Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960 Author(s): Victoria de Grazia Source: The

Journal of Modern History, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 53-87 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1880967 . Accessed: 07/10/2011 07:36
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The and Mass Culture Sovereignty: American Challenge to European Cinemas,1920-1960*

Rutgers University

Victoria de Grazia

as on "Then,onedaywe sawhanging thewallsgreat posters longas serpents. with redhandkerchief, a leveled Atevery a man,hisfacecovered street-corner . intothecinemasand a revolver thepeacefulpassersby. . . We rushed at realizedimmediately everything changed."While the GreatWar that had wastedawayEurope'sresources, American the cinemaoccupiedthehome the fronts. theParisian For futurist Philippe Soupault, flickering imagesof PearlWhite's"almostferocious smile" announced "the revolution, bethe of the cultural ginning a newworld."1I themid-1920s, swayof America's By industries so powerful someEuropeans was whether that questioned old-world states exercised still In over citizens' leisure. England, sovereignty their "the bulkof picture goersare Americanized an extent makesthem to that regard theBritish as a foreign film a film," commentedLondon DailyExpress writer in 1927; "theytalkAmerica, think America, dream America; haveseveral we million people,mostly women, who,toall intents purposes, temporary and are American citizens."2 Fromthe1920s,thisoutpouring cultural of artifacts imagespresented and societies European with setofchallenges leastas complex confounda at and ingas that posedbyAmerican manufacturers' intense competition.3 first The camefrom free-floating challenge the of quality American commercial culture
* Research thisessay was supported a 1981 American for by Councilof Learned Societies and fellowship bygrants from Rutgers the Research Council.For University their I exacting comments, am grateful RobertSklarand to PeterKatzenstein, to Charles Maier,Fritz and Scharpf, other fellow members theproject of Experimenting withScale directed Philippe by Schmitter under auspicesof theSocial Science the Research Council'sJoint Committee Western on Europe.
1

GlennHughes(Seattle,1930), p. 13.

Philippe Soupault, The AmericanInfluencein Europe, trans.Babette Hughes and

Newsletter (July 1927): 320. 183 1, 3 The influence U.S. massculture of abroadhas beendebated widely, though less byhistorians by sociologists students masscommunications. various than and of The schoolsof thought, roughly speaking, reflect their authors' assessments thevirtues of and vices of American massculture within United the Statesitself. The position that
? 1989by The University Chicago.0022-2801/89/6101-0002$01.00 of All rights reserved.
[Journal of Modern History 61 (March 1989): 53-87]

2 A. G. Atkinsonin the London Daily Express, quoted in J. WalterThompsonCo.

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as it followed globalizing the tendencies thecapitalist of marketplace, overboundaries eluding and riding nation-state political controls. it did so, it As two on subverted idealsof national community in contention theConlong The one, originating France,rested an identification soverin tinent. on of with cultural eignty a shared legacy longnurtured within country's that historic it to political boundaries; extended citizenship all who upheldFrench high culture'suniversalizing values and rationalist precepts-or,at least, who sharedthe languagein whichtheywerecouched.The other originated in based on theidea of a Kulturnation,antedated it modemGerman Germany: of statehood, aspiredto builda community blood and belief,and designed ambitions territorial and lines.4 alongethnic linguistic American also in commercial culture poseda challenge itsapparent classlessness. a it over Formingnewcultural koine, trespassed conventional cultural of of lines. The products a societyin whichthe intense commodification had to the culture tended blursocial distinctions, American movies(notto forms popular of culture suchas jazz or the mention other commercialized of movedintothemorevisibly class-stratified cultures condetective story) its tinental Europe,whereneither conservative messagesnorits moresubversiveones werefamiliar enoughto be culledreadily.5 Hence, American betweenhighand low, elite and mass culture the challenged distinctions in had to cultures sincetheseventeenth that popular century arisen response
has "cultural imperialism" beenargued American have industries abetted U.S. cultural workis sumSchiller. and related His Herbert by mostemphatically thesociologist I. eds., NationalSovereignty and in marized Kaarle Nordenstreng Herbert Schiller, arN.J., 1979). OliverBoyd-Barrett's (Norwood, Communication and International of of Framework Analysis Media an Towards International ticle"Media Imperialism: of the (London,1977), pp. 116-41, explores usefulness thisapproach J. Woollacott if numerous a giving Media in theWorld (London,1977), offers globalperspective, the Spreading American cases. The historian EmilyRosenberg's often contradictory exof cultural Conn., 1982), givesthebroadoutlines American Dream (Westport, for in studies examined my"Americanism Export,' are This andrelated pansionism. 7-8 (Winter-Spring 1985): 74-81. Wedge 4 On European Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, see nationalisms, EmestGellner, (London, 1983) is ImaginedCommunities ton, N.J., 1955). BenedictAnderson's of in notions nationhood a globalcontext. in European helpful putting especially 5 The contradictory in cultures Europeis sugof commercial reception American American Popular ed., Superculture: gestedin variousessays in C. W. E. Bigsby, of and Europe (London, 1975); and mostsubtly all in theworkof Reyner Culture Design," in LessonsfromAmerica,ed. Banham;see his "Europe and American Richard Rose (London,1974), pp. 67-91.
N.Y., 1983); in additionto Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History(PrinceTunstall,in The Media Are American:Anglo-American in relationto themedia. Jeremy Systems," in Mass Communicationsand Society,ed. J. Curran, M. Gurevitch,and

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 55 on The tendencies attendant theprint revolution.6 eighteenththedemocratizing it that and conservative found deplorable Leibnitz hismaidmight had century bemoaned the read the same book; his earlytwentieth-century counterpart his factthattheparson'swifesat nearby maidat Sundaymatinees, equally and and that intellectuals workingmen raptin thegaze of Hollywood stars, in alikedelighted CharlieChaplin'santiauthoritarian antics. turnover themes, of and messages Not leastof all, theprodigious styles, fostered American by commercial culture underscored volatility social the of in order postwar societies. ThattheNew World was subject fadsandwild to fluctuations publicopinionhad long been remarked in upon by European Yet observers.7 theAmerican had also seemedexpansive economy enough to satisfy desires the unleashed themarketplace. socialcustoms by Moreover, so appeared thoroughly that wouldnot homogenized rapidly changing styles precipitate social unrest. Finally, UnitedStates'constitutional the structures seemedso firmly embedded thatthepolitical system stoodfirm before the unsettling turnover traditions. Europe,by contrast, of In where political the order so appeared unsettled, cultural distinctions entrenched and mores offered security. bourgeois The who boldlyconfronted revolutionary outbursts, as LucienRomier once remarked, brokedownifhis slippers weremisplaced.8 Thesechallenges proved especially formidable during interwar the decades, evenmore than thepost-World II era,when so in War America's presence real was greater, U.S. personnel in wereactively involved rebuilding local inand dustries, moviesmade in theU.S.A. wereidentified the inroads with

6 The parallelwas first drawn H. A. Innis,in his idiosyncratic by essay Empire andCommunications (Oxford, 1950),esp. pp. 173-217, andnowmore systematically

trans. Josephson M. (New York,1928),esp. pp. 106-34, 178-229. The differences between American and Europeancultures, viewedin lightof theemergence-and threat-of massculture havebeenremarked by leading on European intellectuals and social commentators, figures diverse Matthew as as Arnold, Ortegay Gasset,F. R. Leavis, and GeorgeOrwell,notto mention Antonio Gramsci Herbert and Marcuse. Theorigins thepeculiar of relationship between market culture, among and and political elites,intellectuals, masspublics examined Raymond and is in Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York,1983). Thattheclass-stratified character cultural of tastes becomea sociological has givenandan aesthetic norm contemporary in Europe, or in France,at least,is argued Pierre in Bourdieu, Distinction: Social Critique A of theJudgement Taste,trans. of Richard Nice (Londonand New York,1986).

argumentsare made in his better-known Who Will Be Master: Europe or America?

1983). 7 Signally, this genre comment of originated Alexisde Tocqueville, with Democracy in America (New York,1945), vol. 2, bk. 2, chaps. 13-14, bk. 3, 1-21. 8 In LucienRomier's La promotion la femme de (Paris,1930), pp. 91 ff.;similar

in Elizabeth Eisenstein, The PrintingRevolutionin Early Modern Europe (New York,

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everywhere the American of way of life.9Duringthe 1920s and 1930s, America'smovieindustry offered entirely paradigm organizing an new for cultural production industrial on lines:whatFordism to globalcar manwas ufacturing, Hollywood the studio system topromotingmass-produced, was a internationally marketed cultural commodity. Between1918, whentheU.S. industry established leadership Europe,andthe1960s,whentelevision its in aggravated severeslumpin moviedemand, a causinga restructuringthe of industry led to moredispersed that and variedsystems production, of the American cinemadominated European markets. onlydid it setthepace Not of innovation promote and new professional identities-it also fostered new consumer solidarities reshaped and cultural genres. Duringtheinterwar yearsthere was also a highly visibleeffort devise to of strategies resistance thedomination U.S. commercial to of culture. From the1920s,European policymakers, and intellectuals, party leaders to sought define whatwas "national" aboutpopularculture and to distinguish how European cultural traditions differed American from modelsin terms their of relationship the market, politicalsystem, theforming social to the and of consensus.By the war years,thesehad culminated efforts in within Nazi and Germany Mussolini's to to Italy buildan entire alternative American mass one culture, thatwas protected from international cultural flows, putatively nationalistic marketable, of course,susceptible local yet to and, cross-class, political manipulation. Thattheultimate defeat a self-styled of alternative Americanto European ismcoincided with Alliedtriumph Germany World the over in WarII is not fortuitous. Germanculture was in manyways identified withthe era of of hegemony print and the culture, during interwar the years German cultural the industry presented UnitedStateswithits mostpowerful competition. German also expansionism posed thegravest threat theVersailles to treaty the of system, premise which that was territorial would units cultural-linguistic somehow areasthat werebothbigenough support yieldmarket to free-trade and in capitalism sufficiently terms overcome to homogeneous ethnic political strife.'0 in New Order, ThirdReich laid claim to the Finally, its wartime of beingthestandard-bearera renascent revitalized European community, by thefundamentalist valuesof a racially economic dimenpurestateand with sionsat leastequal to America's own."I Germany's defeat pavedthewayfor
9 Thereis no overallhistory thecultural of of impact theUnitedStatesin post1945Europe.Muchuseful informationregard theimpact themoviesis given in to of
10 Innis, pp. 208-9.

since1945 (Bloomington, Ind., 1969).

in Thomas Guback, The InternationalFilm Industry:Western Europe and America

Alan S. Milward's fine studies, especially The New Order and the French Economy

11The regionalist economiclogic underlying German is expansionism set out in

and Sovereignty 57 Mass Culture on peace premised the free theEuropeanstatesto accede to an American a of relinquish conception nationhood trade goods and ideas and thereby of over sovereignty culture. that presumed over Euadvantage To claim thattheU.S. cinemaachieveda sustained in the was after filmmaking 1914 is notto arguethat latter backward ropean not sense-even though Europeanobservers, to mention any conventional and 12 contended much. French Italianproducers as often U.S. businessmen, in markets the during as wereat leastas prominent Americans international and distribution network production had era. pre-1914 TheFrench a worldwide from other nations' absorbed motifs techniques and thatrapidly companies with set manufacturers, plants werealso theleading equipment they cinemas; the years,Euthe Throughout interwar up in and servicing U.S. market.'3 with someof itsmost Europe-suppliedHollywood rope-especiallycentral and directors. is not It enterprising producers, brilliant virtuoso performers, on own would eventually have thatEuropeanproducers their implausible as automobile manufacturers on embarked massproduction-much European on of did under competitive pressures-capitalizing all varieties local innothe vations.Yet even as theydid so, theyacknowledged U.S. cinema's and was to whatever innovative "modern" and supremacy tended identify precedents. withAmerican leadership quickly so Statesacquired Norare thereasonswhytheUnited obvious.True,theEuropean industries wereall and overwhelmingly wholly wereclosed downforthe by damagedin one way or another thewar:they of or to and their capitalwas duration thehostilities turned war purposes, and that weremerging, retooling, at depleted theverymoment U.S. firms to drives. all cases,European In firms weredependent export preparing mount were States costsofproduction the on export whereas theUnited in markets, their products amortized thevasthomemarket, on enabling firms market to probably hampered abroadat very low cost. In Europe,wartime regulations it to making harder respond economic conditions, to rapid adjustment postwar

journals such as the U.S. Varietyand the French La cinematographie fran,aise and researchedFrench Cinema: The First Wave, 1915-1929 (Princeton,N.J., 1984), esp. chap. 1. On Italy, see Aldo Bernardini, Cinema muto italiano: Arte, divismo, e

C. Kirby (Cambridge, 1981), esp. pp. 78 ff.,91-92. 12 Thesecommonplaces amply are illustrated both in American European and trade

(Oxford, 1970), and War,Economy and Society,1939-1945 (London, 1977). See also Andreas Hilgruber's provocative Germanyand the Two WorldWars, trans. William

weresoonthesubstance popular of most fictions, notably Sinclair Lewis'sDodsworth. 13 The French and Italianmovieindustries stoodout:see Richard Abel's carefully

mercato, 1910-1914(BariandRome,1982).BothSweden Denmark powerful and had cinemaestablishments though a smaller on too, scale, a factthatraisesfascinating

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to American competition. Finally, tasteshad changed: whether was bethis cause of wartrauma, postwar social conflicts, thepresence new,more or of proletarian, morefemale, moreyouthful and publicsis unclear. anycase, In European moviemakers, to working theatrical used with conventions, seemed notto respond thesenewdesires. to Atthesametime, U.S. industry the cameoutofthewarprepared sustain to its initialadvantage.Its major strength came from the greatscale of its The enterprise. American homemarket, biggest theWest,was from the in 1920 protected tariffs exclusionary by and distribution networks, whileits worldlanguage potential market-if British the dominions included-far are surpassed Germany's eighty as million, well as France'ssixty million and Italy'sfifty million.Fiercecompetition amongAmerican firms favored had big producers: thepostwar by period,fouror fivegiantfirms formed had cartels the and controlling distribution exhibition networks. capitalized, Well theso-calledMajors (Paramount, Fox, Loew's [MGM], and Warner Bros.) pickedup quickly theassembly on line and scientific marketing techniques worked in other out industries. Bitter to incompetition continued prompt not in novation, only production-Hollywood thefirst promote to being sound, animated in cartoons, color,and television broadcasting-but merchandising as well: Hollywood theway with feature led the the film, moviepalace, the 14 chain-store distribution and system, publicrelations campaigns. In theimmediatepostwar years,the Hollywoodproducers pressedtheiradvantage withbookingoffices, thenestabagainstEuropeancompetitors: beginning own distribution their subsidiaries occasionally and in lishing investing firstas runtheaters well, theysought monopolize to control distribution, of exand hibition, equipment manufacture. were aidedinthis endeavor They greatly to as The MotionPicture Producers and by their capacity organize a sector. Distributors America(MPPDA) actedas carteland lobbyand, withthe of in bureauas well; alestablishment theHays office 1930, as censorship of it in often wracked rivalries, was brutally though by singleminded theface firms. from of competition and foreign smalldomestic
before success and for commercial artistic what accounted international about questions hegemony. theera of American du 14 In addition to classics such as PeterBachlin,Histoireeconomique cinema
(Paris, 1947), a translationof Der Film als Ware; Lewis Jacobs, The Rise of the American Film (New York, 1939); and Henri Mdrcillon, Cinema et monopoles: Le American Movie Industry:The Business of Motion Pictures (Carbondale, Ill., 1982),

historians by studies U.S. film (Paris, 1953), severalrecent cinemaaux Etats-Unis to In industry. addition GorhamKindem,ed., The are devotedto the American The Thompson, Classical Hollywood and Staiger, Kristen Janet see David Bordwell,

Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 (New York, 1985). See also

in RecentFormulations Economic and Industry: Douglas Gomery's"Film Culture Iris History," 2 (1984): 17-30.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 59 Government factor thanis commonly support proveda moreimportant or foreign in American accounts. states enforced suggested either European set economic but never tariffs, quotas,anddispensed subsidies, they provided thekindof precise, enthusiastic feedback trade on matters afforded Julius by Klein's Bureau of Foreign and DomesticTrade insidethe Department of Hoover Commerce. the Moreover, and,more generally, Republican presidents ofthe1920s,encouraged at as self-regulation, which, thesametime itfostered stateregulations.'5 conformity, helpedforestall also extraneous Monopoly at for practices, though restricted home,wereencouraged use abroad,and tariffs against abetted discrimination films foreign imports against imported on thepartof U.S. distribution exhibition and networks. R. Hays, the W. czarofHollywood hiscapacity chief in as of so-called executive theMPPDA, was titled"ambassador"abroad;although private-sector a plenipotentiary, he was empowered theU.S. government threaten to in by boycotts theevent 16 to of obstacles American entry. Alongwithitseconomic the predominance, U.S. motion-picture industry a established kindof cultural To its means superiority. understand nature the choice:didEuropean raising vexedissueofconsumer publics freely prefer American cinemabecausethey to judgedit superior their own; or did they chooseitbecauselocal alternatives foreclosed unfair were by trade practices? Intellectual was muchdivided.If a fewcritics opinion sought dismiss to the for preference U.S. moviesas "cultural imperialism," mostothers argued that moviegoers preferred American the product onlybecauseitwas better not technically setdesign,lighting, editing), also becausetheacting (in and but was morenatural spontaneous, narrative style and the morecompelling, and therendering dailylifemore of accurate. Naturally, assessments such begged '7 themorefundamental of whythoseattributes issue madea film "better." In anycase, evenintellectuals wereanti-American who appreciated vigor the of U.S. filmmaking. Indeed,theyinvokedthe successesof Hollywoodin
Rosenberg 3 above), pp. 138-201. (n. FrankSouthard, American in Industry Europe (Bostonand New York,1931), pp. 93-102. 17 The subject audiences justbeginning be addressed film of is to historians. by See, e.g., Jeanne Allen,"The FilmViewer Consumer," as Review FilmStudies Quarterly of 5 (1980): 481-99. Thethesis response socially that was differentiated European among
15
16

researchers.See, e.g., J. P. Mayer,Sociology ofFilm: Studiesand Documents(London, 1946), and his BritishCinemas and TheirAudiences (London, 1948), in which Mayer

pp. 95 ff.;on working-class receptivityAmerican to massmediainBritain, Herbert see Gans,"Hollywood Filmson British Screens: Analysis theFunction American An of of Culture Abroad,"Social Problems (1962): 324-28. Although methods con9 the and clusions earlysurveys debatable, of are responses them to offer useful a resource for

publics is noted by I. C. Jarvie,Towards a Sociology of the Cinema (London, 1970),

reprints largenumbers so-called of motion-picture autobiographies.

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orderto legitimate filmas an art formand to defend theirown positive assessments thefilm of medium against traditionalists inveighed who against thesociallyand culturally degenerative effects movieculture.'8 of Arguably, American movieswere moreresponsive consumer to desires than films. European Beyond appealing imagesofconsumer abundance, they presented novel and attractive social identities the increasingly to socially mixedpublicsof interwar Europe-thusthecompanionate couple,thetough working girl,thehero-entrepreneur. American moviesalso offered practical lessonsaboutfashion, makeup,and courtship, well as the "art of the as -all useful artistic embrace" skillsin societies whichwomen in weregoing out moreand in whichsocial moreswereundergoing rapidchange.'9The reasonfortheU.S. cinema'sappeal to widelydiverse publicswas notunto connected itsrelocation Hollywood to from East Coast birthplace. its By thismovetheU.S. cinemamade a clean breakwiththekindsof theatrical that dear filmmakers into thirties. well conventions remained to European the its True,American filmmaking thereby relinquished popular origins well. as to vaudeville and in it However, Hollywood continued drawon urban styles to developa fast-changing senseofimmigrant thekeenmarket entrepreneurs was an to idiompitched a vastpolyglot public.Fromthe 1920s,Hollywood and directors came center whichforeign to international actors, technicians, as raidedtalent in searchof fame,skills,and work,especially Hollywood In in elsewhere theprocessof subduing competition. thissense,Hollywood without frontiers" oftheAmerican the epitomized enduring capacity "empire and tastes global of and redistribute to discover, process, techniques, styles, provenance. The innovation at leastin theinterwar that, decade,seemedto tietogether of was At all of the features Hollywoodmoviemaking the starsystem.20 suited mobilizing to in this bottom, was a business strategy hugecapital order
18 For a typical The Soupault, of stancein support theU.S. cinema,see Philippe "Europe's Highaccount, in Influence Europe(n. 1 above),andhisplayful American vol. 110(August 1931). The position 8, Digest, Hail Mickey Mouse," Literary brows

e by against is typified Mario Verdone, Gli intellettuali il cinema (Rome, 1952). The

and and betweena traditionalist and Europeanpositions lines betweenAmerican in in out weresketched clearly themid-1930s conculture modemcinematographic

to tributions Le r6le intellectueldu cine'ma(Paris, 1937). womenis offered of of 19An interpretationtheimpact U.S. movieson European

and Minds,PaganBodies:Americanization Models paper"Puritan in myconference at Europe" (paperdelivered the Rockefeller in of Modem Womanhood Interwar Bellagio,"Womenin DarkTimes," August10-14, 1987). conference, Foundation (New StudioSystem The 20 On the starsystem, see Douglas Gomery, Hollywood the Powdermaker's Hollywood, Dream Hortense York,1986);as wellas anthropologist of in is (London,1951). The phenomenon discussed terms itssociopsychoFactory in logicaleffects EdgarMorin,TheStars(New York,1960).

and Sovereignty 61 Mass Culture possibleaudience.For good to thewidest and sell a standardized to produce over human capital obtained monopoly their a of tycoons purposes production, of In studio long-term contracts. terms to by the by binding starlets thefilm like namesthey guaranteed actedas known quantities; brand sales, thestars to manufacturers standardize product enabling the qualityof the product, not As moviescame to be sold unpreviewed, juston the definition. a result, footage-butalso on thebasisof their is, basis of quantity-that byreel-can Notleastof all, thestarswere as contents, assayedby theactorsinvolved. to referred a univerthey vehicles:fictive notunreal, yet cultural important in diverse, salized humancondition such a way as to appeal to ethnically to sociallymixedpublics.To publicizethe stars' attributes an ever more diverseaudience,Hollywood publicity agents culturally distant, physically of networks plied a moreand morespecializedtabloidpressand far-flung and fanclubswithimages,information, gossip. was in Americanism themovieindustry generally In thisdistinctive form, modelsof contrast theprevailing to in European as perceived standing sharp of The cinemastoodformajoreconomies cinemaorganization. American itfavored actionan and technologies, standardization; scale,capital-intensive to on narrative focused thestarand pitched a crossfilled cinematographic who outside of were class audience.Itspromoters professionals wereformed and attuned within industry, whowere the closely of traditional centers culture, the tradition their of By totheproblem marketing products. contrast, European with artisan-atelier andwas associated shops with was identified decentralized to and conventions attuned well-defined publics.It rested theatrical dramatic techmediated intellectuals-meaning directors, on a commercial network by and betweenthe theater nicians,and actors(who movedback and forth and organizers critics. cinema)as well as cultural changing their without thesetraditions could defend Whether Europeans from economic an viewpoint, Purely problematic. veryessencewas highly as production, the to to it was quiteprofitable tie one's fortunes American film and Italianfirms in the 1920s by relinquishing prodid leadingFrench of in duction orderto specializein the distribution U.S. movies.Froma impossible practically "national"was, at leastinitially, cultural perspective, to define: after whatwas innately "national" about,say,Italiansilent all, what films Or, Romanhobbyists? forthatmatter, by produced aristocratic at moviesamongpublicsthat, was recognizably "foreign"aboutAmerican and would by wereuncoached cinemacritics leastthrough mid-1920s, the or robberies forthemostparthavebeen oblivious whether fantasy train to in Apachesof the Far Westwere invented Hollywoodor shoton sets in on wereconsensus theexistence France'sCamargue But region? evenifthere style,could such a cinemabe commercially and desirability a national of in worried the 1930s, nationalists And, as German exports? viable without

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s cinema stillstay true coulda Kulturnation' ifforeign outlets werenecessary, to its soul?21 Europedepended to cinemain interwar Overall,responses theAmerican of imports thedegreeto whichthese or less on actualquantities American of of on suchas thedegree organization the cutintolocal output than factors of and of sector a whole,traditions stateintervention, theattitudes intelas of Not least of all, the nature the response lectualsand politicalelites.22 on to national depended therolethecinemawas perceived play in shaping identities. in those In very we responses the1920sfrom broadterms, can distinguish business alonethat worried in the 1930s. In theearlier period was usually it and at and stopped therough usually about competition, government the policy or of markets with contingency systems quotas. futile mechanism protecting -these were easily circumvented making"quota quickies" by The latter abroadto fillEuropean regovernment films, financed U.S. companies by be of that annually percentage themoviesdistributed quirements a certain no so offered competition they slipshod that locallymade,weredeliberately addressed problem the intellectuals Meanwhile, with Hollywood productions. in The laterperiod system. of defining cinema'sfunctions thecultural the nationalism economic and cultural was characterized therise of strong by in of The protectionism. advent thesoundfeature theearly1930saccentuated effort protect to local induswas a heightened The outcome thesepositions. the tries,to identify special qualitiesof local cinemaart, to expandthe and of economic marketabilitycinemadomestically abroad,andto influence to indigenous products. moviegoers appreciate
21 The complexissue of identifying motionwhatis "national" aboutnational and historian critic PhilipRosen in "History, is up production taken by film picture in Burchand Some Problems the Studyof National Nation:Kracauer, Textuality, to is there amplereference twoof themost Cinema,"Iris 2 (1984): 69-84, in which and cases, thoseof Germany Japan. problematic producto imports only68 domestic were577 American there 22 In 1925 France, distributed pictures of to tions;thisamounted 83 percent the totalof 693 motion or to in nationwide; 1929 Francetheratiowas 211 U.S. films 52 local productions In and from Germany elsewhere). Italy, coming of 48 percent thetotal(thedifference releasedin 1925 and 75 percent of for accounted 65 percent thefilms U.S. imports 229 local production to 202 and outweighed U.S. imports in 1929. In 1926Germany, imports by distributed; 1929, American of for accounted 44 percent thetotalfilms 426 films of 192) andequaled30 percent thetotal Germany's (142 against had fallen

distributed.See Georges Sadoul, Histoire ge'nerale du cinema: L'art muet, 19191929 (Paris, 1975), 2:29; Ugo Ugoletti,Stato e cinematografo(Rome, 1930), p. 23.

in On Italy,see also Libero Bizzari, "L'economia cinematografica," La cittadel

cinema: Produzione e lavoro nel cinema italiano, 1930-1971, ed. Assessorato della

del cultura Comunedi Rome (Rome, 1979), p. 40.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 63 local movie industries in encountered defending against The difficulties in American domination wereespeciallyevident 1920s France,whereone After coalition form to mostreadily. a all, might haveexpected protectionist movieindustry beentheworld'sbiggest had supplier to 1914, up theFrench distribution and Pathe,dominating Gaumont international its leadingfirms, nation the of sincetheEnlightenment power theFrench networks. Moreover, of of in been measured terms thecosmopolitanism French abroadhad often and wereindeedthefirst mostvociferous French intellectuals highculture. of cultural imperialism.23 decriers American firms had coalition shapedup. Once themajorFrench Yetno protectionist of markets and States'advantages scale on international sized up theUnited of ownhomeoutlets, abandoned simply calculated shallowness their the they fell into feature Thereafter, feature filmmaking largely thehands production.24 several ofa fewmedium-sized firms (e.g., Albatros, Aubert, Ermolieff), and (Osso, Haik, Diamant-Berger, Sapene, Natan, "American-style" producers were to superproductions Nalpas) whose aspirations makeHollywood-type a of to and,finally, quantity often boosted their by connections U.S. capital, virtues-were often independents, who-whatever their small-scale, one-shot noteasilyorganized a sector.25 thisway thedominant corporate stratIn as accentuated secU.S. capital, actually egies,by strengthening tieswith their toral divisions within France.As a result, smallandmedium producers were and and French connections, inpitted againstAmerican distributors their French exhibitors wereplacedat themercy foreign-dominated of dependent distribution chains. NorwereFrench defense readily able to mount coherent any intellectuals of a national what"national" meant.A more cinema,noreven to define traditionalist including supporters EdmondRostand's1918 proposal of set, on behalf a liguefrancaise cinema various of for du and spokesmen a comedie withthe urgedthatthe cinemabe dignified cinematographique, franVaise like sametaxbreaks subsidies thetheater. and as Nationalist ideologues, those
23

p. 88, AndreChevanne estimated that,in 1928, on theaverage,15 percent the of Europeanpopulation wentto the cinemaweekly, whereasonly 12 percent the of French did. 25 Abel (n. 13 above), pp. 51-64.

England, and Germany.In L industrie cine'ma:Le cine'masonore (Bordeaux, 1933), du

2:309-73. 24 Around 1930,thenumber movietheaters France of in numbered 2,400compared to 18,000in theUnited States, 3,730 in Germany, about3,000 inEngland and (Abel, thesefigures reflect neither size of theaters thefrequency the nor p. 12). Notethat of both attendance, of which, wereprobably greater theUnited however, far in States,

work of Sadoul, Histoire g'nerale du cine'ma: L'art muet, 1919-1929,

On theFrench movieindustry, in addition Abel, pp. 5-65, theclassic see to

1:7-50,

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for a de 1922appealfor groupe defense French Francaise's whobackedAction the to cinemaartand thereby defend supplicated stateto support the films, civilization.26 of against crassquantity materialist the culture quality French of alternative sought develop to intellectuals and communist socialist Meanwhile, Among Left's the producers. terms independent for circuits easiercredit and whobecamethedefendant was LeonMoussinac, best-known figures thecritic by Sapeneandhiscompany Cineroman court in a four-year case brought Jean (1926). the in MGM's Jim Harpoonist panned after Moussinac, L'humanite, the by Moussinac, "inciting publicto boo" at whathe was that The charge value. The commercial the had damaged film's called a "bad film," plainly the exonerated 1930.27In themeantime, case had in critic was ultimately of At cause-celebre. issue seemedto be thepossibility becomea left-wing an to cinemathatwouldbe bothradical building alternative theprevailing This cinemawouldhavedefended engagedfilmindependent, and national. rather moviegoers be critical to incited makers capital, against andforeign big the and the movement against submissive consumers, defended workers' than Right. commission study to decision setup a state to the Ultimately, government's than to pressure tothevoice thecinema less,itappeared, industrial responded of Headed by thethenminister and of intellectuals to foreign precedents. in as bureau, Edward Herriot his capacity headoftheBeaux-Arts instruction the the had goal: to grant industry same legal the commission a threefold a French to cinema; as body rights thetheater; establish permanent to defend as industries the by the enjoyed film andtoaccord industry sameprotection that once that Herriot unduly was industry, granted elsewhere. optimistic theFrench ita regime protection, wouldreciprocate establishing "unitywithin by de film a he self." Accordingly, proposed quota:one locallyproduced had to be the four abroad.Immediately MPPDA threatened shownforevery produced cowed and distributors exhibitors, and of a boycott theFrench market, French with after the meeting protested plan.Eventually, a personal bythat prospect, for settled a moremodest quotaof sevento one, whichwas Hays, Herriot Bonnetreconfirmed of ratio.In 1932 Minister Commerce nearthe market tariffs champagneon was the theseaccords; onlytrade-off lowerAmerican in then of of reminder theterms exchange a prevailing in itself humiliating trade.28 Franco-American
26 Marcel Lapierre, Les centvisagesdu cinema(Paris, 1948), pp. 144-45; also (New York,1976); p. 42. in Paul Monaco,Cinemaand Society Franceand Germany Social Cinemaofthe1930s (New York,1980), French 27 Elizabeth Strebel, Grottle pp. 76-77. vol. 1 of Le cine6ma de la politiquedu cinema 28 Paul Leglise,Histoire frangais, (Paris),esp. pp. 61-102, 261-66. Re'publique et la Troisieme

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 65 was to of In the1920s,theItalianresponse notdissimilar that theFrench, manifest theFascistgovernin tendencies the notwithstanding protectionist movieexporter before war. the ment after 1925. Italytoohad beena leading Golden Age from1910 to 1920, the Italiancinemawas Duringits first the an version for invented multireel anddivismo, early recognized having epic After war,however, Italianentrepreneurs, unlike of thestarsystem. the the in shied away fromfixedinvestments distribution, big Frenchproducers, In or equipment manufacture, film development. thefaceof the"American invasion"and withsupport from Italianbig banks,they mistakenly thought into but to exploit their successesbyputting prewar everything costly potencolossalslike Quo Vadis.In 1919, producers, tially high-profit distributors, in and a fewexhibitors bandedtogether a well-capitalized the consortium, UnioneCinematografica to headItaliana,or UCI, hoping thereby compete on withthegiantAmerican firms.29 Not surprisingly, strategy this of failed,forit tookno account increasing from UnitedStatesand Germany, the in export competition changes public taste the state theItalian of In during war,ortheshaky banking system. 1923, UCI wentintobankruptcy The whilefilming proceedings. yearfollowing, Ben Hur on locationin Rome, the director Fred Niblowdealt the Italian a industry coup de grace.As thetroupe monopolized studiospace and emof and at ployedhundreds laborers extras inflated all wages,itbrought other production a standstill; to whenit finally packedup forHollywood later that in year,it lefttheItalianmovieindustry shambles.30 The survivors thisinvasion of learned early needto adaptto theAmerthe ican cinema'sstrengths. fortuitously, Not Italy'smostresilient entrepreneur, the TurineseStefanoPittaluga, provedan attentive observer the U.S. of industry's vertical From mid-1920s worked integration. the he from bottom the withAmerican up, dealingmainly releases(he was exclusive distributor in ItalyforWarners' FirstNationaland Universal) well as thoseof local as producers buildup his own distribution exhibition to and system. 1927, In Pittaluga also acquired Italy'slargest studios, thoseof Cines in Rome's Via Veio. But he rarely ventured production-at into leastnotuntil after 1929, whensoundfeatures promised makethisa moreprofitable to undertaking in Italy. Understandably, this given dependence American on imports-the total Italian output averaging sixteen seventeen only to features annually from 1925
29 On the Italianindustry the 1920s, see the in workof Gian Piero magisterial Brunetta, Storiadel cinemaitaliano,1895-1945 (Rome, 1979); see also his earlier, often thematically clearer Cinema italiano le dueguerre tra (Milan,1975).In addition, see LiberoBizzariandLiberoSolaroli, L'industria italiana(Florence, cinematografica 1958); and Ernesto Cauda, Il film italiano(Rome, 1932). 30 Bizzariand Solaroli,p. 28.

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to 1930-no strong voice was raisedon behalf state of protection. most The that was askedforwas to reduce box office taxesandto enacta mildquota, thelatter obviously beinga measure that divided entrepreneurial opinion. Moregenerally, debates the the on Italian cinema's"renascence'"-whether and whenit wouldoccur-made constant reference America.American to moviecraft, U.S. technology, considered variant cultural like was a on modernity; henceit was a weaponagainst D'Annunzian the affectations an of aesthetically discredited commercially and unprofitable theatrical stylewith aristocratic origins. thetimebeing,theargument For seemedto go, national output was so insignificant to close out foreign that sourcescould onlyenthe courage pretensions old-guard of culture. Italian attitudes toward U.S. the cinemathuscombined utter the self-confidence dimparochialism and sometimes found intellectuals' in discourse other on subjects related modernity. to Thus,in one moment U.S. "menace" wouldbe conjured to castigate the up Pittaluga notbeingsufficiently for interested national in production, in and thenext, American the wouldbe citedfor example emulation.3' curious The result wouldbe carried overinto1930sFascist policies; exceptional familiarity withAmericanism, even outright was imitation, notconsidered antithetical to forming self-consciously a nationalist massculture. Given Fascism's own protectionist after1926, its slownessto impulses national movieproduction safeguard may appearsurprising. for However, mostof thefirst decadeof itsrule,theFascist treated consensus government as something and henceto be shapedby outright explicitly political propagandistic Whereas regime the to manipulations.32 newsinforsought control the of mation, a forestalling exhibition Fox newsreels establishing state by over in monopoly information1925andsetting theIstituto Luce toproduce up anddistribute ownnewsreels, passedoverfeature its it films beingartand as entertainment.anyevent, contingency In the accordsthat werepassedwith thelaw ofJuly 1927,callingforall first-run moviehousesto reserve one 16, Italian dayintenfor that productions, recognized (perhaps unwittingly) American imports wereindispensable. to this According one calculation, measure
31

Bianco e nero and Cinema) and fan magazines such as Cine-illustrazioneacquired Fraccaroli,Hollywood: Paese di avventura(Milan, 1929); and E. Margadonna, Cinema

Beforethe better-known journalism thethirties film of commenced (including

widecirculation, middle-class opinion aboutthecinemawas shapedin various bestsellingbooks suchas Mino Doletti, Aneddoti cinema(Bologna, 1930); Amaldo del

mazione e propaganda nel cinema del fascismo (Florence, 1979); also Philip V. Cannistraro,Lafabbrica del consenso (Bari, 1975).

ierie oggi (Milan, 1932); in addition fanmagazines to suchas Guglielmo Giannini's widely circulated Kines. 32 On thisaspectof state L'occhiodel regime: policy,see Mino Argentieri, Infor-

and Sovereignty 67 Mass Culture whentheactual of films be effective, to production fifty called fora yearly of was the until mid-thirties onlyaboutone-third that.33 output in could wardoffU.S. competition, spite industry Noteven theGerman enercreative morestate enormous moreand favors, marshaling ofreceiving Germarket. Arguably, accessto thehugecentral-European gies,andhaving the advantage-namely, industry's began withyet another man producers of distributed locally As newness. late as 1914,only15 percent thefeatures Denfrom France, the there, bulkof therestbeingimported wereproduced WartheGerman the HighComduring Great and mark, Sweden.However, of a the industrialists recognized importance having nationally mand leading and In movieoutput. 1917, whilecentral Europe controlled centrally oriented, of interests a by was blockaded theEntente, combination stateand private as known UFA. By 1918,in addition Film the founded Universum AG, better it film companies, had a commanding amongGerman position to occupying in studios Europe.It also had built itsown up and best-equipped thebiggest This a of outright. proved owning string movietheaters distribution networks, overdistribution forin themoviebusinesscontrol to be a majorstrength, By what was keyto determining was produced. theearly1920s,UFA was cinemaculture witha thepivotof a richcentral European becoming rapidly of million.34 cross-national market abouteighty language led the industry, by UFA (whose In thefaceof U.S. competition German outby theDeutsche Bankafter war),develthe state-held stockwas bought cinemalike the moretradition-bound which oped some counterstrategies a down firms by precluded winding Italian couldnot,andwhich bigFrench the who ErichPommer, in 1921became investment production. in According to Declabought his own firm, out the chiefat UFA after company production specialproduct film expressionist exemplified stylized Bioskop,thehighly of ization opposedto massmanufacture: as itturned peculiarities German the of writers, stock and talented traditions, its filmmaking-includingtheatrical prodstandardized fine a Hollywood's strength against actors-into marketing helped was foreign markets greatly ucts.35 Naturally, successin finding its then, the start, spiral.Almostfrom by earlyWeimar'sgreatinflationary market as becameindispensable theindustry's health, thedomestic to exports costs. production rising of amortized onlyabout30-40 percent therapidly
33Bizzari (n. 22 above), pp. 39-40. 34Julian Petley, CapitalandCulture: German 1933-1945(London,1979), Cinema,

FilmundKapital(Berlin,1975),pp. 9-79; in addition esp. pp. 29 ff.;Jurgen Spiker, to H. H. Wollenberg, YearsofGerman FilmMaking Fifty (London,1948). 35GeorgeHuaco, Sociology FilmArt(New York,1965), p. 31; also Siegfried of FromCaligaritoHitler(Princeton, Kracauer, N.J., 1947), esp. pp. 65, 131-37.

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especially competition, export at dismay German industry's The American to firms responded the with American the in France,explains rapidity which in stabilization 1924. As in industry thewakeof currency crisisof German U.S. with wereflooded its boomcollapsed, homemarkets export Germany's UFAits flaunted poweroverthefledgling Hollywood Meanwhile imports. (including Pomtalent major cinema awaysomeofGermany's drawing Stadt, work if of mer) withhighsalariesand the promise stimulating, frenetic, position not enough tolose itsdominant was conditions. UFA itself diversified was in specializing production as firms; usual,thesmallfirm German among Failing crisis.Butby 1925UFA tooneededa bailout. hit worst bytheexport to it investors, was forced either stateor big private the to obtainit from of Paramount MGM. The upshot this and an deal conclude unfavorable with in interest, exat Reichsmarks 7.5 percent million was a loan of seventeen the company, infamously changeforwhichUFA joined a new distribution policycalled forUFA to Parufamet. Company and exploitative short-lived these a minimum for showing films from eachofitspartners, twenty distribute concerns whilethetwoAmerican cinemas, half-week in all UFA-owned each per to ten homecircuits distribute UFA films year.In to promised use their to wereforced concompanies German 1926, UFA as well as some smaller firms. with majorAmerican clude similar agreements other to of attempts the marked highpoint theU.S. industry's Such agreements the However, move weakenits strongest competitor. buy intoand thereby it Moreover, problems. industry's gravefinancial did notsolve theGerman French traditionalist the Right, nationalists who,unlike more incited German the aboutexploiting new werenotsqueamish of withitsfears massculture, mulIn Hugenberg's and medium's potential profitability.early1927Alfred out in a share UFA,buying American timedia acquired majority conglomerate and the with ministry theminister apparently somehelpfrom foreign interests, UFA's to This move, followedby measures consolidate of the economy. exports, strengthening schedules, market production by position rationalizing as was treated a majorvictory out sector, and branching intothetechnical Indeed,by 1928, fornationalist-conservatives againstU.S. imperialism.36 in and of therewas a discernible pattern crisis,restructuring, growth the The the after Nazi takeover. that Germanindustry would be accentuated of ideologues of interests the dominant firms, the state,and of nationalist industrial capitalized strongly integrated, thuscoalescedto builda vertically of to Oriented thebroadmarkets central Europe,it was sufestablishment. in cinema the to American and diversified innovative keeppace with ficiently of the nextmajorphaseof moviehistory, development thesoundfeature.
36

schaftin Deutschland: Documenten und Materialen (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 135-236.

FilmundGesellvon pp. Petley, 36-41; also Wilfried BredowandRolfZurek,

and Sovereignty 69 Mass Culture

Warner Company In the severalyearsafter1927 whentheenterprising a process Hollywood precipitated "talkie,"TheJazzSinger, produced first the transformed aspect the every of competitive innovation throughout Westthat to Huge new infrom production techniques exhibition. of moviemaking and costsdoubledand tripled theaters vestments werecalled foras feature maralso changed The had to be refitted soundequipment. soundfilm with to Initially spurring moviegoing newheights-ata moment keting strategies. of crisisas had whenmarkets becomeunpredictable a result theeconomic of publics.To polyglot soundalso raisedthelonger-term problem serving their continental optheir strengthen holdin Europe,theMajorsbroadened in studios 1930at decision openitsownproduction to erations. Paramount's of was perversions itsU.S. films Joinville-Paris makeoriginal-language to of newexpansionism. Geared assemblyto visible evidence this hapsthemost of division Europethemostadvanced to linerhythms,brought continental it laboreverseen in moviemanufacture.37 at ForEuropeans, soundfilm the presented once a new menaceand new cultural it identity morethanthesilent opportunities. Certainly threatened film: no" went antisound one sloganfrom France.Amer"Noise yes,words ican language (noteven "real English")was an assaulton theears. Worse, and of it shattered "complicity silence" which,formanyfilmmakers the sound, was art. that key theoreticians, thevery tocinematic Somefeared with peculiarto techniques forsaking montage the moviemakers would regress, Howeffects filmed of theater.38 panning moviemaking theanachronistic for suitedto satisfy public's the ever,the domesticoutputwas likelybetter of poor post-synchronization, than dullsubtitling, quality the expectations sound theirown Beyondcornering and amateurish dubbing foreign of imports.

37On thedevelopment soundin theUnitedStates,see Bachlin, of Histoire 'conomique cinema(n. 14 above), pp. 60 ff.;also Gomery, Hollywood du The Studio System 20 above), pp. 5-26. On Paramount-Joinville,thedescription Ilya (n. see of Ehrenburg, "C'est un film Paramount," Re'vue cinema(June 1931),pp. 7-24; du 1, andDudleyAndrew, "Sound inFrance: The Origins a Native of School," YaleFrench 60 Studies (1980): 94-114, esp. 100-101. Directors variedas Gance, Duvivier, as MarcAllegret, and Calvalcanti, Camerini worked Joinville. at 38 See esp. RendJeanne, "L'invasioncin6matographique Re'vue des americaine," deuxmondes (February 1930),pp. 857-84, andhis "La France le film 15, et parlant," Revuedesdeuxmondes (June 1930),pp. 533-54; also Alexandre 1, Arnoux, muet Du au parlant: Memoire d'un temoin (Paris,1946);andLapierre, 206-32. RendClair pp. recallshis doubtsand ultimate to conversion soundin Reflexion faites:Notespour servird l'histoire (Paris, 1951), as do other in protagonists the special number of 47 Cinematographe (May 1979): 1-27 devoted Du muet parlant. to au

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markets, producers the European-language alsohoped exploit from big areas to thedistress smaller of nations, SwedenandDenmark, like whosehigh-quality products hitherto had occupied tidy little niches theinternational film in silent market. somemarket For leaders, suchas theGerman-Dutch sound equipment combine Tobis-Klangfilm-Kuchenmeister, oftheT-Ergon inventor soundfilm process, changeover the meant quick,sure,and big profits.39 Indeed,soundappeared have "nationalized cinema."40 to the Sound accentuated cultural the distinctiveness homeproduction; heightened of it defenses a of against newround American investment; finally, raisedthe and it problem how to commercialize of national cultural products order use in to markets offset to shallow export home demand higher and costsofproduction. In France,theprospect an Anglo-American of "linguistic imperialism" compounding threat economic the of colonization accentuated efforts define to the so-callednational essenceof French filmmaking. cinemahad just The been recognized "Art" by thecultural as recently establishment whenthe du Cinema,sponsored theBeaux-Arts theSorbonne 1929, Semaine at in by was endorsed conservative suchas Le Figaro's editor by critics LucienRomier;thatleftonlythediehard-preeminently self-styled that contempteur duprogres author thebest-selling of Georges America Menace the Duhamel, of the effects standardized imageson the (1931)-to excoriate pernicious to foulesanonymes.41 art,themedium As was now subject thesamecritical film standards criticism becamea cottage appliedto highculture: industry. At thesametime, criteria which distinguish to practical minds formulated by from and national hybrid coproductions genuine products ways to translate into The of theAmericanized of vocabulary filmmaking French. editors mass not to circulation magazines, leastthosewho weremostbeholden U.S. fan for to aboutthe magazines their format, pretended educatemoviespectators The differences between national American and massculture. beauty contest, had becomea French neverso widespread in theUnited as although States, aside from institution the mid-1930s, had the fan club. Its intent, as by for local talent the fresh the and avowedly promoting sponsors recruiting sexual mores,and the was industry, to domesticate new beautystandards, films.42 social habits fostered American by
39On the Europeanresponse,see Douglas Gomery, and "Economic Struggles 60 Studies (Winter to EuropeConverts Sound," YaleFrench Imperialism: Hollywood (n. (n. 1980): 80-93; see also Southard 16 above);Chevanne 24 above);andAndrew (n. 37 above). 40 Chevanne, 40. p. 41 In Georges et (Paris, 1933), pp. 9-11, 188Duhamel,L'humanite' l'automate

of of to 42 The specialappealby fanmagazines theconstitution newkinds female suchas Cine'monde, reviews in of is publics visible thecolumns 1930smass-circulation

90.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 71 the cinemaadjusted an Yet from economicstandpoint, French veryawkBetween1929and 1931,Gaumont conditions. wardly thenewmarket to and the Gaumont withother firms enter soundfield, to Pathecombined forming withNatan.But those Gaumont-Franco-Aubert whilePathemerged Films, of weredea who believedthat thesemergers signaled rebirth theindustry and luded.In 1932Gaumont went bankruptcy, inthetwoyears into following, unsound notdownif was depleted thenewpartner's Pathe-Natan's capital by dismissed their right shadyinvestments. officialdom Although as operations albeitwithmore chaoticand fly-by-night, firms small mostfilms, produced but difficulty in thetwenties. notonlywerecostshigher, in addition than For distribution becomeevenmore had in concentrated American hands: 1935 by sevenof thethirteen national distribution chains,including very the largest, wereeither U.S. company subsidiaries in friendly or French hands.43 In thewake of theGaumont the bankruptcy, state joinedkeyintellectual in for in figures pressing a morecohesivestructure the filmindustry a as whole. Underadvice fromindustry spokesmen, Beaux-Arts' the director Petsche proposed UFA-style an reorganization, pillarof which the was to be Gaumont-Franco-Aubert. However,1934 Francewas neither WorldWar I nor Germany theNazi state;nor,forthatmatter, theFrench did statehave thepowersof theVichyregime, whichsuchan idea was eventually in welcomed-exceptinsofar thereorganized as industry threatened compete to with the grasping monolith UFA! The French competitors Gaumont-Francoof Aubert wereopposedto thereorganization (admittedly, UFA's competitors hadreacted in similarly Germany), exhibitors, and distributors, producers and werestillat odds abouttheir interests regulating sector. next in the The year, in response widespread to protests overtheindustry's economic plight, the once government moreproposed intervene. Carmoy to The report, drawn up of by theinspector finances call attention thesituation to to allarmante, led theNational Economic Councilin May 1936to backstate in theform aid of taxrelief, and It credits, tariffs.44also proposed support to self-regulation by laying a national out statute reopening and negotiations thelatest over and, as always,unsatisfactory Franco-American contingency agreements. How-

cine'matographique.

notto mention various women'smagazines published theBerlin-based by House of Ullstein from mid-1920s. the 43 See Andrew and Strebel 27 above). Moregenerally governmental (n. on policy toward cinemain thethirties, Leglise (n. 28 above) and thefindings the the see of Carmoy in inquiry ConseilNational Economique, L'industrie cine6matographique (Paris, 1936). 44 Leglise,pp. 75 ff.,106-7. See also ConseilNational Economique, L'industrie

Cinemiroir,and Confidentialin France, and Cine'-illustrazione and Piccola in Italy,

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ever,the industry, although now led by a triumvirate spokesmen of repreits senting various branches-not bytheHollywood-style that yet czar some recommended-remained thoroughly dividedon whatmoreto ask of state intervention. was especially nowthat Popular This true the Front inpower was andtheLeftunions wereputting forward demands nationalize industry. to the In thenexttwoyears,parliamentary inquiries callingattention thedisorto ganization thesector of appealedforunetresgrandeseverite corporative to the strengthen industry a whole.45 these as But inquiries failed propose also to anysolution. In theprocessof documenting claimthat sector its the was in chaos,the government inadvertently revealedthe sourceof theFrench cinema'sconsiderable in creativity thoseyears.The Renaitour Commission citedtheproliferation independent, of often one-film enterprises newlyformed (158 in 1935, witha totalcapitalization seventeen of million francs; 175 in 1936, million totaling on onlytwelve francs), commenting their highfailure rate.46 Yet theseindependent, small-time enterprises, usingthePathe,Gaumont, or Eclairstudios renting and of much their equipment, appear haveaccounted to forsignificant in production increases thelate 1930s. How muchtheseenof the era terprises supported filmmaking thePopularFront and vice versa In calls forfurther the 1939 were inquiry. anyevent, yearsof 1935 through of the the as years successfor French cinema-or,ifnotfor industry a whole, for film. Front LiketheGerman certainly the"poeticrealism"ofthePopular film in this expressionist of the1920sandItalianneorealism thelateforties, was a specialized that successnotonlyat homebutabroad product garnered as well.47 In ItalytheFascist on of regime, oncelaunched itsprogram "reaching out to to thepeople," becameincreasingly and arsusceptible cultural political on of For intellectuals guments behalf stateintervention. theyounger espefor the eliteand cially,cinemawas theideal medium bridging gap between a cinema these masscultures. Though avowedly supportingnational industry, still intellectuals did notunequivocally younger rejectAmericanism. Partly had eventhough thiswas dictated realism: by production pickedup slightly was stillso modest(theratioof imports Italian to after 1931, totaloutput sourceswas unfilms nineto one in 1934) thatto curbAmerican running 1934 was Italian backwardness heldtobe so great authoritative thinkable. (an in behind all aspects maintained Italywas fiveyears that to report Mussolini the that of moviemanufacture) perforce cinemamusttakestockof foreign

45 Jean-Michel fran,ais?(Paris,1937). ed., Renaitour, Oil va le cine'ma

46 47

Ibid., p. 115. pp. Strebel, 115-17.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 73 experiences.48 Giventhechoicebetween and European American models,it was obvious,as Mussolini'sson, Vittorio, observed hisjournalCinema in in late 1936,that United the States'"technical and narrative virtuosity fluid styles"weresuperior every in German wayto "heavy-handed trauma"and the"trite farceand doubleentendre" theFrench.49 of for Sympathy Americanism was also dictated a misplaced by confidence Italianfilmmakers that could borrow without Hollywood to technology beingbeholden Hollywood themes. the Theycouldappropriate "solid commercial structure" "narand rativestyle" "made in theUSA"; then,boastedtheyoungMussolini a in 1937issueoftheofficial Popolo d'Italia, "we can begintotalkaboutFascist cinema."50 sum,filmmakers critics In and a of sought form state intervention that wouldbe bothprotective nurturing, at thesametimetolerant and yet of experimentation. Behindthiswas a logic thatcouldjustify either slavish a Americanism a vehement or anti-Americanism, as in thethirties, at or, both once. This demandwas obviously confused to be untranslatable any so as into coherent policy.Its inconsistencies in factreflected improvised were in legislation, unintended the effect whichwas to give anyclear-sighted of entrepreneurs unusualleverage making in final decisions.Since 1927 theFascist government adopted had various stopgap protectionist measures; notuntil but it 1934,after had setup a general Directorate Cinematography of responsible to theundersecretarypressand propaganda of (latertheminister popular of culture), was it presented witha strategy stateintervention the film for in sector. This was drawn by Luigi Freddi,theDirectorate's up new chief,a foreign correspondent former and editorof Popolo d'Italia, just after his return from month-long in Hollywood. a stay Freddi'sgoal, as one historian characterized was to builda state-run it, MGM;5' thiswas to be powerful

48 LuigiFreddi, "Rapporto sullacinematografia," 22, 1934,inArchivio June Centraledello Stato,Presidenza Consiglio Ministri, 1934-36, f. 3/2.21397, sf. Freddi, Luigi. 49 Luigi Freddi, cinema(Rome, 1949), 1:297. On theresponse Americanism IH to moregenerally, Brunetta, see Storiadel cinemaitaliano,1895-1945 (n. 24 above), pp. 213-19, 227, 409-16; also AdrianoApra, "La 'rinascita'sulla paginacinematografica 'Tevere,'1929-1930," inNuovimateriali cinema del sul italiano, 19291943,Quaderno (Pesaro,1976),pp. 60-85; inthis 71 samecollection, also Lucilla see Albano,"Volonta-possibilita cinemafascista: del Riviste periodici e degliannitrenta in Italia," pp. 101-36. 50 Freddi, cinema,1:297. IH 51Ibid., 1:46 ff.,64. On thethirties, theinterpretative see framework Lorenzo of Quaglietti: cinema "II degliannitrenta Italia:Primi in elementi un'analisi per politicoin strutturale,"Materiali cinema sul italiano, 1929-1943,Quaderno (Pesaro,1975); 63 and Freddi, cinema,1:293 ff. Il

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yet of and production, distribution, exhibition, free dayenough integrate to aid massive state andsteppedinterference. this sought For he to-day political up protection. at againstsuch measures, leastforthetimebeing, However, counseling serene of of wereconsiderations bothcost and thedesirability maintaining had onlyjust beenaprelations withtheUnitedStates.In 1934, Mussolini of million wastetheyearbefore four of Luce's extravagant prised theIstituto epic Forzano'spropaganda-art lire (about550,000 dollars)on Giovacchino flop.52 and that failure a box-office Camicia nera,a film was botha critical was the Cines-Pittaluga auditedby the recently Moreover, after bankrupt (IRI) in 1933-34, regime founded Institute Industrial for Reconstruction might off, pay whiledistribution had been apprised that, officials doubtless enterprise. a As back to private risktaking feature on films was bestturned to whenthegovernment decided putup funds buildnewproduction to result, Roncoroni, studiosin late 1935, it did so at thebehestof theindustrialist IRI. In whoonlythat side the yearhad purchased production of Cinesfrom caution. In itsdealingwith American the firms, Fasciststateshowedsimilar a order a reversed previous Hays,Mussolini November 1936,after visitfrom in to that to curbimports order stopcapitaloutflows-anorder had certainly to notbeen incomprehensible thattheUnitedStateshad lentsupport given 70 the League of Nations'sanctions againstItalyand thatapproximately of from new film releasesin 1935 had gone to percent thegrossearnings U.S. companies. bothstateand private enterprise a involving Ultimately, mixedsolution the that overtheplan fora government monopoly; argument proprevailed over triumphed productivity tectionism subsidies might yieldincreased plus No on arguments behalfof totalstatecontrol. doubt, politicaland cultural was Italywas a by too, theprocessof intervention simplified thefactthat there weremany and competing France,where dictatorship, in Italy(unlike at was onlyone majorclaimant anygivenmoment: Pittaluga claims),there at from1926 through 1931; his successor Cines, EmilioCecchi, in 1932with from Roncoroni 1935to 1939. Pittaluga's negotiations 33; and, finally, for in thestateresulted thelaw of June18, 1931-a happy precedent future bona all for produced butone of thethirteen petitioners statehelp: having from his films madethat fide naturally profited a measure Italian year, company meaIn to bonusesin proportion box-office that awarded receipts. fargreater was a bonus forprivate of construction Cinecitt'a sure, the government's

52 "Attivita 1933:Relazionea S. E. dal Presidente nell'esercizio dell'Istituto svolta Centrale M. dell'Istituto Paoluccide' Calboli,"March31, 1934,pp. 20, 36, Archivio dello Stato,Minculpop.170.20.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 75 on enterprise. twoyears Inaugurated Mussolini April28, 1937,less than by to it of after was commissioned replacetheold Cines studios Via Veioafter to Ronhad whichprovidentially burned theground ninemonths just werea European from IRI-Cinecitta'shugestudios had them coroni acquired a with combined craft-based moviemaker's dream; they organization themost in of advancedequipment Europe,underthesupervision a technologically 53 Law Italian Hollywood-trained engineer. TheAlfieri ofJune 1938offered 16, an bonus stillanother to incentive movieentrepreneursgranting automatic by whosescript passed had of for equal to 12-25 percent grossreceipts anyfilm or merits. of censorship, regardless artistic other without comment govthe of In light thesefavors, industry the accepted a overdisernment's in late 1938 to establish complete decision monopoly The had a stakein thisdomain:IRI tribution. stateadministration already and and had retained Cines's distribution exhibition network, since1935this had beenrunoutof theEnteNazionaleIndustria Cinematografica (ENIC), a of Istituto Luce. Thedecision office headed thedirector the specialparastate by to use ENIC as a clearing as feature agencyforimported well as domestic films dictated was mainly theneedto stanch by capitaloutflows, evenif,for propaganda it as cultural purposes, was trumpeted a blowfor autarchy against plutocratic decay.The government hopedthat still somecompromise might be reached keeptheAmerican to from marMajorsfrom withdrawing Italian kets-whichthey atthevery of 1938-and that anycase theMinors in did end (including RKO, Universal, United and whichalready Artists), used Italian wouldstayon. Butthese distributors, companies unableto cope with proved the complexclearing arrangements devisedby thedictatorship, under and from Big FourAmerican pressure the producers, too withdrew. they Italianexhibitors Although initially feared they that couldnotcompensate fortheloss withdomestic products that and moviegoers who weredeprived ofClarkGableandGary Cooperwoulddesert theaters, wererelieved the they to find neither thecase. Domestic that was output quickly tookup theslack, andafter several months uncertainty of audience attendance picked again, up demonstrating by the late thirties moviegoing that the habithad become than stronger allegiance anysingle orstyle. to star Thishabit certainly opened for up opportunities domestic products, especially all kinds Hollywood for of

54 imitations.

Redi (Venice,1979), pp. 219-32. 54 More generally thisperiod,see JeanA. Gili, "Pouvoirpolitique interets on et economiques: L'industrie cinema Italiependant periode du en la Film&change fasciste," 9 (Winter 1980):67-88. Fascist worries abouttherepercussions thenewlegislation of

53Bizzari and Solaroli(n. 29 above), pp. 32-41. On Cinecitta: Lucilla Albano, "Hollywood: Cinelandia. . . ," in Cinema italiano sotto ilfascismo, ed. Riccardo

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By the end of thedecade, FascistItalyhad becomea movieinvestor's paradise, with protected a market rapid in expansion themoviegoing as public grewfrom 348 million attending annually 1938 to 477 million 1942; in in state-financed production studios(whichafter Roncoroni's deathin 1939 passedinto government hands); state-sponsored a distribution toallocate cartel markets; finally, bonuses, and big rewarded quantity for rather qualitythan on thebasis of box-office receipts rather forartistic than merits cinematic or professions political of faith. Underthesecircumstances, investors new enteredthe market and production flourished. wartime, By output had risen from thirty-one in 1927 to the 1940 totalof eighty-three;1942, 119 films in features were produced."5 Of these,remarkably were politicalin any few conventional sense.The mosttypical, notthemostnumerous, if werein the "whitetelephone"style,a clevercommercial blendof Italiansocial comand mentary Hollywood melodramatic A formulae. significant directors few mixedAmerican French and realist genres-thegangster film and the film noir-to form newnational, the albeitoppositional, cultural in style that the postwar yearswoulddevelopintotheItalianneorealist school.56 to of Compared themaking-do theimprovisatory French Italian and efforts, theautarchic in policiespursued theThirdReichto builda national cinema look like partof a granddesign. In fact,theyresulted froman unusual of combination circumstances, industrial namely concentration, ideological and intervention. Nazis cameto powerwithan The cohesiveness, dictatorial would expressits nationalist organicist ideologythat,it was anticipated, within Nazi party, the volkisch nature the through moviemedium. However, on there occur.As might expected, be werediverse positions howthisshould a cinema: meant this theextremist-populist proposed movement wing favoring and out movieswithan explicitly or content helping political propagandistic of smalland independent theater were owners, many whomapparently Nazi

in is minorfilmmakers now well documented on audiencesand on the American economica di pp. Brunetta, 293-97, 515-19; see also LiberoSolaroli,"Profilo storia (Milan, 1958), del cinemaitaliano,"in PeterBachlin,II cinemacome industria pp. 198-99. 55 Bizzari(n. 22 above), p. 40. is of Italiananalysis themixof old and new genres 56 The mostvividand subtle production cultural to and textual analysis a sensitivity issuesof popular bring works TheItalianCommercial MarciaLandy, of of to thestudy theformation thesegenres:
Cinema, 1931-1943 (Princeton,N.J., 1986); and James Hay, Popular Film Culture in Francesco Savio, Ma l'amore no: Realismo, formalismo,propaganda e telefoni, bianchi nel cinema italiano del regime, 1930-1943 (Milan, 1975). Two recentU.S.

on section an Ind., 1987), whichcontains interesting in FascistItaly(Bloomington, "American Imagesin FascistItaly,"pp. 64-98.

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 77 In the stalwarts. contrast, institutional including Reich'spropaganda the wing, that minister soundness Goebbels,a zealousmoviefan,contended economic and that state merit shouldbe guiding and artistic precepts policyshouldbe toward thealready industrial oriented structure. hisThe developing existing the cinemain the decade after Nazi seizureof power toryof the German this structure makeit at once commerto pivoted around altering industrial withthe Nazi notionof movie cially sound and ideologically compatible culture.57 Morespecifically, involved this at beating foreign competitionhome rivalries within and especiallyabroadby curbing intracompany Germany, develcutting costs,building theshallowdomestic up market, and, finally, withinternational opinggenres appeal. WhentheNazis came to power, movieindustry in a particularly the was to for good position formulate demands help.To cope with slump the the of preceding fouryears,theindustry's led professional groups, by theSpitzder Film Industrie, alreadysought had enorganisation deutschen out state intervention. theso-calledSPIO Plan of 1932,thisexceptionally With powerfulinterest in group-which,since its foundation 1923, had represented notonlyproducers distributors exhibitors well-proposedtocodify and but as itsregulatory powers becoming state a by administrative With UFA's agency. chiefexecutive as LudwigKlitzsch itshead,theSPIO was strong to enough secureitself voice in thenew government a not which, though yetprepared to addressideological issuesrelated theGerman to cinema,was responsive to itseconomic After problems. with consulting theSPIO leadership,founded it the Reichsfilmkammer the Filmkredit and bank,in whichmajorpositions wereoccupiedby leading trade spokesmen. thetimebeingthere For was no market of Goebbels'sso-calledtheory theeffect "the nationalist test to that and racialist of purity autochthonous sourceswouldgive [German cinema] thevitality transit to international barriers." relatively explicitly The few Nazi films made in 1934-35 werefordomestic consumption rather thanforinternational audiences.58 The morecomplicated issueof reconciling commercial appealwith spea Nazi cinema cifically aroseas theindustry's style profits slumped 1936-37. in this Partly was becausecostswererising a result soundproduction as of and becauseof thehugesalariespaid to German partly stars whoseservices for UFA had to compete against Parisand Hollywood. was also theresult It of a long-term declinein exports, further aggravated thoseyearsby foreign in
57 On theNazis' reorganization thecinema, of see Petley 34 above); andSpiker (n. (n. 34 above), pp. 80-181. 58 Citedfrom his April30, 1935 speechat theclosingsessionof theInternational Film Congressin Berlin,in FrancisCourtadeand PierreCadars,Le cine'ma Nazi (Paris, 1972), pp. 318-19.

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boycotts Nazi films.Exportshad covered40 percent moviecosts in of of 1932-33; they coveredonly6-7 percent 1936-37.59 in Theregime's response this to crisis was fourfold. First, promoted it another round concentration rationalization. of and Hugenberg removed head was as of theboardof UFA and thecompany was putunder direct stateauthority; in thenextthree years,its operations werecoordinated thethree with other industry leadersso that, 1939, German by film production couldbe characas terized a state-protected oligopoly. Second,thegovernment sought build to up domestic consumption-not, appears,by promoting fanclub, the it the movie magazine, thegiveaways or typical U.S. marketing of campaigns during theDepression and widelyimitated Europe,butby mobilizing Nazi in the political apparatus (Kraft durch Freudeand traveling cinemas),discounting and the tickets, sponsoring UFA "revivals."Third, developed ownstar it its system,substituting Germanstarsfor Hollywoodfavorites imitating and American genres."At leastuntil grasstakesdeepenough the root squeeze to outtheweeds": that, to according one Berlinproducer, thereasonwhy was films were stillbeingmade on studiolots in the spring 1939, of gangster with and in complete pleasant-looking policemen clerks shirt sleeves, telephonestudded desksand skyscraper the its broadened backdrops.60 Finally, regime at exportmarket, first peaceablemeans,through by coproduction arrangements with and and with annexation the Italy, Austria, France, then force, by of of Austria and invasion all of contiand Czechoslovakia thesubsequent nental Europe. From Even before warbegan,thispolicyhad begunto showresults. the increased about to films year, studio increased, use 1937,production eighty per in and andinnovations sound technology color(UFA-andAGFA-color) began from American to be appliedto production. imports dropped rapidly sixtyin fourin 1933 to twenty 1939, whenGoebbels,usingAnatoleLitvak's to Confessions a Nazi Spy as a pretext, of sought ban U.S. filmimports in altogether.6' there was a big increase audiences-notjust a widFinally,
p. 59Petley, 60.

1939): 110. On theNazis' emulation Biancoe nero3 (June "Rassegnadellastampa," Le to and Cadars,Cinzia Romani, dive see of thestarsystem, in addition Courtade "The SoundandtheFuihrer," Traubner, Reich(Rome, 1981); and Richard del Terzo 1978): 17-23. 14 Film Comment (July-August 28, 1941 (Secret 61 According Goebbels's "ordersof the day" on February to werestillin circulation films Ewald Osers [London,1967], pp. 123-24), American disruptions of as the at that date. Ultimately flowwas halted a result thecommercial to orders stop draconian futile evidently on than attendant thewarrather therepeated, them.
ConferencesofDr. Goebbels, October 1939-March 1943, ed. Willi A. Boelke, trans.

60 As observed theMilan-based critic EmilioCeretti, movie chief L'ambrosiano's by

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 79 eningof themarket Nazi Germany as out expanded of theOld Reichbuta as deepening well. The Nazis' self-styled "alternative" theAmerican European to cinema was established outright ultimately rather economic-cultural than by conquest comIn petition. thescale of its continental the of market, dimensions thegiant UFI holding company up in January 1942to consolidate assetsof all (set the majorfirms, in including UFA, involved motion wereat leastequal pictures) to theAmerican homeoutlets. itstechnical In industry's it accomplishments was certainly peer.It evenhad itsownequivalent Hollywood a of the flair, so-calledUFA style.Topping all offwas theInternational Chamber; it Film thisbody,intended itschief Goebbelsto be theEuropean by promoter counof terpart thepowerful all MPPDA, ostensibly represented continental filmmakers distributors was launched and and under slogan the cinema" "European justafter fallofFrance. the The "unitary order" backed the by Nazisdepended on pressures other than market forces: political cencontrols, meaning army sorship, confiscations of (especially extensive Jewish and properties), a monopoly overnewssources.It also calledforthemanipulation commercial of accords,including businessagreements involved that UFI in coproduction and direct investment new national in cinemacorporations as France's such the Continental, ItalianEuropaFilm, and Hungary's Messter as Company, well as distribution accords that gaveitaboutsixteen thousand outlets the by early1940s.62 Although warmadethisGerman-dominated the alternative possible,proposals fora common front againstU.S. competition come up before. had Indeed,sincethemid-1920s, rather thanprovoking animosity, German the industry increasingly had appeared French Italian to and competitors offer to theonlyviableEuropean leadership. somevery In concrete waystheGerman industry indeedpromote did unity. one thing, fostered flourishing For it a middle-European cinemaculture drawing Berlindirectors, by to actors, and technicians from Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania.It also and helpedputFrenchfirms back intotheEuropean market. Thus, by making
62 MarcusS. Phillips, "The German Film Industry theNew Order,"in The and Shapingof theNazi State,ed. PeterD. Stachura (London,1978), pp. 257-81. For

et son cinema(Paris, 1981); and especially briefanalytical the pieces of Stdphane Levy-Klein, "Sur le cinemafranqais annees,1940-1944: Pt. 1, L'organisation," des Positif (April1975): 23-30, andpt. 2, "Les realisations," (June 168 170 1975): 3544; and most recently, Evelyn Ehrlich, Cinema ofParadox: French Filmmakingunder the German Occupation (New York, 1985).

Europe as a whole see Georges Sadoul, Histoire generale du cine'ma, vol. 6, Le cinema pendant la guerre, 1939-1945 (Paris, 1954), pp. 8-70. On this period in France, see also Paul Leglise, Histoire de la politique cinematographique, vol. 2, Entredeux republiques, 1940-1946 (Paris, 1976); Jacques Siclier,La France de Pe'tain

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accordswiththe Germancompanyin 1930, the Gaumont-Franco-Aubert had conglomerate been able to enter intocartelagreements regarding distribution with Klangfilm UFA; andbyestablishingtrust and a relationship with Tobis-Kuchenmeisterhad entered soundequipment it the market.63 Since 1932,theSPIO hadurged other European lobbies emulate ownvertically to its organized interest groupstructure orderto combatthe influence the in of MPPDA. By 1937theSPIO's influence proved threatening theAmerso that ican group,alongwithBritish traderepresentatives, decidedto boycott the Film International Congress forJuly Paris.Theirgrounds set in werethat the one had been heldin Berlinin 1935) were periodic meetings previous (the toolsof a German-led, becoming anti-American continental bloc.64 As theGerman cinema cametodominate continental the market during the to war,theNazi regime was compelled address morefundamental a tension: that between a and producing widely marketable a commodity creating "national"cinema legitimate to In nation-state as power. theUnited States, noted this was moreor less automatically. earlier, problem resolved Fromthestart theindustry actedlike a sponge,absorbing personnel themes its and from of sources that constituted newmarmany thesamecultural its subsequently kets.Itsownnational diverse socially stratified and publicwas ethnically less its own testof thevalue of theproduct thananyEuropean public.Finally, and was shamelessly measured corporate balancesheets box-office by figures. to In sum,beinginternational necessity, there no needforitto resort was by of thekindwhich, caricatured theFrench as cinema artifice cosmopolitan by in and Ford,led some European critics Jeanne producers questof polyglot whose brother an is an publicsto devise plotsfiguring American ingenue an Italianvampmarried a French is to comic and whose mother Austrian leadingman.65 moved make cinema to German Nazi Muchmore self-consciously, Germany markets. salableabroadas it reliedmoreand moreon export Judging his by Goebbels seems of in abreast theAmerican keeninterest keeping competition, intoeager to have graspedthateven captiveaudienceshad to be turned of films German for He consumers. heldbiweekly showings American proare withobjectlessonsfrom ducers,and his diariesand conferences dotted benefit his close of cultural for of his reading American history theeventual here.The first Two of theseobjectlessonsare relevant collaborators. one,
good (n. Abel (n. 13 above), pp. 28-30, 35. Andrew 37 above) is especially the in firms Francefrom midGerman of presence Tobis and other on the strong to twenties themid-thirties. 64 Leglise (n. 28 above), 1:93, 152; Lapierre 26 above), p. 499. (n. et 65 Rene Jeanne and CharlesFord,Le cine'ma la presse, 1895-1960 (Paris), pp. 419-20.
63

and Sovereignty 81 Mass Culture from withitsCanadianand SouthAmerican drawn U.S. relations observing held markets, that tolerate native but Germany might producers, onlyifthey a from preserved purely a local character werekept and acquiring commercial of base and corporate own. The secondlessonacknowledged identity their that Americans the their own (admittedly were "masters"at taking scarce) "'cultural it it stock,"freeing of "politicalballast,"and making palatable to a mass public.66 German cineasts had to do likewise theNew Order if was to acquire justa politico-military not dimension an economic cultural but and as unity well. On thesegrounds, from a early1942Goebbels justified policy of promoting entertainmentUnterhaltungsfilm: seventy-two or of the motion from pictures commissioned UFI for1945, sixty-four in thisescapist were One production particular in epitomizes changed the relationship between culture and sovereignty implied thischoice. The extravagant in Baron von was Munchhausen commissioned 1941with eyeto the1943celebration in an of UFA's twenty-fifth anniversary thetenth and sincetheNazi "renascence" oftheGerman cinema. Directed theHungarian by Josef Bakyandstarring von most Germany's popular HansAlbers, tellsthetaleoftheeighteenthactor, it Saxonlibertine,contemporaryCasanova,Dr.Faustus, century a of Cagliostro, and theBaronof Crac. Imperturbably adventurous, aided by fabulous trick techniques helpvonBaky, (to Goebbels reportedly procured KordaandDisney films),68 Baroneffortlessly the crossedfrontiers: Saxonyto Moscow, from from Caliphateand Veniceto the moon and back. The medium the was dazzlingAgfa-color, messagenone,exceptthat a contemporary the at highbourgeois soireetheBaron,having recounted earlyexploits, last rehis at nounces Faustian the inquietude eternal of youth age inpeaceably to burgerlich stylewithhis belovedwife.In thisway,theNazis' cinematoo transcended theboundaries nation-state of culture appealtoa cross-class, to trans-European public. That it did so in thissplendidly crafted workby counterposing to Hollywood's modern myths archaic the fantasies a domesticated of pre-nationstate cosmopolitanism suggests theNazis hadlostoutto thecompetition that evenbefore lostthewar. they
style.67

As thevictorious Americans swept awaytwodecadesofprotectionist measures,theU.S. movieindustry, leastin theshort at run,was able to impose
66 Citedin Louis P. Lochner, ed. andtrans., Goebbels The Diaries(London,1948), pp. 151, 165; see also Boelke,ed., pp. 123-24. 67 Courtade and Cadars,pp. 298-99. 68 David Stewart Hull,Film in theThird Reich(Berkeley, 1969), p. 253.

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up zone, UFI empire divided byoccupation was itsownconditions. great The American interests it Meanwhile, pending plans to dismantle completely. to policywhich, whilepurporting laythefoundations insisted a free-trade on a and effectively guaranteed that German cinema, for de-Nazified competitive wouldbe hobbled decades.In May 1946Leon Blum for theGerman industry ending prewar the French an with of signed agreement Secretary StateByrnes per import quota of 120 films year.The new accordsallowedfora screen for films. four weekseach quarter French quotaof sorts;that it reserved is, films, whichindithe boomlet ninety-six of Nevertheless, 1945 production industrial capacity cated thatFrancehad indeeddevelopeda considerable collapsed.By 1947,Amerwhileunder during waryears, the UFI protection of the With ican movieshad overrun country.69 theabolition theENIC moof Law in October1945, Italy,like nopolyand the annulment the Alfieri In werereleased, becamea wholly openmarket. 1946,850 imports Germany, sixtyproduced of which 600 wereAmerican. Meanwhile, local industry the stoodat 668, whereas Italianoutput fivefilms.By 1948 theU.S. imports 75 of the had dropped fifty-four, former to the earning percent all revenues, a latter, mere13 percent.70 in American Europeis presence postwar Evidenceof thisoverwhelming had that cinema notoffered argue a European-based to production beenwholly in crushed. thecontrary, thenextseveralyearsEuropean On governments and granted selectiveaid to industry soughtto limitcapitalexports.The accommodated U.S. of combination mildprotectionism (whichnevertheless and and investments incentives enabled coproduction arrangements) direct U.S. export the industries survive postwar to offensive, and theFrench Italian to in their to husband and, finally, displaya new energies theearlyfifties, the vigorduring EconomicMiracleof theearly1960s as theU.S. industry The of wentintoa decade-long itself period slumpand restructuring. points on werenowbeing suchmeasures to be madehereare three: justified First, as rather than to the by corporatist grounds, thedesire defend cinema a sector identities. claimto defend national case, Second,in theworst byanygrander comindustries though cropped up-as in Bavaria,which, Germany, cottage talents cultivated in singular pletelyimmersed the Hollywoodexperience, to who lentmomentum the Fassbinder and Werner such as Wim Wenders in the New Waveof thesixties. German Third, thebestcase, Italy, industry as and as a wholerevived flourished, though arguably partand parcelof an of the system. American-dominated restructuring cinemaproduction global
69 On the U.S. presence in postwarEurope, see the indispensablework of Thomas Guback togetherwith subsequent updates of his research, the major argumentsof and whichare summarizedin Thomas Guback, "Cultural Identity Film in theEuropean Economic Community,"Cinema Journal 14 (1974): 2-7. 70 Bizzari (n. 22 above), p. 41.

and Sovereignty 83 Mass Culture Judging thecase of Italy-whichby theearlysixties had becomeEuby film and moviemarket theworld'ssecondlargest rope'sbiggest exporterthe it seemsthat reproducing American model,albeitwithsome significant on craft innovations building a strong and stylistic legacy,had becomethe Some cinema's keytopicking theslackintheU.S. industry.71 oftheItalian up from interwar suchwas thecenera: were the strengths of courseinherited of refurbished state Romeof tralized plant Cinecitta turned which, by funds, was also thescrappy thesixtiesinto"Hollywoodon theTiber." But there to out of habituated ferreting market entrepreneurshipa ragtag capitalism nichesand rapidly bothinternationally in the and to shifts adapting stylistic homemarket. leastof all, Cinecitt'a Not the cultivated realist genre;at one to time promoted Fascist by ideologues "reachouttothepeople,"ithadthen been turned radicalsduring the againstFascistbombast Americanizing by wartime years, becoming immediately thewarthedistinctive (moafter and mentarily) successful trademark thenewItaliancinema. of highly Muchin thesamewaythat the changes during interwar yearswerebound up withtheU.S. challenge, thesepostwar innovations moreor less immeto of In diately responded theincreased influence Hollywood. thefirst place, of post-1947 not governments acceptedthemassiveinflux American films so the to simply as to avoid irritating Majors or in order appeasetheState but Department alsobecausetheHollywood was with style compatible regnant The Christian conservative Democratic ideologies. claimed party Hollywood starsas its allies during crucial1948 electoral the and tempered campaign Church with Catholic ecumenicism whenitcameto devising own zealotry its bonussystems interpreting and rulesin theconformist ofthe censorship spirit Hays Code. Meno stracci, gambe(Less rags,morelegs) was themotto piu' of GiulioAndreotti, was in charge movielegislation who of whileundersecto of retary thepresident theCouncilof Ministers thelate 1940s.72 His in for policywas motivated equallyby distaste theradicalpoliticsof Italian neorealism thedesireto promote and sales abroad. The secondcondition Italiansuccesswas a well-developed for movieinThe dustry organization. industry's majortrade association, ANICA (or Associazione nazionaleindustrie cinematograficheaffini), e whichfromits foundation 1945 included in of representatives U.S. firms, prided itself on like operating an American interest group, lobbying stateaid and laying for downindustry codes. It also cultivated production amicable relations its with

71 On postwar Italy,see Gian Piero Brunetta, Storiadel cinemaitaliano,1945agli anni ottanta (Rome, 1982), p. 198, and LorenzoQuaglietti, Storiaeconomicopoliticadel cinemaitaliano,1945-1980 (Rome, 1980). 72 Brunetta, Storiadel cinema italiano, 1945-agli anniottanta, 34 ff.;Bizzari, pp. pp. 41-42.

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powerful counterpart, reorganized the U.S. now as Motion Picture Association of America which, whilenotguaranteeing speany (MPAA)-a relationship cial economicfavors, keptItalianentrepreneurs abreast Hollywood of production styles business and methods helped and attract American investment. Indeed,thethird condition underlying Italianmovie"miracle" was this the immediate massive and American involvement coproduction in arrangements. as Italian wellas foreign Mobilizing capital overhauling work and local methods, itbrought Italian moviemakers face-to-face thefamiliar with Hollywood The outcome genres. was a burst inventiveness: spaghetti of the western, to takeone example,reinterpreted genre.Withits hyped-up the rhythms and gratuitous it slaughter,was soona leading item theindustry on balancesheets. The last condition was thebig yetwell-articulated homemarket. This had been stretched thewidespread by habit frequent of movie-going acquired as of a result postwar U.S. dumping. This market sustained longer was far in Italythanelsewhere Europedue to the lack of competition in from other entertainment as television.73 such Articulated a huge,often by redundant of network commercial private and the a circuits, Italianmarket attracted publicthatwas bothmassiveand specialized-broadenough absorbproto B of and local imitations, deep digiousquantities Hollywood films their yet to sustain as well. enough quality production

As theItaliancase suggests, neither flourishing local cultural the of pronor confirms validity myargument: the of duction itscrisisnecessarily that massculture, themost in American as disseminator images history, of prolific of a notion thescale and character sovereignty of that challenged European on print was originally based culture. the of Admittedly, vastdimensions the had economies scale of American market initially madepossibletheunusual if nota monopoly, powerful a comthatgave American cultural products, the American artifact-inpartbecause at petitive edge abroad. However, homeit appealedto an ethnically diverse, relatively egalitarian populationalso was able to appealto European publics.This doublepower-economic
73 Brunetta, 1950 to 1955 Storiadel cinemaitaliano,p. 56, who notesthatfrom rate theaters Italyopenedat theastounding of 1,100peryearfora totalof 6,629 in save Italythemostmovieseatspercapitaof anycountry Sweden.In in 1955,giving U.S. influof and analysis theenduring anecdotes intelligent general, fascinating for ence in Italiancinema,see La cittadel cinema(n. 22 above); also the marvelous

memoirscollected by Francesco Savio: Cinecittaanni trenta:Parlano 116 protagonisti del secondo cinema italiano, 1930-1943, 3 vols., ed. Tullio Kezich (Rome, 1979). II racconto che cambia (Milan, 1980).

Hollywood-Cinecittd: of is in Compari, Theinfluence American genres studied Roberto

Mass Culture and Sovereignty 85 and cultural-intrinsic a commodity film, to like confounded European interests theseinterests opposedto Americanism. two Basically pursued paths: onewas tosecure their market or positions, protection, by subsidies, conquest; theother topolicetheir was orcensorship. cultures, political by manipulation Yet neither haltedtheseemingly irresistible of movement Amerstrategy ican cultural modelsthrough international the markets. thetimeof the At Popular MGM's trade Fronts, Voice the journal of Lionwas rallying thousands of littlechildren Laurel-Hardiste clubs.74In 1937, as Mussolini's in fan regime was drawing plansto close outtheU.S. Majors,theDuce's own up son, Vittorio, in Hollywood concludea deal withHal Roach to film was to Italianoperas. Not even the mostself-isolating was impervious: in system the autarchic of Germany the earlyforties, actresses droveaboutin their and directors schlagsahneautomobiles drew movie-mogul salaries while Propaganda Minister Goebbelswas exhorting producers makequality UFI to entertainment theReich'scaptive for audiences studying standardized the by plot lines and happyendingsof Hollywood.The cases are too numerous and theiroutcomestoo repetitive lay blame on a lack of nationalor to sectoral will,on capitalist to capitulation foreigners, on thegullibility or and bad tasteof mass publics. Did thediffusion theAmerican of modelsignify transfers power, was of as feared Europe? a very in In general sense,thespread themechanized of image, byrooting U.S. culture European in civilsociety, indeed did secure influthe enceofwhat might calledan "open-frontier be imperialism." the"faded Like of nationality" TheMagicMountain's Mynheer Peppercorn, American cinema possessed bedazzling a fatuousness. Discombobulating seasoned the alliances and rationalist certainties Old World of it culture, generated solidarities new as wellas newcommunities resistance. of Lookingwithin old territorial the a boundaries, number trends obof are vious.Perhaps leastremarkable the the were neweconomies scaleincultural of production; theseoperated themovieindustry way giant-sized in the corporations actedin other sectors, damaging notirrevocably yet eliminating the resilient smalland independent producers. Less obviously, intrusion the of U.S. models favored new cultural elites: the media counterparts J.-J. of Servan-Schreiber Francoise and Giroudin thesixties werethe 1930s' U.S.connected movie producers, distributors, movie and magazine editors: DiamantBerger, Sapene,Osso, Haik, and Cine'miroir's Vignaudin France;PitJean taluga,Rizzoli, Umberto Notari, Guglielmo and Giannini Kinesin Italy; of ErichPommer theUllstein and brothers Germany. in Political meninsofar as
74 See Le lion vous parle, MGM's monthly and promotional fanmagazine, 193439, esp. 1935-36.

86

De Grazia

outsideof any conventional yet theyappealedto publicloyalties, standing and Left,they used American capital,technologies, between Right division the power, of if to andsymbolism transform,notthebasic substance political style whichit appeared. in this of trend theworld possibilities emergwas the Perhaps leastunderstood to It is openedup to theconsumer-spectator. unnecessary ing mass culture in by contend thatthepublicwas in some way empowered movieculture subtracted was power thereby by order be abletosaythat, itsdissemination, to in of In from traditional authorities. themajorstudy audienceresponse the J. refugee sociologist P. Mayerat by interwar undertaken theGerman era, Rankin themidJ. leadingcinemaproducer Arthur thebehestof Britain's women,indicated working-class mainly dozensof therespondents, forties, of movieshad beenfortheformation whatmight how significant American Morethan a distraction, just as peerculture.75 be described a "new-woman" often with female women couldgo unescorted, was a placewhere thecinema and or movieswerea majorsubjectof discussion members friends; family As and mannerisms fashion. such,thecinemaafforded influencing memory, offered possitheorists, pace mass cultural a kindof imaginary space; this, disto of impervious theclumsy practically bilities individual development authorities. or community, familial state, ciplineof traditional acrossterritorial in production of Theeffects thechange thescaleofcultural mass them.Although as is boundaries at least as complicated thatwithin this as cultural may now be described transnational, has not organization from of meanta transfer powerabroad-at least not in the sense inferred whether in of couched terms national phrased of sovereignty, defenses culture or and in of of in thelanguage theRight, terms tradition identity, oftheLeft, cultural imperialism.76 against in protest beenused by states In thepast,of course,technological edgeshaveoften control. defend To and to political toestablish monopolies thereby consolidate or to elitessought either appropriate to national againstsuch monopolies, raises a different the However,mass culture supersede new technologies. of transfers theearlyindustrial Unlikethetechnological orderof problem. mass publicsas well as elites have become involvedin new revolution, has market thussenand habits.The cultural consumption patterns cultural statewithin to sitizedentire populations the "civilization"of thedominant imof it the international subjecting to a new universe discourse, system, as Williams Empire a Way Life in William of it what Appleman printing with
75 See J. P. Mayer,bothBritish Cinemas and Their Audiences and Sociology of Film: Studies and Documents (n. 17 above).

76 The rejection suchdefenses national of of culture emphatic AlainMasson, is in "Halte 'a 'americanisation," 248 (November Positif 1981): 2.

and Sovereignty 87 Mass Culture defined wayof of confusion an economically as characterized the"imperial of defined standard living."77 lifewitha culturally it defenses againstthis "imperialconfusion," is to In the effort mount spearrevolution communications that to tempting forget thetwentieth-century of all altered previousnotions headedby the UnitedStateshad radically all meanquestioning changemust this Recognizing fundamental boundaries. that or presume thenational-territorial explicitly implicitly thosepoliciesthat by or be is production stillintact might reconstituted means scale of cultural or a agencies.These include,first, transnational Common of appropriate scale of againstthe supranational to organization protect Market-related to of systems statepatronage defend second,middle-level Americanism;78 or a and relations;79 third, microlevel suband productions bilateral hybrid small,or vanguard the to system encourage independent, support national society.80 of the within interstices national producer and the that format theimagesofAmerthe ignore fact All suchstrategies Yet are ican mass culture now universal. theEcce Bomboof Italy'sWoody of German radicalism the Americanized Moretti, theavowedly or Allen,Nanni idiomthanthe of are Wim Wenders, no less expressions an Americanized of context, altematives more the E. spectacular T. In this fairy-tale Hollywood is there Accordingly, market less, smallscale or large,becomeillusory. or from Roland Barthes's to or for something thecritic policymaker learn perhaps that product is so any is premise that cultural whosestarting "mythologist," sets and ambiguous, who,therefore, nature is widelydistributed by itsvery accept To its out to comprehend ambiguity.8' avoid old debates,we might is wine;theproblem to detercinemais "good," likeFrench that American and was constructed spread. of minehow themyth its goodness

as of Williams, Empire a Way Life(New York,1980),p. 220. William Appleman in Challenge Servan-Schreiber The American by As exemplified Jean-Jacques in and of (New York, 1968); cf. Guback'scritique thisposition "CulturalIdentity (n. EconomicCommunity" 69 above). Filmin theEuropean 79 As exemplified government in French cinemaaccording by interventionpostwar Le exploite (Paris,1978). On theobstruction study, cinema to RendBonnell'scareful of Market policyon thecinema,see Don R. groups a Common by national interest Film Industry: BeyondLaw and Economics,"in Le Duc, "The CommonMarket Kindem, (n. 14 above), pp. 361-72. ed. 80 As advocated in for Godard thepress release La chinoise (1967), by,say,Jean-Luc in Vietnams thebosomof thevastHollywoodin whichhe called for"two or three etc., CinecittA-Mosfilm-Pinewood,Empire,"as citedin ThomasElsasser,"Two De" ed. Hollywood theCinephiles, inBigsby, (n. 5 above), and cadesinAnother Country: p. 216. 81 Annette (New York,1972),pp. 156-57. Mythologies Lavers,comp.andtrans.,
77 78