The Holy See in Transnational Governance

Mariano Barbato, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/Universitt Passau, ECPR, Reykjavik 2011

Draft, please do not quote without permission

Abstract There are many religious actors in transnational governance but one of them represents more than one billion people, has an historical record as a political actor, is the only religious actor with a special status to the UN, has full diplomatic relations to most states, acts as a norm entrepreneur on the global public sphere and nevertheless attracts almost no attention from IR scholars: the Holy See. The paper argues that through the study of this actor one can learn how the international society and its diplomacy emerged from European Christendom, that is, how transnational governance became a rather secular enterprise without excluding its religious heritage, being thus open for the importance of religion in the process of globalization. The case of the Holy See can show that religious actors always played a role in the transnational governance of the international society, indeed, this actor ensured that transnational governance was right from the start part of diplomacy. Mainly against this actor the idea of a sovereign state system without transnational aspects was fought for but with very limited success. The analysis starts from the perspective of Hurrells interpretation of the English school and constructivism (2007) which combines the perspective of international relations and global governance with the focus on norms but misses the importance of religious actors for both realms. The paper will use historical and contemporary examples to illuminate the influence of the Holy See on secular state systems as well as on the emerging global public sphere and vice versa. The continuation of these examples will show the endurance of religious actors and transnational governance within the state system and globalization.

Introduction: The Returning of the Pop e in International Relations

The last three decades have seen religion returning from exile back into politics. This return started in the political praxis of world politics with the Iranian Revolution and slowly reached theoretical scholarship on international relations two decades later.1 The Holy See has been returning to international relations at least since World War I and had actually never been completely gone. However, IR scholarship missed this topic more or less completely. In the last years when the return of religion came into focus there was some interest in the Catholic Church but no specific interest in the role of the Holy See.2 The demise of communism was a first opportunity to realize the return of religion and also the crucial impact of the Holy See. It marks a shift of the analysis of change in international relations from capabilities to ideas3, and in this context the role of the Polish pope received some attention. The

1 2

Petito (2003). Casanova's research is most prominent here (Casanova 1994). Charles Taylor's thinking is informed by his Catholic position (Taylor 2009). Huntington (1991) claimed an impact of the Second Vatican Council on the third wave of democratization. 3 Kratochwil (1993).

focus on transnational actors and interdependence from the 1970s4 returned with the spread of globalization and global governance beyond government since the 1990s.5 The Holy See, though taken note of in the debate of the 1970s,6 has not yet reached the governance debate or even the debate about transnational actors.7 The breakthrough for IR scholarship on religion occurred with the attacks of 9/11 which shook the secular foundations of the system of Westphalia.8 The concept of sovereignty was already contested9 when these events showed that the claim from religious sociology that the modern world was not secularized but desecularizing10 made sense and also had an impact on the concept of secularism in international relations.11 Again the Holy See played no role in the central debate around Westphalia, even though in this context the role of the Holy See would be very illuminating.12 Over the last decade, numerous publications were released on secularism as well as on religion.13 Despite the burden of terrorism and the threat of Huntingtons clash of civilization thesis14 becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, scholars form different perspectives managed to avoid both focusing on religion only in the perspective of violence15 and a new cold war.16 In International Relations particularly the study of globalization and governance allowed addressing religion in a broader perspective.17 In this context it was mentioned that the Holy See was very much active in peace politics geared towards avoiding a clash of civilization for instance in preventing notions of crusading in the War of Terror, but no research was focused on this actor. This silence and disinterest of IR scholarship is particularly astonishing as the Holy See is the transnational head institution of one billion people, has an historical record as an eminent political actor, is the only religious actor with a special status to the UN, has full diplomatic relations to almost all states (China and Saudi-Arabia are the only major powers without such ties) and acts as a norm entrepreneur on the global public sphere. The Holy See, literally the cathedra, the chair of St. Peter, means the pope as a person who acts as a sovereign within his church (the Vatican state in addition) and within the international society of states.18 This makes him a very special actor of transnational governance being a religious peer in the society of states and at the same a genuine transnational actor across almost all countries.

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Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1973). Rosenau and Czempiel (1992). 6 Valier (1973). 7 For instance even Risse (1995) has none. 8 Philpott (2002) 9 Gene M. Lyons (1999). 10 See Peter Berger (1999). For the perspective of a global South and the impact on religion including Catholicism see also Philip Jenkins (2007) and Jeffrey Haynes (1994). 11 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008). 12 See Shan and Philpott (2011: 32). 13 See for starters Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008). 14 Huntington (1993). 15 R. Scott Appleby (2000). 16 Juergensmeyer (1993). 17 Haynes (1994, 2007). 18 Arajou (2001).

The message of this paper is very simple. To put it bluntly: Political scientist, pay attention to the pope! Particularly scholars of International Relations interested in the transformation of state systems and of transnational governance should consider the Holy See as a field of research. This paper is very much a work in progress or maybe a kind of research outline, because I considered following this call of importance myself only most recently. I can thus make only primarily remarks to show the importance of this actor, which however persuaded at least myself to start digging deeper into this research issue. The importance of the Holy See which I am trying to highlight is not so much about a terrible powerful influence, in the way Stalin meant his question about the divisions of the pope.19 The focus is primarily on the potential it offers to study change and an eminent actor in the field of transnational governance. Nevertheless, as already Churchill knew the influence of the pope and his legions should not be underestimated either.20 It is a more Arendtian than a Weberian version of power or as Andrew Hurrell put it: Power is, after all, a social attribute. To understand power in international relations, we must place it side by side with other quintessentially social concepts as prestige, authority, and legitimacy.21 Hurrell adds a quote of Martin Wight to drive this point home against the flawed power concept of realism: Power is not self-justifying; it must be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond itself, and thus be transformed into authority.22 The Holy See is such an authority from which transnational governance can gain legitimacy, both by referring to it and by its participation as a genuine transnational actor. Actually, claiming to be the Vicar of Christ, the Holy See understands itself as the highest spiritual authority on earth legitimized by heaven. While there is no longer a direct claim to political power, this self-conception has indirect political consequences. Less controversially, the Holy See's authority is based on its influence on more than one billion Catholics who believe in the special status of the Holy See full-heartedly or at least in principle, and who are addressable in many political questions and even when push comes to shove.23 Moreover, the authority of the Holy See is based on the ability to engage and persuade secular thinkers as well as adherents of other religions.24 One does not need to believe in the Vicar of Christ to understand that a monarchical figure whose soft power addresses more than one billion people directly and has an impact to adherence of other believes might have something to say to remaining billions, even more so as the Catholic Church managed to keep up with the population growth in the Global South. Thus, it is very astonishing that this actor attracts almost no attention as there would be a lot to tell and talk about. To make good on these claims, the paper addresses in a first step the silence of IR on the Holy See. The secular perspective of IR has already problems to overcome its general distance to religion, and the Holy See might be of a particular embarrassment. It is difficult to engage with a literature which
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How many divisions has the pope?, Stalin famously asked to downplay the papal influence on world politics. 20 Troy (2010:492-493). 21 Hurrell (2007: 38) 22 Wight (1991: 99) quoted after Hurrell (2007: 38). 23 Not all Catholics support equally the Holy See's positions on capital punishment, abortion, war, and social justice, particularly in the US there seems to be a gulf between these supportive in the first two and those in the second two issues. 24 On the funeral of John Paul II not only a huge crowed participated in Rome and maybe two billion saw it via television, also a huge number of chief of states and religious leader attended it, thus reflecting the huge impact particularly this pontiff had on global politics. See George Weigel (2010: 392-393).

almost ignores the issue. In a first step, the paper refers to the few articles which address the Holy See. To integrate the Holy See in the center of the debate of transnational governance, Hurrells illuminating work on global values, order and agency will be used. As typical, Hurrell's work ignores religion almost and the Holy See completely, however, its argumentation about the shifts and simultaneous persistence of pluralism, solidarism, and global governance based theoretically on constructivism and the English School provides a suitable framework for analysis. In a second step the Holy See is analyzed in its structure as an transnational actor which has 1) a territorial base (the Vatican state) but cannot be reduced to it, 2) is accepted as a sovereign and special peer among states in diplomatic respects, and 3) has a power base of one billion faithful almost all over the world with not only a territorial structure of dioceses but also with a canonical law and ethical principles which are meant to constitute order above and on the fundaments of the states as well as on a global public sphere. A third section deals with historical turning points which show that the analysis of the Holy See can not only increase insight into an interesting actor but also shed some light on crucial turning points of the development of international relations. The Holy See was always engaged in international relations being so the salt to refer to the biblical metaphor which turns international relations into transnational governance. In two subsections the structural importance of this actor is illustrated by examples on the issue of war, peace and revolution in the context of the Cold War and by crucial events in the emerging global public sphere such as the UN-Conference on World Population in Cairo and the speech about reason, religion, and violence Benedict XVI delivered in Regensburg. Many other examples ranging from efforts to support and shape the integration of Europe to prevent war between Argentina and Chile on the Beagle Canal to the more general influence on many Catholic peace and development NGOs, large scale and grassroots, on the ground have to be left out but put an emphasis on the claim of the importance of more research in that area.

The Holy See and IR debates

IR Journals increasingly cover papers on religion, but in the last decades almost no articles,25 as far as I can see, have been devoted to the Holy See. International Organization had in 1971 a paper by Ivan Vallier on the Catholic Church as a transnational actor which dealt primarily with the Holy See26 and which was also published in Keohane and Nyes book on world politics and transnational relations.27 This article tells the story of a dynamic actor, and indeed, a lot of things. Otherwise, however, the Holy See was debated only on the margins, if it was touched at all. The path breaking work of Richard Falk, for instance, devoted a whole section to Hans Kng, the suspended Catholic theologian, and his noble but rather elitist project of world ethos, but makes only some rather margins remarks about the pope with a negative timbre.28 Since the 1970s, some articles in Law journals appeared: a rather normative paper in the Columbian Law Journal argues fiercely for the exclusion of the Holy See from the UN as a permanent observer.29 There is also a paper in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 30 and some articles in in Catholic law journals.31 Together with a political science paper in Survival on

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There is one exception which deals directly with the Holy Sees role at the UN Conference in a polemic way I will refer to later. 26 Vallier (1971). 27 Vallier (1972). 28 Richard Falk (2001: 123-142). 29 Abdullah (1996). 30 Bathon (2001). 31 Araujo (2001, 2006).

the Relationship between the White House and the Holy See by a journalist32 and a very short one on papacy in world politics33 this is the bulk of the literature. Thus, Scott Thomas rightly claims that the Holy See is unique among non-states religious organization, but the importance of this legal status for the Vaticans role in international affairs is not widely discussed.34 As far as monographs are concerned Eric O. Hansens book from 1987 seems to be the only book from a political scientist. Unfortunately, the reprint from 2006 has no update.35 In German, maybe due to the German pope Joseph Ratzinger, there is one recent introduction available36 and one theory-led book forthcoming.37 Also two recent articles in political science journals are available.38 Of course, there is a vast number of publications on the papacy and politics, however, historians, theologians, and journalist are doing the job. Why are scholars of International Relations not interested? One could only speculate why this is the case.39 Instead of probing further the causes for the near absence of these topics in IR literature I will concentrate on what there would be to talk about and how these topics can be engaged with relevant approaches and literature. As Jack Snyder argued for the analysis of religion in general, realism and liberalism concerned with materialist ends are rather poorly equipped to deal with these issues however both should take note of religion for their very own conceptual reasons.40 Liberal institutionalism could develop an interest in the Holy See as an organization despite of the secular attitude of liberalism, and the IO-Article mentioned above would be a good reference point for such a new beginning.41 The English School with Butterfield and Wight has also a Christian but almost forgotten legacy in this respect.42 However, it might be a good starting point primarily for its interest in rules and norms of pluralist society of states, maybe changing to a more solidarist version. From the perspective on changing constitutive rules of world politics constructivism is the most prominent starting point for such a research agenda. Snyder rightly stated that constructivism in its Wenditan version is nevertheless not interested in religion.43 Scott Thomas has already criticized constructivism for not being well equipped for the analysis of religion and pleaded instead for the English School as a point of reference for this task.44 However, constructivism is more than Wendt. On this opposite side of the constructivism spectrum, which Karin Fierke termed consistent in contrast to Wendtian conventional constructivism,45 is the place where the interest of religion can be found. From this constructivist point of view but naming it soft constructivism vs. rule orientated constructivism and based mainly in Nick Onuf's thinking, Vendulka Kublkov developed her approach of International Political Theology.46 Friedrich Kratochwil together with Nick Onuf, the other founder of the consistent version
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Franco (2010). Shelledy (2004) 34 Thomas (2000a: 99). 35 Eric O. Hanson (1987). 36 Rotte (2007) 37 Sommerecker (2011/forthcoming). 38 Jodok Troy (2010), Kallscheuer (2005). 39 Jenkins' notion of anti-catholicism as the last prejudice comes to mind and gets some credibility when reading Neals article. Philip Jenkins (2003), (Neals 1998). 40 Jack Snyder (2011:7-14, 17-19). 41 Jack Snyder (2011: 18-19). 42 Dunne (1998). 43 Jack Snyder (2011: 14-18). 44 Thomas (2000b) 45 Fierke (2010: 183-190). 46 Kubalokova (2000:677).

of constructivism, contributed widely to this debate on religion in world politics with a specific focus of the historical and conceptual co-constitution of the political and the religious sphere.47 A focus on the historical process of communities and societies reproducing and changing themselves and others by their rule guided praxis, which is offered by the English School and consistent constructivism, is one good starting point in the theory of International Relations to focus on the impact of religion on international affairs. The work of Andrew Hurrell combines the tradition of the English school and the insights of constructivism48 to debate fragmented developments from a pluralist to a solidarist society of states and global governance including both states and transnational actors. Thus, Hurrell offers one of the most interesting approaches on global politics, particularly regarding the fundamental changes of the constitutive rules of the international society of states and the emerging global governance structure. Hence, Hurrells framework of pluralist, solidarist and global governance elements of the current world order is chosen here to provide the conceptual tool of the analysis. His approach enables to make the argument of the importance of the Holy See in transnational governance instead of debating the Holy See at the margins of IR scholarship where it is currently reduced to appear. The Holy See as an international actor is integrated in the pluralist concept of the international anarchical society of states. From its internal ideational setting the Holy See has a straightforward solidarist perspective, focusing as the Vicar of Christ not only on the faithful on each countrys soil but speaking to all mankind on earth. Nevertheless, the Holy See is well aware that some elements of the liberal solidarist view are strongly at odds with its perspective of what the foundations of rules of global solidarism should be. The Holy See is also attentive towards to the plurality of solidarist versions in general. Secular liberalism, as a child of Christian universalism, has the same global ambition as any Christian or Muslim interpretation of the world. Each gospel is meant for everyone. Global solidarist projects are thus not only in contestations with pluralism, but with other solidarists. Charles Taylor made this point particularly clear in a debate with Habermas arguing that, say Kantians are not more or less universal in scope of their claims than Catholics.49 Despite this pluralist perspectives on overarching solidarist narratives it is obvious that a kind of overlapping consensus to use the Rawlsian term has to be found to deal with global problems, or to put it in Hurrells words: global governance is best understood as a response to the increasingly serious collective action problems generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic interdependence.50 It is here that the transnational governance perspective comes to the fore. Crucially, Hurrell argues that the state loses its place as the privileged sovereign institution and instead becomes one of many actors and one participant in a broader and more complex social and legal process.51 States alone are not capable to deliver results on a global scale. Transnational actors are needed, too. The Holy See is in the center of these problems because it is the only actor which is part of the society of states but also runs across all states because its church structure includes faithful from any nation. In addition, it develops and strengthens diplomatic and transnational ties to states and other transnational actors with the clear agenda of fostering global politics and a common agency of mankind. Hence, the Holy See is of a high relevance as an analytical focus for these changes.
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Kratochwil (2005) Barbato/Kratochwil (2009) Hurrell (2007: 12, 17). 49 Taylor (2011). 50 Hurrell (2007: 15). 51 Hurrell (2007: 7).

Hurrells book, however, has a typical IR secular Western bias. Religion appears only at the margins in the contexts of nationalism, identity, terrorism52 and the problem of human rights vis vis a backward religious majority.53 His focus follows completely the secular legacy: Since at least the end of the eighteenth century, Western understandings of social order have been structured around the relationship between three domains: the state, the market, and civil society.54 His secular outlook is already problematic for the West and insofar as a global order should be discussed it clearly lacks religion.55 Although Hurrell gives no hints one might guess that he subsumes religion under civil society. However, even such an approach would actually find its challengers on the basis of Hurrells very own point of view. Is religion just one issue of public interest actors of civil society or is it constitutive for the whole arrangement of state, market and civil society? Hurrells statement tracing the trias of state, market and civil society back to the 17th century can be understood as a yes to this question, as the order emerging from the 17th century is understood as a secular one in contrast to the religious informed order before. If religion is returning, the whole arrangements will be touched. Philpott and Shane are talking about mainstreaming religion to show the general problem.56 Secularism, as Talal Assad57 or more in particularly for IR Elizabeth Shakman Hurd58 had argued, made a specific arrangement of the state, market, and civil society which is about to change if religion develops an increasing impact. Hurrells whole concern is about changing patterns of constitutive rules and values of the global order, and he makes the point that conflicting values and on unequal power59 are in the core of his interest. In line with constructivist and English school thinking norms are central to understanding the power to mobilize, to justify, and to legitimize action.60 There is no doubt about it that religious communities with their beliefs and their practices are the key entrepreneurs of norms. One of these global conflicts about values is the contestation of secularism directed on the unequal power of the West. However, Hurrell misses this point altogether. Thus, Hurrell provides a perfect research agenda to integrate religion and its impact on constitutive rules and changes but falls short because of a secular bias to do this himself. Of more specific importance for the research agenda here Hurrell can serve as a starting point for two distinction empirical questions to be dealt with in the next two sections. The first one is about the characteristics of the Holy See as international actor concerning the aspect of sovereignty over territory, the acceptance as a peer among states with or without territory, and the role as the transnational leader of more than one billion faithful all over the world. Hurrells focus on the Westphalian settlement can serve as a starting point to address this position of the Holy See in the realm of international relations. Based on the eminent work of Alexander Osiander which, however, tackles the Holy See only at the margins,61 Hurrell has a sober understanding of the Westphalian myth concerning sovereignty as well as the right to intervene for religious minorities but ignores also the impact of the Westphalian Treaty on the Holy See.62 The interesting point here is that the secular
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Hurrell (2007:139). Hurrell (2007:158). 54 Hurrell (2007:6). 55 Barbato/Kratochwil (2009). 56 Jack Snyder (2011: 19). 57 David Scott (2006). 58 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008). 59 Hurrell (2007: 10). 60 Hurrell (2007:18). 61 Andreas Ossiander (2001). 62 Hurrell (2007: 55).

impact of the end of the Thirty Years War on the Holy Sees influence was indeed very costly, actually much more than the shrinking influence of the emperor. However, in contrast to the emperor who in 1806 lost his Holy Roman Empire and after World War I vanished as emperor of Habsburg Reich like his Prussian-German counterpart, the Holy See managed to survive these changes and challenges and to adopt its position to the territorial as well as to the nation states society. Thus I will argue that with the Holy See the pluralist society of states never lost its solidarist rudiments completely and was always open for aspects of global governance understood as transnational governance. With his focus on the simultaneous relevance of pluralism, solidarism, and global governance, Hurrell provides also the starting point for the next sections question on the influence of the Holy See in international relations. While the empirical section before argued that the Holy See is already interesting for just being around, this section argues the Holy See is important for what it does, taking its role in the Cold War and in the debates about an emerging public sphere as examples. It is worth quoting Hurrells central points about pluralism, solidarism and global governance in length to get the starting point for this argument: There is a political as well as a legal and moral reality to solidarist and transnational norms and, even on purely pragmatic grounds, states need to justify their actions in terms of those norms and to seek the legitimacy from those international bodies that are the repositories and developers of those norms. But, on the other side, a state-based pluralism continues to play a fundamental role in the political, legal, and normative structure of contemporary international society. [] We are therefore not dealing with a vanished or vanishing Westphalian world, as much transformationist writing suggests, but rather with a world in which solidarist and cosmopolitan conceptions of governance coexist, often rather unhappily, with many aspects of the old pluralist order.63 [I]t is not enough simply to lay out a view or a vision of where we think the world ought to be heading, however sophisticated and well-argued it may be and however attractive it is to us and those like us. Rather, the task is to think very hard about conditions under which moral principles and moral ideas can be meaningful and persuasively defended, justified, and criticized within global society as a whole. [] I suggest that three conditions are of fundamental importance: moral accessibility, institutional stability, and effective political agency.64 To engage this with the Holy See, it is striking how much the papacy has moral accessibility, institutional stability and effective political agency. The Holy See is the most centralized elite of a very established, sophisticated kind of global solidarism which is particularly powerful on the ground with more than one billion faithful and an audience beyond its flock. Thus, it becomes clear that the cosmopolitan blue print has to be engaged on a pluralistic basis with those which are already there to foster transnational governance. There is a very pluralist society of transnational solidarist actors alongside with the pluralist society of states. The papacy forms a powerful part of both, and both are engaged in global governance. From a straightforward secular perspective, the moral accessibility might be challenged, adding wrongs the papacy did or failed to prevent in the past to the very recent history of dealing with child abuse in the church. However, this is a biased picture. For instance, the UN general secretary Ban Ki-moon made clear that religious leaders are crucial for motivating

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Hurrell (2007: 9) Hurrell (2007:12)

people.65 Their moral is much more accessible for most inhabitants of the planet even if this seems hard to imagine or concede for those only familiar with the secular version of Enlightenment. This affects also the question of stability and agency. Some religious institutions exist since millennia and their political agency seems to be more effective then secular ideologies or rational self-interest to motivate people to change their behavior. What is true for religious actors in general is particularly the case as far as the Holy See is concerned. The rise of religion replaced communism as a challenging idea of how to organize the world as a purely secular cosmopolitan liberal project. In contrast to the very egalitarian hierarchy of the Muslim world, however, the Holy See has a very centralized and institutional stabilized power. Atatrk managed to abolish the caliphate, Napoleon and Garibaldi failed to do the same with the papacy. Thus, the Holy See as a stable institution has a political agency effective enough to foster its moral accessibility globally more than others. The Holy Sees ambition is higher than to become a chaplain of globalization, which it probably already is, but to shape its very constitutive rules. The Holy See has developed a clear teaching on morality aiming at everyone and a clear understanding that global problems have to be addressed globally within global political structures, ranging from the 1960s encyclical Pacem in Terris of John XXIII to the encyclical Caritas in Veritate in 2009 of Benedict XVI concerning globalization directly. In addition, the papacy developed an agenda of how to lead one billion Catholics globally in a world church without a state like apparatus to force them to obey. The Holy See continuously addresses the political scene, leaving much room for maneuver in some aspects, however almost none in others. The Holy Sees political agency is not always successful but always vocal. It is prepared to challenge other global projects from preemptive war to contraception. Thus, the cosmopolitan project of dealing with global issues and creating a global solidarist community has in the Holy See a counterpart that is doing the same, sometimes as a partner, sometimes as a challengers or a competitor. Thus, the Holy See is acting as part of the pluralist, the solidarist and the global governance order and as a major player in the debates of constitutive rules of the global public sphere. The Holy See has to be studied to understand the ongoing change from pluralist, solidarist and global governance perspectives, and because the Holy See itself constitutes a unique international actor who has to be perceived in the center of transnational governance. The next sections will focus on the institutional uniqueness of the Holy See to understand its ability to adjust and shape changing political orders that is what it is as well his agenda in world politics in illustrating cases that is what it does.

The Holy See: Vatican State, diplomacy and the Church

The Economist suggested that the Holy See should declare itself as the world largest nongovernmental organization.66 It is true that the Holy See, the Santa Sede of St. Peter, means the pope himself and not the Vatican state as sometimes is falsely argued or the Catholic Church. The pope as a person has the status of an international legal person. Thus, one has to ask why the pope as a person is granted such a legal status. The special status of the Holy See has been developing since the Medieval Ages. It had some setbacks and crises when the Papal State was conquered first by troops of the French Revolution in 1798, then by Napoleon in 1808 and finally by Italy in 1870. Since the end
65

Referring to the problems of climate change while addressing an audience of major faith groups, Ban Kimoon urged these religious leaders to use their persuasive power to convince people. We have know-how and resources but the only vacuum is political will, that is all that is lacking. You can provoke, challenge and inspire political leaders. *+ Your potential impact is enormous. You are the leaders who can have the longest, widest and deepest reach." Quoted in http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/03/ban-ki-moon-religiousclimate-change 66 Economist (2007).

of World War I, the Holy See has started to flourish again. After World War II and with the decolonization of the world it gained an observer status at the UN and memberships with some UN Organizations, and also developed relations to almost all states. The Lateran Treaties which established the Vatican State in 1929 helped to develop this status, although it does not depend on it. The pope is the sovereign in the church and in the Vatican state. The global power and prestige of the pope is based on its role as leader of the Catholic Church and not on its role as the monarch who acts as a sovereign of the tiny Vatican City. The diplomatic relations of the society of states are with the Holy See and not with the Vatican State. Thus, the Holy See is not a non-governmental organization but actually head of a very specific governmental organization. The Holy See does not only govern a small state, it governs the Church. It is accepted as equal among sovereign states and is as such part of global governance processes. The role of the head of the Catholic Church might be seen as equal to a CEO of a multinational company or to the Executive Director of Oxfam, equal in structure but larger in seize. However, canonical law, which is different to state law, international law and religious laws, as it claims not only superior status to state law but also has a centralized full-fledged juridical system with the pope as its highest judge, makes the church also unique among transnational actors, even among religious ones. It has its own validity and is not derived from International Private Law as do multinationals and NGOs. The Holy See makes moreover an additional claim, which reaches beyond the usual interests that representatives of states or transnational actors have. The Holy See understands itself as the Vicar of Christ and, going back to pagan times of Rome, as the Pontifex Maximus, the builder of bridges. As such the papacy sees itself as responsible for the whole world and gives regularly advice in his social teachings to all people of good will. The papacy does not claim a political rule over the world as it did at some points during the Medieval Ages, however, the annual Easter blessing urbi et orbi, for the city and the world, makes it clear how far reaching its impact is meant to be. Thus, it is a unique trans-governmental and transnational, global actor. To understand its unique institutional structure and the specific impact which drives out of it for the global order it seems in order to clarify how much its governmental structure has to do with a state, what kind of role the papacy plays diplomatically in the international society of states, and what impact its leadership of the Catholic Church has. Territory the Vatican State In 1929 the Holy See and Italy agreed on the Lateran Treaty and established the Vatican State in the Vatican City, a very small territory in Rome around St. Peter which is named after the Vatican Hill, a name going back to Romes pagan times. This agreement made an end to almost 60 years since the fall of the Papal State in which the Pope understood himself as a prisoner in the Vatican, which however never was his position. Instead in this period without territory and in hostile environment of secular liberalism, the papacy managed to strengthen its global role as a transnational actor particularly through the internationalization of the church. The incoming fascist regime of Mussolini in Italy agreed on the Treaty because it sought to use the reputation the Papacy had in Italy and worldwide to gain legitimacy for itself. Thus the Vatican State has to be understood as a product of the Holy Sees eminent role, not the other way round. The territory of the Papal State, dating back to the mists of the early medieval donation of Pipin in the 8th century, was much larger than the newly created Vatican State. It included the whole center of the Italian Peninsula. It saw times of a central government which some understand as a prototype 10

of modern statehood.67 However, it was in decline since decades before the Italian troops made an end to it in 1870. Moreover, it should be clear, that the Papal State even in its heydays gave the Holy See just a kind of territorial power base as the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire had at his familys homeland but the popes political power never has been reduced to a monarch over central Italy. If the papacy was too much focused on the Papal State, its universal role was under risk to be lost. The popes political power was based on its ability to command the Church and via this ambition to influence the political sphere. The surrender of the Papal State can be seen as a breakthrough for the rise of the modern papacy as a global actor. Nevertheless, the territory had its function to guarantee a certain kind of independence from other rulers. To that extent, the Lateran Treatys creation of the Vatican City State supports the international and independent role of the Holy See, as the medieval role of the papacy was based on the Papal State. The legally undisturbed territorial integrity since the Lateran Treaty and particularly the practical freedom from pressure after the end of Fascism in Italy and German occupation of Italy after the end of World War II, secured the Holy See the energy and agency to act more freely on the international scene without worrying about being pressured at its doorstep. The integrity of its territory gives the pope a kind of territorial reference point to its independence. However, it should be clear that even in comparison with the declined Papal State the Lateran Treatys Vatican state of today is just a shadow of the old statehood and with no full-fledged state-like impact of its power on territory and population and thus a rather symbolic capacity: the Swiss Guard needs support from the Italian police and even the Vatican post with its beautiful stamps is actually a Swiss enterprise. The Euro coins with the Popes portrait are more or less collectors items only but nevertheless leave a footprint on the European currency. The pope reigns as sovereign monarch over the Vatican city but the Papal State of yore and state sovereignty, understood as the ability to enforce its rule by means of power, including military power, have been lost with the capitulation of the last Papal troops, an international brigade of Catholics called Papal Zouaves, to the Italian troops of Garibaldi in September 1870. But the smallness of the state territory and the very limited state power of the Vatican state of today do not reduce the impact of the Holy See on the international scene. The Holy Sees diplomatic status in the world of territorial states is underlined with this symbolic territory. But its diplomatic status drives from the person of the pope who is only additionally the monarch of a small city state. The Holy See, to use a common phrase, acts from within the Vatican State, it is not reduced to the Vatican State. Diplomacy the pope as peer in the society of states The Holy Sees status as a sovereign international actor depends foremost on the willingness of the other sovereign international actors to accept the pope and its curia as a peer. This was always the case at least for some states, even in its weakest moments without any territorial command. This development has a long legacy in the feudal time of Europe and developed with state diplomacy in the 16th century. The Holy Sees status was special insofar as it was understood to have both spiritual and temporal powers. Temporal powers understood as its very own interests like that of any other monarch were supplemented by an understanding of intertwined spiritual and temporal power with a highly political impact. Thus, amongst other things the pope legitimatized otherworldly powers and acted as a mediator or a kind of referee. This role had a global reach as the pope supported the division of the world between his most loyal kings, the king of Spain and the king of Portugal, in the Treaty of Tordesillas. As mentioned above in the context of Hurrells approach, the Treaty of
67

Michael Mitterauer (2003: 152-234).

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Westphalia was in respect to the role of the pope in international affairs more than the myth of secularization. Referring to secularization as differentiation and pointing to the pressure this puts on the papacy as an overwhelming structure of international relations, Timothy Samuel Shan and Daniel Philpott quote Pope Innocent X who condemned the treaties as null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time.68 The pope was just left out. The legal acceptance of non-catholic denominations within the Holy Roman Empire weakened his role as a spiritual and political leader dramatically. Nevertheless, soon after he was back in business, particularly in his contribution to the defense against the Ottoman threat to Europe. However, the influence in Protestant states was void and the ideas of the Enlightenment and absolutism marked a time of decline also in Catholic states. In 1773 pope Clemens XIV could no longer resist the pressure from the European states to close the Societas Jesu, the Jesuits, because of their transnational influence and their state-like reservations for the indigenous population in South America (Paraguay). The Jesuits with their special vow of obedience to the pope were one of the actors which fostered the transnational agency of the pope from Europe to America and China. It is interesting to see that the Jesuits survived in Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia because their rulers just refused to publish the enforced papal letter. The secularization as differentiation during the Reformation and the schism with the Orthodox Church were thus supportive for the papal Jesuits against the pressure of Enlightenment secularization. Anyway, this illustrates that already at the eve of the French Revolution, the papal influence in the society of states was waning. The decline of the popes power was certainly most manifest after the first surrender of the papal state to French troops of the Revolution, being prisoner of Napoleon (Pius VI) and then his extra at the coronation scene (Pius VII). However in the Vienna Congress, the papal nuncio was the dean of the diplomatic corps, a role the nuncio has today in one third of the countries which have one. The 19th century brought finally the end of the Papal State, however, as discussed above, not the end of the Holy See's status as an international actor. Even in the difficult time of conflict with Italy and with no territory of its own the Holy See had diplomatic relations with other states. However, its diplomatic international impact was limited. In World War I, Pope Benedict XVs call for peace had no impact at all.69 However Pope Pius XII has been harshly criticized for being too cautious in his struggle against Nazi-Germany, a critique which started prominently with a German theatre play in which a German dramaturge blamed the silent pope for not being more outspoken in its damnation of Germany.70 The papacy, even if not successful directly during the First World War, had nourished the expectations of the international public. This was particularly the case, as we will see in the next section, because the Catholic Church not only survived the French Revolution but flourished globally like never before. After World War II, the papacy was in the position to settle its position in Italy by supporting the rule of the Christian Democrats and the prevention of the communists from power. Right from the start, the pope was a cold warrior against communism. Even before America accepted Kennans advice the pope had containment on his agenda.71 Despite close ties with the United States in this perspective full diplomatic relations with the Nation under God had to wait until 1984 as one commentator noted anti-catholicism was stronger than anti-communism.72 However the bulk of other nations was less reluctant. The young independent states of the former colonial emperies were ready to have diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Today the Holy See has diplomatic ties with almost all
68 69

Philpott (2011:32). Pollard (1999). 70 Conway (1965). 71 Jodok Troy (2010: 501). 72 Frank J. Coppa (2008).

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countries Malaysia is the most recent new country with diplomatic relations since July 2011. China is the big player who refuses the diplomatic offers of the Holy See. However, it is interesting to notice that the Holy See is prepared to resist the Chinese governments position to appoint Catholic bishops by itself, a position completely at odds with the current relationship between states and the Holy See globally, but not unfamiliar in European history. Saudi-Arabia, North Korea, Afghanistan and Vietnam are the only major states which have no relations with the Holy See; Vietnam despite of a large and growing Catholic population percentage, Saudi Arabias king Abdallah visited the pope in 2007. Other states with a very small Catholic minority maintain diplomatic ties. Iran, by the way, has never broken its diplomatic relations but has one of the largest corps at its embassy to the Holy See. Moreover, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with the EU and is present as permanent observer to the UN and many other international organizations like the UNESCO, the European Council, the African Union, and the World Trade organization. The Holy See is a full member in OSCE, IAEA, UNCTAD among many others and has a special member status in the Arab League, a position which makes the Holy See certainly unique.73 This uniqueness, however, is missed completely by the economists writer, who suggested a new self-definition of the Holy See in terms of a big NGO. Particularly, the Holy Sees campaign at the UN-Conference on Population and Development made its role at the UN for some very unpopular.74 However, the ties with almost all states of the UN will continue to secure the Holy See its seat at the international table. The Church the Holy See as a transnational leader The internal base of the Holy Sees sovereignty is the Catholic Church and its faithful. Since the 1970ies, when the global population almost doubled, the number of Catholic faithful more than doubled. Almost 20 percent, more than one billion human beings are Catholic and thus, more or less interested in what the pope says. Most of them live in the Global South. Almost 50 percent of them live in the Americas, almost 25 percent in Europe, more than 15 percent in Africa, more than 10 percent in Asia. It is still the West that is Catholic. However taking the population growth and the increase of Catholics together, Vietnam is one of the Catholic key countries. There are no liable figures from China. All global figures on religious data suffer from this one billion black whole, especially as the Catholic Church of China which is loyal to the pope was forced to go underground.75 Of course, keeping the Catholic flock together is often a heavy task for its shepherd who has abandoned the help of watchdogs since the alliance of throne and altar has been broken. Nevertheless, the papacy managed during the 20th century to establish a global reach of coherence which even exceeds that of the Medieval Ages. Stripped of its temporal power, the decision of the papacy lost to a certain degree the odor of this-worldly interest. This does not mean that the papacys decisions were uncontested but that the papacy could defend them on theological grounds. Two events, standing in contrast just at first glance, were crucial: the First und the Second Vatican Council. In Vaticanum I, 1869/70 the papacy managed to install the infallibility of the pope under certain conditions just before his sovereignty over the Papal state was to end. This new dogma strengthened not only the papacys central command in the church but also its visibility and popularity. Of course, those not in favor of this new dogma were not amused, however the ordinary

73

For a full list see the official site of the Vatican: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_seg-st_20010123_holy-seerelations_it.html 74 Abdullah (1996), Neal (1998) 75 Philip Jenkins (2007).

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Catholics under pressure from their secular or protestant state had one more reason to look to Rome for their identity as Catholics. A pilgrimage to Rome became more and more are pilgrimage to the Holy Father and less to the tombs of St. Peter and Paul, not to speak about the seven churches each medieval pilgrim had to visit if he or she wanted to be a real Rome pilgrim. The global expansion beyond the Americas happened during the time of European imperialism which brought also the Catholic faith to parts of Africa and Asia which it had not reached before. All this happened under a papacy which was stripped of its this-worldly powers and thus could represent the heavenly power much better. The pope was not concerned with Central Italy but with the globe. The second event, the second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, was in many respects the complete opposite of the first one.76 This time, the aim was not the building of bastions against the modern world but the breakdown of these bastions and adjustments to the modern world. In perspective of the global power of the papacy, however, the effects were comparable. Admittedly, there is no doubt that the contestations about the interpretations of the outcome of the councils were very rough. The different strands of Catholicism, not only in the West but also in the global South, particularly liberation theology which spread from Latin America all over the Catholic world, were no easy to integrate in the teaching of the papal church. However, Pope John Paul II and his cardinal Ratzinger managed to contain the spread of Marxist thoughts while still securing the option of the poor77 in the teaching of the church. This contestation brought the papacy a very bad press but, given the fall of communism five years after the controversial decisions, everything else would have embarrassed the Church even more. The most crucial aspect of the Second Vatican Council from a political perspective was its decision to favor democracy and religious freedom over an authoritarian but Catholic rule. Bishop Lefebvre disagreed with this adjustment and separated himself and some supports from the church in a community which is now known as the Pius Brothers. On the other side, Huntington stated in his analysis of a third wave of democratization that this wave had a clear Catholic impact deriving from the decisions of the council in favor of democracy.78 In the long pontificate of John Paul II, despite of ongoing critique not only from the liberal West, the Holy See managed to combine social teaching in favor of the poor, liberal and democratic attitudes towards democracy, a conservative stand in theology and a centralization of juridical and administrative powers. The compendium of the canonical law, the Codex Iuris Canonici of 1917, was reviewed in 1983 and in 1992 a new catechism of the church followed. Different to the Sharia, these codes are not understood to become directly the law of the land but they are meant to renew the established juridical system of the church in the case of die Codex Iuris Canonici and to function as a guide for believers but also as the moral back bone of politics in the case of the catechism. The Codex is particularly interesting insofar as it provides the legal structure of the relationships within the church to its central leadership in the Vatican. Particularly, the relationships with the bishops heading the dioceses all over the world and their appointments by the pope are of relevance to understand the centralized global impact of the Holy See. In the case of the catechism the impact is less direct but even larger. While some moral judgments are understood to be not negotiable and it is the duty of every Catholic to defend them, it is not allowed to use religion for party politics, as was the critique against liberation theology and other political theologies. For instance, there is some room for interpretation in the just war question, however there is almost none in questions of abortion or euthanasia. Catholic politicians and citizens/voters are called to accept these guidelines as binding,
76 77

Stefan Nacke (2010). Option for the poor means that the church has to be side by side with the poor. 78 Samuel P. Huntington (1983).

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excommunication as in the debate of Senator Kerry might become a public issue with impact on the political results. Different to Vaticanum I the church does no longer emphasize its role as a societas perfecta. The one true Church as Robert Bellarmine put it in 1588, is no longer visible and palpable as the Kingdom of France or the republic of Venice.79 The Second Vaticanum speaks about the church as sharing the joys and sorrows of the people, stressing the closeness to the concerns of the current situation that the faithful are in. However its spiritual self-understanding about Gods will and the task of the church and particularly the task of the papacy and its infallibility fosters an understanding which sees the church not as a part of the civil society but as constitutive for civil society itself. In the perspective of the emerging of a global public sphere the papacy and the church see itself as genuine actors. Unlike other transnational actors the church understands itself as constitutive for human society and not just as part of human society. Notwithstanding the readiness to cooperate with all people of goodwill and being prepared to accept competing solidarist views and a pluralistic society of states and beliefs, the spiritual dimension of Gods will is the bottom line of the churchs conception of itself and of its service to the people as the constitutive force of social rules and conduct. This idea is common to many religious actors and separates them from other public interest actors within civil society. However, no religious entity has mastered to project this idea at such a scale, measured in the number of faithful, and in such quality, measured by the standard of a coherent set of rules administered by one coherent body of final interpretation. This player seeks to constitute also the political rules of the global polis and has influence and power enough to participate in this contest. Apart from analyzing what this actor is doing, the focus on what this actor is brings a lot of insights to the changes of world politics. Global Neo-Medievalism since Westphalia: The Holy Sees agency in World Politics Hedley Bull coined the term of a new medievalism based on the medieval condition of the contestations about the different rule over people not unified by a territory but by overlapping functional spheres of influence.80 Jrg Friedrichs emphasized the neo-medieval analogy between the dichotomy of politics and church (emperor and pope) then and politics and global economy now.81 The analogy is fruitful, however, I suggest that religion and the pope where not replaced but supplemented by economic actors. As traders and vendors were already powerful players particularly during the first beginning of modernity from the Italian Medici to Southern German Fugger and Welser, the papacy is also part of the game in Westphalian world politics. The neomedieval changes of globalization strengthen a post-medieval papacy which was never out of business. Even the age of the nation state which divided its faithful into belligerent enemies like never before with the devastating World War in which Catholic Europeans fought on both sides has been survived by the papacy. The neo-medieval transnational conditions are much more in line with the character of the Holy See calling for solidarity of the rich with the poor and fighting and convincing competitors along religious and ideological grounds. Being part of the plurarist society of states and having the church as its power base, the Holy Sees teaching makes it a global player who acts as a norm entrepreneur strong enough to lend legitimacy to projects of global governance and withdraw it. The struggle about a solidarist foundation of global politics had its rather narrow limits during the Cold War as both sides had completely different ideas about what a solidarist globe should look like. The papacy was prepared to engage with its own agenda in this struggle. After its victory over communism the Holy See sees its version of solidarism entangled with at least two other ones, the secular version of liberalism and the religious version of Islam. The papacys course on this is to be prepared to contest both parties but being able to make coalitions with both of them to
79
80

Robert Bellarmine, De Controversiis (1588) 15

Hedley Bull (1995: 254-271). 81 Friedrichs (2001).

support its own agenda or rebuff others. However the Holy See made it very clear in its teaching that he is very supportive of the aspect of a global coming together. It is completely in line with the spiritual dimension of one world under God and the transnational aspect of faithful in each state. The last encyclical of Benedict XVI added this spiritual dimension of globalization explicitly: Mans earthly activity, when inspired and sustained by charity, contributes to the building of the universal city of God, which is the goal of the history of the human family. In an increasingly globalized society, the common good and the effort to obtain it cannot fail to assume the dimensions of the whole human family, that is to say, the community of peoples and nations [..], in such a way as to shape the earthly city in unity and peace, rendering it to some degree an anticipation and a prefiguration of the undivided city of God.82 This is one solidarist version of the globalization project. The Holy See is prepared to create common agency for global and transnational governance on a pluralist bases. However, the contestation as to who will draw the solidarist bottom line and seize the middle ground is just getting started.83 Cold Warrior: Waging the Cold War, constraining it and winning it by revolution The Holy Sees political agency was powerful well before the neo-medieval age of globalization. The Cold War serves here as an example to illustrate this.84 The Holy See was in the forefront of the Cold War right from the start. As mentioned above, to some extent one could argue that the papacy waged it before the US joint. Churchill, for instance joined him explicitly in combating communism.85 The Holy See certainly helped the West during the initial phase, it helped however also to constrain the Cold War, particularly in the Cuba Crisis, and it was crucial to end it through revolution. Religion played an underestimated role in the Cold War.86 Pius XII was a straightforward anticommunist right from the start, however he was fully aware of the problem of a nuclear war and thus focused on containment policy rather to advocate for the roll back policy. With John XXIII a seminal figure of peace appeared on the scene and during the Cuban missile crisis also on the front pages of the Soviet official newspaper Pravda. John Paul II is one of the historical figures without whom the end of communism might not have happened the way it did. It is not the place for an in-depth analysis here. However, my crucial point is that while the Cold War is present in every IR text book and shaped the whole theorizing of IR scholarship, the role of the Holy See is at the margins or completely out of focus. In three snapshots here I can only offer first clues to the importance of the three popes and their transnational action which shaped the course of the Cold War. The story of the Holy See in the Cold War can be told in terms of strategic interest and alliances. For the Holy Sees assessment of communism the obvious factor was its uncompromising anti-religious and atheistic stand. Thus the USSR could be understood as a kind of natural enemy of the Holy See, even more so than secular liberalism or fascism. However, from a constructivist point of view being interested in the constitutive rules which shaped the identity of the actor one should not miss the spiritual dimension, particularly as the natural story line got supernatural support from a distinct narrative. For the Cold War and also the Second World War the epic struggle of Communism and
82

Benedict XVI (2010). Before 9/11 there was a conservative American call for the global jihad of all faithful Muslim, Jews, and Christian. See Peter Kreeft (1996). After 9/11 jihad has become associated with terrorism. Such shifts show the solidarist coalitions of the global village to form a global polis are still in the making. 84 Jonathan Luxmoore (1999). 85 Frank J. Coppa (2008: 149). 86 Dianne Kirby (2003).
83

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Catholicism had a Marianist metaphysic narrative: the message of Fatima.87 A Marian apparition set already before the October revolution the course for the spiritual combat against communism and fascism, warning of a spread of falsities from Russia which would cause massive trouble and a second war even more devastating than the ongoing world war. The rosary and some other pious rituals along with a conversion of the heart should win the struggle. The message of Fatima formed the background for the political actions of both Pius XII and John Paul II. In contrast to Pius XII and John Paul II, the Fatima story was less important for John XXIII. When confronted with the third secret he refused to open it and sent it back to the archive. The attempted assassination of John Paul II in 1981, however, was interpreted by John Paul himself as forecasted and prevented by the intervention of the Virgin Mary. He brought the bullet which hit him almost deadly to Fatima and put it in the Virgin Mary statues crown. Both Pius and John Paul acted in their consecration of the world to the immaculate heart of Mary according to their interpretations of the message of Fatima. In both cases the faithful can point to coincidences with turning points of history. After the consecration of 1942 Hitler lost the turning point battles of El Alamein und Stalingrad. After the consecration of 1984 Gorbachev came to power. As I am not interested in causal relationships but on constitutive rules, I do not have to tackle question of metaphysics or superstition. This would be more interesting for a Wendtian agenda how ideas can have causes in the material world.88 Interesting for the research agenda here is that these consecrations were public acts in which not only bishops from all over the world were included but which was also based on a Marian mass-movement with a particular type of devotion like praying the rosary and veneration of statues of the Fatima Virgin Mary that spread all over the world. This anti-communist Fatima narrative provides one of the constitutive rules which hold the Holy See and a global community of faithful all over the world together and keep them on a particular political track. Of course, this was not the only narrative, but one which is so at odds with secular thinking that it is kept almost completely outside the academic discourse,89 but that can be found on Wikipedia and on the margins of the discourse.90 Of course, such a story can be neglected completely in a positivist neorealist discourse, but as soon a constructivist agenda interested in religious notions which constitute a common mind set for social action is put forward, it cannot be ignored on the academic level of political science. This is the background of the diplomatic actions of the Holy See I would like to focus now in three short episodes. Pius XII inherited his anti-communist agenda from his predecessor Pius XI. The Holy See had seen its church prosecuted in Russia from the beginning of the communist rule which was of course openly hostile to the Opium for the Masses as Lenin reformulated the Marxian quote. Thus, Pius XII was reluctant to join an anti-Hitler coalition as the Western allies asked for as long as Stalin would then become his ally, too. Churchills famous quote If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons was not really an option for the pope. He understood Hitler as well as Stalin as forces from hell.91 However, he was prepared to lift the ban on communism insofar as he made a differentiation between the government of a state in defense of its country and communism as such, thus allowing Catholics to participate in the allies support for

87

The Message of Fatima, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message -fatima_en.html 88 Wendt (1999) 89 Even George Weigel (2005), the conservative biographer of John Paul, does not have it. 90 Timothy Tindal-Robertson (1998). 91 In the case of Hitler a very unusual rite of a far distance exorcism has been performed by the pope.

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Stalin. To the Axis-Powers which urged him to join a crusade against communism he said no.92 Particularly after his death, beginning with a theatre play on his silence about Hitler and the Holocaust,93 Pius was criticized for being more aware of the problem of Communism than Nazism. However, right after WWII it was taken as given that he had combatted both enemies of the free West and in the emerging Cold War his anticommunism was very welcomed. As mentioned above, the pope was a cold warrior avant la lettre who understood already Yalta as a Soviet betrayal.94 Thus the US was rather joining pope Pius cold war than the other way round. Despite the popes exclusion from settling the Yalta order, the overwhelming support the papacy gave to the Italian Christian Democrats which ruled the country and kept the communists at bay greatly helped Italy, despite its large communist party, to achieve the task of joining NATO and staying within the Western camp. The papacy did not establish the cold war structures and its international order, but it played a crucial part in legitimizing Western efforts to contain Soviet power and delegitimizing any communist backing in the West. When John XIII took office in 1958, times were changing not only for the church but the nuclear stalemate changed the whole scenery of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis which brought the world closest to an atomic war was a decisive moment for both. The well-known Cuban story does not need to be re-told in length. Brinkmanship, contingency, and fortune came together to avoid a possible nuclear overkill. However, the contribution John XXIII made is not told very often. John F. Kennedy, being the first Catholic president of the USA, and his administration might have had to prove to the American public their secular position. Thus, the role of John XXIII is left completely out of this picture and the thanksgiving message of Kennedy to the pope immediately when everything was over on the eve of 28th October 1962 is rather unknown. As Nikita Khrushchev had nothing to prove in this respect, he was much more explicit. Nevertheless, on the 23rd of October, the day the quarantine of Cuba was established, Kennedy contacted Norman Cousin, a Catholic book journalist and peace activist, to ask the pope to intervene. The Holy See agreed. The intervention was signaled by Cousin to the Kremlin via a conference with Soviet Scientist and by the Holy See itself to the Soviet embassy in Italy. After it was well received by Khrushchev, John XIII delivered a speech urging both superpowers for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This speech was globally broadcasted on the 24th of October 1962 and featured by Friday October 26 as the cover story of the official Soviet newspaper Pravda. The papal plea for peace was understood as a possibility to withdraw with less embarrassment. On the October 28 Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the missiles.95 After the crisis, Cousin went to Moscow via Rome taking an oral message from the Holy See to Khrushchev on the 13th of December 1962 asking for the release of the Ukrainian patriarch Josef Slipyi from Siberia. Khrushchev released not only the bishop but asked for a continued communication with the Vatican through private contacts.96 One of the consequences was the visit of Khrushchevs daughter Rada and her husband Alexis Adzhubei, the editor of Izvestia, to John XXIII in 7th March 1963.97 Johns encyclical Pacis in Terra deliberated during the Cuba Crisis and published in 11th April 1963 continued

92 93

Frank J. Coppa (2008: 127-131). If he was really publically too silent and doing not enough or if this was prudent given the Holy See in Rome under German pressure and its efforts to protect Jews is a very controversial debate. 94 Jonathan Luxmoore (1999: xi). 95 Peter Hebbelethwaite (2000: 230-232). 96 Eric O. Hanson (1987: 10-11). 97 Peter Hebbelethwaite (2000: 247-248).

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this policy. The Vatican Ostpolitik of his successor Paul V was created by this pontiff who died in the same year as Kennedy and one year before Khrushchev was driven out of office. The first Slavic pope, John Paul II, the Polish pope from a faraway country as he introduced himself to the Romans, had its own ideas about communism.98 The time for coexistence changed into a time of revolution. John Paul was elected pope in 1978, seven years before Gorbachev came to power. In these seven years his support was crucial for the success of Solidarnod in Poland. He put pressure on the Soviet Union to keep out of Poland and also openly criticized the martial law imposed by general Jaruzelski, supposedly to avoid the Soviet invasion. Before and during martial law, his visits to his homeland, which the communist government could not prevent, made clear that the Polish people were fed up with communism. John Paul fostered their resistance and was able to support Solidarnod through his firm stance towards the communist government but also by being prepared to keep the Polish resistance on a peaceful track. The Polish work for change had not been possible without the Polish pope. The Reagan administration and its anti-communism stand towards the empire of evil saw a strong ally in him. When Gorbachev came to power, the pope addressed him directly in a personal letter to which the General Secretary not only replied but which he took as an opportunity to visit the pope. Weigel who published a book entitled Final Revolution99 about the impact of religion in general and the pope in particular on the revolutionary changes that made possible the end of the Cold War, quoted elsewhere John Gaddis on the popes role in the end of the Cold War. It is worth quoting this at least in an abridged version: Real power rested, during the final decade of the Cold War, with leaders like John Paul II whose mastery of intangibles of such qualities as courage, eloquence, imagination, determination, and faith allowed them to expose disparities between what people believed and the system under which the Cold War obliged them to live *I+t took visionaries saboteurs of the status quo to widen the range of historical possibility.100 Three popes brought the papacy in crucial positions at the beginning, brink and revolutionary end of the cold war. The Holy See supported the West from its beginning, helped to avoid nuclear disaster in the Cuba missile crisis and participated in the policy of dtente. The pope also was a leading figure in the final act of the cold war during the1980s, and the peaceful revolutions, which finally brought about the downfall of the Soviet Union, started in Poland and with its pope. In a secular conflict and in a time of secularization the Holy See thus managed to play a crucial role. Furthermore, the Holy See was able to tell its own spiritual narrative about the cold war in which the Fatima story played a crucial part. All this happened before the so-called return of religion. Actually, at that time communism rather than Catholicism seemed to win the day. But the Holy See not only survived this age of secularization but managed to stay in global politics and even to add its very own stamp on it. The argument here is not that the papacy drove home the cold war by itself. The emphasis is rather on the fact that a crucial conflict for IR had a crucial player which is most of the time not part of the picture. Drawing the bottom line and seizing the middle ground: Cairo and Regensburg During the Cold War the papacy was part of the West but in a unique position. How much so became clear shortly after the Cold War ended. With the end of the Cold War, the questions of war and peace took on another shape. The Holy See was strongly engaged in attempts to avoid both US-led
98 99

The most important biography is from George Weigel. George Weigel (2005, 2010). George Weigel (1992). 100 Gaddis 195-196. See George Weigel (2010: 184).

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wars in Iraq and at several other occasions. Particularly after 9/11 John Paul II did everything to stop the crusade ideology and rhetoric, which the US administration was not free of, and some conservative American Catholics who otherwise admired John Paul took exception to this.101 Nevertheless the idea of a crusade is historically rooted in the papacy. From an orientalist perspective the crusades have to do with the re-conquest of the Holy Land. However, this view is too narrow. The crusades were holy wars of catholic laymen and cleric orders declared by the pope. They started in the earlier medieval era to re-conquer Jerusalem, were later waged throughout Europe against heretics and pagans and had their great secular revivals in the end of the 19th centurys imperialism, which explains why the Arab nations are still very sensitive to the term. Although the Holy See had its competitors to call for a crusade, it is still the papacy which can claim a kind of copyright to call to take the cross.102 Thus, it is crucial that the Holy See developed a pacifistic teaching on the questions of war and is eager to defend its crusade copyright to safeguard any misuse.103 The constitutive rules of the global public sphere are still to be laid down, and this also holds true for the concept of just war with its medieval heritage. The secular human rights discourse is certainly part of the parcel of global constitutive rules, however the arrangements, say, of free speech and insulting believers, as it was the issue in the caricature struggle, have to be renegotiated. Although the Holy See is avoiding a crusading rhetoric it has in some of these arguments a very straightforward position which it is prepared to fight for. The arenas of these disputes vary. The UN is still one of the major fields of this contestation. However, the global media coverage can produce world events out of more random speeches. The virtual forum becomes very real in action on the ground, as the aforementioned example of the caricatures clearly showed. The Holy Sees impact on these debates can be illustrated with two events. One is the UNConference in Cairo 1994 the other is the Regensburg Speech in 2006. The first examples shows how the Holy See was able to form a coalition to prevent the UN and the US Administration to constitute a human right of abortion, which can be understood from the perspective of the Holy See as an action of drawing the bottom line of a global public sphere. The second example was meant to seize a kind of middle ground between secular and relativistic reason on the one hand side and a voluntaristic potentially violent version of religion on the other. Both issues are at the center of the global struggle about constitutive rules of a common public sphere. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart stressed in their widely read book Sacred vs. Secular the point that issues of sexual morals might be one of the dividing lines in the global public discourse.104 The standing thesis of the so called population explosion, termed by Ehrlich,105 is that a high fertility rate will soon eat up literally the benefits of development policy, and that it should thus be prevented for the sake of all. Chinas one-child-policy might be the strongest adaption of this point of view. However, others like Bauman point out that decline in population at home in Europe and America is seen as much as a problem as its increase in the global south,106 thus reflecting a Neo-Malthusian attitude of the few rich in fear of the many poor. Without taking a normative stand, Norris and Inglehart also see a confrontation across such lines. This aspect is embedded in their wider argument
101 102

See for instance his biographer George Weigel (2005). On the history of the crusades and the 19th century see Jonathan Riley-Smith (2005). 103 nd The self-declared crusader who committed the bloodshed of the 22 of July 2011 in Norway was very aware of that, criticizing Benedict XVI for being pacifistic instead of calling for a crusade. 104 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004). 105 Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich (1990). 106 Zygmunt Bauman (2008: 45).

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of secularization and globalization. They argue that religion is still alive despite of global modernization which is at odds with the secularization theory that expected a decline of religion as soon modernization is going its way. Norris and Inglehart argue that a key factor which secularization theory overlooked was that the poor stay religious and thus keep their pre-modern attitude in sexual issues which makes them more fertile than the rich seculars who are declining by numbers because of their unwillingness to accept sexual intercourse as tied up with reproduction. Thus, we have a potential confrontation of the many, religious poor and their concept of sexual identity and the few, secular rich and their notion of sexual freedom.107 This conceptual underpinning might be a bit too simplistic, however there is something to it. Mara Hvistendahl showed for instance most recently how the concept of preventing a population explosion by abortion, contraception and sterilization was forced upon the women of the global south by the US.108 The Cairo Conference was meant to be a hallmark in this respect by formulating abortion as a reproductive health right and as a human right. John Paul II was outraged on this issue.109 He started an unprecedented campaign and wrote a letters to all head of states asking them to reject this agenda.110 His argument was very much in line with Norris and Ingelhardts analysis that reading the draft document of the consensus in advance of the conference leaves the troubling impression of something being imposed: namely a lifestyle typical of certain fringes within developed societies, societies which are materially rich and secularized.111 This rebuff of the Western agenda was echoed by then Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who criticized the Cairo draft document as an attempt to impose adultery, sex education and abortion on the world.112 The papal critique that linked moral arguments of family life with the social argument of a rich North selfishly imposing its agenda of population control on the South instead of changing unjust imbalances worked out. Supporting also civil society groups on national as well as transnational level in taking countermeasures, the Holy Sees delegation to Cairo with the Harvard Law Professor Ann Marie Glendon as its president helped with this typical twin strategy in the background to change the draft documents wording and spirit. The winning CatholicMuslim alliance was crucial for this but it also raised strong emotions. The rather limited IR literature on the Holy See increased by the above mentioned article, which was very critical in the role the Holy See played.113 The constitutive rules on these issues are still contested but a solution for the secular liberal campaigners for population control was pressed to rely on other strategy to come forward with their agenda. The UN-Conference on Women 1995 in Bejing was to be the next battleground with similar results. 9/12 2006, at the University of Regensburg, in a very different setting another contestation about constitutive rules happened rather randomly at the occasion of a pastoral visit of Pope Benedict XVI to his Bavarian homeland.114 However, the remarks made in rather random circumstances were very much in line with the most fundamental notions of Benedict XVIs theology on faith and reason.115 His speech basically claimed a middle ground for religion which is able to give reasons to convince
107 108

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004: 215-241). Mara Hvistendahl (2011). 109 George Weigel (2005: 715-727). 110 Letter printed in Monsignor Carl J. Marucci (2007: 199-202). 111 Letter printed in Monsignor Carl J. Marucci (2007: 201). 112 Quoted after George Weigel (2005: 725). 113 Abdullah (1996), Neal (1998). 114 Benedict (2007). 115 Joseph Ratzinger (2004). It is however fair to say that Ratzinger has more Asian religions and especially Western liberalism which he refers to as relativism than Islam in mind when he was analyzing these issues.

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others in contrast to secular relativism which abandoned reason and its willingness and capacity to convince others, but also in contrast to violent religion which is prepared to force others to become part of their project. According to Benedict XVI, faith and reason should go together to establish constitutive rules for the global public sphere. The change from a pluralist society of states to a solidarist perspective to foster global governance is understood as a contested endeavor. Many voices participate in it, faith and reason should lead this dialogue. As it is widely known, that speech became very controversial. Benedict delivered his speech at his alma mater, university in Regensburg, on the 12th September 2006, one day after the fifth anniversary of 9/11 and exactly on the day the Catholic Church still celebrates Marys help at the siege and victory of Vienna against the Ottoman army. Benedicts quote of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II who some decades before the final fall of Constantinople in 1453 asked bluntly in a debate with a Muslim scholar if the Prophet Mohammad had brought anything new but religious violence resulted in outraged reactions in parts of the Islamic world. Many commentators took this as a diplomatic faux pas or even worse, a kind of verbal crusade against Islam. However, as Eric Fassin pointed out, this crusade had a different end and called for different means than the project of American neoconservatives. Nevertheless, the aim was to establish a dominant discourse and seize the middle ground for its own position. Fassin summarizes this nicely: Religion cannot, should not, wield a sword: the hegemony of Christianity is purely cultural, rather than military.116 Interestingly, the pope managed afterwards to further develop his ongoing dialogue with Muslim leaders and scholars.117 In November of the same year his visit to Turkey and three years later to Jordan were deemed a success, particularly the visit to Jordan was important to establish a Catholic-Muslim Alliance against violence. The already mentioned visit of the Saudi King to the pope in 2007 has also to be seen in this respect. The alliance against violence had a deliberate philosophical backing. It is rooted in Benedictine theme of faith and reason. The Emperors quote was chosen by the pope because it made the point that religion can rest on reason and argument and thus does not need violence which can only target the body but cannot convert the soul. This was meant not only as a critique of violence but aimed at the notion that reason can bring convincing argument for faith. Faith is not a private idiosyncratic decision based on a voluntaristic act of feeling and emotions. It is a reasonable and justifiable public attitude because God himself is not voluntaristic and irrational but logos himself. In this argumentation, and this was the main theme of the speech at the university of Regensburg, the Western Protestant and Enlightenment concept of secular reason falls short of the full meaning of reason which not only includes faith but leads to him. The idea of this argumentation aims at the foundation of reasonable debates in the global public sphere and can thus be understood as a continuation of the debate with Jrgen Habermas which Joseph Ratzinger led as a cardinal shortly before he was elected pope in which they debated the idea of a postsecular society.118 Habermas was not very much amused when Ratzinger pointed out a much stronger reading of what a postsecular society might be than what Habermas could accept.119 However, Muslim scholars were very much in line with the idea of a religious based concept of reason. By attacking possible Muslim as well as Enlightenment shortcomings Benedict XVI tried to establish the Catholic faith in the middle of the debate, joined only by the Orthodox Church which was present in the quote of the Byzantine Orthodox Emperor and was already envisaged for the following trip two month later to Turkey meeting the patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul. Fassins

116 117

ric Fassin (2007: 237). Fischer (2009) . 118 Jrgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger (2005). 119 Habermas (2007: 55-56).

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term of a Vatican geopolitics puts it in a nutshell.120 The political agency of the papacy is playing a part in the foundations of world politics, not through enforcement but through an influence which should not be overlooked.

Sympathy for the Holy See

The pope is a contested figure. Some see him as a sometime noble person but always in an overambitious position. In the extremes, the faithful understand him as the Holy Father and the Vicar of Christ, his adversaries as a backward relict form the dark ages or, if they are religiously musical themselves but in another tonality, as the Anti-Christ, the devil. The Rolling Stones once, at the time shockingly, had a song entitled Sympathy for the Devil. The story line of this song is the selfintroduction of the devil, claiming to have been around for a long, long year and on the spot from the Crucifixion of Jesus to the October Revolution in Russia and at many other quarrels of bygone and recent history. Admittedly, St. Peter betrayed his master and left him shortly before Crucifixion, and the pope was not always directly on the spot as the devil might have been, however the Holy See was always around in western world politics and managed to become part of world politics during the globalization. The Catholic Church managed to survive secularization in the West and to become part of the global South. Today the Holy See is one of the key actors of global governance accepted by Islamic as well as secular regimes as a peer. Thus, through the lens of the Holy See one can gather crucial insights about continuation and change in world politics and particularly the endurance of transnational governance from the Pre-Westphalian to the Post-Westphalian order. Even for those who do not believe in the gospels interpretation that the pope was meant, as Jesus proclaimed to St. Peter, the rock against which the powers of death shall not prevail, it should be clear that the Holy See will probably be around for a long long year also in the future of world politics. Thus, for political scientists the puzzling question raised in the Rolling Stone song is also applicable here: What's puzzling you is the nature of my game. This nature of the Holy Sees game could only be scratched in this article. The Holy See has a unique position in transnational governance which derives from its double position as a peer in the society of state, which had its own state but could even do without, and simultaneously as a very specific transnational actor who constitutes rules and norms for more than one billion faithful and who has the ambition to persuade all. The Holy Sees organization does not only have its territorially defined branches all over the world but also a central structure of command. The Holy See cannot pressure the global public sphere or the society of states as the papacy sometimes could in the time of European medieval Christendom but in the struggle of moving from a pluralist society of states to a solidarist perspective for engaging in gobal governance, the Holy See is an actor which is prepared to foster its interpretation of the globalization. Globalization as such is endorsed fully and Pope Benedict gives the highest possible blessing. However, the constitutive rules of this project are contested. Given the rise of the South in general and the alliance with the South of the Holy See shifting its faithful power base from the North to the South, the Holy See will be a crucial player to wage and mitigate conflicts during these changes, as he is the only player with a history in the north which is increasingly shifting southwards. The next pope might be from the South himself. The papacy managed to survive the turmoil of modernity in Europe and the return in the middle of world politics. The Holy See has the pole position in the turmoils of globalization as Catholicism moved south more rapidly than Coca-Cola. Thus, it is not only interesting what the Holy See is, but also what the Holy See does. There is a lot room for research in this aspect. Thus, if you meet the Holy See, the same attitude might be called for as when meeting for Mick
120

ric Fassin (2007).

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Jaggers devil: Have some courtesy, Have some sympathy, and some taste, Use all your well-learned politesse- or you might miss one of the most interesting research agendas in transnational governance and religion.

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