity of Communist countries. As

In short, contagion, repression, and institutional theories in their current

Another possible extension of this paper is to the wider group of authoritarian

Appendix: Data Sources

Albania: Albania: A Country Study 1994 (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/albania/al_appen.html, accessed

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