Social Institutions First published Thu Jan 4, 2007; substantive revision Tue Feb 8, 2011 The term, social

institution is somewhat unclear both in ordinary language and in the philosophical literature (see below). However, contemporary sociology is som ewhat more consistent in its use of the term. Typically, contemporary sociologis ts use the term to refer to complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business c orporations, and legal systems. A typical definition is that proffered by Jonath an Turner (Turner 1997: 6): a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodge d in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patt erns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-su staining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societa l structures within a given environment. Again, Anthony Giddens says (Giddens 198 4: 24): Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life. He (Giddens 1984: 31) goes on to list as institutional orders, modes of discours e, political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions. The con temporary philosopher of social science, Rom Harre follows the theoretical socio logists in offering this kind of definition (Harre 1979: 98): An institution was defined as an interlocking double-structure of persons-as-role-holders or office -bearers and the like, and of social practices involving both expressive and pra ctical aims and outcomes. He gives as examples (Harre 1979: 97) schools, shops, p ost offices, police forces, asylums and the British monarchy. In this entry the above-noted contemporary sociological usage will be followed. Doing so has the virtue of grounding philosophical theory in the most salient em pirical discipline, namely, sociology. At this point it might be asked why a theory of social institutions has, or ough t to have, any philosophical interest; why not simply leave such theorising to t he sociologists? One important reason stems from the normative concerns of philo sophers. Philosophers, such as John Rawls (Rawls 1972), have developed elaborate normative theories concerning the principles of justice that ought to govern so cial institutions. Yet they have done so in the absence of a developed theory of the nature and point of the very entities (social institutions) to which the pr inciples of justice in question are supposed to apply. Surely the adequacy of on e's normative account of the justice or otherwise of any given social institutio n, or system of social institutions, will depend at least in part on the nature and point of that social institution or system. The entry has five sections. In the first section various salient accounts of so cial institutions are discussed. Accounts emanating from sociological theory as well as philosophy are mentioned. Here, as elsewhere, the boundaries between phi losophy and non-philosophical theorising in relation to an empirical science are vague. Hence, it is important to note the theories of the likes of Durkheim and Talcott Parsons as well as those of John Searle and David Lewis. In the second section so-called collective acceptance theories of social institu tions are discussed (Searle 1995 and 2010; Tuomela 2002 and 2007.