THIRD DIVISION [G.R. Nos. 136149-51.

September 19, 2000]

The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large.*9+ In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10] On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail. The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs; 2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio; 3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs; 4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault. The Case Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him. Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3] was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.*5+ The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.*7+

three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57). Hence, this appeal.[12] The Facts Prosecutions Version In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise: At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the AntiVice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36). After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, *P+olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16). SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51). In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21). Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23). At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP AntiVice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32). Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15). While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass *through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).

The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.

After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).

An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial

number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).

containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)

With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).

Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).

The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry *a+ firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)*14+ After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).

Defenses Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision: During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them*,+ only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).

Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam *was+ only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 4647, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha*d+ a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx *at+ the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen *were+ the one*s+ who fire*d+ at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they *would+ die *b+ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag

Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon*;+ before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).

Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock *o+n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his

DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).

It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the *R+evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.*19+ (emphasis in the original)

Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that *o+n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nurin Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).

Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.

Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that *o+n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).

Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:

Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock *o+n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).*16+

Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant.*23+

The Trial Courts Ruling

As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25] The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence *of+ the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure*26+ since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.*27+

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:

For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against

them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]

more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.*30+

The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:

The Issues The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.*29+

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil *had+ fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.

II

The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.

In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner: III x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.

The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.*31+

The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable *for+ the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two

In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.

The Courts Ruling

A: Yes, Your Honor. The appeal has no merit. COURT: First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired upon? Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.*32+ We do not agree. A: More or less, five (5) meters.

We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house.*34+ Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]

xxxxxxxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:

Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?

A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence? PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

A: Yes. Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?

Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right? A: Yes.

A: Yes. Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?

Q: What did you see inside the house?

Reform. That is leading

A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.

Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?

A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam. xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

Q: Were you able to go down? A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house. A: Yes.

Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house? Q: What happened when you were there?

A: Yes. A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.*42+ Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?

What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43] as follows: A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house. Q: What did you notice *o+n the second floor?

xxxxxxxxx A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw *an+ M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the second floor because there *are+ a lot of children here. COURT: Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?

Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm? A: At the sala set. A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to the investigator. Q: This sala set where is this located?

Q: Where did you turn it over? A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.

A: At the crime scene. Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this? A: Yes.

A: Yes. Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?

Q: Why? A: Yes.

A: I put x x x markings. Q: Why can you identify that?

xxxxxxxxx A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.

COURT: Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?

So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines? A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.

A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14. FISCAL NUVAL:

Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty? This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round *ammunition+.

A: Empty.

Q: How about the M14?

These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:

A: Found with [ammunition]. Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?

xxxxxxxxx A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder nitrates. Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines? Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate? A: In the corner. A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates. Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16? Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun? A: I turned [them] over to the investigator. A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates. Q: Can you identify them?

Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun? A: Yes, because of my initials[.]

A: Yes. Q: Where are your initials?

xxxxxxxxx A: On the magazines.

PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: RJL?

Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this? A: RJL.*44+

A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.

May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.

COURT: Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?

Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident? A: It indicates that the gun was fired.

A: Yes. Q: Recently?

Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue? A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x. A: Yes, Your Honor.*45+ (emphasis supplied) COURT: Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification*47+ stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]

Q: There is also black residue?

A: Yes.

Q: What does it indicate? Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired. From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost. Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?

A: This one.

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.[53] He testified thus:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?

Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors*+ house at that time when you heard gunshots?

A I could not remember. A I was in the house near my house. Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct? FISCAL NUVAL: A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.*54+ Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this? Crime and Punishment (Showing) The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these. A Yes, Sir. This is mine.

Maintenance of a Drug Den Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; *the+ house you are referring to *in+ this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.

A Our house.

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct? The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that *t+he act of the accused *of+ firing an M14 rifle *at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime.*56+ A They were not there.

We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision

correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.*58+ If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat. Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms. We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and

direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no other crime was committed.

SECOND DIVISION

Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide *was+ not before us for consideration.

G.R. No. 108524

November 10, 1994

Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, INC., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AND REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, BIR MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.

Damasing Law Office for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 4791 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization. 1

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.

Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.

On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.

The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:

Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

We agree with respondents. In interpreting 103(a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his classification of copra as food was based on "the broader definition of food which includes agricultural commodities and other components used in the manufacture/processing of food." The full text of his letter reads:

(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in their original state by the primary producer or the owner of the land where the same are produced;

10 April 1991

(b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and marine food products, livestock and poultry of a kind generally used as, or yielding or producing foods for human consumption, and breeding stock and genetic material therefor;

Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR. Chairman VAT Review Committee Bureau of Internal Revenue

Under 103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.

Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Mr. Deoferio:

The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC. On June 11, 1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." 2

This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990 stating that copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the context of BFAD's regulatory responsibilities which focus mainly on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is not covered.

The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under 103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds, which will be presently discussed although not in the order raised in the petition for prohibition.

However, in the broader definition of food which include agricultural commodities and other components used in the manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra should be classified as an agricultural food product since copra is produced from coconut meat which is food and based on available information, more than 80% of products derived from copra are edible products.

Very truly yours, First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the BIR is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. Petitioner cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible.

QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D.

Director Assistant Secretary of Health for Standards and Regulations

judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. 6

Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."

In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.

Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in petitioner's argument if the circular in question were in the nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative rule.

Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.

The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. 8

Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3)

In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. 4

Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the VAT and that to the extent that prices are reduced the government would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is correspondingly diminished.

In addition such rule must be published. 5 On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the case of agricultural food products their sale in their original state is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate, the argument that the classification of copra as agricultural non-food product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or policy which should be addressed to respondent officials and to Congress.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127240

March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South CotabatoThe facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said

Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines SO ORDERED. SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78617

June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was

taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1

Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

Hence, the present recourse.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-36378

January 27, 1992

PIO BALATBAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO PASION, respondents.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioner.

Roberto Y. Miranda for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by an agricultural lessee who was ordered ejected in an action for ejectment filed by the new owner of the landholding on the basis of the latter's claim that he will personally cultivate the land pursuant to Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844.

The antecedent facts, as gathered from the pleadings, are not controverted.

Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land located at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing an area of 18,490 square meters, more or less, which is owned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to private respondent Domingo Pasion and had declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126. Sometime after the sale, Domingo Pasion, on a claim that he will personally cultivate the land, filed on 15 June 1970 with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch II at San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint to eject petitioner alleging therein that he had notified petitioner of his intention to personally cultivate the landholding, but despite the lapse of one (1) agricultural year from receipt of the notice thereof, petitioner refused to vacate the land.

SO ORDERED. 1

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R; he urged said court to reverse it because the agrarian court gravely erred in: (a) ordering his ejectment, completely denying the fact that private respondent, due to his sickness, is physically incapable of personally cultivating the subject landholding and that private respondent filed the complaint out of vindictiveness, and (b) in dismissing the counterclaim for redemption, contrary to the facts and law. 2

In his amended answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied having received any notice from the private respondent and by way of special and affirmative defenses, he alleged that: (a) the jurisdictional requirements of the law have not been complied with by private respondent; (b) the latter has another palay landholding situated at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga with an area of 2 1/2 hectares which is being worked by a hired helper; (c) private respondent is physically unfit to perform the different phases of farm work; and (d) that private respondent filed the case merely to harass petitioner because of the latter's adoption of the agricultural leasehold system and refusal to shift back to the 50-50 sharing arrangement with the former. In his counterclaim, petitioner sought to exercise his right of redemption over the subject landholding pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 in view of the failure of the former owner, Daniel Garcia, to notify him beforehand of the intended sale of the landholding. Private respondent filed his Answer to the Counterclaim.

On 16 December 1972, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R affirming the decision of the agrarian court. In disposing of the assigned errors, said Court ruled that private respondent complied with the requirement of notice of at least one (1) agricultural year. And although private respondent was already 69 years old at the time he testified, there is nothing on record to indicate that he is suffering from any physical ailment; besides, in this age of advanced technology, most of the back-breaking processes of farming have been lightened by machinery. As regards the asserted right of redemption pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3844, the Court held that the petitioner "failed to comply with the requirements" and took note of petitioner's petition before the lower court to litigate as pauper as "a circumstance that is highly indicative of lack of funds on his part." 4 His motion to reconsider 5 the decision having been denied in the resolution of 25 January 1973, 6 petitioner took the instant recourse to present the following legal issues for this Court's resolution:

At the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties could only stipulate on their being of legal age, their residences and on the fact that private respondent is the owner of the landholding in question, which is cultivated by petitioner under the leasehold system.

1. What is the effect of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389, abolishing personal cultivation by landowners as a ground for dispossession of tenants from their landholdings, on pending appealed cases?

After trial on the merits, the agrarian court rendered a decision against petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

2. Should pending appealed cases on personal cultivation be decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389?

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered granting authority to plaintiff Domingo Pasion to eject defendant Pio Balatbat from the landholding in question described in the complaint and to personally cultivate his landholding, and ordering said defendant to vacate the said premises and to deliver the possession thereof to the said plaintiff, subject, however, to the second proviso contained in Section 36(1) and to the provisions of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844.

Expectedly, petitioner maintains that this case should have been decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 since, in view of the appeal, the private respondent did not yet acquire a vested right to personally cultivate the landholding. In short, the application of the repealing law warrants the dismissal of the action for ejectment.

The claim for damages of plaintiff is DENIED for lack of basis.

Republic Act No. 6389 took effect on 10 September 1971, during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals.

The counterclaim of the defendants is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. After private respondent filed his comment 7 in compliance with the resolution of 13 March 1973, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition 8 and thereafter required the petitioner to file his Brief, 9 which he complied with on 22 June 1973; 10 he makes the following assignment of errors: No pronouncement as to costs.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 reads as follows:

The Court a quo gravely erred in ordering the ejectment of herein petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation.

Sec. 7.

Section 36(1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

II

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing private respondent's complaint for cultivation in view of the repeal of Section 36(1) Rep. Act 3844 by Section 7 of Rep. Act 6389. Since under the original provision of Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, the dispossession of the agricultural lessee on the ground of personal cultivation by the agricultural lessor-owner can only take place when "authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory," it follows then that since the repeal of the provision took effect before the judgment in this case became final and executory, private respondent may no longer dispossess petitioner on that ground because it had been removed from the statute books. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Greta-Diosa Quitorio, Trial Attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, made a thorough study of the history of R.A. No. 6389 and came up with the conclusion that, as gathered from the questions and answers of Senators Diokno and Laurel, the legislative intent to give retroactive effect to said law or to make it applicable to pending cases of ejectment on ground of personal cultivation, appeared clear. She further summoned to the aid of petitioner an arsenal of impressive doctrines in statutory construction to protect the cause and strengthen the case of the petitioner. All of her efforts, which are undoubtedly commendable, are futile. As early as 1984, in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and Castro vs. Castro, 11 this Court, per Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., ruled that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect because, while during the debates on the bill which was eventually enacted into Republic Act No. 6389, there were statements made on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure" even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded in ejecting the tenants, 12 Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectment cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts. This Court thus stated: (1) The agricultural lessorowner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession.

Private respondent filed his Brief on 25 September 1973.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6389, Section 7 of which amended Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844. As amended, personal cultivation is no longer a ground to dispossess an agricultural lessee of his landholding. Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844 originally read as follows:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).

xxx

xxx

xxx

As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:

also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).

The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment, prospective.

It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without number. . . .

In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez v. Zobel (55 SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that "on this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. . . . There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the present Constitution.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant from the bondage of the soil, transfers to him the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor, has (sic) recognized personal cultivation as a ground for retention and, therefore, exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal cultivation cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up the land to the owner.

The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543.). Thus Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. . . . (Farrel v. Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306)

In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.

The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership, democratization of political power, and implementation of social justice do not require that a landowner should be deprived of everything he owns and that even small parcels as in these two cases now before us may not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought to be remedied by agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the land while another works on it. The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by the owner.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength from later developments.

Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In addition to proof of ownership and the required notices to the tenant, the bona-fide intention to cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. And as earlier stated, the tenant is protected in case the owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work the land himself for three years.

Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with a social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." The Constitution

The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who do not own other agricultural lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. (Letter of Instruction No. 472 dated October 21, 1976).

SECOND DIVISION The subsequent cases of Diga vs. Adriano, et al. 13 and Gallardo vs. Borromeo 14 reiterated the rule We laid in the Nilo and Castro cases. [G.R. No. 104215. May 8, 1996]

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JULIO ANDRES, JR. and FLORENCIO BURGOS, respondents. SYLLABUS

No pronouncement as to costs. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY LAW IN FORCE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF OVERSEAS WORKER FILED ON MARCH 31, 1982. - The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 797 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA); WITHOUT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION; LABOR ARBITER NOT DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION BY EFFECTIVITY OF E.O. 797. - E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CURATIVE STATUTE; DEFINED. - A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Ardala, Pecson, Bengzon, and Jimenez for petitioner.

Fabian Gappi for private respondent. DECISION On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.*2+

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and decide the complaint[1] for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.

Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983, he rendered a Decision[3] in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The facts are undisputed:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the complainant as follows:

In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00 and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of US$ 1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or extends his employment contract without availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September 20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August 25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;

2.

The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the same date, as his contractual bonus.

The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December, 1979, petitioner notified private respondent that the position of service driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which changed the position of private respondent into that of helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance of US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for approval.

The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime pay and unpaid wages or commission are DISMISSED for lack of merit.*4+

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of E.O. No. 797. On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioner's Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a helper/laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of US$210.00, in accordance with the second contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of employment after one year. His salary and allowance were increased to US$231.00.

In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991,[5] respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled:

Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded from the petitioner the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should have been awarded to him for not availing of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner denied private respondent's claim.

"To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters were integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391. On May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. There is no dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case on hand, which accrued and was filed when the two above mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force.*6+

On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and contractual bonus.

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari reiterating the argument that:

"The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiter's void judgment in the case a quo."[7]

It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad Agro Developinent Corp. vs. Dela Cerna,[8] petitioner argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by private respondent.

E.O. No.111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers' access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.[9] On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691[10] and Presidential Decree No. 1391[11] which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."[12] At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen."[17] The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity.

E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.[13] We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.

Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC[18] is more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time, the power to hear and decide cases involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services. We held:

The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna[14] cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989.[15] It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on November 9,1989, the Court, in a Resolution,[16] reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws.

"When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code. At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent provision of the said presidential decree states: Article 15. Bureau of Employment Services. (a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory subject to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be final and inappealable.

Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims undeniably arose out of an employer-employee relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. x x x

Republic of the Philippines Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as follows: SUPREME COURT Manila

(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of Employment Services may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and inappealable.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776

October 28, 1993

Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the regional offices of the then Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services in the National Capital Region. It is noteworthy that P.D. No. 1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall have jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code.

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA 663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment. These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was promulgated more than a year after the complaint was filed. (Italics supplied) In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private respondent against the petitioner. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."

SO ORDERED.

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of

the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5

2.3.4.

Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article

8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"

rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oftcited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil.

68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio. SUPREME COURT Manila

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79060

December 8, 1989

ANICETO C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (University of the Philippines), respondents.

Pedro F. Martinez for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set aside the judgment of public respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1987 which affirmed the trial court's decision finding petitioner guilty of violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for one (1) year, with the accessories provided by law and to remove the house constructed on the land in question within thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment, otherwise, private respondent University of the Philippines was authorized to demolish or dismantle the house at the expense of the petitioner.

The facts are not disputed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 15, 1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received a telephone call; the caller reported that somebody was constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum.

Villanueva, Ladip and Ernesto were directed to investigate (pp. 4-5, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 4, TSN, July 22, 1985).

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove ownership of the land in question and that it failed to prove that the land on which the petitioner constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.

Villanueva and Ladip are members of the U.P. Police Force connected or assigned with the U.P. Squatter's Relocation Team. The U.P. Arboretum is located at the back of the U.P. Petron, beside the U.P. Hydraulic Research Center (p. 5, TSN, June 21, 1985). They proceeded to said place and there they saw some people constructing a house. They asked the carpenters who owned the house and were told that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is the owner. Aniceto Ocampo who was present at the time, was asked whether he had a building permit. The accused admitted that he had no building permit, although he claimed that he bought the parcel of land on which his house was being constructed from a certain Roberto Pael (p. 5, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 6, TSN, June 21, 1985).

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, arriving at the following conclusion:

The accused was informed that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines and that he should stop the construction of his aforesaid house. The accused complied (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 6, TSN, July 22, 1985).

The prosecution did not present in evidence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove that the land in question, indeed, belongs to the University of the Philippines. The absence of this piece of evidence, in the considered view of this Court, did not cripple the fact that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is not the owner of said property. And since there is no showing that the accused occupied the lot in question and constructed his residential house thereat with the knowledge and/or consent of the owner thereof, the accused is a squatter within the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 772. "Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772 reads:

However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed the construction of his aforesaid house. The aforenamed prosecution witnesses reminded the accused that he was violating Presidential Decree No. 772 (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 21, 1985; pp. 6-7, TSN, July 22, 1985).

Any person, who with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused was again told to stop the construction of his house. The accused ignored the U.P. Police Squatter's Team, and insisted that he bought the land from Mr. Pael (p. 9, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10, TSN, June 21, 1985).

(p. 5, Comment; p. 25, Rollo)

The team reported the matter to their Chief, Captain Madrigal, and executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") which they submitted to the U.P. Legal Department (p. 9, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10, tsn, June 21, 1985).

On October 7, 1985, the trial court found Aniceto Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

A picture of the house constructed by the accused was also taken" (Exhibit "B"). (pp. 2-3, Comment; pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Accused then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in: (a) applying Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rule of Criminal Procedure; (b) convicting appellant on the basis of evidence which does not measure to the degree of proof as required by law; and (c) not applying the principle of presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.

After the preliminary investigation had been conducted, an information dated March 25, 1985, was filed against Aniceto Ocampo charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-38997.

Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding said appealed decision to be in accordance with law and supported by evidence as well.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant (now petitioner) pleaded "not guilty".

Hence, accused-appellant filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

In this petition, two issues are presented involving purely questions of law:

1. Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present evidence of ownership is not a fatal defect in finding the accused-petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of squatting; and

We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court's decision which maintained that the failure of the prosecution to present title to prove ownership by the University of the Philippines of the land in question is not material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is the act of squatting of the petitioner and his nonownership of the property, both of which have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Is the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused-petitioner a bar for him to present evidence?

As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the affirmative. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

For failure of the petitioner to file his reply within the period which expired on December 20, 1987, this Court, in a resolution dated February 3, 1988, resolved to dispense with the aforesaid reply and considered the case submitted for deliberation.

Section 15.Demurrer to Evidence. after the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

Petitioner alleges that the very essence of the case is the proof of ownership of the land involved herein. We do not agree.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied).

The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, which embraces three (3) elements, namely: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. In the case at bar, all three (3) elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect only on October 1, 1988, but the same was given retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos vs. People, in its resolution dated, September 19, 1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent" (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784; Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The amendment would therefore apply in this case.

The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that Aniceto Ocampo was not the owner of the land on which he constructed his house and that he did so against the owner's will or without its consent. Prosecuution witnesses testified that as early as May, 1983, petitioner was told that the area is U.P. property; that he began constructing his house without a permit from the owner; that petitioner had no building permit and that he had been informed that he was violating the Anti-Squatting Law. Besides, it was also confirmed that petitioner had never shown title to the land he claims to have purchased from one Roberto Pael. Yet, he failed to present any deed of sale or any title in his name. This alleged sale is a defense which the petitioner could have successfully utilized to his advantage but failed to substantiate it with evidence at the trial. When petitioner moved for dismissal of the case, he forfeited his chance to prove his claim. It must be noted also that this Roberto Pael was shown by testimonial evidence to be not the owner of the land and that said land is the subject of a criminal case against Pael for squatting.

In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that accused-petitioner's demurrer to evidence was filed with prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment aforestated would therefore work against herein petitioner.

By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal, a gamble which he lost." (pp. 31-32, Rollo)

Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary permit to the U.P. Security Force or in court, such being attached only to his motion for reconsideration. Worthy of note is the fact that such permits are both dated June 26, 1985, which is more than ten (10) months after the illegal construction took place and three (3) months after the case had been filed against petitioner. (p. 29, Rello)

More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his motion to dismiss bars him from presenting his evidence, but nowhere in his petition does he endeavor to argue in his favor. Such a question should have been raised by the petitioner in the court a quo and on appeal yet he failed to do the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.