An Examination of The Effectiveness of The Incident Command System Using Case Studies From The 1970 and 2003 California Wildfires

An Examination of the Effectiveness of the Incident Command System Using Case Studies
An Examination of the Effectiveness of the Incident Command System Using Case Studies From the 1970 and 2003 California Wildfires Stephen Messer American Military University In partial completion of the requirements for EDGM 541: Mass Casualty Incident Management Professor Slobodan Pesic
Abstract In 2004, the United States Department of Homeland Security presented an incident management system to emergency services agencies and personnel. This system known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was heralded as a nation-wide incident management system (USDHS, 2004) that would resolve the major issues identified during previous catastrophic events. The intent of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the Incident Management System as it has been applied during large-scale disasters in the United States. By examining the relevant literature, this study seeks to explore the effectiveness of the Incident Management System by examining case studies of the 1970 wildfires in Southern California and comparing the management issues identified at that time with the management issues discovered during the 2003 wildfires in Southern California. This study will determine if the implementation of the Incident Management System by the California practitioners resolved or lessened the impact of the management issues identified in 1970. The wildfires of 1970 revealed serious problems in the management of a large, catastrophic wildfire in which multiple agencies and levels of government responded. From this disastrous fire, the responding agencies in southern California cooperatively developed FIrefighting REsources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE, 1988) to address the management issues. In 2003, southern California was again ravaged by a series of firestorms. These storms tested the incident management system that had developed after the 1970 fires. The analysis of the issues discovered during these two catastrophic wildfires suggests that the incident command system did lessen the managerial issues of the 1970 fires. However, major issues still remained to be resolved in mutual aid, incident command, communications, and multi-agency cooperation. This study may be used by emergency management practitioners and decision makers to enhance mitigation efforts and preparedness efforts. It may assist emergency management planners in the development and implementation of an more effective management tools and technology that will address any shortfalls in the National Incident Management System. keywords: incident command system, wildfires, FIRESCOPE, NIMS
An Examination of the Effectiveness of the Incident Command System Using Case Studies From the 1970 and 2003 California Wildfires
In 2004, the United States Department of Homeland Security presented an incident management system to emergency services agencies and personnel. This system known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was heralded as a nation-wide incident management system (USDHS, 2004) that would resolve the major issues identified during the response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19, 1995 (OKCEM, 1996) and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This system was a central component of the National Response Framework (NRF) unveiled by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator R. David Paulison during a press conference held on January 22, 2008. (Chertoff & Paulison, 2008) The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was extolled by Secretary Chertoff as a system that ...is well understood by responders; and that it allows first responders from different jurisdictions and across different disciplines to work together within a common framework. (Chertoff & Paulison, 2008) Through the mandated requirements of the NRF, which required the use of NIMS by emergency response agencies (USDHS, 2008), the incident management system that had been originally designed to support the response to wildfires in California, had now become the incident management system for use by diverse agencies and all levels of government during response to and recovery from natural and man made disasters. The intent of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the Incident Management System as it has been applied during large-scale disasters in the United States. By examining the relevant literature, this study seeks to explore the effectiveness of the Incident Management System by examining case studies of the 1970 wildfires in Southern California and comparing the management issues identified at that time with the management issues discovered during the 2003 wildfires in Southern California. This study will determine if the implementation of the Incident Management System by the California practitioners resolved or lessened the impact of the management issues identified in 1970. The severe wildland fires that struck Southern California in 1970 were selected as a case study due to these fires being the large-scale incidents that prompted California to develop and implement the incident
management system from which NIMS evolved. The California wildfires of 2003 were selected for their close resemblance to the 1970 fires in the land area affected. Additionally, it was the incident management system used during this incident that provided most of the system that was adopted by the USDHS less than a year later. (USDHS, 2004) This analysis will seek to answer the following questions: 1. What were the significant management issues identified during and immediately after the Southern California wildfires of 1970? 2. How were these issues addressed by California? 3. What were the significant management issues identified during and immediately after the Southern California wildfires of 2003? 4. How did the implementation of the Incident Management System change or impact the management problems identified? If the problems identified after the catastrophic wildfires of 1970 in Southern California are not resolved by the implementation of the Incident Management System during the wildfires of 2003, then the use of the Incident Management System will not improve the management of large-scale disasters. The Wildfires of 1970 When Southern California figuratively exploded into flame during the late summer and fall of 1970, a patchwork of laws, incident management systems, plans, and leadership philosophies existed regarding how to manage major, large scale disasters. In the United States, all fifty states had passed state laws establishing policies and procedures for disaster response that were as unique as the individual state legislatures that wrote and adopted them. (Rowley, 2010) In 1950, Earl Warren, the sitting Governor of California established the Office of Emergency Services in the Governors Office as part of the State Office of Civil Defense in order to provide direction and responsibility for large-scale events in California. (CGOES, 2003) Additionally, in 1950, California took unprecedented steps and established mutual aid agreements between counties. (Johnson, et al., 2009) All fifty-eight counties and most municipal governments were linked together by these mutual aid agreements. In 1956 the Office of Civil Defense was renamed the California Disaster Office with a focus directed toward response to natural disasters. (CGOES, 2003) The California Disaster Office was again reorganized
into the Office of Emergency Services with the passage of the Emergency Services Act of 1970 by the California Legislature. (Rowley, 2010) The Emergency Services Act required that all emergency response agencies in California operate under a State Fire Disaster Plan which is coordinated by the Fire and Rescue Division of the Office of Emergency Services during a major wildland fire. (Rowley, 2010) The State Fire Disaster Plan established a process for coordination of local, state and federal fire suppression forces. This plan, along with other progressive wildland fire management policies placed California as a national leader in both wildfire management and large-scale disaster interagency coordination. However, the historic fire season of 1970 would quickly expose the short-comings of these efforts. The weather conditions during late August and early September of 1970 were creating the perfect storm for wildfires. Santa Ana winds were moving across the chaparral covered landscape at forty and fifty miles per hour with gusts sometimes exceeding hurricane force. Southern California had been experiencing severe drought conditions for over six months with little to no rain falling over much of the chaparral and pine covered mountainsides. The average temperature during that period was around one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. The relative humidity was often less than ten percent with the Santa Ana winds acting as a huge evaporator further dropping the humidity to between one and two percent. (Schroeder & Buck, 1970) The conditions for a major wildland disaster were present in California and the State's local, state and federal firefighters waited for the shoe to drop. (Phillips, 1971) Phillips, the author of California Aflame describes the initial event that was to trigger what became known as the Fire Siege of 1970. It all started when a man set his match intentionally to tinder-dry grass along the Fish Ranch Road in the hills behind Oakland. Within minutes flames, feeding on dry coyote brush and pine trees and whipped by a strong northeast wind, swept to the ridge top and leaped into homes perched on the steep hillside above San Francisco Bay. In less than two hours fire completely destroyed 36 homes, badly damaged 37 others, and desolated 230 acres of valuable watershed. (Philips, 1971) From this somewhat inauspicious beginning on September 25, 1970 the wildfires exploded across the southern portion of California until they were brought under control thirteen days later. On September 28, 1970, at the height of the fire suppression operations, ...it is estimated that over 10,000 personnel and 800 units of fire apparatus were in use from many agencies battled the fires that went on to burn 1,000 structures
and damage 2,000 more. The scope and severity of these wildfires is staggering. A continuing siege of major wildfires over the chaparral region of southern California severely taxed the capabilities of the region's fire protection agencies and caused major damage to structures and wildland resources. (Chase, 1980) The fire protection agencies were overwhelmed by 773 wildfires that burned approximately 580,000 acres. The fires completely destroyed 722 homes when they burned isolated residences or spread from the hills into urban communities. Sixteen lives were lost, attributed directly to the fire activity. Suppression costs and damages together were estimated at 233 million dollars. (Phillips, 1971) Thirty-two of these fires were classified as large fires that accounted for 93 percent of the total acreage burned and 89 percent of the homes that were completely destroyed. (Phillips, 1971) 1970 Wildfire Issues This series of fires exposed major problems in the areas of mutual aid, incident management, communications, and multi-agency coordination. (FIRESCOPE, 1988) These impedements did not suddenly appear during the 1970 firestorms. This incident was consistent with five decades of research on organizational response to disasters, which repeatedly found that major disasters require coordinated response by many organizations. Unfortunately, much valuable time is lost while trying to overcome differences in organizational design, positional titles, emergency response training, and organizational procedures. (Lindell, et al., 2005) These issues were substantiated by T.E. Drabek in his ground-breaking study of how human systems function in disaster situations. (Drabek, 1986) Even though a mutual aid system had been established prior to the 1970 fire season, it soon became apparent that the lack of a central coordination facility greatly hampered the ability of agencies to effectively support each other without significant coordination being done during the crisis. The wide variety of equipment, training and experience provided evidence that a more robust mutual aid system with some type of capabilities typing was needed. One of the most significant incident management issues that quickly became apparent during the fires was the difficulty of coordinating and controlling ...the vast numbers of firefighters and other emergency responders. (Rowley, 2010) Estimates provided by Phillips show the number of professional firefighters actively engaged in fire suppression activities as 19,500 firefighters from over 500 different departments.
Additionally, there were thousands of volunteers and support personnel engaged in the suppression efforts. (Phillips, 1971) To control and coordinate this vast number of assets and organizations a headquarters was set up in the Los Angeles county Fire Department Headquarters in accordance with the State Fire Disaster Plan. The makeup of this headquarters was not designated in the plan and it grew in an ad hoc fashion as local, state, and federal agencies sent senior leaders to this location. This organization proved to be cumbersome and inadequate. Additionally, other headquarters were established at the Division of Forestry Headquarters in Sacramento and at Regional and District Headquarters throughout the affected areas. (Rowley, 2010) There was no formal information system established between these various control and coordination centers with resultant conflicts and issues arising due to each headquarters independently controlling a particular segment of the response effort. On September 28, 1970 the primary headquarters located in Los Angeles County moved to Riverside, California due to a significant increase in firefighting forces being shifted into San Diego and San Bernardino Counties. This required the headquarters to move from California Region 1 to Region 4 with resulting confusion regarding responsibility, coordination and control. (Rowley, 2010) Phillips points to the obvious when he writes GHQ did not operate smoothly at all times. (California Aflame, p. 39) One of the most significant problems that developed due to this lack of centralized control and coordination was the inability to gather and disseminate accurate and timely information across the various segments of the impacted region. This, along with the inability to conduct centralized planning prevented managers from establishing rational priorities in allocating scarce fire suppression resources and coordinating individual agency requests for aid. (Chase, 1980) This led to the overtaxing of some resources while other resources were underutilized. In addition to an inability to adequately coordinate the allocation of fire suppression resources, the various agencies organizational structures were incompatible. (Sager, 2008) Likewise, terminology and tactical procedures varied to such an extent that coordination of resources was extremely difficult. Sager demonstrates this problem by pointing to different agencies using different titles for personnel doing the same job. (Sager, 2008)
Adding to the difficulties in managing this series of large fires were significant issues regarding communications. Among the various issues that arose was the amount of traffic being placed on the system and the many radio frequencies involved. (Chase, 1980) A more strategic problem was discovered by investigators examining the fire response when they discovered that ...the fire agencies could not communicate because they didn't share radio frequencies and used different terminology and radio codes. (Sager, 2008) The significance of this problem was demonstrated by Bill Plough, CDF Division Chief when he stated One department could not talk to someone from another department over the radio systems. You had to flag them down and talk face to face. (Eckles, 2004) Intertwined with the problems of mutual aid, incident management, and communications was a series of issues involving multi-agency coordination. In its findings regarding the 1970 fires, the Task Force on Californias Wildfire Problem complemented the efforts made by agencies from all levels of government, yet stated that All agencies recognized, however, that a number of problems significantly hampered the effectiveness of this cooperation. (TFCWFP, 1972) Chase is more succinct when he states that coordination lacked a centralized information and coordination source. Agencies were required to meet this need on an individual basis. (Chase, 1980) Addressing The 1970 Wildfire Issues The impact of these fires and the resulting organizational and technological issues that surfaced attracted national attention. This often critical attention upon the wildland fire management personnel and practices of southern California provided impetus to the local, state, and federal agencies to come together to discover how to better integrate their efforts by developing a common language, management concepts, and communications (Moynihan, 2009) In 1971, during the 92nd United States Congress, 900,000 dollars was appropriated to strengthen fire command and control systems research at Riverside, California, and Fort Collins, Colorado. (Chase, 1980). This funding was provided to initiate research and development aimed at alleviating the problems apparent during this disaster. Congress further tasked the group at Riverside to concentrate on developing advanced airborne fire intelligence methods for detecting and mapping fires, including real time telemetry of information and display at fire command control centers.... (Chase, 1980) This directed focus would impact the research
conducted in subsequent years. In order to facilitiate progress on these Congressional recommendations, all of the major agencies involved in wildland fire protection in southern California agreed to cooperate in a research and development program that would address the problems of the 1970 situation. (Chase, 1980) The Pacific South-west Forest and Range Experiment Station was given overall direction of the project with cooperation from the major wildland fire protection agencies, municipal fire departments, local, state, and federal governmental agencies. The program began in 1972 with the intial aim of discovering which areas would be most the most productive study areas. This analysis conducted in 1972 found that the solution to the wildfire management dilemma would necessarily address not only advanced airborne fire intelligence methods, but fire information systems generally and their effective utilization in planning and coordinating action on both single-and multipleagency fires or similar emergencies. (Chase, 1980) A charter containing these items was approved in March 1973 under the auspices of the Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). The initial analysis identified five major components that would make up the FIRESCOPE system. These components were: coordinate multi-agency resources during major incidents, develop improved methods for forecasting fire behavior, develop standard terminology, Provide multi-agency communications, [and] provide multi-agency training. (FIRESCOPE, 1988) Chase presents the intent of the FIRESCOPE system development as found in the unpublished charter of FIRESCOPE The intent of the research design effort was to "make a quantum jump in the capability of southern California wildland fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations." (Chase, 1980) The intent of FIRSCOPE was to design and provide the procurement, testing, and implementation of an operation fire suppression coordination system.... (Chase, 1980) Though a complete system including organizational structure, equipment and training was not accomplished during the initial five year grant cycle of FIRESCOPE, the basic operational concept which called for a ...timely commitment of adequate multiagency resources, operating under common procedures and organizational structure, to all incidents which exceed, or threaten to exceed, the capability of any single fire protection agency.... (Chase, 1980) was accomplished. The initial implementation of FIRESCOPE occurred from 1977 to 1979. Though all partner agencies had not agreed
upon every component of the FIRESCOPE system, the basic concepts had been agreed upon with all partner agencies having fully implemented the FIRESCOPE ICS. In his 1980 examination of the ICS portion of FIRESCOPE, Chase reported that The major elements of the ICS, namely, common terminology, uniform organizational structure, and uniform procedures for incident operations, have been tested and adopted by all partner agencies, and are currently being implemented in the FIRESCOPE area. (Chase, 1980) When the funding from the initial grant ended in 1982 approximately sixty percent of the planned system had been developed and implemented. In a report prepared by FIRESCOPE in 1988, the FIRESCOPE research and development cooperative had achieved significant progress toward the quantum leap forward envisioned in its charter with the development and implementation of seven major system components. These accomplishments included automated weather stations, a common mapping system of orthophoto maps, an incident communication plan system with an integral Fire Information Management System (FIMS), a computer based fire behavior modeling system, an airborne infrared monitoring system, designated and functional regional multi-agency Operations Coordination Centers (OCC), multi-channel radio caches, communications vehicles, an inter-agency agreement on radio frequencies, and a common Incident Command System (ICS). (FIRESCOPE, 1988) The participating fire protection agencies continued to develop and refine the system in the years that followed the initial implementation. The fire protection practitioners of Southern California saw ICS as reducing their coordination problems and increasing the effectiveness of their responses. (Bigley and Roberts 2001; Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre 2006; Cole 2000; Moynihan 2008) This perception of the benefit of ICS usage during wildland interface situations led many of the fire protection agencies to begin using ICS during urban structure fires, rescue situations, hazardous material incidents, as well as large scale natural disasters such as earthquakes. Moynihan saw this expansion of ICS use beyond its designed intent as the beginning of a second stage in ICS development. (Moynihan, 2009) with ...crisis responders...voluntarily adopting the ICS, at least in part because they perceived it as a tool to solve the problem of interorganizational coordination common to most crises. (Moynihan, 2009) As FIRESCOPE ICS became the standard throughout the fire service in California, fire professionals from outside of California began to recognize the possible benefits of this management tool and they began to adapt
the system to meet the needs of incident management across the United States. By the beginning of the 2003 wildfire season, FIRESCOPE had ...become the de facto American national standard making body, with the active support of the National Fire Protection Association. (Hannestad, 2005) The ability of the FIRESCOPE ICS was about to receive its largest test since its inception. The 2003 Wildfires As the fire season of 2003 drew near, government and fire protection officials throughout Southern California recognized that the weather conditions prevalent throughout the area presented the potential for a catastrophic wildland-urban interface fire. Several key factors were coalescing to bring about the worst fire conditions in modern history. A drought had plagued Southern California for the past several years. This drought coupled with a devastating bark beetle infestation produced a significant increase in dead and diseased trees. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) Santa Ana winds of thirty to forty miles per hour coupled with high ambient temperatures and extremely low humidity made Southern California vulnerable to a major conflagration. An outgrowth of the lessons learned from the 1970 fire season was the development of a fire intelligence section at Riverside, California. This section called Predictive Services closely monitored the weather and fuel conditions in the region. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) They predicted the arrival of the Santa Ana winds and the developing severe fire weather before it impacted the region. Brad Doyle, a forecaster for the National Weather Service (NWS) reinforced the Predictive Services warning when he announced If the winds are strong enough, the fire will begin to advance rapidly. Every fire is potentially dangerous, but these conditions obviously magnify those concerns. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) This intelligence initiated the movement of fire resources from northern California to southern California before most of the large fires started. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) Also, in response to the predictions of Predictive Services, the U.S. Forest Service moved additional air assets into Southern California in preparation for the possible disaster. As Predictive Services had accurately predicted, the Santa Ana winds of forty to fifty miles per hour coupled with high ambient temperatures and extremely low humidity turned the Southern California area into a tinderbox. All that was needed was a match to be struck. On October 21, 2003 the match was struck when a fire ignited on a range at Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base in San Diego County, California. Before the day was over, three additional fires had ignited in the
region. The fire siege of 2003 had begun. Over the next three weeks, fourteen major fires swept across Southern California. Many of these fires such as the Grand Prix Fire, Piru Fire, Simi Fire, Old Fire, Cedar Fire, Paradise Fire, Mountain Fire, Padua Fire, and Otay Fire (Clark, et al., 2003) burned their names into the history and collective consciousness of the people of Southern California. These fires began as wildland fires but quickly extended into urban areas burning over four thousand homes and businesses. The extreme fire behavior surprised even veteran wildland fire control specialists. One of the fires, known as the Cedar Fire, grew from 500 to 31,000 acres in four hours. (WFLLC, 2003) This type of fire growth was unprecedented with fires igniting up to three-quarters of a mile ahead of the main fire, igniting homes and businesses great distances from the main head of the fire. By the time the fires were controlled, over 750,000 acres of land were burned with over 4,000 homes destroyed. Twenty-six people were killed, most of them killed when the firestorm outran them as they tried to escape sixty foot wall of flames. (Clark, et al, 2003) In his 2004 study of the firestorms of 2003, Keeley stated that these fires were ...cumulatively, the single largest event in Californias recent history...the costliest disaster to befall California exceeding previous fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. (Keeley, et al, 2004) In addition to the multiple fires, the wildland-urban interface issues, and the economic expenses, several factors were present that significantly added to the difficulties faced by the emergency response agencies. Blackwell and Tuttle identified six factors that added compelxity to this incident: multiple large fires burning at the same time, large fires exceeding span of control plans, fires involving multiple jurisdictions, a great deal of involvement by both elected officials and the media, policy differences between agencies, and fires burning in both urban and wildland settings simultaneously. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) 2003 Wildfire Issues The fire siege of 2003 presented the fire protection agencies and all levels of government with a situation that challenged the plans and advancements made in California through FIRESCOPE. In order to determine if ICS as developed through FIRESCOPE had lessened the problems discovered after the 1970 wildfires, this paper will examine the same four general areas identified after the 1970 wildfires. The first area of examination is mutual aid. During the 1970 fires, it was discovered that even though a mutual aid system had been developed, it had not been fully implemented and without significant coordination
prior to an event, agencies found it difficult to successfully provide mutual support. Shortly after the 2003 wildfires, Mission-Centered Solutions (MCS) was contracted to conduct research into the 2003 fires. During this research, MCS found that responders ...reported that the mutual aid and the mobilization system caused many to be on assignment elsewhere while large incidents were in progress on their home units. (MCS, 2003) Though this may seem to suggest that the mutual aid system had not reduced the issues discovered in 1970, the issue of units being away while fires were burining in their primary response territories actually demonstrates the success of the mutual aid system. According to MCS, the reason for the responders criticism mentioned above is that units were aggressively dispatched to support engaged fire suppression forces very early as incidents began. (MCS, 2003) This suggests that the mutual aid system had become much more efficient than the one used in 1970 allowing units to be quickly dispatched to other jurisdictions, and engaged once in the other jurisdiction. As MCS discovered, the mutual aid system worked so efficiently that many responders found themselves away battling the fires while someone else was fighting fire back on theirs. (MCS, 2003) This caused many responders to question whether mutual aid agreements or the mobilization system ought to have a provision to keep resources at their home units during severe fire conditions or to reassigned resources back to their home unit when the situation requires. (MCS, 2003) The mutual aid system worked much more efficiently in 2003 than in 1970. It worked so well, that further refinement was needed in order to solve issues arriving from its efficient mobilization of forces. The second general area of inquiry identified after the 1970 fires was the area involving incident management. In order to adequately cover this area, it is important to note that several things were done prior to October 21, 2003 directly related to incident management that developed out of the issues of 1970. One such development was the implementation of the Predictive Services Section located at the Operational Center in Riverside, California. This group provided real-time and near-time intelligence regarding weather conditions, fire weather severity and fuel loads for Southern California. As discussed earlier in this paper, this groups accurate and timely predictions allowed fire officials to initiate the staging of high-value assets. Another development that was operational prior to the fire ignition in 2003 was that by and large, responders were well trained and experienced with the ICS. In addition, they benefited from planning and training made under somewhat realistic circumstances. (Moynihan, 2009) Cole provides supporting evidence to this by
stating that ...planning exercises were helpful to the extent that they prepared for predictable needs, including staging areas, resource needs, helicopter loading points, backfiring locations, and evacuation plans. One fire chief suggested that such planning meant that he could focus his mental energy on the more dynamic aspects of the fire, and that such plans foster a sense of confidence within the ICS, reducing the feeling of being overwhelmed. (Cole, 2000) The fire chief quoted above identified another development that originated in the incident management issues of 1970, knowledge and confidence in ICS. Recognizing that the ICS used during the 2003 fires was the refined ICS developed through FIRESCOPE after the 1970 fires, it is of great importance that the responders who participated in the 2003 MCS study ...expressed a strong them that the Incident Command System (ICS) provided the critical foundation for trust between agencies and effective interagency cooperation.(MCS, 2003) A study entitled Lessons Learned 2003: Success and Challenges from AAR Roll Ups conducted in 2004 by The Guidance Group found that during the chaotic first hours of the major fires when suppression forces were often isolated and overwhelmed, it was the trust between agencies provided by the commonality of the ICS that allowed difficult decisions to be made and carried out. (The Guidance Group, 2004) Likewise, personnel who had completed ICS training saw ICS as valuable and that their knowledge of ICS affected command and control and their ability to interface with the larger incident organization. (MCS, 2003) The MCS study also found that agencies who had trained all their personnel in ICS were much more effective than those agencies who had not conducted such training. A majority of responders who participated in the MCS study expressed support for mandatory, standardized ICS training for all agencies involved in response, ...including volunteer organizations and public utilities. (MCS, 2003) The evidence seems to suggest that the use of ICS during the 2003 fires provided a framework that allowed significant improvement in incident management. It should be noted that on several occasions, the fire was moving at such a rapid rate that the standard process by which agencies would establish a management structure was too slow. (SDFD 2004) MCS supports the findings of the San Diego Fire Department by recognizing that the speed of the fire changed the developing situation so rapidly that unified command could not keep up and plans rarely remained valid beyond six hours. (MCS, 2003)
A direct correlation to the responders familiarity with ICS is the finding that unified command can be highly successful during complex events if the participants are confident of the system with a clear understanding and definition or role. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) This was particularly true when the participants were from similar organizations. In contrast to this were the coordination problems that occurred during the Cedar fire when unfamiliar agencies were brought together in a unified command. This was particularly true when the agency personnel had limited or no background in ICS. (Moynihan, 2009) In the 1970 fires, the concept of span of control was not effectively implemented. Evidence provided by several of the Area Command Teams (ACT) of 2003 suggests that maintaining span of control continued to challenge incident managers. The ACTs from the 2003 fires reported that maintaining appropriate span of control was their most difficult challenge. (The Guidance Group, 2004) It is apparent that the incident command system developed after the disastrous 1970 fires allowed responders to more effectively control and coordinate the response to the complexities of the 2003 fires. A major component of incident management that was identified as a serious issue during the 1970 fires was resource management. The MCS study found that both the numbers of fire personnel and equipment was inadequate. The result of these shortages had a serious impact on the plans that were developed prior to the event because adequate resources were not always available to implement them. (MCS, 2003) Additionally, it was found that long-term lack of resources seriously impacted the San Diego Fire Departments ability to respond during the Cedar fire because of the low-level of funding due to shortcomings in training and equipment. (SDFD, 2004) A significant issue that was demonstrated during the 2003 fires was what responders described as unnecessary and unacceptable delays in resource ordering. (MCS, 2003) These delays were the result of an interoperability issue that existed between the state of Californias Multi-Agency Incident Resource Processing System (MIRPS) and the national Resource Ordering Status System (ROSS). Due to the inability of these two systems to integrate, all requests for resources had to be manually transferred from MIRPS to ROSS. (MCS, 2003) Field Commanders stated that this cumbersome system was 24 to 48 hours behind in processing orders. (Blackwell & Tuttle, 2004) The evidence suggests that the use of the Incident Command System was productive when the responders were trained in the system and the event allowed for the command structure to be established. However, from
this evidence also suggests that when responders were not fully trained in ICS or the event escalated and changed at a pace that did not allow the command structure to become established, ICS did not improve the leaders ability to manage the incident. Another significant issue that arose during the 1970 fires was the inability for responders to communicate between units from different agencies. After the 1970 fires, the FIRESCOPE system established a state-wide emergency communication system complete with transmission towers, repeaters, and radios. One of the foundational characteristics of the ICS as used in 2003 was the standard usage of plain text for radio transmission. This allowed easier communication between agencies. (Eckles, 2004)Though it was noted that communications was more effective in 2003 (MCS, 2003) there was still significant problems with the communication system. Some of this was due to transmission towers and repeaters being destroyed by the firestorms. (Eckles, 2004) MCS found that Respondents indicated unanimously that resolving the communications interoperability problems between the municipal and county 800 MHz and state/federal VHF systems should be the number one priority of management. They indicated that this issue affected safety and operations more than any other. (MCS, 2003) Thus, though improvement had been made in this area of the incident command system, communications remained a significant management issue. From the 1970 fires, emergency response agencies had determined that major wildfires required effective multi-agency coordination. One of FIRESCOPEs primary objectives was to increase the effectiveness of agencies ability to rapidly coordinate and work with other agencies. (FIRESCOPE, 1988) In the after action reports of the 2003 fires, a consistent perception among responders was that Developing a working relationship between members of the IMT and personnel of other key agencies increases understanding of agency specific missions and contributes to effective implementation of operations. Stay flexible and adapt operating procedures. (The Guidance Group, 2004) Several of the Incident Management Teams (IMT) stated that their most notable success (The Guidance Group, 2004) was the establishment of effective working relationships with personnel from other agencies and local governments. (The Guidance Group, 2004) However, like other areas, the evidence is mixed regarding multiagency coordination. One IMT stated that this was their greatest challenge. Questions regarding jurisdiction and the role of the IMT became an issue during structure protection decisions, and those questions never were
resolved. (The Guidance Group, 2004) Additionally, it was found that there was a tendency in the higher levels of government to incorporate the knowledge of local responders when involved in conversations regarding strategy and objectives. (MCS, 2003) This hindered the effectiveness of the response. Conclusion From the evidence gleaned from the 1970 Wildfires it was apparent to the emergency response agencies in Southern California that serious issues existed in the areas of mutual aid, incident command, communications, and multi-agency coordination. A cooperative of fire suppression and government agencies formed to develop a system to address these issues. From this cooperation the FIrefighting REsources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE, 1988) was developed and partially implemented. Though great advancements had been made in the major issue areas identified after the 1970 wildfires, the firestorms of 2003 presented the fire suppression forces of southern California with a test of immense proportions. In this test, the FIRESCOPE ICS was found to significantly improve the management of a catastrophic wildland-urban interface fire event. However, this event demonstrated that the FIRESCOPE ICS had not resolved all of the management issues of 1970. With the U.S. Department of Homeland Security adapting the FIRESCOPE ICS in 2004 as the National Incident Management System (USDHS, 2004), more research must be done to determine if the issues discovered in 2003 will be magnified when this ICS is used for catastrophic events beyond the large wildland fires it was designed to manage. Though some research has been conducted in which ICS has been examined using wildfire events and other types of disasters, (Moynihan, 2009) further research needs to be conducted. From an operational perspective, NIMS could provide a solution to some of the management issues, in particular interoperability and multi-agency coordination. Further work needs to be done to develop and implement communication systems and strategies that will enable emergency responders from disparate agencies to quickly and effectively communicate. Advances in telecommunication technology could provide some of the solution. The use of a satellite based communications system could be investigated in order to remove the issue of transmission tower loss during events. Perhaps the most significant issue with interoperability, communications, and incident management could be lessened if all persons and agencies involved in response to major incidents received standardized training in the incident command system. (Cole, 2000)
This study sought to examine the effectiveness of the Incident Management System as it has been applied during large-scale disasters in the United States. By examining the relevant literature, this study explored the effectiveness of the Incident Management System by examining case studies of the 1970 wildfires in Southern California and comparing the management issues identified at that time with the management issues discovered during the 2003 wildfires in Southern California. The analysis of the issues discovered during these two catastrophic wildfires suggests that the problems identified after the catastrophic wildfires of 1970 in southern California are lessened but not completely resolved by the implementation of the Incident Management System during the wildfires of 2003.Though the use of ICS has significantly improved the ability of emergency managers to respond to catastrophic wildfires. Recognizing that major issues still remain to be resolved in mutual aid, incident command, communications, and multi-agency cooperation; the emergency management practitioner may accept that the use of ICS will improve the management of large-scale disasters.
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An Examination of The Effectiveness of The Incident Command System Using Case Studies From The 1970 and 2003 California Wildfires

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