MERALCO INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING SERVICES CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, OFELIA P.

LANDRITO GENERAL SERVICES and/or OFELIA P. LANDRITO G.R. No. 14540

Ofelia P. Landrito General Services (OPLGS) is a business firm engaged in providing and rendering general services, such as janitorial and maintenance work to its clients, while private respondent Ofelia P. Landrito is the Proprietor and General Manager of OPLGS. MIESCOR and OPLGS entered into an agreement wherein the latter would supply the petitioner janitorial services, which include labor, materials, tools and equipment, as well as supervision of its assigned employees at the formers thermal plant in Makati City. OPLGS assigned 49 janitors. The 49 employees lodged a complaint for illegal deduction, underpayment, non-payment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and night differentials against the OPLGS before the Labor Arbiter. Contract was amended for the 10th time to increase the minimum daily. Two months thereafter, Meralco sent a letter to OPLGS informing them that they are terminating their contract. Accordingly, the employees were pulled out. Employees amended their Complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal and to implead the petitioner as a party respondent therein. Parties failed to settle amicably before the Labor Arbiter and proceeded with the complaint. Arbiter dismissed the complaint against Meralco for lack of merit; but ordered the OPLGS to pay the complainants the total amount of P487,287.07 representing unpaid wages, separation pay and overtime pay; as well as attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 10% of the award or P48,728.70. OPLGS appealed the aforesaid Decision to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Arbiter with the modification that Meralco was solidarily liable with the OPLGS. Both moved for reconsideration of the Resolution of the NLRC. Meralco averred that private respondents should be solely responsible as it sufficiently paid private respondents all the benefits due the complainants. OPLGS reiterated that the complainants abandoned their work and so should not be liable for separation pay; and that Meralco should be liable for complainants other monetary claims, i.e., for wage differentials and unpaid overtime. The NLRC denied the OPLGS Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC likewise directed the Labor Arbiter to enforce the monetary award against the OPLGS surety bond and to determine who should finally shoulder the liability. Alleging grave abuse of discretion of the NLRC in its issuance of the Resolution, OPLGS filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari. Court dismissed petition. Courts Resolution became final and executory. Labor Arbiter resumed in determinating of who should finally shoulder the liability for the monetary awards granted to the complainants, in accordance with the NLRC Order. The judgment award in the total sum of P487,287.07 as contained in the Decision consists of three (3) parts, as follows: First, the judgment award on the underpayment; Second, the judgment award on separation pay; and Third, the judgment award on the overtime pay. It finds Meralco solidarily liable with OPLGS on the judgment awards on the underpayment and on the non-payment of the overtime pay. The complainants may enforce the judgment award on underpayment and the non-payment of overtime pay against either OPLGS and/or Meralco. Also, since Meralco had adjusted its contract price for the janitorial services it contracted with OPLGS, if the complainants enforce the judgment against Meralco, the latter can seek reimbursement from the former OPLGS, but should the judgment be enforced against OPLGS, the latter cannot seek reimbursement against Meralco. The judgment award on separation pay is the sole liability of OPLGS. Both parties appealed before the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the order and dismissed both appeals for non-posting of the appeal or surety bond and/or for utter lack of merit. OPLGS moved for reconsideration but it was denied by NLRC and its decision became final and executory. OPLGS filed a Petition for Certiorari before the SC but it referred the case to the CA. CA modified the decision of NLRC. Meralco was held solidarily liable with OPLGS for the satisfaction of the laborers separation pay. Meralco filed Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Meralco now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the sole issue of "whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals palpably erred when it went beyond the issues of the case as it modified the factual findings of the

Labor Arbiter which attained finality after it was affirmed by Public Respondent NLRC and by the Supreme Court which can no longer be disturbed as it became the law of the case." Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. The only matters settled in the Resolution of this Court, which can be regarded as the law of the case, were (1) both the petitioner and the private respondents were jointly and solidarily liable for the judgment awards due the complainants; and (2) the said judgment awards shall be enforced against the surety bond posted by the private respondents. However, the issue as regards the liability of the petitioner for payment of separation pay was yet to be resolved because the NLRC still directed the Labor Arbiter to make a determination on who should finally shoulder the monetary awards granted to the complainants. And it was only after G.R. No. 111506 was dismissed by this Court that the Labor Arbiter promulgated his decision, wherein he clarified the respective liabilities of the petitioner and the private respondents for the judgment awards. The Labor Arbiter explained that the solidary liability of Meralco was limited to the monetary awards for wage underpayment and non-payment of overtime pay due the complainants, and it did not, in any way, extend to the payment of separation pay as the same was the sole liability of OPLGS. The Court of Appeals indeed erred when it ruled that the petitioner was jointly and solidarily liable with the private respondents as regards the payment of separation pay. Hence, while it is true that the petitioner was the indirect employer of the complainants, it cannot be held liable in the same way as the employer in every respect. Meralco may be considered an indirect employer only for purposes of unpaid wages. There is no question that OPLGS are operating as an independent contractor and that the complainants were their employees. There was no employer-employee relationship that existed between Meralco and the complainants and, thus, the former could not have dismissed the latter from employment. The only instance when the principal can also be held liable with the independent contractor or subcontractor for the backwages and separation pay of the latters employees is when there is proof that the principal conspired with the independent contractor or subcontractor in the illegal dismissal of the employees. The contract executed between Meralco and OPLGS contains no provision for separation pay in the event that the petitioner terminates the same. It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties and the stipulations therein, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, shall be binding as between the parties. But while this Court had previously ruled that the indirect employer can recover whatever amount it had paid to the employees in accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor, the said ruling cannot be applied in reverse to this case as to allow the private respondents (the independent contractor), who paid for the judgment awards in full, to recover from the petitioner (the indirect employer). Private respondents have nothing more to recover from petitioner. Petitioner had already handed over to private respondent the wages and other benefits of the complainants. Records reveal that it had complied with complainants salary increases in accordance with the minimum wage set by Republic Act No. 6727 by faithfully adjusting the contract price for the janitorial services it contracted with private respondents. This is a finding of fact made by the Labor Arbiter, untouched by the NLRC and explicitly affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and which should already bind this Court. Having already received from petitioner the correct amount of wages and benefits, but having failed to turn them over to the complainants, private respondents should now solely bear the liability for the underpayment of wages and non-payment of the overtime pay. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2000 and 27 September 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50806, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 30 January 1996 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 001737-91 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-04432-89) is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

HEIRS OF MAURA SO, namely, YAN LAM LIM, JIMMY SO LIM, and FERDINAND SO LIM vs. LUCILA JOMOC OBLIOSCA, ELVIRA JOMOC GARDINAB, and HEIRS OF ABUNDIA JOMOC BALALA, namely, ROSITA BALALA ACENAS, EVANGELINE BALALA BAACLO, OLIVER JOMOC BALALA, and PERLA BALALA CONDESA G.R. No. 147082
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land. . Upon his death, the property was inherited by his wife, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces (collectively referred to as the Jomoc heirs). In February 1979, the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of petitioner, Maura So, over the property for P300,000.00. The Jomocs and Maura So failed to affix their signatures on this document and the document was not notarized. So made a partial payment of P49,000. So demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc heirs ignored the demand. On February 24, 1983, So filed a Complaint for specific performance against the Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable deed of sale over the lot. On February 28, 1983, the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed in favor of the spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00. Trial court favored So. CA affirmed the decision with modification. The Jomoc heirs and the spouses Lim filed separate petitions for review with the Supreme Court which petitions were later consolidated. Court rendered a decision that So has the better right over the property. So then filed a motion for execution. The respondents opposed the motion on the ground that they did not participate in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land and they were not parties to the case. Trial court granted the motion for execution. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied it. Trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution and divesting all the Jomoc heirs of their titles over the property. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the Jomoc heirs and issued it in the name of the petitioner. Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. They alleged that herein respondents were not parties to the case; therefore, they should not be bound by the decision therein and be deprived of their right over the property. CA dismissed the petition, holding that respondents were bound with the decision. R respondents were aware of the pendency of the case, yet they did not intervene, and that the case is barred by res judicata. Respondents elevated the case to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. Court denied the petition. Court concluded that the contract of sale is valid and effective between the parties since the essential requisites [consent, object and cause of the obligation concur, and they were clearly established to be present] are present. Court agreed with the CA that Jomoc heirs failure to intervene in said suit for the protection of their rights binds them with the decision. Court has held that a writ of execution may be issued against a person not a party to a case where the latters remedy, which he did not avail of, was to intervene in the case in question involving rights over the same parcel of land. As for the issue of res judicata, we believe that the same applies as a bar to the instant Petition. The Court had occasion to rule that herein Maura So had the right to compel the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc to execute the proper public instrument so that a valid contract of sale of registered land can be duly registered and can bind third persons. Court denied petition and it became final and executory. It appears that, on March 1992, respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against So with RTC of Misamis Oriental. Respondents posited that since they didnt sell their shares in the property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by the other heirs. RTC resolved the case in favor of the Jomoc heirs. RTC ordered So to allow the Jomoc heirs to exercise their substantive right of legal redemption of the shares of plaintiffscoheirs. The RTC granted petitioners motion for reconsideration. Jointly on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and respondents Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a Resolution, denying Sos motion for reconsideration and granting Jomoc heirs motion for execution. Petitioner, later substituted by her heirs, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment. CA denied the petition, holding that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available since petitioner Maura So had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the same orders of the trial court.

Prior to the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, Maura So filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the same RTC Order and Resolution. Court denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court likewise denied petitioners first motion for reconsideration and the second motion for reconsideration. CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision denying the petition for annulment of judgment. Petitioners then filed this petition for review. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Thus, it may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. We agree with the CA that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available to petitioners since their predecessor-in-interest, Maura So, had already availed herself of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Further, none of the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, is present in the case. First, petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. The error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial courts exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. Second, well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro

tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in the case. The Court has the inherent power and discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and executory judgments. The first is this Courts Decision which upheld the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura So. The second is the Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the order of execution of the said decision against the herein respondents despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in the first case. And the third is the Courts Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 which denied Maura Sos petition for review of the RTC Decision granting respondents right to redeem the property. It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous judgments. It rendered final and executory the Resolution of the RTC which recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from Maura So. The RTC premised its decision on its finding that respondents did not actually sell their shares in the property to Maura So because they did not sign the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of So; hence, they remained co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous because this Court had already pronounced in the first two final and executory judgments that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC was barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action.

In Collantes v. Court of Appeals, the Court offered three options to solve a case of conflicting decisions: the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort. Instead of resorting to the first offered solution which would entail disregarding all the three final and executory decisions, we find it more equitable to apply the criteria mentioned in the second and third solutions, and thus, maintain the finality of one of the conflicting judgments. The principal criterion under the second option is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such that earlier decisions should be sustained over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. The major criterion under the third solution is a determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be accorded more respect than those made by the lower courts. While all three judgments actually reached this Court, only the two previous judgments extensively discussed the respective cases on the merits. The third judgment (in G.R. No. 118050) was a Minute Resolution, dismissing the petition for review on certiorari of the RTC Resolution in the legal redemption case for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolution was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy. In a manner of speaking, therefore, the third final and executory judgment was substantially a decision of the trial court. The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court to set things right in order to prevent a grave injustice from being committed against Maura So who had, for 15 years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself to be the owner of the property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 2000, and Resolution dated January 11, 2001, are REVERSED. The April 27, 1994 Resolution and September 7, 1994 Order of the RTC are SET ASIDE. The complaint for legal redemption docketed as Civil Case No. 92-135 is DISMISSED.

CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, doing business under the name of MANILA DOWNTOWN YMCA vs. REMINGTON STEEL CORPORATION G.R. NO. 159422
Remington Steel Corporation (Remington) leased ground floor units 964 and 966 and second floor unit 963 of a building owned by the Manila Downtown YMCA (YMCA). Remington used the combined areas of ground floor units 964 and 966 as hardware store, offices, and display shops for its steel products, as well as a passageway to second floor unit 963 which was used as staff room for its Manila sales force. YMCA formally terminated the lease over second floor unit 963 and gave Remington time to vacate the premises. Remington filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Manila a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over unit 963. YMCA filed in the same court an action for Unlawful Detainer involving the same unit 963 against Remington. The two cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 26). During the pendency of the petitions, Remington filed another petition on the ground that YMCA refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966. Remington decided to surrender possession of units 964 and 966 and tendering two checks to cover all past rentals due on the two units. YMCA filed a No Objection to the Turn Over of the Leased Premises at #964 and 966. Order was issued declaring the consignation case closed. Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as passageway to second floor unit 963. It kept the premises padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises. MeTC-Br26 extended for three years from finality of the decision the lease period on second floor unit 963 and dismissed YMCA's complaint for ejectment. Remington filed in MeTC-Br26 a Motion to Constitute Passageway alleging that it had no means of ingress or egress to second floor unit 963. It assigned a Commissioner to conduct an ocular inspection. RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate court, rendered a Decision granting Remington a longer extension period of five years for second floor unit 963 and ordering YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between units 964 and 966. Dissatisfied, YMCA filed an appeal with the CA. The CA held that the lower courts had authority to fix an extension of the lease period. It found that Remington continued using occupation of unit 963 resulted in a new lease on a month-to-month basis, which subsisted for over a year; thus, while YMCA had the right to seek its termination, Remington was entitled to a judicial lengthening of its period based on equity. Nonetheless, CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, as the continuation of the lease was no longer tenable after the lapse of six years, since the parties' formal contract had expired. It also noted that since Remington had already transferred to its own building, there was no more reason to continue the lease. Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA considered as moot, for Remington had vacated the premises. YMCA filed in MeTC-Manila two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to evict Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966. Upon Remington's motion, the two cases were consolidated. However, when Remington filed a motion for reconsideration, the consolidation of cases was reversed and canceled. Thus, the cases were tried separately. YMCA contended in both cases that Remington did not surrender the ground floor units but padlocked the doors, refused to surrender the keys, and failed to pay rent. Remington countered that it vacated and surrendered ground floor units 964 and 966; that although it had the doors of the units locked, it did so only as an act of self-preservation, since it had a valid lease on second floor unit 963, and YMCA refused to heed the order to provide a passageway to the second floor; that, if it were true that no turnover of ground floor units 964 and 966 was made, YMCA had the remedy of filing the appropriate motion in the consignation case, where the parties agreed on such turnover; and that the fact that it did not complain shows completion of such turnover. Both branches of MeTC-Manila separately ordered Remington to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees to YMCA. Remington separately appealed both decisions to the RTC-Manila. Both branches separately reversed the respective decisions of MeTC-Manila and dismissed the two complaints for unlawful detainer. YMCA filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied. YMCA then filed separate petitions for review in the CA. CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition for review involving unit 964 on the ground that William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of authority to file the petition for review. YMCA filed a Motion for Reconsideration therein, appending thereto a Secretary's executed by YMCA's Corporate Secretary attesting to a Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William Golangco to prepare and file the petition for review. CA issued a Resolution denying YMCA's motion for reconsideration. CA emphasize that requirement of the CNFS is mandatory and should be filed with the petition in the first instance. Hence, the petition.

These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The requirement that the petitioner should sign the VCNFS applies even to corporations. The purpose of requiring verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification, non-compliance does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional. YMCA rectified its failure to submit proof of Golangco's authority to sign the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its Motion for Reconsideration a Secretary's Certificate issued by its Corporate Secretary stating that prior to the filing of the petition, Golangco had been authorized by YMCA's Board of Directors. YMCA timely filed a VCNFS, but merely failed to submit proof of authority of the signatory to sign the same. While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too literally as to defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping. In the meantime that the present petition was pending, the CA rendered a Decision involving ground floor unit 966 reversing the Decision of RTC-Branch 25 and reinstating the Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 on YMCA's complaint for unlawful detainer. When Remington's motion for reconsideration was denied, it filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. Court rendered a Decision granting the petition and dismissing the unlawful detainer case involving ground floor unit 966. However, upon YMCA's motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a Resolution setting aside its Decision and reinstating the Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 with the modification that Remington was ordered to pay YMCA P11,000.00 a month from July 1998 until March 2004 as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises. Remington failed to comply with its obligation to return the premises to YMCA. In order to return the thing leased to the lessor, it is not enough that the lessee vacates it. It is necessary that he places the thing at the disposal of the lessor, so that the latter can receive it without any obstacle. He must return the keys and leave no sub-lessees or other persons in the property; otherwise he shall continue to be liable for rents. In the case at bar, records show that despite the termination of the lease, [YMCA] was never in possession of the premises because it was padlocked. From the time the lease was terminated, [Remington] unlawfully withheld possession of the leased premises from [YMCA]. YMCA is entitled to a reasonable compensation for continued occupancy of the premises. Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration therein but it was denied with finality. Remington subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit. Thus, the resolution in that case has become final and executory. The final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." Under the doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same. In this particular sense stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based upon the judgment. The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for
the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. It bears stressing that the facts of the present case and those of prior ones are substantially the same. The only difference is the unit involved; prior case involves unit 966 while the present case involves unit 964. The opposing parties are likewise the same.

Clearly, in the light of the final Resolution which the Court follows as precedent, Remington unlawfully withheld possession of the leased premises because its constructive delivery did not amount to an effective transfer of possession to YMCA. It is the Courts duty to apply the previous ruling in the final Resolution to the instant case. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS herein petition insofar as the outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 is concerned. The Resolutions dated January 16, 2003 and July 29, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 of the Court in G.R. No. 171858 shall likewise govern the rights of the parties insofar as unit 964 is concerned.

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE G.R. No. 151243
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] alleged that he and Nave had entered into an agreement involving a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna. Nave backed out when she refused to accept the partial downpayment because she didnt want to sell her property to him anymore. Fernando filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. [Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1) she was not fully informed of the nature of the piece of paper handed to her for her signature. When informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna, she immediately returned the said piece of paper and at the same time refused to acknowledge the same. She even rejected the tendered partial down payment to her; and 2) she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblingsafter the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, Fernando has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, he cannot sue there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so. The Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the property and they were included as party defendants. RTC denied Naves Motion to Dismiss. Nave filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim to implead her husband as co-defendant. Including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. RTC admitted such claim. Unsatisfied, Nave and her husband filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against the Pabale, it included the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted by a clinical psychologist. Court found the motion unmeritorious. Nave filed a motion for reconsideration as she raised therein as a defence her mental capacity, this being a decisive factor to determine whether the contract is null and void. Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the RTC, with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. Court a quo ruled that Nave is incompetent and cannot take care of herself without outside aid nor can she manage her properties. She and her estate are placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from the Court. Both Fernando and the Pabale siblings did not appeal. In the meantime, Nave died on December 1992. On September 1993, Atty. Gesmundo, sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from Nave. A motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Atty. Gesmundo with the court a quo. The Pabale siblings filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case. The case was then set for an annual conference. Atty. Gesmundo filed a motion for his substitution in the case. Not long after, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayri since the property was sold to her by Atty. Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Atty. Gesmundo however filed a manifestation that what he executed is a Deed of Donation, not a Deed of Absolute Sale and that the motion should be denied. RTC recognized Alamayri as the owner of the subject property and declared that the contracts executed between Nave and Fernando and with the Pabale siblings were null and void. It ordered Pabales to execute a transfer of title in favor of Alamayri, to surrender possession over the property, and to report for its income from the time they took over possession to the time it is turned over to the latter. Fernando filed an appeal with the CA and Pabale siblings intervened as appellants. The latter claimed that RTC erred in declaring that the sale executed by Nave in their favor was null and void. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. Alamayri sought reconsideration, invoking the decision of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings. Said decision became final and executory

and none of the parties appealed. The CA denied for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo. Hence, the petition to the SC. First. Alamayri positioned that given the final and executory decision finding Nave incompetent, same fect may no longer be relitigated based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. Two main rules: Bar by prior judgment - where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. conclusiveness of judgment - where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues on the Guardianship petition and to the Cross-claim petition. No identity of parties SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence. It is the objective of the RTC on hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian is to determine: 1st, whether a person is incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties. 2nd, who is qualified to be appointed as her guardian Pabales presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian since they are not Naves relatives nor are they caring for her. No identity of issues Neither is there identity of issues. In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate. In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void. While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearingguardianship petition; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. . Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings in 1984. The burden of proof to the contrary fell to Alamayri which she failed to do. As there is no identity of parties and issues. Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, on the case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favour of the Pabale siblings.