Counterplan: United States federal government should deploy space-based lasers in low earth orbit beyond the Earths

mesosphere for the purpose of ballistic missile defense and antisatellite capability.

PIC

Use of The before United States Congress inscribes nationalistic geopolitics, creating us-them dichotomies Thrift 2k (Nigel, University of Warwick Vice Chancellor, University of Bristol Professor of Geography, Its the Little
Things, Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought p.383-385)

Let us finally come to one more arena: the arena of words. After all, here we might be thought to have the clearest example of representation at work, the word. Yet, what we do not get from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of how words function to bring about geopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as geopolitical forces continue to be framed as big and commanding (with all the masculine overtones). Some of the most potent geopolitical forces are, I suspect, lurking in the little details of peoples lives, what is carried in the specific variabilities of their activities (Shotter and Billig 1998:23), in the context of utterances. And these variabilities have immediate consequences. Thus, As Bakhtin notes, and as is confirmed by the work in conversational analysis, we sensitively catch the smallest shift in

intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another persons practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips (Bakhtin 1984:201). And we in turn show our stance to what they do or say also in fleeting bodily reactions, facial expressions, sounds of approval or disapproval, etc. Indeed, even in the continuously responsive unfolding of non-linguistic activities between ourselves and othersin a dance, in a handshake, or even a mere chance collision on the street we are actively aware of whether the others motives are, so to speak, in tune or at odds with ours. And in our sense of their attunement or lack of it, we can sense their attitude to us as intimate or distant, friendly or hostile, deferential or arrogant, and so on. (Shotter and Billig 1998:23) Thus, very effective work has been done in disciplines like anthropology and discursive psychology (Billig 1995,

national identity and an accompanying geopolitical stance are inscribed through the smallest of details. Thus, for example, national identity is not accomplished in grand displays which incite the citizen to wave the flag in a fit of patriotic fervour. Instead, it goes on in more mundane citations: it is done unobtrusively on the margins of conscious awareness by little words such as the and we. Each day we read or hear phrases such as the prime minister, the nation, or the weather. The definite article assumes deictically the national borders. It points to the homeland: but while we, the readers or listeners, understand the pointing, we do not follow it with our consciousnessit is a seen but unnoticed feature of our everyday discourse.6 (Shotter and Billig 1998:20) Such work goes some way towards understanding the deep, often unconscious aggressions which lurk behind so much geopolitical reasoning,
1997) which attempts to provide a sense of how which through small details build a sense of us as not like them, and from which political programmes then flow as infractions are identified and made legible.7 In these few brief comments, , one still based on discourse, but on discourse understood in a broader way, and one which is less taken in by representation and more attuned to actual practices. In turn, such an agenda leads us away from interpretation of hyperbolic written and

I hoped to have outlined a parallel agenda for critical geopolitics

towards the (I hesitate to say real) work of discourse, the constant hum of practices and their attendant territorializations within which geopower ferments and sometimes boils over.
drawn rhetorics (which, I suspect, are often read by only a few and taken in by even fewer)

Geopolitical borders fuel racism and violence Dike 02 (Mustafa, University of London Royal Holloway Geography Dept. Human Geography Lecturer, Pera Peras
Poros: Longing for Spaces of Hospitality, Theory Culture Society)
Californias Proposition 187 was an attempt to build safe homes for Californians, not for all of them of course. The political abuse of the image of home as a sheltered and safe place drew upon an exclusionary, territorializing, xenophobic, premodern and patriarchal cult of home (Antonopoulos, 1994: 57). It was an elaborate fixing of boundaries, making California a safe home for its legal residents based on the exclusionary politics of home.

remember, however, that it is not only the situation of the guest but also the host that needs to be reconsidered since, in the case of , it is both receiving populations and immigrants [that] . . . risk mutual transformation, [that] . . . engage and attenuate their home-yearning for each others sakes and for the sake of their political life together (Honig, 1999: 203). The point, therefore, is about openings, about keeping open the question of who the people (the demos) is, since the question of democracy always arises at the limit of the demos . . . wherein

Boundaries, evidently, not only evoke the idea of hospitality, but of hostility and racism as well.12 It is important to immigration, for example

There is a need to reconsider the boundary, not only as a separator but as a connector as well, where hospitality comes into play pointing beyond the boundaries.
native, subject, citizen, or people receives its designation as such from the way the human encounter with the stranger and the strange is assumed (Dillon, 1999: 120 and 96).

There is a need, perhaps, to reflect on what the title words, in Greek, of this text suggest: Pera peras poros: the other side/beyond limit passage; beyond the limits that interdict passage (Baptist, 1999: 102). There is a need, more importantly, if a cosmopolitan approach is to be assumed, to think about hospitality that would be more than cosmopolitical, that would go beyond strictly cosmopolitical

there is no way, I would argue, to escape the advent of the stranger, to avoid questions and questionings that tremble, if not stir, the socio-political order that once appeared, perhaps, as a safe home. Nor is there a way to avoid the production of others. What is more important, instead of reflecting on the ways by which no other would be produced, is to be able to resist processes that produce and reproduce others; processes that stabilize themselves, that close spaces, and that derive their sustainability from the very process of othering itself. Again, what is more important, rather than reflecting on the ways by which to avoid the disturbance of the stranger, is to be able to provide for the social, cultural, institutional, ethical and political spaces where we could learn to engage with and learn from each other, while being
conditions, that would go beyond the interests, authority, and legislation of the state (Derrida, 1999a: 43). To conclude, able to constitute our subjectivities free from subordination, in democratic ways. The point, then, is to open spaces, spaces where recognition as well as contestation and conflict can take place. Furthermore,

the point is not merely to open spaces; more importantly, it is to keep them open. Hospitality is aimed at such a concern.

They dont specify their agent thats a voting issue

A-Spec

Kills neg ground they can say the plan is implemented differently than our disads assume which lets them spike out of all our links Prevents us from knowing how the government works, prevents any policy implementation

T-Increase
Interpretation increase requires an expansion on a pre-existing structure. Buckley et al, 06 - attorney (Jeremiah, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf)
First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word increase is to make something greater, which it believed should not be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged. 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite

Because increase means to make something greater, there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edos actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an increase occurred. Congress
conclusion. could have provided that ad-verse action in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an increase. That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) ([a] defin-ition which declares what a term means . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words existing or applied for, Congress intended that an increase in any charge for insurance must apply to all insurance transactions from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy. 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words exist-ing or applied for in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a cancellation, reduction, or change in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term increase also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it) (citation omitted).

B. Violation The affirmative doesnt increase an existing program C.Standards Ground They steal our ground by creating some program that doesnt exist, we cant expect an aff that doesnt have any pre-existing framework in the government. Limits They explode the case list, any new program could be created. Voting issue for fairness

T-Development/Exploration
Development is manned projects Livingston 07 former adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Business at Golden Gate University his doctoral dissertation was titled

Outer Space Commerce: Its History and Prospects citing Eric Westling co-author of The Space Elevator and numerous papers on space tech and development [quals in card] (9/10/07, This Week On The Space Show: Eric Westling, http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298)

Eric Westling is a science writer, pundit on science, technology, and economics. He is the co-author of The Space Elevator with Dr. Brad Edwards . In addition, Mr. Westling is retired and is a former Army officer and helicopter pilot, civilian Airline Transport Pilot (ATP), former consultant to many small companies regarding engineering, computer, and business troubleshooting. His most recent papers are on Solar Power Satellites, Economics of the Space Elevator, Energy and time lag in the 21st century , and Erics axioms (a list of principles
of science, technology and economics). Mr. Westling stats that Space Development is the only long term answer to the, just starting, energy shortage; which will otherwise continue until we have an economic collapse. He believes that no-one is doing space development . Instead,

we have space technology, not development. NASA has no TRL 10 therefore no plans to develop space . He defines space development as the rapid expansion of manned commercial projects in space.

Violation they weaponize space Voting issue limits

Allowing the aff to do anything in space is unpredictable. The aff would race to the smallest possible aff barely related to space. Only we force the aff to have predictable mechanism thats is the key internal link to education because predictability is a prerequisite to research and clash.

ground
We lose all space science based generics because they can say earth science, which is perceived very differently Small satellites dont link to spending or trade off disads.

Our interpretation is that affirmative action should be limited to the mandates of the resolution; fiat is not part of that, making it extra topical. Voting issue Predictability- resolution is all that the negative has to research, allowing the affirmative to go outside the bounds of the resolution destroys negative ground. Ground- we are prepared to debate the consequences of the aff advocating the resolution, we have reasons why advocating that the USFG should do something is bad

Fiat is Extra-T

ORS Counterplan
Counterplan: The United States federal government should sign the EU Code of Conduct and substantially increase the development of Operationally Responsive Space by developing military launch infrastructure that includes deployment of small satellites, capacity for launch on demand and rapid satellite reconstitution, constellation architecture, improvement of space situational awareness, preplanned actions, maneuverability, and hardening of its military satellites. Defensive measures are consistent with a code of conduct but combining it with weaponization will destroy international support Krepon et al, 11 President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, also Theresa Hitchens, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research and Michael Katz-Hyman, Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center on the Space Security and South Asia Projects (Michael, Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf)

Because the use of weapons in or from space can lead to the loss or impairment of satellites of all major space powers, all of whom depend on satellites for military and economic security, we believe it is possible to craft a regime based on self-interest to avoid turning space into a shooting gallery. This outcome is far more difficult to achieve if major space powers engage in the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT weapons or space-to-Earth weapons. We therefore argue that it would be most unwise for the United States, as the spacepower with the most to lose from the impairment of its satellites, to initiate these steps. Similar restraint, however, needs to be exercised by other major spacefaring nations, some of which may feel
that the preservation and growth of U.S. spacepower are a threat, or that it is necessary to hold U.S. space assets at risk. The United States is therefore obliged to clarify to others the risks of initiating actions harmful to U.S. satellites without prompting other spacefaring nations to take the very steps we seek to avoid. Consequently, a preservation and growth strategy for U.S. spacepower also requires a hedging strategy

because, even if the United States makes prudent decisions in space, others may still make foolish choices. Hedging The exercise of restraint from using weapons in space is not easy for the world's most powerful nation or for other nations fearing
catastrophic losses that they believe might be averted by disabling U.S. satellites. How, then, might U.S. spacepower influence the decisions of other nations to leave vulnerable satellites alone? We maintain that a prudent space posture would clarify America's ability to respond purposefully if another nation interferes with, disables, disrupts, or destroys U.S. satellites, without being the first to take the actions that we wish others to refrain from taking. Thus, our proposed hedging strategy would not include the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT or on-orbit weapons because such steps would surely be emulated by others and would increase risks to vital U.S. space assets. Whatever preparations the United States takes to hedge against attacks on its satellites must be calibrated to maximize freedom of action and access in space. Hedging moves that create an environment where the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons would be a common occurrence would thus be contrary to U.S. military and economic security. Responsible hedges by the United States include increased situational awareness, redundancy, and cost-effective

hardening of satellites and their links. The strongest hedge the United States possesses is its superior conventional military capabilities,
including long-range strike and special operations capabilities. Since an attack on a satellite can be considered an act of war, the United States could respond to such an attack by targeting the ground links and launch facilities of the offending nation or the nation that harbors a group carrying out such hostile acts. Far more punishing responses might be applicable. A hedging strategy is also likely to include ground-based research and development into space weapons technologies, activities that are under way in major spacefaring nations. The demonstration of dual- or multi-use space technologies that could be adapted, if needed, to respond to provocative acts would constitute another element of a responsible hedging strategy. Such technologies could include on-orbit rendezvous, repair, and refueling technologies and other proximity operations. These activities are also essential for expanded scientific and commercial use of space and would be key enabling technologies for long-duration missions such as the return to the Moon and the exploration of Mars. A prudent hedging strategy would also align U.S. military doctrine and declaratory policy with America's national security and economic interest in preventing weapons in space and ASAT tests. In the context of a proactive Air Force counterspace operations doctrine and

official disdain for negotiations that might constrain U.S. military options in space, the hedging strategy we advocate might be perceived as preliminary steps toward the weaponization of space, which we would oppose. Wise hedging strategies would also be accompanied by constructive diplomatic initiatives. The flight-testing of multipurpose technologies, the possession of dominant power projection capabilities, and the growing residual U.S. military capabilities to engage in space warfare should provide a sufficient deterrent posture against a "space Pearl Harbor."4 These capabilities would also clarify that the United States possesses the means to defend its interests in a competition
that other major space powers claim not to want, as well as to react in a prompt and punishing way against hostile acts against U.S. space assets. If all responsible spacefaring nations adhere to a "no further ASAT test" regime, and an adversary still carries out a "space Pearl Harbor" by using military capabilities designed for other purposes, the United States has the means to respond in kind. U.S. latent or residual space warfare capabilities exceed those of other spacefaring nations and are growing with the advent of ballistic missile defenses. We maintain that the existence of such capabilities constitutes another element of a hedging strategy, while providing further support for our contention that dedicated ASAT tests and deployments are both unwise and unnecessary.

More ev. Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems that also have ASAT capabilities would likely affect first-strike dynamics in space in ways that mirror counterspace weapons. Systems with orbital components that could attack other satellites would, in a crisis with another spacefaring nation that also had ASAT capabilities, exert pressure on that state to strike first, in an effort to save its own satellites from first-strike losses.16 Similarly, terrestrial-based BMD weapons capable of intercepting satellites, might also be threatening to a spacefaring opponent in a crisis, but first-strike pressures would not be as great as they would be if either of the adversaries had weapons in orbit. In all of the foregoing cases, brandishing behaviors would make first-strike instability more severe, given space systems inherent vulnerabilities, as might explicit deterrent threats if they are not carefully tailored to support a coherent national strategy to enhance first-strike stability in space. Obama is pursuing space cooperation US multilateral leadership is creating a framework against weaponization Huntley, 11 - senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Wade, The
2011 U.S. National Space Security Policy: Engagement as a Work in Progress, Disarmament Times, Spring, http://disarm.igc.org/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=429:the-2011-us-national-space-security-policy-engagement-as-a-work-in-progress&catid=154:disarmamenttimes-spring-2011&Itemid=2) As is well understood, the space policies of the Bush administration were decidedly oriented toward military security concerns and independent action. The 2006 National Space Policy unabashedly proclaimed the U.S. intention to maintain a dominant position in space indefinitely. This policy orientation dismissed multilateral cooperation as impinging on U.S. freedom of action, throwing weight instead behind a wide range of technology development initiatives founded on the assumption that deployment of weapons in space was, if not already factual, certainly inevitable.2 U.S. commercial and civil engagement was overshadowed by these security concerns, expressed through the tightening of export control restrictions inhibiting a broad range of technology sharing. Once again, U.S. space policy was subsumed by other national priorities, in this case dominated by military security concerns. This background is essential for appreciating how the space policies of the Obama administration are beginning to genuinely

break new trails. The U.S. National Space Policy issued in June 2010 has been widely recognized for its cooperative and multilateral tone, including as explicit near-term goals the expansion of international cooperation on all activities and pursuing international as well as national measures to enhance space stability. Particularly notable are the documents emphasis on orienting U.S. leadership toward fostering international cooperation, and its references, in its concluding section, to
cooperation with other states and non-state actors in the pursuit of national security space objectives.3 Less broadly noticed was this policys clarity and coherence in articulating a vision for U.S. space activities on its own terms. The document is organized around core principles, subsidiary goals and implementing guidelines that exceed its predecessors in delineating a longer-term direction for U.S. space policy that is integrated with, rather than derivative of, broader U.S. global aims.4 The policy also was generated and issued far earlier in the tenure of the administration than either of its predecessors, indicating an increased prioritization of attention to space policy at higher levels of policy-making. To some degree, a turn toward

multilateral cooperation in U.S. space policy was to be expected. Chinas 2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2009
Iridium-Cosmos collision increased awareness of the challenge of space debris and the need for better global information sharing on space situational awareness (SSA).5 Also, new budget realities and unpromising technological developments have scaled back

ambitions in some quarters for solving U.S. space security concerns with new independent capabilities. Finally, the
Obama administration has pursued a more cooperative disposition across a wide range of global policy challenges, from Iranian nuclear ambitions to global climate change. But the improved clarity of vision in the 2010 Space Policy suggests that the emphasis on fostering global cooperation on spacerelated activities is more grounded in deliberate foresight than sailing the prevailing political winds. The 2011 National Security Space

Strategy, released February 4, is best interpreted against this background of the Obama administrations turn toward both greater international space cooperation and greater attention to space policy in general. This first-of-its-kind strategic statement
culminates a congressionally mandated space posture review.6 The initial section portraying the strategic environment to which U.S. security policy must be responsive highlights the growing problems of space debris, orbital congestion and coordination among a growing number of space actors not state-based security threats per se. The Security Space Strategy features the objective of a stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility.7 Specific provisions intended to implement this strategy, relevant to the preceding observations, include:8 The strategy presents a full section on Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms. This category is not wholly multilateral in the traditional sense, displaying a symbiosis of alliance-building and collective cooperation not always carefully distinguished; i.e., The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so. The strategy intends to encourage responsible behavior in space and lead by the power of example, a significant observation given the tendency of U.S. policymakers (as noted above) not to expect quid pro quo responses to cooperative gestures. Also, the strategy states the U.S. will support

development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations. [italics added] In the context of the section on Preventing and Deterring Aggression, the
strategy similarly intends to support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space as well as pursue international partnerships that encourage potential adversary restraint, along with other measures. This emphasis on norm-building and the role of example

suggests a near-term endorsement of the development of codes of conduct for space activities (such as the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct, discussed below), whether or not such concord leads to more formal arms control arrangements in the longer-term. The Department of Defense is directed to foster cooperative SSA relationships,
and to expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms. Greater SSA information sharing has been a key suggestion for fostering international cooperation; the U.S. possesses globally superior SSA capabilities, but restricts the sharing of this information on the basis of national security concerns.9 Hence, this nominal commitment is significant in its own right. The strategy commits

to reforming export controls. In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system will
better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts. As noted above, the oppressive impact of current U.S. export controls not only impinges

on U.S. commercial space actors but also epitomizes the high degree to which U.S. policy has subsumed commercial and civil interests to national security concerns. The strategy appears to acknowledge this connection and commit to remedy it. The most assertive passages of the statement are moderated with community-building intent. For example, the strategys section on Preventing and Deterring Aggression concludes that the U.S. will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail, but immediately adds that the U.S. will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense. The concluding and most conflict-oriented section of the strategy opens by noting that some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide military advantage. Counterspace capabilities, unarticulated in the document, include ASATs, ground-based directed energy weapons and satellite transmission jamming. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte explained at the strategys rollout that China is a principal concern in this regard, but so is the proliferation of these technologies: If Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite, you have to worry what others can do.10 This section of the strategy does not, however, call for maintaining options to develop complementary space conflict capabilities. Rather, the strategy asserts that the U.S. must be prepared to fight through a degraded environment, and identifies resilience and space protection as the key criteria. The preceding survey of elements of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy is deliberately selective, highlighting those elements expressing consistency with the 2010 National Space Policys bend toward fostering greater international collaboration. Perhaps as striking as the prevalence of such passages, however, is

the absence of expressed intention even couched in hedging language to sustain or expand the kind of independent space-based military capabilities that were the centerpiece of the prior
administrations aims (if not its accomplishments). Again, to some extent this turn in tone is overdetermined by extenuating global circumstances. But one must still be struck by the degree to which developments such as the Chinese ASAT test have not ignited the kind of response one might have anticipated only a few short years after Donald Rumsfelds notorious warning of a space Pearl Harbor.11 The most immediate significance

of the National Security Space Strategy is likely the signals its sends concerning U.S. policy toward the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct.12 The strategy did not explicitly endorse this EU initiative, but Mr. Schulte, at the February 4
presentation of the strategy, highlighted the initiative as a potential way to promote transparency and confidence-building measures, which tend to be voluntary as opposed to legally binding. A week earlier, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, stated at the Conference on Disarmament that the administration was nearing a decision on whether the U.S. would sign on to the code, and what modifications might be required in order to do so.13 As U.S. interest in the Code of Conduct has increased, debates over its provisions and its relationship to the Outer Space Treaty have intensified. These policy movements toward multilateral engagement and

commitment to behavioral standards (even if non-binding) mark a sharp departure from the stiff resistance to curtailing U.S. freedom of action in the previous administration, and have accordingly generated resistance from congressional
opponents on just those terms. Prior to the release of the National Security Space Strategy, a group of 37 Republican senators led by Arizona Senator Jon Kyl issued a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressing concern over a potential multilateral commitment that might limit development and/or deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors and ASAT-defeating systems.14 Critics also decried the strategys emphasis on the old fallacious assumption that the power of example will prevent adversaries from doing the United States harm, and endorsed maintaining the goal of U.S. retention of a dominant position in military and intelligence space capabilities.15 In fact, the administrations warming toward normative commitments in general and the EU Code of Conduct in particular are in part intended to forestall pressure for more formal and binding measures that would definitively cut off the hedge of unilateral U.S. weapons development options.16 The balance of U.S. debate may have shifted toward greater international cooperation, but the terms of the debate remain the same. In sum, the National Security Space Strategy appears to

mark not only a swing in U.S. policy toward greater global engagement but also, and more importantly, a step toward greater long-term coherence in thinking concerning the core goals of U.S. space activities. Even supporters of the
general directions of the strategy noted its more-than-expected breadth of thought.17 But if this reading is sound, the strategy is still but one step on a long road, and ongoing debates over the role of U.S. space policy vis--vis broader national security interests will insure that road is bumpy. Suggesting such limitations, Mr. Schulte acknowledged that the classified version of the strategy is only four pages longer than the released version, indicating that more specific guidelines for military implementation of the strategy remain to be developed.18 Many devils may lurk in these details.

Multilateral cooperation against weaponization is vital to preventing miscalculation, first strike incentives and global war Hitchens, 8 president of the Center for Defense Information (Theresa, Space Wars - Coming to the Sky Near You?, Scientific American,
February, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=space-wars-coming-to-the-sky-near-you)

Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations, including one of Chinas regional rivals, India, may feel compelled to seek offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. The U.S. trade journal Defense News, for
instance, quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kinetic-energy (nonexplosive, hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons. If India goes down that path, its archrival Pakistan will probably follow

suit. Like India, Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system. Even Japan, the third major Asian power, might join such a space race. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a bill
backed by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for military and national security purposes. As for Russia, in the wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscows stance against the weaponization of space. At the same time, though, he refused to criticize Beijings actions and blamed the U.S. instead. The American efforts to build a missile defense system, Putin charged, and the increasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were prompting Chinas moves. Yet Russia itself, as a major spacefaring power that has incorporated satellites into its national security structure, would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space. Given the

proliferation of spacefaring entities, proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based
weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably

destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competitionwhether in space or elsewhereequilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to

have gained an advantage. Again, there

would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic. Hit-to-Kill Interceptors According to assessments by U.S. military and intelligence officials as well as by independent experts,
the Chinese probably destroyed their weather satellite with a kinetic-energy vehicle boosted by a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile. Technologically, launching such direct-ascent antisatellite weapons is one of the simplest ways to take out a satellite. About a dozen nations and consortia can reach low Earth orbit (between roughly 100 and 2,000 kilometers, or 60 to 1,250 miles, high) with a medium-range missile; eight of those countries can reach geostationary orbit (about 36,000 kilometers, or 22,000 miles, above Earth). But the real technical hurdle to making a hit-to-kill vehicle is not launch capacity; it is the precision maneuverability and guidance technology needed to steer the vehicle into its target. Just how well China has mastered those techniques is unclear. Because the weather satellite was still operating when it was destroyed, the Chinese operators would have known its exact location at all times. Ground-Based Lasers The test of Chinas direct-ascent antisatellite device came on the heels of press reports in September 2006 that the Chinese had also managed to paint, or illuminate, U.S. spy satellites with a ground-based laser [see lower box on page 83]. Was Beijing actually trying to blind or otherwise damage the satellites? No one knows, and no consensus seems to have emerged in official Washington circles about the Chinese intent. Perhaps China was simply testing how well its network of low-power laser-ranging stations could track American orbital observation platforms. Even so, the test was provocative. Not all satellites have to be electronically fried to be put out of commission. A 1997 test of the armys MIRACL system (for midinfrared advanced chemical laser) showed that satellites designed to collect optical images can be temporarily disrupted dazzledby low-power beams. It follows that among the satellites vulnerable to such an attack are the orbital spies. The U.S. and the former Soviet Union began experimenting with laser-based antisatellite weapons in the 1970s. Engineers in both countries have focused on the many problems of building high-power laser systems that could reliably destroy low-flying satellites from the ground. Such systems could be guided by adaptive optics: deformable mirrors that can continuously compensate for atmospheric distortions. But tremendous amounts of energy would be needed to feed highpower lasers, and even then the range and effectiveness of the beams would be severely limited by dispersion, by attenuation as they passed through smoke or clouds, and by the difficulty of keeping the beams on-target long enough to do damage. During the development of the SDI, the U.S. conducted several laser experiments from Hawaii, including a test in which a beam was bounced off a mirror mounted on a satellite. Laser experiments continue at the Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Pentagon budget documents from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 listed antisatellite operations among the goals of the Starfire research, but that language was removed from budget documents in fiscal year 2008 after Congress made inquiries. The Starfire system incorporates adaptive optics that narrow the outgoing laser beam and thus increase the density of its power. That capability is not required for imagery or tracking, further suggesting that Starfire could be used as a weapon. Yet despite decades of work, battle-ready versions of directed-energy weapons still seem far away. An air force planning document, for instance, predicted in 2003 that a groundbased weapon able to propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to [stun or kill low Earth orbit] satellites could be available between 2015 and 2030. Given the current state of research, even those dates seem optimistic. Co-orbital Satellites Recent advances in miniaturized sensors, powerful onboard computers and efficient rocket thrusters have made a third kind of antisatellite technology increasingly feasible: the offensive microsatellite. One example that demonstrates the potential is the air forces experimental satellite series (XSS) project, which is developing microsatellites intended to conduct autonomous proximity operations around larger satellites. The first two microsatellites in the program, the XSS-10 and XSS-11, were launched in 2003 and 2005. Though ostensibly intended to inspect larger satellites, such microsatellites could also ram target satellites or carry explosives or directed-energy payloads such as radio-frequency jamming systems or high-powered microwave emitters. Air force budget documents show that the XSS effort is tied to a program called Advanced Weapons Technology, which is dedicated to research on military laser and microwave systems. During the cold war the Soviet Union developed, tested and even declared operational a co-orbital antisatellite systema maneuverable interceptor with an explosive payload that was launched by missile into an orbit near a target satellite in low Earth orbit. In effect, the device was a smart space mine, but it was last demonstrated in 1982 and is probably no longer working. Today such an interceptor would likely be a microsatellite that could be parked in an orbit that would cross the orbits of several of its potential targets. It could then be activated on command during a close encounter. In 2005 the air force described a program that would provide localized space situational awareness and anomaly characterization for friendly host satellites in geostationary orbit. The program is dubbed ANGELS (for autonomous nanosatellite guardian for evaluating local space), and the budget line believed to represent it focuses on acquiring high value space asset defensive capabilities, including a warning sensor for detection of a direct ascent or co-orbital vehicle. It is clear that such guardian nanosatellites could also serve as offensive weapons if they were maneuvered close to enemy satellites. And the list goes on. A parasitic satellite would shadow or even attach itself to a target in geostationary orbit. Farsat, which was mentioned in an appendix to the [Donald] Rumsfeld Space Commission report in 2001, would be placed in a storage orbit (perhaps with many microsatellites housed inside) relatively far from its target but ready to be maneuvered in for a kill. Finally, the air force proposed some time ago a space-based radio-frequency weapon system, which would be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems. Air force planning documents from 2003 envisioned that such a technology would emerge after 2015. But outside experts think that orbital radio-frequency and microwave weapons are technically feasible today and could be deployed in the relatively near future. Space Bombers Though not by definition a space weapon, the Pentagons Common Aero Vehicle/Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (often called CAV) enters into this discussion because, like an ICBM, it would travel through space to strike Earth-bound targets. An unpowered but highly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, the CAV would be deployed from a future hypersonic space plane, swoop down into the atmosphere from orbit and drop conventional bombs on ground targets. Congress recently began funding the project but, to avoid stoking a potential arms race in space, has prohibited any work to place weapons on the CAV. Although engineers are making steady progress on the key technologies for the CAV program, both the vehicle and its space plane mothership are still likely decades off. Some of the congressional sensitivity to the design of the CAV may have arisen from another, much more controversial space weapons concept with parallel goals: hypervelocity rod bundles that would be dropped to Earth from orbital platforms. For decades air force planners have been thinking about placing weapons in orbit that could strike terrestrial targets, particularly buried, hardened bunkers and caches of weapons of mass destruction. Commonly called rods from God, the bundles would be made up of large tungsten rods, each as long as six meters (20 feet) and 30 centimeters (12 inches) across. Each rod would be hurled downward from an orbiting spacecraft and guided to its target at tremendous speed. Both high costs and the laws of physics, however, challenge their feasibility. Ensuring that the projectiles do not burn up or deform from reentry friction while sustaining a precise, nearly vertical flight path would be extremely difficult. Calculations indicate that the nonexplosive rods would probably be no more effective than more conventional munitions. Furthermore, the expense of lofting the heavy projectiles into orbit would be exorbitant. Thus, despite continued interest in them, rods from God seem to fall into the realm of science fiction. Obstacles to Space Weapons What, then, is holding the U.S. (and other nations) back from a full-bore pursuit of space weapons? The countervailing pressures are threefold: political opposition, technological challenges and high costs. The American body politic is deeply divided over the wisdom of making space warfare a part of the national military strategy. The risks are manifold. I remarked earlier on the general instabilities of an arms race, but there is a further issue of stability among the nuclear powers. Early-warning and spy satellites have traditionally played a crucial role in reducing fears of a surprise nuclear attack. But if antisatellite weapons disabled those eyes-in-the-sky, the resulting uncertainty and distrust could rapidly lead to catastrophe. One of the most serious technological challenges posed by space weapons is the proliferation of space debris, to which I alluded earlier. According to investigators at the air force, NASA and Celestrak (an independent space-monitoring Web site), the Chinese antisatellite test left more than 2,000 pieces of junk, baseball-size and larger, orbiting the globe in a cloud that lies between about 200 kilometers (125 miles) and 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles) above Earths surface. Perhaps another 150,000 objects that are a centimeter (half an inch) across and larger were released. High orbital velocities make even tiny pieces of space junk dangerous to spacecraft of all kinds. And ground stations cannot reliably monitor or track objects smaller than about five centimeters (two inches) across in low Earth orbit (around a meter in geostationary orbit), a capability that might enable satellites to maneuver out of the way. To avoid being damaged by the Chinese space debris, in fact, two U.S. satellites had to alter course. Any shooting war in space would raise the specter of a polluted space environment no longer navigable by Earth-orbiting satellites. Basing weapons in orbit

also presents difficult technical obstacles. They would be just as vulnerable as satellites are to all kinds of outside agents: space debris, projectiles, electromagnetic signals, even natural micrometeoroids. Shielding space weapons against such threats would also be impractical, mostly because shielding is bulky and adds mass, thereby greatly increasing launch costs. Orbital weapons would be mostly autonomous mechanisms, which would make operational errors and failures likely. The paths of objects in orbit are relatively easy to predict, which would make hiding large weapons problematic. And because satellites in low Earth orbit are overhead for only a few minutes at a time, keeping one of them constantly in range would require many weapons. Finally, getting into space and operating there is extremely expensive: between $2,000 and $10,000 a pound to reach low Earth orbit and between $15,000 and $20,000 a pound for geostationary orbit. Each space-based weapon would require replacement every seven to 15 years, and in-orbit repairs would not be cheap, either. Alternatives to Space Warfare Given the risks of space warfare to national and international security, as well as the technical and financial hurdles that must be overcome, it would seem only prudent for spacefaring nations to find ways to prevent an arms race in space. The U.S. focus has been to reduce the vulnerability of its satellite fleet and explore alternatives to its dependence on satellite services. Most

other space-capable countries are instead seeking multilateral diplomatic and legal measures. The options range from treaties that would ban antisatellite and space-based weapons to voluntary measures that would help build transparency and mutual confidence. The Bush administration has adamantly opposed any
form of negotiations regarding space weapons. Opponents of multilateral space weapons agreements contend that others (particularly China) will sign up but build secret arsenals at the same time, because such treaty violations cannot be detected. They argue further that the U.S. cannot sit idly as potential adversaries gain spaceborne resources that could enhance their terrestrial combat capabilities. Proponents of international treaties counter that failure

to negotiate such agreements entails real opportunity costs. An arms race in space may end up compromising the security of all nations, including that of the U.S., while it stretches the economic capacities of the competitors to the breaking point. And
whereas many advocates of a space weapons ban concede that it will be difficult to construct a fully verifiable treatybecause space technology can be used for both military and civilian endseffective treaties already exist that do not require strict verification. A good example is the Biological Weapons Convention. Certainly a prohibition on the testing and use (as opposed to the deployment) of the most dangerous class of near-term space weapons destructive (as opposed to jamming) antisatellite systemswould be easily verifiable, because earthbound observers can readily detect orbital debris. Furthermore, any party to a treaty would know that all its space launches would be tracked from the ground, and

any suspicious object in orbit would promptly be labeled as such. The international outcry that would ensue from such overt treaty violations could deter would-be violators. Since the mid-1990s, however, progress on establishing a new multilateral space regime has lagged. The U.S. has blocked efforts at the United Nations Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a treaty to ban space weapons. China, meanwhile, has refused to accept anything less. Hence, intermediate measures such as voluntary confidence-building, space traffic control or a code of responsible conduct for spacefaring nations have remained stalled. Space warfare is not inevitable. But the recent policy shift in the U.S. and Chinas provocative

actions have highlighted the fact that the world is approaching a crossroads. Countries must come to grips with their strong
self-interest in preventing the testing and use of orbital weapons. The nations of Earth must soon decide whether it is possible to sustain the predominantly peaceful human space exploration that has already lasted half a century. The likely alternative would be unacceptable to all.

Counterplan: The European Space Agency should should deploy space-based lasers in low earth orbit beyond the Earths mesosphere for the purpose of ballistic missile defense and antisatellite capability. Counterplan solves the case Brauer and Monte 05 (Gerard and Luca del, Gerard is the head of the ESA, European Space Research and Developmentfor the Security and
Military Sectors pdf) The above described scenario suggests that the potential contribution of ESA

ESA CP

in the framework of a European network of technical agencies in support of a European security/defence system for the time framework 2013-2015, could be the step wise development of a balanced mix of top-down and bottom-up initiatives complementing each other. On
the one hand there is a recognized need for the collaboration and eventually for the convergence of these two approaches in the short-medium time, on the other hand there is the responsibility of national Governments for the security of their citizens. Nationally owned

assets are going to be the main tools for security and defence, but these assets need to be linked by using commonly agreed standards and by a commonly owned basic infrastructures. Some elements of the future architecture are being discussed by the European Member States interested in space. The definition of future situation awareness capabilities must be a short term goal. The development of multi/hyper-spectral, radar, optical, infrared sensors and platforms will be necessary to support the security user communities.. Today, the next generation of these systems is far from being mature. Their development should be coordinated from the very beginning. ESA, the organisation charged with developing the major European space programmes, possesses the overall set of capabilities in the definition and conduct of space infrastructure programmes and in the definition of technology preparation and accompaniment programmes. It has an intimate knowledge of the industrial fabric and the capabilities available in Europe. Through its programmes, ESA has access to all categories of space applications and possesses ground facilities and space systems, which could be made available in support of specific applications with defence relevance (launchers, observation and telecommunications satellites, test and operations facilities, etc.). The Agency is the primary source of institutional contracts in a number of applications areas and in the R&D field. Being an intergovernmental agency with a programme remit, ESA has demonstrated its ability to establish cooperative ventures at European level. Under its leadership the space sector has indeed come to be seen as a pioneer and an acknowledged model for the
process of European integration. The optional programme, a tried and tested legal form, provides a basis for a flexible model of cooperation between States, one which accommodates the participants specific objectives and constraints while at the same time allowing resources to be pooled and common rules to be applied. In practice, the Agencys contribution to the emergence of a space component for the European defence policy and the ensuing activities may take many forms. These may be classified in accordance with the level of Agency involvement and the extent to which the activity concerned is defence-specific. A first group of activities are those concerned with optimising synergies in technologies and infrastructures. ESA has

started consultations with the defence entities on technological priorities and critical technologies of interest to both communities with a view to coordinating preparatory work and upstream research activity. The requirements emerging in this way from the defence entities should be incorporated in the European space technologies master plan. The consultation process could be extended to test and operations facilities to ensure more effective investment
planning on all sides and avoid unwarranted duplication. Another possibility to be considered is the development by the Agency of dedicated dual use programmes or the availability of Agencys infrastructures for defence uses (one example might be a demonstration of data relay between an Agency satellite and a military aircraft). The Agency might, lastly, be assigned responsibility for developing prototypes, demonstrators or space borne infrastructure components to serve defence requirements.

Counterplan
Counterplan: The United States federal government should adopt a systematic methodology for the continuous development of official doctrine of deploying and using space-based lasers in low earth orbit beyond the Earths mesosphere for the purpose of ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite capability in relation to historical military experience, innovation in new technologies, new geopolitical encounters, and the emergence of new threats.
ONLY a dynamic open-doctrine approach to policy-making capable of learning lessons from experience and integrating new strategic concepts can allow the plan to become adaptive to new scenarios and facilitate effective force structure. ONLY the counterplan allows for the restricted mission to be an effective war-fighting instrument post-plan by developing a dynamic framework approach RATHER THAN any durable eternal mandate Temple 92 Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, (USAF, Retired (USAFA; MBA, University of Northern Colorado; MS, West Coast University), is a private
consultant on space policy and programs. Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Airpower Journal, Summer http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/sum92/temple.htm SW) We now have the end objective in sight. The incorporation of frameworks as described here will both help us write better doctrine and, just as importantly, help us interpret whatever history we read to determine its usefulness for ourselves. Unfortunately, we do not now have a

doctrine that is developed according to the framework approach. The current draft of AFM 1-1 has taken a giant step forward by incorporating historical examples and vignettes, as many of us have encouraged in the past.19 Frameworks offer the only valid method for doctrine development. Each new war does not necessarily improve our ability to wage war successfully. Korea and Vietnam were not improvements on our success in World War II. Whether they could have been is moot; they were not because doctrine had not adequately accounted for the increased political dimension of the latter wars. Lessons learned in wars do not move inexorably toward perfect understanding. Methodologies that cause us to believe we will eventually achieve perfect principles of war are dangerous. Each war has elements from previous wars, but in an essentially new framework. Unless doctrine is dynamic enough to recognize changes in frameworks, it will not enhance our chances of success. Writing successful doctrine requires recognizing, judging, and describing how the Air Force operates in such a way that we can observe and assess the changes as frameworks evolve and come into contact with other frameworks. The Air Force's frameworks were modified by the development and fielding of stealth technology in both Tactical Air Command (TAC)
and Strategic Air Command (SAC); it also necessitated modification of the framework of anyone who might be an enemy, since they would have to try to counter stealth. In this case, we are forcing the rest of the world to react to a revolutionary new technology. As we force others to adapt to

our new framework, we cannot wait and adapt to their changing frameworks. We must stay intensely aware of the status of the frameworks of potential enemies as an important aspect of professional military education. Without this, there would be little hope for recognizing the areas where doctrine would help exploit weaknesses in the adversary and where the adversary might exploit our own weaknesses. Doctrine must be at once historical and futuristic. It must be historical to understand how the framework came to be what it is. Once we understand why it has become what it is, we will be able to understand what elements of the framework will need to be changed in order for us to meet the future, to stay ahead of technology, or to change aspects of the present framework that we do not like. Suppose we object to the size and weight of present military satellites and believe we should spend resources to develop lightsats instead. Before rushing ahead, we should be able to find in an adequate space doctrine just how we came to have such large satellites--and we should do this in terms clear enough to understand what is required to reduce their size and what is lost in downsizing without adversely affecting other aspects of the Air Force's space business. An adequate doctrine would also allow us to judge if smaller satellites are
even a good idea once we understand the subject. Operation Desert Storm provides an excellent example for doctrinal framework evaluation. The doctrinal frameworks we might compare it to are the Vietnam War and the North African campaign in World War II. Both have common elements to carry forward into the framework for Desert Storm. Some of the same problems faced Field Marshals Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery (heat, water shortages, and sand). But I submit that what we actually saw was the crossing of a significant framework boundary. Although it will take more serious thinking, judgment indicates the new framework must be built on the basis of the three key elements of

precision guided munitions, the vast flow of information (public, private, and military), and the tight integration of all US and allied forces. Precision guided munitions were not new to Desert Storm; however, never before had they been used in such numbers (many
times the total number used in the entire Vietnam War), with such intensity (a few months versus years for the Vietnam War) and with such devastating effects. Precision guided munitions hold the potential to be Sir George Milne's machine guns of the latter half of the twentieth century in terms of doctrinal impact. No war in history ever had so much information flowing. It will take some time to comprehend

the impact of the vast amount of information from mass media, from command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems in the military, and from other sources and to fold them into doctrine. However, the information revolution of Desert Storm is just as
important doctrinally as the precision guided munitions within the new framework. The integration of forces was also a key to success. It was truly a showpiece for aerial warfare, but it took the synergism of land, sea, air, and space forces to prosecute the war with such overwhelming effect on the

enemy. The

use of frameworks would also cause us to examine other aspects of the war. Before we claim the decisiveness of air power, we ought to realize that the symmetry of numbers was not evident in the tactics, resources used, technology, training, and in virtually every metric we could apply. The coalition fought a lopsided war because it took
advantage of the three key elements enumerated and because the Iraqis could not. The use of precision guided munitions and the information to employ them being readily available were a major asymmetry in Desert Storm. Judgment indicates that before we derive a doctrine that asserts the ascendancy of air power (as Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet would have had us do 60 years ago), we terms of its framework. Frameworks

must understand Desert Storm in will allow us to build doctrine that helps us anticipate the changes in war before they occur by interpreting our enemy's altering frameworks rather than waiting and adapting afterwards. In a time of decreasing budgets, we need a doctrine incorporating lessons learned from Desert Storm to select where to take cuts and perhaps to justify budget increases to meet the challenges of peace. As Unger's approach makes clear, we need
both science and art together, as provided by the concept of frameworks.

Closed doctrine cant apply to new warfare -- leads to miscalc as new technology develops WWI proves Temple 92 Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, (USAF, Retired (USAFA; MBA, University of Northern Colorado; MS, West Coast University), is a private
consultant on space policy and programs. Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Airpower Journal, Summer

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/sum92/temple.htm

First, we must recognize that AFM 1-1 must be changed. If we remain tied to its 1984 structure, we will have a doctrine manual but no doctrine with which to meet the challenges ahead. Second, we must pick a starting point in a dynamic world (today would be good), describing the framework of the Air Force as it has come to be. This includes the operation of the Air Force's frameworks, the underlying structures of these frameworks, and why the Air Force is structured the way it is for the various political, military, and economic reasons that actually underlie its present form. Simply describing the four-star commands is inadequate. We must tie the evolution of the Air Force to its history and judge what is good or bad about that legacy. Explicit historical reference couples meaning to doctrine and understanding when changes occur. Third, we must give insight into the role of

weapon systems as they apply either within the existing framework or as they change the existing framework. Stealth or the Strategic
Defense Initiative are instances in which the existing framework will cease to apply, and frameworks explain why this is so. Largely because of the strength and vision of its leaders, the Air Force has not drifted aimlessly since its inception. But we cannot always count on being so lucky.

We must be able to bring people on board quickly in the case of a national emergency. The lessons of World War I's "Peace for All Time" aftermath must not be forgotten. Nor can we continue to fool ourselves that our people understand the Air Force's frameworks well enough to avoid unwise or frivolous resource expenditures. Now is the time to devote our best and most experienced minds to the development of an adequate doctrine before we make mistakes more devastating than the British in regard to the machine gun in 1914

Solvency
NASA is part of a conspiracy using their space program to uphold the premise that the Earth is round. Space travel is impossible and photos are doctored. Jack W. Administrator Flat Earth Forums, 2008 (The Flat Earth Society, Flat Earth FAQ, Dec 12,
http://www.theflatearthsociety.org/forum/index.php?topic=11211.0, Accessed: 6/22/11, SL) Q: "What about satellites? How do they orbit the Earth?" A: Since sustained spaceflight is not possible, satellites cannot orbit the Earth. The signals we supposedly receive from them are either broadcast from towers or any number of possible pseudolites.
However, temporary space-flight is possible. Space Exploration and Government Q: "NASA and other world space agencies have pictures of the Earth from space, and in those pictures the Earth is clearly a globe; in this day and age, hasn't it been proven beyond any doubt that the Earth is round?" A: NASA and

the rest of the world's space agencies who claim to have been to space are involved in a Conspiracy to keep the shape of the Earth hidden. The pictures are faked using simple imaging software. Q: "Are you saying NASA had Photoshop in the 1960s?" A:
Of course not. Back then the pictures taken were of far lower quality and were likely produced using analog means. Q: "Why has no one taken a photo of the Earth that proves it is flat?" A: Only those connected to the Conspiracy have access to heights from which the shape of the Earth can be discerned. Also, nobody has been to the edge of the Earth and lived; conditions on the Ice Wall get increasingly treacherous the further you get out, and navigation methods become unreliable that far south. It is also possible that the Conspiracy is guarding the edge to prevent people from getting too close to the truth. Q: "How did NASA create these images with the computer technology available at the time?" A: NASA did not send rockets into space; instead, they spent a fraction of their funding on developing increasingly advanced computers and imaging software to cover their lies. PLEASE NOTE: This means that pictures confirming the roundness or flatness of the Earth DO NOT CONSTITUTE VALID PROOF. Q: "What is the motive behind this Conspiracy?" A: Although their main objective can only be speculated upon, the most favored theory is that of financial gain. In a nutshell, it would logically cost much less to fake a space program than to actually have

one, so those in on the Conspiracy profit from the funding NASA and other space agencies receive from the government. Q: "If you're not sure about the motive, why do you say there is a conspiracy?" A: Well it's quite simple really; if the Earth is in fact flat,
then the space agencies must be lying when they say it isn't. Q: "No one could possibly pull off such a conspiracy successfully." A: Actually, they could. Q: "How are the world governments organized to carry out this conspiracy?" A: Only those governments with space agencies that have

actually been to space and produced round pictures of the Earth need be in on the Conspiracy. And even in those cases only a limited number of people within those governments need necessarily be involved. For the most part, even those in the highest positions of these governments are probably unaware of the Conspiracy. Q: "Why has this site not been shut down by the
government?" A: Not enough people take this site seriously for it to be perceived as a threat by those involved in the Conspiracy. Shutting it down, however, might open them up to suspicion. Q: "There's no way the government could possibly guard the entire Ice Wall! It would take too many men! Millions of men!" A: Not really. You could do it with a few hundred men and some basic equipment. But even so there's no reason to assume the Ice Wall is guarded; the harsh conditions of the region make it very difficult to reach anyway. Q: "Why is NASA's space shuttle runway curved?" A: It was specially constructed by NASA to be so. After all, NASA is at the heart of the conspiracy.

Earth is flat and covered by a dome no space travel possible oceans prove vote neg on presumption Shenton, president of the Flat Earth Society, 1998 (Daniel, Why the Earth is Flat, The Flat Earth Society,
http://www.alaska.net/~clund/e_djublonskopf/Flatearthsociety.htm, SL) Water. Regardless of which train of thought you follow, it covers over seventy-five percent of our planet's surface. And the atmosphere, also a fluid, covers the entire surface. The difference is why. While flat-Earthers know that the ocean is really just a large bowl, (with great sheets of ice around the edges to hold the ocean back), and the atmosphere is contained by a large dome, the backwards "round-Earth" way of thinking would have you believe that all those trillions of gallons of water and air just "stick" to the planet's surface.

Weaponization wont deter global conflict Coffelt, 5 Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE
STRATEGY AND POLICY. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.) Second, the

argument goes further, asserting that being in such a position enables the US to provide protection from ballistic missile launches, air raids, and even that this may even allow the US to put an end, once and for all, to interstate conflict.287 ABM discussions in the MIRV and SDI case studies reveal the weaknesses in this argument. Assuming one could deploy a perfect, impenetrable defensive shield that also had the capability to affect other targets in space, in the air, on land, or at sea, there is no evidence that such a capability would have any ability to prevent cross border incursions or conflicts. The monopoly on nuclear weapons did not prevent such acts, therefore, why would the US assume that orbiting space weaponry would? Analyses of these cases indicate that deployment of an impenetrable defense is also highly unlikely. Even if the US could de deploy a system that was 99.9999% reliable, these machines still will have some associated, finite mean time between failures. Essentially, the question becomes when not if. The US would certainly not find itself in a tenable position if it had publicly stated it would shoot down all ballistic missile launches only to experience a system failure or simply miss when country a fired a missile
land invasions by aggressor nations against their neighbors. It envisions on country b. World opinion would be more apt to believe the US allowed the impact of country as missile on country bs sovereign territory vice the truth that the system simply malfunctioned. The

US would immediately be viewed as having taken a side in the conflict and would be subject to

the accompanying strategic implications of that perceived support or non-support. Therefore, there is no evidence to support a conclusion or belief that an offensive space strategy enabled by orbital weapons would be welcomed by the rest of the international community who would accept the US as the benevolent trustee of space. Soft weapons such as satellite jammers solve power projection avoids debris and spending DAs Day, 5 -- associate editor of Raumfahrt Concret (german aerospace magazine) and on Space Studies Board of the National Research Council/National Academy of
Sciences (Dwayne, the space review, June 6, Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1) CMR There are also numerous downsides to traditional kinetic ASAT

weapons. They generate debris, for starters, making orbits that the United States needs to use unhealthy for our own satellites. The United States might also find itself in a situation where it is more desirable to temporarily shut down an adversarys satellite than to permanently do so. For these and other reasons the United States increasingly favors softer methods of denying an enemys space assets than blowing their satellites out of the sky. Jamming or incapacitating them is the ideal option. If the United States can destroy a ground station with an existing cruise missile, that would prove far more cost effective than spending billions to develop an ASAT capability. Why develop
a new weapon when existing ones can already do the job?

Cohen evidence is from 96 no brink to Russia inevitably rising up Cohen is only descriptive of if Russia became a hegemon in the world no evidence saying theyre trying to now

Russia Advantage

No risk of a bioterror attack, and there wont be retaliation - your evidence is hype Matishak 10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear
Strike, Experts Say, 4-29, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php)
WASHINGTON -- The

United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in

the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number of

reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead

following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclear

attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he
said. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience. "There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the

concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added. Bostrom evidence doesnt have a warrant and hes only descriptive of what the Cold War brought into the world, he says all nuclear wars cause extinction

Even if weaponization is inevitable, there is a substantial advantage to US inaction letting other countries go first gives us international political cover Coffelt, 5 Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE
STRATEGY AND POLICY. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Sputniks launch bestowed the honor and prestige of being first in orbit upon the Soviet Union, but was fortuitous for United States policy makers, as well. Whether or not the soviets beat the United States outright or the United States allowed the soviets to go first is irrelevant. The critical point is the soviets did go first. In one stroke, Sputnik solved the complicated, politically charged overflight issue that us policy makers grappled with and could not resolve. This enabled the United States to pursue its space reconnaissance program free from the legal and policy quagmire that accompanied launching first, and avoided appearing as an aggressor. Responding to the
soviet capability fueled and legitimized the United States spending on its space program, 291 and garnered unprecedented public support. Robust funding complemented by international legitimacy and public support provided the united states space program a significant advantage. If,

as some argue, weaponization of space is truly inevitable, the United States should manage risk, research and develop in secret, allow an adversary to cross the weapons in space threshold first, and reap the sputnik-like rewards of being a close second. In spite of the apparent advantages this strategy offers, it is likely much easier said than done. Advocating or supporting any second-follower strategy would
be an extremely difficult position for an elected official or military officer, considering the US clear, longstanding preference for positive action and offensive solutions.

If realism is true and inevitable, other countries, including Russia, will try to weaponize space and resist U.S. domination even if the Plan is done you dont solve Russia will only build ASATs as a response to the USthey advocate arms control Isachenkov 09 [Vladamir, Staff writer @ the Associated Press, Associated Press, Russia Building anti-satellite weapons, March 5, 2009,
LexisNexis, DavidK]

Russia is working on anti-satellite weapons to match technologies developed by other nations and will speed up modernization of its nuclear forces, a deputy defense minister was quoted as saying today. The statement by Gen. Valentin Popovkin signaled the government's intention to pursue its ambitious plans to strengthen the military despite the money crunch caused by a worsening financial crisis. He said the military will procure enough new missiles to deploy near Poland if the US goes ahead with its European missile defense plans. Popovkin said Russia continues to oppose a space arms race but will respond to moves made by other countries, according to Russian news reports. "We can't sit back and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being conducted in Russia," Popovkin was quoted as saying. Russia
already has some "basic, key elements" of such weapons, he said without elaboration. Popovkin, who previously was the chief of Russian military Space Forces, reportedly made the statement at a news conference in response to a question about US and Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons. In February 2008, a US Navy ship launched a missile that hit a dying spy satellite. The test boosted the credibility of missile defense advocates. In 2007, China destroyed one of its own defunct satellites with a ballistic missile. The Kremlin has criticized US plans for space-based weapons,

saying they could trigger a new arms race. Russia and China have pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, but
their proposals have been rejected by the United States.

Their 1AC Doleman evidence says other countries wouldnt weaponize space because it costs too much money proves other countries wont No way for weaponization to deter bioweapons from being used Russia could give it to terrorists

Hegemony Advantage
Inherent checks and their evidence has an economic incentive to say space is being weaponized Mueller, 6 (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space, March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public
Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the opening sentence Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it wont be a big deal is a statement the author is attempting to refute. 2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it wont be a big deal. This is a political matter: its consequently true only if people believe it Like

it or not, the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we dont know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it. I would liken them to the people who
on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, We shouldnt have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesnt start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000. That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant because this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, its up to you. There

is a norm of space sanctuary that exists and that is largely because of the behavior of the United States over the last forty or fifty years. The United States could take steps to convince people that the millennium was actually in 2001
instead of 2000 or convince people that it already had weaponized space or convince people that GPS is a weapons system. However, there are a number of reasons why we havent done that to this point and why we might not want to do that in the future. I dont want to suggest that because everybody thinks it is so means that it is immutably the case, but for the time being, space weaponization would be a big deal. So it is something that needs to be ad-dressed in political terms as well as technological terms.

No motivation or ability for adversaries to challenge us in space - only a risk US weaponization would lead to conflict Hitchens, 3 (Theresa, Director of the Center for Defense Information, Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space
Assets Will Drive Weaponization, Disarmament Forum No1, Accessed on Spacedebate.com, http://ctbtdebate.org/evidence/1222/) It is obvious that American space systems do have inherent vulnerabilities. It is also obvious that technologies for exploiting those vulnerabilities exist, or are likely to become available over the next several decades. However,

neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into threats. In order to threaten American space assets, a potential adversary must have not only the technological ability to develop weapons and the means to develop and use them, but also the political will and intent to use them in a hostile manner. There is little evidence to date that any other country or hostile non-state actor possesses both the mature technology and the intention to seriously threaten American military or commercial operations in space and even less evidence of serious pursuit of actual spacebased weapons by potentially hostile actors. There are severe technical barriers and high costs to overcome for all but the most rudimentary ASAT capabilities, especially for development of on-orbit weapons. It further remains unclear what political drivers outside of American development of space-based weaponry would force American competitors, in the near- to medium-term to seriously pursue such technology. Neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into threats. Weaponization wrecks soft power Coffelt, 5 Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE
OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Weaponizing space also decreases the United States ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form coalitions of the willing.289 The United States currently enjoys a
significant superiority in air/land/sea combat power, robustly enhanced and enabled by space capabilities. In this position of advantage, it makes little strategic sense to disrupt the status quo with the deployment of destabilizing, offensive weapons in space. Putting weapons in space or

pursuing an offensive space strategy upsets an advantageous status quo and overplays the United States hand,
shortening the period of advantage. Moreover, if, as some believe, the world is on a path to the inevitable weaponization of space, there are clear advantages in assuming the follower role.

Soft power solves democracy

Kroenig et al, 10 -- Department of Government Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA (Matthew, December 13, 2010, Taking Soft Power Seriously Comparative Strategy, 29: 5, 412 431http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Taking%20Soft%20Power%20Seriously.pdf) The United States has also attempted to use soft power to promote the spread of democracy around the globe. Unlike in the other two issue areas, the U.S. democracy promotion campaigns met with some success as evidenced by a spate of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region. We argue that the successful inuence of these U.S. democracy promotion efforts is due to the presence of the necessary conditions for an effective soft power campaign. In the countries that experienced electoral revolutions, there was a functioning marketplace of ideas, the United States identied and supported credible messengers to transmit ideas about democratization, and ideas about the best practices for bringing down authoritarian regimes could signicantly impact the outcome. In recent years, the United States has devoted a disproportionate amount of its democracy promotion attention to the postcommunist region. The proportion of countries receiving USAID democracy assistance, and the duration of time over which the countries receive assistance, are higher in the postcommunist region than in other world regions. A survey of USAID funding from 19902003 reveals that the postcommunist
region stands out as a clear priority for USAID with respect to democracy assistance. 73 Other U.S. government-funded democracy promotion organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy have similarly concentrated their resources on the postcommunist region. The U.S.s soft power strategies aimed at promoting democracy in the postcommunist world since the end of

the Cold War have met with notable success. The rate of electoral revolutions in this region has been staggering. According to a recent study, pivotal elections that have either enhanced or introduced democracy have taken place in eight countries, or 40 percent of the twenty postcommunist countries that remained eligible for such revolutions. 74 The well-publicized color revolutions swept through Georgia (The Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (The Orange Revolution,
2004), and Kyrgyzstan (The Tulip Revolution, 2005).

The available studies on the wave of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region all identify American democracy promotion efforts as an important contributing cause of these revolutions, and some scholars go so far as to argue that the revolutions were signicantly engineered by the United States. 75 For example, in a recent study
on Ukraines Orange Revolution, Michael McFaul writes that the ideas and resources provided by the United States and other external actors did play a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the oppositions power. 76 The United States invested in opposition, media, and civil society groups, signaled their displeasure with incumbent authoritarian regimes, and intervened to prevent incumbent regimes from stealing elections. 77

Democracy is key to solve multiple scenarios for extinction Diamond, 95 Director @ The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law @ Stanford and Senior Fellow @ The Hoover Institution (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the %201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic one. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threatsto security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, andopenness. Lessons of the Twentieth Century The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse"their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democraciesdo not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties
since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Cyberattacks will disable US space assets turns the case Donahue, 10 USAF Major (Jack, CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc564ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_af691818-359f-4999-be24f88ca154bd94/display.aspx?rs=enginespage) Another unpredictable driving force that needs to be considered is adversary exploitation of space vulnerabilities via the cyber domain. Through cyberspace, enemies (both state and non-state actors) will target

industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains.86 One of the easiest ways to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the utility of space assets is to attack or sabotage the associated ground segments through cyberspace.87 The ground segment includes telemetry, tracking, and commanding of space assets and space-launch functions. Ground stations are an extremely critical piece of a satellites continued operation. However, many satellite tracking and control stations are lightly guarded and many satellite communications, launch, data reception, and control facilities are described in numerous opensource materials making the ground segment extremely vulnerable to cyber attack.88 An attack on a fixed ground facility can stop data transmission, render launch facilities unusable, and prevent control of satellites.89 Thus, rendering affected orbiting satellites inoperative from the communication disruption and creating a risk to other active satellites and a potential for additional orbital debris. A single incident or a small number of incidents could significantly impact space systems for years.90 Space weaponization causes massive debris makes space useless and turns the case MacDonald 08consultant on technology and national security policy management @ The Council on Foreign Relations, senior director for
science and technology @ the National Security Council, Assistant Director of National Security @ the White House Office, BSE in Aerospace Engineering @ Princeton University, M.A. in Aerospace Engineering @ Princeton University, M.A. in Public and International Affairs @ Princeton University [Bruce, the Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, September 2008, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707, DavidK]

Offensive counterspace capabilities could permanently damage or destroy costly satellites and leave substantial harmful debris in space if they physically destroy the satellites. Space debris can collide with and destroy satellites and is an important element in thinking about space weapons. Like radioactive fallout from nuclear war, debris from space war can linger for many years. While the word debris sounds harmless based on common usage, most orbital debris moves at a speed of more than seventeen thousand miles per hour. Thus, relatively small debris pieces are highly destructive to a satellite in a collision. One
only has to imagine what life would be like if thousands of bullets from World War II were still whizzing around to get some feel for the danger that debris growth poses for the future of space. At present, twelve thousand detectable debris pieces that are ten centimeters or

larger orbit the earth, as well as millions of 6 China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security smaller pieces. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) estimates Chinas 2007 ASAT test alone increased orbital debris by 10 percent, and its fallout will take more than one hundred years to reenter the atmosphere. The implications of these new counterspace developments for peacetime and crisis stability, as well as the conduct of warfare, are profound. The sudden major loss of satellite function would quickly throw U.S. military capabilities back twenty years or more and substantially damage the U.S. and world economies. While backup systems could partially compensate for this loss, U.S. military forces would be significantly weakened. Space debris makes economic collapse inevitable Ansdell 10 PhD Candidate @ GWU Megan Ansdell, Graduate Student @ GWU, 2010, Active Space Debris Removal, Princeton Publications, http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2010/Space-Debris-Removal.pdf Although the probability of catastrophic collisions caused by space debris has increased over the years, it remains relatively low and there have been only four known collisions between objects larger than ten centimeters (Wright 2009, 6). Nevertheless, the real concern is the predicted runaway growth of space debris over the coming decades. Such uncontrolled growth would prohibit the ability of satellites to provide their services, many of which are now widely used by the global community. Indeed, in a testimony to Congress for a hearing on Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Uses, the Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, Dr. Scott Pace, stated that, space systems such as satellite communications, environmental monitoring, and global navigation satellite systems are crucial to the productivity of many types of national and international infrastructures such as air, sea, and highway transportation, oil and gas pipelines, nancial networks, and global communications (Pace 2009). Economic collapse causes global war Auslin, 9 resident scholar at AEI (Michael Averting Disaster, The Daily Standard, 2/6, http://www.aei.org/article/100044) when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to
As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that

development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America
has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet

policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic
the 1973 Oil Crisis,

troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply,

Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the
continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be

it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the
far more bloody, and

ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.

Primacy will be impossible to sustain dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government
& Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK

China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's secondlargest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but
more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial

dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably
David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the

delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could

choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures.
Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive

in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable only abandoning unipolarity solves nuclear war John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 A Multipolar Moment http://www.fpif.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed, argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. "These aren't the golden 1990s, when U.S. power was at its zenith. In this first decade of the 21st century, the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years,' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration," he writes in Multilateralism in
Munich. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherry-picking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. Necessity will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism, in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China

is coming up fast. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India, Brazil, and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions, so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. Over here, meanwhile, the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force but we have failed to defeat alQaeda, we are quagmired in Afghanistan, and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. The global recession is hammering the U.S. economy, and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. With the bank bailout, the stimulus package, the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget, the red ink is mounting. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid?